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
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INSANITY AND THE
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
JOHN C. GOODWIN

INSANITY AND THE CRIMINAL

BY

JOHN C. GOODWIN

AUTHOR OF "SIDELIGHTS ON CRIMINAL MATTERS," "PRACTICAL
MUSKETRY INSTRUCTION," "THE VISUAL TRAINING
OF THE SOLDIER," ETC.



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INSANITY AND THE CRIMINAL
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To
FRANK SWETTENHAM GOODWIN

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

THIS book resumes the discussion of crime, though on a different plan, at the point where my book, *Sidelights on Criminal Matters*, ended. As I pointed out in its elder brother, although there is an immense amount of written matter on both crime and insanity, there is a most noticeable dearth of material indicating how, why, and where the two subjects come into contact and often overlap.

Partly because of this, and partly in view of the widespread interest which is being evinced, both in England and in the United States of America, in connection with the influence of abnormality upon crime, I have ventured to prepare these chapters as a cursory survey of the theme.

I have written them primarily for the man in the street, who, for various reasons, seldom gets the chance to read the more authoritative works of the medico-legal experts, and it is because of this that I have appended to this volume a bibliography of the most recent books bearing directly or indirectly upon the subject of this one.

Though I have written from the standpoint of Freud where my theme has swerved definitely into the realm of psychology, that fact does not necessarily imply that I proclaim my unconditional submission to the whole of Freud's doctrines. Very few Freudians do. Because of this, and because there are two sides to every question (and there appear to be a thousand sides to this one!), I have embodied in my bibliography representative books of different shades of opinion.

I tender my acknowledgments to Dr. Bernard Hart, M.D., and to the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press, for permission to base my brief exposition of Freud's interpre-

tation of insanity upon Dr. Hart's well-known book, *The Psychology of Insanity*. I am under a similar obligation to Miss Barbara Low, B.A., and to Messrs. George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., for kindly allowing me to utilize Miss Low's most lucid book, *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis*, as the foundation of my short account of the bearing of psycho-analysis upon my theme.

To both these authors, and to their respective publishers, I offer my cordial thanks.

J. C. G.

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INSANITY AND THE CRIMINAL

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CHAPTER I

SURVEYING THE PROBLEM

SIR BRYAN DONKIN, speaking at a conference in Birmingham, said: "The weak-minded amount to between 10 and 15 per cent. of the total number of persons committed to prison; the true maximum is probably higher than this. . . . Owing to their inherited incapacities, and to certain surroundings, a large number of mental defectives tend to become criminals, and a considerable proportion, even twenty per cent., of so-called criminals or law-breakers are demonstrably mentally defective."¹

Sir Bryan Donkin's statement may be said to crystallize the whole question of the relationship between insanity and crime, for he offers us visible proofs of the results of the operation of heredity and environment in the cases of possibly one-fifth of our "so-called criminals or law-breakers."

There are, of course, causes other than heredity and environment in the production of abnormality of thought and conduct, and in the following chapters I hope to assume the rôle of guide in a cursory survey of the relationship which modern research, especially psychological research, has found to exist between insanity and crime, to indicate in brief the bases of the present position, to outline the bearing of Freud's

¹ Sir Bryan Donkin, M.D., *The Feeble-Minded Criminal*.

discoveries and their resulting system of psycho-analysis, and to estimate future progress in the light of present-day trends.

Perhaps the chief difficulty in such an enterprise is to be found in the lack of such information as would assist in a treatment of the subject as a whole. Although there is a vast amount of written matter devoted to both crime and insanity, as separate subjects, there is a famine in books and other records indicating how, why and where delinquency and insanity overlap, though the fact that no two subjects appear to overlap more than these gives birth to a paradox as obvious as it is strange.

In days gone by the criminal was regarded as a surly individual, who had deliberately, and of his own "free will," taken to evil courses out of sheer badness of heart. It was one of the cramped and cramping views which were instilled into our grandfathers, and their grandfathers, with much minatory talk of "sinners," "Hell fire," and other picturesque crudities representing the Deity as a vindictive monster, glorying in making our lives as cold as possible, and the flames of his Hell as hot as possible.

Other views have been held, and dropped, and from time to time thinkers have arisen who attributed crime to such factors as alcohol, environment, heredity, economic stress, congenital mental defect, and even to anatomical structure, upon all of which I hope to comment at appropriate points in the unfolding of my theme. There is a germ of truth in every heresy, and if the protagonists of each of the various theories which I have mentioned had said: "We feel that our theory will help you to put your finger on the cause of crime," instead of asserting: "Our theory is the only one which explains crime," their assembled contributions to the problem would have been, as indeed they have been when purged of fanaticism, of real and lasting value.

Morel was among the first thinkers to notice the presence of some connection between crime and insanity. He regarded

criminality as the outcome of degeneration in the sense that although a criminal was not necessarily a degenerate, the degenerate had in him the ingredients of a criminal. And degeneration Morel defined as the "morbid deviation from the normal type of humanity," regarding as especially active in its causation social environment, industrial stress, unhealthy occupation, and pathological transformation.²

One point I must stress. There is no such thing as the "criminal type." You can not point to a man and say—because he is small, walks with a furtive shuffle, owns a receding chin or a "sugar loaf" head, blinks upon the world with watery eyes, possesses peg-top teeth, a suggestive smirk, and talks with a guttural grumble: "That man is a born criminal." A man's outward appearance can not be relied upon as the index of his character. You can not judge a book by its cover.

In contemplating the problems arising out of delinquency, the one safe and certain rule from which, whatever views you may hold and wherever your researches may take you, you must guard against swerving, is that you must cease to think of crime and think, instead, of the criminal; for every man's acts are the outcome of his particular psychic life. You can evolve an elaborate theory of "crime" until it looks attractive, sounds plausible, and appears perfect; but you may find that the history of the first gaol-bird to whom you apply your theory will demolish it. We have heard the views of the criminologists on the criminal: it is time we heard the views of the criminal on the criminologists!

If the views held concerning the criminal have been narrow, those held concerning the lunatic have been narrower. In ancient writings, we find that the view of Saul's period of melancholia was that "the evil spirit from the Lord" had visited him, while demoniacal possession was also held responsible for the lapses of Nebuchadnezzar, who "did eat grass like an ox," and the Delphic Oracles are now regarded as

² *Vide* B. A. Morel, *Des Dégénérescences*.

hysterical manifestations parallel with the mediumistic capers which accompany the modern spiritist *séance*.

It was not until the fifth century B.C. that we find any attempt to explain insanity on sane lines, when Hippocrates, the "Father of Medicine," announced (460 B.C.) his belief that insanity was a physical affection of the brain substance, thus laying the foundation of the theories of the physiological school of thought.

What amounts to a *hiatus* in the history of views upon insanity lasted until the Dark Ages, when Europe was dominated by an ecclesiasticism which set up Scholasticism in place of Reason, and Mysticism in place of Philosophy, and attempts at honest thought were accordingly stifled, while lunatics were anathematized as witches and agents of the Devil, and accordingly burnt.

When the powers of the ecclesiastics began to wane, the lot of the lunatic began to improve until, at the end of the eighteenth century, the physiological conception of insanity as the result of physical changes in brain tissue had become more or less accepted.

Unfortunately, there persisted with this development of thought, the practice of chaining lunatics in cells, physicians of those days subscribing to the fallacy that the lunatic, though a sick man, was a morally tainted thing. There were, indeed, physicians on the continent, who were half afraid lest to hold liberal views on the subject of insanity might be regarded as a sign of insanity. And, in point of fact, we must remember that, as recently as 1832, Pope Gregory XVI. anathematized as a form of insanity the view that freedom of conscience was every man's birthright; while in 1869 the Vatican Council anathematized those who accepted scientific truths at variance with the dogmas of Rome, or interpreted such truths in a sense other than that approved by the Holy See.

In due course, matters improved, especially in England. St. Luke's Hospital was reorganized on saner lines. Chains

were abolished there and in other asylums. Research was vigorously instituted into the anatomy and physiology of the brain and a temper at once more scientific and more humane began to prevail.

From these researches, and from contemporary investigations on the continent, was evolved the modern psychological conception of abnormality culminating in the announcement, in 1899, of the epoch-making discoveries of Professor Sigmund Freud, of Vienna.

The discoveries of Freud have so profoundly influenced our outlook, not only in the realm of criminology, but also in those of anthropology, sociology, politics, education, religion, morals, art, and indeed in every department of both individual and collective thought that, so far from its being remarkable that they should have forced us to abandon our obsolete ideas of the criminal, it would have been much more remarkable had they failed to do so.

The Freudian theory was evolved through the practical application of Claud Bernard's maxim: "Look at facts over and over again, *without previous bias*, until they begin to tell you something."

By 1870 the study of man's unconscious mind (termed by Freud the Unconscious) had begun to attract attention. Charcot, of the Salpêtrière, and Bernheim, of Nancy, under each of whom Freud had studied, had stressed the significance of the operation of the Unconscious in cases of hysteria and in the realm of functional disorders.

Some ten years later, Dr. Breuer, the Viennese alienist, was engaged in treating a girl suffering from hysteria. He hypnotized her and made her repeat during the trances certain bizarre expressions which she was in the habit of mumbling during her hysterical attacks. By this means he induced a reconstruction of certain phantasies, or imagined incidents, which she had visualized during her hysterical periods.

By patient experimenting and lengthy investigation, Breuer

evolved and elaborated a process which eventually became the germ of Freud's "psychic catharsis," or mental purging, to which I shall return in Chapter XIV.

In the middle of these experiments, Freud returned to Vienna from his work with Charcot at the Salpêtrière and added his efforts to those of Breuer. In the course of their contemplation of the girl's case, Freud noticed that she tended, in her trances, and during other abnormal mental states, to revert to long-forgotten happenings of her infancy, and he was led thereby to recognize that every psychic experience assumed, and was governed by, an earlier psychic experience.

Soon afterwards, Freud and Breuer disagreed, and Freud continued to experiment independently, with the result that by 1893 he had discarded hypnotism, and had formulated a theory embodying the essentials of psycho-analysis as we know it today. Two years later (1895), he delivered, to an audience composed solely of the three alienists, Adler, Stekel and Sadger, a series of lectures on his discoveries, notably on the interpretation of dreams, and for the next four years devoted himself almost exclusively to dream investigation, publishing, in that period, his famous thesis *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1899).

In the following year his most distinguished disciple, Dr. C. G. Jung, of Zurich, introduced Freud's methods to his clinic at that town, and his successes gradually attracted to him a group of other alienists who, though working in direct association with Jung, kept in close touch with Freud, and in 1908 the first congress of psycho-analysts was held at Salzburg, with the result, *inter alia*, that the first journal devoted to psycho-analysis was founded, published by Freud and edited by Jung, who, just before the congress, had contributed the important theory of complexes to the general body of Freud's teaching. To this I shall return in Chapters IV and VI.

In 1909 psycho-analysis was formally expounded to American psychologists by Freud himself, who, with Jung and

Ferenczi, addressed a representative gathering of American thinkers at Clark University.

In 1911, Adler broke away from Freud and Jung, and inaugurated his own theory of psychology, based partly on a diluted adaptation of Nietzsche's "Will to Power" philosophy, holding that a man's actions were governed, in the main, by his sense of inferiority impelling him towards the attainment of superiority, which teaching Adler proceeded to disseminate by organizing the Society of Free Psycho-Analysis, though he eventually discarded the word "psycho-analysis" altogether.

In 1913 Jung also deserted Freud over a difference of opinion concerning Freud's views of the theory of sexuality; and Jung, christening his new body of doctrine "Analytical Psychology," divided all psychological types into introverts and extroverts, which I hope briefly to discuss in Chapter IV. Stekel also seceded, and drew up a theory of his own which, as it has attracted only a handful of supporters, need not be discussed here. Of Freud's original associates, therefore, Sadger alone remained loyal.

In the last ten years, the Freudian Theory has captured the allegiance of thinkers in every department of learning and there is every reason to hope that it will spread very much further, until, in years to come, it will have been adopted in every sphere of thought on which it sheds new light.

I am convinced that the only honest method of estimating the present position with regard to the relationship between crime and insanity necessarily involves some understanding of the meaning of criminal responsibility, for the whole theme of this relationship revolves around this central point. And closely bound up with the question of criminal responsibility is the problem of the treatment of the criminal. His treatment, indeed, depends upon the acknowledgment, or otherwise, of his responsibility. To him it may constitute the difference between Dartmoor and Broadmoor.

We shall consequently find ourselves compelled to look back-

ward in order that we may look forward. One problem of criminality is not so much what the insane criminal is, but what the circumstances are that have made him what he is. We shall accordingly find it necessary to embark upon a retrospective investigation.

Let me clarify my meaning. It is quite certain that we must examine the insane criminal's mind. It is much more certain that before we can hope to do this we must have at least a nodding acquaintance with the working of a sane man's mind. You can not put your finger upon the defect in a broken-down engine until you know something of the working of an engine in good running condition.

Scarcely less urgent is it that we should have some working idea of the physical seat of mind—the brain—and, incidentally, of the interaction of brain and body, and of mind and body. Having thus dug down to bedrock, we can at least claim that we have done as much as we can to find out as much as we can.

But other points suggest themselves, and I accordingly propose to adopt the following plan.

I should like to commence by inviting your consideration of the physical structure of the brain, and the part which it can play, and has been found to play, in the making of a criminal, a lunatic, a criminal lunatic, or a lunatic criminal. With that as our foundation, I hope to take you thence to a brief review of some ascertained relationships between mind and body. Then we shall endeavour to discover what contribution, if any, modern psychology has made to our understanding of the thought-processes of normal and abnormal minds. We must also find out what place must be assigned to such things as heredity, environment, alcohol, drugs and epilepsy, and discover whether they are to be regarded as causes or effects of abnormality. Further, we must endeavour to arrive at a clear conception of the special attributes of that vast horde of borderland cases—cases which, hovering

on the brink of criminality or insanity, or both, constitute by far the knottiest problem in criminology. And the parts which prison life, economic duress, and other considerations play in our theme must not be ignored.

Then, when by looking behind us we have obtained a bird's-eye view of the chief factors bearing upon the production of the type of individual of whom I hope to write, the ground will have been cleared for such discussion.

We will begin at the beginning, and explore your brain.

CHAPTER II

EXPLORING THE BRAIN

WHEN you say of a man, "He has no brains," you are, of course, consciously lying. You are exaggerating, and speaking relatively. Everybody has a brain of some sort, and although brains differ widely in physical as well as in mental quality, certain features are apparent in those of all humans, and serve as a common denominator, linking the brain of the Fiji Islander with that of the Senior Wrangler.

To look at, your brain is a light grey, shiny mass, its uneven surface twisting here and turning there, and presenting a general appearance of ribbed and undulating jelly. If you can recall to mind one of those plaster contour maps of England, where the mountains are raised above the general surface of the map, and if you visualize the appearance presented by, say, the Pennine Range, you will have a fairly good idea of the surface of your brain. Better still, obtain the brain of a sheep, a cow, or a pig from your butcher, and scrutinize it until you can recall a clear mental picture of it. In many ways the human brain resembles in appearance that of any one of these three animals, and, as a matter of fact, when you call a man "pig-headed," you are far nearer the truth than you imagine.

Your brain is practically divided, from front to back, into two halves, the left half being slightly larger than the right. The left half governs the right side of your body, and *vice versa*. They are bridged, underneath, by a large bundle of nerve fibres arranged fan-wise to form a pear-shaped bulb, termed the *medulla oblongata*, and narrowing downwards until they commence to traverse your spinal column. I mention

this bulb because it plays a not unimportant part in your mental life, and will receive some further consideration in Chapter VII. It regulates the beating of your heart, and the heaving of your chest which accompanies your breathing.

The topmost layer of your brain is termed the cortex, which is an enveloping cover varying, in individuals, from one-twelfth of an inch to one-sixteenth of an inch in thickness, and embodies some one million five hundred thousand cells, each measuring from one three-hundredth of an inch to one three-thousandth of an inch in diameter and constructed of several thousands of millions of particles of nerve plasm, each containing, among other constituents, hundreds of atoms of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen and sulphur.

Says Joseph McCabe: "The atom of hydrogen contains about one thousand electrons; the atom of carbon, twelve thousand; the atom of nitrogen, fourteen thousand; the atom of oxygen, sixteen thousand; and the atom of sulphur, thirty-two thousand. These electrons circulate within the infinitesimal space of the atom at a speed of from ten thousand to ninety thousand miles a second. It would take thirty-four thousand barrels of powder to impart to a bullet the speed with which some of these particles dart out of their groups. A gramme of hydrogen contains energy enough to lift a million tons a hundred yards."¹

Writing of the brain itself, Joseph McCabe says: "The whole fabric is pervaded and held together by the cosmic fluid, of which each cubic millimetre has the equivalent of a thousand tons and an energy equal to the output of a million horsepower station for forty million years."²

The layers of grey matter in your cortex are composed of neurones (nerve cells) supported by neuroglia. This grey matter is supplied with blood by a network of capillaries—to the nature of which I will return presently—which feed the

¹ Joseph McCabe, *The Evolution of Mind*.

² *Ibidem*.

grey matter with tiny "tabloids" termed chromatic granules. The exact composition of these chromatic granules is at present the subject of research, but as the cells require, more than anything else, a supply of oxygen, we may safely conclude that the granules are abundantly charged with it.

Your cortex also includes quantities of white matter, the strands of nerve fibres which do not require, and consequently do not receive, so generous a supply of blood.

I shall have occasion to refer to the brain cells and the cortex from time to time, and it is of interest to note that the present views held by physiologists are a great advance upon those held at various times in the past. In the eighteenth century, for example, some anatomists regarded the cortex merely as a protective envelope for the brain proper. Others flew to the opposite extreme, and announced that the cortex was the soul. (I use this word here in the theological, and not in the psychological sense.) Descartes, on the other hand, affirmed that the soul was in the pineal gland; while Sommering announced that the cerebro-spinal fluid was the soul. The theologians held views of their own: the only point on which the theologians and the scientists agreed was that they did not agree.

Speaking of the brain as a whole, it does not necessarily follow that the weight or size of a brain varies either in direct or in inverse ratio to the weight or size of the body; nor can intelligence be said necessarily to depend upon brain bulk. In animals other than man the relation between the weight of the brain and that of the body offers a less criterion of mental capacity, nor can we say that the more the brain predominates the more intelligent the animal. The brain of a canary, for example (an unintelligent creature), is one-fourteenth of the weight of its body, while that of an elephant (a highly intelligent animal) is only one five-hundredth.

The brains of criminals have been weighed from time to time, notably by Bischoff, Schwabe, Benedikt, Broca and Gall,

and the researches of these authorities have yielded the discovery that the average weight of a criminal brain is decidedly less than that of a normal man or woman. Other points that have been evolved are the deviations in number and depth of the fissures or valleys in the brain, as well as the number of convulsions, or hills. In the case of criminals these tend to become exaggerated—in one direction or the other—as compared with the brains of normal people. The brains of criminals also tend to be smaller and, in many cases, bear signs of arrested development; but one or another of such deviations is frequently apparent in the brains of epileptics, imbeciles, incurable lunatics and other abnormal folk as well as in those of quite normal persons, so that to class all persons whose brains are physically abnormal as criminals would be to fall into the errors of the Lombroso school and to argue from false premises.

Speaking literally, women have less brain than men, though forty thousand years ago the brain *capacity* of a woman exceeded that of the average man of to-day, in spite of the fact that both the volume and the weight of the brains of both sexes in those days were less than they are to-day. The average man's brain weighs forty-nine ounces, while that of the average woman weighs only forty-four ounces. Professor L. Bischoff, of Munich, argued that women were mentally inferior to men because of this, but when his own brain came to be weighed, after his death, it was found to weigh less than that of the average woman!

Your brain cells constitute, of course, the most important factor of your brain which, incidentally, contains some three thousand millions of them. The structure of a cell is examined by soaking a brain in certain chemicals until it loses its jellified nature and toughens to the consistency of soap. It is then sliced into tiny shreds, which are dyed to accentuate their structure when viewed through a powerful microscope.

When a cell is in good working order, it is liberally supplied

with nourishment from your blood in the form of the chromatic granules to which I have referred. It is fed with these while you sleep, or under other favourable conditions. When you are tired the number and sustaining power of these granules are lessened.

In appearance your cells are not unlike a tiny jelly-fish provided with not more than six legs or fibres (termed dendrites) some of which link up every cell with neighbouring cells and one of which (the axis cylinder) enables the individual cell to transmit nerve force down your spinal cord to any part of your body, as we shall see in the next chapter. It is the presence of millions of these axis cylinders which gives the white colouring to your cortex.

One cell by itself is practically powerless. It is when a body of thousands of cells co-operate that activity ensues. Some physiologists hold that one cell by itself is literally powerless, but it is difficult to realize how an army of powerless individuals can possess, and use, power.

Your groups of cells perform the prescribed functions of that area of your brain in which they happen to be situated. As in a large general post-office one group of workers attends to the sorting of letters, another to the telephones, another to the telegraphs, and so on, your brain cells are correspondingly organized into distinct groups for the exercise of distinct functions, though all are correlated to induce greater efficiency in the general activity of the whole organization.

It is possible—though it has not been proved—that all impressions received from the outer world through the senses, and all judgments formed within the brain are recorded, as on a gramophone record, on the cells directly concerned. If this is true it is probably equally true that the primitive inherited propensities, impulses, likes, dislikes, and other inherited mental furniture which I shall discuss in later chapters leave similar impressions on the tissue of our brain recesses. When we, so to speak, make a record play we are inaugurat-

ing the mental process which, for lack of a *mot juste*, we call "remembering."

Though the fallacy that a man with a large head must necessarily have an abnormally efficient brain inside it has been exploded, physiologists appear to agree that the brain of a man of brilliant intellect contains more and better cells than that of a dolt. Further, though a child is born with the same number of brain cells as an adult, they are, at birth, incomplete in structure and, what is more important, they do not possess their full number of connecting fibres. These they throw out, like the rootlets of a growing tree, as the child grows. In the case of an imbecile the linking up of cell with cell by these tendrils ceases in childhood.

Both your cells and their fibres are extremely sensitive. It follows, therefore, that the introduction of a poison—alcohol, for example—into the blood plays havoc with the delicately fashioned cells. Your blood travels from your heart to your brain through tubes known as arteries. When these reach the neighbourhood of your brain they become divided, like the forked branches of a tree, each branch being termed an arteriole. These arterioles worm their way among your brain tissue in all directions and are presently split up once more—this time into infinitely tiny tubelets called capillaries. To one or another of these capillaries each cell throws out a nerve fibre, which links up the two and enables the chromatic granules to be pumped from the capillary into the cell by the action of your heart, just as water is conveyed to each house in a street by means of radiating branch pipes.

I have mentioned that your brain is divided into localized areas, the cells of each area exercising the function governed by that area. Take, for example, three typical areas of your brain—the sensory area, the motor area, and the association area. The sensory areas embody sub-areas, each of which receives impressions communicated by one sense, e.g., the sense of smell (olfactory area), the sense of hearing (auditory area),

the sense of touch (tactile area), and the sense of sight (visual area). The motor areas are similarly organized and are adapted to sending out messages that will cause you, or part of you (e.g., leg or hand), to move. The association areas in your cortex link up these and other areas in an intricate network of communication activities—they form clearing houses between different parts of your brain.

Imagine, for instance, that a pickpocket is standing near you in a crowd watching the Lord Mayor's Show, and he (the pickpocket) sees in you a likely victim, certain cells in the "judgment" area of his brain having informed other cells in his motor area. These flash a message to his motor area, which tells his hand that it is to pick your pocket, and further messages are telegraphed to his first and second fingers that they are to take your wallet. When these fingers come into contact with it they wire the news to the tactile area of his brain, which telegraphs back: "Withdraw it gingerly." Further messages pass between his fingers and other parts of his brain until at last the different areas concur that your wallet has been transferred from your pocket to his.

In the lower animals practically the whole of the cortex is taken up with the sensory and motor areas, the association areas being very minute and of poor quality. As we examine the proportionate relationship between the two in other animals, finally reaching man, we find the predominance of the one varying in inverse ratio as we ascend until in man we find the association areas more numerous and more highly developed.

As regards your cortex generally, the anterior portions govern your emotions and your "will"; the middle part actuates your speech and hearing; while the posterior zones are sensitive to outside impressions, such as touch. The anterior are the youngest, and the posterior the oldest.

Your cerebellum, which is situated in the posterior part of your brain, is the seat of the sex impulses. Where the cere-

bellum is injured or destroyed, the sexuality of the subject is affected accordingly. I mention this point here because (this book being written, in the main, from the Freudian standpoint, the case for which I hope to develop in my succeeding chapters); its influence upon the conduct of both the criminal and the lunatic is enormous. Professor Benedikt, who conducted a post-mortem examination upon the brain of Hugo Schenk, who was executed in 1891 for a series of murders of servant girls with whom he had been enjoying illicit associations, found that Schenk's cerebellum weighed twenty-five per cent. above normal. And records are available of cases where abnormal sexuality has been induced by inflamed, wasted, undersized or even completely absent cerebellum. One need not be a Lombrosian to admit the genuineness of such cases. It is when a universal postulate is based upon such fragmentary evidence that one finds oneself arguing from the particular to the general. Further, while my observations on the localization of brain areas are recognized as true, I trust you will not form the impression that they in any way bolster up the pretensions of phrenology, which, with its grotesque jargon relating to "bumps," and their alleged significance, provides a living of a kind for charlatans of a kind.

Brain work wears out your brain tissues, wearies your cells, and draws heavily upon your reserves of chromatic granules, and it has been proved by experiment that the brain's temperature rises when it is active, and falls when it is at rest. "Hot-headedness" is therefore more than a convenient figure of speech.

In genius, as in insanity, we find one or more areas of the brain developed at the expense of the others. It is one of Nature's compensatory laws that gain in one direction is counterbalanced by loss in another. Great mathematicians, for example, are frequently devoid of any artistic skill, or any æsthetic or imaginative ability. The "mathematics" areas are developed at the expense of the "artistic" areas. In other

words, the "artistic" areas waste through want of use. If you were to use your right arm alone, it would become abnormally muscular, while your left arm would grow correspondingly weak. It is of interest to note, as an illustration of Nature's law of loss and gain, that imbeciles not infrequently tend to display unusual engineering skill, while artistic and literary geniuses include in their ranks a relatively high percentage of moral perverts.

The reason why the brain of a man of genius frequently breaks down is that as he overworks his brain cells, frequently works until very late, and generally draws too heavily upon his reserves, there comes a day when his over-driven brain refuses to go on. Again, the mental exaltation induced through the stimulus of a great conception or aspiration, is bound to play havoc with at least one set of brain cells, and as all the cell areas are interconnected, general wear and tear is inevitable. Hence, "Brain-fag."

Though an exhaustive exposition of the "geography" of the brain, and the function of each of its numerous areas, would involve our groping our way through a vast labyrinth of digressions, in which we would lose sight of our main theme, I think a brief survey of the purpose of certain of these areas will assist us to acquire a general idea of the brain, without which an honest discussion of our subject would be impracticable.

If you place your hand on the nape of your neck, you will find a place where the base of the skull ends and two strong bars of muscle run downwards from it towards your spine. Just inside this part of your skull is the *medulla oblongata*—the bulb to which I referred earlier in this chapter.

In the bulb are situated nerve centres connected with your breathing and the action of your heart. These actions are what are known as reflex actions. That is to say, they do not demand conscious premeditation. Your breathing and the beating of your heart go on without effort on your part—when,

for example, you are asleep. In the bulb are also the centres which superintend such activities as perspiration, the flow of saliva, swallowing, vomiting and other operations, and the bulb is that part of the brain which is snapped by the hangman's rope when, seeing that it is the area controlling the heart and the breathing, death must obviously be instantaneous.

Situated further forward, almost in the centre of your brain, and above the bulb, are the four small clusters of neurones known as the *corpora quadrigemina*, which receive, in the first instance, impressions from your optic nerves, and transmit them to your sight area in another part of your brain, which enables you to "see" things.

In your cerebrum, or brain proper, there are the centres for special senses—touch, sight, smell, hearing, and so on. Singularly enough, the centre associated with taste has not yet been located. In your cerebellum, that large laminated mass overhanging the bulb, are your association areas—those which link up your numerous localized centres, and co-ordinate all mental activities. In playing the piano, for instance, you see the sheet of music, you use your fingers, and you hear the sounds. These areas of your brain, then, are co-operating simultaneously. There are, as a matter of fact, many more areas involved, but I disregard these in the interests of brevity and clarity.

Physiologists tell us that there is still much to be learnt regarding the inter-relation between thought and the thought areas of the brain. As Joseph McCabe says: "Nothing is gained by hiding with sonorous phrases the fact that consciousness is still a profound mystery; a fact that does not surprise those who know what exploration has still to be made."³

Speaking broadly, the rear portion of your brain appears to be concerned with the proper ordering of your body, while the front portion tends to link you up with other people and things.

³ Joseph McCabe, *The Evolution of Mind*.

A great deal of nonsense has been written concerning the relationship between the head and the brain, and one school of thought has gone one better than the Creator in creating a "criminal type," the insignia of membership of it being a receding forehead, high cheek-bones, "peg top" teeth, a prominent frontal crest, and other engaging attributes. English people have for long been accustomed to indulge in false generalizations. To some folk a duke is a man who wears a coronet and a monocle; a Socialist a political madman who will not wash; and a Frenchman is a "foreigner" who talks with his hands, fights a duel a day, practises a discreet form of polygamy, and generates strength for these activities on an exclusive diet of frogs. Ever since Herophilus vivisected condemned criminals there have been those who have insisted upon a rigid physical type. Given a "criminal head" the owner of it must needs have a criminal brain inside it. They would hang a man on the evidence of his photo and certify another as insane after learning the width of his forehead and the relative disposition of his ears.

While the theories of Professor Cesare Lombroso have long since been discredited (and Dr. Charles Goring applied the death-blow with his classic, *The English Convict*) and the quackery of our sixpenny phrenologists is regarded with amused contempt, there is, nevertheless, as in all heresies, a germ of truth. A grossly abnormal type of head will occasionally go with the moral instability of which Lombroso declared it to be the index, but their coincidence is generally fortuitous; and the man who will argue that all people with abnormal skulls are either criminals or lunatics should, if logical, assert with equal sincerity that because some water is sometimes solid ice, therefore all water is always solid ice.

The Lombrosians could see no further than their pet theory; they turned their backs upon everything which might upset it and, when called upon to make their inconsistency appear consistent, took refuge behind a rampart of statistics. And

from statistics, as all the world knows, you can prove both everything and nothing.

Writing of the Lombrosians, H. G. Wells says: "They gain access to gaols and pester the unfortunate prisoners with calipers and cameras and quite unforgivable prying into personal and private matters, and they hold out great hopes that by these expedients they will evolve at last a scientific survival of the Kaffirs' witch-smelling."⁴

In the purely physiological and anatomical fields the statistics compiled by Lombroso and his followers were undoubtedly of value; and if they produced no other result they certainly drew attention to the fact that some scientific study of the criminal, and his first cousin the lunatic, was a crying need. They paved the way for the later workers who, profiting by the mistakes of the Lombrosians, were enabled to evolve the Freudian theory of mentality which, being applicable to the sane, the insane, and the delinquent alike, has proved, and will prove still more in the future, to be the most important progressive step since the formulation of the Darwinian theory.

A case tending, perhaps, to testify to the value of one phase of the Lombrosian theory occurred in the spring of 1922, when an American detective, Mr. Grant Williams, of the New York City Police (since retired), who had made the study of anthropology his hobby, "reconstructed" the head of a woman with no clue to guide him other than her skull. This was found lying on a mountain near Haverstraw, in New York State. On examining the skull he announced that it was that of a Polish-Irish girl, mentally defective, and of violent temper, and proceeded to re-model her features with plasticine. As an institute for mentally defective women was in the vicinity one of its doctors was summoned to the scene, and he at once recognized the "face" as that of Lilian White, an escaped inmate of the institution, who had been missing for several months.

⁴ H. G. Wells, *Mankind in the Making*.

Another theory to which some people have at times tended to attach too much significance is the inheriting of physical attributes. We all know that our physical characteristics are inherited even more than our mental equipment, for whereas we can change our minds by our surroundings, our health, our education, and other and less obvious factors, we can not change our physical features. But the trap into which we are all liable to fall as regards our inherited physical attributes is that we need not necessarily inherit them from our fathers or our mothers or, indeed, from any near relation. A child may be totally unlike either of his parents and yet his appearance may most decidedly be inherited—perhaps from an ancestor who lived at the time of the Norman Conquest (for we all have ancestors, be they known or unknown). On the other hand, he may be a miniature replica of either of his parents or combine the characteristics of both. The only certainty about physical heredity is its uncertainty.

From time to time cases crop up in the Law Courts involving questions of parentage. The child is planted in the middle of the court. Grave and expensive counsel bend bewigged and bewildered heads and peer at him as though he were a deadly microbe. The judge smiles tolerantly upon the scene, and the only person in court who appreciates the joke is the child, who regards it all as a new game organized for his entertainment.

When we turn to the question of head injuries we are on much surer ground.

If a portion of your brain is lacerated, cut away, or even subjected to pressure, the result may be as slight as a scarcely noticeable change in your behaviour or as serious as your complete mental shipwreck, and you can even kill a man merely by standing behind him, placing your hands on either side of his head, and pressing your thumbs against his carotid arteries and the vagus nerve in his neck—a method not unknown in the East.

It is well known that during the Great War many men were killed by the bursting of a shell in their vicinity without the infliction of an externally visible wound. This was one of the many points raised during the sittings of the War Office Committee of Enquiry into Shell Shock, and in their report issued on June 22, 1922, we find the following explanation accompanying a reference to commotional shock induced through the explosion of a shell: "At the base of the skull, where the vital centres of the brain are situated, there is a collection of fluid which serves as a water cushion, so that if the vibrations are transmitted with sufficient intensity to this fluid they might not only so disturb the functions of the whole brain as to produce an immediate loss of consciousness, but even cause sudden death by arrest of action of the vital cardiac and respiratory centres in the *medulla oblongata*. . . . Three brains were examined from cases in which the history of the explosion and post-mortem examination pointed to commotion due solely to transmission of the aerial force generated to the brain. The brains at the post-mortem exhibited no visible changes to account for death. A careful microscopic examination, however, revealed the rupture of small vessels with hæmorrhages in many places."

It is also well known that the presence of a physical defect in the brain is one cause of moral imbecility. Writing on this subject in the *Journal of Mental Science*, 1917, Sir Bryan Donkin (Medical Adviser to the Prison Commissioners) says: "These cases are certainly more common among convicts than among the general population; and whatever their nature be deemed to be there is a general consensus of opinion that the characters manifested point to imperfect cerebral development as the predominant element in their causation."

And it has been proved that in the case of general paralytics, hallucinationists and sufferers from melancholic delirium and convulsions, the convolutions of the cortex wither.⁵

⁵ *Vide J. Luys, The Brain and Its Functions.*

This is, of course, only one form of brain injury and, to digress, it is interesting to note that the presence of blood on the brain may cause a layman—a detective, for instance—to err in drawing his conclusions. When blood is found between the skull and the cortex the cause is probably (though not necessarily) a blow. This point can generally be cleared up by examining the superimposed skin for signs of a blow. When blood is found in the brain substance the cause is probably disease, though it is sometimes disclosed at coroners' inquests that the cortex is torn while the skull remains intact.

Each half of your brain is, in a sense, a distinct organ. Authorities have said that if the right half is put out of action the left half can function without it. Francis Joseph Gall (1758-1828), one of the greatest anatomists in medical history, stated that he himself knew of a case where a man's intellect remained unimpaired after one hemisphere of his brain had been destroyed. But note that Gall refers to his intellect, and not to that side of his body governed by the destroyed half of his brain. You may ask, with reason, how it is that since I have stated that every nerve centre in the brain is correlated with every other centre, so large a tract as half a brain may be destroyed and the mental efficiency remain intact. In reply I will quote Dr. Bernard Hollander, who says of this case: "The brain consisting of two spheres, just as the nerves of sense are double, the remaining hemisphere carried on the work."⁶

An injury to the head is capable of turning a man into either a criminal, a lunatic, or a criminal lunatic. No less than eleven per cent. of convicts bear unchallengeable signs of head injuries, and this proportion is greatly in excess of that relating to normal folk. And it is worth while noting that a person who has once sustained a head injury of sufficient severity is particularly prone to be overcome by the effects of excesses, whether sexual or alcoholic. Dr. Bernard

⁶ Bernard Hollander, *In Search of the Soul*, vol. I.

Hollander writes: "I have seen insane patients, in whom I could trace head injury, whose insanity dated from the day when they partook of alcohol, though not in excess of the dose they were accustomed to before their injury."⁷

A head injury may also generate tumours, epilepsy and more abstract affections of the brain, such as delusions or hallucinations (according to the nerve centre injured), or moral defects such as sexual perversion or inversion. Satyriasis, for example—a form of sexual obsession found in some men—has often been caused through a blow on the back of the head injuring the cerebellum. It will be obvious that, areas of the brain being devoted to special senses, an injury to any one of those areas will provoke abnormality of some sort in respect of the sense to which it ministers. You can hardly read your morning paper daily for a week without encountering an instance of a person being struck dumb or losing his hearing from a kick on the head from a horse, or a blow received there in a street fight, or sustained in some other manner, while, on the other hand, a sense may be as suddenly restored through a similar agency, as in the case of shell-shocked soldiers recovering their speech through falling down. Tear off a man's manhood by a blow on the head, and underneath you will find the animal or the fool.

Professor Glaister quotes the case of a man who, twenty-one years prior to his death, had quarrelled with another man, who hit him on the head with a hammer, the force of the blow splintering a small area of his skull, the broken fragments of bone forming a cup-shaped hollow which pressed upon a portion of his brain. After his recovery, he displayed a greatly enhanced tendency to quarrel (especially when drunk), which he had not previously shown.⁸ And imbecility has been caused through a baby striking its head on a hard substance during childbirth.

⁷ Bernard Hollander, *The Psychology of Misconduct, Vice and Crime*.

⁸ *Vide* John Glaister, *Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology*.

It being conceded that in the frontal lobes of the brain, i.e., that portion of your brain bounded by your forehead, are the nerve centres governing inhibition—many processes and activities related to your feelings, impulses and relations towards your fellows—it follows that any injury to the frontal lobes will affect a man's dealings with his fellows. Though there are no actual brain districts mapped out into definite centres for moral and ethical activities, there are localized control centres which regulate and inhibit certain tendencies of a primitive kind; injury to, or wastage of, which may profoundly affect conduct. A reservoir behaves itself until the dam is broken.

The *Journal of Mental Science* for April, 1920, embodies an account of a soldier who had been wounded by a piece of shell immediately above the right ear. "Formerly a steady, quiet man, he was now noted as showing a marked insubordination. Formerly a staunch teetotaler, he now took to drink."

Professor R. von Krafft-Ebing describes a case of a quiet, amiable youth of twenty-one, who was unconscious for nine days following a blow on the left side of the head. On regaining consciousness, his nature was found to be changed. He became quarrelsome and violent, frequently thrashing his wife and children until they were unconscious and bleeding. Finally, he killed a neighbour for teasing him.

As a contrast, I offer another case, taken from the *Glasgow Medical Journal*. An inmate of Glasgow Lunatic Asylum, Gartnavel, so battered his own head with a hammer that his brain bulged through the hole in his skull. He recovered his health, but not his sanity.

Can an injured brain be repaired by surgical treatment? Yes. Dr. Herbert A. Powell, writing in the *Pacific Medical and Surgical Journal*, gives a case of an insane Swede, thirty-five years of age, and an inmate of the Arizona Penitentiary, having been sentenced for manslaughter. A depression, cov-

ered by a cicatrix (scar of a healed wound) was found in his skull, just above his right ear. He recovered after an operation.

It has long been recognized that the examination of blood-stains will determine, amongst other things, whether they are of human blood or that of an animal. Sir Bernard Spilsbury, the well-known Home Office pathologist, now tells us that if brain tissue be found bespattered about the scene of a crime, it is possible, after elaborate tests, to arrive as a similar decision.

Science, in fact, is making immense progress in the investigation of brain affections, and the day is not far distant when results which at present appear to some to be uncannily impracticable will be announced.

As it is, persons suffering from lethargy, lack of confidence, and similar minor mental defects, have been treated with the galvanometer, an electric current being sprayed upon that part of the skull overlying the brain area concerned. That their brain efficiency has been enhanced by this treatment is proved by the fact that backward or indolent students so treated have been enabled to pass with credit examinations in which they have previously failed.

If the physiologists are right who affirm that our brains not only receive but record impressions of everything which we do, say, hear, think and experience generally, as if they were gramophone records, we may one day learn that a physiologist has invented an instrument which, when applied to any localized sense-area of the brain of a corpse, will reproduce in some form (vocally or otherwise) the impressions in the treated area.

The brain so used would have to be that of some one but recently dead, for since decay of the tissue obviously begins to set in at the moment of death such deterioration, if at all advanced, would hamper a successful reproduction. We shall see, in the next chapter, how "dead" tissues of lower animals

can be stimulated into activity by electricity, and the process on which I am now speculating would only be an advance—an improvement.

Such treatment of the brain of a newly-murdered man, for example, might yield results of enormous value, disclosing the identity of the murderer (whose appearance would have been sharply impressed upon the victim's brain, enabling him to "describe" it), his remarks, and a thousand other clues of undoubted value.

The process would help to reduce the number of undiscovered crimes, and would clear up all doubt as to whether the case was one of murder, manslaughter, suicide or accidental death.

A brain might even be kept "alive" indefinitely, in a hermetically sealed jar, where it could be fed with some preparation embodying chromatic granules, oxygen and blood, and its tone maintained by periodic bathing with an electric current.

A fantastic speculation? Emphatically no! When you reflect upon the enormous strides which medical science has made during the last fifty years the mind can impose no limit whatever to the progress it will make during the next fifty. As I write a staff of experts is busy at University College Laboratory, London, assembling and scrutinizing observations made upon the brains of those who are at present passing through our prisons; while the Michigan State Penitentiary, at Jackson, has introduced an X-ray photographic apparatus with which to examine the skulls and brains of the convicts. When an operation is deemed desirable it is voluntarily performed by two public-spirited surgeons from Detroit. Such laboratories should be established at every large prison and asylum in this country, while operations on the brains or skulls of criminals or lunatics could be "filmed" (the patient's features presumably being concealed by the chloroform pad) and exhibited at university lectures and meetings of medical and other learned societies.

CHAPTER III

BODY AND MIND

IT was R. W. Emerson who said of the English: "They are full of coarse strength, rude exercise, butchers' meat and sound sleep and suspect any hint for the conduct of life which reflects on this animal existence, as if somebody were fumbling at the umbilical cord and might stop their supplies."

Since Emerson wrote this indictment we appear to have changed our attitude. In fact, if the pronouncements of some of our bishops and other ecclesiastical eminences are to be believed, the pendulum has swung to the other extreme. And that mysticism, occultism, spiritism and other fashionable *-isms* of the moment are temporarily enjoying a popular (and lucrative) vogue cannot be denied.

The immense strides which psychology, and especially psychiatry, took during the Great War were due to two very different factors—the prevalence of mental breakdown at the front and the frequency of mental breakdown at home—and when the almost miraculous cures effected by psycho-pathologists became known they were besieged by those who were ill, by those who thought they were ill, and by those who hoped they were ill.

Psychology became fashionable, and since psychology was fashionable half the sharks in London made a living out of half the fools in London, while the real psychologists—the qualified specialists—looked on with amazement and amusement and found their practices swollen by the influx of those whose mental poise had been still further jeopardized by the quacks.

And since, to-day, the influence of mind on body is realized as it never was before and since, again, the protagonists of the supremacy of body over mind have to fight harder than they ever did before, a brief scrutiny of the facts adduced by the patient researches of the disciples of each of the two schools of thought—the psychological and the physiological—is not only advisable but essential in a discussion, however superficial, of any theme embracing insanity.

Not so many years ago we were busy discussing the question of a healthy mind in a healthy body. Some thinkers argued that if the body were diseased the mind would fall correspondingly short of perfection. Others stressed the converse of this proposition, and insisted that mental *malaise* could, and did, induce bodily, or at any rate functional, weakness. The two schools, after great argument, agreed, not that one was right but that both were right, and that the influence of body and mind upon each other was mutually inclusive and reciprocal: each was dependent upon, influencing, and being influenced by, the other.

Modern thought, while admitting the invulnerability of the essence of that conclusion, purges it of its fallacies, improves upon it, and adds the corollary that although a healthy mind may seem to exist in an unhealthy body (and many men of genius have been cripples or semi-cripples) a healthy mind can not, at all events, exist in an unhealthy brain. This we saw in the preceding chapter, where we came across instances of organic affections of the brain the consequences of which were appalling. Mental stress, is, indeed, more damaging to the individual than bodily hurt. As John Galsworthy says: "Prolonged starvation and agony of the mind is worse than starvation and agony of the body, carrying, as it does, the wreck of the body with it."¹

You need only ponder over the relationship between body and mind for five minutes, and you will find yourself wonder-

¹ John Galsworthy, *A Sheaf*.

ing how it comes about that we know so much more about the workings of our bodies than we do of those of our minds. And one reason for it is that our bodies, being visible, tangible things, are nearest to hand, more obvious, and clamour more successfully for our attention. It is but comparatively recently that mind has begun to enjoy a belated recognition of its claims. Freudians, and, indeed, all other psychologists, are frequently accused of stressing the importance of the intangible at the expense of the tangible, but that is surely not the whole truth. And it is interesting to speculate upon the outcome if, in the past, the bulk of speculative thought had been focussed upon our minds, and not upon our bodies. Our bodies would by now be the battlefield for conflicting hypotheses, while the workings of our minds would be relatively familiar to us all.

