Getting the price right?: the impact of competitive bidding in the Medicare program
- Collection:
- Health Policy and Services Research
- Series Title(s):
- Working paper (Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research)
- Author(s):
- Ding, Hui, (Researcher in medical and public economics), author Duggan, Mark G. (Mark Gregory), author Starc, Amanda Kay, author
- Contributor(s):
- Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, issuing body.
- Publication:
- [Stanford, CA] : Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR), February 3, 2021
- Language(s):
- English
- Format:
- Text
- Subject(s):
- Competitive Bidding Medicare -- economics Durable Medical Equipment -- economics United States
- Genre(s):
- Technical Report
- Abstract:
- We study Medicare’s competitive bidding program (CBP) for durable medical equipment (DME). We exploit Medicare claims data to examine both prices and utilization, focusing on continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) devices to treat sleep apnea. We find that spending falls by 47.2% percent after a highly imperfect bidding mechanism is introduced. The effect is almost entirely driven by a 44.8% price reduction, though quantities also fall by 4.3%. To dis-entangle supply and demand, we leverage differential cost sharing across Medicare recipients. We measure a demand elasticity of -0.272 and find that quantity reductions are concentrated among less clinically appropriate groups.
- Copyright:
- Reproduced with permission of the copyright holder. Further use of the material is subject to CC BY-NC-ND license. (More information)
- Extent:
- 1 online resource (1 PDF file (49 pages))
- Illustrations:
- Illustrations
- NLM Unique ID:
- 9918383970906676 (See catalog record)
- OCLC no.:
- 1327813441
- Permanent Link:
- http://resource.nlm.nih.gov/9918383970906676