Report to Congressional Committees NATIONAL SECURITY Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States As Identified by Federal Agencies December 2018 GAO-19-204SP Highlights of GAO-19-204SP, a report to congressional committees National Security Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States As Identified by Federal Agencies Why GAO Did This Study data from the questionnaire, GAO reviewed national The United States faces a complex array of security strategies and agency documents provided threats to our national security, including our by DOD, State, DHS, and ODNI, and interviewed political, economic, military, and social systems. key agency officials. This report is a public version These threats will continue to evolve as new and of a classified report that GAO issued on September resurgent adversaries develop politically and 28, 2018. Information that DOD deemed classified militarily, as weapons and technology advance, and sensitive has been omitted. and as environmental and demographic changes occur. A House committee report accompanying What GAO Found a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act DOD, State, DHS, and ODNI independently for Fiscal Year 2018 included a provision for identified various threats to the United States or its GAO to identify emerging threats of high national national security interests. In analyzing more than security consequence. This report focuses on 210 individual threats identified by organizations long-range emerging threats—those that may across DOD, State, DHS, and ODNI, as well as its occur in approximately 5 or more years, or those review of national security strategies and related that may occur during an unknown timeframe—as documents, and interviews with key agency officials, identified by various respondents at the Department GAO developed four broad categories for 26 long- of Defense (DOD), Department of State (State), range emerging threats that officials identified: Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Adversaries’ Political and Military Advancements, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Dual-Use Technologies, Weapons, and Events and Demographic Changes. To identify long-range emerging threats, GAO administered a questionnaire to 45 government The figure below contains examples of the 26 threats organizations that assess emerging threats across in 4 categories—as identified by DOD, State, DHS, DOD, State, DHS, and ODNI, and had a 78-percent and ODNI—in response to GAO’s questionnaire. response rate. GAO conducted a content analysis For more information, contact Joseph W. Kirschbaum at of the responses to identify specific threats and (202) 512-9971 or kirschbaumj@gao.gov or Brian M. Mazanec develop broad threat categories. To supplement the at (202) 512-5130 or mazanecb@gao.gov. Emerging Threats As Identified by DOD, State, DHS, and ODNI Adversaries’ Political and Military Advancements Chinese Global Expansion» China is marshalling its diplomatic, economic, and military resources to facilitate its rise as a regional and global power. This may challenge U.S. access to air, space, cyberspace, and maritime domains. China’s use of cyberspace and electronic warfare could impact various U.S. systems and operations. Russian Global Expansion» Russia is increasing its capability to challenge the United States across multiple warfare domains, including attempting to launch computer-based directed energy attacks against U.S. military assets. Russia is also increasing its military and political presence in key locations across the world. Iranian Political and Military Developments» Iran is expanding its influence by increasing the size and capabilities of its network of military, intelligence, and surrogate forces, while increasing economic activities in other areas of the world. Iran will also likely continue to develop its military capabilities, including developing technology that could be used for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and improving its offensive cyberspace operations. North Korean Military Developments» North Korea is developing capabilities to strike North America and its allies with long-range missiles and may produce significant numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Foreign Government Capacity and Stability» Violent extremist organizations may proliferate in countries that have limited governing capacity and are facing conflict, which may result in a higher risk of terrorist attacks and increased demand for U.S. resources to counter them. Countries in Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean may experience instability based on conflict, which may lead to humanitarian disasters and government collapses. Terrorism» Violent ideologies could influence additional individuals to turn to terrorism to achieve their goals across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Terrorists could advance their tactics, including building nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, or increase their use of online communications to reach new recruits and disseminate propaganda. New Alliances and Adversaries» The United States could face challenges from potential new state adversaries and non-state adversaries (e.g., private corporations obtaining resources that could grant them more influence than states). Information Operations» Adversaries—such as Russia, Iran, and China—may engage in advanced information operations campaigns that use social media, artificial intelligence, and data analytics to undermine the United States and its allies. Emerging Threats As Identified by DOD, State, DHS, and ODNI (Continued) Dual-Use Technologies Artificial Intelligence (AI)» Adversaries could gain increased access to AI through affordable designs used in the commercial industry, and could apply AI to areas such as weapons and technology. Quantum Information Science» Quantum communications could enable adversaries to develop secure communications that U.S. personnel would not be able to intercept or decrypt. Quantum computing may allow adversaries to decrypt information, which could enable them to target U.S. personnel and military operations. Internet of Things (IoT)» The United States may face difficulties protecting networks and data as IoT grows and traditional approaches for security (e.g., encryption) may no longer effectively protect information. Adversaries could also disrupt IoT-enabled critical infrastructure and devices. Autonomous and Unmanned Systems» Adversaries are developing autonomous capabilities that could recognize faces, understand gestures, and match voices of U.S. personnel, which could compromise U.S. operations. Unmanned ground, underwater, air, and space vehicles may be used for combat and surveillance. Biotechnology» Actors—which may include state or non-state entities such as violent extremist organizations and transnational criminal organizations—could alter genes or create DNA to modify plants, animals, and humans. Such biotechnologies could be used to enhance the performance of military personnel. The proliferation of synthetic biology—used to create genetic code that does not exist in nature—may increase the number of actors that can create chemical and biological weapons. Other Emerging Technologies» Actors may gain access to new technologies previously limited to militaries, such as affordable and sophisticated encryption technologies, which would hinder U.S. efforts to monitor terrorist and criminal activities. Other emerging technologies—such as additive manufacturing (i.e., 3D printing)—may be vulnerable to cyber attacks or be used to manufacture restricted materials, such as weapons. Weapons Weapons of Mass Destruction» An increasing number of actors may gain access to these weapons. Adversaries could steal nuclear materials from existing facilities or develop new types of biological weapons using genetic engineering and synthetic biology. Electronic Warfare» Adversaries are developing electronic attack weapons to target U.S. systems with sensitive electronic components, such as military sensors, communication, navigation, and information systems. These weapons are intended to degrade U.S. capabilities and could restrict situational awareness or may affect military operations. Hypersonic Weapons» China and Russia are pursuing hypersonic weapons because their speed, altitude, and maneuverability may defeat most missile defense systems, and they may be used to improve long-range conventional and nuclear strike capabilities. There are no existing countermeasures. Counterspace Weapons» China and Russia are developing anti-satellite weapons to threaten U.S. space operations. China is developing capabilities to conduct large-scale anti-satellite strikes using novel physical, cyber, and electronic warfare means. Missiles» Adversaries are developing missile technology to attack the United States in novel ways and challenge U.S. missile defense, including conventional and nuclear ICBMs, sea-launched land-attack missiles, and space-based missiles that could orbit the earth. Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) Platforms» Future advances in AI, sensors, data analytics, and space-based platforms could create an environment of “ubiquitous ISR”, where people and equipment could be tracked throughout the world in near-real time. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are developing multiple ISR platforms. Aircraft» China and Russia are developing new aircraft, including stealth aircraft, which could fly faster, carry advanced weapons, and achieve greater ranges. Such aircraft could force U.S. aircraft to operate at farther distances and put more U.S. targets at risk. Undersea Weapons» Russia has made significant advancements in submarine technology and tactics to escape detection by U.S. forces. China is developing underwater acoustic systems that could coordinate swarm attacks—the use of large quantities of simple and expendable assets to overwhelm opponents—among vehicles and provide greater undersea awareness. Adversaries could achieve breakthroughs in anti-submarine warfare—such as using AI to locate U.S. submarines—or attack U.S. undersea infrastructure, which could cripple communications. Cyber Weapons» Adversaries, such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, may launch cyber attacks against critical U.S. infrastructure (e.g., electric, oil and gas, and nuclear power systems) and military infrastructure (e.g., communications and ISR platforms). Adversaries could also launch cyber attacks on the U.S. health care system, threatening patient safety by disrupting access to medical care. Finally, adversaries are also developing tools to directly attack hardware and embedded components in aviation systems, which can manipulate or destroy data. Events and Demographic Changes Infectious Diseases» New and evolving diseases from the natural environment—exacerbated by changes in climate, the movement of people into cities, and global trade and travel—may become a pandemic. Drug-resistant forms of diseases previously considered treatable could become widespread again. Climate Change» Extreme weather events—such as hurricanes and megadroughts—could intensify and affect food security, energy resources, and the health care sector. Diminishing permafrost could expand habitats for pathogens that cause disease. The loss of Arctic sea ice could open previously closed sea routes, potentially increasing Russian and Chinese access to the region and challenging the freedom of navigation that the United States currently has. Internal and International Migration» Governments in megacities (i.e., over 10 million people) across Asia, Latin America, and Africa may not have the capacity to provide adequate resources and infrastructure, and may be vulnerable to natural or man-made disasters. Mass migration events may occur and threaten regional stability, undermine governments, and strain U.S. military and civilian responses. Source: GAO analysis of DOD, State, DHS, and ODNI questionnaire responses, agency documents, and national security strategies. | GAO-19-204SP 4 GAO-19-204SP NATIONAL SECURITY Contents Letter 1 Background 3 DOD, State, DHS and ODNI Identified a Variety of Emerging Threats 6 to U.S. National Security That May Occur over the Next Approximately 5 or More Years Adversaries’ Political and ilitary Advancements M 7 Dual-Use Technologies 8 Weapons 9 Events andDemographic Changes 10 11 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 12 List of Congressional Committees 13 Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology 17 Appendix II: DOD Comments 18 Related GAO Products This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and dis- tributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. GAO-19-204SP NATIONAL SECURITY 5 Abbreviations AI Artificial Intelligence DHS Department of Homeland Security DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DOD Department of Defense ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missile IoT Internet of Things ISR Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence State Department of State December 13, 2018 Congressional Committees The United States faces a complex array of threats A House Committee report accompanying a bill to our national security, including our political, for the National Defense Authorization Act for economic, military, and social systems. These Fiscal Year 2018 included a provision for us to threats will continue to evolve as new and resurgent identify emerging threats of high national security adversaries develop politically and militarily, consequence.2 This report describes long-range as weapons and technology advance, and as emerging threats as identified by DOD, State, DHS, environmental and demographic changes occur. and ODNI.3 For purposes of this report, we define Our adversaries may include foreign governments, long-range threats as threats that agency officials violent extremists, transnational criminal identified that may occur in approximately 5 or more organizations, and megacorporations.1 Threats may years, or those threats that could occur in a future also come from events such as pandemics, human unknown time frame.4 migration, regional conflict and instability, economic inequality, or the effects of climate change and This report is a public version of a classified report environmental issues. that we issued on September 28, 2018.5 It omits classified and sensitive information about threats A variety of national intelligence and security identified by executive branch agencies and organizations are responsible for national security, described in 26 profiles in our classified report. It including identifying, analyzing, and countering also omits classified and sensitive information in emerging threats. Such organizations include: the those profiles related to specific threats, the effects Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of of those threats, specific warfare domains, and State (State), the Department of Homeland Security questions for oversight. Although the information (DHS), and the Office of the Director of National provided in this report is more limited, the report Intelligence (ODNI). addresses the same objectives as the classified report and uses the same methodology. For purposes of this report, we define “threat” as an actor with capability and intent, or an event with To identify long-range emerging threats, we potential capability, to harm the United States or administered a questionnaire to 45 selected its national security interests. We define “emerging organizations across DOD, State, DHS, and ODNI.6 threat” as a threat that may be newly recognized; In the questionnaire, we asked respondents to may have been recognized before but may identify and describe emerging threats that their potentially affect a new or different population, organizations assess could occur in approximately industry, or geographic area than previously 5 years or more from today, or those that have an affected; or may be an existing threat that has unknown time frame. We received approximately developed new attributes. 210 individual threats from 26 of these 45 1 Adversaries are potentially hostile or disruptive state or non-state actors. According to the 2018 National Defense Strategy, state actors and non-state actors, such as terrorists, transnational criminal organizations, and cyber hackers, have transformed the direction of global affairs with increased capabilities of mass disruption. Disruptive state actors include North Korea, Russia, China, and Iran. Non-state actors include violent extremist organizations such as al-Qaida and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Transnational criminal organizations can participate in the sale of illegal drugs and counterfeit goods, human trafficking and smuggling, and other criminal activities. According to DOD officials, megacorporations are large companies that have the financial resources and a power base to exert influence on par with or exceeding non-state actors. 2 H.R. Rep. No. 115-200, at 181 (2017). 3 ODNI supports the Director of National Intelligence’s role as head of the Intelligence Community. The Intelligence Community is comprised of 17 separate organizations such as the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Agency, and intelligence components within agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, and the military services. 4 We established this time frame because officials from DOD and ODNI stated that they consider threats occurring earlier than 5 years from today as near-term or mid-term threats, which receive greater attention and resources from defense and intelligence organizations than long-term threats. 5 GAO, National Security: Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States Identified by Federal Agencies, GAO-18-497SPC (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2018). (SECRET//NOFORN) 6 We focused on DOD, State, DHS, and ODNI as among the federal agencies with primary responsibility for national security. We identified the 45 selected organizations within these agencies that assess long-range emerging threats through consultation with agency officials. 