Perhaps Nature's policy of compensation is nowhere more strikingly manifested than in the relationship between body and mind. Loss in respect of the one is frequently counter-balanced by gain in respect of the other. Homer and Milton were blind. Cervantes, Spain's greatest novelist, had only one hand. Florence Nightingale was an invalid. Nelson, Dickens, Theodore Roosevelt and Napoleon were weaklings when young. Perhaps that is why the last-named was never known to smile.

William James held that three stages—mental and physical—comprise a thought-process. We see something, or hear it, or feel it—in short, we perceive it through the medium of a sense. This perception is physically registered in the nerve centre (or centres) concerned, and when we experience this recording process (sensation), we feel emotion. William James' three stages, then, in chronological order, are: Perception—Registration—Emotion. And to James emotion and reaction were virtually synonymous.

Developing his argument, he contended that if we give battle on the appearance of the second, or middle, stage, the

onset of the third stage will be repulsed. For example, if we experience fear, and counteract its visible manifestations (muscle stiffening, quick breathing, and so forth), by deliberately forcing their opposites, the emotional stage will be controllable. It is the practice of this precept of self-restraint that has formed our national character, with its reputed attribute, *sang-froid*.


If you will contemplate, for a moment, this question of controllability, it will become apparent that the essence of insanity, of criminality, or of the not infrequent combination of both, is lack of controllability. Both the criminal and the lunatic share this one common attribute—lack of self-control.

I use the term in its widest sense. Self-control is not apparent only when you resist the impulse to fly into a passion. Every effort, however slight, involves self-control. When you light your pipe, you control every action, from the taking of the match from its box, striking it, inserting your pipe between your teeth, holding it there, puffing it, extinguishing the match, and throwing it away.

Your mind controls your body through the medium of your nervous system, which comprises a most intricate system of nerve fibres traversing every part of your body. Let us glance at this highly sensitive instrument.

A nerve resembles a piece of thread surrounded by a fatty, resilient sheath. The two are enclosed in a thin jacket termed the *neurilemma*. If you look at a candle, and note the way in which the fat surrounds the wick, you will have formed a very fair conception of the appearance of one of your nerves when viewed through a powerful microscope. If, instead of a wick, you were to substitute a thin wire, the simile would be a better one, for a nerve impulse travels along the nerve, which is insulated by its protective sheath of fat, just as an electric current speeds along a wire. Certain parts of your body are traversed by nerves without this sheath, and in other

cases a bundle of nerve strands share one large nerve cord, each strand insulated from its fellows, as in the following diagram, which represents a section of a severed cord.



XYZ, nerves. AC, axis cylinder. IS, insulating sheath.
N, neurilemma. TW, tissue wadding.

The whole of a nerve, including its cell at one end and that at another, is termed a neurone, as we noted in Chapter II. Neurones, seen through a microscope, vary in structure, according to their functions. A neurone of touch, for example, differs slightly from an auditory neurone; while neither exactly resembles a motor neurone.

A neurone leading from your skin, a muscle, or any other part of your body which it happens to serve, to a nerve centre in your brain or spinal cord, is termed an afferent neurone. Those radiating outwards from the nerve centre to the part concerned are called efferent neurones.

Whether an afferent neurone is stimulated at its end or at some intermediate point in its course your nerve centre interprets the stimulation as having occurred at the end, for the simple reason that as thousands of sensations have been travelling along that neurone for years at the rate of over sixty yards per second your brain (or other centre) has come to regard their origin as at the end of the nerve. Hence, when a man has lost a leg, his brain, receiving impressions from the afferent nerves in his stump cannot, at first, realize that the source of irritation is not at his amputated foot but in the stump.

Incidentally, it is of interest to note that extreme cold, or the partaking of a drug such as alcohol, chloroform or *dhatūra*, may render a nerve inoperative.

The question of the nature of the energy which travels along your nerves is a profound one. This energy has been thought by some to be electricity, but though its comparison with electricity is an excellent one for illustrative purposes it has been proved that the force itself is not electricity. Briefly, the present position is that the impulse is one of physico-chemical agitation generating, and accompanied by, electricity. The molecules of the neurones are, it is true, agitated; but it is equally true that no matter travels along the neurones, for at least two reasons. Firstly, when an afferent neurone connecting brain with muscle has been stimulated no trace of matter having been deposited at the muscle end of the nerve has been found. Secondly, matter cannot pass through matter.

The working of your nervous system is worth further investigation. Just as you can take an interest in wireless telegraphy without holding a degree in science, so you can derive

pleasure from a study of your nervous system without possessing a sheaf of medical diplomas.

And, indeed, I cannot conscientiously invite you to consider the relationship between insanity and the criminal without commenting, however briefly, upon the nervous system, where matter, the instrument of mind and the associate of mind, is seen to play its part in the acts of both normal and abnormal people—and in the latter category I bracket the criminal, the lunatic, the criminal lunatic and the lunatic criminal.

We saw, in the preceding chapter, that your brain, generally regarded as the seat of consciousness, is organized into two halves—its right hemisphere governing your left side and its left hemisphere actuating your right side. The nerve fibres from each of these halves travel downwards to form what is called a cerebral peduncle. These two peduncles become welded together in your *medulla oblongata*, which we christened the "bulb." From the bulb your nerves traverse your neck through your spinal column and, now known as your spinal cord, they sweep down the entire length of your spine, throwing out, at intervals, branch lines of nerves which, dividing and sub-dividing, spread themselves out, like the branch system of a tree, to every part of your body.

Every nerve organization in your body is organized on the double principle of a railway track, with its "up" line and its "down" line. Each nerve conducts either from the organ or area which it serves up to the nerve centre concerned, where it arouses sensations, or outwards from the nerve centre to the organ which it operates in response to the original stimulus.

At intervals throughout the length of your spinal cord are situated nerve centres, like the dots in a dotted line. A nerve centre, which, as we saw in Chapter II, is composed of a group of cells, is capable of inducing certain reflex actions without the co-operation of your brain. If your spinal cord were severed, and a lighted match applied to the sole of your foot,

you would jerk your leg upwards, the movement being automatic and reflex, and no mental impulse being necessary. If you chop off the head of a living goose the bird may, for a few moments, run around the farmyard, its actions, little more than successive muscular jerkings, responding to the automatic floods of energy from the nerve centres concerned.

When you are engaged in anything requiring exact co-operation between certain nerves and certain muscles their association is known to physiologists as co-ordination. In playing the piano, for instance, or riding a bicycle, numerous nerves are allied together. But there is another factor in the case. It is obvious that this alliance should be regulated. If too much energy were infused into the playing of the piano the result would be discord—plus a smashed action—while were too little energy given to riding your cycle you would fall off it. This process of judging the amount of force needed for any operation is termed *eumetria*. Co-ordination plus *eumetria* are a combination attainable only by practice, and the result of this practice we term habit.

Your sense organs are tuned up to such a high pitch of efficiency that they can respond to such infinitesimal stimuli as the following:—

1. A pressure on your skin of .002 gramme.
2. A rise or fall in temperature of one-eighth degree Centigrade.
3. The presence of one part of sulphate of quinine in a million parts of water.
4. The presence of one part of iodoform in a million parts of air.²

Your brain is, of course, the seat of your intelligence, but the place commonly assigned to your spinal column is, generally speaking, relatively obscure. Its importance, in fact, is commonly underrated. While your mind governs your muscles to an undoubted extent, it is equally true that their action

² Vide J. C. McKendrick, *The Principles of Physiology*.

can be stimulated when they are, so to speak, disconnected from your brain. Soldiers have been shot in the spine, with the result that all feeling in their legs has been lost, together with the power of moving them. But if you tickled the soles of their feet they would lift their legs quickly away, though their minds did not perceive the tickling. Again, if an electric current is driven into a severed spinal cord the legs of the subject of the experiment kick out with even greater power than those of an uninjured person. Elaborations of these novel experiments have proved that although your brain is the seat of intelligence, "will," impulse and general activity, yet your spinal cord is, by itself, capable of translating an external stimulus into action. In short, your cerebro-spinal nerve centres react to external stimuli.

Further, when the activity of your higher nerve centres is temporarily suspended you can perform reflex and automatic actions through the directing agency of your lower centres, such as when you walk in your sleep. Holbein, during one of his attempts to swim the Channel, was noticed to be asleep for part of the time, though still swimming.

The lower animals exhibit the same trait. You can entirely remove a frog's brain and it will continue to breathe, and its heart will continue to beat: if you give it food it will live almost indefinitely. Writing on the subject of this and similar experiments Professor W. McDougall says: "There seems to be no scope for the intervention of mind as a directing agency. The whole process, from beginning to end, seems to be physically determined by the molecular structure of the nerves and by the mode of interconnection of sensory and motor nerves within the spinal cord, which determines that the excitement transmitted by the sensory nerves shall pass over to this or that group of motor nerves."³

Whether a higher animal—man, for example—can be made to manifest similar activity after death is at present a highly

³ W. McDougall, *Physiological Psychology*.

speculative proposition. But in April, 1922, Barry Pain wrote a most interesting short story centring round this point; his theme being that under given conditions a man may move after death provided that the determination to move is intense immediately before death, when, he speculates, the dead man's brain will have telegraphed an urgent command to his lower centres, which would obey it in response to a sufficiently powerful stimulus. In the story to which I refer a dead man murders his widow's lover immediately *after* his own death!

It is true that matter affects mind. It is equally true that mind affects matter. The identity of the predominant partner in this alliance is difficult to determine. One might as well try to solve the riddle: "Which came first—the hen or the egg?"

Matter can and does affect mind in innumerable ways. So commonplace an ailment as indigestion can affect your mental outlook: it certainly affects your cheerfulness and the desirability, or otherwise, of your society. (If you disagree with me on this point you will encounter no difficulty in recognizing this trait in some of your friends.) Many eminent men have suffered mental agony through it. Carlyle was a martyr to it, and I have not the slightest doubt that crimes have been committed through a state of mind generated through it.

If your food is not properly digested your blood draws poisonous substances from your stomach and alimentary canal. Your blood, charged with the poisonous matter, bathes the walls of your chief organs, including your heart, lungs, stomach, and liver. As these organs are all represented in your brain and as, moreover, your blood travels through your brain to feed your nerve cells it would be a matter for surprise were your brain not affected in some way by the effects of hurried or badly cooked meals or of an unsuitable diet. Says Dr. Bernard Hollander: "I have seen both boys and girls addicted to violent rage without, or on very slight, provocation, who

would destroy anything they could lay their hands upon and be a positive danger to their playmates, making ferocious attacks on them with any instrument available. I have found that in very young children the cause is often to be found in premature and excessive feeding on animal food." ⁴

Again, if you use your brain immediately after a meal indigestion in some form results. Your blood is required in your stomach to enable you to digest your food, and if you engage in intellectual work—which attracts blood to your brain—neither your stomach nor your brain receives its required supply, the activity of both is handicapped and, as each acts and reacts upon the other, the result is a general stagnation. Long years ago Sir Lauder Brunton said: "I was once staying at a hydro when I observed that any patient reading a newspaper within an hour after dinner was fined one shilling. The patients were chiefly engaged in business, and the first thing they turned to was the money column; thus their minds became occupied with commercial affairs and digestion was not so good."

You have doubtless experienced that sluggish state of mind caused through eating a "good square meal." You want to work; you cannot. You want to think; you cannot. You want to growl at somebody; you can, and you do. Do you remember how H. G. Wells tickled us with his clever piece of characterization in his *History of Mr. Polly*? We find the dyspeptic Mr. Polly "sitting on a stile between two threadbare-looking fields," anathematizing the world in general, and Foxbourne, his home, in particular. He calls it names. He calls the weather names. He curses his luck, his business, his wife, his hat—everything except himself—and acts, with complete success, like a peevish brat, growing redder in the face every moment. And the whole comic *crescendo* of rage is the result of a meal of pork, suet pudding, treacle, cheese, beer, pickles, and other things destined to foment internal

⁴ Bernard Hollander, *The Psychology of Misconduct, Vice and Crime*.

strife. One feels that one more mouthful would have driven him to murder somebody. As it was, he eventually set fire to his house and deserted his wife.

And in viewing this question of brain and stomach, we encounter the vicious circle. A debilitated nervous system impairs the digestion; an impaired digestion leads to the fermentation of partly digested food; and this, in its turn, sends poisons into the blood which, as we have seen, transfers them to the brain and the nerve cells.

The state of your blood has a far greater effect upon your conduct than would at first sight seem credible. You admit microbes into your system when you eat or breathe. They find their way into your blood in vast armies. You are provided with a defence force in the shape of another army, your blood being garrisoned with billions of tiny things called leucocytes, which generate the antidote to destroy the invading armies of microbes. If the invaders are stronger than your leucocytes, the latter will be routed, and the poison will penetrate through your capillaries into your brain.

It is one of Nature's paradoxes that she makes us ill through trying to make us well. When the invading microbes are powerful, our leucocytes are reinforced by millions of others. But the very presence of leucocytes in excess is both a cause and a symptom of mental ill-health.

There is much truth in the old axiom that a healthy mind accompanies a healthy body; as also in its fellow, that pure blood generates pure thoughts. Professor D. Fraser-Harris writes: "The transcendent nonsense of the post-impressionist painters arose from an absinthe-poisoned blood. Their blood was abnormal, their nervous system was abnormal, their painting was abnormal; this series looks very like one of cause and effect. 'Pure blood, pure thoughts,' is not a wholly misleading aphorism."⁵

And a striking demonstration of the direct effect of blood

⁵ D. Fraser-Harris, *Nerves*.

upon brain may be witnessed by transfusing the blood of an exhausted dog to the arteries of one that is fresh. The latter immediately becomes exhausted.

Max Pemberton gives us an illustration of an organic affection inducing brain disturbances in his biography of his friend, the late Lord Northcliffe, who died from the effects of endocarditis. Endocarditis is a disease of the endocardium, which is a slimy layer of tissue and cells lining the cavities of your heart. Writing of the organs which were affected in Lord Northcliffe's case, he says: "The earliest to go was the brain. . . . He had become excited beyond reason, attacked most fiercely those for whom he had had the greatest affection, and, finally, in this mood almost of delirium, he went off to the Rhine Provinces, to write those amazing articles which nothing but ignorance of his condition permitted to appear in the columns of *The Times*. . . . Mr. Wickham Steed visited him in Switzerland, and instantly discovered that the poison had temporarily deprived him of his reason."⁶

One school of physiological psychologists affirms that all thought is expressible in concrete terms. A thought, or the registering of a sensation or impression is, they contend, accompanied by movement, or even change, in our cell tissues; and that our neurones are physically active in some way is, at any rate, a reasonable postulate when we realize (as we noticed in Chapter II) that an atom—and every cell in your brain, nerves and body is necessarily composed of atoms—incorporates countless electrons which whirl round at an incredible speed, and form a miniature stellar universe of their own. This movement is accelerated by any physical or mental activity, say the adherents of this school. They affirm, to put it simply, that a message travelling from your brain or other nerve centre to a limb or organ, is like the force which sends each car in a train bumping into the car ahead of it when the train is shunted backwards. The engine (your brain) gen-

⁶ Max Pemberton, *Lord Northcliffe: A Memoir*.

erates and liberates the motive force, which then travels down the nerve concerned (the string of cars), and sends each cell (each car) colliding against its predecessor.

Another school embraces the vibration theory of thought, and holds that the cells do not collide, but vibrate the current of energy from one to another, the intensity of the tremblings being governed by the intensity of the thought-impulse giving birth to them.

An outcome of this theory is the invention by Dr. Albert Abrams, of San Francisco, of an apparatus of two complementary parts, which he has christened the Oscilloclast—the principle of its use being the radio-activity (vibratory property) of our blood and our tissues.

Dr. Abrams contends that all tissue disease is the outcome of interrupted or tardy vibrations of the electrons which form its ultimate components. Suspected tissue, when successfully localized, is tested by the Oscilloclast, the diagnostic part of which registers the rate of its vibrations and their deviations from the normal. The therapeutic half of the apparatus restores the rate of the vibrations to normal by spraying the affected tissue with an electric current loaded with counter-vibrations of the regulated stimulatory nature required.

The power of vibration has, of course, long been recognized by physicists, especially in the realm of sound. And the late Signor Caruso was fond of demonstrating this law by tapping a wine glass, estimating its note and then, by singing into it in the same note, smashing it to fragments.

Dr. Abrams, whose supporters include Sir James Barr and Dr. Mather Thomson, claims to be able to treat cancer, tuberculosis, syphilis and other diseases, and to prove or disprove parentage by comparing the electronic vibrations of the blood of a child with those of its alleged parent, and his evidence in cases tried in the United States has been proved (in one case by the subsequent confession of a party concerned) to be correct. He further claims to be able to distinguish race and

sex by blood vibrations, and in one case, following his electronic treatment of a teaspoonful of blood, successfully diagnosed that the person from whom it had been drawn was suffering from a tumour of the brain, though the blood used in the test had travelled two thousand miles and had occupied several days on the journey.

Of late we have heard a great deal concerning thyroid and its connection with our physical and mental well-being. If your thyroid gland (in your neck) is affected adversely the tissues of both your body and your nerves suffer accordingly. It has been proved that in the case of imbeciles suffering from diseased thyroid glands a diet of the thyroid glands of sheep undoubtedly gives them mental and physical tone. Old people are partly rejuvenated by a similar diet, while the beneficial effects, both to body and mind, of an operation on their thyroid glands have recently received a wide publicity.

Physical injury, such as a broken leg, a wound or other bodily mishap, often produces a harmful effect, or reaction, on the mind. Many a man of flabby mentality, after having been "fussed over" by his womenfolk during a long illness, has left his sick-room a spoilt and useless object. I have known soldiers who, prior to being wounded, were manly and well-disciplined fighters, return to duty after a few months in convalescent camps and on sick furlough completely changed. They had been spoilt by hero-worship, by excessive adulation, and the unblushing homage and advances of that type of woman whose notion of "doing her bit" in the Great War seems to have been to pamper and demoralize a splendid fighting soldier until he became a petulant pest serving one form of punishment or another for one offence or another.

Your memory can be impaired by fever. Malaria sometimes induces temporary insanity by affecting important centres of the brain with the poison introduced to the blood through the medium of a mosquito bite. Over large tracts of India a not uncommon offence is robbery while the victim

is unconscious through the administering of the drug *dhatūra*, which lends itself to the assistance of crime by growing near the wayside. For some time after recovering consciousness the victim's memory is affected, and in the meantime the robber escapes.

The minds of many of us can be affected by climate, weather, temperature, the state of the atmosphere and other contributory causes, from a repugnant occupation to an inharmonious blending of colours. Referring to the high rate of mortality among Russian savants due to the state of their unfortunate country, which three-fourths of the "Christian" nations of Europe have conspired to crush by starvation of body and mind, H. G. Wells says: "The mortality among the intellectually distinguished men of Russia has been terribly high. Much, no doubt, has been due to the terrible hardship of life, but in many cases I believe that the sheer mortification of great gifts become futile has been the determining cause."⁷

Life in India is, to many Europeans, a harmful experience. The heat, the air, the environment—in many cases one of squalor and stench—these and other drawbacks tend to undermine a white man's mental and physical health until his life is hardly worth living. Officers in India, especially when commanding native troops, where they are the only white men for hundreds of miles, tend to become dispirited and morbid. Cases of actual insanity are not infrequent, and it was the effect of the observation of these assembled causes that led Rudyard Kipling to write *At the End of the Passage*.

The innate eccentricities of a woman become accentuated when she is *enceinte*. She develops cravings for all sorts of things, and her irritability may, and frequently does, lead her to temporary insanity. The same observation applies, though to a much lesser extent, to women at the *climacterium*, while the explosive irascibility of old people, due in part to the gradual shrinkage of their brain cells and the slow decomposi-

⁷ H. G. Wells, *Russia in the Shadows*.

tion of certain connective nerve fibres, is proverbial. We noted, in Chapter II, that the average weight of a man's brain is forty-nine ounces. But by the time he has reached the age of seventy-five it has decreased in weight by at least four ounces. Some cells become choked up with fat. Others turn black. All become unhealthy. The capillaries grow frail, their walls wasted and wellnigh transparent (hyaline degeneration) and they are easily blocked up and lose their resiliency. As a result they become choked up with waste matter, and waste matter is sheer poison. The consequences of these processes are the familiar symptoms of old age.

If matter affects mind, which it does, it is equally true that mind affects matter.

If you hypnotize a man and tell him that he will perspire, or grow hot, or cold, he will do so; and the connection between mind and matter is very clearly brought home to us when we watch the behaviour of a man in a temper. The brain storm which temporarily dominates him shows itself in outward and visible signs. His shrill, staccato invective is punctuated with jerky gesticulations. His face is flushed. His eyes blaze. His hands are clenched. His breath comes in short pants, as though he had been running, and altogether he works himself up into a fury—like a spoilt woman—over nothing.

Not so very long ago there was invented an apparatus for recording the physical manifestations of emotion. It is well known that the mention, in conversation, of the name of a person or event which recalls painful or embarrassing memories makes us jump. We pause. We plunge into a more agreeable topic. Perhaps we flush. In short, we display outward signs of inward confusion. But the presence of such embarrassment is not always apparent. Perhaps the cause, being slight, induces a very slight reaction, or perhaps our feelings are subordinated to a rigid discipline.

But some effect, however trifling, will follow a repugnant

stimulus imposed from without. I hope to go more closely into the purely mental side of this in Chapter VI and in Chapter XIV, but its physical significance has been proved by the invention and use of a somewhat novel apparatus of American origin. It is termed the sphygmomanometer, and its use is as simple as its name is complex.

It consists of three distinct pieces of apparatus. The first one—the chronoscope—is actuated by electricity, and measures time. The second one—the kimegraph—records the patient's (or criminal's) breathing. The third one registers his blood pressure.

The operator and his subject sit facing one another. To the mouth of each is arranged a mouthpiece connected by electric wires to the chronoscope. The kimegraph is connected with the subject's chest, and the heart apparatus to his pulse.

The operator slowly reads out a list of words, the first half-dozen or so of which have no relation to the crime of which the subject is suspected, or to the moral difficulty or failing under which he is labouring.

The part the subject plays in this experiment is to give, as quickly as possible, a word which, to his mind, appears to be closely related to the word uttered by the operator, thus:

<i>Stimulus word</i>	<i>Reaction word</i>
Sea.	Water.
Grass.	Green.
Gun.	Noise.

The chronoscope measures, in tenths of a second, the time elapsing between the stimulus word and the reaction word. Sometimes a stop watch is substituted and used by the operator. Suddenly the latter utters a word connected with the crime or mental trouble with which the subject is considered to be concerned. The reaction time is recorded by the chrono-

scope; the sharp intake of the breath is noted by the kime-graph, and the leap in the heart's action is registered by the third apparatus. If this is continued for a quarter of an hour the operator, by comparing the subject's reaction time to each of, say, fifty words, is able to classify each as a stimulus word or a "blind" word, and after a few sittings is in possession of an extraordinarily reliable conception of the subject's mental contents. If he is suspected of a crime he will have given himself away. If he is a mental patient the cause of his psychic disturbance will have been made clearer.

Probably nothing furnishes a stronger illustration of the influence of the mind over the body than does the abnormal condition which we term hysteria.

To the popular mind hysteria signifies a highly emotional state accompanied by alternate fits of laughing and crying. The hysteric is always a woman (film producers regard her as a stock figure) and she is always conceived as showing off her carefully planned parlour tricks only in the presence of a distracted and sympathetic audience.

Like most fallacies this one enshrines a grain of truth.

Then what is hysteria?

Sydenham, a physician who lived and died several centuries ago, defined it in these words: "Hysteria imitates almost every disease which befalls mankind. Whatever part of the body it attacks it will create the proper symptom of that part." And Sydenham's definition is still accepted as valid.

You will observe that he says, not "the hysteric imitates" but "hysteria imitates." The patient is not acting. He, or she, is dominated by the mental disorder, and is temporarily irresponsible.

The witches of mediæval days were undoubtedly hysterics, as were many "saints." The clerics of those days were at a loss whether to impute the grotesque antics of the afflicted one to the influence of God, or to that of the Devil. They made the assistance or otherwise which the hysteric could give

to their own activities the criterion in deciding whether to give credit to Heaven or to the Leader of the Opposition! In the one event the sufferer was canonized: in the other case he was burned. The lunatic country wench, Joan of Arc, who passed through both experiences, would in these days undoubtedly be certified as insane.

The signs of hysteria are many. It may take the form of paralysis—of a limb, of a sense, or of the whole body. A small patch of skin may be rendered insensible to pain (local anæsthesia), and it was the frequent occurrence of this which gave birth to the mediæval superstition that the Devil had touched the hysteric, or witch, on the benumbed part, which was known as “the Devil’s Claw.” On the other hand, a patch may become extremely tender (local hyperæsthesia), and a slight touch will then be felt as a painful burn.

A sense may be temporarily destroyed or temporarily exaggerated, the hysteric may hear voices (auditory hallucinations), or may become deaf, or dumb (aphonia). In this last connection, Major W. J. Adie, R.A.M.C., in giving evidence before the War Office Committee of Enquiry into Shell Shock, in 1920, gave an interesting account of the method employed by him to restore speech to soldiers struck dumb through hysteria. He placed the subject on an operating table, explained that his speech would return to him, and gave him a whiff of ether. At the onset of the “stifling” feeling, the man would try to get rid of the mask. Major Adie then insisted that the mask would be removed when the soldier had said, “Take it away,” but not before. At that instant he pricked the patient vigorously with a pin, on the larynx. As a rule, these combined stimuli compelled the hysteric to ejaculate: “Take it away!”

It is true that hysteria does occasionally manifest the symptoms with which it is popularly associated, when the hysteric alternates between laughing and crying. This disorder is

often a feature of religious revivals which, whatever claims they may put forward in other directions, are undoubtedly responsible for a certain amount of temporary (and sometimes permanent) insanity among the unstable folk whom they attract by their frenzied clatter and frothy ecstasy.

Other causes of hysteria are inherited instability and shock, such as a wound, an accident, or the receipt of bad news. When the frenzy has subsided, and the hysteric may seem to be comparatively normal once more, an indeterminate period follows, during which he, or she, may unknowingly indulge in kleptomania, exhibitionism, vagrancy, or other and less anti-social lapses, such as entering a bath fully dressed.

The hysteric is unstable, lacks purpose, and is wayward. His lack of self-reliance and his indisposition—indeed, inability—to work, make him dependent upon others whom he can use as a prop. He will summon to his aid any and every subterfuge which will help him to do this. He will cheat, lie, forge and malingering, but the lack of concentration and courage which prevent him from working also prevent him from committing any crime involving pluck, application or organization, such as burglary or safe-breaking.

We have long been familiar with the recognition, in one form or another, of the parallel which is discernible between the abstract and the concrete. Literature and rhetoric alike are saturated with this quite logical analogy. Writing of the excuse frequently employed to bolster up moral peccadilloes, the late Father Bernard Vaughan said: "Just as there is no sin in falling short of physical standards of health and beauty, so there is no fault in not attaining to arbitrary standards of moral excellence."⁸

For countless centuries philosophers have been endeavouring to ascertain and expound the relationship between body and mind. Aristotle devoted the best part of a life-time to it,

⁸ Father Bernard Vaughan, S.J., *The Sins of Society*.

and his example has been followed right down the ages. But in spite of the vast volume of thought that has been expended upon the problem, little, if any, progress has been made.

You can have life without mind, but you cannot have mind without life. One school of thought (the Animists) has assumed that mind can exist anywhere—in a stone, for example—but this speculation, which verges dangerously near to the occult, is an illogical and highly improbable heresy.

On the other hand, life is not mind. A tree has life, in a very real sense of the word, but a tree has not mind; though when you reflect upon the uncanny precautions taken by certain plants to protect themselves, and to reproduce themselves by the intermingling of the male and female seeds, it seems less improbable that they are capable of thought and impulse than that a stone is. If mind were matter it would be limited, restricted in space if not in time, whereas if we know nothing else concerning mind we do know that it is limitless.

Let us glance briefly at a few of the chief theories of the relationship between mind and matter.

One school holds that thoughts are secretions of the brain. This theory kills itself. It commits suicide, for no single organ in your body creates its own secretions or secretes its own creations, and the notion that thought is matter would, if pursued to its logical conclusion, land us in the fallacy that we have only to eat sufficient blood-producing foodstuffs to build up a powerful intellect. Our universities would become fattening pens, and their examinations would degenerate to the level of an agricultural show.

Another school believes that mental activity is induced and accompanied by activity in our brain cells. This may be perfectly true, but to state that thought is the mere outcome of our cells jostling each other is surely an exaggeration. What would make the cells jostle each other, unless it were mind, i.e., thought?

A third school affirms that mind and brain travel towards

their common goal on parallel tracks independently of each other. That it is at least a possibility is not unreasonable, but that there must be some connecting link or overlapping margin common to both seems equally reasonable, and that there is, in fact, a connecting link between the physiological and the psychological views is apparent when we examine the ground on which the two theories do tend to meet—for example, in the case of hallucinations. I shall return to this point in Chapter VI.

A fourth school postulates the interactions of the mind and the nervous system. Each, they say, can influence the other. True; but, broadly speaking, the generating power lies in the mind, for even in reflex, automatic actions, such as breathing and the beating of your heart, the motive force lies in, and is operated by, your mind. Even in the case of artificial respiration, when the heart of an apparently dead person may be stimulated into activity, that activity is stimulated by the activity of mind—of another person's mind.

A case where a man's heart continued to beat for five hours after his death occurred at the Royal Infirmary, Manchester, on December 6, 1922. The patient was to have undergone an operation for an abscess on his brain. When the time came for the operation his breathing was found to have stopped. For five hours doctors worked in relays of two applying artificial respiration, and although this kept his heart beating he died.

There are other theories of the relationship between body and mind, but I have summarized the chief ones. And in them all we search in vain for the answer to the question of the origin and nature of thought. Even if your brain cell, as a physical, tangible, visible organism, does cause thought which translates itself into activity (mental or physical or both) it is surely you who set the ball rolling, and not your cell. In spite of the patient labour of philosophers, scientists and psychologists we are not very much nearer to the ultimate

solution. Some day (it may be millions of years hence) the problem will be solved, but at present we can only say—with the other Agnostics: "We do not know."

Modern psychology, while fully admitting the materialistic theory that matter, brain matter, is concerned with psychic energy does so only with the reservation that physiology must take second place to psychology in searching for the key to the riddle. This much we can insist upon: that although brain is undoubtedly concrete matter mind is undoubtedly abstract energy. And the abstract governs the concrete, but is assisted by it. The one is the director, the other is the instrument. That is what Ovid meant when he wrote: "It is the mind that makes the man."

In the *Strand Magazine* for August, 1922, Thomas Alva Edison, the inventor, propounded an original theory of the relationship between brain and mind. He postulated that a man is not, in himself, a life unit, but a combination of life units, just as a building is a combination of bricks. These life units, he admitted, may be our cells, but more probably they are tiny inhabitants of our cells, so minute as to be beyond the range of the best existing microscopes. That each of these life units possesses memory he concluded from the fact that when a hand is burned the ridges and furrows of the scorched fingers reproduce themselves in precisely the same conformation as that existing prior to the mishap—a fact which has long been appreciated by the finger-print experts. Finally, speculates Edison, the life units in our bodies are probably directed by "master units" in a localized area of our brains.

But this, again, is but a speculation which can be neither proved nor disproved, and is only one degree removed from the old philosophic fallacy that "the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile." The nearest that we can approach to anything in the nature of a dogmatic pronouncement is that mental processes react upon one another, but between this alliance and an indissoluble partnership of body and mind there

is a great gulf fixed. The one influences the other; but, like oil and water, they will not mix. They are, and must for the present remain, separate but friendly entities; and any terms, phrases or definitions which imply a hard and fast association between the one and the other must be regarded rather in the light of helpful metaphors.

We can only produce the evidence, examine it, and speculate. Our knowledge is incomplete, and fragmentary at that. Vast tracts await exploration and until we have surveyed the whole field the formulation, to-day, of any rigid theory regarding body and mind may be upset to-morrow. As Professor William McDougall comments: "In spite of heated controversy, the question still remains just where Aristotle left it."⁹

⁹ W. McDougall, *Social Psychology*.

CHAPTER IV

THOUGHTS ON THOUGHT

WHEN Charles Dickens wrote *Hard Times* he gave us, in the person of Mr. Gradgrind, a character counterparts of whom are still to be found. "You can only form the minds of reasoning animals on facts: nothing else will ever be of service to them. Stick to facts, sir!" That was the attitude of Gradgrind.

Sherlock Holmes himself, whom we are invited to regard as a perfect thinking machine, fell into the same error. Sherlock Holmes regarded the human mind as a sort of suit-case. Every man's mental suit-case, he argued, could hold only a limited number of facts packed within it to equip him for his journey through life. But only "useful" facts must be packed in it, all others being left out as superfluous. Further, argued Holmes, should a new fact be discovered which appears likely to be of greater use than a fact already included in the man's mental luggage it must be taken on the journey instead of the other fact. The latter must be forgotten, left behind. Of Holmes himself, in his student days, Dr. Watson says: "Of contemporary literature, philosophy and politics he appeared to know next to nothing. Upon my quoting Thomas Carlyle he inquired in the naïvest way who he was and what he had done. My surprise reached a climax, however, when I found incidentally that he was ignorant of the Copernican Theory and of the composition of the solar system. . . . He said that he would acquire no knowledge which did not bear upon his subject. Therefore all the knowledge which he possessed was such as would be useful to him."¹

¹ A. Conan Doyle, *A Study in Scarlet*.

But education surely depends for its success upon the response which it arouses within you. Unless some emotional desire such as curiosity, wonder or interest is stimulated education is a farce. The mere pumping of Greek paradigms or Latin tags into the mind of any individual, be he fourteen or forty, is an insult to his intelligence. I well remember, as a schoolboy, a remark which the present Bishop of Lichfield (Dr. J. A. Kempthorne) made at a prize distribution at which he spoke. "Some people," he said, "falsely imagine that education consists in connecting a boy's head, by a tube, with a barrel of 'useful knowledge,' and pumping 'useful knowledge' into him until his head shows signs of bursting." In short, you cannot transform a fool into a genius by stuffing his head with wedges of facts. Mr. Gradgrind tried, and Mr. Gradgrind failed.

In the two previous chapters we formed a nodding acquaintance with the structure and functionings of your brain and your central nervous system, and we discovered that these are very closely connected with your bodily activities and their limitations. It will be obvious that these physiological considerations bear with equal, indeed with greater, force upon the thoughts and deeds of the criminal, the lunatic, and that unfortunate hybrid, the criminal lunatic, owing to the more responsive and less disciplined natures with which these folk are cursed.

And before we go on to examine in greater detail the position and prospects of the criminal lunatic at one end of the scale and the slightly abnormal folk whose eccentricities are barely noticeable at the other I invite you to consider briefly such thought-processes of "normal" people (nobody is literally normal) as bear upon the proper understanding of our theme. You cannot hope to understand a broken-down motor-car until you know something about a car which is in good running order.

This book, as I intimated in Chapter I, is written from

the standpoint of Freud, whose system of thought-delving, amplified and buttressed by the researches of hundreds of others, has come to be designated in bulk as modern psychology, or the new psychology. I prefer the former phrase: the latter savours of quackery and there is nothing new about modern psychology except that its doctrines were not codified or clothed with words until recently. The truth is old; the presentation of the truth is new.

I propose, in this chapter, to touch but lightly upon some aspects of the Freudian Theory. We are not so much concerned with its explanation of the mentality of the sane as with the flood of light with which it illuminates the problem of the insane. In fact, we shall see, in Chapter VI, that when we hack our way down to essentials there is very little real difference between the lunatic and the man who thinks he is sane. If, therefore, you find (as you inevitably will) that parts of this chapter on the minds of the comparatively sane bear a strong family likeness to parts of my later chapter on those of the insane I invite you to believe that such apparent repetition is unavoidable owing to the startling relationship existing between the two minds. In very many ways they coincide.

In all living things, including plants, there is embedded a perpetual urge, or striving, against, or in order to adapt themselves to, environment. There is a noticeable purpose in all animate organisms which serves as their common denominator. The rootlets of a growing plant will reach out instinctively towards the richer and well-manured strata of soil. A man exhibits in the highest degree this trait of adaptability. He presses ever forward either to come to terms with his environment or to exchange it for a better one.

Where consciousness of this urge is present in the mind of an animal (including man) it is termed desire. Where it is present, but its presence passes unrecognized, it is termed libido or conation. Your libido is one of the most important

factors in your psychic life. The three basic impulses of fighting, feeding and sex, which we group together and term their alliance the Pleasure Principle, are the main channels along which your libido seeks self-expression. Your libido may be regarded as the will to live, the vital force. It was defined by Nietzsche as the "will to power," and Adler calls it the "desire for superiority," which is another name for the same thing. All these definitions imply that the living organism is perpetually journeying towards security along a road menaced by insecurity.

When your libido, or urge either towards some high ideal or in the direction of some harmful indulgence, becomes apparent to you, its cause is often unknown to you. It exists, in fact, in your unconscious mind. Feeling that it must give an appearance of completeness to the urge—if only for your own peace of mind—your Unconscious invents an imaginary goal towards which it persuades you that you are striving.

To the imaginary object towards which you are pressing Adler has given the name "fictitious goal," or "guiding fiction." Adler maintains that everybody focusses his energy upon some purpose, be he aware of it or not and be the purpose attainable or not, and the only difference between the sane man and the lunatic is that the former can see when his desire is at variance with the facts of life and can regulate it accordingly, whereas the lunatic will smash the universe, if necessary, in order to achieve his end.

Thus a man may fail to earn a living wage, and may, in consequence, be unable to marry. Conflicting impulses now swirl about in his Unconscious (perhaps some of them gain access to his Conscious) and, one thought-process leading to another, his obstructed libido drives him to forge a cheque. To mask his crime he invents the fictitious goal that he was starving. He quite probably *was* starving, but the real cause of his lapse was the desire to keep a wife: the desire to keep himself was of secondary importance.

There is a brighter side to the picture. The sense of helplessness has caused a libido which could not be utilized in one direction to be employed in another. Men whose striving has been denied fulfilment in the sphere they themselves would wish have achieved a compensating victory in some other sphere. Milton was blind, but he gave us literary treasures to see. Humble folk have been oppressed but, by becoming reformers, have devoted their lives to the service of the oppressed. Says one writer: "The discontented man is the hope of the world."²

There is nothing more interesting than the human mind. Your mind is not a one-roomed tenement. It is divided into various levels, or "arcs" as they are termed, each of which, though communicating with each of the others, exercises definite functions and plays a definite part in your psychic life.

Its structure is roughly comparable with that of a lighthouse, with its three rooms one above the other and traversed by a staircase common to them all.

The levels of your mind are three in number: the Conscious, the Unconscious and the Automatic. The last named is the lowest level, and is often termed the reflex arc. We shall have occasion to mention it again presently.

Let us glance at your three levels in turn.

In your Conscious only those activities go on of which you are either directly aware, indirectly aware or able to make yourself aware. For this reason the Conscious is often partitioned, for convenience of explanation, into three subdivisions, thus:—

Conscious	}	Focus of Consciousness.
	}	Fringe of Consciousness.
	}	Foreconscious.

Your Focus of Consciousness is concerned solely and directly with whatever you are considering at the moment: your

² A. Tridon, *Psycho-Analysis: Its History, Theory and Practice*.

consciousness is directly focussed upon it. In your Fringe of Consciousness other thoughts, ideas and sense-impressions hover about ready, it is true, to oust the subject of your attention and take its place with your permission. Your Foreconscious is tenanted with accumulated impressions and concepts which you can recall at will to assist you in contemplating the subject which occupies your Focus of Consciousness.

I cannot think of a better illustration than the one under my nose as I write. I am sitting on the summit of a gorse-clad hill writing this chapter. My Conscious is concentrated upon establishing communication between my mind and yours through the only medium available—that of words. I have certain things to say to you which I have thought out during my walk here, and I am endeavouring so to present my meaning that you will be helped to understand the contents of this book which you are paying me the compliment of reading. The clothing of my thoughts with words, then, is the subject which fills my Focus of Consciousness.

But though I am directly concerned with this immediate aim I am dimly conscious of other things—not so much thoughts as vague sense-impressions. I feel the paper touching the hand which rests upon it. I see my pencil travelling over the surface. I can detect a faint odour of burning wood from an encampment of gipsies not far away. The shrill squeals of delighted urchins slit the air in the valley beneath me. A ploughboy encourages his team down there. Cars purr. Cattle low. Leaves rustle. Little wild things cry. . . .

All these sense-impressions reach me in a hazy sort of way, but they take second place to my chief occupation—writing. In psychological language, they occupy my Fringe of Consciousness.

Still less apparent to my mind is a layer of ideas which I selected as the framework of this chapter on my way here. They comprise facts, illustrations, arguments and recollections

of other and cognate arguments which I have decided to use and have assembled in, I trust, logical sequence in order to transfer my ideas from my mind to yours. This fresh layer of "mind stuff" occupies my foreconsciousness. These three layers, then, comprise your Conscious: the Focus, the Fringe and the Foreconscious.

Your second mental level is your Unconscious. In your Unconscious are assembled all those inherited impulses which constitute a legacy from thousands of generations of your ancestors. The chief of these are, as we have seen, the impulses to fight, to feed, or to breed offspring; and they form the general urge, or libido, for the production, survival and development both of the individual and the race.

Side by side with the libido, or the Pleasure Principle, is another great force which tenants your Unconscious, although it was born later on in the psychic history of man, when the individual found it expedient for him to link his interests with those of his fellows. This other inherited propensity we term the herd instinct, or the Reality Principle—the propensity which urges you to adapt yourself to your environment and to come to terms with your fellow-men.

Your third and lowest level, the Automatic, often termed the reflex arc, is allied with your spinal cord rather than with your brain. This arc man shares in common with all living things. It inaugurates and governs all the automatic, reflex movements which we noted in Chapter III, such as breathing and the beat of the heart. The sharp distinction between this level and the highest, your Conscious, is illustrated by the fact that if your brain becomes diseased or injured your reasoning powers are crippled, though your automatic activities remain unimpaired, whereas if your reflex arc is affected your automatic activities are hampered, while your purely mental operations continue to run smoothly.

Just now I compared the three levels of your mind with the three superimposed rooms of a lighthouse, all connected

by a staircase. For our immediate purpose we can disregard the lowest level, your reflex arc, and concentrate upon the connection between the two remaining levels—the Conscious and the Unconscious.

Your Conscious may be called the topmost room in your mind; your Unconscious is the room immediately beneath it. But all the time, though you are not necessarily aware of it, communication is maintained between the two, just as the rooms in the lighthouse are connected by the staircase. Ideas ascend from your Unconscious to your Conscious by various means. They are feeble things: they cannot climb up unassisted, so they are helped up by two main agents—by the association of ideas, which we will consider presently and by the influence of complexes, which we will consider now.

A complex is an idea, or cluster of ideas, pleasant or unpleasant, buried in your Unconscious, but influencing your Conscious.

Two simple examples:

You are fond of music. It is your hobby. The idea, or complex, of music is firmly rooted in your Unconscious. You overhear the band in Hyde Park playing an air from one of your favourite composers. You stop to listen. If you are an admirer of Sir Frederick Bridge even an invitation to “play bridge” may induce a momentary and whimsical association between the two, while you will consider a performance by the Beecham Opera Company worth much more than a guinea a box!

On the other hand, a man may have committed a trifling crime and escaped detection. The consciousness of guilt haunts him. His actions are influenced, probably for life, by his guilt complex. He will avoid the neighbourhood of his crime. A casual discussion in a railway carriage on some similar crime will drive him to another compartment. This line of conduct will persist indefinitely. He may eventually

succeed in "forgetting" it, i.e., he may manage to drive it down into his Unconscious, but its presence there will indirectly affect his actions for the rest of his existence without his knowing it.

When a complex associated with a strong primitive instinct seeks admission to your Conscious in order to secure an immediate gratification, but is prevented by family, social or other considerations from doing so, two courses are open. It is either inhibited, or driven back by a process termed censorship, into your Unconscious, there to foment discontent "at the back of your mind," or it is permitted to emerge in a masked and more conventional form. A healthy boy, for instance, has the primitive fighting instinct strongly marked. He cannot run amok, knocking people down, so he "lets off steam" by indulging in violent exercise, such as boxing or football. The impulse towards violent aggressiveness has become diluted and shows itself in a form which has received social sanction and even encouragement. When such an impulse manifests itself thus we say it has become sublimated: its pent-up energy releases itself in a less gross form. Thus, in more extreme cases, the sexual impulse, the urge to create, instead of expressing itself in grossly anti-social acts of a sexual nature, sublimates itself and finds relief in the creation of a picture, a poem, a noble building, or a big industrial concern. Sublimation is your mental and moral safety-valve.

