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The melding of artificial intelligence and medicine

"One of the lessons learned in knowledge engineering is just how complicated is human knowledge"

Artificial intelligence in medicine—computer programs that attempt to act as medical experts or consul-

rams that attempt to act as medical experts or consul-tants — is passing through the laboratory door and is ready to begin appearing in the clinics. — Doctors' offices are likely to be next. Since Stanford is one of the world's leading centers for AI (artificial intelligence) research, a for of those laboratory doors and clinics are here. And some of the first patients whose treatment is influenced by these programs also are here.

At the Medical Center's outpatient oncology clinic patients with Hodgkin's disease, non-Hodgkin's lympatients with Horgkin's disease, non-Horigkin's tym-phomas, and breast cancer, have been treated with the help of a program called ONCOCIN. The program keeps track of the patient's progress, advises on labora-tory tests, and recommends drug therapies. Since almost no two cases of these diseases are exactly alike, amost no two cases of triese diseases are exactly alike, and since many of the therapeutic drugs are toxic, physicians in the clinic, even those reluctant to use computers, generally accept the help.

The researchers are now adapting the program so it will run on the desk-top computers that doctors' offices

can afford.

A program called PUFF, derived from another Stanford AI program, has been actually interpreting physiological tests of lung patients at the Pacific Medical Center in San Francisco. A program to help physicians appraise professional journal reports is under development.

Stanford, of course, is not the only place where researchers are trying to use AI tools to help physicians and medical researchers. The national interest in biomedical applications of AI became so intense in the early 1970s that the National Institutes of Health early 1970s that the National Institutes of Health several years ago agreed to fund a national computer resource, a large machine that many researchers from around the country could access. They put it on the ground floor of the Stanford Medical Center, and it is known as SUMEX-AIM (Stanford University Medical Experimental Computer-Artificial Intelligence in

SUMEX-AIM is a collection of scientific worksta-tions tied to a Digital Equipment Corp. 2060 and VAX computers. Three to four hundred researchers around the country are plugged into the SUMEX com-

puters.

The leading edge of this research at Stanford is at the Knowledge Systems Laboratory (KSL), an interdisciplinary set of projects tying the Computer Science Department to the School of Medicine.

More than 100 researchers, including five principal investigators, and scores of graduate students work in the five sublabs of the KSL. In addition, researchers in other fields, such as Oleg Jardetzky, of the Magnetic Resonance Laboratory, and Charles Yanofsky in biolo-

gy, are working on specialized programs.

From the beginning, a goal of AI researchers has been to encapsulate the knowledge and problemsolving skills of experts into a computer application, so-called expert systems. It would be useful, the researchers believed. chers believed, to try to put the reasoning and know-ledge of human subject experts into the computer so non-experts could draw upon their skills.

The first expert system was produced at Stanford in the late 1960s. Called DENDRAL, the program was developed by Nobel Laurcate Joshua Ledetberg, Bruce Buchanan and Edward Feigenbaum, professors of computer science. It attempted to capture Lederberg's expertise in analyzing organic compounds from mass

spectroscopy.

One of the most successful AI programs ever, DE-NDRAL can be found in many organic chemistry labs, issued under a Stanford liceuse.

DENDRAL is based on a core concept in artificial intelligence, the use of heuristics, sometimes known as the art of good guessing. Heuristics are similar to the mental processes of a chess player. The chess expert ignores the almost infinite number of possible moves in a game, concentrating only on those relevant to the particular situation.

DENDRAL cannot consider every possible molecule in doing its analysis. Using heuristics, however, the program considers only those likely to be the answer.

program constitutes only timose likely to be the answer. The next logical step was a program for cluical medicine, designed as part of a dissertation by Edward Shortliffe, now associate professor of medicine and computer science. Shortliffe is an M.D. with a passion for computers. Along with Stanley Collen, Bruce Buchanan, and Stanton Axline, Shortliffe developed MXCLM.

MYCIN, which uses heuristics, gives advice on the





Edward Feigenbaum

use of antibiotics for the treatment of infectious dis-

The method used to put the expertise of Cohen and Axline into the computer shows how these programs are developed — and how difficult it can be to build them. The process is called "knowledge engineering," and it turns out to be one of the most complicated parts

and it turns out to be one of the most complexace pairs of building. At programs.