1 GAO-19-204SP NATIONAL SECURITY organizations, which formed the basis of our unpredictable events with no prior warning. threat profiles.7 See appendix I for more details Therefore, this report does not attempt to provide about the specific organizations that received a comprehensive listing of all potential emerging the questionnaire. In addition, ODNI submitted a threats to the United States that may arise over questionnaire but did not identify any threats on the the next 5 or more years. Rather, it represents the questionnaire. Instead, ODNI officials referred us assessments of agency experts who responded to to their Global Trends: Paradox of Progress report our questionnaire, supplemented by information and provided verbal input on long-range emerging from national security strategies, related agency threats.8 We used this information to supplement documents, and interviews with agency officials. questionnaire responses from DOD, State, and DHS Furthermore, many questionnaire responses focus organizations. In total, we received a 78-percent on threats that originate outside the United States. response rate (28 of 36) to our questionnaire.9 For more information on our objective, scope, and methodology, see appendix I. To supplement information from the questionnaire, we reviewed documents provided by DOD, State, The performance audit upon which this report is DHS, and ODNI. For example, we reviewed the based was conducted from July 2017 to September most recent national strategies that pertain to 2018 in accordance with generally accepted emerging threats and ODNI’s 2017 Global Trends: government auditing standards. Those standards Paradox of Progress report.10 We also interviewed require that we plan and perform the audit to officials about long-range emerging threats from obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 22 organizations, including 11 DOD organizations, reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 6 State organizations, 4 DHS organizations, and based on our audit objectives. We believe that the ODNI. We selected these 22 organizations because evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for they may have a role in identifying and assessing our findings and conclusions based on our audit long-range emerging threats. This review did not objective. We subsequently worked with DOD from assess any efforts to mitigate threats. We pre- September 2018 to December 2018 to prepare tested the questionnaire instrument with officials this public version of the original classified report from different agencies to confirm that it would for public release. This public version was also be understood by respondents as intended, and prepared in accordance with those standards. determined that the data collected were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. It is not possible to predict every potential long- range emerging threat. According to Intelligence Community officials, the further out in time predictions go, the more uncertain they become, because the future is a confluence of multiple trends with an infinite number of possible permutations. For example, adversaries may use emerging technologies together in novel and unpredicted ways to amplify their harm. Several DOD officials also noted that there will always be completely 7 Two additional organizations provided responses after the response period had ended. These responses were not used in the development of the threat profiles but were included in our response rate calculations. 8 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Council, Global Trends: Paradox of Progress, NIC 2017-001 (Washington, D.C.: January 2017). An ODNI official stated that the Global Trends: Paradox of Progress report lists some key threats over the next 5 to 20 years. In particular, ODNI officials emphasized economic threats such as U.S. debt and growing inequality; new technologies and ethical questions surrounding the use of those technologies; geopolitical conflict, including the spread of corruption to the developed world and the rise of China; and the spread of populism and nationalist identities around the world. 9 Of the 45 organizations selected to receive our questionnaire, 9 organizations were excluded from our response rate calculations because 8 told us that they do not identify threats that meet our scope or definition, and 1 told us that a separate office within their organization had responded on their behalf. Of the remaining 36 organizations, 28 organizations provided responses (2 of which provided responses after the response period had ended, and were not used in the development of the threat profiles). In addition, 1 organization did not receive a questionnaire due to an administrative error and ODNI submitted an incomplete questionnaire that did not identify any threats. We did not receive responses from the remaining 6 organizations. 10 NIC 2017-001. GAO-19-204SP NATIONAL SECURITY 2 Background Current Landscape of Emerging Threats • Iran realigning the Middle East by using proxy DOD officials noted that Western liberal democratic forces to create friendly governments including institutions around the world are being challenged Syria, Iraq, and Yemen at the expense of U.S. in new and novel ways. Adversaries have had over leadership in the region; 40 years to study the United States and Western institutions. As such, the nature of warfare has • “Strongmen” in countries such as Venezuela, evolved to include “gray zone” conflict—defined Egypt, and Turkey using democratic institutions to as the area between war and peace—where promote new paradigms independent of Western weaker adversaries have learned how to seize liberal norms; and territory and advance their agendas in ways not recognized as “war” by Western democracies. Also, • The continued attraction of extremist groups, these gray zone conflicts can offset superior U.S. including the Islamic State and al-Qaida, as a economic and security structures. DOD officials preferable means to achieve Sunni Arab autonomy added that adversaries around the world may erode as a viable alternative to minority governance in democracies, often using democratic institutions, countries with majorities that outnumber them (as in the gray zone of conflict.11 ODNI officials also in Syria and Iraq). noted that China and Russia are pursuing gray zone strategies to achieve their objectives without DOD officials said that, with current demographic resorting to military conflict. trends, Western liberal democratic institutions will be tested in new ways as the nature of warfare changes. DOD officials provided a list of recent significant The challenge for the United States and its allies examples of adversary success in the gray zone will be to develop responses faster than adversaries of conflict, several of which have occurred without through a better understanding of the strategic significant consequences, including: environment. Officials added that this presents a challenge since the United States appears to be • Russian and Chinese near-unrestricted thefts strategically surprised by an evolving world. of U.S. intellectual property, Office of Personnel Management data theft, and penetrations of U.S. DOD officials also said that the United States must civil, utility, and military data and electoral voting adapt to challenges from adversaries and better link systems; security objectives and economic objectives, or risk further erosions of U.S. influence to adversaries such • Russian seizure of Ukrainian territory, namely as China and Russia. Officials stated that China Crimea; and Russia are more agile than the United States in creating relationships with other countries to • Chinese seizure of the South China Seas and degrade U.S. bilateral and multilateral frameworks. the building of military islands in defiance of For example, China and Russia are working to define international court rulings; the United States as a “status quo” power trying to preserve the old world order in what is becoming • China using bilateral economic deals to a multipolar world. These officials added that the marginalize U.S. multilateral frameworks in Asia, nature of conflict has changed, and so the United Africa, Latin America, and the Pacific; States must evolve. • Russia attempting to resurrect former Soviet client state relationships with Syria, Egypt, and Libya, and potentially with additional countries in the Middle East and North Africa; 11 Officials from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency noted that gray zone warfare is characterized by limited conflict that sits between normal state competition and what is traditionally thought of as war. 3 GAO-19-204SP NATIONAL SECURITY Future Landscape of Emerging Threats 5 Governing is getting harder. The public ODNI’s January 2017 report Global Trends: will demand that governments deliver security Paradox of Progress describes future trends that and prosperity. However, flat revenues, distrust, will shape the direction of the world over the next 5 polarization, and a growing list of emerging issues or more years.12 ODNI’s report describes potential will hamper government performance. Technology environments from which long-range threats may will expand the range of players who can block or emerge, based on secen key global trends: circumvent political action. 