

March 16, 1971

- Chairman

Joshua Lederberg

Honorable J. William Fulbright
U. S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator,

I am pleased to note that you have begun hearings on the ratification of the Geneva Protocol. As you perhaps already know I have been deeply concerned about biological and chemical warfare for many years.

In this connection I have prepared the statement, copies of which are enclosed, which I hope you may find pertinent to your committee's deliberations. As this is in the form of a dialogue that attempts to explore the complexities of the issues raised by the Geneva Protocol, I should point out that I have marked off a small segment as the focus of the policy that I would in fact advocate.

The article was also the basis of a lecture in an Arms Control Course that the Department of Political Science has organized here at Stanford and which had very enthusiastic attendance by almost 200 registered students and many other auditors.

The article is also scheduled for publication in the Outlook Section of The Washington Post, probably on March 21, if not the following Sunday. It is, nevertheless, freely available for any purpose that you or your committee wish to make of it. I have enclosed both a single and a double spaced version of the type-script for convenience in editing and reading.

The essence of the policy I advocate is that the Protocol must be all means be ratified as a small but essential step towards comprehensive control of chemical and biological weaponry. The scope of the Treaty needs to be modernized in order to take account of the introduction of tear gas and of herbicides as agents of war. It would be desirable if the United States could take the initiative in the development of a formal, international position on these innovations. As indicated in my article, a preferred way of accomplishing this would be the attachment of a reservation that would, in practice, become binding on the United States if, and only if, an important majority of other adhering countries adhered to the same reservation by comparable formal actions. This approach to a consensus might also be the most effective way of persuading the Administration that the inclusion of non-lethal chemical weapons within the scope of the prohibition was accomplished in a way that did not leave the United States in an untenably disadvantageous position compared to other potential users of these weapons.

Sincerely yours,

FULBRIGHT, J.W.

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