When you think of one thing it frequently happens that some other thought leaps to your mind to keep it company. Many modern thinkers, especially Locke, Hamilton and John Stuart Mill, have devoted a great deal of time to this phenomenon, which has come to be known as the Association of Ideas. The assembled results of their researches, which are, to a large extent, endorsed, though amended and clarified, by modern psychologists such as Freud, Jung and Adler, have induced the formulation of a canon that all passive thoughts are correlated by one of three processes—the laws of Con-

tiguity, Similarity and Contrast. And when I use the term "passive" I mean to imply that no conscious effort accompanies the passage of your mind from one idea to another, as would, for instance, mark the different stages in the unravelling of a complicated problem in mathematics. Ideas, then, become associated by Contiguity, by Similarity, or by Contrast.

In Association by Contiguity the element of chance predominates. Two objects, or incidents, are associated by reason of some chance link between them. No process of reasoning enters into the matter. For example, if you count from one to five, your mind will urge you to go on to six, for the simple reason that five and six have always been neighbours in your mind. You can ponder on this for a lifetime and burrow into countless treatises, but you will never discover any other reason for it, because there is none.

The essence of Association by Similarity is that two ideas are linked together through the medium of a third. Reason enters here. The one object, or idea, stimulates a complex in your mind associated with a previously formed conception of something common to both ideas and the second object is visualized. For example, whenever I see a certain friend of mine I think of Arnold Bennett. The reason is that the one is almost the "double" of the other, and the two are linked in my mind by their similarity of appearance. Again, whenever I am reading anything by either Stacy Aumonier or Thomas Burke I am reminded of the other. Each possesses a wonderful gift of expressing his thoughts in a delicate melody of words, which invariably makes me think of the work of the other. There are differences of a subtle nature between their respective styles, but each gives me an impression of fragile beauty which the wordcraft of no other author conveys in quite the same way.

In Association by Contrast the thought of one thing is summoned up by another by virtue of their striking dissimilarity.

If you were to walk along one of the streets of Poplar and note the squalor, stench and general hideousness of the surroundings among which thousands of your fellow creatures are expected to exist (one cannot say "live") your thoughts would at once fly to the pampered parasites of another class; and you would reflect bitterly upon the injustice that for every flower in such people's hothouses there are a thousand human beings who cannot afford to buy one! The principle of Association by Contrast is the essence of such familiar phrases as "black and white," "night and day," "summer and winter," and "rich and poor."

Just as a process of association accompanies the comparison of one conception with another, so it constitutes an adjunct to your recollection of experiences and things visualized or encountered in the past. All thoughts flow through your mind in a never-ending stream. Even when you are asleep your Unconscious is active. It sometimes manifests itself in the guise of dreams. At other times it is working unknown to you. You should have no difficulty in remembering at least one occasion when you have gone to bed worried over some insoluble problem and on waking in the morning found that the problem had solved itself during your sleep. You had been considering it unconsciously, and your Unconscious had found the solution.

Modern psychology affirms that associative memory responds to two laws. Firstly, when a definite part of your nervous apparatus is pricked by a given stimulus its actuation ever after by that stimulus (or by an allied stimulus) will be accomplished more easily. In the second place, if two or more parts of your nervous apparatus are stimulated at the same moment they become "joined" to each other. As a result of this alliance, if one of them is at any time prodded into activity its ally will become correspondingly active.

An example of the first law: You stay at an hotel. You are grossly overcharged. You avoid it ever afterwards.

An example of the second law: During a painful experience through which I once passed there was a strong odour of celery. Whenever I smell celery now I am reminded of it.

Should a memory association occur frequently we may say, in psychological metaphor, that it engraves an associative channel in your mind. Such a channel is termed an acquired association of memory. William James defined conscious memory as "the knowledge of an event, or fact, of which, in the meantime, we have not been thinking, with the additional consciousness that we have thought of, or experienced, it before."³

Modern psychology does not recognize the existence of free will. When you appear to choose between two alternatives your choice is governed by the sum-total of various predisposing causes, such as your inherited tendencies, your acquired habits, your environment, the influence of your previously formed views on that and cognate topics, and the subconscious recollection of your conduct on a previous and similar occasion. When you have known a man intimately for a number of years you can prophesy with certainty his views on any given topic, new or old, and the course which he will adopt when confronted by any given set of circumstances. It is obvious that the man's will is not free. His Ego—call it his "views" or his "mind stuff" if that will help you—compels him to act and think in one way, and in one way only.

Closely allied with free will is that mental attribute which we call intuition, which is popularly supposed to denote a conclusion reached, or an opinion formed, without the intermediate process of reasoning. Women are supposed to possess intuition in a highly effective degree. But this is only a polite fiction which, when dispassionately scrutinized, means only that a woman jumps to conclusions. If she takes the trouble to test her conclusions by reasoning or by ascertaining whether they square with the known facts as they are (and not as she may find it in her interests to pretend they are) she proceeds

³ William James, *A Textbook of Psychology*.

either to distort the facts, or, more rarely, to entertain unconfessed doubts as to the magic of her "intuition."

The illusion of free will is responsible for the fallacy by which we flatter ourselves that all our actions are the outcome of logical reasoning, whereas they are but the natural outcome of the leverage exerted on our Conscious by our inherited propensities and our masses of buried and interlaced complexes.

Modern psychology, in discarding the illusion of free will in favour of the law of determinism, has been accused of accepting fatalism. If fatalism were logically sound modern psychology would accept it, and should the day ever dawn when fatalism is proved to be logically sound modern psychology will accept it on that day. But there is this difference between determinism and fatalism. Determinism says that a given man will, at a given time, and in the presence of a given set of contributory circumstances, act in a certain way and in no other. Fatalism says that *all* men would make the same response, which is a very different thing and one that is untenable when tested by experience. If a runaway horse bolts along the street will every man in the street try to stop it, or only a few, or one, or none?

What we term choice is proved by the doctrine of determinism to be an illusion. A burglar may decide to break into a house. His plans are complete and the coast is clear. All that remains is for him to obey his primitive impulse of acquisitiveness, itself an offshoot of the feeding impulse, which, in its turn, is a sub-division of Freud's Pleasure Principle. On the other hand, there is a conflict between his impulse of acquisitiveness and another factor—the fear of arrest. This sense of fear is the outcome of another primitive instinct—the instinct to fly from danger. If a policeman approaches the burglar may bolt. In this case the one instinct has triumphed over the other. The Reality Principle (the emotion of fear induced by the approach of the policeman) has ousted the Pleasure Principle. Another burglar in the same dilemma

might have hidden from the policeman, but the impulse to hide is only another primal urge, and the apparently free decision of the second burglar to hide would also signify the victory of one instinct over another. A third burglar, in the same position, might stun the policeman and burgle the house. Here again, the fighting impulse defeats the fear impulse and enables the burglar to satisfy his acquisitive impulse. To crystallize the argument, each burglar would be the toy of his primitive impulses operating in his particular Ego. The elements of chance, choice and free will do not enter into the matter. What you delude yourself into labelling as an act of free will is nothing more or less than the reaction or response which your particular personality makes to the circumstances which prick it to make that response.

Judgment is the name which we give to the result achieved by the association of complexes. Take the case of a child and a nettle. The child sees a small green plant of no striking beauty, the leaves of which, if he is close enough to see them, are covered with minute hairy spikes like his father's unshaven chin. He is told that it is a nettle. An elementary complex is born in his mind. Whenever he sees another nettle plant the sight of it will stimulate the nettle complex introduced to his mind by the sight of his first nettle. The weed and the word are wedded. But suppose he has touched his first nettle and has been stung. This trifling mishap will have given birth to a new complex in his mind—the sting complex. He will have the idea of what a sting feels like embedded in his mind and when he, so to speak, lays them side by side and contemplates them the thought of the one is associated with that of another, and in future he will know that if he touches a nettle he will be stung. And this comparison of complexes is what is popularly termed judgment.

In the long run, all action is impulsive. You have in you a legacy from thousands of generations of ancestors. That legacy is the impulse to do certain things—to fight, to feed,

to create. Those impulses, responding to the diluting influences of time, experience, education, and so on, have assumed a masked form in which their origin and nature is apparent only to those who know how, when and where to seek them and are not deterred by mental laziness from seeking them.

The impulse to cheat, for instance, is only a masked form of the fighting instinct. Tens of thousands of years ago man lived only by fighting for the right to live. He had to fight the wild beasts who threatened to molest him and his mate in their cave or primitive mud dwelling. He was also compelled (by the operation of the feeding instinct) to fight and kill the wild beasts in order to eat them. To-day, the descendant of that man must also live by fighting. He has to fight his way in the world by besting those who are stronger intellectually, socially or financially. Sometimes the effort to do this proves too much for him and his feelings are outraged by the spectacle of himself burning up nervous energy in a futile effort to climb up to the level of one who is there not necessarily because of his own deeds but often in spite of them. The disappointed and enraged under-dog then passes through a mental crisis and, perhaps against his better judgment or, as modern psychology would explain it, as the outcome of a clash between two rival patterns of complexes, he resorts to cheating as the short cut to the immediate fulfilment of his longings.

The man's primitive instincts impel him to do this, reinforced by his past experiences. The collision between them and the rottenness of a social system which permits gain without effort is the cause of which his conduct is, in his case, the inevitable effect. Every man is the toy of his instincts and his circumstances. When W. E. Henley wrote: "I am the master of my fate, I am the captain of my soul," he was unconsciously indulging in meaningless froth. When Henley's statement is analyzed, pruned, qualified, diluted and regarded with our tongues in our cheeks it is found to incorporate a germ of truth, but what a strangling of truth he offers us!

Your instincts, as we have seen, are stereotyped, but gradually respond to education, circumstances and environment, though if your environment is suddenly changed or broken down your instincts make themselves apparent, just as a man's nakedness is seen when his clothes are ripped open by lightning.

The difference between the instincts of man and those of the lowest animals is that the associative areas in the more highly developed brain of man render him capable of adapting himself, more or less, to his environment. In other animals the associative areas are less efficient. In the lowest types of all they are virtually non-existent, and a member of one of such types is able to perform only a limited number of actions. One type of ant, for example, whose life consists of little else than fighting and marching will, if put in a glass jar, proceed to "form fours" with others of its type and march round and round for days on end. It feels that it must do something. Its nervous discharge, responding to that stimulus, urges it to do the only thing it can do; so it does it.

Pavloff, a Russian savant, made an exhaustive series of experiments in the field of reflex actions, such as the one I have just mentioned. We have seen that many of our actions are automatic responses of a spontaneous nature. Pavloff showed how such responses may be rendered ineffective by the operation of a simultaneous but more powerful stimulus. He took a dog and fed it daily for some months. Every time the dog was fed he rang a bell. Thus the dog came to associate the ringing of the bell with the eating of food. Now when any animal eats food saliva enters its mouth. In popular parlance "its mouth waters." In time the dog's mouth began to water whenever the bell was rung, whether at its meal-time or not. Pavloff concluded his experiments by proceeding a step further, and ascertained that though he could make the dog's mouth water at the sound of the bell the flow of saliva was arrested by another and simultaneous noise.

The principle which he accordingly announced was that the activity of a set of nerves may be paralyzed by the greater activity of another set responding to a more powerful stimulus. This phenomenon is termed a conditional reflex.

Similarly, complying with the law of psycho-physical parallelism, which asserts that processes in the physical world have their counterpart in the psychic world, a like reaction is noticeable in the sphere of your complexes.

Your libido, though easily recognizable when you are performing some act directly associated with one of your basic primitive impulses, is expressing itself all day and every day in countless ways which are not only less obvious but also, in many cases, incredible at first sight.

Just as primitive man sought to make things his own—food, weapons, clothes, shelter and other necessities to the fulfilment of his impulse to live and transmit that life to others—so does the modern man seek to obtain those things which will make life more easy for him to live. This impulse to acquire is closely allied with that of fear—in ancient man, fear of destruction; in modern man, fear of poverty. In its debased form it connotes the grasping of things over and above a man's needs, or for the furtherance of excessive pleasure. The child, by reason of his primitive and undeveloped nature, grabs everything within reach, sucks it, breaks it, throws it away. Altruism has not yet been grafted on to his primitive nature. His attitude is egocentric, autocratic and self-laudatory.

Curiosity is allied with wonder, and is noticeable in your desire to scrutinize anything which excites your wonder. It is a sublimated survival of the desire of the very young child to explore his own person and that of his mother and playmates, to which Freud has given the designation of the auto-erotic state, which we will mention again in Chapter VI.

When your psychic energy is utilized in the carrying out of your natural response to a primitive instinct, you experience,

at the conclusion of the act, a feeling of pleasure, or satisfaction. After three hard rounds with the gloves an amateur boxer feels a glorious glow of satisfaction. Epicures are said to experience a similar sense of well-being after a carefully selected meal. Each is satisfying a primitive impulse—the one by fighting, the other by feeding. When an artist or an author has achieved some fine piece of creative work, he has won a similar feeling of satisfaction—though on a higher plane—through the sublimation of his sexual instinct, the instinct to create. Conversely, the prevention, denial, or limitation of the release of such energy-floods induces a feeling of dissatisfaction.

When a complex is so strong, through its reinforcement by allied complexes, or by a situation which constitutes such a vigorous stimulus to prick it into intense activity that all opposing complexes (inhibitions) operate against it in vain, we term this mental state a passion. We recognize every day manifestations of a passion when a man falls in love, and we see a higher form of the same passion when another man throws up a lucrative appointment, or the chance of a life of ease, in order to better his fellows.

Interest is a much milder form of passion. Here, again, a powerful complex, when stimulated by an allied complex, or by some external incident or state of affairs, joins hands with it, and, at the same time, all repugnant or inharmonious complexes are temporarily or permanently repressed.

Attention is more or less allied with interest. The latter is a distant relative of the Pleasure Principle. But occasions arise when the operation of the Reality Principle renders it expedient that your mind should be devoted to some distasteful or semi-distasteful occupation, to the exclusion of all complexes of the more desirable Pleasure Principle. In such cases the Reality Principle reinforces a weaker complex in order to bring about what appears to be a deliberate act of will, in the shape of a forced concentration upon a repugnant

occupation or theme. In interest the emotional side predominates. In attention the position is intellectually coloured.

For example, a doctor wishes to go to the theatre (interest). A 'phone message summons him to a patient. The Reality Principle—composed, in this case, of the facts that some one is suffering, that public opinion would condemn his refusal to render aid, that his own altruism would likewise frown upon it, and that he has to earn his living—forces him to give assistance to his patient (attention).

To a very large extent your thoughts are influenced by the world around you—the town in which you live, your occupation, your friends, their views, events in the political and industrial worlds, and so on. In the course of the vigorous strides which contemporary thought is making towards ultimate truth a theory which is clamouring more and more for recognition is that which has been christened the materialist conception of history. This theory postulates that all our social, legal, educational and political institutions and their periodical fluctuations are the outcome of our reaction to our environment. The materialist conception of history also affirms that the extent to which a man reacts to his environment and the degree in which he attempts to cope with it together give birth to his behaviour. Bertrand Russell crystallizes the modern theory of materialism thus: "The view that all mental phenomena are causally dependent upon physical phenomena."

The man upon whom the laws of his country press but lightly or at whose conduct they connive is lulled into a state of acquiescence with things as they are. But the man upon whom they press heavily, although his conduct is no more culpable than that of the other man, may suffer from a sense of persecution which will urge him to long to smash the whole fabric of them. A destitute woman is sent to prison for stealing a lump of coal in the middle of winter from the cellar of an individual who "earns" a five-figure income by rigging the

markets and swindling his fellow-men. Law and justice are not interchangeable terms.

A phrase which is often employed by Freudians, especially in its sociological sense, is "the illusion of finality"—a belief cherished by sluggish thinkers and shared by those who think it too much trouble to think about thinking. "Everything is as it should be," they pontificate. "What was good enough for my father is good enough for me." When a new problem arises, or a strike breaks out, or the claims of orthodox religion or those of a too rigid convention are successfully challenged they look upon these symptoms of intelligent restlessness as a personal affront, a criminal act, a piece of impertinence. It is the mental attitude common to Pall Mall and the Oldest Inhabitant.

They take things as they are, hope they will continue to be as they are, and see no reason why they should be other than they are. They share the mental fatuousness of the sleek clergy of the Victorian era who sprinkled their congregations of withered spinsters with the blessed assurance that, this life done, they would grace a localized heaven marshalled in rows and crowned with gold.

Your thoughts, then, are influenced by your temperament. And when you speak of a man's temperament you mean the reaction which his Ego makes to his environment. The man whom we sometimes describe as possessing common sense is often undeserving of the compliment. The apparent mental stability which he displays is frequently the outcome of his indifference to facts and circumstances. He is calm not because he has overcome difficulties but because he has not taken the trouble to overcome them. He just lets things slide. Another type of man is he who changes his views as the facts of life are changed. He is adaptable. He does not bother to alter his environment. He lets his environment alter him.

Variation between the thought-capacities of one person and

another will obviously influence the trend and nature of their respective thoughts. Transfer your own thoughts for a moment from mental variation to physical variation. If you walk down the road you will meet different types of people. You will see short, tall, dark, fair, thin, fat, attractive, plain, strong and weak. But each of these shares many points of resemblance with each of the others—two legs, two arms, upright posture, the faculty of speech, and so on. These attributes enable you to apply the term "human being" to every one of them. Now allow your mind to return to thought, and the forms which it assumes and you will be struck by the parallel which is apparent there. The minds of your friends will appear to exhibit marked variations. One is dull but sincere; another is brilliant but volatile; a third is sociable but lazy, and so forth.

At the time when the United States entered into the Great War and saved the situation, an American statistician, Professor Goddard, drew up a schedule of tests whereby one million seven hundred thousand recruits were classified mentally, the object being that every soldier should be assigned to that branch of the army to which he appeared to be best suited. The assembled results of Professor Goddard's experiment proved to be of immense service to psychologists. He classified each recruit according to his mental age. And by that he meant that in his opinion the mind of every person, on his reaching a certain age, arrives at a stage beyond which improvement is impossible. It has attained to its permanent intelligence level. The mental capacity of an imbecile, for instance, never exceeds that of a very young child, even though he should live to be forty (the prime of life). The mental capacity of others may never exceed that of a child of six, or nine, or twelve. Professor Goddard found that the mental age of the average man is fourteen; that of a genius is eighteen or nineteen. Beyond a person's mental age his capacity is at a standstill, though on the other hand his mental quality can

be speeded up by study and encouragement to take an intelligent interest in things.

In brief, then, variation denotes the inborn mental capacity of one individual, as compared with another, beyond the limits of which he cannot proceed any more than he can alter his height or the colour of his eyes.

My cursory observations in this chapter are, as I announced at its beginning, intended to indicate briefly the conclusions which modern psychology has reached so far. I have endeavoured to restrict my remarks to those factors only which tend to bear perhaps more than others upon our understanding of the minds of all people, but especially of the minds of those folks whom we regard as at variance with the world and the people in it.

The more detailed scrutiny of the mentality of these weaker brethren I have reserved for the next chapter but one, where I trust you will let me introduce you to what is, to my mind, the most fascinating aspect of the theme to which this book is devoted.

CHAPTER V

SHAMMING

THOSE whose conversational stock-in-trade embodies an assortment of proverbs designed to meet every contingency seldom fail to include in their repertoire the axiom that "men were deceivers ever."

Simulation, and its twin brother, dissimulation, are the outcome of the deep-rooted instinct of self-preservation. Long centuries ago the weak, when in danger from the predatory designs of the strong, whom they could not defeat in open combat, sought refuge in disguise or concealment. Simulation is pretending to be something which you are not. Dissimulation is pretending not to be something which you are.

And in this brief chapter I want to swerve slightly from my main theme and to invite you to accompany me while I digress towards the subject of criminals and others who, for reasons of their own, pretend to be insane.

A lunatic never pretends to be a criminal. He is too sane to do that! He never pretends to be anything: he is the one man who is in deadly earnest, and he could give points, in questions of integrity, to many of us who, rightly or wrongly, consider that we are sane.

Pretending to be insane is no new subterfuge. Lycophron, a Greek savant of the time of Ptolemy Philadelphus (*c.* 35 B.C.), alludes to the feigned madness of Ulysses, who, when conscripted to fight against the Trojans, began to plough a field and to sow salt in its furrows. Palamedes, a witness of this by-play, tested him by setting Telemachus, Ulysses' son, on the ground in front of the plough; but Ulysses, on beholding his son, pulled up the team and thereby admitted malingering.

We noticed, in Chapter III, that hysteria frequently assumes the form of malingering—though of unintentional malingering: it is the disorder which simulates the symptoms of some other disease, and not the patient himself. Imitation is, in fact, widely regarded as the essence of hysteria, and Charcôt went so far as to call hysteria *la grande Simulatrice*.

I am reminded of a strange case which I once had to have investigated. During the Great War a private soldier in a unit under my command furnished, at the time, an interesting conundrum for the Medical Officer by reason of the fact that he was noticed, when walking, to be doing so on tip-toe with one foot, while its fellow met the ground in the normal manner.

The question at issue was whether the man was a genuine hysteric or a malingerer. On the one hand he had a neurotic medical history—partly inherited, partly acquired—and he was introspective, solitary, and inclined to be insubordinate. On the other hand his symptoms became exaggerated when there were rumours of the impending departure of a reinforcing draft, while when he himself was included in one he made a point of “parading sick” in apparent distress.

It was decided to test the state of the foot concerned under the influence of an anæsthetic, when the paradox emerged that he both was, and was not, a malingerer. He had, for many months, malingered by deliberately walking with his foot in the arched position, and for so long had he done so that the muscles actuating it had tended to set in their originally feigned rigidity.

On being arrested, or at his trial, a criminal will sometimes pretend to be a simpleton. His object is twofold. He hopes to create the impression that he is not quick-witted enough to have planned and carried out the crime with which he is charged and, secondly, he hopes, by his dazed and halting attitude, to gain time when answering awkward questions.

The aim of an examining counsel in such a case is to decoy the malingerer into betraying himself by his contradictions. A

malingerer of this type may successfully maintain the rôle of fool in his answers to ninety-nine questions, but, when caught off his guard, or when tired or "rattled," will betray himself by an intelligent and ready answer. With this type of man one has to proceed carefully, slowly, craftily. It does not do to let him think he is suspected. A persistent, sustained, relentless flow of questions put to him in an undertone will, sooner or later, reveal the true state of the position. Lead him, coax him, sound him, decoy him, but never attack him. He will capitulate in the end.

It is significant that a skrimshanker, while taking care to have an attack of epilepsy, mania or other mental disorder in front of any one who, he decides, may be deceived by his simulation, thinks twice before attempting to hoodwink a medical man. He knows that the latter knows too much!

But among the uninformed the malingerer treads less warily. The proverbial credulity of country folk was illustrated by a case of malingering which occurred in November, 1922. The malingerer pretended that he was a soldier who had been reported as killed in the Great War. The tale which he invented was that he had been imprisoned in Germany for a long time, and when the widow of the real soldier (whose marital rights he had enjoyed) protested that he was shorter and different in other ways from her husband, he succeeded in convincing her that the "changes" in his appearance were due to his prison hardships. When pressed to recall incidents of his past life which would go to prove the genuineness of his claims, he feigned loss of memory, though when the police appeared he remembered to disappear!

Speaking broadly, malingerers tend to go to extremes; they overact the part, and consider that their rôle must be interpreted in spectacular terms. They gesticulate. They talk in italics. They overwork their superlatives. Consequently, epilepsy, with its melodramatic accompaniments, makes an irresistible appeal to them.

A witness will occasionally have an epileptic seizure in the middle of his examination. If such an attack occurs at a moment either distinctly favourable or distinctly unfavourable to the witness or to the accused, its genuineness is obviously suspicious, and may be regarded as part of a preconceived plan to throw discredit upon somebody, to enlist sympathy, or to afford a means of escape from, or of preparing a diplomatic answer to, an embarrassing question.

Such subterfuges as feigned epilepsy are as old as the valleys, and as a rule sudden illness in court does the party concerned more harm than good. Even if genuine, it leaves a feeling of uneasiness and distrust, and may jeopardize the interests of the person who, at fight sight, has everything to gain by it.

If a prisoner or witness is suspected of feigning epilepsy or a fainting fit, he can be decoyed into giving himself away if the doctor or police official remarks to a colleague, in an audible undertone, that he should have immediate treatment, and goes on to suggest something which will be markedly unpleasant for the "sick" man. In one case, the doctor in attendance observed that the patient should have his spine cauterized with a red-hot poker. The sufferer immediately recovered.

Dr. Tennyson Patmore, formerly of Wormwood Scrubbs, treated a convict who malingered epilepsy by remarking, in his hearing: "There is no medical treatment for epilepsy except a protracted course of very low diet." Another recovery.

Among the symptoms of an epileptic seizure are a livid face and lips, a frothing at the mouth, and a lacerated tongue—the latter produced by the epileptic having bitten his tongue during the course of his paroxysm. His pupils, too, are dilated.

Now, while it is fairly easy for a malingerer to produce most of these symptoms, the dilation of his pupils presents a serious difficulty. He can generate a frothing at the lips by concealing a piece of soap between his cheek and gums. He can induce a livid complexion by certain excesses; and there

is nothing to prevent a man from biting his own tongue; but he can only dilate his pupils by taking certain drugs—such as opium or paraldehyde. But as these are practically unobtainable without a medical certificate, and, when taken, are far from odourless (paraldehyde emits an appallingly offensive smell), and as the first thing that an astute doctor will look for is evidence of drug-taking, feigned epilepsy rarely, if ever, succeeds.

A sure test, as we have seen, is to frighten and deceive the suspect at the same time.

A little drama, taken from life:—

A man fell down in the street, apparently in an epileptic fit. "Get a bundle of straw," suggested an onlooker. It was brought. "Lay him on it," he continued. Volunteers did so. "Set fire to it!" was the next command. Headlong flight of patient.

Apart from extreme measures in unmasking an impostor, there are at least three other methods of discriminating between true and false epilepsy.

The genuine epileptic, in falling, topples over without resistance. He frequently hurts himself, but his expression betrays no knowledge of his injury, and no cognizance of its pain. The simulant takes care to fall in a "gentlemanly" manner. He selects the best place, subsides without unseemly haste, and with an eye to effect, and, whether he hurts himself or not, he treats the onlookers (he never malingers when alone) to a series of grimaces calculated to portray suffering and woo sympathy. He is an actor—a bad one.

The genuine case generally emits one cry during the seizure. Now, this cry is easily recognizable. It has a *timbre* of its own: it is like nothing else. On the other hand, the genuine epileptic may not shout at all. But the malingerer overacts his part, uttering a poor imitation of this cry at too frequent intervals.

In the true epileptic, many of the body muscles jerk and

tremble convulsively, but he seldom moves his limbs. The sham epileptic waves his limbs about, but does not ruffle his muscles—for the simple reason that none but a genuine epileptic or a trained contortioner can do this.

Half way between genuine and feigned insanity, we find cases where a criminal, though apparently sane, and without having been certified insane at any other period of his life, discloses the fact that a near relation has been, or is at the moment, confined in an asylum.

Such cases, owing to the fluid state of medical opinion as regards insanity, are frequently given the benefit of the doubt where the charge involves a point of criminal responsibility, as lawyers interpret the phrase, and, in view of the undoubted influence of heredity and consanguinity in the causation of insanity, this attitude, whether right or wrong, is undoubtedly a reasonable one. The accused person may or may not share the mental imperfections of his relation but, to recall an old legal axiom, it is better that a hundred guilty men should escape the consequences of their acts than that one innocent man should be punished.

Unfortunately, the criminal is aware of this, and, obeying his primitive instinct of self-preservation, trades upon this advantage, and makes capital out of the wretchedness of his own flesh and blood.

In cases, too, where an accused party has previously been certified as insane, but has been discharged from an asylum as recovered, the same eagerness to use that fact as a lever is very frequently apparent. But here, too, clemency is perhaps to be recommended. The dividing line between sanity and insanity is, in numerous cases, so difficult to discern that neither the judge nor the public conscience can inflict punishment in a doubtful case. We English have our faults, but open bullying is not one of them.

Cases, too, are not infrequent where a man may be genuinely unbalanced one day, and, though calm the day after,

trading on his *malaise* of the day before. Since fluctuation of his nervous state is one of the most marked symptoms of the genuine neurasthenic (whose mercurial temperament is proverbial), the boundary between the neurotic and the skrimshanker is, at first sight, undetectable.

There is not much malingering in convict prisons. The convict possesses this advantage over the lunatic; he knows when his sentence will expire. The lunatic himself may expire before his sentence does, and the convict, warned by the terrible uncertainty of asylums, is unwilling to exchange what is, after all, definite, for that which is tantalizingly indefinite.

Occasionally, two convicts will feign illness (not necessarily insanity), in order to seize the chance of conversing surreptitiously with each other while waiting to see the Medical Officer. Words may not pass audibly between them; lip-reading is cultivated among old lags, and is an accomplishment which has proved "a very present help in time of trouble."

At Dartmoor Convict Prison there is a barbarous contrivance designed to apply a test when a convict is suspected of shamming insanity. It is a cupboard made of glass, lined with iron bars, and just large enough to enclose one man standing upright. The suspected malingerer is stripped naked, and placed in this cage. Above his head is a cold shower, which is turned on and allowed to play over him for a period not exceeding a quarter of an hour.

The principle of its use is that, if the convict is feigning, the severity of this cold douche will force him to confess that fact. If he is genuinely insane, the idea will obviously not enter his head, and he will stay there until exhausted or until the expiration of the quarter of an hour. It is only fair to record that this extremely brutal apparatus has only been used once since 1901.

Cases are not unknown where a person who has malingered insanity for any length of time has found an outraged Nature redressing the balance by depriving him of his mental poise.

It is a fact that if you suggest a certain state of mind to yourself intensely enough, and for long enough, you will find your mind responding to your autosuggestion. A malingerer feigning a delusion may find himself—or others will—genuinely harbouring that delusion.

And if Nature does not punish the malingerer others will expose him. Insanity is normally leisurely in its approach. Should a person suddenly “go mad” at the moment best suited to himself, the inference is obvious, though the emotional strain of being suddenly accused of a crime may, and often does, cause a temporary nerve storm.

A lunatic always insists that he is sane, and appears less mad on the approach of strangers. A malingerer says, in effect, that he is mad, and redoubles his efforts to be considered mad. The lunatic says: “I know I’m sane, because you madmen call me mad.” The sane man says: “I must be sane, because I know I’m mad.” The malingerer says: “I know I’m sane, but I’ll pretend to be mad.”

We have touched upon a few important points in the detection of feigned epilepsy. When we pass to the wider field of insanity in general, our task is more complicated, though the grasp of seven leading considerations will facilitate a correct diagnosis.

Firstly, has the suspect anything to gain by feigning insanity? We sometimes find, during murder trials where the case seems to be going against the accused, that a hint is thrown out that he may perhaps be *non compos mentis*, the object apparently being to save the accused’s neck by persuading the court to find him “guilty but insane.” Prisoners are, of course, aware of this. Frederick Rothwell Holt, who was convicted at Manchester Assizes in March, 1920, of murdering Mrs. Elsie Breaks at St. Annes, suddenly “suffered” from visual and auditory hallucinations halfway through his trial, and pretended to be pursued by powerful hounds, who tried to tear him limb from limb!

Secondly, an attempt should be made to discover a possible cause of the prisoner's insanity. Insanity, it must be remembered, is an effect. It may be the effect of a head injury, of worry, of economic stress, of heredity, or of internal conflict. If the accused is shown to have a clean heredity, a serene previous life, no money worries—if, in short, there seems to be no reason why he should be insane except to avoid being saddled with the consequences of his act—he is probably shamming.

Thirdly, the expression of his eyes must be carefully but inobtrusively watched. It is a maxim that a sane malingerer may be astute enough to act a part while being directly interrogated, but when his questioner's attention is momentarily diverted his expression will change. He will discard the mask. And the most capable actor living cannot sustain a part indefinitely. Fatigue will impair his talent. Further, if the malingerer overhears a remark implying that his ruse is making no impression the expression of his eyes will betray his appreciation of the position. In the case of a genuine lunatic such remarks would, of course, pass unheeded.

Fourthly, the malingerer may, like the epileptic, be over-acting his part. While it is possible for an insane person to be suffering from more than one form of insanity (mania, delusions, obsessions, melancholia, and so on) cases of this sort are comparatively rare. When the malingerer, like the small boy in the tuck shop, wishes to "try the lot," he is a bigger fool than he wants people to think he is.

Fifthly, should a suspect be able to recall without effort facts relating to everything except the crime with which he is charged, manifesting, on its mention, haziness, uncertainty or forgetfulness, his attitude is probably simulated. At the same time it must be remembered that loss of recollection of one specific thing may co-exist with an otherwise clear memory in the case of epileptics.

Sixthly, a lunatic—especially a maniac, the remnants of

whose mind are proverbially active—rarely sleeps soundly. His slumbers are disturbed by the simmerings of desires and impulses which jostle each other for an outlet or for expression, and his sleep is punctuated by ejaculations and mutterings of an incoherent though persistent nature. The malingeringer, on the other hand, sleeps soundly, often because he is exhausted by the effort of malingering.

Seventhly, an impostor may loudly proclaim his intention of committing suicide. This the genuine suicide-to-be will rarely do: he knows that steps would be taken to prevent him from carrying out his threat, which is the last thing in this world that he wants to happen. It is true that cases are sometimes reported in the newspapers in which a suicide has previously announced his intention to destroy himself, but such announcements may generally be regarded as a sample of "thinking aloud" or as a sublimation of the impulse towards suicide. In such cases, also, the act normally takes place some time after the threat, the suicide concluding that, the apprehensions of his friends having been stilled by the lapse of time, he can carry out his intention without hindrance.

Finally, there are certain physical tests known to medical men, involving the examination and recording of the suspect's bodily response to his alleged mental derangement. Signs disclosed by the tongue, its state, position and behaviour, the blood pressure, tremors of the hands, behaviour of the pupil of the eye under certain conditions, the pulse, sweating, stammering, attitude towards the world and the people in it—these and a hundred other considerations are taken into account.

A malingeringer can always fool a policeman, and he can often fool a judge and jury—especially the jury—but he can never fool a doctor. If the lunatic shows method in his madness the malingeringer shows madness in his method!

CHAPTER VI

THE SANITY OF INSANITY

THERE is no such thing as insanity. It is comparable with what we term cold, and cold is nothing more than the absence of heat. We can manufacture heat, but we cannot manufacture cold, save by withdrawing heat, just as we can only manufacture darkness by withdrawing light, and in no other way.

And when we come to examine the various causes through which sanity leaves the mind, and follow, in all their intricate ramifications and bizarre manifestations, the processes by which insanity makes itself apparent—in other words, when we *understand* insanity—we shall see that it is, relatively speaking, a comprehensible state of mind and that, pruned of inessentials, the minds of the sane and the insane differ only in degree. They obey the same laws, they try to reason in the same manner, and the boundary line between sanity and insanity is at times exceedingly difficult to discern. As H. G. Wells has said: "The man in the street thinks madness is a fixed and definite thing, as distinct from sanity as black is from white. . . . But a very little reading of alienists will dissolve this clear assurance."¹ In a surprisingly large number of cases the laws of "sane" thought which we examined in Chapter IV are equally appropriate to "insane" thought. Says A. Clutton Brock: "No novelist, even in his most fantastic characters, has ever drawn the strangeness of the most normal of men."

The present-day view of insanity is, of course, a great advance upon the garbled and muddled theories of mental

¹ H. G. Wells, *Mankind in the Making*.

malaise which held the field until a few years ago, and we have to admit at once that the so-called lunatic owes a very great debt of gratitude to the much abused Professor Sigmund Freud, of Vienna, whose theory of the working of the unconscious mind startled the world not so very long ago.

Many eminent psychologists, from among whom Professor C. G. Jung, of Zurich, stands out in singular prominence, have improved upon, and in some cases partly withdrawn from Freud's initial theories (Freud himself has modified his original premises), but all owe—though all do not acknowledge—their indebtedness to Freud.

We are compelled to admit that philosophy is a speculative science. It is constantly changing, though that is surely inevitable in all spheres of research, and its "possibly" of yesterday may be its "probably" of to-day and its "undoubtedly" of to-morrow. And in no branch of philosophy is this shifting of position so noticeable as in the domain of psychology.

Some have asserted that such is a sign of weakness, and have said that such groping and hesitating as psychology—the youngest of the sciences—displays are the weak links in the chain. But the thinker who refuses to see new light, to salute fresh revelations, and to adjust himself to his own additional discoveries, or to those of others, is no thinker. He is a hindrance, a coward, and a victim of the worst of intellectual vices—self-deception.

In spite of the downpour of articles and essays misrepresenting the Freudian theory, to which we have submitted in certain periodicals during the last few years, there is a growing enthusiasm for the doctrines enunciated by Freud. But there is still a widespread ignorance in the matter. Not one man in a hundred can offer an intelligent and intelligible answer to the question: "What is the Freudian theory?"

The ailing have blessed it, and bishops have damned it; and people in responsible positions, whose words are eagerly devoured by other persons of intelligence, have delivered violent

attacks against it, on the principle, apparently, that if they only throw enough mud some of it is bound to stick, and have then confessed (privately) that they have made no study whatever of the theory which they are attacking. It is a matter for regret that these orators do not see fit to incorporate such admissions in their public utterances.

I propose, then, to preface my attempt to clarify the obscurities of insanity by a brief survey of the position to which the modern school of psychology has climbed in spite of opposition.

I would invite you to follow my immediate observations very closely, as I shall have occasion to refer to them, and occasionally to amplify them, as the argument develops, and I further ask you not to lose sight of the fact that the principles which I am endeavouring to make clear apply to the sane and the insane alike.

Miss Barbara Low, in her wonderful little book on the subject of psycho-analysis,² defines the Freudian theory in these terms: "The investigation of the content and working of the unconscious mind, and of the relation between the Unconscious and consciousness."

From this the conclusion may possibly be drawn that the human mind is split up into the Unconscious and the Conscious, and that it may be regarded as a dual affair.

Yes, and no.

Modern psychology affirms the essential unity of all mental life. We are often invited to assume that a child's mind at birth is blank, like a gramophone record prepared to receive impressions, and that from the moment of its entry into the world until the moment of its exit from it, a stream of impressions plays upon it.

But modern psychology maintains that this is only half the truth; the other half being that in the intra-uterine state impressions—inherited impressions—are beginning, and that all

² Miss Barbara Low, *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis* (Allen & Unwin).

these impressions exist in the conscious mind—in a necessarily hazy manner, it is true—until the child reaches the age of three or four, when they are driven down into the Unconscious.

In psychology, the terms Conscious and Unconscious do not always denote a sharp and impassable distinction. They are merely labels to connote—through lack of a vocabulary which will more adequately convey their meaning—the very subtle distinction between the thoughts of which we are aware and those of which we are for the most part ignorant.

It would be difficult to say where the top half of a river touches the bottom half; and in a similar manner do the corresponding streams of thought flow along together.

Your Conscious (the upper layer of your stream of thought) at any given moment includes present mental processes, ideas and impressions, together with any mental contents which, though not actually present, may be recalled to mind at will. (This is not infrequently termed the Foreconscious.)

Your Unconscious is tenanted by unknown and ungovernable processes, propensities and biases, which manifest themselves in such guises as dreams, phantasies, trances, mania, irresistible impulses, and in other forms which we will have occasion to examine presently.

The obsolete theory that the mind was divided into a bunch of faculties—for example, the faculty of hearing, and the faculty of seeing, presented so many vulnerable points that the marvel is not that modern psychology shattered it, but that it was not shattered many years before, since any metaphysical theory which ignores the Unconscious is ignoring practically the whole of its subject.

It is surely reasonable to affirm that as the Unconscious, that vast storehouse of impressions and experiences extending over many years, is obviously a far wider tract for the explorer to traverse than the Conscious, which is concerned only with to-day, and ignores the thousands of yesterdays, the psy-

chology which sets the Unconscious in the position which it can rightly claim is surely not very far from the truth.

Hostile critics have quibbled that the phrase "unconscious mind" is a contradiction in terms. But, as we have already noticed, the terms employed by modern psychology do not necessarily and invariably convey the exact shade of meaning intended. One is limited by language; one can only do one's best with the material available. The phrases to which opponents take exception are, in consequence, not always perfect. If they were perfect, they would obviously be fool-proof, which they obviously are not.

We are, of course, only relatively and temporarily unconscious of the tenants of the secret places of our minds. Many causes operate to make them soar up into consciousness, one of which is psycho-analysis.

The contents of your unconscious mind are, as we have seen, recollections, some accumulated, others inherited. Says Freud: "There is no chance in the psychic world any more than in the physical." In other words, your mental contents at any given moment are governed by all your past and present mental experiences.

This doctrine of the unity of all mental life is at the root of Freud's teaching. Past and present, Conscious and Unconscious, are inseparably welded into one. As a corollary to this proposition, Freud developed his famous doctrine of psychological determinism, which, in simple language, means that every effect must have a cause, and that every cause operating on or in any given mind is capable of producing one effect, and one only, on the owner of that mind. Every reaction which a person manifests to any mental stimulus is, in fact, the only possible reaction which that person could make to that stimulus, and in those circumstances. This we discussed in Chapter IV.

Opponents of Freud have erred in confusing this postulate with the theological doctrine of predestination held by Cal-

vinists and others. To go further into this matter would involve a digression into the realms of theological controversy which would take up the remainder of this book, and still leave many unconvinced. Such a discussion would lead towards nowhere, and would consequently reach that destination. Either you do accept Freud's axiom or you do not. I am compelled to leave it at that and to return to the discussion of your Unconscious.

Its tenants, your inherited and acquired propensities and impressions, link themselves with each other, and with all new and buried concepts, to form a vast network of unconscious complexities which influence your thoughts and actions without your knowing it. G. K. Chesterton, writing of our inborn instinct of fear, says: "One small child in the dark can invent more hells than Swedenborg. One small child can imagine monsters too big and black to get into any picture, and give them names too unearthly and cacophonous to have occurred in the cries of any lunatic."³

The inherited cluster of propensities which is your psychic legacy from the whole of your ancestors, back to the beginnings of terrestrial life, is, roughly, the primitive or savage mind, which is the only mental equipment of the newly born child, and lies beneath the threshold of his mind from his third or fourth year until the day of his death, and each of these propensities can be classified under one or another of three main headings—fighting, feeding, and sex, especially sex.

Those who make a point of opposing anything which seems new, on the sole ground that it is new—be it good, bad, or indifferent—and offer, in consequence, a wearisome and hampering resistance to the Freudian theory, forget that its foundation is a principle with which they have been familiar all their lives. It has, it is true, borne other names, and has appeared to different thinkers in different guises, but because Freud and his followers, regardless of existing bigotry, ob-

³ G. K. Chesterton, *Tremendous Trifles*.

scurantism, mock-modesty and self-deception, have presented the truth as it is, and not as we should like it to be, their courage has offended the tender susceptibilities of the smug, the self-complacent and the artificial, who, with their prejudices too petty to be regarded, hinder truths too profound to be disregarded. These folk are shocked by Freud, secretly thrilled by mysterious and appalling intentions which they falsely attribute to Freud, and, after inhaling with ecstasy each other's distortions of the Freudian theory at suburban tea-parties, regretfully bring an all too-short afternoon to a close, and return to their own homes full of strong convictions and weak illustrations.

Theologians have for centuries enlarged upon their own theories of the conflict between the flesh and the spirit, and its bearing upon the eternal question of good and evil, and they have, in their doctrine of original sin, recognized the powerful impulse towards evil which they used to affirm that we had inherited from the legendary Adam of primitive times. But when they find their own theory buttressed, but made infinitely clearer, in the name of science, they gather up their skirts and bolt.

In refreshing contrast to these folk stands the Dean of St. Paul's, who has never written truer words than these: "Beneath the dingy uniformity in international fashions in dress, man remains what he has always been—a splendid fighting animal, a self-sacrificing hero, and a bloodthirsty savage. Human nature is at once sublime and horrible, holy and satanic. Apart from the accumulation of knowledge and experience, which are external and precarious acquisitions, there is no proof that we have changed much since the first stone age."⁴

We have noticed that the Freudian theory is erected on the base of the perpetual conflict which goes on within every man. Freud, in his altruistic researches into the question, has

⁴ The Very Rev. W. R. Inge, D.D., *Outspoken Essays*.

come to the conclusion that our primitive, innate impulses are directed towards ourselves, our gratification, our preservation, our sustenance, and all aims and sub-aims allied with and directed by one or another of these major propensities.

Freud has affirmed that although there are three major propensities—fighting, feeding and sex—the first two arise out of the last—sex. It is, in a sense, a great pity that the word “sex,” with the emphasis by some on homosexuality, has been given so much prominence in discussions on the Freudian theory. But we must bear in mind that Freud uses the term in its widest possible significance. It embraces not only love, but affection, friendship, sociability, attraction and modesty, and, in its narrower sense, all forms of sexual perversion, conversion, inversion, aversion and diversion. As the old logic books would crystallize it, its extension is greater than its intension.

After all, sex is the most powerful driving force in life. Arnold Bennett, in his novel, *Lilian*, writes: “If a man has hypnotized himself into the belief that a girl’s body is paradise, he’ll win paradise and keep paradise. He’ll steal, commit murder, sell his wife and children, abandon his parents to the workhouse; there’s nothing he won’t do.”