"We sat around, went over patient cases, and tried to understand how Axime and Cohen would decide how to treat those cases," explained Shortliffe, who was a second-year medical student at the time. "We'd stop them — those of us who knew only a little medicine and were more computer scientists — interrupt and ask,

'Welf, why do you say that?'
"We met once a week for an hour and a half. Axline we net once a week for an hour and a half. Axline would bring in an interesting case, a chart, and Cohen would ask him questions. Axline would answer them from the chart. Cohen would be problem-solving, trying to figure out what he'd do for that case, and we would try to understand why Cohen was asking the questions he was.

questions he was.
"We'd write down the rules that he told us, that
Axine would help refine with him, and in the interim
week, I'd put those rules into this developing and
emerging computer system," Shortliffe said.
"And then we'd all have a good laugh the following
week when I showed them how the computer had tried
to handle the same case. What you did (was) discover

the great simplifications they made in explaining the

rules from the previous week, where they'd go wrong if

you tried to run it on any kind of different case."

And, "every once in a while," Shortliffe said, "some issues would arise which caused a major change in the underlying structure of this developing program. Suddenly it wasn't just a matter of writing the rules; you

denly it wasn't just a matter of writing are fues, you had to make major program changes."

The program, like most Al programs, is written in a difficult, non-numeric computer language called LISP; the data and the commands are so integrated that by altering one, you may automatically alter the

One of the lessons learned in knowledge engineer-One of the tessons featured in knowledge engineering is just how complicated is human knowledge. The computer, for instance, was quite capable of asking whether a patient was pregnant, even if the patient was male. We know only females get pregnant, but the programmers had to remember to add that little bit of commonsense knowledge to an intrinsically ignorant machine

Nonetheless, MYCIN worked. More important, the Nonetheless, MYCIN worked. More important, the program could be exported to other fields. The logical part of the program, what came to be called the "inference engine," seemed to be relatively universal. By extracting it and simply plugging in new data from a different domain, the MYCIN program could work for other fields just as it did for infectious diseases. The inference engine was called Essential MYCIN or EMYCIN, PUFF at the Pacific Medical Center is based on NAMMER.

prent program under development by Shortliffe and Lawrence Fagan. MYCIN also led to ONCOCIN, the cancer

Lawrence Fagan.

ONGOCIN monitors the patient's condition by asking the physician questions about the patient, the treatment given so far, and the results of tests. The program manages the patient's drug therapy and is usefulbecause of the complexity of cancer chemotherapy. The computer also has the ability to retain in its memory far more treatment details than an oncologist can remember. It is also constantly being updated with the newest research results.

If, for instance, a test shows that a patient's white blood cell count is decreasing, ONCOCIN may suggest ways of changing drug treatment. As with all such

programs, the physician can accept or reject the advice— the ultimate responsibility remains with the doctor. (That is not a minor issue. Besides the natural refuctauce of a physician to relinquish control, particularly to a machine, the question arises: what happens if the machine is wrong? Who gets sued for malpractice? These are challenging legal issues not yet tested in the

These are challenging legal issues not yet tested in the courts.)

ONCOCIN has a secondary program that explains the basis for its decision. If the physician asks why a recommendation is made, ONCOCIN reviews its reasoning and documents the information upon which the advice was given. The physician then has a better idea how much weight to give the suggestion — and, in some cases, may learn something for other did not know, or tenember something forgotten.

ONCOCIN is built on a series of IF-THEN statements; if a particular situation applies, then the computer should conclude something specific or recommend a particular course of action. However, "although ONCOCIN may appear to be very fiteral... it is important to remember that we don't tell the computer what to recommend for every conceivable situation," said Larry Fagan, project director and sonior research

associate.
"Instead, we supply it with knowledge and instruc-tion on how to put bits of knowledge together. The computer then integrates incoming information on its 'own." In very large programs such as ONCOCIN, the result is often unexpected.

How well do these machines do? In a test matching

How well do these machines do? In a test matching ONCOCIN with human experts, the program "shows excellent performance of the computer relative to physicians treating cancer patients at Stanford," Fagan said, (1 he study was described in the December 1985 issue of The Annals of Internal Medicine.)

Another large expert system, CADUCEUS, written at the University of Pittsburgh, was tested using cases from The New England Journal of Medicine. Its performance was then compared to that of a group of physicians, Over a wide range of diagnoses, the machine was found to be more accurate than an average physician,

cans. Over a wide range of dispusses, the final fine set found to be more accurate than an average physician, roughly comparable to the teams of physicians who cared for the patients, and almost as good as expert physicians asked to review the cases in retrospect.