1The rich population is shrinking, the poor 6 The nature of conflict is changing. The risk population is not. Working-age populations are of conflict will increase due to diverging interests shrinking in wealthy countries and in China and among major powers, an expanding terror threat, Russia, and are growing in developing, poorer continued instability in weak states, and the spread countries. This trend has the potential to increase of lethal, disruptive technologies. Disrupting economic, employment, urbanization and welfare societies will become more common, with long- pressures, and spur migration.13 range precision weapons, cyber, and robotic systems to target infrastructure from afar, and with 2 The global economy is shifting. Weak more accessible technology to create weapons of economic growth will likely persist in the near term. mass destruction. Major economies will confront shrinking workforces and diminishing productivity gains while recovering 7 Climate change, environment, and health from the 2008-2009 financial crises with high debt, issues will demand attention. A range of global weak demand, and doubts about globalization. hazards pose imminent and longer-term threats Inequality and wealth concentrations—combined that will require collective action to address—even with corruption and eroding trust in authorities—are as cooperation becomes harder. More extreme driving a wave of political change. weather, water and soil stress, and food insecurity will disrupt societies. Sea-level rise, ocean 3Technology is accelerating progress but acidification, glacial melt, and pollution will change causing discontinuities. Rapid technological living patterns. Tensions over climate change will advancements will increase the pace of change grow. and create new opportunities, but will aggravate divisions between winners and losers. Automation The Global Trends report also points out that and artificial intelligence will threaten to change conflicts in the next 5 to 20 years will be more: industries faster than economies can adjust, potentially displacing workers and limiting the usual • Diffuse—referring to state, non-state, and sub- route for poor countries to develop. Biotechnologies state entities having greater accessibility to such as genome editing will revolutionize medicine means of warfare; and other fields, while sharpening moral differences. • Diverse—referring to the means of warfare 4 Ideas and identities are driving a wave of varying across a wider spectrum, from nonmilitary exclusion. Growing global connectivity amid weak capabilities to advanced conventional weapons economic growth will increase tensions within and and weapons of mass destruction; and between societies. Populism will increase on the right and the left. Some leaders will use nationalism • Disruptive—referring to a greater emphasis to shore up control. Religious influence will be by states and terror groups on targeting critical increasingly consequential, and nearly all countries infrastructure, societal cohesion, and government will see economic forces boost women’s status and functions, rather than defeating enemy forces on leadership roles, but backlash against this trend the battlefield through traditional military means.14 also will occur. 12 NIC 2017-001. 13 In its report, ODNI states this trend as “the rich are aging, the poor are not.” See NIC 2017-001. 14 NIC 2017-001. GAO-19-204SP NATIONAL SECURITY 4 Roles and Responsibilities of Agencies That • DHS plays a role in preventing a variety of Identify and Mitigate Emerging Threats threats within the homeland, particularly terrorist DOD, State, DHS, and the Intelligence Community attacks within the United States. DHS also seeks have key roles in identifying and mitigating long- to reduce the vulnerability of the United States to term emerging threats. Specifically: terrorism, assisting in the recovery from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States, • DOD has a role in, among other things, and disrupting connections between illegal drug defending the homeland from limited ballistic trafficking and terrorism, and for coordinating missile and cruise missile attack; large-scale efforts to sever such connections. DHS officials terrorist attack; chemical, biological, radiological, added that DHS is also the lead agency for or nuclear attack; and space, electromagnetic, or defense of civilian cyber infrastructure (such as kinetic attacks against our critical infrastructure. .gov accounts) from cyber-attacks, and for aiding DOD also works to prevent adversaries such private-sector critical-infrastructure cyber security. as state and non-state actors from acquiring, DHS officials also said that DHS has primary proliferating, or using weapons of mass responsibility for border and transportation destruction, and is the lead agency to defend security issues, including interdicting illicit U.S. military and intelligence infrastructure smuggling of humans and contraband into the from cyber attacks and conduct offensive cyber homeland, traveler security screening, and, via operations. DOD also works to rebuild the the U.S. Coast Guard, securing the maritime military strength and maximize the competitive approaches to the homeland. advantage of the United States and its partners, while constraining the ability of our adversaries • ODNI supports the Director of National to achieve their military objectives. DOD efforts Intelligence in his role as the head of the may include preventing terrorists from directing or Intelligence Community, acts as the principal supporting operations against the U.S. homeland advisor to the President, National Security and its partners, and bolstering its partners Council, and the Homeland Security Council for against coercion. Finally, DOD assists State and intelligence matters related to national security, the U.S. Agency for International Development and oversees and directs the implementation with natural disaster and conflict response around of the National Intelligence Program.15 ODNI’s the world. activities include integrating intelligence analysis and collection, driving secure information sharing, • State is the lead U.S. foreign affairs agency setting strategic direction and priorities for and the lead institution for conducting American national intelligence resources and capabilities, diplomacy. State plays a role in protecting and developing and implementing unifying intelligence advancing the interests of the United States strategies, and advancing capabilities to provide by, in part, countering threats and adversaries, the United States with a global intelligence deepening U.S. security relationships and advantage. partnerships around the world, and strengthening our allies and alliances. State also engages in security and capacity building and other non- military assistance, such as border patrol, with other countries. In conjunction with DOD and the U.S. Agency for International Development, State also responds to natural disasters and conflict- induced crises around the world. 15 The National Intelligence Program is intended to provide the resources to develop and maintain intelligence capabilities that support national priorities. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 1011 (2004). According to 50 U.S.C. § 3003 (6) “the term ‘National Intelligence Program’ refers to all programs, projects, and activities of the intelligence community, as well as any other programs of the intelligence community designated jointly by the Director of National Intelligence and the head of a United States department or agency or by the President. Such term does not include programs, projects, or activities of the military departments to acquire intelligence solely for the planning and conduct of tactical military operations by United States Armed Forces.” 