We are used to the slogan that the highest and main human object is the propagation of the species; that in the whole organic world all energy seems to be directed towards this end. Indeed, in some species, when the female has justified her existence, she dies. She has fulfilled her function, can do so no longer, is therefore superfluous, and withdraws, in consequence, from the scene. The body of the female, some one has said, is an egg-producing organism, designed to produce other egg-producing organisms. Were sex eliminated from this planet, all organic life would swiftly cease.

Bearing this in mind, Freud’s theory that the other two propensities—fighting and feeding—are directed by and minister to sex, which accordingly becomes the predominant part-

ner in the trinity, becomes startlingly true. Feeding is essential in order to sustain life generated by the operation of sex, and fighting is necessary in order to protect that life from ceasing. But there would be nothing to feed or defend were it not for sex.

We have only to think for five minutes to note the vast ramifications of sex in our daily lives. The average novel or play without a woman at the bottom of it would be an uninteresting failure, and the major and minor evidences of sex in all its various forms are so very apparent—weddings, dances, and what not—that I feel I am insulting your intelligence by remarking the obvious.

These impulses, then, especially sex, dominate your life; sometimes directly, through the Conscious; sometimes indirectly, through the Unconscious. As Professor Gilbert Murray has said: "We cannot escape from the grip of the blind powers beneath the threshold."⁵

Freud has crystallized the whole question of their operation in the Unconscious by stating that they aim at the realization of pleasure, and we use the term Pleasure Principle to denote the sum total of the various currents of psychic energy which are projected towards this object. His other term is "affect," but in order to avoid confusion with the verb "affect," we will stand by our phrase, Pleasure Principle. Bergson termed it the *élan vital*, which means the same, and remarked, as do Freud and his former disciples, Jung and Adler, that these bed-rock impulses (or impulse, if you agree that sex embodies the other two) are always begetting fresh impulses and clusters of impulses. We will see how this occurs presently.

The unfortunate Freud has also stirred up no little hostility by stressing the importance, in his view, of the parent-child relationship, and, citing the case of *Œdipus Rex* and his desire to possess his mother (known to modern psychology as the "*Œdipus complex*"), argues that the horror which we all natu-

⁵ Professor Gilbert Murray, *Stoicism*.

rally feel towards the disgusting vice of incest is the normal and healthy outcome of the repression in our minds of the primitive urge towards that grossly anti-social act.

Miss Barbara Low, in her book, *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis*, put the matter very clearly. "To the male child," she writes, "beginning life, the mother is woman; she stands for all that female sex can mean to him at this stage of existence, and since to Freud all psychic life is a unity, he is compelled to realize that this child-love is potentially the same in kind as the love of a later stage, which we so unanimously recognize as sex love. It is only so in the degree to which the child has developed his sexual wishes and trends; but these latter, as Freud has discovered through abundant data, exist in a modified form from the very beginning of life."

The Freudians go on to assert that when normal love comes in later life, it is born of the desire either to return to that child-love or to make a clean break with it. They maintain, moreover, that all resistance to authority is an unconscious manifestation, in the case of males, of an original resistance to the authority of the father, he being unknowingly regarded with jealousy, as coming between the son and his first love—the mother. In the case of females, the sex attractions and repulsions are correspondingly transposed.

As a development of, and a corollary to, this much-discussed theory, Freud has postulated a sex basis for many human attributes not previously regarded as having any connection with sex. Curiosity, for example, he claims to have traced to the primitive urge to explore the mysteries of the opposite sex, the original impulse being gradually repressed, or diverted, by upbringing, education, and the various conventions of modern civilization. It frequently emerges in the masked forms of, for example, the desire for scientific or literary research.⁶ The diluted sexuality of the higher forms of art has long been recognized. Says George Bernard Shaw of

⁶ *Vide* Barbara Low, *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis*.

artists: "Nine out of every ten of them are diseased creatures, just sane enough to trade on their own neuroses."⁷ This is not altogether true; the process is termed sublimation, concerning which I shall have more to say presently.

It will now be clear that the Pleasure Principle accepts or rejects all experiences, according to the pleasure or pain which they induce in the Conscious. It clamours for gratifying experiences of a primitive and frequently sexual nature. To realize this, you have only to recall the effect on a child, a savage, or any other primitive being, or any bright or bizarre object. A child without its toys would not be a child.

In children, too, we note the frequency of, and delight afforded by, day-dreams, or phantasies, in which the child, disconcerted, and probably disappointed by the world as he finds it, seeks some avenue of escape from it, that he may return to his prenatal state of a Nirvana, where all wishes (such as they were) gained an immediate fulfilment, and there was no pain. His early years are accordingly governed by the policy of "Let's pretend."

Adults, of course, indulge in day-dreams—the world would be a dull place without them—but I must postpone the discussion of these until a later stage.

As our own behaviour is the only legacy which we do not welcome, I asked you, at the beginning of this chapter, temporarily to dispossess your mind of all your preconceived theories, and to regard my attempt to show the vital bearing of modern psychology upon the human mind as applying both to the sane and to those whom we loosely (and sometimes unkindly) term insane.

Before passing on to the most interesting part of my task—probing into the minds of the insane, or less sane—one vital question remains to be answered: Is there any force which restrains or resists the Pleasure Principle?

Yes. The operation of the Pleasure Principle is regulated

⁷ George Bernard Shaw, *An Unsocial Socialist*.

by another though relatively artificial force—the Reality Principle, which tends to tame the Pleasure Principle, and to urge the mind to adapt itself to reality—to face the facts of life. Of this principle, Professor Chalmers Mitchell writes: “It is not in man, inborn or innate, but is enshrined in his traditions, in his customs, in his literature and his religion.”⁸

The Reality Principle is built up by a constant succession of prohibitions imposed from without. One thing which, above all others, impresses any one studying psychology is the very striking analogy which may be drawn between the development of a nation (indeed, of the whole human race), and the training of a child, and psychologists, anthropologists, and all others whose life work is the study of mankind, find themselves more and more drawn towards ethnology—the science of the growth of races—and more impressed by the resemblance just mentioned.

As a savage tribe emerges from the primitive state, *tabus* are imposed. This berry must not be eaten; this grove must not be entered, and so on—all these admonitions having for their object the guiding of the tribe or nation on the best lines, by the imposition of restrictions based upon past experience. (If you wish to study this question further, I recommend you to obtain and read Sir J. G. Frazer’s *Golden Bough*, an abridged and cheap edition of which was published in the autumn of 1922.)

Corresponding admonitions are laid upon both the young tribe and the young child. Both are steered towards maturity by a series of restrictive behests intended to benefit both the individual and the community.

This, then, is the genesis of the Reality Principle which, in civilized countries, may be defined as the influence exerted by the sum-total of all educative, social and altruistic precepts—in short, public opinion, or civilization—call it what you will. In another million years man will probably be a

⁸ Chalmers Mitchell, *Evolution and the War*.

purely reasonable being unless, as many hold, he will have been civilized out of his sanity—but we need not worry ourselves about that!

Modern psychology shows man up as he really is—a hypocrite. An unconscious hypocrite, no doubt, but none the less a hypocrite.

When the Pleasure Principle and the Reality Principle clash, a mental *malaise* is set up which is responsible for an overwhelming majority of cases of insanity, moral and mental instability, neuroticism and criminality. To this *malaise* we give the name of Conflict, which, as its discussion will disclose, is the outcome of the friction between the two basic influences in psychic life.

We have now reached the point where we can push ahead with our inquiry into the way in which the Freudian theory affects our grasp of the problems of insanity and criminality, and the plan of the remainder of this chapter will, in the main, be based upon Dr. Bernard Hart's book, *The Psychology of Insanity*, which I have found to embody the best exposition available of this phase of my subject, and I cordially recommend any one wishing to delve further into the problem of insanity to study Dr. Hart's very readable book.⁹

Students of logic frequently find themselves considering empiricism. Professor Venn, in fact, has written a book on it. The empirical method of reasoning is the method based upon observation and experiment, and not on theories which are not proved flawless. In other words, a theory is formulated after the patient sifting of the available facts. The facts must not be manipulated to fit any preconceived theory, and if the theory does not square with the facts, it is rejected, and a better one substituted.

Now, the empirical method is the one which has always been used by scientists. It is, in fact, frequently termed "the

⁹ Bernard Hart, M.D., *The Psychology of Insanity* (Cambridge Univ. Press).

scientific method," and we shall adopt that name in our examination of the question of insanity.

The scientific method involves three stages. First, the facts are assembled and recorded (in this case, the phenomena of insanity). Secondly, the facts are classified. Thirdly, a formula is devised which will embrace all applications of the ascertained facts. Says Camille Flammarion: "It was on the comparison of observations that astronomy, the most positive of sciences, was founded. It will be the same with psychic science, and this is the only method by which to attain to a knowledge of truth."

Dr. Hart, for example, instances Kepler's law governing the motions of the planets as they spin through space. Kepler first assembled the facts. Selecting a planet, he recorded its position on a certain day. He then repeated the act day after day, his record tracing the movements of the selected planet for some time. Finally, he proposed a formula which would embrace, and be applicable to, each of the facts. And the formula which he suggested was that every planet in whirling round the sun describes an ellipse, and his formula, which eventually withstood every test, became known as Kepler's law.

Kepler was, of course, dealing with facts—tangible, visible things. But a valid scientific law may relate to abstract things; even to creatures of the imagination, provided that it squares with the ascertained facts, and that the element of chance cannot intrude. Once these conditions are fulfilled, the formula devised automatically attains the dignity of a scientific law until, of course, it is dethroned by a more reliable formula. We have, for example, a scientific law which applies to what we term "waves of ether." No one has ever seen or handled a wave of ether; the term was coined simply to express the intangible in terms of the tangible, but that does not invalidate the law governing them, for the simple

reason that these, so to speak, "fictitious" waves of ether obey it. Nothing else matters.

The psychological conception of insanity deals solely with mind. Brain, as brain, has no place therein; it is physiological territory, as we saw in Chapters II and III. Physiology and psychology are not, however, antagonists. Far from it; they are sister sciences, helping each other and travelling along parallel tracks towards a common goal, but we are warned that in the final laws ultimately evolved by both the physiological and the psychological conceptions of insanity the terms must not be confused. As Dr. Hart observes: "The physiological laws must contain no psychological terms, and the psychological laws must contain no physiological terms. Nothing but hopeless confusion can result from the mixture of 'brain cells' and 'ideas.'"

And time and space preclude anything approaching an exhaustive scrutiny of the relationship between brain and mind. It properly belongs to the comparatively uncharted seas of speculative philosophy, which is a constantly changing subject, at present the scene of heated controversy.

Following our scientific method, we will collect the available facts.

As a general rule, every manifestation of insanity can be assigned a place under one of six main headings; though these headings are by no means mutually exclusive—a patient may be, and sometimes is, suffering from more than one phase of insanity.

To begin with there is what may broadly be termed lack of mental capacity, which may be congenital, as in the case of imbeciles, or acquired, as in the demented.

An imbecile is born without a normal mental equipment. His mind never attains to maturity. An imbecile is not always recognizable as such to a layman, since there are various forms and degrees of imbecility. In mild cases he is simply backward at his lessons, slow of speech, movement or thought,

simple, "not all there," as people sometimes say; and though his condition may prevent him from making headway at school, or in after life, it will not altogether debar him from earning a humble living in a humble way.

In the more pronounced cases, which are easily recognizable, he presents a pathetic appearance. We have all come across adults with the minds of children who can do nothing, blunder in everything, and are unfitted for anything. They gape vacantly at one when addressed, and their only means of communication appears to be a monosyllable and a vacuous snigger. Perhaps a faculty is missing—speech or hearing—perhaps two, as in the case of deaf mutes. They can barely read or write; perhaps they can do neither.

Joseph Conrad, in his story, *The Idiots*, gives us a vivid description of an imbecile child in his teens:

"The glance was unseeing and staring—a fascinated glance; but he did not turn to look after us. Probably the image passed before the eyes without leaving any trace on the misshapen brain of the creature. . . .

"He might have been sixteen, judging from the size—perhaps less, perhaps more. Such creatures are forgotten by time, and live untouched by years till death gathers them up into its compassionate bosom; the faithful death that never forgets in the press of work the most insignificant of its children."¹⁰

In an acquired lack of mental capacity the sufferer's mind slips back into any of the conditions observed in congenital imbeciles. Various causes operate to bring about this disaster, such as a head injury, and the relapse is often accompanied by a physical change in the brain. We discussed this in Chapter III.

In the second of our six groups, we can assign a place to the symptoms, excitement, apathy and depression. We all become excited at times. We gesticulate, and talk in italics,

¹⁰ Joseph Conrad, *Tales of Unrest*.

and the doctor who proposed to certify as insane a person who manifested an isolated spell of excitement through some reasonable cause would find his own sanity doubted.

The crux of the matter lies in the fact whether the person's excitement is sustained and permanent or, above all, out of harmony with his position and surroundings. If you were suddenly to inherit an unexpected legacy of £100,000, your joy—however wildly expressed—would be reasonable; but if you were to leap with delight on hearing that your house had been burned to the ground, your attitude would be astonishing—unless you were over-insured! The same observations apply to the man who flies into a passion without apparent cause. (I introduce the word "apparent" deliberately, for a reason to which I will pass in due course.) In extreme cases, the changes from one extreme to the other occur without warning.

The symptoms of depression are too well known to justify their description at this stage. To these, too, I shall return later.

Apathy, or emotional dementia, is neither excitement nor depression: it is sheer indifference. But an apathetic patient is more interested, and interesting, than he seems. Although he sits all day as motionless as a wax effigy, his mind is by no means as inactive as his body. Behind his apparent indifference he is thinking, observing, reasoning; but he never translates his thoughts into action. Things are simply not worth while.

Under our third heading we will consider the symptom known as somnambulism. I invite you to pay particular attention to the processes and nature of somnambulism, also to those of hallucinations, delusions and obsessions, which will follow in their turn. Each of these four plays a prominent part in insanity, and its relation to crime, and if you grasp the rather elusive distinctions between these symptoms you will, I hope, meet with much that should interest you in the remainder of this chapter.

In a somnambulism (which must not be confused with what is popularly termed sleep-walking), the subject from time to time breaks away from his ordinary surroundings and mode of life, and lives, for the time being, what is virtually a separate existence, after the manner of Robert Louis Stevenson's *Jekyll and Hyde*. It is practically induced by local amnesia, or loss of memory.

Professor Janet, in his monograph, *The Major Symptoms of Hysteria*, describes a case of somnambulism which, under the name of "Irène," has become one of the two classical examples of this form of mental *malaise*. Irène was a French girl who had nursed her mother during a long and painful illness, which had ended in her death under such terrible circumstances that it imperilled the daughter's mental poise, which gradually verged further towards the abnormal.

At intervals Irène, perhaps while fulfilling her ordinary social and domestic duties, would suddenly become detached from her surroundings, and would imagine herself back once more among the circumstances of her late mother's death, when she would faithfully reproduce every word and action which she had said or done at that time. While she was, as we sometimes say, "miles away," she was quite oblivious to her present surroundings and associates, and all efforts to communicate with her were as fruitless as though she were a figure performing on a cinema screen.

The somnambulism would terminate as abruptly as it had begun, and Irène, on coming to her senses, would bring with her not the slightest recollection of her relapse, and, what is even more amazing, would be unable to recall, during her normal periods, the memory of the incidents attending her mother's death. Her recollection of these facts was, so to speak, part and parcel of her abnormal periods, and was precluded, by a logic-proof barrier, from intruding upon her normal mental life.

Hallucinations comprise our fourth group. I dealt super-

ficially with these, together with delusions and obsessions, in the last chapter of my book, *Sidelights on Criminal Matters*. But there is much of interest to be learned from a more comprehensive survey of these symptoms, which occupy, as I have said, a prominent place in the problem of insanity.

A person suffering from an hallucination "hears" voices or "sees" people, animals or even inanimate objects, which either have no existence in fact, or may so exist, but appear to him to be moving or talking, sometimes both. The most familiar example of the hallucinationist is the toper suffering from *delirium tremens*, who sees (I am told) pink peacocks strutting across his ceiling, or snakes of a sociable disposition who endeavour to share his bed. I once spent a pleasant evening endeavouring to soothe an Army Chaplain, who imagined that the brass knobs on his bed were yelling unprintable profanities at him. He was afforded ample opportunity, during his subsequent "rest" in an asylum, of meditating upon the subtle distinction between things spiritual and things spirituous!

Delusions, our fifth group, are frequently confused with hallucinations. To many people, they appear to be interchangeable terms. They are not. An hallucination is a sensory impression coming from without, and engendered through one of the senses—hearing, for example, or seeing. Some authorities consider that an hallucination is a purely physiological manifestation expressible only in terms of matter, and whether that is so or not, it is on this ground that physiology and psychology do tend to meet, and to work hand in hand.

A delusion is a subjective symptom: it is begotten within the sufferer, and is a belief, as opposed to a sensory impression. Hilaire Belloc, for example, in *First and Last*, introduces us to a delusionist who thought he was living fifty years ahead of his time. The complaint known as megalomania, or "swelled head," is a mild and a common form of delusion. The subject of it imagines that he possesses mental or physical

attributes which he obviously does not, as in the case of the author who dedicated his book: "To the British Public—these pearls." He overrates himself too highly, and exhibits petulance on discovering that others do not accept him at his own valuation. A clerk often thinks he could manage the firm much better than the manager; the intellectual capers of the sixth form boy are a standing joke. In the more acute forms of megalomania, the patient imagines himself to be a multi-millionaire, or the holder of some exalted rank. Such folk constitute a large percentage of the permanent inmates of our asylums where, as Dr. Hart puts it, "we encounter a most distinguished assemblage of emperors, generals and other representatives of the great."

Delusions of persecution seem to be becoming more general. Hardly a week passes without some one being arrested for threatening vengeance upon another person (often a public official) for some imaginary grievance. Delusions of persecution, as their name implies, persuade the sufferer that he is the victim, or intended victim, of some conspiracy against him, sometimes by an individual, sometimes by a group of individuals, frequently the government. A persecution delusion is often the almost logical outcome of megalomania; in which case the patient may think he is a millionaire, and that his enemies are trying to ruin him. On this foundation he builds up a most elaborate series of grievances, in which everything that his "enemy" does is distorted and manipulated to fit in with his grievance. This, now strengthened, begins to extend until it incorporates the words and deeds of the whole of society, which, in his view, is engaged in one vast conspiracy against himself. He does not merely want to be "in the picture." He *is* the picture: the rest of the universe is but the frame.

Closely akin to delusions of persecution are delusions of reference, when every triviality throughout the day is made to centre round the patient. He imagines that he is the subject

of the casual conversation of total strangers. Should a relation cross over to the window to see whether it is raining, he imagines that innocent act to be a signal to some other "conspirator" outside. There is no limit to the lengths to which his suspicions will drive him, and there is scarcely any form of delusion which does not exist in the mind of one lunatic or another, though I have been unable to find a case of an insane person suffering from the delusion that he is insane!

All delusions are logic-proof. Argument with a patient on the subject of his delusion is worse than useless: it only convinces him that you have been bribed by his enemies to champion their cause against him. At the same time it is an even greater mistake to assume that a delusionist is incapable of logical reasoning, for, in matters not related to his delusion, he is quite normal, sometimes brilliant. His irrationality is not evidenced by his reasoning powers, but by his attitude towards the subject concerning which he reasons, as we shall see presently.

An obsession, as all the world knows, is simply the preponderance of one idea or impulse. The patient can think of nothing else. Talk to him on any subject you choose, and he sooner or later will decoy you towards his pet topic. It is the "King Charles' head" of his existence, and affords a revealing comment on the law of the association of ideas.

The various "phobias" which we will discuss in Chapter VIII are closely related to obsessions. A phobia is the fear (as the word itself implies) of some definite object or circumstance, which dominates the sufferer's life, and may seriously affect his mental balance in various bizarre ways, which we shall encounter in due course.

Following the scientific method which we decided to adopt, we have collected the available data, which now lie before us under six main classifications.

Now that we know the symptoms of insanity, we can commence our search for their causes, and so evolve a theory

which, in that it squares with our ascertained facts, will fulfil the recognized conditions of a scientific law.

With the possible exception of imbecility and some forms of dementia, all manifestations of insanity may be traced to one or another of a few clearly established sources, which, in their turn, can ultimately be regarded as branches of one common tree.

If, for the remainder of this chapter, you will be content to rest assured that almost every symptom of insanity is but an exaggerated form of a normal man's behaviour, you will find an understanding of the sanity of insanity well within your reach. Every man puts his hands into his pockets. It is when he puts one into somebody else's pocket that eyebrows are elevated.

The ultimate foundation of nearly every form of insanity is what is termed the dissociation of consciousness. One need not necessarily be a Freudian to realize that both the maniac and the delusionist share this common denominator.

In the normal mind the stream of consciousness is flowing along all the time without a break. A sane man may be thinking of one thing one moment and of another thing the next moment, but if he probes patiently and successfully into the relationship between the two things, he will *invariably* find a link, and I would ask you to regard this statement not as a speculative theory, but as an ascertained fact.

But in the mind of the lunatic this continuity is broken, for reasons which will step into their proper places in the discussion in due course. And this splitting of the conscious mind into two dissociated fragments is termed, appropriately, the dissociation of consciousness.

Instances of this occur within ourselves all day long. The motorist who is driving his car and talking to his companion at the same time is experiencing a dissociation of consciousness; so is the man who reads his newspaper while eating his breakfast. The man who snaps out: "I can't do two

things at once," is an unconscious liar. But the difference between the sane man and the lunatic is that in the former case the dissociation is controllable. Our motorist, for example, can stop either his car or his conversation "at will." But the lunatic's dissociation is uncontrollable, not only by himself, but, to a large extent, by others as well.

Dr. Hart gives us a splendid illustration of dissociation, in which one person can engage an hysterical patient in conversation, while a third party places a pencil in the patient's hand without his conscious knowledge (I employ the phrase deliberately), and whispers questions to him, the answers to which the patient writes down. This ruse is sometimes employed by Freudian practitioners when they wish to revive buried memories by psycho-analysis. The consciousness is, in short, temporarily split into two, each half unaware of the other's activity, though Dr. Hart stresses the fact that "they are nothing but exaggerated forms of those dissociations which have been seen to occur in every normal individual."

Now, if the stream of consciousness is suddenly broken, with the result that in the moment after the break all recollection of the mental contents in the moment before the break is destroyed, another type of dissociation occurs. In our first type, the streams of thought ran concurrently: in our new type, they run consecutively.

I have mentioned, as one of the two classical examples, Professor Janet's case—Irène. The other instance, frequently discussed by psycho-theraputists, is that of the Rev. Ansel Bourne, to whose case attention was originally drawn by William James.

On January 17, 1887, the Rev. Ansel Bourne, of Providence, R. I., disappeared from that town for two months. On March 14, at Norristown, Pennsylvania, a shopkeeper, known as Brown, announced, with terror, that he was the Rev. Ansel Bourne, and that he remembered nothing since leaving Providence. His experience, in short, was comparable,

though in a less dangerous form, with that of the central figure in *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*.

When we survey these three cases—Jekyll and Hyde, Irène, and Ansel Bourne—we find that the dissociation factor persists in each.

Let us analyze dissociation.

The main current of thought which tenants the Conscious when it is normal, or, as we say of a man, "when he is himself," is termed the Ego—the term denoting a man's normal personality: Bourne, for example, at Providence. The dissociated current of thought is independent of the Ego, and is uncontrollable by the Ego. Bourne had no say in the matter when he left for Norristown: he did not know whither he was going, or why, or what he would do when he arrived there. Conversely, the Ego is equally divorced from the dissociated portion of the mind.

These principles conceded—that in dissociation the Ego is both unaware of the dissociated portion and unable to control it—are we to assume dissociation when both these features are present, or only one? And, if we decide on the latter, then which one? Now, if the Ego is unaware of the dissociation, it is obviously unable to control it. Consequently, controllability is the criterion of a dissociation.

Dr. Hart thrashes the matter out, and evolves the following rigid definition: "A system of ideas is said to be dissociated when it is divorced from the personality, and when its course and development are exempt from the control of the personality."

We can now indicate the bearing which dissociation has upon obsessions and delusions. The Conscious becomes divided into two parts, each locked up in a logic-proof compartment. One half urges the subject to think, to say, or to do things which its fellow can but disregard, for no amount of reason can be adequately digested by a mind fifty per cent of which is out of action. Half the mind is dominated by the

delusion or obsession, and the other half is amenable to reason, but the halves are respectively oil and water. They will not mix.¹¹

Even "sane" people suffer from dissociation, especially stubborn people. All religious and political prejudice is the product of dissociation, or of a complex—a factor which we are about to discuss. In the disconnected portion of their minds, their private bias lies entrenched; and no amount of reasoning will convince them.

Take, for example, that friend of yours, who not only refuses to hold your religious or political creed, but sees no merit in any single phase of it, because he is prejudiced. His mind is made up. Your arguments are wasted. Even though he "quite sees your point of view," the expression of this polite fiction is as far as he will go. And a form of intermittent, controllable dissociation is responsible for the moral peccadilloes of people who would stand aghast at the suggestion of inconsistency. Says the Rev. R. J. Campbell: "Many a commercial magnate is able to curse himself in general terms on Sundays and in church, for his abstract unworthiness in the presence of his Maker, but is not too particular as to the ways in which he obtains his dividends on the remaining six days of the week, or the lives he crushes in the process."¹²

Following our scientific method, we have marshalled our facts—the phenomena of insanity—and have grouped them into clusters of symptoms which are traceable to a parent stem, and we have been struck by the presence of a singular and ever-recurring factor, which constitutes the common attribute of these groups—the dissociation of consciousness.

Having cleared the ground, we are now free to explore the question in greater detail, and to answer that tremendous little word, "Why?"

¹¹ Since I wrote this statement Professor A. M. Low has invented a process by which oil and water *will* mix. I, therefore, employ the simile as *formerly* understood.—J. C. G.

¹² R. J. Campbell, *Christianity and the Social Order*.

At the root of modern psychology we find, as we have seen, the law of psychological determinism—the law which insists on the fact that every effect must have had a cause, no matter how bizarre the effect of the cause. This is, of course, a truism. That is why we are so apt to overlook it. We devote hours to wading through difficult questions, which only too often sway on very frail foundations, but we ignore the obvious. We “can’t see wood for trees.” If the law of psychological determinism teaches us nothing else it warns us not to judge by appearances. A man may commit some astounding act in direct contradiction to his nature, and to his expressed views, and there appears to be no reason for his conduct, until we probe.

It must be remembered, in examining insanity, that the thought-processes of the sane and the insane alike are subject to the same laws—their apparent divergence is only a question of degree. In order to make this statement intelligible, we must enlist the aid of several terms which have enjoyed a deserved prominence of late, and which will soon pass into general use—complexes, conflict, repressions, rationalization, sublimation, and others.

The term complex was, until comparatively recently, used only as an adjective. Dr. C. G. Jung, of Zurich, has raised it to the dignity of a noun. A complex denotes an idea, prejudice, or bias, which, temporarily or permanently, wholly or partly, consciously or unconsciously, dominates a person’s mind. All our likes and dislikes are traceable to complexes, and the stronger the complex the stronger its influence. Says Dr. Bernard Hollander: “As a psychologist I have studied the hatreds of people and found them invariably due to some incident in their lives which aroused a strong emotion and persisted as an obsessional mental weakness.” The same applies to strong likes.

For example, a man in love is dominated by his love complex. All his thoughts and deeds acquire a new orientation,

and become actively correlated with Her. She becomes the most wonderful being in this or in any other world. His infatuation for Her so orders (or disorders) his life that he will do the most extraordinary things on her behalf, or in order to win her affection, and his conduct may become so humorously extravagant that his friends—the knowing ones—rub their hands, and tell themselves and each other that “he is madly in love,” or that “she is making a fool of him.” Both phrases, you will observe, imply the recognition of mental disorder, and there are shrewd folk who say that love, like genius, is akin to insanity. “There is only one cure for love,” they chuckle, “and its name is marriage!”

An injurious complex is frequently built up by damning an impulse as it soars up from the Unconscious to the Conscious, to which it is repugnant; and as it is not diverted, or sublimated, to a better use, it becomes buried—an abscess in the soul—though its power for evil lies in its dynamic rather than its static quality.

The operation of a complex can only be induced by a stimulus. For example, a man who loves dogs (and who does not?) finds his dog complex—a non-injurious one—stimulated by the sight of his pet. He melts. He becomes sociable. He wants to pat it, to play with it, to take it for a run, to enjoy its company in every possible way.

In this connection I am reminded of a short story, by Stacy Aumonier, which appeared under the title of *The Accident of Crime*.

A French youth of seventeen, Laissac by name, passionately fond of dogs, attacks a Chinaman for ill-treating one. Not realizing his own strength in his fury, he kills the Chinaman, and is sent to prison for manslaughter. The incident, with its harsh result, embitters him, and, after years of solitary cogitation in gaol, he emerges with the resolve to revenge himself on a society which, to him, has punished him for punishing a beast; and he takes to a life of crime. “To him, in the here-

after, the dog would stand as the symbol of patient suffering; humanity as the tyrant." In the language of the Freudians, Laissac's mind would be dominated by two complexes—love of dogs and hatred of society. He died, in fact, through slipping off a rain-spout, along which he was crawling to rescue a dog which was unable to descend from his roof!

A man whose mind is swayed by the activity of a strong and injurious complex ceases to be strictly normal. Everything which fits in with the complex gains in force, and everything which does not is inhibited—buried—and a festering accumulation of unpalatable complexes clogs up his Unconscious. If a man is aware of the presence and tendency of a complex, little or no harm ensues; but, if not, trouble lies ahead, and dispassionate judgment is hampered, if not killed.

Listen carefully to a man with a strong religious or political bias, arguing on his pet theme. All arguments from his opponents which clash with his complex will be rejected with scorn, even without scrutiny. An unbiassed discussion is impossible, and the only use to which such a man can be put is to let him reel off all his own arguments as violently as his own self-deception and lack of humour will permit. Then let his opponent follow suit; and refer their conflicting arguments to the relatively dispassionate judgment of a third party, as in the case of English law court procedure.

Another of our terms is rationalization, which word connotes those subtle mental processes by which a man harbouring an unconscious complex invests the expression of his views with a plausibility which deceives no one but himself. In plain English, rationalization is making our thoughts appear rational in the eyes of others. George Bernard Shaw has said: "They regard me as a cynic when I tell them that even the cleverest man will believe anything he wishes to believe, in spite of all the facts and all the text-books in the world."¹⁸

It is a popular delusion that all our thoughts and actions

¹⁸ George Bernard Shaw, *Socialism and Superior Brains*.

are the outcome of reason. Far from it! We too often do things out of habit, impulse or expediency, and then, when challenged, cast about for reasons which we hope will prop them up. We take the effect seriously, but flirt with the cause. We want things to appear in such and such a light, and, the wish being father to the thought, we see to it that they do. If George Washington really said that he could not tell a lie he told the biggest lie in history.

Our second term—conflict—denotes the struggle between the original impulses of primitive man (the Pleasure Principle) and the new impulses grafted on to him by the repressive processes of civilization (the Reality Principle). It is the friction between a complex and the rest of the mind.

In extreme cases the Pleasure Principle, in its attempt to realize itself, may go so far as to drive the subject to inflict pain (on himself or on another), in order that he may ultimately experience an intensified pleasure—a pleasure enhanced by contrast.

This factor in abnormal psychology provides us with the key to the revolting vices of sadism and flagellation (where the sexual excitement of the sadist is stimulated or enhanced by the infliction of pain upon his victim of the opposite sex); of masochism (where such sexual ecstasy is only realizable through the suffering of such pain); and of lust murder, which is sadistic cruelty carried to such appalling lengths that the victim dies. Needless to say, a sadist is a lunatic, and not a criminal.

Commenting on a case of this sort, at the Liverpool Sessions, on October 6, 1922, the Recorder, Mr. E. G. Hemmerde, K.C., said: "In other countries such cases are treated as mental. English law, however, gives no option but to treat the prisoner as a criminal. Some day the authorities will realize the absurdity of the present law." The classical instance of sadistic lust murder in this country is the series of fatal mutilations inflicted by Jack the Ripper, the Whitechapel murderer; while

Thomas Burke, in the course of one of his stories assembled under the general title of *Whispering Windows*, has given us a masterly study of the manner in which the impulse to indulge in flagellation tormented the mind of a schoolmaster.

The primitive desire to achieve a pleasant titillation of the senses through the infliction of pain is traceable in ancient religions. H. G. Wells, writing of the prevalence of sadistic lust murders among the ancient Aztecs of Mexico, says: "Their religion was a primitive, complex and cruel system, in which human sacrifices and ceremonial cannibalism played a large part."¹⁴

From time to time reports appear in the newspapers of girls whose plaits of hair have been cut off, in the streets, in broad daylight, and without their knowledge. Such plait-cutting is a mild or sublimated form of sadism. Another form of this vicious trait was apparent in the malicious cutting of the coats and dresses of women attending political meetings at Cardiff during the general election of November, 1922. The sadistic neurotic (and the term embodies the flagellator) is driven by the perversion of his primitive pleasure impulse to inflict physical cruelty on a member of the opposite sex, and is prevented by the Reality Principle—in this case the fear of consequences—from carrying out his intention to its natural and awful limit; stopping short, in consequence, at the comparatively harmless stage. These persons are very infrequently caught. The offence is relatively rare (though increasing), and the hair despoiler, with the cunning of the true pervert, will take infinite pains to accomplish his object without detection.

Thomas Burke, in a chapter of his book, *The London Spy*, draws with a master hand a realistic picture of such a person, and his collection of "between twenty and thirty plaits, curls, tresses. . . . Slowly, with face bent, his hooded eyes half lit, he passed them through his fingers and across the back of his

¹⁴ H. G. Wells, *The Outline of History*.

hand; and something seemed to creep about that silent room and fill it with damp echoes and wreathing shapes, and the slow bubbling of swamps."

If you happen to be interested in these branches of abnormal psychology, you will find them candidly examined in Professor R. von Krafft-Ebing's book, *Psychopathia Sexualis* (translated by Dr. C. G. Chaddock), while I discussed them superficially in my book, *Sidelights on Criminal Matters*. It is a distasteful subject in many ways, but obscurantism and self-deception in these matters have led to so much misery—misery which could easily have been avoided in nearly every case by an honest admission of the facts as they are, and not as we would wish them to be—that I feel that to shirk even this brief allusion to it would evidence a cowardly and hypocritical neglect of duty. Writing of parental neglect in sexual matters, H. G. Wells says: "We are trained from the nursery to become secretive, muddle-headed and vehemently conclusive upon sexual matters, until at last the editors of magazines blush at the very phrase, and long to put a petticoat over the page that bears it."¹⁵

In the ideal solution of a conflict, either the complex would win, or the rest of the mind. But this solution is rarely possible. Conflict is avoided, the complex is buried, and from that moment onwards it is fomenting future trouble.

A graphic illustration leaps to my mind. A wife had heard, through the medium of thoughtless gossip, that her husband was unfaithful to her. Instead of tackling him on the matter, she tried to stifle the thought—it became a buried complex. Gradually, the half-forgotten complex fostered an aversion towards him which, like all morbid thoughts, fed upon itself. Ultimately she killed him, only to learn later that the rumours concerned his brother. The gossips went unpunished.

Sometimes a chronic conflict persists between two complexes, or between a complex and the rest of the personality, in which

¹⁵ H. G. Wells, *First and Last Things*.

the supremacy alternates from one to the other. Such a state of affairs, though obviously not harmless, is not necessarily harmful, since its very symptoms bear witness to an intermittent recognition of his state by the subject himself.

Dr. J. A. Hadfield, in a paper read before the British Medical Association at Glasgow, on July 26, 1922, cited the case of a patient of his, a doctor, who, although patients were waiting for him in his consulting room, would steal away to London, and crave admission to an asylum. He felt the onset of one of his periodic urges towards homicide, and his prudence commanded him to have himself put out of harm's way until the dangerous phase had passed.

But it is not every one who has such a mastery over himself. Too often, in conflict, the abnormal triumphs over the normal. In October, 1922, at Sutton, Surrey, a man who had lost his situation tried to conceal the fact from his wife and three children by leaving home and returning at his usual hours daily, utilizing the time in seeking fresh employment. At length, funds running out and no work coming in, his courage failed him and, in a pitiable attack of frenzy, he broke his wife's skull and cut his own throat. In this case, the sufferer was aware of the presence of a harassing complex, but lacked the mental strength to handle it as it should have been handled. It is the buried, unrecognized and permanently entrenched complexes that are so devastating, and were the Freudian theories acknowledged by the authorities, and practised by the authorities, what we loosely term "motiveless crimes" would be investigated by skilled and sympathetic physicians, and much misery banished.

In some cases of conflict in "normal" minds, the opposed forces are consciously allowed, as the safest way out of the impasse, to co-exist side by side, agreeing to disagree in separate insulated chambers of the mind. Thus, a man will have one code of honour in public, and another in private.

Dissociation, if it is anything at all, is the outcome of con-

flict. It is a defensive system erected to avoid conflict, and is most obvious in the bizarre symptoms of somnambulism, delusions and obsessions. Complete dissociation is rarely possible for long, since some correlating thought which links up the two portions of the mind will, sooner or later, cut through the barrier. Then, however, the mechanism of rationalization is brought into play, masking the illogicality of the complex as seen by the rest of the mind and rendering it apparently reasonable by the spurious thought-processes accompanying the rationalization.

Burglars, for example, frequently argue that "a man must live." They admit, to themselves, that burglary is ethically wrong, so they employ the bastard reasoning induced by their burglary complex. Delusionists, as we have already seen, rationalize all repugnant arguments. The woman who thinks her husband is trying to poison her will ascribe an ulterior motive to his very solicitude; and the megalomaniac will account for his obvious poverty by declaiming that his persecutors have reduced him to that state—megalomania being his primary delusion, and persecution his secondary delusion.

Repression is a term of which we read much these days. When the conflict between two sets of thoughts, or between two complexes, is so fierce as to preclude tranquillity, a mental *malaise* ensues—especially in a sensitive or delicately poised mentality—which seeks compensation in the repression of the harassing complex. We employ this stratagem when we try to forget unpleasant things, overlooking the distinction between forgetting to remember and remembering to forget.

We can understand repression more clearly by harking back to our old simile between the race and the child. As civilization folded itself around the growing race, primitive impulses were necessarily repressed. *Tabus* were imposed, restrictions were evolved, and the crowd mind acquired a new orientation, in which the interests of the one were subordinated to those of the many who, more and more, began to discern the prior

claims of the community, and made the individual toe the line. Thus, we see the beginnings of present-day Socialism, which, in some form or other, will eventually capture the allegiance of the whole of mankind, by reason of its gospel of unselfishness and its revolt against the tyranny of shams.

In the case of the child a parallel development takes place. We have observed how, as the child develops, his primitive impulses (the Pleasure Principle) are repressed by his environment, and his training, and his slowly evolved realization that to yield to his primal impulses would be anti-social. The primitive impulses are not killed. They are only slumbering, muffled; for all mental life, as Freud has ascertained, is imperishable and unified.

The root impulses frequently manifest themselves in abnormal states of mind, such as dissociation or perversion, as we have seen, or in dreams and phantasies, as we shall see. Freud has arrived at the conclusion that the reason why we cannot recall incidents of early childhood is that, since they are to a large extent symptomatic of the repugnant primitive impulses, we find it expedient to "forget" or repress them.

Wise, gentle and kindly admonitions on the part of parents, teachers and others, who are entrusted with the care of children, is, of course, necessary and invaluable. But far too often the "Do's" and the "Don'ts," and the brutal thrashings and other cruelties to which children are sometimes subjected are the bedrock causes of their ultimate criminal acts. Says the Rev. R. J. Campbell: "The man is made by the mental atmosphere that the child breathes." It is notorious that a child, strictly brought up, with its healthy animal spirits frowned upon, and its laughter stifled or even punished, goes to the bad later in life, and becomes a furtive, vicious, anti-social brute, whose straitlaced parents are the first to express "righteous" indignation at the disaster which they, and they alone, have caused. If a child is not allowed to be a child in its youth it will be a beast in its maturity. If a father does

not begin by being a "pal" to his child he will end by being its worst enemy.

So with certain "homes" and orphanages. In some of them all the fun, the healthy tumult, and the golden glory of youth is frozen out of sensitive children by the pious hypocrisy of kill-joys, to whom laughter is a crime and happiness a sin. You will never abolish crime until you have abolished crime factories, and if our paid politicians would only stop bleating their platitudes for one day, and transfer their attention from the things that do not matter to the things that do, they might be of some use after all.

Repression differs from the resort to the logic-proof compartment, in that in the latter case the ordinary thought stream of the individual is allowed to flow along with the offensive complex, whereas in repression the repugnant section of the stream is, so to speak, diverted downwards, and embedded in the lower strata of the mind, until such time as it shall erupt into consciousness, or emerge in a diluted and diverted form by way of sublimation.


The phenomena of somnambulism and double personality differ in degree rather than in nature. Both are dissociations, but whereas in double personality the individual can consciously make his actions conform with his environment, in a somnambulism he is as completely oblivious as though he were literally walking in his sleep.

I have used the term sublimation several times in the previous pages. As it denotes a most important factor in the psychic life of both the sane and the insane, and is, perhaps, the most interesting process in that life, we will do well to examine it in detail.

When a complex, by reason of its offensive or forceful nature, is precluded from expressing itself directly, and accomplishes that object by a more devious route, so that it is diluted, or toned down, it is said to be sublimated.

Let us take a very simple illustration.

A motorist wishes to drive from A to B. A heavy gale has blown down a tree, which lies across the road at C. He is accordingly forced to reach B by the loop road DEF.



Reasoning on parallel lines, a complex seeks to travel from the Unconscious (A) to the Conscious (B), and there express itself in full force. But a censure or obstacle (expediency, public opinion or any other restrictive factor) is encountered at C. The complex, therefore, expresses itself through the less direct channel DEF.

One of the Pleasure Principles—fighting—unless sublimated, manifests itself directly in the form of disorderly conduct, manslaughter or murder. If sublimated, it may assume the milder form of a certain aggressiveness. It is the recognition of this factor that urges us to advocate violent exercise, such as boxing, football or hunting, where the energy induced by the primitive impulse of combativeness is diffused by sport.

Dr. Hamblin Smith, in his book, *The Psychology of the Criminal*, throws further light on this point. He writes: "We have the varieties of the 'collecting instinct.' And this instinct, combined with the well-known attraction of bright objects for primitive man, goes far to explain many cases of hotel thefts. Again, the instinct of trusting to chance is common among savages: hence, we have stock exchange transactions and other forms of gambling."

To observe the numerous forms of sublimation is, to my mind, one of the most fascinating of psychological studies, and, as the normal and the abnormal overlap on this ground, it is a phase which cannot be treated superficially.

In the case of the so-called "normal," the boundary between conscious and unconscious sublimation is sometimes so indistinct that one has to tread warily. This was the subject of comment by Mr. Justice McCardie, in the King's Bench Division, on October 19, 1922, when he said: "The great majority of actions for breach of promise of marriage have not been brought in order to secure recompense for actual injury sustained by the woman, but rather to inflict anxiety and hurt upon the man by public trial, because he had disappointed the woman."

Referring to unconscious sublimation, Dr. Hart says: "The mode of expression must be sufficiently indirect to ensure that the real origin of the ideas appearing in consciousness is efficiently concealed from the individual himself."

A man had been deserted by his wife, and the complex begotten in his Unconscious by her disloyalty was repressed by

him until, years later, he met another *man*, who bore an amazing resemblance to the woman. The complex, thus stimulated, surged up, and impelled him to attack the man, whom he nearly killed. It was not until his fury had cooled down that he was able to analyze his impulse, and to grasp the true position in all its nakedness, though at the time of the attack he was obviously not responsible for his actions.

Sublimation frequently betrays itself in the form known as symbolism, where a desire deprived of its normal fulfilment is directed elsewhere. Spinsters, for example, denied the natural realization of the maternal impulse, sublimate it by lavishing affection upon other women's children, or upon a pampered dog. They both offer and desire an atmosphere of emotion. Their psychology is understood only too well by young preachers of magnetic personality, who are astute enough to attract a congregation of elderly virgins and caress them with words.

Old maids sometimes fail to sublimate this instinct, in which case they repress the sex complex, and mask its existence by the assumption of an excessive prudery, where they fly to the opposite extreme and manifest an unhealthy interest in the matrimonial alliances and misalliances of others.

It is, incidentally, important to note that persons of both sexes who attract public attention by their hectic advocacy of a too rigid standard of morality are as a rule neurotics. A perpetual conflict is waged between their own abnormally powerful sex impulses and their sublimation capacity, their conflict manifesting itself in their all-absorbing desire to sublimate their impulses, and, by transference, to desire, at all costs, a corresponding victory for sublimation in the minds of others.

In plain English, they are distinctly sexual and have the utmost difficulty in controlling themselves. They cannot understand that there are people in the world who are not so sexual as themselves; and they accordingly strive to restrain not only themselves but others as well. The sight of a paint-

ing of a nude figure, for instance, stirs up in these prudes thoughts which a normally balanced person would not experience.

This fact helps us to understand the eccentric and ludicrous behaviour of "converts" at religious revivals who, not content with screaming in public that they are "miserable sinners" (though no one has said they are not), manifest a deplorable lack of taste in including their "unconverted" (i.e., less hysterical) brethren in the same category.

