In this report, we examine the distributional effects of two health reform policies that are each financed with two alternative tax strategies. We determine the net beneficiaries, for whom new government spending exceeds new taxes, and the net contributors, who pay more in new taxes than they receive in new benefits. Health reform poses difficult choices for policymakers. It is important to know what effects health reform proposals will have on coverage and affordability and which income and demographic groups will most benefit, as well as what a reform policy will cost and who will bear the financing burden. The first policy we examine is an incremental reform that would expand coverage considerably compared with current law, mainly in the nongroup market through enhanced premium and cost-sharing subsidies and the introduction of a public option. The second policy is a more comprehensive reform that both further improves subsidies and introduces an auto-enrollment feature resulting in universal coverage of people legally present in the United States. Each option is financed through two alternative approaches—an increase in payroll taxes that falls on both employers and employees or a proportional increase in income tax rates. We show the distribution of new spending and new taxes by income, race/ethnicity, age, and region, as well as by what coverage a person would have had without reform.
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