5 GAO-19-204SP NATIONAL SECURITY DOD, State, DHS and ODNI Identified a Variety of Emerging Threats to U.S. National Security That May Occur over the Next Approximately 5 or More Years DOD, State, DHS, and ODNI independently identified various emerging threats to the United States or its national security interests. Our analysis of these threats led to 26 threat profiles that fell within four broad categories: 1) Adversaries’ Political and Military Advancements, 2) Dual-Use Technologies, 3) Weapons, and 4) Events and Demographic Changes, as shown in figure 1. Figure 1: GAO’s Four Broad Categories for 26 Long-Range Emerging Threats Identified by DOD, State, DHS, and ODNI Adversaries’ Political and Dual-Use Weapons Events and Military Advancements Technologies Demographic Changes • Chinese Global Expansion • Artificial Intelligence • Weapons of Mass Destruction • Infectious Diseases • Russian Global Expansion • Quantum Information Science • Electronic Warfare • Climate Change • Iranian Political and Military • Internet of Things • Hypersonic Weapons • Internal and International Developments • Autonomous and Unmanned • Counterspace Weapons Migration • North Korean Military Systems • Missiles Developments • Biotechnology • Intelligence, Surveillance, and • Foreign Government Capacity • Other Emerging Technologies Reconnaissance Platforms and Stability • Aircraft • Terrorism • Undersea Weapons • New Alliances and Adversaries • Cyber Weapons • Information Operations Source: GAO analysis of DOD, State, DHS, and ODNI questionnaire responses, agency documents, and national security strategies. | GAO-19-204SP GAO-19-204SP NATIONAL SECURITY 6 Adversaries’ Political and Military Advancements » Our adversaries are developing new political and military policies, strategies, doctrines, and tactics to advance their interests. These activities may or may not be intended to harm the United States and its national security interests. Agency officials identified examples such as Russia’s integration of irregular warfare, influence operations, deception, and cyber attacks. Figure 2 shows the identified threats for this category. Figure 2: Threats Identified under Adversaries’ Political and Military Advancements Threat » Description » Examples » Chinese Global China is marshalling its diplomatic, economic, and military resources to facilitate its rise • Expansion and Power Projection Expansion as a regional and global power. This may challenge U.S. access to air, space, • Fusion of Military and Civilian cyberspace, and maritime domains. China’s use of cyberspace and electronic warfare Sectors and Control of Supply could impact various U.S. systems and operations. Chain • Cyber and Electronic Warfare Russian Global Russia is increasing its capability to challenge the United States across multiple warfare • Military Capabilities across Expansion domains, including attempting to launch computer-based directed energy attacks against Warfare Domains U.S. military assets. Russia is also increasing its military and political presence in key • Global Military and Political locations across the world. Influence • Biotechnology Advancements Iranian Political Iran is expanding its influence by increasing the size and capabilities of its network of • Military and Economic Influence and Military military, intelligence, and surrogate forces, while increasing economic activities in other • Ballistic Missiles Developments areas of the world. Iran will also likely continue to develop its military capabilities, • Cyber Attacks including developing technology that could be used for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and improving its offensive cyberspace operations. North Korean North Korea is developing capabilities to strike North America and its allies with • Nuclear Strike against the Military long-range missiles and may produce significant numbers of intercontinental ballistic Continental United States Developments missiles. • Numerical Overmatch of Ballistic Missile Systems Foreign Violent extremist organizations may proliferate in countries that have limited governing • Governments’ Ability to Address Government capacity and are facing conflict, which may result in a higher risk of terrorist attacks and Influences from Violent Capacity and increased demand for U.S. resources to counter them. Countries in Africa, Latin America, Extremist Organizations Stability and the Caribbean may experience instability based on conflict, which may lead to • Foreign Militaries’ Reduced humanitarian disasters and government collapses. Military Readiness • Instability in Africa • Instability in Latin America and the Caribbean Terrorism Violent ideologies could influence additional individuals to turn to terrorism to achieve • Proliferation of Terrorism and their goals across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Terrorists could advance their tactics, Violent Ideologies including building nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, or increase their use of online • Terrorist Use of Chemical, communications to reach new recruits and disseminate propaganda. Biological, and Nuclear Materials • New Tactics and Techniques New Alliances The United States could face challenges from potential new state adversaries and • Disrupted Alliances and Adversaries non-state adversaries (e.g., private corporations obtaining resources that could grant • Rise of New Nation-State and them more influence than states). Non-State Adversaries • Foreign Nation-States’ Influences on International Agreements and Standards Information Adversaries—such as Russia, Iran, and China—may engage in advanced information • Exploitation and Theft of U.S. Operations operations campaigns that use social media, artificial intelligence, and data analytics to Information undermine the United States and its allies. • Weaponized Information Source: GAO analysis of DOD, State, DHS, and ODNI questionnaire responses, agency documents, and national security strategies. | GAO-19-204SP 7 GAO-19-204SP NATIONAL SECURITY Dual-Use Technologies » These are technologies that may be developed by governments or the private sector for benign or beneficial purposes, but may have a dual-use application. For instance, in an adversary’s hands, these technologies may pose a risk to the United States. Agency officials identified examples such as unmanned vehicles, artificial intelligence, and encryption technologies. Figure 3 shows the identified threats for this category. Figure 3: Threats Identified under Dual-Use Technologies Threat » Description » Examples » Artificial Adversaries could gain increased access to AI through affordable designs used in the • Nation-State and Non-State Intelligence (AI) commercial industry, and could apply AI to areas such as weapons and technology. Development of AI • Intelligent Systems with General AI Quantum Quantum communications could enable adversaries to develop secure communications • Quantum Communications Information that U.S. personnel would not be able to intercept or decrypt. Quantum computing may • Quantum Computing Science allow adversaries to decrypt information, which could enable them to target U.S. personnel and military operations. Internet of Things The United States may face difficulties protecting networks and data as IoT grows and • Unsecure Networks and Data (IoT) traditional approaches for security (e.g., encryption) may no longer effectively protect • Attacks on IoT-Enabled information. Adversaries could also disrupt IoT-enabled critical infrastructure and Infrastructure devices. • Attacks on Commercial and Military Devices Autonomous and Adversaries are developing autonomous capabilities that could recognize faces, • Enhancement of Autonomous Unmanned understand gestures, and match voices of U.S. personnel, which could compromise U.S. Systems Systems operations. Unmanned ground, underwater, air, and space vehicles may be used for • Weapons with Autonomous combat and surveillance. Navigation • Autonomous and Unmanned Vehicles Biotechnology Actors—which may include state or non-state entities such as violent extremist • Human Genetic Modification and organizations and transnational criminal organizations—could alter genes or create DNA Synthetic Biology to modify plants, animals, and humans. Such biotechnologies could be used to enhance • Plant and Animal Genetic the performance of military personnel. The proliferation of synthetic biology—used to Modification create genetic code that does not exist in nature—may increase the number of actors • Other Biotechnology Applications that can create chemical and biological weapons. • Increase Access to Technology Other Emerging Actors may gain access to new technologies previously limited to militaries, such as • Expansion of Removable Media Technologies affordable and sophisticated encryption technologies, which would hinder U.S. efforts to and Storage monitor terrorist and criminal activities. Other emerging technologies—such as additive • Additive Manufacturing manufacturing (i.e., 3D printing)—may be vulnerable to cyber attacks or be used to • New Materials manufacture restricted materials, such as weapons. • Development of Technologies that Address Electric Power Scarcity • Advancements in Camouflage Technology • Advanced Sensors Source: GAO analysis of DOD, State, DHS, and ODNI questionnaire responses, agency documents, and national security strategies. | GAO-19-204SP GAO-19-204SP NATIONAL SECURITY 8 Weapons » These threats are inherently threatening military devices that may be used by our adversaries to inflict harm upon the United States or its national security interests. These weapons do not have potential beneficial or benign uses from the perspective of the United States. Agency officials identified examples such as hypersonic missiles, weaponized pathogens, or stealth aircraft. Figure 4 shows the identified threats for this category. Figure 4: Threats Identified under Weapons Threat » Description » Examples » Weapons of Mass An increasing number of actors may gain access to these weapons. Adversaries could • Global Proliferation of Weapons Destruction steal nuclear materials from existing facilities or develop new types of biological weapons of Mass Destruction using genetic engineering and synthetic biology. • Development and Use of Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons • New Forms of Biological Weapons Electronic Adversaries are developing electronic attack weapons to target U.S. systems with • Electronic Attack Weapons Warfare sensitive electronic components, such as military sensors, communication, navigation, • Attacks on Communications and and information systems. These weapons are intended to degrade U.S. capabilities and Navigation Systems could restrict situational awareness or may affect military operations. Hypersonic China and Russia are pursuing hypersonic weapons because their speed, altitude, and • Hypersonic Weapons and Weapons maneuverability may defeat most missile defense systems, and they may be used to Missile Defense improve long-range conventional and nuclear strike capabilities. There are no existing • Hypersonic Ballistic and Cruise countermeasures. Missiles • Hypersonic Glide Vehicles • Future Development and Convergence Counterspace China and Russia are developing anti-satellite weapons to threaten U.S. space • Anti-Satellite Weapons Weapons operations. China is developing capabilities to conduct large-scale anti-satellite strikes • Increased Access to Space and using novel physical, cyber, and electronic warfare means. Anti-Satellite Weapons Missiles Adversaries are developing missile technology to attack the United States in novel ways • Advancements in Missile and challenge U.S. missile defense, including conventional and nuclear intercontinental Technology ballistic missiles, sea-launched land-attack missiles, and space-based missiles that could • Adversary Plans for orbit the earth. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles • Orbital Missiles • Sea-to-Land Missiles • Adversary Missile Defense Intelligence, Future advances in artificial intelligence, sensors, data analytics, and space-based • Worldwide and Ubiquitous Surveillance, platforms could create an environment of “ubiquitous ISR”, where people and equipment Surveillance Reconnaissance could be tracked throughout the world in near-real time. China, Russia, Iran, and North • Adversary Improvements in (ISR) Platforms Korea are developing multiple ISR platforms. Radar and Surveillance Platforms Aircraft China and Russia are developing new aircraft, including stealth aircraft, which could fly • Russian Aircraft faster, carry advanced weapons, and achieve greater ranges. Such aircraft could force • Chinese Aircraft U.S. aircraft to operate at farther distances and put more U.S. targets at risk. Undersea Russia has made significant advancements in submarine technology and tactics to • Russian Improvements in Weapons escape detection by U.S. forces. China is developing underwater acoustic systems that Undersea Stealth could coordinate swarm attacks—the use of large quantities of simple and expendable • Unmanned Underwater Vehicles assets to overwhelm opponents—among vehicles and provide greater undersea • Anti-Submarine Warfare awareness. Adversaries could achieve breakthroughs in anti-submarine warfare—such • Attack on Undersea Cables as using artificial intelligence to locate U.S. submarines—or attack U.S. undersea infrastructure, which could cripple communications. Cyber Weapons Adversaries, such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, may launch cyber attacks • Attacks on Critical Infrastructure against critical U.S. infrastructure (e.g., electric, oil and gas, and nuclear power systems) • Military Infrastructure and military infrastructure (e.g., communications and ISR platforms). Adversaries could • Cyber Attacks on Health Care also launch cyber attacks on the U.S. health care system, threatening patient safety by • Malware and New Form of disrupting access to medical care. Finally, adversaries are also developing tools to Attack directly attack hardware and embedded components in aviation systems, which can manipulate or destroy data. Source: GAO analysis of DOD, State, DHS, and ODNI questionnaire responses, agency documents, and national security strategies. | GAO-19-204SP 9 GAO-19-204SP NATIONAL SECURITY Events and Demographic Changes » Events and demographic changes are occurrences with no adversary behind them and therefore no intent to harm the United States. Nevertheless, events and demographic changes may have the capability to harm the United States or its national security interests in the absence of mitigating factors. Agency officials identified examples such as influenza pandemic, climate change, food shortages, and the growth of megacities. Figure 4 shows the identified threats for this category. Figure 5: Threats Identified under Events and Demographic Changes Threat » Description » Examples » Infectious New and evolving diseases from the natural environment—exacerbated by changes in • Pandemic Disease Event Diseases climate, the movement of people into cities, and global trade and travel—may become a • Drug-Resistant Disease pandemic. Drug-resistant forms of diseases previously considered treatable could become widespread again. Climate Change Extreme weather events—such as hurricanes and megadroughts—could intensify and • Extreme Weather Events affect food security, energy resources, and the health care sector. Diminishing permafrost • Loss of Arctic Sea Ice and could expand habitats for pathogens that cause disease. The loss of Arctic sea ice could Permafrost open previously closed sea routes, potentially increasing Russian and Chinese access to the region and challenging the freedom of navigation that the United States currently has. Internal and Governments in megacities (i.e., over 10 million people) across Asia, Latin America, and • Disasters in Megacities International Africa may not have the capacity to provide adequate resources and infrastructure, and • A Mass Migration Event Migration may be vulnerable to natural or man-made disasters. Mass migration events may occur and threaten regional stability, undermine governments, and strain U.S. military and civilian responses. Source: GAO analysis of DOD, State, DHS, and ODNI questionnaire responses, agency documents, and national security strategies. | GAO-19-204SP GAO-19-204SP NATIONAL SECURITY 10 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation We provided a draft of the classified version of Kirschbaum at (202) 512-9971 or KirschbaumJ@ this report to the DOD, State, and DHS, as well gao.gov, or Brian M. Mazanec at (202) 512-5130 or as ODNI, for their review and comment. DOD MazanecB@gao.gov. Contact points for our offices concurred with our classified report and provided of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may technical comments, which we addressed as be found on the last pages of this report. appropriate. DOD’s letter is included in appendix II. We also received technical comments from DHS In addition to the individuals named above, Tommy and ODNI, which we addressed as appropriate. Baril and Hynek Kalkus (Assistant Directors), State did not provide comments. Heather Salinas (Analyst-in-Charge), Ben Emmel, Jamilah Moon, Katya Rodriguez, and Spencer We are sending copies of this report to the Tacktill made key contributions to this report. Tracy appropriate congressional committees, DOD, State, Barnes, Amie Lesser, Amanda Miller, Richard DHS, and ODNI. In addition, this report is available Powelson, Michael Silver, and Alexander Welsh also at no charge on the GAO website at www.gao.gov. provided contributions. If you have any questions about this report or need additional information, please contact Joseph W. Joseph W. Kirschbaum Brian M. Mazanec Director Acting Director Defense Capabilities and Management International Affairs and Trade 11 GAO-19-204SP NATIONAL SECURITY List of Congressional Committees The Honorable James M. Inhofe Chairman The Honorable Jack Reed Ranking Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate The Honorable Richard Shelby Chairman The Honorable Dick Durbin Ranking Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations United States Senate The Honorable Mac Thornberry Chairman The Honorable Adam Smith Ranking Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives The Honorable Kay Granger Chairwoman The Honorable Pete Visclosky Ranking Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives GAO-19-204SP NATIONAL SECURITY 12 Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology This report is a public version of a classified report commonly-used terminology. We reviewed our past that we issued on September 28, 2018.1 It omits reports and publications by research institutions to classified and sensitive information about threats understand how different organizations consider identified by executive branch agencies and and utilize the concepts of “emergence” and described in 26 profiles in our classified report. It “threat.” We adapted the use of the term “emerging” also omits classified and sensitive information in from our prior work in emerging infectious diseases, those profiles related to specific threats, the effects and adapted the use of the term “threat” from the of those threats, specific warfare domains, and documents we reviewed.2 questions for oversight. Although the information provided in this report is more limited, the report After developing