The antics of these folk would be less offensive were their accusations directed only against themselves. But with that selfish disregard of the feelings of others which characterizes them they are not averse to invading the privacy of one's most intimate family affairs. In one case a mother, in the revolting atmosphere of a revival meeting, disclosed before hundreds of witnesses her son's illegitimacy in her son's presence and, of course, ruined his career. It is a notorious scandal that after the various religious revivals which from time to time afflict portions of South Wales immorality increases with inevitable regularity.

The Dean of St. Paul's—one of the few clerics who has the courage to say what he thinks—speaking at the Church Congress at Sheffield on October 11, 1922, said: "I very much doubt whether sudden conversion is a normal experience. . . . Where conversion takes place it is always the victory of one half of a divided personality over the other half." And divided personality, as we have seen, is the outcome of dissociation, which, in its turn, is at the root of all insanity and mental instability. Should you happen to be interested in the question of religious hysteria you will find a readable exposition of this disorder in *Religion and Sex*, by Chapman Cohen.

Another symptom of a repressed complex is that known as a stereotyped action, where the individual spends most of his time in the repetition of some apparently meaningless act. An American killed a Roman Catholic priest, and was convicted of

manslaughter. On his release from prison his mind was affected, and he gradually passed into a state in which he was perpetually crossing himself. That action he unconsciously adopted to convince himself of the purging of his former "unholiness," the action itself obviously being suggested by the calling of his victim.

In many persons of intellect, both normal and abnormal, the desire for sublimation is stronger than the impulse. The outcome of this is an even greater conflict resulting in a super-normal sublimation in the form of the creation of a work of genius, the impulse being apparent in the guise of a work of art such as a brilliant literary achievement. In other cases the impulse is stronger than the capacity for sublimation. As a result, the subject is fettered by his primitive urge, generally sexual, which manifests itself in some anti-social act of a sexual nature which shocks society and lands the patient in an asylum or in gaol. We are not far from the truth when we say that genius is akin to insanity. In this connection G. K. Chesterton says: "In the fifteenth century men cross-examined and tormented a man because he preached some immoral attitude; in the nineteenth century we fêted and flattered Oscar Wilde because he preached such an attitude and then broke his heart in penal servitude because he carried it out."¹⁶

Freud maintains that every individual possesses only a certain capacity for sublimation, and that when the current standard of morality draws too heavily upon this capacity conflict follows in the individual, whose mind is then the zone of a civil war of its own.

Examples of correlated instances of sublimation are apparent on every hand when we contemplate the profound influence which has been exerted on a man by the loss—through death, desertion or other form of separation—of a woman previously held dear. Some of our most eminent men, deprived of their mates, or prospective mates, and unable to enjoy their

¹⁶ G. K. Chesterton, *Heretics*.

society in person, have continued to be stimulated and inspired, by their recollection, to achieve distinction through the refreshing consolation of their memory. The desire to acquire photographs and other souvenirs of those no longer with us is directly traceable to this manifestation of the Pleasure Principle, and were an inquiry instituted into the origin of the veneration of relics in the Roman Catholic Church and of the treasuring of love letters by old-fashioned spinsters it would not improbably yield the same result.

A form of repression seen in everyday life is the sudden introduction of an irrelevant flow of conversation to cover the embarrassment induced by the mention of a painful subject. We popularly describe such tactics as "trailing a red herring" or simply as "changing the subject." In Yorkshire they call it "talking off the top."

Another conscious form is "Mutism"—taking no part in conversation on the principle: "Least said, soonest mended." Mutism is sometimes adopted through suspicion of the good intentions of others. This reserve is seen to perfection in an English railway carriage, where you can travel for hours without your fellow-travellers, if strangers, exchanging a word either with you or among themselves. Englishmen are notoriously reserved. Is it because they do not understand one another, or because they do?

Some folk fly to the opposite extreme, and, in their anxiety to disguise their real feelings, almost drive one distracted with the tumbling eagerness of their sustained chatter. Says Dr. Hart, in this connection: "It is a common observation that a secret unhappiness often lurks beneath the sparkling witticisms of the man of jokes. Humour is, indeed, one of the great refuges of life, and the man who is sensitive but has no humour suffers much from the bitterness of experience." Figaro it was who said that he laughed at the follies of mankind to keep himself from weeping.

Irritability, though the direct opposite to humour, plays an

equally important part in sublimation, an apparently unconnected incident serving to link itself with, and summon up, a repressed complex.

Before passing on to Projection and Phantasy—the only terms now awaiting discussion—I wish briefly to notice two questions which are sometimes asked.

First: why are complexes sometimes repressed and sometimes sublimated? When direct expression would not, to the unconscious mind, be imprudent or anti-social the complex manifests itself directly in an undiluted form. Other and adverse conditions being present it resorts to sublimation.

Second: why is sublimation sometimes only partial? It may be necessarily partial because of the unusual strength of the impulse to which it relates, or because of the absence of an opportunity for successful sublimation. A partial or ineffectual sublimation is undoubtedly dangerous. It may cause a pronounced neurosis; and, if it comes to that, what else can we expect? The criterion of a successful sublimation is, of course, whether it results in gain to the individual or loss. We cannot choose any other standard.

Projection is a compromise between sublimation and censorship, when the activity of the one is balanced by that of the other. Here, too, the goal is escape from conflict. In projection the complex presents itself, it is true, to the conscious mind of the subject, but as the attribute of some other person. We frequently find in our newspapers reports of ill-balanced young husbands who appear on a charge of persistent cruelty to their wives or children. They often accuse the police of persecuting them and protest that they are model husbands and fathers. In other words, the accused recognizes "at the back of his mind" that his conduct is despicable; but, in order to avoid twinges of conscience, or to appear in a more favourable light generally, he makes his "mechanism of projection" transfer his failing to the very persons who wish to prevent him from indulging in it, and he enjoys the pleasant

sensation of a public martyrdom which tickles his vanity, disgusts everybody and impresses nobody. It is only fair to record that although in many cases it is one of the tricks of the trade, in others the accused really believes the story which he offers to the Bench.

Projection is simply blaming others for our own shortcomings. The legendary Adam originated it when he whined: "The woman tempted me!"

Unbalanced folk, notably women with an ungratified sex complex, often attribute to others intentions which, in their heart of hearts, they are only too anxious that they should harbour. Every paltry village where the art of minding other people's business is one of the leading rustic pastimes has its mischief-making spinsters, who, secretly coveting the attentions of the unmarried parson, announce their dismay at his wholly imaginary advances. Sometimes, indeed, the person exists only in their imagination. Like Mrs. Harris, "there ain't no sich person," and the mental process is really a premature wish fulfilment, the nature of which we are about to discuss.

In the case of Phantasy—day dreaming—our complexes are not repressed or fulfilled in the world of fact, but in the world of fancy by a more abstract process of sublimation.

Self-assertion complexes—the outcome of the fighting instinct—are frequently the bedrock cause of a phantasy. The subject of it cannot get on in life, so he gets on in imagination and does, and says, extraordinary things, which manifest themselves in the symptoms of megalomania, of delusions, or in other ways.

The word "phantasy" is synonymous with the word "fancy." And when you have realized all that is meant by fancy you have a conception of the meaning of phantasy which could not very well be bettered. The essence of a phantasy is imagination. We speak of a man as being pre-occupied, "far away," absent-minded or "up in the clouds." The novelists of a past generation, hopelessly out of touch

with realities, were fond of depicting such persons. A. C. Benson has confessed, in contemplating the alleged eccentricity of 'varsity dons, that "the difficulty is that one acquires habits and mannerisms; one is crusty and gruff if interfered with."¹⁷ But some of the novelists of fifty years ago (especially the women novelists) grossly overdrew their characters. The professor of fiction would not have been a professor had he not been absent-minded; the sole qualification of a candidate for a university chair would appear to have been that the applicant, though wise, should be wise enough to act like a fool. The novelists themselves indulged in phantasies; otherwise they could not have written their books, for all creative art necessitates the visualizing of the non-existent, the calling up of images, and the materialization, in imagination, of persons and circumstances which do not exist in fact. G. K. Chesterton, referring to the supposed eccentricity of literary men, says: "Poets are commonly spoken of as psychologically unreliable; and generally there is a vague association between wreathing laurels in your hair and sticking straws in it."¹⁸

It would, of course, be ridiculous to say that novel reading, as such, is harmful. It is, as all the world knows, frequently the reverse, and has brought a blessed consolation to millions. An instance is on record of a convict who, on the morning of his execution, was so engrossed in a novel that he was found reading it when the executioner came to pinion him. Probably no author has ever had a more sincere tribute paid to his genius than has the writer of that novel—Robert W. Chambers. We all read our novels and build our castles in the air—life would often be unbearable if we did not—but their nature, their purpose, the causes which prompt their erection, and the extent of their calls upon our time and attention, are all of vital importance when we reflect upon the good or harm of these visions.

¹⁷ A. C. Benson, *From a College Window*.

¹⁸ G. K. Chesterton, *Orthodoxy*.

A phantasy is a short cut to the materialization of our secret desires. Like certain poisons, it is harmless in small quantities, but if indulged in too freely the frontier dividing sanity from insanity is soon crossed.

In his famous poem, *If*, Kipling draws the distinctions:

If you can dream, and not make dreams your master,
If you can think, and not make thoughts your aim. . . .

We employ Phantasy when we seek something that will "take us out of ourselves." We read novels, and we visit the theatre and the cinema. To the kitchen maid who, surrounded by her pots and pans, is able, while devouring her novelette, to move among the duchesses who strut through its pages with affectations of posture and gesture, at which any duchess would laugh in real life, these marionettes of kitchen fiction afford a real delight, refreshing by novelty and piquant by contrast.

Much has been said, both for and against the living of a solitary existence. Blaise Pascal writes: "Most of the mischief in the world would never happen if men would only be content to sit still in their parlours"; and La Bruyère agrees, with his sweeping generalization: "All mischief comes from our not being able to be alone." But we can have too much of self. A solitary existence is the mother of Phantasy. Hermits (and you can spend your life in the heart of London without speaking to a soul) live apart from their fellows, and, withdrawing by degrees into a place of their own imaginings—a city of beautiful nonsense—live apart, even from themselves.

This phase of existence is often termed emotional dementia, the symptoms of which may be studied in those weird folk who live solitary lives in some country village, talking only to themselves, to the creatures of their disordered imaginations, or, in some instances, sitting like logs, year in and year out.

A form of Phantasy frequently encountered is that known

as "premature wish fulfilment." The subject begins by knowingly imagining himself to be, say, a millionaire. In the next stage, he finds himself wishing it with abnormal intensity. Unless he checks himself at this stage, he ends by believing that he is one. Excessive indulgence in fiction, or in visits to the cinema, may beget this state of mind, the first stage of which often takes the form known as "identification." The kitchen maid, for instance, may begin by identifying herself with the overdrawn duchess, and may end with the delusion that she is one.

A case, the obscurity of which was cleared up by the theory of premature wish fulfilment, was tried at South Shields in October, 1922. A girl desired, in vain, to have a child of her own. As a short cut to the fulfilment of her wish, she stole the baby of another woman. The case, quite rightly, was dismissed.

The late Father Bernard Vaughan threw an interesting side-light on identification. "Actors," he says, "sometimes become so absorbed in the rôle they are playing, and get so identified with the characters they assume, that they continue to personify them, even when they have left the footlights and have returned to their own homes."¹⁹

A minor and, indeed, humorous illustration of the process of identification is available in watching the development of a quarrel involving three persons. A has a grievance against B; C, who detests B, unconsciously identifies himself with A, takes his point of view (if it is the wrong one, that obstacle is swiftly overcome by rationalization), and, in his turn, starts a vendetta against B.

Some psychologists go much further, as regards identification, and produce instances where a person in complete sympathy (*en rapport*) with some one else has contracted—physically or mentally—an ailment from which the other has been suffering. By this theory they seek—not without reason—to

¹⁹ Father Bernard Vaughan, S.J., *The Sins of Society*.

explain the scars in his hands, feet and side, to which Paul, the Apostle, referred when he is said to have said: "I bear in my body the marks," etc. This form of mental disturbance is a fairly common symptom accompanying religious hysteria in the East.

In a phantasy, as in all other forms of mental abnormality, the subject believes only what he wishes to believe. But surely the "sane" man is similarly constituted? All our private opinions are dominated by this influence. If a Catholic wants to be a Catholic, nothing will make him be anything else; and if a Socialist wants to be one, and to remain one, nothing will alter him. The sane man understands why the lunatic cannot see sense, but the lunatic fails to understand why the sane man cannot see sense!

And when we attempt to summarize the present position as regards both normal and abnormal psychology, we are forced to recognize the dominance of its one great basic fact, namely, that all views, both rational and irrational—whether they are held by the so-called sane or by the so-called insane—are the result of complexes. All attempts to change or supplant those views will be met in one of two ways; either by an indignant or contemptuous rejection of the proffered alternatives, or by the creation of rationalizations, which appear flawless only to their creator.

Insanity is purely a question of degree. A man is sometimes termed insane when his views on some subject or other swerve ever so slightly from the accepted view. When Galileo announced his scientific theory in the Middle Ages he was condemned as a sorcerer, i.e., as a madman. To-day, we all accept Galileo's theory. The dividing line between a delusion and an opinion can be very, very faint. We are familiar with the theory that a man may be said to be insane when his views (or their probable results) constitute a danger to himself or to others. In other words, when a man practises what he preaches, and the result is an anti-social act, we call him either

a criminal or a lunatic, or both, for in these much-vaunted days of "clear thinking" we talk about "criminal lunatics." If a man is a criminal he is held to be responsible for his actions and is punished for them. If he is a lunatic he is not considered responsible. If we call him a criminal lunatic the phrase implies a responsible man who is not responsible. But this question properly belongs to Chapter XII, where I shall try to go into the matter more fully.

In our examination of the phenomena of insanity we found that two factors dominate the whole theme—Dissociation and Conflict. Further, when we weigh the values of these two, we find that the evidence indicates that Dissociation is, in fact, the result of Conflict, and that, as in the case of Phantasy, Somnambulism, split personality and delusions, it fulfils the rôle of a means of escape from the mental storm caused by Conflict.

Conflict itself, as we have seen, is caused by the clash of one or more of the three primary instincts—fighting, feeding and sex—with the Herd Instinct (the Reality Principle), which has been evolved concurrently with the development of man himself.

Freud, as we know, says that sex is the only impulse ultimately influencing conduct, but although some physicians and some psychologists are not yet disposed to accept his postulate without certain reservations (even after allowing for Freud's very liberal interpretation of the term "sex") many are confident that it is only a question of time before the bulk of Freud's tenets enjoy general acceptance among thinking people. Strange though it may seem, the opponents of Freud, misunderstanding him, appear to think that his aim is to make us all ultra-sexual, or sexually abnormal and perverse, and, by one of the whimsical paradoxes of life, he is credited with advocating the spread of forms of mental disease which he is devoting his life to cure. But if Freud were to crystallize his own attitude in one sentence, he could not do better than quote

the words of H. G. Wells: "I do not believe we came into the mire of life simply to hold our hands up out of it."²⁰

The Herd Instinct is, in simple language, the sum-total of all those beliefs, conventions and practices which human society has so far found it beneficial to adopt in the best interests of everybody. Conflict, as understood by Freudians, is simply the friction produced when one or more of the primitive propensities fall foul of public opinion, and it is at the bottom of all insanity, instability and irregularity of thought or conduct.

You will readily understand that Conflict can be engendered by environment, and the general nervous strain of modern life. There is no neurasthenia among savages, since they have practically no conventions and social sanctions to restrain or divert their desires.

A civilized being who finds his outlook on life foreign, and in some cases distasteful, to that held by his fellows, has either to repress it by enduring the stinging discomfort of adapting his life and conduct to theirs, or to seek refuge in a sublimating phantasy of self-isolation. If he cannot do so, by reason of his circumstances, and he still finds his conduct at variance with the accepted standard, a brain-storm ensues, and he finds himself in either a hospital, asylum or gaol. As Dr. Hart says: "It is possible that insanity, or a part of insanity, will prove to be less dependent upon intrinsic defects of the individual than on the conditions in which he has to live, and the future may determine that it is not the individual who must be eliminated, but the conditions which must be modified."

We will go further into these questions in the next five chapters. In the meantime I hope I have helped you to arrive at a clearer understanding of the real nature of insanity, of its origins, its processes, and of the immense fillip towards a solution of its mysteries which Freud and his disciples have provided by their zeal and research.

²⁰ H. G. Wells, *First and Last Things*.

CHAPTER VII

CAUSE AND EFFECT

IF, as we discovered in the previous chapter, Conflict plays a vital part in the origin of insanity, the bearing of several factors which are considered by some to be the cause, and by others to be the effect, either of insanity or of criminality, or of both, acquire a special significance. The factors to which I refer are five in number—epilepsy, heredity, environment, drugs and alcohol—and, although the first-named probably stands in a class by itself, the element of conflict manifests itself with a sustained insistence in all discussions devoted to the other four.

There have been races who attributed all insanity, including epilepsy, to the influence of the moon, as the word "lunacy" denotes. The ancients, on the whole, regarded epilepsy, probably in view of its spectacular symptoms, as a visitation from Zeus (Yahweh) or from the Devil, and traces of the lingering of this error are to be found in the New Testament, where an epileptic seizure is regarded as a visit, sometimes from Above, sometimes from Below. And the theory that every man was inhabited by two spirits, a good and a bad, which were engaged in a perpetual wrangle for the possession of his soul, was the cause of the Manichæan heresy which, among others, threatened to split the early Christian Church into two camps.

Hippocrates (400 B.C.) seems to have been the first physician to ridicule such theories, prodding his contemporaries with the gibe that they only declared epilepsy to be of supernatural origin because of their inability to cure it. Praxagoras (300 B.C.) attempted to explain epilepsy by defining it

as the result of the obstruction of the blood vessels, an explanation to which certain doctors of to-day still cling, by venturing the opinion that epileptic fits are induced by jerky contractions of the arteries in the brain.

The majority of physicians, however, now believe that epilepsy is an affection of the nervous system, characterized by fits or seizures, during the continuance of which the subject is unconscious, bites his tongue, froths at the mouth, jerks his muscles and limbs, and displays great physical strength, which often defies the efforts of several men to hold the patient down. (The comparatively recent discovery that Julius Cæsar was an epileptic may put a new complexion on the schoolboy's statement that "Cæsar was a powerful general, who was always throwing bridges across the Rhine!") This violent stage is followed by a period during which the subject is dazed, and may perform some anti-social act (post-epileptic automatism). This is the most common form which epilepsy assumes. There are others, such as simple confusion, in which the epileptic may perform acts ranging from the merely eccentric to the criminal (epileptic equivalent). At first, the attacks are mild and infrequent, increasing in frequency and severity as the disease develops. The epileptic is usually unaware of his acts committed during and often for some time after a seizure. Deaths during an epileptic seizure, though rare, are not unknown. In those cases where a clouded consciousness alone occurs, in place of the more familiar fit, the term "masked epilepsy" is often employed.

In epileptics the primitive sexual impulse is very intense, and Professor R. von Krafft-Ebing hazards the opinion that "the cerebral changes which accompany the epileptic outbreak may induce an abnormal excitation of the sexual instinct,"¹ and goes on to give numerous instances of persons of both sexes, and of unblemished name, who, during, or immediately after epileptic seizures perpetrated sexual offences of which,

¹ R. von Krafft-Ebing, *Psychopathia Sexualis*.

on regaining their mental clarity, they retained not the slightest recollection.

The epileptic goes to extremes. He sometimes thinks himself persecuted, or he may suffer from auditory hallucinations, in which he "hears" voices abusing him. These may spur him to commit murder or manslaughter, or to indulge in exhibitionism. Epileptics are frequently irritable and impulsive. An epileptic, again, may be depressed or querulous. In one form of the disease the patient's mental *malaise* is at first manifested by his excessive religious zeal. Paul the Apostle, Mary Magdalene, Mohammed and Swedenborg were epileptics. In another form kleptomania becomes habitual whenever the epileptic passes into the clouded state following a seizure. It is a marked feature of epilepsy that on emerging from his paroxysm or trance, the epileptic may have retained no recollection of his acts during it, and during the hazy condition following an attack epileptics have been known to walk for considerable distances, to climb walls, to dodge traffic, and to reply when addressed—all these actions being purely reflex.

Not infrequently an epileptic may become a maniac, and manifest irritability, combativeness, violent temper and homicidal tendencies. Violent conduct after a seizure, or series of seizures, is impulsive—that is to say, it is not premeditated or planned. Something pricks the patient into a fury which, while it lasts, renders him *capable de tout*, though he as suddenly recovers his calm. An epileptic, in his calm intervals, is always repentant, generally horrified, and frequently lovable.

The more common forms of epilepsy are familiar to the public through the sight of persons in the throes of a seizure attracting a knot of morbid onlookers who generally do everything except to offer to do something, but the manifestations of "psychic" epilepsy are less familiar and, when noticed, are misunderstood. The "psychic" epileptic may indulge in maniacal outbursts, smashing everything within reach. On the

other hand, he may commit a definite form of crime in a definite manner at definite intervals. Of these Dr. Bernard Hollander writes: "It is only the well-to-do classes that can afford the services of an expert and who will be believed by a magistrate; the poor have to go to gaol, and since their crime is recurrent they are regarded as habitual criminals and punished with ever-increasing sentences."²

The only crime of which many criminals are guilty is the crime of poverty. Nine-tenths of such unfortunates, when charged, have nothing to say because they know that nine-tenths of us will refuse to believe nine-tenths of what they would like to say.

In his lucid intervals an epileptic understands his case, and instances are not unknown where a patient-to-be has sensed the imminence of epilepsy. At the age of seventeen Dostoievsky, the Russian novelist and humanitarian, wrote to his brother, Michael: "There is no way out of my difficulties. I am going to become insane." And he became an epileptic and created Mishkin, an epileptic character.

There are as many causes of epilepsy as there are days in the year, and as many theories. Some authorities insist on its psychic origin. Others, again, proclaim its physical nature. Others reconcile these two theories. On this question one cannot dogmatize.

Can epilepsy be inherited? Strictly speaking, you cannot inherit insanity of any sort. What you can inherit is the tendency towards insanity (the insane diathesis) or towards certain functional nervous disorders of which epilepsy is one. The children of an epileptic parent, or parents, may turn out to be epileptics or they may not. But what is quite certain is the fact that the children of any and every mentally instable parent are far more likely than not to display neurotic tendencies. Sometimes, though very rarely, such neuroticism may transform the child into a genius, for genius and instability

² Bernard Hollander, *In Search of the Soul*, vol. II.

are often interchangeable terms, though were some new eugenist doctrine preached that neurotics should marry neurotics the world would gradually become a vast madhouse!

Two illustrations of epilepsy where the causes were definitely traceable will, I hope, suffice.

The spirit of a boy of cheerful and industrious disposition was gradually broken by repeated floggings administered without provocation, by his father. At the age of nineteen he showed signs of epilepsy and spent the next few years of his life under restraint in various asylums. In his nonviolent intervals he developed religious mania, and ultimately locked a woman in a room and, brandishing a knife in one hand and a Bible in the other, yelled that he had been commanded by the Deity to murder her, which he attempted to do.

In the other case a German patient, at the age of forty-two, sustained a head injury which was gradually succeeded by a period of maniacal outbursts and epileptic seizures. After his death in an asylum an autopsy on his brain disclosed the presence in it of a slate pencil three inches long. The curious feature of this case is that the pencil had not been driven into his brain during the accident, but had apparently been there all his life!

In the vast majority of cases of crimes committed by epileptics the origin of the disease is unknown or obscure. During the trial, in November, 1922, of a boy aged fourteen on a charge of murdering a boy aged three by roping him in a box it was disclosed that the accused had committed the murder unknown to himself and had recalled the fact in a dream. This is explained by the fact that epilepsy is, in certain respects, similar to hypnosis. In hypnosis the subject, on waking, is unaware of what he said or did during the trance. But if he is once more hypnotized he will recall his utterances and actions during his first hypnosis. In this boy's case a parallel state of affairs is discernible. He tied up the other boy during one epileptic attack. He subsequently experienced a second

fit while asleep, and in this fit the memory of his crime leaped into realization. You will remember that we discussed cases of multiple personality in our previous chapter, where we found that thoughts sometimes divide themselves into two or more dissociated streams which alternately occupy the conscious. A similar process appears to have been the experience of this boy in this case. Such, at any rate, was the opinion of several eminent alienists at the time of the trial.

Epileptics are particularly prone to experience very vivid dreams which, strange though it may seem, often continue long after the sleeper awakes. It will be quite clear that should an epileptic dream that a second party is endeavouring to do him an injury, and, on waking, attack the person concerned, in a pardonable fit of temper, the epileptic cannot reasonably be held to be guilty of assault. He is not responsible.

You will be amazed to hear that under our present system epileptics can be, and frequently are, sent to prison. Thomas Holmes, the author and police court missionary, tells us that in one year alone, in only three prisons, one hundred and fifty-five proved epileptics were undergoing punishment, ten of whom had been sentenced to penal servitude. In other words, a man suffers from epilepsy. He is ill. Under the domination of his illness he commits some offence for which he is tried and sentenced to serve a punishment. We punish him although he is ill but not because he is ill!

At the time of writing no measures are taken in this country to cure epileptics who are "criminals." (Here I enclose the term within quotes for obvious reasons.) But in the United States a more humane attitude prevails, and the utmost care is taken to avoid injustice in trying and sentencing epileptics and to provide for their care and cure should epilepsy show itself, for the first time, during the serving of a sentence.

Epilepsy is sometimes curable by an operation. Dr. M.

Allen Starr, the American surgeon, devoted much time and attention to this question, and he concluded that although an operation was feasible in only two per cent. of epileptic cases, and that only twenty per cent. of these two per cent. were likely to be successful, yet the advisability of operation in such cases should invariably be considered in American prisons and asylums.

The relationship between epilepsy and crime is more clearly apparent, as we have had occasion to note. Lombroso considered that epilepsy and criminality resembled each other far more closely than do epilepsy and insanity, and very many medico-legal authorities, including Dr. Havelock Ellis, are inclined to agree with him, though the temptation to regard the criminal as essentially an epileptic—the former view of the Italian school—must be resisted as untenable, in spite of the fact that the death-rate from epilepsy among convicts is more than twice that of the general population.

The Stoics, founded by Zeno at the beginning of the third century B.C., maintained that mental qualities, as well as bodily attributes, are inherited, though their conception of the mind as of a physical nature has long since been rejected. And Hippocrates, to whom I referred at the beginning of this chapter, recognized the influence of heredity. "Our tendencies," he writes, "towards vice and virtue, and towards health and sickness, come from our parents and from the basic elements composing us rather than from ourselves."

Between Hippocrates and Mendel there is, for the purpose of this book, an hiatus during which thinkers who attempted an honest definition of the nature of psychic heredity were either persecuted by their contemporaries, especially by the "religious" confraternities, until they recanted their views or were, in many cases, put to death for not doing so. In the Middle Ages in particular, the latter method of literally killing opposition was employed with what must have been a gratifying success.

In striking contrast to his fellow ascetics Gregory Mendel, instead of shirking or attempting to stifle the facts of Nature, began to explore them, and, when Abbot of Brünn, carried out his experiments in the cross-fertilization of plants, which have made his name famous for all time by reason of the foundation which he laid for the science of physical heredity out of which emerged postulates in the field of psychology. In the form of Mendelism we find the law stated that pairs of qualities have a physical existence in the pollen of plants and the germ cells of animals. They share with the atoms and molecules of the chemists the capacity to form rigid associations with cognate affinities.

But the later decades of the nineteenth century witnessed a disposition to regard the problem in a more generous spirit than that of the pre-Mendel days, and no sooner had Tyndall delivered his famous address to the British Association when he cast doubts on the genuineness of free will and startled his audience by saying: "My intellectual textures are woven for me, not by me," than Henry Maudsley stated the same view in physiological language: "We are saints or sinners according to the configuration of the nerve tracks concerned."

Darwin held that the instincts of a given animal species were moulded by adaptation and transmitted by heredity in their modified form to their offspring. In his *Descent of Man* he went a step further, and affirmed that the theory of hereditary transmission from the progenitor to the progeny held good even in the cases of unicellular organisms and plants.

Even where physiologists and psychologists seem to differ in questions of heredity their apparent divergence is nothing more than a statement of the same truth in the language of their psychological colleagues. Sir Thomas Clouston, for example, a staunch physiologist, writes: "I have no sort of doubt, as the result of my experience of forty years of the medical study of disordered and undeveloped minds, that

heredity comes in as a causal agent in a greater degree than in any other disease.”⁸

In its simplest physical manifestations the influence of heredity is unswerving in its operation. If you take individuals of a unicellular organism, such as that possessed by the lowliest of animals, and observe their development in circumstances common to them all you will find that they reproduce their kind true to type and without divergence between the individuals of that type.

In its more complex applications, such as its influence upon a human being whose brain is an assemblage of millions of cells, and whose mind is the clearing house for millions of impressions the law is less definite—or possibly its definiteness is less apparent—and its investigation becomes more complicated.

It is, of course, well known that physical characteristics are heritable. In both the male and female germ-cells are minute granular particles termed chromosomes. These unite at the moment of fertilization and, in the opinion of scientists, physical if not mental characteristics are transmitted by them. Further, they have been handed on to what will, after the gestation, be a child, not only from its parents but from countless thousands of generations. In these matters we must take long views.

But does a human being inherit the mental strength and weakness of his ancestors? While no rigid law of heredity has so far been formulated this omission is explainable by the fact that our knowledge is incomplete. In order to decide a definite law of heredity, it would be necessary, if we were to be conscientious to the point of absurdity, to investigate the psychic experience and content, not only of every living mortal, but of each of his ancestors, and thus, by a comprehensive process of empirical and inductive reasoning, state an ascer-

⁸ Sir T. S. Clouston, *The Hygiene of Mind*.

tained fact in unequivocal terms. In short, the study of heredity is one of the few which can be definitely furthered by statistics. But although, in view of the fragmentary nature of the evidence available, there is disagreement among the authorities as to the exact terminology in which a theory of heredity is to be presented, there is, to those who are familiar with the sharp cleavages in the ranks of thinkers on nearly every other subject, a striking concurrence of opinion as to the tendencies of heredity. In essentials there is agreement; in inessentials there is divergence.

Heredity is not the power of handing on, as in the case of property, an attribute from parent to child. Heredity is the tendency to produce a recognizable resemblance to that attribute. It has become a biological axiom that "all living things breed true to, and develop within, the likeness of their ancestral type."

Your psychic propensities were determined for you at the moment of your conception, though they did not begin to show themselves in definite shape until you had reached the period of your adolescence (fourteen to twenty-one). Those propensities are developed by education, opportunity, experience and a thousand other moulding influences, and, singularly enough, they are inhibited or diluted by the same influences. Further, as the innate propensities of your ancestors were handed on to you, so modifications and weakenings of those propensities, with their good and bad qualities alike, were transmitted to you, though in lesser degree.

In economic controversy, we sometimes come across the phrase "Dutch Finance," a term used to denote the saddling of future generations of taxpayers with the debts incurred by the generation contracting them. A parallel injustice is to be noticed in the more personal sphere of heredity, when one generation, by drawing too heavily upon its psychic resources, by reason of sexual or other excesses, may not only saddle succeeding generations with debt, but neglect to leave them

enough to pay for it. The powdered voluptuaries of the Georgian era bequeathed a legacy of nervous exhaustion which induced the nonsensical fads and wearisome whimperings of our Victorian grandmothers. It is the old story of the third and fourth generation.

If you grant this, you will understand without difficulty the profound influence of heredity upon such mental abnormalities as insanity and criminality, and their minor and often puzzling manifestations. Vidocq, the queer French neurotic, who was alternately police agent, criminal and private detective, was never tired of insisting that there are whole families in which the criminal taint is handed down from one generation to another.

The anti-social history of five generations of the notorious Jukes family is worth recording. Jukes was an American citizen, with an exceedingly instable temperament, which was the only legacy which he bequeathed to his descendants. In the five generations with which we are concerned, seven hundred and nine members of the family were born, and attained maturity. Of these seven hundred and nine individuals, eleven per cent. were criminals, fifty-two and two-fifths per cent. of the women were prostitutes, and twenty-five per cent. of both sexes were in receipt of outside relief. This family of neurotics cost the state in one way and another one million two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, and no doubt their descendants are at the present moment piling up the bill.

Heredity assumes bizarre forms. A parent may have a latent capacity for something which, through the operation of restrictive influences, he is precluded from expressing, or even discovering. His child will inherit that capacity which, in his case, may find an unrestricted outlet. Those who would decry heredity in such a case miss the point, which is that the son inherits the attribute, not because it was not present in the father, but because it was there, but lay there unnoticed.

The sons of bishops have been inmates of both prisons and asylums.

You may ask how it is that if the theory of heredity is a valid one, two children of the same parents may display opposite characteristics, and you may recall the difficulty which Goethe experienced in attempting to solve this conundrum. But since a child has two parents, it may inherit the attributes of one, or of both, or of neither. It may "throw back" to the characteristics of a remoter relation, or to those of that relation's spouse, or to a blending of the two. One child may inherit the disposition (or certain features of it) of one ancestor, while its brother or sister may be invested with the attributes (or certain of them) of another. In either case the mental legacy need not be transmitted from a parent. And these considerations do not shatter heredity. They tend to prove it.

Much has been written concerning the relationship between heredity and environment, and there is still a certain divergence of opinion. Dr. Ford Robertson takes an extreme and novel view and while conceding that characteristics induced in the parent by environment are heritable, holds that "*offspring as far as can at present be determined*"⁴ inherit no character from their parents." In this quaint belief Dr. Robertson stands practically alone.

More moderate views are held by the majority of thinkers. On the one hand there are those who argue that a man commits a crime under the influence of drink,⁵ to which he flies in order to drown his sorrows induced by poverty. He is poor because he is unemployed. He is unemployed because he is physically, intellectually or socially crippled in his search for work.

On the other hand there are those who consider that environment is an impotent, or relatively impotent, factor which

⁴ The italics are mine.—J. C. G.

⁵ Many criminals who specialize in crimes calling for coolness and dexterity dare not, and do not, touch alcohol.—J. C. G.

arouses a reaction in a man only according to the inherited quality of his inherited mental equipment. What would distress one type of man or drive him to crime produces little or no effect on another.

Others, again, hold that a man is the toy of his inherited propensities, which are played upon and stimulated or depressed by his environment, while a dwindling minority invite us to digest the dictum that "it is the climax of absurdity to imagine that the criminal could breed his kind,"⁶ which view is doubtless shared by the shade of Jukes, deceased!

Whether the question of heredity will ever be disentangled from that of environment with such success that its isolation will facilitate the formulation of a definite law with regard to it is a matter for conjecture. At present we can only hope.

There are those who fit themselves into their environment without effort. "He is a born actor," we sometimes say. Being a born actor is an excellent thing if the born actor finds that he can turn his inherited gift to profitable account. If his heredity does not collide with his environment he is indeed fortunate.

But those whose hereditary mental make-up is suffered to express itself unthwarted are very, very rare. I cannot think of one. And to us that fact, so far from being a discouragement, should give a mental fillip. We visit the theatre and are stirred by the genius of a famous actor, and we say to each other on our way home in the Tube: "By George, that fellow *can* act!" But the life stories of even our naturally gifted actors would reveal a tale of early disappointments, rebuffs, defeats and acute hardships. Their genius has, it is true, enabled them to smash their way through all barriers, but that does not prove the non-existence of the barriers. It proves the reverse.

At the other end of the scale are the social misfits—those whose heredity, instead of endowing them with the driving

⁶ Vide J. F. Sutherland, *Recidivism*.

force to "win through" not because of their environment but in spite of it, proves too feeble for that task.

In his statistical study *The English Convict*, Dr. Charles Goring reproduces a long letter from a criminal (196, W. R. Schedule Records 617) in reply to a request that he should furnish his autobiography. Summarized, this letter discloses the following history:

The criminal, W. R., was a street arab, one of twelve children of whom two had died. His father, though a good worker, was a heavy drinker. His mother was temperate. A maternal aunt had been an inmate of an asylum. Of his nine surviving brothers and sisters all were drunkards except one. W. R. had lost a leg in an accident when twelve years of age, and had been left to pick up a living in the best way he could. He had served thirty periods of imprisonment since the age of fourteen, had drunk heavily when at liberty, had had venereal disease twice, had been confined in an asylum for ten months, and had had sunstroke. In short—a bad heredity, a bad environment, and the prison and the asylum as the inevitable outcome!

Environment will produce a different reaction on one heredity from that produced in another. Everything depends upon the heredity. We saw this vividly exemplified during the Great War. Two men in the same platoon would, in the firing line, respond very differently to the experience of trench warfare. One would feel sickened by the thought of the waste and organized slaughter of human beings to which he had been driven to become a party. He could never see why he should be compelled by brute force to take the life of a total stranger with whom he had no personal quarrel, and on whom, indeed, he had never set eyes either before or after he had murdered him. His companion, on the other hand, was in his element. To him the war was a blessing, a heaven-sent outlet for his animal spirits, an adventure, a romp, an ecstasy.

Environment and heredity are like a pair of naughty chil-

dren addicted to practical jokes which produce tragic consequences to the individual at whose expense they are made. One man of bad mental heredity will be profoundly upset by a trifle. His friend, similarly cursed, but in a different degree, will regard with apathy an external duress which would prick a normal mind into indignation or grief. Again, a man's mind may be normal and his environment abnormal, or *vice versa*.

We sometimes find people pointing to the fact that a man whose brother or sister has been convicted very soon takes to evil courses, and the temptation to attribute this fact to environment, or force of example or circumstance, is very great. But as it has been shown by statistics that in such cases the force of heredity is the more probable determining factor we must resist the temptation to argue from false premises. Similarly, the contention that female convicts are often married to, and presumably influenced by, criminals is only a half-truth, the other half being that, on the principle that like selects like, a male criminal will very frequently marry a woman with similar tendencies. In fact she has very often been his professional confederate, or his mistress, or both.

Environment cannot, of course, change heredity; it can only modify or accentuate the tendencies induced by it. But heredity can influence environment. It may even cause environment and there are those who hold that it cannot fail to do so. A man of inherited mental weakness finds himself compelled to work at high pressure for low wages. Low wages necessitate poor food, and not enough of that. They also necessitate a humble dwelling among thousands of other mortals similarly exploited. And if these things do not constitute a bad environment, what does? It is a significant fact that after the reduction of farm workers' wages in Norfolk, in the autumn of 1922, the prevalence of insanity immediately increased in the districts concerned.

Some will point to the tens of thousands of industrial workers who, though overworked and badly housed, maintain their

mental poise, and have never seen the inside of a prison. But while granting the truth of this statement I maintain that it applies only to those of such heredity as remains unnoticeably affected by their environment. These people are stable in spite of their environment; there are others who are instable because of it.

Cases are known where the child, grandchild and great-grandchild of an insane or neurotic progenitor living in the country have passed their lives in the country with no apparent mental blemish, whereas the great-great-grandchild, though born in the country, has developed insanity on becoming a town dweller.

In extreme cases domestic worry or economic stress induce a criminal act. In one case a woman whose husband had been unemployed for many months, tortured by the sight of her two children starving, drowned them both in a bath as the outcome of her mental tumult.

Summarized, the relationship between heredity and environment may be stated thus: heredity is the dominant factor, because it is practically unchangeable. Environment can be changed. Every man has his breaking-point. When his inherited propensities prove too frail for his environment there is a crisis, and a conflict begins between his Pleasure Principle (heredity) and his Reality Principle (environment). Said the oriental mystic, Lao Tse: "We are dominated by our race ghosts, by the traits of a myriad ancestors. We are a ferment of passions, desires and aspirations kneaded by the strength or weakness of our individual wills. We develop streaks of good or of bad according to our environment and opportunity."

I discussed the various psychic refuges from intra-psychic conflict in my previous chapter. For the purpose of the present chapter I will touch briefly upon two others of which we have heard a great deal of recent years—drugs and drink. Both these habits are contracted in the attempt to flee from

reality, to avoid a conflict, to obtain a temporary relief in the present without a thought for the future.

The taking of drugs to alleviate mental distress is purely a modern practice. The ancients used such drugs as were known to them for the purpose of inducing religious ecstasy. Preparations were employed distilled from mushrooms, lotus, laurel, opium or belladonna. In some religious rites their use was confined to the priests; in others the worshippers shared the drugs. Travellers will recollect that these (and worse) practices are not unknown to-day in the East, and among certain primitive tribes all over the world. But in civilized countries drug-taking is regarded solely as a means of escape, for the time being, from the unpleasant stresses of modern life, and is a practice indulged in by instable or foolish folk.

The opium addict at first experiences a pleasant titillation of his senses, after which he enjoys dreams of ornate pageantry in which women play a conspicuous part. As time goes on he periodically increases the dose necessary to induce these visions. This gradually causes visual hallucinations, mental conflict and mild attacks of delirium. His moral fibre deteriorates, and his intellect becomes sluggish. Should actual insanity grip him it generally assumes the form of delusions.

Many persons use morphine, a derivative of opium, to shelter from the stings of life. They bear living testimony to the saying that the ideal is the refuge of those who are afraid to tackle the real. Morphine soothes. But it also saps the addict's self-respect, his mental poise, and his altruistic regard for the feelings of others. His mind rots.

The cocaine fiend begins by taking the drug to whip his senses into instant activity. He becomes temporarily brilliant. Then he manifests loss of memory, loses what is wrongly termed his will power, and becomes jealous, loquacious and instable. He cannot be relied on to keep an appointment or a promise, and may develop delusions. In extreme cases he

makes maniacal attacks on others, and cocaine has been the cause of more than one murder, and innumerable suicides, to say nothing of deaths by misadventure.

And what of alcohol?

There are two kinds of alcoholism—acute and chronic. The acute alcoholic has an occasional outburst, while the chronic alcoholic is perpetually “soaking.” He is never drunk and never sober. The man who goes on the spree suffers from lassitude, irritability, or, in extreme cases, outbursts of temper. He may be temporarily pugnacious, and may smash things in a blind passion on “the morning after the night before.” The chronic alcoholic easily becomes confused, loses his memory and his judgment, and is moodily irritable and suspicious of everybody, and may burst into a blind passion if pricked by an appropriate stimulus, or even without one, as in the case of John Macdonald who, at the High Court of Justiciary, Glasgow, was convicted of culpable homicide. He returned home drunk one day, seized his eight-weeks-old daughter, and, seizing her by the ankles, repeatedly dashed her head upon the floor.

Whether drink causes insanity or not (and to this point I shall return presently) it certainly induces crime or accompanies it. The love of orgy among criminals and instable folk is proverbial, and the results are to be found in every prison and asylum in the world. Sir Evelyn Ruggles-Brise points out that in 1913 the actual convictions for drunkenness comprised thirty-two per cent. of all convictions,⁷ but were the number of convictions indirectly resulting from drunkenness taken into consideration, this percentage would be considerably increased, and while the death-rate from chronic alcoholism among the general population is twelve per thousand, among convicts it is twenty-six per thousand.

Alcohol undoubtedly affects the brain and nervous system. Its continual use changes their entire structure and cripples

⁷ Sir Evelyn Ruggles-Brise, *The English Prison System*.

their functionings to a really alarming extent. As soon as a sip of intoxicating liquor reaches your stomach, certain gastric nerves transmit an impulse to that portion of your *medulla oblongata*, which, as I mentioned in Chapter II, governs the passage of your blood through your arteries and blood-vessels. This is a reflex action, the inevitable outcome of which is that your blood-vessels are dilated to allow a greater volume of blood to be pumped through them. Presently, your blood in its journey round your body having become loaded with alcohol, it conveys it to your brain, where it bathes with alcohol the cells which are served by your capillaries—the tiny blood-vessels which poke about among its minutest intricacies. Finally, a reaction occurs in your over-stimulated *medulla oblongata*, and the activity of your breathing and your heart become lessened. You become fatigued.

At first sight, you might think that these facts mean next to nothing, and you might go on to argue that since the effects of alcohol are only temporary, and since, after taking it, this crippling of the brain soon passes away, leaving its activity once more normal, no real harm is done. But this is not so. The brain does not completely recover. Assume, for the sake of the argument, that the quality of your brain, when free from the operation of alcohol is 0. You take a few drinks. These lower it to, say, —9 or —10. Now, when the effects of the drink have worn off, your brain does not return to 0. It climbs back to, say, —2 or —1. Further, in the very process of the upward struggle, it burns up energy which can ill be spared.

But these observations apply only to the four or five drinks which the average man takes during the course of an evening. After the habit (plus an occasional minor bout) has been continued for a few years, things become more serious, and I quote but four of the results of sustained alcoholism:—Firstly, the membranes covering the cortex of your brain become thickened, while your actual brain substance correspondingly

shrinks. These changes induce paralysis, or, in extreme cases, imbecility.

Secondly, the sheaths of your nerves become thickened and the efficiency of the muscles or organs served by those nerves become permanently crippled. I illustrated the function of the sheaths diagrammatically in Chapter III, to which I would invite you to refer.

These two results inevitably occur. Two others not infrequently follow. The first of these is *delirium tremens*, the symptoms of which are too well known for me to waste your time in describing them. But I would mention, incidentally, that although it is commonly supposed that the effects of *delirium tremens* vanish on recovery, cases are known where the symptoms of this disorder have recurred some time afterwards—in some cases after two years' interval.

