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Congress v. Wallerstein

The costs of denial $\rightarrow \infty$ for widely available technologies.

But it does not follow we should drop export restraints even there. There are quality and definitional problems in defining technologies as available. To retain leadership in the 20m process the US will have to lean over backwards; some of our political battles will be to try to persuade allies to share our economic disadvantages in sales at the margin.

There is little likelihood of a detailed analysis along these lines. Our rhetoric has led to "missionarist" conclusions similar to Conroy's and Bill Perry's. However, I am prepared to hear evidence to the contrary, namely that a huge list is enforceable at acceptable cost. Who will present that?

Jah.

We need a more explicit trade-off analysis than is brought out in Conroy's monotonie, single curve. It is not just finding an intersection of 2 curves.

For each category we need to estimate the net military advantage of a Soviet procurement (of 1... n items) vs the costs of our effort at denial:

- cost of lost sales to US industry
- " " enforcement: domestic opponent
- " " political accommodations in multilateral agreement allies, neutrals ...

We would be helped by some common currency: how much could we rationally spend out of DoD budget to accomplish each demand.

We have to pay careful attention to the trade-off for single/few items (hardest to enforce) versus a stream of them.