a working definition of emerging addresses the same objectives as the classified threat, we solicited feedback on the definition report and uses the same methodology. through interviews with officials from DOD, State, and ODNI, including assessing whether the This report provides a summary of long-range definition would be acceptable or understood within emerging threats as identified by agencies that, their respective organizations. We modified the among others, have primary responsibility for definition based on their feedback. Furthermore, national security: the Department of Defense we limited the scope of emerging threats, as (DOD), Department of State (State), Department described in this report, to threats that may occur of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Office of the approximately 5 years or more from 2018, or those Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). We utilized that have an unknown time frame. We established questionnaires, national security strategies, agency this time frame because officials from DOD and documents, and interviews with agency officials to ODNI stated they consider threats occurring obtain information on these long-range emerging earlier than 5 years from today as near-term or threats. For purposes of this report, we define mid-term threats, which receive greater attention long-range threats as threats that agency officials and resources from defense and intelligence identified that may occur in approximately 5 or more organizations than long-term threats. years, or those threats that could occur in a future unknown time frame. As the primary mechanism for identifying emerging threats within our identified time frame, we There is no standard definition of “emerging threat” developed a questionnaire that asked respondents within the federal government, and the use and to identify and describe emerging threats that their definitions of the term vary among organizations. organizations assess could occur in approximately To develop a definition of emerging threat that 5 years or more from today, or those that have an generally reflected how multiple organizations use unknown time frame. To identify organizations this term, we reviewed strategies and reports issued within DOD, State, DHS, and the Intelligence by federal government entities—such as the 2016 Community to receive this questionnaire, we Joint Strategic Intelligence Estimate from the Joint consulted with officials from DOD, State, DHS, and Staff and Global Trends: Paradox of Progress from ODNI about the objective, scope, and methodology the National Intelligence Council—that describe of our work. We then identified additional issues, risks, threats, or events that could affect the organizations through an iterative process whereby national security interests of the United States and we contacted DOD, State, DHS and ODNI officials its allies. We also reviewed documents such as the and solicited the names of additional organizations DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms that assess emerging threats. We repeated and the Department of Homeland Security Risk this process until the referrals were mostly to Assessment Lexicon that define and standardize organizations we had previously contacted. 1 GAO, National Security: Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States Identified by Federal Agencies, GAO-18-497SPC (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2018). (SECRET//NOFORN) 2 GAO, Emerging Infectious Diseases: Actions Needed to Address the Challenges of Responding to Zika Virus Disease Outbreaks, GAO-17-445 (Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2017). 13 GAO-19-204SP NATIONAL SECURITY Ultimately, we selected a total of 45 organizations Out of the 45 government organizations selected, to receive the questionnaire, comprised of 36 8 told us that they do not identify threats that meet organizations identified through the iterative process our scope or definition, and 1 told us that a separate described previously and the nine combatant office within their organization had responded commands.3 We took several steps to ensure that on their behalf, so these 9 organizations were the questionnaire would gather reliable information. excluded from our response rate calculations. Of the The questionnaire was developed in collaboration remaining 36 organizations, 26 provided responses with a survey specialist and was reviewed by a by the end of the response period and 2 provided separate survey specialist. We requested and responses after the response period had ended so received comments from subject matter experts they were not used in the development of the threat from DOD, State, and DHS. We also conducted profiles.4 In addition, 1 organization did not receive six pretests of the questionnaire with potential a questionnaire due to an administrative error recipients to assess how the questionnaire would be and ODNI submitted an incomplete questionnaire understood by the eventual recipients. The pretest that did not identify any threats. Instead, ODNI participants included officials from each department referred us to their Global Trends: Paradox of requested to respond to the questionnaire (DOD, Progress report and provided verbal input on State, and DHS) who had not previously reviewed long-range emerging threats during two agency or provided comments on the questionnaire. We meetings.5 We used this information to supplement refined the questionnaire based on the results of questionnaire responses from DOD, State, and each step. Additionally, we included an example to DHS organizations. We did not receive responses guide respondents to the type and length of content from the remaining six organizations. In total, we we wanted them to provide in their response. The received a 78-percent response rate (28 of 36) of final questionnaire was a Microsoft Word form that organizations that provided completed questionnaire the respondents could return electronically. responses. Table 1 lists the 28 organizations that provided completed responses to our questionnaire. 3 U.S. Cyber Command was elevated to a combatant command on May 5, 2018—after we sent the questionnaire. Therefore, U.S. Cyber Command was not included among the combatant commands that received a questionnaire. 4 These responses were submitted more than 3 months after the submission deadline. Many of these responses were similar to previously submitted questionnaire responses, but some of the emerging threats were different. 5 An ODNI official stated that the Global Trends: Paradox of Progress report lists some key threats over the next 5 to 20 years. In particular, ODNI officials emphasized economic threats such as U.S. debt and growing inequality; new technologies and ethical questions surrounding the use of those technologies; geopolitical conflict, including the spread of corruption to the developed world and the rise of China; and the spread of populism and nationalist identities around the world. GAO-19-204SP NATIONAL SECURITY 14 Table 1: Organizations That Provided Completed Questionnaire Responses Department of Defense Department of State Department of Homeland Security Office of Assistant Secretary for Bureau of Oceans and International Countering Weapons of Mass Research and Engineering, Office of Net Environment and Scientific Affairs Destruction Office Technical Assessment Office of Assistant Secretary for Office of Medical Services, Directorate Office of Science and Technology Research and Engineering, Deputy of Operational Medicine Assistant Secretary of Defense, Emerging Capabilities and Prototyping Strategic Capabilities Office Office of Intelligence and Analysisa Federal Emergency Management Office of Net Assessment Agency Defense Advanced Research Projects National Protection and Programs a Agency Directorate Defense Intelligence Agency, Office for Space and Counterspace Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Technology and Long Range Analysis Defense Intelligence Agency, National Center for Medical Intelligence National Security Agency U.S. Army, National Ground Intelligence Center U.S. Navy, Acquisition, Intelligence, and Requirements Office U.S. Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity U.S. Africa Command U.S. European Command U.S. Northern Command U.S. Indo-Pacific Command U.S. Southern Command U.S. Special Operations Command U.S. Strategic Command U.S. Transportation Command Source: GAO. | GAO-19-204SP a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis submitted completed questionnaires after our response period had ended. The information received in these questionnaires was not used in the development of the threat profiles. 