The other possible outcome is that a blood-vessel may burst in your brain. This will injure the neuroglia, or packing substance of your brain, and very often results in paralysis of one side of your body. Alcohol has many other effects. It rots the lining of the stomach, lowers resistance to disease, and shortens life, while its domestic and sociological results are notoriously appalling.

In our everyday conversation we employ phrases which imply a recognized connection between drunkenness and insanity. We use such terms as "he must be either drunk or mad," or "he was mad drunk." And it has been definitely proved that twenty per cent. of the insanity in this country alone is directly due to alcoholic excess.

The mental confusion resulting from alcohol is recognized in civil law as well as in criminal law. If a man enters into a contract when drunk he can repudiate it afterwards, if the other party to the contract knew that he was drunk at the time of agreeing to it. On the other hand, should he, on becoming sober, still wish to abide by the contract entered into when he was drunk, the contract is valid, while in the case

of insanity induced by alcoholism, an act committed by a lunatic of this type is not punishable in law.

Out of the mass of arguments and counter-arguments on the subject of the effect of the drunkenness of parents upon their children one or two incontestable facts emerge. The child of parents either of whom was drunk at the time of conception, will be born with its brain and nervous system affected in greater or lesser degree; while, should both the parents have been drunk at the moment of fertilization, the child will be correspondingly handicapped, and it is important to note that should the child of a drunkard take to drink, he drinks more heavily than his parent.

It is sometimes asked: "What sort of children are produced by the marriage of a drunkard to a lunatic or mentally instable person?" I invite consideration of the following representation of the results of an actual union of this sort. Further comment would be superfluous:—

INSANE FATHER — DRUNKEN MOTHER

DAUGHTER	SON	SON	SON	DAUGHTER
Suicide	Insane	Convict	Insane	Imbecile

Beethoven, the son of a drunken father, was mentally unsound, and there is no doubt that the drunkenness of parents will obviously affect their children in indirect as well as in direct ways. Where there is drunkenness there is poverty. Where there is poverty there is bad environment. Speaking at the annual meeting of the British Medical Association, at Glasgow, on July 28, 1922, Dr. G. Sullivan, the Medical Superintendent of Broadmoor Criminal Lunatic Asylum, said: "Alcoholic excess is due in the main to the environment, and especially to industrial conditions, and is a potent cause of grave anti-social conduct."

Before prohibition came into force in the United States the

consumption rate in America was only half that in this country, where we drink two gallons of alcohol per person per annum, the result of which is that twenty-six and three-fifths per cent. of those admitted to Salvation Army Homes have been wrecked by drink and gambling,⁸ and the fact that drink saps a worker's strength, and diminishes his output, is realized to the full by those employers who, agreeing with one another (over their wine) that drink is a national curse, patronize movements connected with social reform, licensing reform, and "the uplifting of the lower classes."

If you enjoy good fiction, and want a restrained but skillfully presented sketch of the effects of drink upon the lower middle classes in London, I can very cordially recommend *Three Bars' Interval*, by Stacy Aumonier. It is not a propaganda tract; it is a slice of life, and it is true to life.

And what of women?

The moral code of the average woman is undoubtedly higher than that of the average man, and it is an unpalatable fact that the average woman would avoid drinking, towards which she has no real leanings, were she not generally introduced to it by her menfolk. On the other hand, the female drinker is in a more hopeless plight when really gripped by the habit. She is swiftly demoralized. Her mental poise totters. Her conscience is muffled. She will commit a crime, if, by doing so, she can obtain more money for more drink. She is for sale or hire. . . .

There is not the slightest doubt that alcohol is very closely allied with venereal disease. The *fille de joie* has yet to be born who will not agree that the successful accosting of a man is greatly facilitated by his being rendered profitably sexual by drink. And when a man is in that state his prudence is jettisoned, and he will purchase the caresses of the first disease-riddled drab who is astute enough to buttonhole him.

It may be said that alcoholism is both a cause and an effect

⁸ Vide J. Ramsay Macdonald, *The Socialist Movement*.

of insanity. A person of bad heredity, set in the midst of a bad environment, against which he finds himself unable to fight, turns for consolation to drink, which, in its turn, renders both his brain and his mind still less capable of facing the battle of life.

It is true that drink induces sociability. It is equally true that to many thousands of people life would hardly be worth living without the assistance of the consolation which is bottled. But to the instable, the neurotic, and all whose psychic reserves are rapidly exhausted by a swerving, however slight, from a healthy and temperate life, indulgence in alcohol is toying with dynamite. The neurotic who is not teetotal is an unqualified fool.

Alcohol paralyses the inhibiting forces in the Unconscious. The result is a removal of Censorship, and the unrestrained egress of primitive impulses. The shameless candour of the tippler is a notorious feature of convivial intercourse—*In Vino Veritas*. Some Freudians maintain that alcoholism is inevitably the outcome of a repressed complex. The Censorship is just strong enough to repress the complex, but the subject enlists the muffling assistance of alcohol, which, paradoxically, produces the effect which it was expected to ward off, and the complex, its censor broken through by drink, soars up into the Conscious with a tremendous momentum.

“Level by level the mind builds itself up in the race and in the individual; and level by level, under the influence of old age, disease or drugs, the planes of consciousness break down in the inverse order to that in which they developed, the more recently organized centres going first, and the automatic mind, the oldest and most stable, with æons of habit behind it, working on to the last, keeping the bodily mechanism running long after all that makes the organism a man has withdrawn from its dishonoured vehicle.”⁹

⁹ Violet M. Firth, *The Machinery of Mind*.

CHAPTER VIII

THE BORDERLAND

A FRIEND of Disraeli once expressed the hope that he was quite well. "No one is quite well," replied Disraeli.

Whether this is true of our bodily state of health or not it is, so far as it goes, a flawless diagnosis of the mental condition of nearly every one of us. Probably no man is sane in every respect and at all times; if we were all sane the world would be a dull place inhabited by precise, meticulous, cold-blooded machines who would, by their very monotony and sameness, soon drive each other mad!

But humanity to-day is, unfortunately, tending to travel towards the opposite extreme. We are restless folk, scurrying as fast as we can towards a universal neuroticism, and the result of this stampede is to be seen in the various forms of instability and petty delinquency which I invite you to consider with me in this chapter and which may, if given free rein, land those whose minds they hamper either in the asylum or the gaol.

"Happiness is repose," said Turgenev. It is equally true that repose is happiness. And it is just that difficulty which we experience in relaxing—in forcing our minds to rest—that fosters the growth and spread of those erratic and erotic manifestations which present so marked a feature of life to-day. Our capacity for happiness—for self-generated happiness—is evaporating. We reject the natural and seek the artificial. We are tactless folk. We behave like clumsy animals who charge at gates they do not know how to open. We lay in stocks of drugs to send us to sleep, and other drugs to keep us from going to sleep, and we gorge on this unnatural prov-

ender in the hope that their assembled capacities for titillating or soothing, as the case may be, will enable us, and other fools like us, to digest the sticky confection of leisure and pleasure which to many of us constitutes modern life. We are afraid to swallow reality neat.

While the various neuroses, psychoses and symptoms of slight mental abnormality which I shall invite you to contemplate in this chapter severally present certain more or less clearly defined attributes of their own, I would ask you to bear in mind the fact that in other respects they tend to overlap. An eccentric person whose conduct is marked by one noticeable peculiarity is, more often than not, also influenced by the operation of another, or others. In consequence of this, I shall proceed upon the assumption that when I refer to an eccentric as suffering from one form of abnormality I intend such statement to imply that such abnormality is his chief or most apparent one, and that it has been disentangled from its allied abnormalities in order to avoid complexity. The various abnormalities are not mutually exclusive.

Perhaps the best known eccentricity is neurasthenia. The neurasthenic is apt to regard life as a long corridor stretching out into space, its walls broken by recesses and pillars among the shadowy intricacies of which predatory beings lurk ready to pounce upon him with sinister intent. He is suspicious, easily exhausted, volatile and perilously near to harbouring delusions of persecution. He is a pessimist whose lack of humour prevents him from becoming an optimist. He turns his back upon the philosophy of laughter. In his worst moments he is a nuisance, even a danger, for he is apt to forget the unwritten canons of decent society, and may libel or slander those who bear him no ill-will. It is this tendency—happily intermittent—to turn upon his relations and friends at odd moments that renders him so difficult to manage.

Another variant of minor mental *malaise* is psychasthenia. This complaint, as its name implies, is mental exhaustion, and

on this ground neurasthenia and psychasthenia tend to overlap. In psychasthenia the mind is too enervated to grapple with anything for long. Attention is focussed with great difficulty. The psychasthenic tinkers with minor details and muddles along in an inconclusive, purposeless manner, like a hen on a highroad. In due course he becomes aware (if only through the reminders of his friends) of his own mental limitations, and this soon produces a crop of morbid fears or phobias. These we shall consider presently.

A kind of psychasthenia has seized the whole of modern society. We live in cotton-wool. People of to-day show a marked incapacity for sustained effort. We travel by 'bus or tube from Oxford Circus to the Marble Arch, whereas our grandmothers thought nothing of a whole day's shopping on foot, progress impeded by a growing mountain of parcels. The majority of us enjoy nothing more serious than a revue or the cinema. Everything else is highbrow. We live in a tabloid age. Everything must be condensed, made simple, pared and potted, or we, poor things, would faint with exhaustion! We are even too lazy to converse correctly. We prune our sentences. Nay, we massacre them! On all sides we hear tossed to and fro such etymological clippings as "posish," "posh," "any-old-how" and similar distortions masquerading as the linguistic stock-in-trade of supposedly normal people, who squirt these conversational scourings at each other in the affected intonation of the hour.

It is an axiom of modern psychology that if you will have the courage and patience to dig down deep enough for the causes of human conduct you will find that they have a sexual basis. It is also an axiom that when a desire is repressed from your Conscious to your Unconscious, by the process misnamed "forgetting," its opposite usurps its place in the Conscious. Now the opposite of desire is fear. But it has been ascertained (by Freud and others) that when a desire is repressed the fear which takes its place is not necessarily fear

of the thing previously desired and now repressed. We have already formed a nodding acquaintance with the main thought processes and their intricate channels of manifestation, and we have seen that on a symptom of mental *malaise* making its appearance its origin and nature may be so masked and transformed as to be at first sight completely disguised.

The salient characteristic of a repressed sexual desire is, accordingly, fear—fear of crowds; fear of publicity; fear, in the case of spinsters, of sexual embarrassment; fear of anything and everything. To this state of fear or anxiety we give the name Anxiety Neurosis. Its manifestations we term phobias, i.e., fears; and the relationship between a repressed sexual desire and a phobia is, briefly, this: that though the repressed sexual desire generally induces a phobia of some sort—even if it is nothing more serious than one of those unaccountable minor aversions which we all harbour—a phobia may originate in some other agent of a non-sexual nature. Orthodox Freudians, I hasten to point out, claim that even in these cases where the sexual origin is not obvious, even after an analysis of the subject's Unconscious, a further and more thorough analysis will inevitably lay bare that origin. But space forbids an exhaustive examination of this theme, which, if pursued to the length to which I would like to pursue it, would dwarf my main theme out of all proportion.

Let us pass on, then, to some actual cases of phobias due to an apparently non-sexual cause.

A D.C.M. corporal cowered in his chair and sweated freely whenever he heard the buzzing of a bee. It transpired, during his subsequent examination by psycho-analysis, that the buzzing reminded his Unconscious of the buzzing of a German aeroplane, by a bomb from one of which he had been badly shell-shocked.

Another case. An ex-soldier, a clerk in a London office, worked throughout his lunch hour in winter so as not to be compelled to walk home in the dark. Should his office re-

quirements necessitate his staying until after dark he had to pay a man to escort him home. Analysis disclosed the fact that when he had been blown up by a high-explosive shell he had been in his dug-out by night, and his commotional disturbance ever afterwards associated darkness with the possibility of violent death.

Again, a young man had from childhood suffered from claustrophobia—the dread of enclosed spaces such as rooms, lifts and telephone boxes. The Great War broke out and he was sent to France, where life in a confined dug-out, plus the assembled stresses of campaigning, broke him. His analysis revealed the fact that as a child he had been sent alone into a room along a dark passage. Startled by the barking of a dog he turned to flee, only to find the door of the passage slammed and barring his exit. This experience so burned itself into his impressionable mind that he was even afraid to reason himself out of his fear. He accordingly repressed the incident into his Unconscious, where it had lived for years fomenting trouble and finally inducing his collapse.

Fear is the essence of hypochondriasis. The hypochondriac fears illness, and the fear of illness makes him ill. He evolves a mental card-index of every disease known to the medical profession, and of some that are not. His state is comparable with that of the clerk in Jerome K. Jerome's *Three Men in a Boat*, who, on browsing over a medical dictionary, discovered that he had for years been suffering from every known complaint except housemaid's knee!

Those suffering from psychasthenia, anxiety neuroses or phobias are apt in extreme cases to harbour delusions of persecution in that suspicion, the essence of a persecution delusion, serves as the common denominator of these minor affections, and the delusionist, as we found in Chapter VI, is more often than not a potential criminal by virtue of his readiness to assault his "persecutors."

The egotist, the introvert, the ascetic and the pathological

liar form a group by themselves. The habit of introspection, or turning the mind inwards upon itself, the addicts of which we call introverts, is often indulged in to the exclusion of the altruistic sentiment. The introvert thinks more of himself than of others. He is egocentric. The result is an overweening egotism which, with its nauseating accompaniments of self-assertion and conceit, have lost many a man many a friend.

This trait of self-assertion, in its best form, is a useful and necessary ingredient of your mental make-up. Without it, in our present imperfect social organization, no spade work, no pioneering, no creation of a great industrial concern could be achieved. In its debased forms it leads to the love of approbation for approbation's sake which characterizes the egotist and moral weakling who, puffed up with his own self-laudatory conceit, bores those whom his antics do not irritate. With the dazzling assurance of a juggler he tosses his opinions into the air and catches them. It is this love of display, this consuming desire to "make a splash," which has driven many such oddities into the ranks of procurers, forgers, blackmailers and confidence tricksters, in the hope that they may be able to achieve wealth by short cuts and without exertion, and thus obtain the funds necessary for the successful and public gratification of their vanity.

In its more acute and rigidly literal manifestations introversion implies, paradoxically enough, the opposite of external display. In such cases the introvert tends to retire within his shell. Some people are apt to regard ascetics, monks, hermits and similarly abnormal folk as being exceptionally worthy of adulation in view of their renunciations of the world and the people in it. But modern psychology lays bare this fallacy. The ascetic, it says, is one in whom the Herd Instinct is repressed; he is essentially anti-social. The stimulation of a healthy normal existence and a natural appreciation of the world and its witchery have no meaning for him. In the general readjustment of moral and social values

which humanity is beginning to experience as the result of the appeal made by the discoveries of Freud, we shall be compelled to overhaul our shop-soiled ideas of what is praiseworthy and what is not.

There is no doubt that minor mental instability may lead to gaol. Many of our convicts, though not certifiably insane, cannot be regarded as normal. Commenting on this point Sir Basil Thomson, in his Foreword to my book, *Sidelights on Criminal Matters*, wrote: "My own experience has been that about ten per cent. of the convicted criminals in any prison have been pre-destined to commit anti-social acts through some mental or moral defect. One cannot treat them all as a single class. There is the young person who is a congenital liar and may begin a life of crime at a very early age; there is the educated man who seems to have been born without any moral sense at all, and he has the egotism and cynical selfishness hypertrophied, and there is the mental defective, who is just cunning enough to make a living from dishonest courses, and the man of inflamed temper who 'sees red' on the smallest provocation."

The congenital liar to whom Sir Basil Thomson refers is frequently described as a pathological liar, the latter term signifying the habitual liar who cannot help being a habitual liar. The truth is not in him. He is not insane, nor can he be said to be mentally deficient. On the contrary he is often found to be uncommonly astute, and frequently exhibits a gift for weaving imaginative fiction which many a professional novelist would give much gold to possess.

He is generally the victim of an intense craving for notoriety. He is aware—painfully aware—of his own mental or social inferiority, which he represses. This sense of inferiority (the Inferiority Complex) cajoles him into substituting for it the feeling of, or desire for, superiority, and he poses and struts through life manifesting all the irritating symptoms of megalomania, premature wish-fulfilment or swelled head; the

only difference between him and the lunatic suffering from delusions of grandeur being that whereas the lunatic is in deadly earnest the pathological liar realizes that he is only acting a pleasant rôle. He takes stage centre. Almost every murder produces a small crop of bogus confessions from such folk. The pathological liar who makes a bogus confession of murder knows full well that he will not be convicted of the murder. Otherwise he would drop his confession and bolt. He simply desires fame or its first cousin, notoriety; and he is determined to achieve it even if he has to enlist the assistance of Madame Tussaud. Ian Hay, in his story, *Faint Heart*, draws an amusing pen-picture of two pathological liars in the persons of a man who poses as the author of nineteen "best sellers" and a girl who masquerades as the wealthy daughter of a Devonshire squire in order to hook the bogus celebrity.

The crimes which a pathological liar is most likely to commit are trade swindling, obtaining money by false pretences, the writing of bogus begging letters and perjury in court.

The mental duress of many borderland cases makes itself apparent in the first instance by their aversion to sustained effort. I endeavoured to show, in Chapter VI, how every act of your daily life is directed towards the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain—both terms being used in their widest application. You are constantly in the throes of a more or less acute psychic conflict. Conflict is at the root of all human conduct. The normal man experiences it, on the whole, in a very mild form, though we all pass through nerve storms when prodded by appropriate stimuli. The criminal experiences it in a more intense form, while the lunatic and the neurotic endure Hell on account of it. You cannot ignore the presence of conflict.

Idleness, which we regard as a vice, is really an attempt to avoid conflict. The loafer desires to return to the intra-uterine state. He seeks the Nirvana of the womb. It is, of course, the coward's refuge. I do not seek to defend idleness.

I prefer to explain it, and to suggest that many so-called slackers, when not so fortunately placed as not to need to work, or when not so unfortunately placed as to desire work but to be unable to find it, are, in point of fact, folk whose apparent lethargy is induced either as a haven from psychic conflict or as the outcome of mental exhaustion following upon it. Many such know their breaking point and endeavour, in the only way open to them, to turn aside on approaching it.

Some professional criminals, at any rate, do not disguise their aversion to—indeed their incapacity for—hard work. Lemaire, the famous French cracksman, admitted this when he cried out to his judges: "I have always been lazy. It is a shame, I confess, but I am not a natural worker. Work requires effort, and of this I am incapable. I have energy only for wrongdoing. If I must work I do not care about living; I would prefer the death sentence!"

In our ignorance we frequently, and unkindly, accuse the neurasthenic of an aversion to work. But his psychic energy is so exhausted by his perpetual worrying over imaginary bogeys that menace his tranquillity that he has none left for serious thinking.

But if he were to work at something instead of worrying over nothing he would gradually wean himself from that habit of wallowing in profitless conjectures, and his life would be more endurable. Hard work never yet drove a man mad; worry has turned the brains of thousands. When we say of a man: "He was driven mad by overwork," we would find, on closer investigation, that it was not his work which drove him mad but the work of worrying over his work.

Every man has a restless mind, if only for a few years of his life. That restlessness—that mental bubbling—might just as well be devoted to profitable activities as to a fruitless or unproductive purpose. The joys of idleness are grossly over-rated. They swiftly pall.

One group of eccentricities is traceable to the primitive instinct of acquisitiveness. Acquisitiveness is one of the twelve "simple instincts" enumerated by Professor W. McDougall, and is one of the five which are based upon no definable affect (basic cause), other than one of the three primal impulses of feeding, fighting and sex. The other seven, though individually traceable to one or another of these three affects, are more directly the outcome of other and intervening affects: pugnacity, for instance, though ultimately traceable to the fighting instinct, is the immediate outcome of the affect of anger which, in its turn, is the reflex action which the fighting instinct induces when suitably actuated.

Acquisitiveness is the instinctive impulse to obtain and to hoard. It is an offshoot of the Pleasure Principle, and under its operation you are driven to acquire those things which will make life run more smoothly for you. Your ancestors, thousands of generations ago, were forced, in order to sustain themselves and their women and children, to accumulate food against the dawning of a rainy day. The instinct has survived, though with the lapse of centuries and the operation of civilizing and restraining influences, it has assumed a masked and less assertive form. An atavistic throw-back in an individual may urge him, in spite of himself, still to acquire, and to acquire at all costs, but, this impulse gratified, he is temporarily satisfied. In its highest form, it is to be recognized in thrift, banking and in those various measures of prudence which we call "preparing for a rainy day." Vice often being virtue in excess, we can trace the same instinct in its debased form in theft, kleptomania, and many more misdemeanours, involving sharp practice, which keep their perpetrators just within the law.

Kleptomania differs from ordinary stealing in that the essence of it is not the acquirement of some object for the sake of its value, but solely for the sake of gratifying the instinct to acquire. It is the bizarre forms which kleptomania takes

which serve to distinguish it from downright stealing. A wealthy woman was, and I presume still is, in the habit of taking cakes of soap and cheap odds-and-ends from the counters of West End shops, being accompanied by her maid, whose duty it was, under medical advice, to compensate the proprietors after every raid on the part of her mistress.

Cracksmen there have been whose detection was greatly facilitated by their own eccentricities. One well-known house-breaker cherished a passion for the works of Charles Dickens. He seldom broke into a house without taking away with him a volume of his favourite, if there happened to be one. He was, in fact, arrested on one occasion through stopping to read a copy of *Oliver Twist*, the owner of the house returning, and finding him thus occupied.

Another was in the habit of helping himself to neckties, hundreds of which, of all designs and colours, were found at his house when the police entered with a search warrant. He, too, was betrayed by his eccentricity, the owner of a stolen necktie of a peculiarly aggressive design noticing it encircling the neck of this cracksmen.

Gambling is another indirect manifestation of the acquisitive instinct. Gambling is a short cut to the attainment of wealth. Hence its appeal. Your acquisitive instinct may be denied fulfilment, through economic stress or environmental pressure. You see a chance of acquiring something for nothing. The temptation to snatch at the chance is seductive and dazzling. You snatch. You succeed or fail. If you succeed, the world laughs with you. If you fail, it laughs at you. In either case, you have added to the gaiety of nations, so console yourself with that—if you can!

In many ways, gambling is by no means the awful vice which our killjoys would have us think it is. It is only the humdrum sluggish, cog-on-a-wheel type of creature who is too timid to take risks. Arnold Bennett says, somewhere: "Nearly all very successful men have burnt their boats, not

once, but several times. Their lives have been dramatic, often melodramatic.”¹

Excitability and elation may mark certain borderland cases. In many highly strung folk in the borderland state their minds work too rapidly for their tongues. Thought-flashes in abundance jostle each other in such swift succession that their tongues cannot keep pace with them. They jam. The result is verbal incoherence and stammering, the whole muddled hotch-potch embroidered with fantastic grimaces and inconclusive gestures.

In hypomania the subject of it is in a state of chronic exaltation. He is always in good spirits. He bubbles over. He is an optimist. The world is a very fine place. A trifle will sting him into instant retaliation, but he as quickly recovers his sociability, and his witticisms and conversational fireworks win him many friends, who are the last to discourage him from embarking on his characteristic wild-cat schemes, and the first to forsake him when those schemes bring him into the hands of the law. It was probably of hypomaniacs that Dryden wrote:—

There is a pleasure in being mad
Which none but madmen know.

Anger, pugnacity and cruelty serve as indices to another class of neurotics. Anger is the outcome of a libido which has been inhibited to the mental discomfort of the individual. It is generated in instable folk by the collision between the real and the ideal. Again, the element of conflict intrudes. It is altogether different from indignation. Indignation is an emotional state as much as anger, from which it differs in that it is aroused in response to your perception of an act of injustice, and is on a higher plane than the childish emotion which we call anger.

¹ Arnold Bennett, *How to Make the Best of Life*.

Pugnacity is the offshoot of one of the three great primitive instincts. It often actuates a reflex action, as when you are roused to a defensive aggression on your liberty or peace of mind being threatened. You wish to smash that which menaces your well-being. Its very primitive character is graphically proved by the fact that when the higher brain centres of an animal have been destroyed the decerebrated animals can be pricked into angry retaliation on being teased or hurt, the reaction obviously being rendered possible only by the operation of its remaining, i.e., its lower, brain centres.

Crimes of passion and violence are most common among persons of low intelligence. Their higher brain centres, rudimentary through heredity or undeveloped through environmental handicaps, play little or no part in their intercourse with their fellows and, thus crippled, they lack the reasoning and inhibitory mechanism which tends to keep the rest of us out of prison and the asylum.

Cruelty is universally regarded, even by non-Freudians, as a primitive and savage impulse. Freudians maintain that it is often a debased or perverted form of the sex instinct. In sadism, for instance, the infliction of physical pain or the sight of bruised and bleeding flesh arouses a certain sexual ecstasy in certain sexual degenerates.

I can now go a little more closely into the relationship between insanity and genius, to which I have so far made but incidental references. There are a few who affirm that a genius is a madman. Fewer still hold that he is sane, while the majority subscribe to the compromise that he is a borderland case, a creature of moods and tenses, an eccentric of indeterminate temperament.

And what is temperament?

Hippocrates, the "father of medicine," and his contemporaries enumerated four kinds of temperament—the phlegmatic, the bilious, the melancholic and the sanguine. They claimed that every individual could be classed either under one

of those four heads or in a group or sub-group of his own as a blending, in varying proportions of two or more of those four temperaments.

The late Professor Laycock, of Edinburgh, was the first to draw attention to what we now term the neurotic temperament which, with its much-discussed attributes, its advantages and its limitations, has been the focus of so much thought of recent years.

Temperament is the result of the interplay of reason and instinct. Modern psychology affirms that it is the outcome of the constant wrestle which man's instinctive nature is perpetually engaged in with his higher and rational powers. The Pleasure Principle joins forces with the Reality Principle, and the temperament of every individual is the index to the progress of that contest.

There is no end, short of the limitations of vocabulary, to the phrases which may be applied to the types of temperament evolved in the course of this struggle, though the tendency has been to classify temperament in pairs of mutually exclusive—indeed sharply contrasted—types, such as the stable and the instable, the practical and the theoretical, the placid and the mercurial. Trotter tends to use the first pair in his classification. William James divided human types into the tough-minded and the tender-minded, while Jung, one of Freud's first and chief disciples, invented his famous classification of introverts and extroverts, to whom I briefly referred earlier in this chapter.

The introvert looks within. He is a theorist, a dreamer, rather desultory, eclectic, an idealist, attracted by and addicted to creative artistry, brilliant, magnetic, but rather unreliable. From the ranks of introverts are drawn artists, mystics, authors, orators, reformers and others who point the way.

The extrovert is a materialist; plodding, matter-of-fact, stable, faithful, reliable, imitative rather than creative, and

incapable of brilliance or leadership. He lacks initiative and genius. He believes what he is told to believe, or what he finds others believing.

If you grant, as you probably will, the paradox that the nervous organization of a genius is of both the strongest and the frailest quality, you will agree that his mental poise is alarmingly apt to totter in the face of failure, ridicule or discouragement. Such, indeed, is a well-known fact. This being the case you will appreciate that a thwarted genius may swiftly become a dangerous member of society. Every man has his breaking point. When such a one does collapse his affliction often assumes the form of delusions of persecution. He comes to imagine that, he being what he is (and nobody is more fully aware of his own brilliance than the genius himself) his failure can surely not be his own fault. He now throws the blame for his crash upon some other person or persons—real or imaginary—experiencing, of course, no moral remonstrance from within, and, if he is at large and the objects of his animosity are within his reach, he may retaliate for his supposed injury in a thousand and one different ways, from anonymous or threatening letters to a homicidal attack.

A genius, being one who is temperamentally keyed up to a high tension, is obviously burning up nervous energy at an alarming rate. This cannot go on indefinitely. Nature insists on periods of calm and of contemplation. But these are foreign to the temperament of the genius, and he fights against Nature with all his puny strength. Nature wins and, imprisoned by his own futility, he sinks into a semi-exhausted, semi-sulky condition in which thoughts to which he has a natural antipathy visit him unbidden. Even John Stuart Mill floundered periodically in this plight, while the ephemeral suicidal impulses of Thomas Carlyle have been described by himself.

As soon as Carlyle, himself a genius, had said: "Genius is the infinite capacity for taking pains," a host of parrots chorused that absurdity. Reflection kills it; for without those

intuitive flashes which alone constitute genius, all the plodding in this world will fail to evolve a brilliant achievement, or to raise, as with a magic touch, that which is commonplace to the level of that which is inspired. Any man can paint a meat safe; few can paint a problem picture.

Insanity, if it is anything at all, is the exaggeration of one particular mental activity. And genius shares that definition: the artist and the inventor are peculiarly adapted to excel in their respective spheres. An inventor could not stop inventing if he tried. Edison himself has told us that. Nothing deters him so long as he retains his sanity. Poverty, illness, domestic calamity—all these may visit him, but they will never deter him, even though they drive him into the asylum; for on realizing where he is, he will set about inventing a means of escape! The inventor asks for nothing, and the world sees that he gets it. Necessity may be the mother of invention, but invention can be the mother of necessity!

Many authors, artists and musicians whose names are household words have displayed the marked peculiarities of life and manner which we have come to regard as the indices of genius. Some, indeed, have been the inmates of asylums or prisons. Socrates' words on *Immortality* came from him while a prisoner in the common gaol at Athens. John Bunyan wrote *Pilgrim's Progress* while serving a sentence in Bedford gaol. Cervantes, Spain's greatest novelist, was working as a slave in Algiers when he conceived the plot of *Don Quixote*, while Oscar Wilde was moved to write *De Profundis* while confined in Reading gaol.

Others authors there have been whose genius was barred from full expression unless they were able to indulge in various harmless eccentricities. Zola could not write unless he was working in a darkened room. George Eliot always wore her best dress when writing, on the ground that the general feeling of well-being which it gave her assisted the flow of ideas and their appropriate expression. Kant could not think out his

philosophical speculations unless his eyes were fixed upon a certain ruined tower: when some trees grew up and hid the tower, his resulting restlessness was so marked that they had to be cut down. Nathaniel Hawthorne had a habit of cutting up odd pieces of paper and cloth while planning his literary work, while Ibsen could not write a plan unless a trayful of grotesque figures of animals was placed on his desk. Ouida could write only between the hours of 5 a.m. and 8 a.m.

Schumann, Scott, Wordsworth, Shelley, Sheridan, Byron and Oscar Wilde were all slightly abnormal. Cowper was an instable melancholic who at one period of his life was definitely insane. Bach's pedigree included a preponderance of physical and mental weaklings, many of whom were chronic alcoholics, while Beethoven, the son of a drunkard, suffered from delusions of persecution. Wagner was periodically violent; Pascal, Tasso, Auguste Comte, Rousseau, Lamb and Swift were insane at one time or another, and the parents of Turner were both insane. It was Turner who was so lavish in his praise of the genius of John Robert Cozens, whose water colours drew huge crowds to the Burlington Fine Arts Club in December, 1922. Cozens, who was born in 1752, and died in 1799, was said to be the bastard son of Peter the Great. He was insane.

About the time when the paintings of Cozens were being exhibited, another genius, Lorenzo Perosi, the Italian composer and an ex-Director of the Sistine Chapel at the Vatican, was declared insane by the Rome courts after threats on his part to destroy his unpublished compositions, though there are those who affirm that the chief symptom of his insanity was his acceptance of Protestantism!

It is by contemplating the mentality of the occasional criminal that you can best appreciate the symptoms of abnormality born of conflict. Instability is the one outstanding characteristic of the occasional criminal. When his libido struggles for expression and his Herd Instinct is relatively and temporarily weak, he is rendered anti-social for the time being. He has

reached his breaking point. He yields. Should the respective influence of his two conflicting impulses be reversed, a victory for his Herd Instinct ensues. He experiences a mental see-saw from day to day, his urge towards anti-social conduct quickened or damped by environment, opportunity, temptation, altruism, example or any other factor or factors which make a man do the things that he does do; and while it is true that the professional criminal specializes in crimes that call for long preparation and great skill, the vast majority of murders and crimes of passion are perpetrated on the spur of the moment by quite commonplace people, who have been momentarily pricked into a fury. When a man's breaking point is reached, anything may happen. Sir Basil Thomson, in his book, *Queer People*, writes: "The criminal is rarely a criminal by nature. But for the grace of God he is just as you and I, only more unlucky."

It is true that a saint is a sinner turned upside down. It is equally true that a sinner is a saint turned upside down. There are times of acute mental distress in the lives of all men when, under the unbearable strain of domestic worry or business anxiety, they find themselves contemplating some deed at which, in their calmer moments, they would shudder.

In the course of his novel, *Our Mutual Friend*, Charles Dickens wrote: "If great criminals told the truth—which, being great criminals, they do not—they would very rarely tell of their struggles against crime. Their struggles are towards it!" This represents the prevailing ignorance, in Dickens' time, of the true nature of both the criminal and his crime. Any one who has had personal dealings with criminals will tell you that nothing is farther from the truth than Dickens' unintentional distortion of it.

It has long been recognized that the children of criminals, lunatics and drunkards are prone to lack a moral sense. Black is white. White is black. To punish them is worse than useless. Since they have no moral sense, they fail to

appreciate the meaning of a breach of the moral law, and, on being punished for such a breach, they genuinely fail to grasp even the significance (much less the purpose) of such punishment which, in consequence, only embitters them.

Again, it was disclosed, at a meeting of the London Teachers' Association, that the nerves of school-children born during the Great War were greatly inferior to those of the others. Their parents were nerve-racked by air raids and poor and insufficient food, and their children are accordingly condemned to crawl through life mentally and physically handicapped, and to transmit their imperfections of mind and body as an unmerited legacy to generations as yet unborn, as a War Memorial more enduring than stone.

We need not concern ourselves with the stable type of man. He is anchored to security by his placid acceptance of the Illusion of Finality to which I made reference in Chapter IV. If and when he experiences endo-psychic conflict, he saves himself the trouble of solving it by constructing the logic-tight compartments which I mentioned in Chapter VI, and in each of these he locks the several disturbers of his mental tranquillity—like naughty schoolboys—for daring to annoy him.

But the instable type of man does not succeed in doing this because, his mind being more receptive and more flexible, the thin walls of his mental rooms fail to prevent the percolation of the opposing sets of ideas constituting his conflict from one room to the other. He, therefore, represses the conflict, and the result is, as we found in Chapter VI, the simmering mental restlessness characteristic of the neurotic.

Finally, a group of nervous symptoms which often accompany adolescence invite our attention. The inexplicable yearnings and the psychic restlessness of adolescence which so profoundly puzzle parents, teachers and others, are but the natural manifestations of this stage of life. At the period of adolescence—between the ages of fifteen and twenty-one—youths are particularly prone to exhibit marked eccentricities

amounting, in some cases, to actual insanity or criminality. Statistics show that by far the greatest number of first convictions occur during this period, and there is no doubt whatever that the odd lassitudes and periodic nerve-storms which punctuate this time of life frequently lead to the asylum or the prison.

A characteristic disorder of this period is *dementia præcox*, a *malaise* which at first shows itself in an inability to concentrate, to tend to lead a solitary life, to brood, to lose the power of forming a sound judgment, to invert moral values, to become imprudent and improvident, affected, silly, given to immature philosophizing, and addicted to a frothy religious exuberance coloured with a pseudo-mysticism which would be comic were it not rather tragic. Young people who fail to outgrow this phase often become ne'er-do-wells, beggars, tramps, prostitutes, and general hangers-on of the professional criminal fraternity.

In *Kim*, Rudyard Kipling refers to the "half collapse" which young men often experience on approaching their majority. At that age a young man is beginning to lose the fresh enthusiasm of youth. He is separated from his school-fellows. He is passing through the transition from youth to manhood, and the great spaces of uncertainty stretch out before him and awe him. He is bewildered, perhaps discouraged, and to his chilling apprehensions he clings with all the strength of his weakness.

Many of us are convinced that many of the crimes and much of the mental swaying of young men of this age are directly caused by this sense of uncertainty. The man of grit, and the man whose home life and the comradeship of relations provide a crutch on which he can lean during this transitory crisis, pulls through without mishap. But the man whose burden proves too strong for his frail mentality to sustain, surrenders.

We have already seen how repugnant impressions in our

earliest years are banished from our Conscious into our Unconscious, where they lie and, unknown to ourselves, generate psychic tumult sooner or later. From the age of four years upwards the impressions which we banish, or try to banish, from our Conscious, tend to lie in those layers of our minds nearest to our Foreconscious. At times, we may recollect them unaided, though if their recollection would be sufficiently painful to disturb our mental tranquillity, they are accordingly buried more deeply. This process, for lack of a more exact term, we wrongly designate "forgetting." As the outcome of the fact that the minds of children are impressionable and receptive in a most marked degree, we have come to condemn anything which would injure their delicate fabric perhaps for life—bullying at school, for example.

In January, 1923, public indignation was aroused by the fact that a sensitive boy at Christ's Hospital, after suffering keen mortification through being playfully "toed" by an older boy during a Rigger match, committed suicide by stabbing himself. Though no blame was attached either to the school, to the boy whose practical joking was alleged to have led to the suicide, or to any one else, the whole episode led to a feeling of uneasiness, and the view that things are not as they should be at our great public schools gained a multitude of new adherents.

This view was reinforced by another occurrence. In the following month, a well-known physician, Dr. Howard M. Stratford, entered a protest, in the *British Medical Journal*, against the system of perpetual and organized ragging in which the more vicious of our public school bullies indulge. Dr. Stratford's letter was prompted by the fact that he was, at the time, treating a highly strung boy, whose spirit had been lacerated by the sustained ill-treatment of certain of his school-fellows to such an extent that he had been goaded into running away from school—a nervous wreck. Of this school, Dr. Stratford said, in a subsequent interview: "Had he remained there

much longer, I would not have answered for the consequences."

And these two incidents open up the question of the English public school system. We sometimes (though not as often as of old) hear people eulogizing the advantages of a public school education. But we hear very little of its disadvantages.

The curriculum of the average English public school is primarily designed to produce not a man but a type. Of education, in the best and highest sense, there is practically none, though Oundle is an exception to this rule. Their aim seems to be the crushing of individuality. Anything swerving, be it ever so slightly, from the accepted standard of sameness is ruthlessly frowned upon by the masters, and mercilessly ridiculed by the boys. The average public school is a sausage machine. Flesh and blood go in at the one end. At the other it turns out sausages, each one an exact replica of each of its fellows in the string. No better and no worse—just sausages.

Should a sensitive or over-observant boy have the misfortune to be sent to one, his life is a Hell. He is liable to be persecuted with sadistic ruthlessness by a certain type of boy until something happens to expose the whole thing in the Press, and matters mend—for the time being. The bullying Flashman of *Tom Brown's Schooldays* has his emulators to-day, and the imperfections of the public school system which Alec Waugh vividly presented in *The Loom of Youth* still persist.

The Jesuits boast: "Give us a child until it is seven years old. After that, you can do what you like with it." And in many ways the impressionable period of a child's life lasts much longer. Some authorities say until sixteen or seventeen. Others say until the age of twenty-one. But it is an ascertained fact that the majority of phobias are formed in childhood. Dr. Stratford himself says: "The effects of being ragged as a child sometimes last well into middle age. All sorts of phobias may be traced to this origin. The acute misery which many otherwise healthy people feel on being called upon to address a crowd is, more often than not, a relic of the time

when their every remark, however commonplace, was greeted with jeers or kicks from their schoolfellows.”²

Thackeray, when a delicate boy at Charterhouse (which he always referred to as the Slaughter House) had his nose broken by a bully. Blackmore, the author of *Lorna Doone*, was a chronic neurasthenic as the result of being ragged without cessation when at school; while Cowper was similarly chivvied in his schooldays, and was definitely insane for a time later in his life.

We must endeavour to suppress, at all costs, attempts to bully the young. We pride ourselves on our national virtues, and gloss over our vices, though manifesting our insular readiness to censure the shortcomings of other nations. An Englishman was pompously holding forth to a Spaniard concerning the cruelty of bull-fights. The Spaniard swiftly retorted: “But in Spain we have no need for a Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children!”

And we must regard with a more kindly eye those quaint odds and ends of humanity who comprise our borderland cases, who hover, in distressing uncertainty, between sanity and criminality. After all, vice is occasionally virtue in excess, as when love degenerates into lust. And a woman may steal food for her starving children. The wise, in their foolishness, call this a crime. The foolish, in their wisdom, call it mother-love. And the foolish are the wise. We are ready to sympathize with those devoid of physical beauty, while, with the moral magnificence of the hypocrite, we censure those lacking moral perfection, forgetting, in our pettiness, that our own morals need soling and heeling.

Many a so-called criminal, endowed with gifts which he was precluded, for one reason or another, from using or developing, might, had circumstances smiled upon him, have earned the esteem of mankind. And many folk whose circumscribed lives have induced in them the untempted intolerance of the

² *Vide Weekly Dispatch*, February 11, 1923.

virtuous, are said to possess that "pure white flower of a blameless life" of which we hear so much and see so little. The lies on their tombstones prompt us to ask, with the small boy in the story: "Where are all the bad people buried?"

Said Mr. J. A. R. Cairns, most human of London magistrates: "A saint is a bad judge; he is liable to commit injustices because he does not know human nature. A sinner is more just, and can see the point of view of the man in the dock."

CHAPTER IX

THE CRIME OF DESPAIR

SINCE every man has his breaking point, his conduct, on his reaching that breaking point, depends on the quality of his mentality, and the degree of strain to which that mentality is subjected. In cases where the strain is as great as the mind is weak, the individual may seek to solve his mental conflict by fleeing from it. He accordingly takes his life.

And the prevalence of suicide is indicated by the Registrar-General's Annual Report for 1918, which tells us that, in that year, in England and Wales alone, 2,371 persons took their lives.

Why?

Despair is the forerunner of suicide. The suicidal addict sees no hope, no stimulus, no colour in life. He is mentally blindfolded. Despair must not be confused with fear. Fear induces effort, and effort is the normal reaction of a normal person to a situation which cannot be tackled without it. The suicide-to-be is, true enough, afraid of life, but his fear of life does not stir him to try to come to terms with life, because his thoughts are centred on life only to the extent of devising the best means of quitting it.

It follows that, despair being the precursor of suicide, the melancholic is particularly apt to wish to end his days. His vague anxieties and morbid apprehensions, with his distrust of himself and his fellows, render him a pitiable object, and the realization of those around him that his condition is likely to change only from bad to worse, makes it easy for us to understand that the temptation for them to relax their efforts to

prevent him from killing himself can, on occasion, be most intense.

The life of, say, the daughter and sole support of such a one would have made an absorbing theme for the pen of Charles Dickens, whose handling of her anxieties, her struggles, and her inevitable temptations would have consolidated still further the position which he will hold in the literature of his country for all time.

The law states that any person making an unsuccessful attempt to commit suicide is liable to be prosecuted for attempted *felo-de-se*, when fit to stand for trial.

Should a man insure his life when sane, but subsequently commit suicide, a coroner's jury returning a verdict simply to the effect that he took his life, the insurance policy becomes void. This is the logical outcome of the old legal maxim that a criminal (and, by inference, his relations or other representatives) should not profit by the proceeds of his crime. When, on the other hand, the verdict is qualified by the formal declaration of the deceased's insanity at the time of his suicide, the policy is not rendered void unless it embodies a clause annulling it in either case.

In practice, of course, coroners' juries generally qualify a verdict of suicide by the addition of one or other of the formal concessions—"whilst of unsound mind" or "while temporarily insane." This is a legacy of the days before the Church lost her grip on the people, when the suicide's fate—burial at the cross-roads instead of in consecrated ground—was deemed to bring disgrace upon his relations. A similar viewpoint is apparently responsible for the fact that although a resolution is passed (quite properly) of sympathy with the relatives of the deceased, an expression of sympathy is never made with the deceased himself.

Further, we have the legal paradox that if an attempt at suicide is successful the law says the victim was temporarily insane. If it fails, the would-be suicide is regarded as sane,

and is liable to punishment as sane—the success of the attempt constituting the test of sanity!

There is no suicidal class, though, speaking loosely, the unoccupied and the instable tend easily to become tired of life, and to desire to end it. Dr. Goring concluded that criminals convicted of crimes of violence, as well as those who, though serving sentences for crimes unattended by violence, were of a choleric disposition, were more apt to harbour suicidal tendencies than their fellow-convicts. In the case of relatively stable convicts, the tendency towards suicide varied according to the general intelligence of the individuals.

Once a would-be suicide determines to leave this world, he will, if necessary, exercise the utmost cunning and patience to outwit those who would seek to deter him. In the annual volume of the *British Medical Journal* for 1908, Dr. J. Mill Renton records a case where an inmate of a workhouse who was suspected of suicidal tendencies was placed under close observation. In spite of this, he succeeded in tearing small strips from his blankets while in bed, and, stealthily stuffing these into his throat (so tightly, indeed, that they were subsequently withdrawn only with the greatest difficulty), suffocated himself. In another case, a man starved himself to death, dying at the close of the fifty-eighth day of his fast.

Wealthy persons of both sexes, who have nothing to do and unlimited time in which to do it, sometimes find themselves unable to pay bridge or betting debts, and the next three stages in their careers are apt to be—money-lenders, drugs, suicide. Had Becky Sharp stopped to reflect when she said: "How easy it is to be good on five thousand pounds a year," she might have substituted: "How hard it is to be good on five thousand pounds a year."

