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Russian Computers Having Delusions—Or Are They?

WE HAVE just intercepted the following memorandum from the Computer Secretariat at Novosibirsk.

1—Operation Checkmate:

Public news that the Soviet defecated the United States at computer chess game aroused unnecessary concern in our security branch. It is feared enemy strategists might awaken to our successful programming of U.S. foreign policy if the full extent of the computer gap were revealed. There is little danger of this. Nevertheless, Soviet computer scientists should be instructed to allow the United States an occasional win.

2—Operation Spiderweb:

China and the United States remain the major threats to Soviet security. We must continue to pursue all possible measures to assure their mutual neutralization.

Our program in Southeast Asia has succeeded beyond our wildest expectations. In particular, the disruption of internal solidarity in the United States was a bonus that our primitive computer programs of the last decade had not predicted. These programs were too pessimistic.

It was not necessary for us to become openly in-

involved. We had merely acquiesce in the American intervention and they proceeded their policy precisely according to our specification.

Their capacity for self-delusion is what has confused our computers. Most Americans still believe that our fundamental interests are opposed to their commitments in Asia!

We must therefore make a careful study of one previously unsuspected hazard. The United States may become so weakened by its internal dissension, and its alienation from its natural allies, that it will lose its potential value to us as a counterforce against China. We must explore how to give foreign aid to the United States without enraging our own satellites.

3—Operation I a g o. Our long-range plans for a confrontation between the United States and China are proceeding smoothly. Chinese nuclear power had threatened to stabilize their conflict by 1975. However, our feinted ABM system has successfully provoked the correct reaction in the United States; they are starting up a thin ABM which they will soon escalate.

(We estimate a cost-benefit ratio of \$20 billion diverted for every billion rubles we invest. Soviet technologists should continue to concentrate on devising similar high-leverage ventures. U.S. investment in internal economic and social consolidation should be siphoned off systematically but not to the point where the Americans become incapable of accomplishing our strategic aims in Asia.)

We are programing the U.S. ABM-system in order to prevent China's residual nuclear strength from deterring a strategic attack by the United States. Our computers are now studying when to launch the United States into that attack to achieve an American victory and occupation of Asia.

This will keep the United States so deeply bogged down that our own military security will at last be firmly assured. We can then rely upon our economic growth to establish a Soviet peace throughout the world.

For this glorious purpose, it is important above all not to let the United States abandon its illusions of "winning" in Southeast Asia.