15 GAO-19-204SP NATIONAL SECURITY The 26 of 28 organizations that timely responded To supplement the questionnaire responses and our provided approximately 210 individual threats, 4 of review of the national security strategies and other which were later deemed outside of the scope of documents, we interviewed officials from DOD, this review. The questionnaire responses are not State, DHS, and ODNI. In total, we interviewed generalizable to any other organizations. officials from 22 organizations, including 11 DOD organizations such as the Defense Intelligence We then conducted a content analysis of the Agency, several combatant commands, and questionnaire responses to categorize threats and the Joint Staff; 6 State organizations across 5 to identify common themes across responding bureaus, including the Bureaus of Counterterrorism organizations. Two analysts independently and Countering Violent Extremism, Intelligence reviewed and coded each threat described in the and Research, and Oceans and International questionnaires according to the categorization Environmental and Scientific Affairs; 4 DHS framework. After all of the individual threats had organizations, such as the Science and Technology been coded, the analysts met, discussed any Directorate and the Countering Weapons of Mass differences, and reached agreement on the final Destruction Office; and ODNI. We selected these coding for each individual threat. A third analyst 22 organizations because they may have a role adjudicated any unresolved differences between in identifying and assessing long-range emerging coders. threats. Additionally, we interviewed officials at the headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty To consistently report on all emerging threats Organization, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. identified during this review, the analysts conducted European Command. We selected these sites a second phase of content analysis. Using primarily because officials within DOD and State identified the list of descriptors and the threats coded to these organizations as representative military each descriptor, three analysts developed a list commands that identify and address emerging of 26 threats described in separate profiles in this threats. report. In this process, some descriptors were combined into a single threat profile, while others The performance audit upon which this report is were renamed to more accurately reflect the threats based was conducted from July 2017 to September associated with the descriptor and threat profile. 2018 in accordance with generally accepted The analysts coded each of the approximately 210 government auditing standards. Those standards individual threats into 1 of the 26 threat profiles. The require that we plan and perform the audit to analysts resolved any differences by discussion obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a and consensus. We also reviewed documents reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions provided by organizations that participated in based on our audit objectives. We believe that the this review to determine whether the documents evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for identified emerging threats differently from those our findings and conclusions based on our audit identified through the questionnaire responses and objectives. We subsequently worked with DOD from content analysis. We did not identify any additional September 2018 to December 2018 to prepare emerging threats through this document review. this public version of the original classified report for public release. This public version was also We also used information in related documents— prepared in accordance with those standards. such as a DOD risk assessment, DOD threat reports, GAO reports, a Defense Science Board report, National Academy of Sciences reports, and National Intelligence Council reports—to supplement the information gathered from the processes listed above. GAO-19-204SP NATIONAL SECURITY 16 Appendix II: DOD Comments We received these comments on September 25, 2018. The draft report number for the classified version of this report, GAO-18-497C, was subsequently renumbered GAO-18-497SPC for the final classified report. 17 GAO-19-204SP NATIONAL SECURITY (U) Related GAO Products Internet of Things: Enhanced Assessments and Emerging Infectious Diseases: Actions Needed to Guidance Are Needed to Address Security Risks Address the Challenges of Responding to Zika Virus in DOD. GAO-17-668. Washington, D.C.: July 27, Disease Outbreaks. GAO-17-445. Washington, 2017. D.C.: May 23, 2017. Infectious Disease Threats: Funding and Technology Assessment: Internet of Things: Status Performance of Key Preparedness and Capacity- and Implications of an Increasingly Connected Building Programs. GAO-18-362. Washington, D.C.: World. GAO-17-75. Washington, D.C.: May 15, May 24, 2018 2017. Technology Assessment: Artificial Intelligence: Russia: U.S. Government Takes a Country-Specific Emerging Opportunities, Challenges, and Approach to Addressing Disinformation Overseas. Implications. GAO-18-142SP. Washington, D.C.: GAO-17-382C. Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2017. March 28, 2018. (SECRET//NOFORN) Trends Affecting Government and Society: United Countering ISIS and Its Effects: Key Oversight States Government Accountability Office Strategic Issues. GAO-17-354SPC. Washington, D.C.: April Plan 2018-2023. GAO-18-396SP. Washington, D.C.: 20, 2017. (SECRET//NOFORN) February 22, 2018. Avian Influenza: USDA Has Taken Actions to Tax Fraud and Noncompliance: IRS Can Strengthen Reduce Risks but Needs a Plan to Evaluate Its Pre-refund Verification and Explore More Uses. Efforts. GAO-17-360. Washington, D.C.: April 13, GAO-18-224. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2018. 2017. Homeland Defense: Urgent Need for DOD and Nuclear Security: DOE Could Improve Aspects FAA to Address Risks and Improve Planning for of Nuclear Security Reporting. GAO-17-239. Technology That Tracks Military Aircraft. GAO-18- Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2017. 177. Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2018. Radioactive Sources: Opportunities Exist for Nuclear Security: CBP Needs to Take Action to Federal Agencies to Strengthen Transportation Ensure Imported Radiological Material Is Properly Security.  GAO-17-58.  Washington, D.C.: February Licensed.  GAO-18-214.  Washington, D.C.: 7, 2017. January 10, 2018.  Combating Terrorism: Additional Steps Needed Climate Change Adaptation: DOD Needs to in U.S. Efforts to Counter ISIS Messaging. GAO- Better Incorporate Adaptation into Planning and 17-41C. Washington, D.C.: December 8, 2016. Collaboration at Overseas Installations. GAO-18- (SECRET//NOFORN) 206. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2017. Nuclear Security: NRC Has Enhanced the Identity Theft: Improved Collaboration Could Controls of Dangerous Radioactive Materials, but Increase Success of IRS Initiatives to Prevent Vulnerabilities Remain.  GAO-16-330. Washington, Refund Fraud. GAO-18-20. Washington, D.C.: D.C.: July 1, 2016. November 28, 2017. Identity Theft and Tax Fraud: IRS Needs to Update Diplomatic Security: Key Oversight Issues. GAO-17- its Risk Assessment for the Taxpayer Protection 681SP. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2017. Program. GAO-16-508. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2016. Countering ISIS and Its Effects: Key Issues for Oversight. GAO-17-687SP. Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2017. GAO-19-204SP NATIONAL SECURITY 18 Combatting Nuclear Smuggling: NNSA’s Detection and Deterrence Program is Addressing Challenges but Should Improve Its Program Plan. GAO-16- 460. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2016. Iran Nuclear Agreement: The International Atomic Energy Agency’s Authorities, Resources, and Challenges. GAO-16-565. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2016. Emerging Infectious Diseases: Preliminary Observations on the Zika Virus Outbreak. GAO-16- 470T. Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2016. Emerging Animal Diseases: Actions Needed to Better Position USDA to Address Future Risks. GAO-16-132. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2015. Nuclear Nonproliferation: NNSA’s Threat Assessment Process Could Be Improved. GAO-16- 118. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2015. Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Made Progress to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Materials Worldwide, but Opportunities Exist to Improve Its Efforts. GAO-15- 799.  Washington, D.C.: September 23, 2015.  Defense Infrastructure: Improvements in DOD Reporting and Cybersecurity Implementation Needed to Enhance Utility Resilience Planning. GAO-15-749. Washington, D.C. July 23, 2015. Identity Theft and Tax Fraud: Enhanced Authentication Could Combat Refund Fraud, but IRS Lacks and Estimate of Costs, Benefits and Risks. GAO-15-119. Washington, D.C.: January 20, 2015. Identity Theft: Additional Actions Could Help IRS Combat the Large, Evolving Threat of Refund Fraud. GAO-14-633. Washington, D.C.: August 20, 2014. Climate Change: Future Federal Adaptation Efforts Could Better Support Local Infrastructure Decision Makers. GAO-13-242. Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2013. (103090) 19 GAO-19-204SP NATIONAL SECURITY The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and investigative GAO’s Mission arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 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