The present craze for drugs, amongst its other evils, may lead, and often does lead, to suicide. And this it does in two ways. In the one case inability to obtain the coveted drug may lead to suicide through the mental oppression in-

duced by its absence. In the other case, the tempting propinquity of a dangerous drug may lead to a suicide by means of a deliberate overdose.

Incidentally, crimes of all kinds are being committed in our midst, either under the influence of drugs or for the purpose of acquiring the means to buy them. Theft, blackmail, swindling—these, and other crimes of greater or lesser degree, are being perpetrated by those who are too weak to resist a vice which proves too strong for resistance.

Some suicides are impulsive; others evince prolonged premeditation. Uncontrollable impulse—the impulse which, for instance, compels a man to throw himself from a high building—has accounted for not a few so-called suicides. In November, 1922, a man jumped in front of a train at Dalston Junction, and was killed; and the fact that he had had no worries or ill-health led the coroner to attribute his death to that cause.

Even a certified lunatic can show premeditated cunning in planning his suicide. One asylum patient committed suicide by obtaining the removable key regulating the hot water tap in the asylum bathroom, by filling the bath with boiling water, and by jumping into it. She died from shock due to the effects of scalding.

An unusual case of suicide occurred in July, 1922, when a Shoreditch boot repairer, aged 64, was found in a kneeling posture in his bedroom, his chin resting lightly in a looped handkerchief tied to his bedrail. The handkerchief was very loose, and the medical evidence at the inquest insisted that there were no signs of strangulation or other violence. The verdict was accordingly returned that the old man had intended to hang himself, but had died of heart failure—through auto-suggestion—before the completion of the act.

Public interest has been aroused of late by the comparative frequency of suicide pacts. Three typical cases, similar in nature, but different in result, came before the courts in 1922.

There are numerous arguments to be advanced against the infliction of the death penalty in the case of the survivor of a suicide pact. I select two only.

In the first place, it is a sorry system which renders it inevitable that whether the survivor of a pact is awarded a few months' imprisonment or the capital punishment depends solely on the court which tries him, as reports of trials indicate.

Secondly, although the survivor is automatically charged with having incited the victim to commit murder, their actual rôles in the tragedy may have been reversed. The victim may have been the instigator, and the alleged instigator the victim (in the other sense).

A nation is invariably more humane than its penal code. Since humanity is becoming daily more enlightened, and consequently more progressive, it is morally pressing onwards towards To-morrow, whereas its laws, being passed Yesterday, inevitably belong to Yesterday. From time to time something occurs to remind us of this, and we are prodded into a recognition of the difference which sometimes exists between law and justice.

Heated controversy has raged, and will doubtless continue to rage, around the moral issues involved in suicide, its nature, its effects and its ethics generally.

Many hold the view that suicide is the project and product of a diseased mind, and is against the instincts of a normal, healthy-minded person. But that is surely begging the question. It is because the would-be suicide is mentally unhealthy and unhappy that the thought of suicide enters into his unhealthy mind.

We are a mixed mob—stable in some things, instable in others: rigid one moment, volatile the next; and all our thoughts and deeds are begotten of impulses and motives so masked and so interlaced that, to tell you the truth, none of us is qualified to condemn any of us!

Others there are who hold that the suicide deserts his post.

We are where we are, they argue, to help each other, and to come to terms with life. True; but cases sometimes occur when both the would-be suicide and the community of which he is an individual would benefit by his death, as in the case of a sufferer from an incurable disease, such as cancer, syphilis or imbecility. Indeed, a suicide may take his life with the sole object of benefiting his fellows. There have been cases where invalids, realizing the inevitable, though very slow, approach of death, have quietly made their exit, in order to relieve their friends of the burden of keeping them; while to class as suicide the altruistic self-sacrifice of people like Captain Oates, who gave his life while on a polar expedition, in order that his comrades might be able to make their stock of rations last until relief came, would be as uncharitable as it would be untrue.

Nor can we make the sweeping statement—as some of the over-zealous have done—that domestic or economic misfortune drives people inevitably to suicide. There are legions of our fellow-creatures who, in spite of illness, unemployment, bereavement, or the treachery of relations or friends, face their troubles undaunted.

It is equally untrue to say that a suicide is inevitably a coward. Every man has his breaking point, and when that point is reached what happens is determined by a mass of varying factors—the nature of his mental burden, his capacity to recover quickly and fight back, the consequences of his suicide, if accomplished, to those whom he leaves behind, and a host of other considerations, all of which must be weighed and assigned their due, and no more than their due, in a just consideration of the question. Men of outstanding bravery have committed suicide, one of whom was a famous British general and the holder of the Victoria Cross. Even Napoleon attempted suicide. Louis Etienne St. Denis, in his book, *Napoleon: from the Tuilleries to St. Helena*, relates how, after the Emperor's defeat, weighed down by the events of the

period which culminated in his exile to Elba, the man who was never known to smile attempted to poison himself with the contents of "a little bag of black silk," which he had been wearing round his neck for some time, "in which was something which felt the size and shape of a clove." The very act seems to have pulled Napoleon together, for he at once summoned members of his entourage, and submitted to a strong emetic.

Finally, there are those who maintain that, as we have been endowed with life from God, we have no right to regulate or curtail its duration. Christians, especially, tend to hold this view. But its opponents contend that, whether the gift of life is a divine one or not, since no man ever asked for that gift, he holds the right to refuse that which he did not seek of his own accord. They go on to point out that Christianity, being only one belief out of many (each of which stoutly maintains its monopoly of "the truth"), Christians are not entitled to claim infallibility for their moral or religious tenets, especially as immense differences of opinion on those tenets persist among the army of sects and sub-sects which all call themselves Christians. They point to the fact that the adherents of Christianity are in the minority, when compared with the relative numerical strengths of the world's religions, and that there are religions which connive at, and in some cases encourage, what we call suicide, and what in India is sometimes called *suttee*, and in Japan *hara-kiri*. They add that there have been Christian sects which praised, preached and practised suicide, which the Christian Church itself did not denounce until the Council of Arles, in the year 623, and that many philosophers have condoned and, in the case of Socrates, practised it.

Modern psychology, as we noted in Chapter IV, embraces among its doctrines the materialistic conception of history. Every man's mentality is the outcome of his inherited attributes and the response which those attributes make to his

environment. When his heredity collides with his environment and is too frail to withstand the shock he yields—even to the extent of fleeing from his environment through the door of suicide.

Says Freud: "We are what we are because we have been what we have been, and what is needed for solving the problem of human life and motives is not moral estimates, but more knowledge."

CHAPTER X

REVENGE OR REFORM?

ARISTOTLE, in his discourse on the Drama, recorded his opinion that it would not be possible to bear the sight of an innocent man in pain. A corollary to that belief is that it would be possible to bear the sight of a guilty man in pain. And its truth is proved continuously in our prisons in various ways which I hope to indicate in the course of this chapter.

The pain which they induce is not only, and not necessarily, physical pain. They tend, rather, to aggravate existing mental pain and to foster its inception where it does not already exist. Separate confinement in prisons; the mental anguish which prison life invariably begets—sometimes with the results which we encountered in my last chapter—the unnecessary hardships of the Silence Rule; the absence of a sympathetic atmosphere even in the prison hospitals; the rigours and humiliations of observation cells; the care of the feeble-minded in prison, and, by way of showing you the pleasanter side of the picture, a brief indication of what has been done, both in England and the United States, in the direction of humanizing prisons and stripping them of those potentialities for breaking the spirit and the sanity of even the toughest, which have earned for them the title of Crime Factories.

Firstly, I invite your consideration of separate confinement. Pope Clement IX originated a system of solitary confinement by erecting the prison of San Michele, at Rome, on the solitary cell system on the principle, followed in monasteries, that unhampered contemplation was good for the soul. I do not propose to enumerate the pros and cons of this theory or of the system which was its child so far as monasteries are con-

cerned, except to observe that a monk (who cannot be regarded as a normal masculine being) accepts his solitude voluntarily and under the urge of a sense of "vocation," which the convict does not; and solitude, so far from being good for the soul, is bad for it, in common with all other unnatural practices. These observations alone should serve to buttress the view that the facile papal comparison between a monastery and a prison was absurd.

In 1786, the Quakers of Pennsylvania, shocked by the appalling results of unregulated intercourse amongst prisoners of that time, proposed a similar system of cellular confinement. They accordingly equipped Walnut Street Prison, Philadelphia, with thirty cells, and in 1818, satisfied with this experiment, they pulled down that prison and built a new one on the same site entirely on the principle of "a cell per convict."

In 1837 Lord John Russell, then Home Secretary, urged the adoption of the system of confinement in separate cells, on the ground that while it served as a greater punishment for the prisoner it shielded him from the contaminating influence of his fellow-prisoners. This led to the building of Pentonville Prison on the "cell per convict" plan, and it was at that time regarded as a model prison.

During the period 1843-49 the rate of insanity amongst convicts sent to Pentonville, though they were specially chosen for their physical fitness to withstand the rigours of disciplined confinement, was alarming. The effect of the prescribed eighteen months' isolation immediately after admission was, as the Prison Commissioners were forced to record, that mental disease existed in "a ratio twenty times as great as in not the general population but all the other English prisons of the time." Yet, in spite of this official admission, the system still being considered a good one in principle, a later Home Secretary, Sir James Graham, took steps to bring about its adoption in all our convict prisons!

The original period of separate confinement was eighteen months, which, in 1853, was reduced by Lord Palmerston to nine months. Ten years later, in 1863, the exigencies of public work upon which convicts were employed at Chatham and Portland (now a Borstal institution) resulted in the impracticability of keeping convicts in separate confinement for more than, on the average, seven months and twenty days after their admission. This fact induced the Royal Commission of 1863 to state in its report: "We are of opinion that convicts ought to be kept in separate confinement for the full period of nine months, except in the case of prisoners who are found unable to undergo it so long without *serious*¹ injury to their bodily or mental health. No considerations of expense . . . ought to be allowed to prevent this stage of punishment from being continued for the time prescribed by the regulations." And this Report, which reflects unerringly the spirit of that time, went on to advocate less frequent visits from prison Instructors on the ground that their visits "tend to mitigate the irksomeness of separate confinement." There is a story to the effect that one convict, on being informed that under the Prison Regulations he was, while undergoing separate confinement, to be "freely visited by the Chaplain," protested on the ground that that was not included in his sentence!

In consequence of the Report of 1863 the system of punishment was made sterner; convicts were deprived of certain small comforts which they had been allowed up to then, and everything possible was done to render their isolation more complete.

In 1895 the period of separate confinement was once more reviewed, when it was decided to retain it on the ground that to allow convicts whom prison life had tended to tame to be contaminated by the society of new-comers fresh from the outside world and its crimes would be a bad policy, but in March, 1911, Mr. Winston Churchill, then Home Secretary,

¹ The italics are mine.—J. C. G.

cut down the period of separate confinement to one month in the case of all convicts other than recidivists, the period for whom was fixed at three months. It is said that Mr. Churchill was moved to take this humane step after witnessing a performance of John Galsworthy's play, *Justice*, though I have never seen this statement either confirmed or denied.

There are advocates of separate confinement who say that it introduces the element of hope into prison life. They go on to argue that if you are deliberately harsh on a convict at the beginning of his sentence he will feel all the more grateful for your clemency nearer the end of it. This pleasant fiction ignores the certainty that, memory being one of the faculties of which prison life does not strip him entirely, the convict is not likely to love you any more after tasting the delights of your initial barbarity. But if this theory is sound, then let us apply it to the experiences of daily life. Let us condemn all youths leaving school to a month's starvation by day and the Embankment by night, in order that if and when unemployment befalls them in due course they will be able to laugh at its hardships!

Others argue that separate confinement acts as a deterrent. But the vast majority of first offenders have little or no conception of the real nature of prison life. They do not even know whether they will be sentenced at all. How, then, can the dread of separate confinement deter the man who has never heard of it? To this some may retort that the criminal will have heard of it from his criminal associates, who have endured it. But this argument has for its prop the grotesque fallacy that there are criminal gangs forming, as it were, organized detachments of that mythical army which has been christened "the criminal class." There is no criminal class, and the few criminal gangs that there are—and they are rapidly dwindling—embrace, in the main, ex-convicts whose criminal tendencies have been nourished by the very system which I am deploring.

But many of us are convinced that this practice of separate confinement utterly collapses when examined from the standpoint of psychology.

Prior to conviction a delinquent has much to occupy his mind. He is busy planning his defence, is allowed if remanded in custody newspapers, books, letters and visits from friends and from his solicitor. His fighting instinct is stirred by the prospect of his trial. Even the instable pathological liar awaiting trial on a charge of swindling finds a certain pleasant titillation of his self-conceit induced by the prospect of being in the public eye for however brief a period and however unenviable his circumstances. But on conviction, and just when the inevitable mental reaction is beginning to set in, he finds himself and his troubles bundled into a stone box, where he is left to brood and rot. Statistics have proved that the majority of cases of prison suicide and attempted suicide occur during the first week of imprisonment.

Man is a gregarious creature. He likes his club, his team, his circle of friends and his political and social organizations; and to subject a man to the influence of that which is essentially unnatural and vindictively punitive is a very dangerous experiment. Ask any doctor!

Professor D. Fraser-Harris writes, in this connection: "One of the grave results of solitary confinement is the great depression which sets in in consequence of the cutting off of sensory impressions; the mind cannot remain a blank, and in some cases it becomes unhinged altogether when day after day it receives no fresh impressions."² The reason is obvious. If you enclose your arm in a splint and keep it there for long enough it withers. If you similarly refrain from using your mind it, too, wastes. Mental strength cannot be acquired or increased in the absence of temptation.

Let John Galsworthy speak. In his unpublished Preface to his play, *Justice*, he writes: "He who can project himself into

² D. Fraser-Harris, *Nerves*.

the minds of others knows that prisoners in closed cells, moping and brooding week after week, month after month, shut off from all real distraction, from all touch with the outer world and everything that they care for, with the knowledge of years of imprisonment before them and of broken lives when they come out—knows that such prisoners, thousands of them, unseen by any eye, reach a state of mind which would make them constantly fling themselves for relief on their cell doors, if it were not for fear.”³ And although the prescribed length of solitary confinement has been reduced since *Justice* was written—and in the opinion of many that play was the means of securing that reform—the observations of its author still hold good.

To a man of action—and many of our criminals are that if they are nothing else—the enforced idleness of separate confinement is a foretaste of Hell, unless he is endowed with superhuman stoicism, and you must remember that while separate confinement affects more profoundly the neurotic type of man, it is this type, which, owing to the Great War and the ever-increasing stresses of modern civilization, is becoming more and more common. Moreover, many prison offences are perpetrated solely through the nervous tension and general exasperation induced by the system, and to prescribe solitary confinement as a punishment serves, as any student of human nature would agree, only to increase the prisoner’s exasperation, and to render him capable of anything.

The statistics which Dr. Goring assembled of the frequency of suicide among convicts, and the general population respectively, disclosed the eloquent fact that the suicides in prison were more than treble those among the general population; their respective ratios being fifty-six per thousand and seventeen per thousand. These figures do not include unsuccessful attempts to commit suicide.

Is this because those with suicidal tendencies are more

³ John Galsworthy, *A Sheaf*.

likely than not to find themselves in prison, or because those in prison find life there so unbearable that they wish to end it? Are they in prison because they are suicidal, or are they suicidal because they are in prison? Now we know—if only from our daily newspapers—that the vast majority of attempted suicides are either bound over, discharged into the care of friends, or confined for a few months in a county asylum or public mental hospital. Very rarely, practically only in the case of the surviving party to a suicide pact, is a would-be suicide sent to prison.

We are, therefore, forced to admit that prison life induces the suicidal desire, and this in spite of the decreased facilities for a successful attempt owing to the arrangement of the cells and their fittings, and the constant vigilance of the warders. The Reports of Prison Commissioners and others sometimes show a decrease in the percentage of suicides among convicts, but the precautions against suicide in prisons are constantly being improved upon and increased. The official reason given in explanation of the refusal to allow convicts the use of razors is that they might be used for committing suicide, while if you were to obtain an order from the Prison Commissioners permitting you to be shown over a prison, you would be struck by the wire netting stretched across open spaces in the halls and other parts of the building, where a convict might attempt suicide by throwing himself from a landing, balcony or other height.

In Chapter VI I endeavoured to indicate the mental effects of brooding and unhealthy meditation, and to show how a dangerous indulgence in the weaving of phantasies might induce that permanent Dissociation of Consciousness which is symptomatic of a pronounced form of insanity. Yet in prison, and especially whilst undergoing solitary confinement, the convict has little else to do. He receives no impressions save prison impressions. His life becomes rigidly circumscribed. He loses individuality. The prison becomes his world, and his

impressions of prison his impressions of the world. To escape from that world he tends to brood: it is his only avenue of escape, his psychic refuge, and, level by level, his mind tends to rot. The majority of suicides are not impulsive. They are the outcome of sullen brooding, and where can a man brood with more complete success than in a prison cell? We have seen that a man's mentality is the outcome of the response which his heredity, his personality, his Ego—call it what you will—makes to his environment. If we cannot alter the one, we might at least endeavour to adjust the other.

Eminent criminologists have voluntarily sampled separate confinement for themselves. Sir Edmund du Cane, one of the original supporters of separate confinement, described it as "an artificial state of existence absolutely opposed to that which Nature points out as the condition of mental, moral and physical health,"⁴ while Sir Robert Anderson who, by way of testing for himself the value of the arguments advanced by the opponents of separate confinement, spent a few hours in one of these cells, and afterwards exclaimed: "My nerves would not long have stood the strain of it!"

Now let us note the evidence of a brilliant personality. Although he wrote of it as far back as 1896, 1897 and 1898, the impressions of this man apply with equal force to certain conditions of to-day, and particularly to separate confinement. I refer to that pathetic spendthrift of his own genius—Oscar Wilde.

In discussing Oscar Wilde we must charitably separate Oscar Wilde the man from Oscar Wilde the creative artist. That is what his friends in his prosperity, and his enemies in his adversity, failed to do, and his artistry denied by some and forgotten by others, with the facile acquiescences and false generalizations of that day, they begrudged one of the greatest thinkers of his day the right to think and, their opinion of the criminal influenced out of all proportion by

⁴ Sir Edmund du Cane, *The Punishment and Prevention of Crime.*

their natural abhorrence of his crime, his observations fell, for the most part, on deaf ears.

But with the lapse of a quarter of a century, and the growing realization that offenders of this type would be better in asylums than in prisons, we can weigh his remarks in a manner more detached and less vindictive.

Writing from Reading Gaol, on March 10, 1896, he said: "Here I have the horror of death with the still greater horror of living, and in silence and misery. . . ."

Writing later, he said: "When one has been for eighteen months in a prison cell, one sees things and people as they really are. The sight turns one to stone."

In the following extract from *De Profundis* Oscar Wilde catches his vagrant impressions of prison life and invests them with a permanent value: "It is always twilight in one's cell, as it is always twilight in one's heart. . . . Many men on their release carry their prison about with them into the air, and hide it as a secret disgrace in their hearts, and at length, like poor poisoned things, creep into some hole and die. . . . While I was in Wandsworth Prison I longed to die. . . . To those who are in prison, tears are a part of every day's experience. . . . The only really humanizing influence in prison is the influence of the prisoners. . . . It is not the prisoners who need reformation. It is the prisons. . . . The present prison system seems almost to have for its aim the wrecking and the destruction of the mental faculties. The production of insanity is, if not its object, certainly its result!"

The unnecessary hardships of the Silence Rule weigh very heavily upon the majority of prisoners. Of course, wherever you go you will find isolated cases who prefer their own company and physical and mental isolation from their fellows, but these are the exceptions into whose bizarre mentality we peeped in Chapters VI and VIII.

The Silence Rule provides that: "The privilege of talking may be given after a certain period," etc. But in convict

prisons this "certain period" is three years, and although Sir Evelyn Ruggles-Brise, in his book, *The English Prison System*, states that "a prisoner . . . may, on Sundays, after a certain period of sentence . . . converse with another prisoner," etc., the "certain period" in this case means that the convict is not allowed to converse with a fellow-convict until he has reached the last year of his sentence. In the Local Prisons the inmates are not allowed to converse until they have served twelve months, but even this "privilege" practically comes to nothing, for the reasons that very few prisoners in Local Prisons have been sentenced to more than twelve months, and that the very rule permitting such conversation is practically unknown among the prisoners.

The Silence Rule has been condemned by prisoners, reformers, warders and high prison officials. On July 9, 1922, Mr. T. M. Osborne, Warden of the famous Sing Sing Prison, New York, addressed a meeting at Kingsway Hall, and in the course of his speech said: "The rule of silence is blasphemous. When you take the power of speech away from man you are sending him to the level of the beasts. The safety of society demands that we should do away with the idea of revenge." And, although the Silence Rule has been annulled in our prison workshops it, of course, still forms a feature of separate confinement, of the convict's normal cell life, and of the exercise periods.

And what of the prison hospital system?

You would imagine that the position of a convict in his prison hospital would be improved and that, while ill, some effort would be made to help him to forget his position, if only for a short time.

I endeavoured in Chapter III to point to some of the effects which physical illness produces on the human mind. In hospital the convict has to bear a new burden of additional physical stress and its reaction on his mind. Apart from the fact that he is allowed a bed and is excused work (though

perhaps the work, monotonous though it is, would help to occupy his mind) he has practically no other comforts. Moreover, as an offset to this he is frequently kept in solitary confinement in a cell only slightly better than the one which he occupies when well. There are few dormitories in English prisons or prison hospitals. If you have ever had the misfortune to be confined to bed for, say, two months, you will recollect how irksome it was, even with books, magazines, flowers, and the society of cheerful visitors and other compensations. Try to imagine a long illness in prison, where you would be locked up by yourself alone with your illness, your thoughts and, perhaps, two or three books from the prison library as your only companions.

As a compromise between the normal prison life and treatment in the prison hospital, observation cells have been adopted. There are four types of observation cells used for the better surveillance of mental defectives. I would gain nothing by describing them, except to remark that they vary in facilities for observing the prisoner and protecting his warders and himself from his possible violence. In a few prisons these cells are situated in the prison hospital, though in the majority they are dotted here and there among the ordinary cells used by the normal prisoners. The observation cells are used to accommodate prisoners whose sanity is obviously going (often through the effects of the prison life itself), and who may soon be transferred elsewhere. This plan of mixing the ordinary and the observation cells is a bad one; it subjects the sane prisoners to the depressing proximity of the insane and the latter to the curiosity and tactless sallies of the former.

Until 1895 feeble-mindedness among convicts was practically ignored. The prevalence of feeble-mindedness in prisons has been estimated at as high as twenty per cent., and in no case lower than three per cent., but unless a prisoner was definitely certifiable as insane he had to mix with the other

convicts and undergo the same punishments; but under the provisions of the Mental Deficiency Act of 1913, the instable, borderland cases of petty delinquency who form a stage army constantly marching in and out of prisons are being more and more consigned to institutional care where, though under restraint, they are treated as medical rather than penal subjects, and are vouchsafed a less irksome existence. In the ordinary course an offender found to be insane is at once sent either to a county mental hospital or to a Criminal Lunatic Asylum. Should his sentence be less than a month, and should he not be a danger either to himself or to others, he is transferred to a county mental hospital at the expiration of his sentence.

Broadly speaking, though a certain desultory interest is taken in the welfare of prisoners and potential prisoners whose behaviour and medical history, where available, suggest mental illness, a tremendous amount of reform is still overdue, though these delays are incomprehensible, in face of the excellent results achieved when some system of considerate treatment of mentally afflicted delinquents has been adopted and tested.

At Birmingham a genuine effort is made to avoid committing to prison those whose mental weakness indicates that they cannot be held responsible for the crime with which they are charged, are too ill to stand their trial, or are unfit to stand the hardships of prison discipline. Such cases are remanded for observation and enquiry, and are in the care of the prison doctor in a reserved portion of the gaol. When the prisoner is again brought before the Court, after his remand period has expired, the medical officer gives evidence, and sentence of imprisonment is passed on persons who appear to be mentally instable only when detention under medical supervision seems to be the only way of treating the case. In Birmingham gaol, the feeble-minded are housed in a building of their own, with a separate entrance, and the use of a garden. So successful has the Birmingham experiment been that the Bradford magistrates have now tried it, though in a modified form.

Under the present system, aged convicts and those who appear to be weak-minded, are sent to Parkhurst Prison. There they are kept under medical observation, and, should their insanity be conceded, they are transferred to the Criminal Lunatic Asylum at Broadmoor. It is a matter for regret that, should a convict at Parkhurst, though feeble-minded, be considered as not so seriously unhinged as to justify his transfer to Broadmoor, yet to be unfit for employment out of doors, he is permanently confined to his cell, except for the two short periods of exercise during the day. It is also a matter for regret that there are only three Medical Officers to look after the eight hundred sick and aged convicts at Parkhurst, plus the extra number at the neighbouring Camp Hill Preventive Detention prison, and "special emphasis must be laid upon the fact that, despite the concentration of the mentally defective convicts at Parkhurst, none of the medical officers of that prison is a mental specialist."⁵

A splendid effort is being made at Camp Hill to practise the principles of prison humanitarianism. On arrival there, the convict finds that he is regarded as a human being—an imperfect one, it is true, but a human being nevertheless, and not a wild beast who cannot be trusted, and who must be caged, and in Mr. F. E. Wintle, the present governor, he has a genuine friend. The convict is relieved of all those petty, irritating, crime-provoking restrictions and annoyances which breed the sullen, resentful mentality of the seasoned convict, and have earned for our prisons the name of Crime Factories.

At Camp Hill, he wears a suit, instead of the hideous drab prison uniform which, though the broad arrow has now been abolished, still excites resentment among convicts. He finds himself the tenant of a cell not unlike a study, with ordinary windows, a carpet, spring bed, mirror, a cupboard, and, in season, flowers; and he can have about him photographs, Christmas cards and other trifles, which mean so much to a

⁵ Stephen Hobhouse and S. Fenner Brockway, *English Prisons To-day*.

man to whom life has given so little. He receives newspapers, and is allowed to smoke, and (blessed privilege) to talk. He has the use of the prison library, and can write and receive letters, and be visited by his friends without the embarrassing presence of a warder. In the evenings, he can mix with his fellow-prisoners in the Association Rooms, where they can play chess, dominoes and other games. In Chapel, the warders sit at the back, instead of being perched on high stools facing the prisoners, as they do in the other prisons, and this reminder of his lot is removed from him, leaving him free to worship unobserved the God whose image he still is. He cultivates his own allotment, and sells the produce to the prison at the current market rates, and he can earn other money in his spare time. (One convict invented a burglar-proof lock!) He has the key of his cell, and is allowed the run of practically the whole prison, so long as he keeps within the prison grounds. At regular intervals, he attends concerts, lectures and amateur theatricals, and in these he can take part, should he wish to do so, and the bands from the island garrison sometimes perform for his benefit on summer evenings.

In short, from the time he enters Camp Hill to the time when he leaves it, he is made to feel that he is being trusted. His warders lay themselves out to be his friends, his comrades, rather than his taskmasters. He is made to see the tremendous capacities for good that he has in him. His self-respect is coaxed up. In the other prisons the system kills a convict's self-respect, and when a man loses his self-respect he has nothing more to lose. But at Camp Hill every man is made to feel that he is a living, breathing thing, with all the capacity for comradeship, unselfishness and the sublime gift of helping others to be happy and clean which constitute comradeship and citizenship, and prevent a man from doing the beastly things which we are all liable to do.

The pity of it is that no convict can be admitted to Camp Hill until he is an "habitual criminal" within the meaning of

the Prevention of Crimes Act of 1908. A convict sentenced to a spell of Preventive Detention must first have been sentenced to serve at least three years' penal servitude, and then, but not before, he can be sentenced to serve from five to ten years' Preventive Detention. The great fault of the Preventive Detention system is that half the time and energy of those who administer it is taken up in repairing the harm which the convict's previous dose of prison life has done to him. The treatment is applied at the wrong end of the convict's prison life. It should begin as soon as he has left the dock.

Giving judgment in a case at the Court of Criminal Appeal on October 31, 1922, Lord Hewart said: "It is an unfortunate circumstance that under the law as it stands it is not possible to pass a sentence of Preventive Detention without first satisfying the condition precedent of passing a sentence of penal servitude."

I would draw your attention to the fact that although all the convicts at Camp Hill are habitual criminals when they are received there, twice the number of those discharged from Camp Hill are never imprisoned again compared with those discharged from the ordinary convict prisons.

Now turn to America.

The retort to those who protest that a criminal has no honour and cannot be trusted unless he is under lock and key is to be found in that in the United States they have tried the plan of placing convicts on their honour and with success.

Mr. Spencer Miller, formerly Assistant Warden of Sing Sing Prison, New York, furnished a meeting of the Howard League for Penal Reform, held on June 3, 1921, with unchallengeable facts. In certain States a system of Short Paroles has been adopted under which a convict, soon after his admission, is allowed out on parole to assist farmers with their crops. In the State of Kentucky the results were that all the parole men voluntarily returned at the termination of their harvesting leave, that they had improved physically, mentally and

morally, and that they were the first to qualify for discharge in due course. And in Kansas the farmers applied for one hundred and fifty prison inmates to help them in their work. These men were sent, and sent without warders or other officials. They worked voluntarily (and well) for two months, and they returned voluntarily. In Florida a farm of six thousand acres is worked by six hundred convicts. Here, too, no prison officials are in charge of them. They are literally on their own.

At the same meeting Mr. Spencer Miller said: "I consider that those changes which have been wrought in the attitude and policy of the administration of our prisons and institutions for correctional purposes have been due to the fact that there has taken place in America, both in the official mind and in the public mind, a vast change in the attitude towards the criminal. No longer is he regarded as the man who is despised and rejected, as a man who is worthy only of punishment, and the vengeance of society. He is regarded as a human being, who is entitled to the understanding of his fellow human beings, and to every assistance in bringing about his own rehabilitation. . . . The history of punishment is the history of the most conspicuous moral bankruptcy that the community knows." ⁶

It is a maxim in sociology that every institution embodies within itself the elements of its own destruction and its own transformation, and it is the recognition of this basic fact that underlies the efforts of all prison reformers. The first prison reformer was the Marquis de Beccaria, whose book, *Crimes and Punishments*, after its publication in Milan in 1764 inaugurated the movement towards reform to which John Howard gave the impetus in this country shortly afterwards and which has gained in scope and force ever since. It was Howard who so energetically pointed out the glaring defects of a prison system which in his day made the keeping of a

⁶ *Vide The Howard Journal*, October, 1921.

prison a lucrative private speculation dependent upon the heavy fees extracted from the prisoners and often serving as an easy means of living for ex-criminals. The oldest penalties were based on the ancient *lex talionis*, the law of revenge which ordered the criminal to suffer the precise injury which he had inflicted upon his victim. It affirmed, in essence, that the punishment should fit not the criminal but the crime. But public opinion is beginning to urge that the punishment, or treatment, should fit not the crime but the criminal.

The opponents of prison reform prate of a something which they call the "criminal face" and add as their postscript the observation that the owner of such a face is doomed to a life of crime and that no amount of reform will do such a one any good. To these I would retort that the "criminal type" fallacy has long since been exploded, and that in an overwhelming majority of cases the "criminal face" is a prison product entirely, and bears a damning testimony to the type of mentality which prison life manufactures. It would be nearer the truth to call it the "prison face." A comparison of two photographs, one of a convict the day before his admission to prison and the other of the same man the day after his release three or more years later, would prove a revelation to many! Speaking of convicts on discharge, Colonel Baker, of the Salvation Army, said: "They are mentally weak and wasted, requiring careful treatment for months!"⁷

Practically the only counteracting influence to prison monotony is the custom of allowing periodic, but far too rare, visits from relatives. The knowledge that a wife, or child, or mother will soon come to see him—even though they are kept several feet apart from each other and a warder is sitting between them and the subjects of conversation are rigorously restricted—has kept many a broken man from losing his sanity.

The prison officials themselves are not to blame for the system of separate confinement. Their duty is to administer

⁷ *Vide* Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *English Prisons under Local Government*.

the system as it is, and the Prison Commissioners have included such human and humane men as Sir Evelyn Ruggles-Brise (their late Chairman), Sir Bryan Donkin and Mr. A. Andrews, who have spent without stint, time, thought, and money in endeavouring to mend matters in order that if our prisons cannot be made more like Heaven they may be made less like Hell. The warders themselves wish to see separate confinement abolished. They say that the sight of men enduring this unnatural and vindictive punishment day after day has a depressing and disturbing effect upon themselves. There have been warders whose minds the callousness of this blot upon our prison system has affected, and there have been warders who have cheerfully accepted punishment themselves for endeavouring to make a prisoner's separate confinement a little more endurable. Blame the system, but do not blame those who are forced to apply it.

Dr. Mary Gordon, a retired Inspector of Prisons, in her book, *Penal Discipline*, writes: "It may appear that so far I have no good word to say for our prison system in any of its forms. I have not. I think it creates a criminal class and directly fosters recidivism, that our method is dead and done with and in need of decent cremation."

To sum up. Some of our prison punishments are disgustingly degrading; others—such as diet restriction and separate confinement—undermine health, especially mental health, and cause unnecessary suffering and induce pernicious thoughts and habits. Our present prison system is a hotchpotch of negative reforms—reforms which, speaking broadly, are not the product of suggestive, constructive thought, but the belated outcome of indignant and public protests resulting in the elimination of obnoxious defects, which have rarely been supplanted by helpful substitutes. It is founded on the gospel of destruction, the view that you must destroy the prisoner's self-respect by the needless imposition of niggling admonitions as provocative as they are petty. The educated man who has momen-

tarily fallen from grace; the full-blooded rover whose sole crime is an excess of high spirits; the harassed employé irresistibly chivvied to his breaking point by domestic worry and economic stress; and the wretched under-dog who has never had a decent fighting chance—these and all the pathetic odds and ends of humanity are dumped into the same gaol and treated in the same way. The criminal who, after all, is the chief person concerned, is the last person considered.

Were a hospital to incorporate in its scheme of curative treatment methods which made its patients worse, public opinion would convert it into either a prison or an asylum, with the medical staff as its first inmates.

CHAPTER XI

THE SPIRIT OF REVOLT

GUSTAV LE BON, in his book, *The World in Revolt*, has taken for his theme the fact that the world is passing through an era of revolt and hatred of any kind of authority or control. And even in America, the country which emerged from the Great War as the sole creditor State of the world, with a vast mountain of debts due to her from an exhausted Europe and the resulting power of influencing the thoughts and actions of the politicians of every civilized country, there are hints of a definite discontent.

This, of course, is not news. Change is in the air; the only point which now furnishes a topic of conversation or Press comment in this connection is the form which that change is likely to assume. Will it be slow and peaceful, or will it be swift and bloody?

And although this subject, as a subject, does not fall within the compass of my theme, the omission of a consideration of the mentality of those who are working to bring about the change, inasmuch as they sometimes fall foul of the law, would leave a conspicuous gap in this book and render it unpardonably incomplete.

I am not concerned with the respective claims of those revolutionaries (I do not employ this word in its contemptuous, but in its literal sense) who approach their task from different, sometimes conflicting, points of view, nor have I any inclination to adopt the dangerous expedient of those who dismiss the respective programmes of Socialism, Communism, Syndicalism, Internationalism, Bolshevism and Anarchism under the one

general designation—Rowdyism. The questions with which I am more directly concerned are: Is the revolutionary a criminal or a lunatic? Or both? Or neither?

Before I embark upon my search for the answers to these questions—a search which must be necessarily incomplete—I would observe that those who bewail the evils of discontent would do well to ponder upon the benefits of discontent. If every man were content with his lot we should all stagnate through lack of ambition. The dyspeptic clubman of long pedigree and short temper who, from his luxurious arm-chair, croaks his wheezy denunciations of the ugliness of dissatisfaction, is apt to forget that he would not be enjoying that arm-chair were it not that his ancestors were as dissatisfied with sitting on the boles of trees as their ancestors were with swinging from other trees by their tails!

The rich are quick to recognize the ugliness of the poor, while placidly ignoring the causes which have given birth to that ugliness. Their attitude is that of Mabel Sabre who "read the caption under one of the pictures of the wives and families of the four hundred and twenty-nine colliers killed in the Senghenydd mine, but not under any of the others." The point she noted was that the women "of that class" wore "those awful cloth caps. . . ." The poor irritate the rich with their presence. The rich are too apt to regard the poor as crawling things, which persist in forsaking the crannies which are their appointed home, and expose their hideousness to the gaze of the indifferent.

In contemplating the revolutionary, we must not confuse crime with immorality. A man of unblemished character may commit an act which, while leaving his conscience quite clear, and earning for him, indeed, the goodwill and support of a large body of his fellows, may bring him into conflict with the law, and result in his being legally convicted as a legal criminal. A man may, for example, find that he can no longer persist in his allegiance to the doctrines of Christianity. He may

be a model citizen, and endowed with great intellectual gifts, which he uses according to his lights; but should the manner of his public presentation of his views to others be too candid for their liking, he may find himself the victim of a "heresy hunt," or even the central figure in a prosecution under our Blasphemy Laws. We make him suffer, not for his dishonesty, but for his honesty.

Turn for a moment to politics. The greatest crime in the eyes of the law is not murder: it is high treason. And the reason for this is obvious. A murderer, revolting though his crime is, injures at the most a handful of people—his victim and his family. The criminal who commits high treason attempts to overthrow the whole community, and as all laws are drawn up with the prime intention of safeguarding the State—the interests of the individual, while acknowledged, being regarded as of secondary importance—a crime against the welfare of the State as a State is the most serious of all, whatever the private virtues and attainments of the criminal who has injured the State. This was the argument used against the Ulster Orangemen of 1913, the Sinn Feiners of 1916 and the conscientious objectors of 1917-1918.

That the person plotting against the State does so with the genuine conviction that his activities are benefiting the community, and assisting to bring about a new and better order of things, matters not one jot. If he were to overthrow the existing State to-day, he would make high treason against his new State a criminal offence to-morrow. And rightly so. The law says, in effect: "If you wish to dissolve the constitution, you are at liberty to do so provided that you do so in constitutional ways and by the use of constitutional methods. Within those limits you are a reformer. Beyond those limits you are a criminal."

Before going on to consider the nature of revolution, I invite you to contemplate the types of men who advocate it, and the war against property which it commonly implies. As

might be expected, offences against property are very rare amongst upper-class delinquents. These tend to specialize in crimes involving fraud. It has been observed that our prisons are for the most part tenanted by inmates from the lower classes. This is true; but it is true because, for one reason, the lower classes are numerically in the majority. For every rich man there are thousands of poor men, and it is inevitable that the bulk of offenders should belong to the preponderant class. Indeed, considering the appalling conditions among which our poor are expected to exist, the wonder is not that they transgress so much, but that they transgress so little, and I would mention that detectives of wide experience have told me that the worst criminals among the poor are those who have sunk into poverty from the upper classes. Further, the upper-class criminal runs a better chance of evading detection than the poor man. His mode of life indicates ample resources. What temptation, then, is there for him to commit a crime in order to acquire that which he does not lack? His position disarms criticism from the uninformed. Again, the upper-class offender is astute enough to keep just within the law: the man who specializes in "long firm" frauds, for example, is extremely difficult to arrest, while the consciences of certain of our merchant princes appear to be kept well under control.

What is it that tends, *inter alia*, to transform a man into a revolutionary? The causes are manifold, though the scrutiny of a few of them may help us to understand the mentality of the revolutionary, even though we may not agree with him.

We know that many cases of theft are born of the anti-social grudge. Thieves sometimes argue: "Here is a man who has inherited a five-figure income, which he is squandering on fripperies. Here am I, willing to work but unable to find work. This man spends as much on one meal as would keep me for one month. I am morally entitled to a share of that man's unearned wealth." And from their hatred—envy if you

wish—of the individual, they pass on to an envy of the whole of society.

An unnecessarily harsh sentence may turn a man into a revolutionary. We all know a certain type of county J.P., who has never performed a day's work in his life, but who nevertheless has the impertinence to deliver a pompous homily on the evils of idleness to some unfortunate wretch who is workless and homeless, and then sends him to gaol on a charge of vagrancy; punishing him for not going home when the man has no home! This injustice naturally rankles in the man's mind, and he, too, from regarding the magistrate as an individual, sees in him the representative of society. Society, he now argues, has done him this wrong, and he forthwith declares war on the society which has wronged him.

But the revolutionary spirit may be induced in a man not by the contemplation of his own lot but out of sympathy with the unmerited sufferings of others. Indeed, many of our reformers are men who are financially independent. Many members of the Fabian Society, for instance, are men whose abilities enable them to earn so much that they are not compelled to work continuously, and they accordingly devote their leisure hours to the service of their less fortunate fellows. In this connection it is a matter for regret that we should find a thinker of the sincerity and courage of the present Dean of St. Paul's recording his opinion that "the only class that has learnt nothing is the group of young 'intellectuals' chiefly in London and the Universities, who still exhibit the typical revolutionary mentality, with its excitability, blindness to facts, and cruelty blended with sentimentalism."¹ It is equally unfortunate that the Dean should have permitted himself to ejaculate: "The position of a Church which should sell itself to the Labour Party would be truly ignominious."² May I venture, with all deference, to cheer the Dean with the as-

¹ The Very Rev. W. R. Inge, D.D., *Outspoken Essays*.

² *Ibidem*.

surance that such a transaction will never be effected? Those to whom the Church has already sold herself would demand too large a profit.

Once the spirit of revolt has gripped a man's mind it seldom quits it. The revolutionary is essentially emotional, and if he is endowed with intellectual adroitness and the ability to digest facts and arguments and fire them at his opponents with the precision of the skilled advocate his words, like sparks from a prophet's torch, re-kindle the slumbering fires in the minds of others.

It is the sincerity, the gripping sincerity, of the revolutionary which constitutes the difference between him and the habitual criminal. Both are warring against society, but with totally different objects. The habitual criminal simply destroys; the revolutionary, on the principle that you must break eggs to make omelettes, destroys in order to be able to rebuild.

Dr. Hamblin Smith, a Freudian, writes of the revolutionary thus: "The boundary line between the paranoiac and the enthusiastic politician is at times very hard to define. . . . It is difficult for the ordinary man . . . to realize the enthusiasm which politicians put into their work. When a man gives up a good situation and incurs disgrace among his friends in order to give his energies to some unpopular political cause, we realize that we are dealing with the abnormal."³

Other Freudians tend to regard revolutionaries as purely psycho-pathological cases and instance, *inter alia*, the attire and mannerisms of the long-haired men and short-haired women among the *intelligentsia* as instances of bisexuality who evince a form of Narcism induced by the arrest of psychic development in their infantile and auto-erotic stage of growth. But it has been said that there are two sides to every question. To some, of which this is one, there are a dozen sides; and in view of the highly controversial and still unsettled discussion which is going on concerning this question

³ M. Hamblin Smith, *The Psychology of the Criminal*.

I doubt whether anything would be gained by the swerving from my main theme which my participation in the prevailing orgy of speculation would involve.

And there are other reasons. . . .

Other Freudians, again, regard the political firebrand purely as one who has been cheated of the fruits of his industry by an employer or unscrupulous rival and, unable to obtain redress, has—his mind passing through the stages to which I invited your consideration in Chapter VI—developed minor delusions of persecution in which he begins, as in the other instances which we have encountered, by suspecting the individual who has bested him and proceeds to a more extended distrust of society in general.

In this connection it is often true that unless a man has reserves of money, position, or influence, his efforts to achieve success are abortive, whatever his sincerity, industry and personal integrity. In innumerable private firms the lucrative appointments, like insanity, "run in the family," and the applicant is told that he lacks the personality, the experience, the business acumen or technical knowledge to fill the appointment which he seeks to fill. His achievements are belittled and his shortcomings magnified; and although he is often told that he is asking too much he is seldom told that he is receiving too little or that he is working too hard for that little.

The political malcontent is often one whom the colliding forces of life have toyed with and exasperated. He has often spent long periods of unemployment, living on chance and charity. He has ventured into life and has found that its road can be very steep, his requests for work met with curt refusals, suspicious comments or jaundiced advice from his "betters," and he begins to realize that the poverty of the poor can be nothing beside the poverty of the rich, since in the fundamentals of life the rich are poor and the poor are rich.

Perhaps his next step is to join a revolutionary organization.

The gregarious instinct—the instinct which urges men with the same tastes, of the same class, or inspired by a common purpose to gather together—is a noteworthy and inherent characteristic of human existence. The first thing which visitors to the East notice is that in any large town the Europeans tend to gather together and inhabit a clearly defined portion of it. And they also tend to sort themselves out according to nationalities. You consequently become familiar with the British quarter, the French quarter, and so on. In very large towns the principle is carried still further, especially in the business part of the place, where those of the same trade or occupation herd together. In London, even, this is noticeable. The doctors have monopolized Harley Street, the newspapers have established themselves in Fleet Street, and the automobile firms gravitate towards Long Acre.

The trend of modern psychology is to reinforce the old analogy between the individual and society. Modern psychology recognizes that in the group mind and group life lie the answers to many questions. As your bodily organs are functionally inter-related, and as your body and mind act and react on one another, so the individual and the crowd respond sympathetically to anything which serves to link them. A street arrest of an individual attracts a crowd which, in its turn, attracts other individuals. A practised orator who can sense the mind of his audience has only to attune himself to its mood of the moment, and to offer it a message which inspires in words that thrill, and his audience becomes a sensitive instrument which will respond to his lightest touch and adapt itself to his every mood.