Although CADUCEUS can bandle 600 different dispusses to the case of the case

Although CADUCEUS can handle 600 different diagnoses, the scientists who programmed it, like those in all aspects of AI in medicine, do not believe the program can ever replace the physician.

Among other things, says Pittsburgh's Jack Myers, CADUCEUS lacks imagination. It cannot cope with a disease it is unprogrammed to diagnose, whereas the bright human physician will recognize something new. All the programs, including ONCOCIN, lack imagination.

ONCOCIN has been used experimentally in the Stanford oncology clinic since 1981, but the large computer prototype was recently removed in anticipation of the new version that will run on small machines.

The new interface with the physician will resemble the Apple Macintosh with graphics and "windows" (sections of the screen that show specific functions). The physician will move a mouse to control the action on the screen.

The screen will look just like the kind of paper chart the physician is familiar with - a deliberate design

"It can do everything the physician's paper record can do, but is also able to do things that only computers



Edward Shortliffe

can do -- for example, using continuous forms on the screen that can be lengthened as necessary," Fagan

A separate research program is being developed to use more general strategies, Fagan said. This will enable the physician to cope with more complex cases. "For the simple case it comes out with a simple answer; for the simple case it comes out with a simple answer; for the complex case it comes out with more general or fuzzier answers.

"This corresponds to two cases. One is the regular case which the physicians generally handle them-selves," Fagan said. "The other corresponds to the place where they would call in the expert for special-

ized advice."
Having ONCOCIN on a large research computer is of little practical value to a local physician; the goal is to put ONCOCIN on a workstation, a microcomputerized machine costing between \$10,000 and \$20,000, which puts the machinery within reach of many doc-

which puts the Inactinety and the Core of the Medical Computer Science Group has proposed distributing ONCOCIN experimentally in collaboration with the Northern California Oncology Group so the programs can be tested on workstations

faboration with the Notherin Cannon Consoly, away from Stanford.

ONCOCIN is perhaps the largest of the medical Alprojects going on at Stanford. However, there are several other related projects.

One program, called PATHFINDER, is an attempt to advise pathologists on the proper classification of lymph node abnormalities viewed under the microscope. This program is being built in collaboration with the University of Southern California.

REFEREE, a program being written by Bruce Buchanan of KSL and William Brown and Daniel Feldman of the Medical Center, is an attempt to try to build an adviser for interpreting papers from the medical literature. REFEREE, will give the physician a feel for the reliability of the data in the reported study. PROTEAN, developed by Buchanan and Barbara Hayes-Roth of KSL, along with about 10 students and nuclear magnetic resonance expert Oleg Jardetzky, will help researchers determine the structures of protin molecules.

In the meantime, SUMEX has been changing. A num her of research projects from around the country have chosen to move off the large DEC machines at the Medical Center and use workstations or large micro computers.

computers.

SUMEX is now part of the Symbolics Systems Research Group, the sublab in the KSL that is responsible for the computing "environment" for the laboratory Interestingly, aithough the medical programs, lik all the other AI programs at Stanford, frequently have practical applications, the researchers are driven by the means, not the end. Trying to unravel Oleg Jai detzky's world in nuclear magnetic resonance maprove helpful to Jardetzky, but it is more helpful to the AI researchers, who learn by doing.

"It's a fine line, because it looks like we're building a application for Jardetzky. That we hope will be a re-

"It's a line line, because it looks like we're building a application for Jardetzky. That we hope will be a risult, but it's not anything whose success we coulguarantee, certainly not when we started. It's true every project we do," Buchanan says.

On the other hand, of course, it would be nice if the

programs work, he adds. That helps get enthusiasi collaborators.

collaborators.
All this could lead to a scenario out of science fiction.
A doctor in the Sierras has a patient whose disease I cannot handle. He needs help. The help comes fro his office computer. Housed in the metal box, on the silicon chips, behind the video screen is an inanima.

expert.

The computer asks questions. The physicial transfer of the computer delvices asks and the computer delvices. answers them at the keyboard. The computer delainto its vast data bank, makes the judgment worthy

an expert, and prints out its best advice.

Ed Feigenbaum, the co-author of DENDRAL, the lieves that will begin the real computer revolution. -Joel Shur