The crowd is sensitive and plastic. It is also imitative. Let a local epidemic of crime break out and it will beget other epidemics. Strikes, religious revivals, crazes—all these movements provoke similar movements elsewhere. Given the right setting, there is no movement, be it a crime or a crusade, which will not produce its imitators. We are inherent mimics, indi-

vidually and collectively. We have not yet emerged from the monkey stage. A crowd will act collectively as not one of the individuals composing it would dare to act separately. That is the reason why we have our trade unions and a multitude of other organizations. Governments dare not ignore a crowd. Its voice is loud and its mass gives the individual who happens to be one of it a sense of security and power which nothing else can offer him. The revolutionary, then, joins a crowd in the shape of a political or industrial organization in order to strengthen both his crowd and himself in the struggle with that larger crowd, the State.

And how does he regard the State?

In his book, *The State and Revolution*, Lenin develops the theory of the State advanced by Karl Marx. In effect, Lenin argues that the State is an anachronistic survival of a decadent and coercive organism. He regards it as a machine designed for, and applied to, the oppression of the proletariat by the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie whom he regards as pandering to the aristocracy through servility begotten of snobishness; and he advocates the revolt of the proletariat in order to disrupt the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie and to smash the organization for which they stand.

Does modern psychology help to explain revolution itself?

For many years a friendly argument has been going on between those who affirm that heredity, in its widest application, is at the root of all development and desire for development, and those who point to environment as the all-important factor. Darwin, of course, gave a tremendous fillip to the heredity theory as applied to biology, though some of his conclusions are still *sub judice*, and many have had to be modified, some developed, and a few rejected, as the outcome of the assaults of Lamarck and his followers.

To Karl Marx it was always environment that counted, and his disciples, in applying his conclusions to the facts of everyday life and comparing them with, and endeavouring to

reconcile them to, those periodic developments in the fields of science, sociology and psychology, realized, with the help of Marx, the significance of the profound interaction of heredity and environment; and in postulating the doctrine of the materialistic conception of history, which affirms, you will remember, that our conduct right down the ages has been the outcome of our hereditary attributes and their response to the demands made upon them by environment, they clothed one of the tenets of Freudians in the language of Marxians.

You cannot produce a perfect man in five minutes, or in five generations. If you produced the Perfect State to-morrow the individuals composing it would be no better and no worse than you or I. Revolution—wise revolution—is a slow process. Time, in legal parlance, is the essence of the contract—the contract between the State and the individuals composing it.

Modern Marxism, then (I employ this contradiction in terms for the sake of clarity), accepts the materialistic conception of history as illustrating the moulding influence exercised upon a man's heredity by his environment; but I note that although Mr. Ramsay Macdonald recognizes the fact that the materialistic conception of history—which he calls by its other name, economic determinism—applies the terse, scientific method to the recording and interpretation of history, and thus renders invaluable service if only because "its assumptions can never be displaced from the motives in history,"⁴ he appears to regard it as a toy designed by Buckle and fondled by the *intelligentsia*.

But since Marxians and many other Socialists accept this view of economic history, the principles of which are undoubtedly buttressed by modern psychology, it follows that in the processes of development, both of the Herd and partial Herd, efforts towards progress should be directed against environment rather than against heredity; the former is alterable, the

⁴ J. Ramsay Macdonald, *The Socialist Movement*.

latter is not so alterable, and we tend to take the line of least resistance when challenged by a dilemma.

Environment, argue the revolutionaries, begets the opinions, aspirations and resentments of men. When you have a body, or aggregation of bodies, of men of one class united by one purpose which they hold in common—whatever their differences on other matters—you are dealing with what has come to be known as class consciousness. Class consciousness finds its outlet and expression in the class warfare, and in economic determinism, just as in psychological determinism, we perceive, as its essence, instead of a free-will line of conduct, that cluster of psychic rationalizations born of the conflict between heredity and environment, and urging the revolutionary to do the things which he does in the manner in which he does them.

Modern psychology, then, tends to indicate that all abnormality, including political fanaticism, depends less upon the inherent nature of the individual than upon the environment which encloses him; and this view is reflected in the slow—to the revolutionary, the all too slow—modifications in environment to which we give the name Social Reform.

There will probably always be some desire for revolution. In the past, as Karl Marx points out, the bourgeoisie rebelled against feudalism, and in the present the proletariat are rebelling against the bourgeoisie in order to create the Socialist Commonwealth. It remains to be seen who will, at some time in the future, rebel, in turn, against the proletariat.

The extreme form of revolt is, of course, anarchism. What is anarchism?

A resolution passed at the International Anarchist Congress, held in August, 1907, at Amsterdam, embodied the following clause: "Anarchists think that the destruction of the capitalist and authority society can only be realized by armed insurrection and violent expropriation. . . ." The idealism of the International Anarchist seeks to realize the state of affairs

indicated in the last verse of the Book of Judges, where "there was no king, and every man did that which was right in his eyes," evincing, in common with the writer of this verse, a calculated reticence concerning the eyes of other people! As Bertrand Russell exclaims: "The general tone of the Anarchist press and public is bitter to a degree that seems hardly sane. . . . The revolt against law naturally leads, except in those who are controlled by a real passion for humanity, to a relaxation of all the usually accepted moral rules, and to a bitter spirit of retaliatory cruelty, out of which good can hardly come."⁵ At the same time, we must remember that the "bitter spirit of retaliatory cruelty" is a feature of all extremist action. Did not the Fascisti burn down Byron's palace at Ravenna, in 1922, on the ground that it was being used as the headquarters of the Italian Socialist Co-operative Society?

A revolutionary whose discontent with the existing order develops into an intense hatred of those who represent that order is a potential anarchist. The anarchist is a paradox. Arguing that the maintenance of the existing order rests on force, he seeks to overthrow that order by the use of force. Force is his weapon, his idol, his spouse. Without it he is not an anarchist, save in theory. But if he is a paradox, he is a consistent paradox. In his relations with his fellow-revolutionaries, the temptation to resort to force is seductive. As George Bernard Shaw remarked, in a paper read to the Fabian Society: "On the Continent, the discussion between Anarchism and Social Democracy is frequently thrashed out with the help of walking-sticks, chair legs and even revolvers."⁶

Criminals occasionally tend to assume the pose of anarchists, especially in Spain, Italy and the United States. In the hope of exciting sympathy, they invest their deeds with a pseudo-altruism: "I, a poor man," they declaim, "wage war on society because society wages war upon the poor." If the

⁵ The Hon. Bertrand Russell, *Roads to Freedom*.

⁶ George Bernard Shaw, *The Impossibilities of Anarchism* (Fabian Socialist Tract, No. 45).

criminal, in such a case, gains nothing by his crime, he may be regarded as an unfortunate hysteric, whose impulses have lacked inhibition, or whose inhibitions have been weakened or destroyed. His zeal has outrun his discretion. But if he gains anything personally by his act, he is a responsible and punishable fraud.

In extreme cases, the anarchist develops into a regicide, whose energies are bent towards assassinating the ruling head of the State; not so much to rid the country of its king or president—for he realizes that if he killed a ruler per day, successors to those assassinated would be found either by hereditary right or by popular ballot—as to attract attention to the policy for which he (the assassin) stands.

Deplorable as is the conduct of the regicide, we cannot term him a criminal, except in so far as his act is a breach of the laws of his State, and technically makes him a criminal. But the criminal is actuated solely by self-interest. He estimates that his crime will bring him gain, and that he will be able to enjoy his gain without detection or molestation. The regicide, on the other hand, knows that he can gain nothing by his act. He deliberately offers his life as a sacrifice for the ideals which he cherishes, and, so far from evading detection, he covets it, with the secondary intention of preaching his seditious doctrines from the dock.

Successful assassinations by regicides are, fortunately, rare; so that anything approaching a satisfactory inquiry into either their methods or their minds is impracticable. Czolgosz, the Polish-American assassin of President McKinley, whose conviction was largely secured through the evidence of a cinematograph film in the days when the cinema was a novelty, was bodily sound and showed no physical indications of an overstrung nervous system, though saturated with the anarchist doctrines of his political associates. His manner was restrained, almost phlegmatic, though not detached and, claiming that he had only done his duty in murdering the President,

argued that he was justified by his view that McKinley was "an enemy of the good working people." He was examined by five medical men, declared sane, and electrocuted. This, however, happened nearly a quarter of a century ago, and had Czolgosz been examined in the light of the enormous advances achieved in abnormal psychology since then he would probably have been found insane.

Many Freudians tend to explain the phenomena of anarchism in the terms of the Œdipus Complex to which I referred in Chapter VI, and although they tend to confuse Anarchism with Communism I will very briefly summarize their contention for the sake of the light which it throws on certain revolutionary trends.

To the anarchist the existing state of things represents the father and the authority, unnecessarily harsh, of the father; and just as Œdipus slew his father in order to return (only too literally) to his mother, so the anarchist seeks to smash the existing "paternal" state in order to return to a confraternal Nirvana, which will "mother" himself and his political brethren. Similarly, Rousseau's advocacy of the "return to Nature" is to be interpreted as a regressional wish for the restoration of intra-uterine conditions. Further, some Freudian mystics suggest that the murdering of landowners and other representatives of the squirearchy is a modern manifestation of the Œdipus Complex tenanted, as it were, the Unconscious of the Mass Mind: the landowner being the "father" (*sic*) of his tenants, his "sons" (*sic*) wishing to gain possession of their mother (Mother Earth) and organize themselves into a Communistic ergatocracy. As Lorenz comments: "A State which should undertake the comprehensive care of all members of the population on equal terms . . . would be the most complete renewal of the matriarchal type of community of primitive days. . . ."

We cannot indulge in sweeping generalizations. Just as there is no "criminal class" and no "criminal type" so a survey

of revolution and revolutionaries suggests that we must resist the temptation to generalize concerning either the one or the other. We cannot treat revolutionaries as a class, in spite of the facts that they tend to be class-conscious members of one class; for others of the same class are not revolutionaries, and the argument, when pursued, resolves itself thus:

The revolutionary—like the criminal, the lunatic, the criminal lunatic, and the borderland case—must be viewed as an individual. I suggest (and I fully anticipate contradiction!) that the revolutionary is a man whose heredity has clashed with his environment and that the result of this collision is psychic conflict which may pass unnoticed or betray itself in the form of “criminality” or insanity, or both.

Here my theme invites a survey of criminal responsibility, to which I hope to devote my next two chapters.

CHAPTER XII

THE LUNATIC AND THE LAW

LORD CHIEF JUSTICE COLERIDGE, speaking in 1888, said: "The law in the matter of insanity is not incapable of being so interpreted as to do terrible injustice."

Although that opinion was expressed thirty-five years ago it is nearly as true to-day as it was then. I deliberately insert the qualification "nearly," for although you may be surprised to learn that the legal view of criminal responsibility is the same to-day as it was eighty years ago—when the *McNaughten* case provoked an authoritative pronouncement on certain points arising out of it—there are signs that lawyers are beginning to realize that for them to persist indefinitely in an attitude of indifference to the march of psychological science will result only in bringing the law into contempt in the eyes of the man in the street.

Criminal responsibility is an elusive, fluid thing. One cannot dogmatize on it or lay down rigid definitions which are to last for all time. I propose, therefore, to outline in brief the present procedure in cases where courts are called upon to deal with persons who are alleged to be irresponsible, to sketch the history of the development of the idea of criminal responsibility, to offer for your scrutiny the salient features of the *McNaughten* case and the Rules which were the outcome of that famous trial, to throw into relief the chief points of dissension between lawyers and doctors on the vexed question of criminal responsibility, to outline the present position as the result of that dissension, and to indicate the bearing of modern psychology upon the question as a whole.

In a criminal trial it is insanity which must be proved, not sanity, for just as it is a fundamental assumption in law that every man is innocent until he has been proved guilty, so every man is deemed sane until his insanity has been established.

Insanity, as the law stands, can be urged on behalf of an accused person with one of two objects—as a plea in bar of trial or as a plea in bar of sentence.

Insanity is advanced as a plea in bar of trial when it appears that the accused is suffering from mental disorder such as to render him incapable of instructing counsel for his defence.

In this connection it sometimes happens that the accused stands mute. In such cases the judge calls upon the jury to decide whether he is “mute of malice,” i.e., feigning insanity or through mischievous obstinacy, or *ex visitatione Dei*. The law regards an accused as mute “by the visitation of God” when he is either a deaf mute or prevented by deafness from hearing the indictment as it is being read. He may, alternately, be suffering from the definite form of insanity known as “mutism,” which I touched upon in Chapter VI, though in such a case it is hardly likely that his affliction would have persisted for so long without his being confined in an asylum or mental hospital. Should the jury decide that he is mute *ex visitatione Dei*, as in the case of “mutism,” they find that he is insane, upon which the judge orders him to be detained during His Majesty’s pleasure.

An interesting case, cited by Professor Glaister,¹ was tried before Mr. Justice Darling at the Old Bailey in November, 1897. A man named Harris was charged with murder followed by attempted suicide by cutting his throat. He severed his vocal cords and rendered himself practically dumb, and as he could neither read nor write he was unable to instruct counsel. The jury, however, found that he was sane, and that although he was unable to instruct his defence, his disability was self-

¹ *Vide* John Glaister, *A Manual of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology*.

induced and that he was fit to plead. Mr. Justice Darling adjourned the trial until the next session, when, on January 12, 1898, before Mr. Justice Channell and a jury, he was found guilty on the ground that up to the time of his committing the crime he was responsible for his actions, and although he was strongly recommended to mercy he was sentenced to death.

A plea in bar of trial may be urged on the ground that the accused, though sane at the time of the commission of the act, has since become so insane as not to comprehend, on arraignment, the proceedings in which he is the central figure. Should the jury find that that is so the judge may order his detention during His Majesty's pleasure. When the accused is obviously insane the jury are asked to decide his *sanity* (not his fitness to plead) at the commencement of the trial, medical evidence being called at the outset. This procedure is adopted for two reasons—to bring the accused within the purview of the Criminal Lunacy Acts, and to avoid wasting time trying an obvious lunatic on a charge for which he is obviously irresponsible.

On the other hand, an accused may be fit to plead and yet have been insane at the time of the offence, as in the case of a crime committed during a period of intermittent insanity, the trial in respect of which crime is being held, as it so happens, during one of the accused's lucid intervals. Should the accused insist on his sanity (and, as we noted in Chapter V, such an attitude may constitute eloquent proof of his insanity!) he may, subject to the consent of the judge, ask permission to put certain questions to the medical witnesses with the object of eliciting confirmation of his alleged sanity. This procedure is admissible whether insanity has been suggested in bar of trial or in bar of sentence. Should the jury decide that the prisoner is fit to plead, a formal plea of "Not Guilty" may be entered, in which case the trial proceeds, though should the insanity of an accused person, though not apparent at the

commencement of a trial, become obvious during its course the judge may exercise his power to discharge the jury.

Insanity, as a rule, is but rarely pleaded either in bar of trial or in bar of sentence except as a last resort as, since the accused, even if acquitted on the ground of insanity, will be consigned to the Criminal Lunatic Asylum at Broadmoor, from which, according to statistics, only one inmate in one hundred and fifty is discharged, the accused probably has nothing to gain by being found "Guilty, but Insane," unless he is being charged with murder.

There are criminal lunatics and there are lunatic criminals. The difference between these two classes has never been so tersely defined as it was by a writer in the *Medico-Legal Journal of New York* for September, 1898. "In a strictly legal sense," he explained, "there is no insane criminal. The act of the insane, which in the sane would be criminal, lacks every element of crime. . . . A sane man, who has committed a crime, may thus become insane, either before or after conviction for the crime. He may be rightfully called an insane criminal. If the insanity developed before the trial the law would suspend his trial while the insanity continued. If the insanity came after conviction he should be treated as an insane man, not as a criminal."

And in England the same observations may be taken as applying to the question. Roughly defined, a criminal lunatic (King's Pleasure Lunatic) is a man who has committed a crime when insane; and a lunatic criminal (Secretary of State's Lunatic) is a criminal who has become insane after conviction as sane. If a man becomes insane between the date of his crime and the date appointed for his trial he cannot be tried until he has recovered his sanity. And if a murderer becomes insane after his conviction (a lunatic criminal, as distinct from a criminal lunatic) he cannot be hanged until after his recovery, for the reason that he may have a plea in stay of execution which his temporary insanity prevents him from urging.

If the Court of Criminal Appeal is satisfied that an appellant was guilty of the offence of which he was convicted by a junior court, but that he was insane at the time of the offence, and was accordingly not responsible for his actions associated with the offence, it may quash his conviction and order his detention as a criminal lunatic under the terms of the Trial of Lunatics Act of 1883, as in the case of the procedure followed by an Assize judge or a judge at the Central Criminal Court.

In the Middle Ages everybody was regarded as responsible. Then inanimate objects, corpses and animals were recognized as irresponsible, though up to the end of the sixteenth century corpses and animals were tried and sentenced in courts of law. In 1454 the Bishop of Lausanne instituted proceedings against the leeches which infested the ponds of Berne. The case was tried before a bench of judges at Berne, the bishop being represented by counsel, and a leech was solemnly arraigned, found guilty of trespass, and, with the other leeches, ordered to quit the ponds within three days! The order of the court having been disobeyed, the leeches were duly declared contumacious, ordered to be treated as idiots, and a trustee was appointed to protect their interests. The leeches persisting in ignoring the decision of the court, the bishop formally anathematized them! Although there is no evidence to show that the bishop and judges were insane, there is very little to show that they were sane.

If you delve back into the origins of our laws, you will find that as insanity was not then regarded as such, the question of criminal responsibility could not, and did not, arise; though curiously enough, when madness gradually came to be recognized, the "criminal" acts of madmen interested the courts of those days not so much as regards the disposal of the accused as the disposal of his property—a verdict of guilt involving, in certain cases, forfeiture of the whole or part of his goods. Further, the only form of insanity recognized as such was

permanent insanity: neither partial nor intermittent insanity was recognized. So long as a man was "not wholly destitute of the use of his reason," he was regarded as sane, and, being sane, as responsible. Sir Matthew Hale, a seventeenth-century jurist, crystallized the contemporary view of responsibility by stating: "Such a person as, labouring under melancholy distempers, hath yet ordinarily as great understanding as a child of fourteen years hath, is such a person as may be guilty of treason or felony," which argument is demolished by Sir James Stephen's famous comment on the inappropriateness of comparing the mind of a boy of fourteen with that of an adult melancholic. "The one," he retorts, "is healthy immaturity, the other diseased maturity, and between them there is no sort of resemblance."²

The recognition, as insanity, of permanent and total insanity only, persisted until the middle of the eighteenth century, and its operation in practice is illustrated by the case of Arnold, who, under the delusion that the then Earl of Onslow (1724) was persecuting him, by sending invading armies of devils into his bedroom every night, shot at, and wounded, Lord Onslow. Insanity was pleaded in his defence, but dismissed as irrelevant by Mr. Justice Tracey, who tried the case, on the ground that Arnold could not be regarded as insane, "unless he was *totally* deprived of his understanding and memory, and did not know what he was doing any more than an infant, a brute, or a wild beast."

In 1760, at the trial of Lord Ferrers, on a charge of murder, the Solicitor-General summarized the law relating to responsibility, by stipulating, as conditions essential for an acquittal, total and permanent absence of reason, or total though temporary absence of it at the moment of the crime, which, though a less rigid definition of responsibility, nevertheless indicates that very little progress had been made.

Later on, the attention of jurists was attracted to the ques-

² Sir James Stephen, *History of Criminal Law*, vol. II.

tion of criminal responsibility by the appearance of Blackstone's famous *Commentaries* (1765), in which he pleaded for a reduction in the number of offences punishable by death, and a more humane conception of insanity. Two other circumstances also aroused interest in the question—the insanity of the reigning monarch, George III., and, in 1800, a homicidal attack on that lunatic king by a lunatic subject, Hadfield, who, suffering from auditory hallucinations, believed that he was ordered by the Deity to sacrifice himself for the sins of the world, and, loth to commit suicide, sought death on the scaffold by shooting George III. in Drury Lane Theatre. He was tried for treason by Lord Kenyon, who stopped the case when half way through, and directed the jury to find the prisoner guilty but insane, if they considered Hadfield to have been insane "at the very time when the act was committed." The jury accordingly found him "Guilty but Insane."

The next case to bring the question of responsibility to the front was that of Bellingham, who, while on a business mission to Russia, had been imprisoned there, and, on appealing to Lord Gower, the British Ambassador, appealed in vain. His mental poise affected by this refusal, which appears to have induced a delusion of persecution, Bellingham besieged, in turn, the King, the Privy Council, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Spencer Percival), several Members of Parliament, and the Bow Street Magistrates, in a fruitless endeavour to obtain redress for his treatment at the hands of the Ambassador. Finally, he proceeded to the House of Commons (May 11, 1812), and mortally wounded the first Member of Parliament who emerged into the Lobby, who happened to be Mr. Spencer Percival, now Prime Minister as well as Chancellor of the Exchequer. It is noteworthy that although Mr. Percival had been one of the dignitaries to whom Bellingham had appealed in vain, it was a sheer accident that caused him to be the victim. Bellingham, having suffered an injustice at the hands of one servant of the State, had for his object retaliation upon

some other—any other—servant, such as an M.P. As Bellingham himself protested incessantly, he “bore no malice against Mr. Percival.”

Turn now to the outstanding features of his trial. This was unduly hastened. The documents on which he based his defence were in the hands of the Law Officers of the Crown. He made two fruitless applications for a postponement of his trial, in order to enable him to prepare his defence from the scant material available. At the trial, Chief Justice Mansfield opened the ball by a speech to the jury, in the course of which he said that it was “as clear as daylight that, at the time of the commission of this deed, he was in a sound state of mind.” At one point in the trial, Bellingham’s counsel was told that the court would not listen to him. Three witnesses bore testimony to Bellingham’s apparent insanity. His counsel neglected to bring forward another twenty witnesses. It was disclosed during the trial that his father had died insane. Chief Justice Mansfield’s summing up was virtually a paraphrase of the Attorney-General’s speech for the prosecution, and embodied Mansfield’s remarks that it was futile for the prisoner to plead insanity “unless it be that the prisoner, when he committed the act, was so far deranged in his mind as not to be capable of judging between right and wrong.” Exactly a week after firing the shot, Bellingham had been executed, and the slipshod method even of that is evidenced by the fact that his heart continued to beat until four hours after his body had been opened by the surgeons. Well might Lord Campbell, as Attorney-General twenty-eight years later, observe: “There are some doubts as to the correctness of the mode in which the case was conducted.”

The facts speak for themselves. I merely observe that in Bellingham we have a homicidal lunatic, who was obviously insane before and at the time of his crime, and whose trial was as unjustly engineered as his execution was brutally accomplished.

The next case of importance from our point of view occurred in 1829. In that year Jonathan Martin set fire to a portion of York Minster, under the delusion that a voice commanded him to burn it down, in consequence of the immorality of its clergy. Medical evidence established his insanity (auditory hallucinations) at the time of the act, and he was acquitted on the ground of insanity; as was Offord, who, in 1831, murdered a neighbour named Chigwell, at Hadleigh, under the delusion that Chigwell and other neighbours were plotting to injure him; the court being satisfied that, as in Martin's case, Offord must have been insane at the moment of his crime.

In July, 1840, the youth Oxford was tried at the Old Bailey for the attempted murder of Queen Victoria, in that he fired twice at the Queen as she drove along Constitution Hill in an open carriage. At the trial medical and other evidence disclosed abundant proof of insanity in the family, Oxford's inclination to revel in his act, his delusion that he was the leading light of a non-existent anarchist confraternity, total inability to judge or reason, no moral sense, and indifference to his fate if found guilty. Lord Denman, who presided over the trial, stressed, in his summing-up, the essentials that, in order to find the prisoner insane, insanity at the moment of the act must be proved, such insanity must necessarily have precluded him from ability to distinguish between right and wrong, and observed that "if a man were the agent of a controlling disease which he could not at all resist, he was not then held to be a guilty party, and he would be entitled to an acquittal on that ground." Oxford was accordingly acquitted on the ground of insanity at the time of the act, and inability to distinguish between right and wrong.

Three years later, the celebrated McNaughten case was tried. Before I invite your consideration of this case, I propose to skip thirty years, in order to cite two cases where proved epileptics have been sentenced (one of them to death)

in respect of crimes committed when they were obviously not responsible.

When the epileptic Treadaway was tried at the Old Bailey, on February 8, 1877, he had an epileptic seizure in the dock, and although doctors then and there vouched for its genuineness, he was found guilty of the crime with which he was charged, on the ground that it had not been shown that he was under the influence of epileptic disease at the moment of the crime.

Again, in 1919, Henry Perry, an epileptic of insane stock, murdered a family at Forest Gate. At the trial three mental specialists, including Sir Robert Armstrong-Jones, tendered evidence indicating Perry's insanity, while another mental specialist, Dr. Hyslop, expressed the opinion, before the Court of Criminal Appeal, that he was insane at the time of the murders, and that he did not know the difference between right and wrong, and Perry's prison records (he was an old offender) embodied evidence of delusions and epileptic fits while in prison. In spite of all this, Perry was executed. On the connection between epilepsy and criminal responsibility, let Dr. Bernard Hollander speak: "From my experience as a brain specialist," he informs us, "I could quote several cases of epileptics with most dangerous impulses, who require personal attendants to watch over them and restrain them if necessary. I know of one gentleman who dare not go out alone in the streets, as he jumps at people's throats and attempts to strangle them, though he expresses his apology immediately afterwards."³

The paranoiac McNaughten, like Bellingham, suffered from delusions of persecution. Under the impression that his "enemies" and their spies were endeavouring to ruin him, he invited the aid of various magistrates, who disregarded his approaches. Associating them, as officers of the State, with the State itself, he then turned his attention to Sir Robert Peel,

³ Bernard Hollander, *Crime and Responsibility*.

as the highest official of the State, and, seeing in him the State personified, concentrated his resentment against him in that capacity. Unfortunately, he mistook Mr. Drummond, Sir Robert's private secretary, for Sir Robert himself, and, under this misapprehension, waylaid Mr. Drummond, and, on January 20, 1843, shot him.

On March 13, 1843, he was tried on a charge of murder before Chief Justice Tindal, Mr. Justice Coleridge and Mr. Justice Williams, with a jury, at the Old Bailey. The crime could not be, and was not, denied, but insanity was pleaded. Medical evidence to support the theory of McNaughten's irresponsibility was given, including that of Mr. Forbes Winslow, a mental specialist, and the history recounted of his eccentricities leading up to the crime itself. Stress was laid upon McNaughten's own statement that as Mr. Drummond passed him in the street "all his feelings rushed into his mind at once—all he had suffered for years—and he thought it would give him peace if he shot him."

At the present time, when the admissibility, or otherwise, of Freudian psychology is being hotly contested in connection with criminal responsibility, it is of interest to note that at the time of the McNaughten trial a French school of thought, headed by Esquirol, had attracted attention in medico-legal circles by the doctrine of partial insanity or, as it was then termed, monomania, the phrase denoting mental disorder which influences or is liable to influence only a part of a man's behaviour. With superlative cunning Mr. Alexander Cockburn, Q.C., counsel briefed for the defence, who ultimately became Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, sought to save his client by advancing the plea of partial insanity in bar of sentence while, at the same time, craftily refraining from mentioning either the phrase or its French originator to the judges who, as now, were apt to resist attempts to keep legal thought abreast of medical or psychological advances.

By dint of quotations from Erskine's speech in defence of

Hadfield, to the effect that insanity might influence the mind on one point only, and by reading judiciously selected extracts from the works of Ray, the American alienist, to a like effect Cockburn advanced the theories of Esquirol in the guise of Erskine and Ray. The judges swallowed the powder with the jam and, stopping the case, Chief Justice Tindal addressed the jury and asked them whether they were "satisfied that at the time the act was committed" the accused "did not know right from wrong." These two criteria, you will note, still continued to constitute the essentials of responsibility in criminal trials. The jury answering in the affirmative McNaughten was acquitted on the ground of insanity.

The McNaughten case provoked debates in the House of Lords on March 6 and 13, 1843, the outcome of which was that five questions were addressed to fifteen judges, their replies being received in the following June. As space precludes the literal transcription of the very lengthy questions and still lengthier answers I will substitute a *précis* of both.

Question 1. What is the law regarding crimes committed by persons with delusions where, for example, the accused at the moment of the act knew that it was illegal, but considered its illegality outweighed by the necessity for personal revenge or public redress?

Answer. If the accused was insane only in respect of his delusion the motive of his act, however urgent in his eyes, should be disregarded if he knew, at the moment of the act, that that act was illegal.

Question 2. What questions should be submitted to the jury when the alleged delusionist is charged with a crime and pleads insanity in his defence?

Question 3. In what terms should the prisoner's mental condition at the moment of the act be left jury?

The judges bracketed these two questions together for the purpose of their reply, which, in effect, was as follows:—

Answer. The jury should be informed that every man is regarded as sane and responsible unless the contrary is proved. *To establish a defence on the ground of insanity it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.*⁴ The question which we have tended to leave to the jury is whether the accused, at the moment of the act, could distinguish between right and wrong. We prefer their opinion on the accused in the dock to their opinion on hypotheses or generalities.

Question 4. If a person under a delusion as to existing facts offends in consequence is he to be executed?

Answer. It depends on the delusion. If this is his sole form of insanity he must be regarded as being as responsible as though the facts in regard to which he harbours that delusion were real. If he were under a delusion that a man was murdering him and he killed that man in self-defence he would be exonerated. If his delusion was that his victim was persecuting him or injuring his character he would be punishable.

Question 5. Can a doctor be asked to give an opinion as to the accused's state of mind at the moment of the

⁴I have reproduced the sentence in italics in the actual words of the judges, in view of their vital importance in the eyes of lawyers and others. Some writers, in fact, omit even reference to the other sections of the McNaughten Rules, regarding the italicized words alone as of any value.—J. C. G.

act, when the doctor, though present throughout the trial, has never previously seen the accused?

Answer. No. To do this would be to transform the doctor from a witness into a jurymen!

Mr. Justice Maule's replies to some of the questions differed slightly from those of his colleagues—he was cautiously non-committal—but, as he was outnumbered by fourteen to one, his views, though doubtless of interest to lawyers (who already know them) would not interest the man in the street.

The Answers of these judges, which are known as the McNaughten Rules, have been regarded in England as the authoritative statement on the law in regard to insanity where it affects criminal responsibility, though certain modifications and divergencies have been preferred and adopted in some of our colonies, and in the United States of America.

In years gone by, there have been judges and jurists who have tended to regard the McNaughten Rules as final and binding. They have ridiculed with scorn attempts to point out that nothing is final which can be improved upon or altered, and that as long as saner theories of insanity continue to be formulated so the views of lawyers and others, even if they cannot keep pace with those advances, will be expected not to lag too far behind.

On the other hand, there have more recently been judges who have not considered them authoritative, regarding them rather as tentative suggestions thrown out at an informal confab of other judges. Mr. Justice Maule, of course, disagreed with his colleagues at the time, and did not hesitate to say so; while Mr. Justice Blackburn, in 1874, and Mr. Justice Cave, in 1884, in directing the juries in their respective cases, made no attempt to conceal their disagreement with the McNaughten Rules.

But, speaking broadly, the tendency from that day to this has been for judges to regard the McNaughten Rules virtually

as law, or, at all events, as a recognized standard of comparison, and a guide for themselves and their juries.

If you concede that the dividing line between sanity and insanity is at times very difficult to discern, you will also agree that it is absolutely impossible to draw up a rigid set of rules which will apply to every conceivable case of insanity, especially where questions of criminal responsibility are involved. Lord Wensleydale, one of the fourteen judges, regarded the McNaughten Rules as final and perfect (naturally!), though Lord Chief Justice Cockburn held that in questions not falling within the scope of the Rules they were of no value, and Mr. Justice Stephen suggested that the Rules should not be regarded as statements of law until they had been approved by a court trying a definite case.

To-day there is an increasing number of jurists who consider that the McNaughten Rules constitute indeed a dangerous test of responsibility in view of the conditions under which they were framed. These critics regard them more in the light of panic legislation. They point to the facts that an attempt had been made to assassinate the Prime Minister, who had escaped only because his secretary had been shot by mistake; that political feeling had been pricked into resentment by the murder; that the public, headed by Archbishop Whately, still tended, in those unenlightened days, to regard a lunatic as a criminal; and that McNaughten would indeed have been hanged but for the supreme generalship of his nimble-witted counsel, and they argue that these rules can, in consequence, be regarded as neither final nor binding, but only as a temporary and eighty-years-old expedient, devised in a hurry to placate the public.

In criminal trials during the years immediately following the publication of the McNaughten Rules, we find that the two essential conditions precedent to a verdict implying irresponsibility were ignorance of the difference between right and

wrong, and ignorance of that difference at the moment of the crime.

Two points I must stress. Where the McNaughten Rules embody the phrase "right and wrong," they imply moral right and wrong, and not legal right and wrong. The difference may be illustrated by instancing fornication between an unmarried man and an unmarried woman over the age of consent, which, while morally wrong, is not a legal crime. In fact, a man may commit a crime, knowing it to be legally wrong, but under the conviction that it is morally justifiable, as in the case of political madmen, who glory in assassinating or wounding the rulers of States—Hadfield, for example. And that the McNaughten Rules referred to moral right and wrong, rather than legal right and wrong, is abundantly proved by reports of trials, and by the comments of judges and other authorities at that time and since that time. Secondly, the phrase, "nature and quality of the act," while it has been the subject of much legal quibbling, has gradually come to be regarded as meaning that an accused person, in order to be deemed responsible for his act, must have been cognizant of the degree of (moral) right or wrong involved in it.

In view of the tendency of the courts to look askance upon pleas of insanity when raised as a plea in bar of sentence, the medico-legal world is occasionally astonished to find an accused person acquitted on the ground of insanity, although he has not pleaded insanity in bar of trial or sentence. Professor Glaister quotes such a case, which was tried at the High Court of Justiciary, Glasgow, in September, 1902, when a man was charged with murdering another man by shooting him with a revolver.

Noticing that the Crown had called a number of medical witnesses for the prosecution, the judge asked counsel for the Crown the reason for this, and received a reply to the effect that the Crown was holding them in reserve, in case insanity

was pleaded in defence. The judge accordingly turned to counsel for the defence, and asked him whether he intended to plead insanity. Counsel replied in the negative, and no hint was dropped during the trial that the accused might have been irresponsible at the moment of the crime, except that the judge made that suggestion to the jury towards the end. The jury, after a short consultation, returned a verdict of "Guilty, but Insane." As Professor Glaister remarks: "Probably there was no one in court more surprised at the verdict than the prisoner himself."⁵

The war which is perpetually being waged between doctors and lawyers upon the question of criminal responsibility will probably never come to an end. As Dr. Havelock Ellis succinctly indicates: "Our courts of justice are still pervaded by the barbaric notion of the duel. We arrange a brilliant tournament, and are interested not so much in the investigation of truth as in the question of who will win."⁶ The lawyers tend to cling obstinately to the McNaughten Rules—rules drawn up in a time of panic when the suggestions of modern psychologists and alienists had not been voiced—and the doctors attack the lawyers for their laggard attitude in the face of the progress of science. Attempts to achieve peace have been made by suggesting the adoption of a compromise, the terms of which are that while medical men must forbear from demanding that lawyers should abandon their ancient axiom that a criminal may only be regarded as irresponsible through his ignorance of moral right and wrong, the lawyers must on their part concede that the precise interpretation of that axiom must depend upon the bearing of the latest achievements in psychopathology.

This suggestion the lawyers tend to reject, on the grounds that psychopathological thought is a fluid thing, changing from day to day—with the result that a criminal held responsible to-day might be deemed irresponsible to-morrow—and that

⁵ John Glaister, *A Manual of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology*.

⁶ Havelock Ellis, *The Criminal*.

the doctors themselves disagree among themselves, and not infrequently contradict each other in the same witness box during the same trial.

And the result is deadlock.

Lawyers, regarding irresponsibility as a disorder of the intellect, demand that the boundary line between responsibility and irresponsibility shall be clearly defined. Medical science, regarding irresponsibility as a disorder of the emotions, insists that no definable boundary line exists.

There are judges who welcome the most detailed and comprehensive medical evidence, not only with regard to the accused's mental poise during the medical examination, but concerning his mentality at the moment of the act. Others there are who tend to beam with patronizing condescension upon the doctor, as if tactfully tolerating the eccentricities of a crank; while other judges indulge in a childish brow-beating of doctors, regarding them as hired perjurers retained for the purpose of ridiculing the obsolete machinery of the law and the antiquated ideas of some lawyers.

As a result, the unfortunate doctor who is called as a witness does not know what is required of him. The judge possesses all the advantages. It is his court. He can rule out evidence as (in *his* opinion) inadmissible. He can so comment on it as to render it ludicrous, even self-contradictory, and he can, by his petulance and pomposity, succeed only in widening the gap between the lawyers and the doctors which the efforts of other judges are directed towards bridging.

There are as many definitions and tests of responsibility as there are days in the year. Dr. Charles Mercier suggested that if you are to class a criminal as responsible, you must prove that he "willed" the crime, intended the consequences of his act and sought to benefit himself by the crime; that the crime followed insufficient provocation; and that the criminal knew and appreciated the conditions under which he committed his crime. If any one of these considerations was absent,

responsibility could be assumed to be impaired or non-existent. The French Penal Code enacts that "there can be no crime or offence (*délit*) if the accused was in a state of madness at the time of the act," and the Statutes of the State of New York affirm that "no act done by a person in a state of insanity can be punished as an offence."

A growing number of thinking people are beginning to doubt the sanity of all murderers, on Behaviourist grounds. Some morbid mental process, they reason, must be operating in the mind of a murderer, otherwise he would not murder. And they base their view, not without logic, on the fact—well known to psychopathologists—that large numbers of people go through life tormented by a vague impulse to kill; their ability to control that impulse alone keeping them out of the dock. Reflecting on this point begets the question: "How many insane murderers have been hanged?"

From time to time a test is suggested which will definitely constitute the criterion of criminal responsibility, but they have invariably been rejected after scrutiny. There are those, for example, who would invite lawyers to regard as criminally irresponsible any man who is certifiably insane. But insanity is normally the exaggeration of only one function of the brain, and to bracket as equally irresponsible for the crime of murder the madman who kills his brother under the genuine delusion that the latter has entered his bedroom with the object of killing him (the madman), and the harmless lunatic whose only desire is to live alone in a disused quarry, would be absurd.

While the views of conflicting schools of psychology as yet carry little or no weight at criminal trials, it is, fortunately, true that facts, indisputable facts, do sway judges and juries. Facts are evidence, and evidence is everything. If it is shown, on behalf of an accused person, that he, or a blood relation, has at any time been certified as insane, or that the accused has at any time manifested the symptoms which we associate with borderland cases, the witness who produces such facts as

evidence is addressing the court in the only language understood by lawyers.

It now appears to be established that a jury must not weigh the question of criminal responsibility solely on the merits of the case on which they are engaged, but must base their findings on certain rigid rules of law. Even where they are convinced that the accused is not morally responsible, they must find him legally responsible, if the evidence tendered in court fails to satisfy the test of the *McNaughten Rules*.

The attitude of the law towards criminal responsibility may be roughly defined as follows, though I hasten to warn you against confusing the attitude of the law with the attitudes of either lawyers as a body,⁷ doctors as a body, individual lawyers or individual doctors, for the reasons which I have already invited you to contemplate:—

An accused person is not responsible for a crime committed when he was prevented by mental defect from distinguishing moral right from moral wrong at the moment of the crime, or from grasping the moral significance of the crime. Judges, in practice, tend to accept proof of such mental defect immediately prior to a crime as implying continuance of that mental defect up to, and including, the moment of the crime.

Ability to appreciate the nature of the crime, then, is the essence of the test favoured by lawyers. But such a test discredits itself by its rejection of the one sure index of insanity which, as we found in Chapter VI, is controllability. You can walk till you are footsore through the wards of any large asylum, and you will find only a small proportion of the inmates who do not know the difference between right and wrong. The bulk of our certified lunatics know full well the difference, but they fail to apply that knowledge to the every-

⁷ Though lawyers, as a body, are notoriously conservative and loyal to the traditions of their profession, yet their attitude, even as a body, is slightly less uncompromising than the attitude of the law (including its interpretation) which they are bound to uphold. To put it in another way, a discussion on criminal responsibility at an informal gathering of lawyers would be more liberal than their opinions expressed in court.—J. C. G.

day things of life. They lack self-control. That is why they are where they are.

It is now many years since Sir James Stephen wrote his *History of the Criminal Law of England*, but even then he remarked on the connection between insanity and controllability, and went on to hint that if ever the Criminal Law of England should be codified, it should be made clear that the essence of insanity is loss of self-control. Lawyers, as we have seen, tend to take it for granted that if a motive for a crime is obvious, the person accused of the crime is sane, and, being sane, responsible. But even a madman may have a motive. An idiot might chop off the head of his sleeping brother, grinning in ecstatic anticipation of the sleeper's amazement when he should wake and find his head missing! And the lawyers ignore the fact that an insane person, being endowed with the same instinctive passions as the one who is sane, may direct those passions towards the fulfilment of that motive. The sane man with a motive can regulate the operation of that instinct which urges him to realize his motive: the lunatic cannot exercise that control. The lunatic, like the sane man, may "know the difference between right and wrong," but he differs from the sane man by his inability to choose between right and wrong. Sir Robert Armstrong-Jones, writing in the *Contemporary Review* for March, 1923, said: "It is inconceivable to medical men who have spent their lives in studying mental diseases that the criterion accepted by lawyers should be the sole and only legal test, viz., the knowledge of right and wrong."

Further, a person may be sane but irresponsible. A child under the age of seven may be perfectly sane, but the law exempts him from liability in respect of a crime. Again, a man may, while sleeping with his wife, dream that he is being attacked by a wolf, and, in his dream, grapple with the wolf, and strangle it, only to find on waking that he has strangled his wife. You may argue that a sane man asleep is still

a sane man. But the mind in sleep can be anything but normal. You have only to recollect the ghastly nature of some of your dreams to realize that your mind in the dream state runs amuck, free, uncontrolled and literally abnormal. As one celebrated physician put it: "Every man is a lunatic for several hours out of the twenty-four!"

The law, in drawing up its penal code, did so with a twofold object: to punish offenders, and to deter would-be offenders. Deterrence is obviously of much greater value than punishment, and in considering the questions arising out of criminal responsibility, we must assign due weight to deterrence. In several of my previous chapters, I invited your attention to the Freudian denial of our conception of free-will. Freudians, you will remember, hold that our actions are the result of our hereditary and acquired tendencies, and the response which those tendencies make when quickened or muffled by the conditions of our environment at any given moment.

Curiously enough, this doctrine was preached, though in a modified form, by such enthusiastic physiologists as Lombroso, Ferri and Garofalo, in Italy, and Broca, Lacassagne, Manouvrier and other criminologists in France. And environment, in its broadest sense, means not only the visible, tangible surroundings among which we live—house, friends, employment, money and so on—but all the influences which are brought to bear on us, and of whose operation we are wholly or partly conscious.

Viewed from this angle, the realization that he may be punished for the consequences of his crime may constitute as real a fragment of his environment as the place in which, and the weapon with which, one man intends to kill another. His inclination urges him to kill; the deterrent realization that he may be killed for killing may curb that inclination. With it he is more likely to repress it. In short, deterrence reinforces the would-be criminal's self-control.

It is recognized, for example, that there are certain border-

land cases whose actions are determined more or less by the same motives and considerations as those whom we call normal, and upon whom the fear of punishment acts as a deterrent. These are the type whom Lord Bramwell doubtless had in mind when he suggested, as a test, that they "would not have yielded to their insanity if a policeman had been at their elbow."

If you reject the views of both doctors and lawyers as mere academic speculations, turn to the view of a practical man, Mr. Thomas Holmes, the well-known police court missionary, who once said: "This is the great lesson of my experience; that a great deal of crime does not proceed from wickedness; . . . but very often from causes over which the so-called criminal has no control, and against which he often struggles in vain."

And that is precisely what Freud teaches. The Freudian doctrine of psychological determinism denies the existence of chance in the psychical world as in the physical world. An uncaused effect is, says Freud, a contradiction in terms, and every effect, whether it be an act, an impulse or even an idea, is the only one which could possibly occur at a given moment, and in the circumstances of that moment. Modern psychology does not recognize the existence of will apart from individual volitions which, in their turn, are the outcome of heredity plus the sum-total of the respective influences of previous experiences, and the environment attending those experiences.

Freudians recognize the term "responsibility" only as denoting the normal reaction of civilized society to any specified act. When, therefore, society, through its accredited spokesmen and interpreters in Parliament or on the judicial bench, chooses to indicate the extent of psychic disorder that shall modify its reaction to certain crimes, we say, very loosely, that those afflicted with that degree of psychic disorder are, in popular parlance, "not responsible for their actions."

Neither the lawyers nor the doctors have been able to evolve, either separately or conjointly, any rigid definition of insanity, for the simple reason that there is none. And since it is virtually impossible to define insanity, it is still less possible to define responsibility, for the latter is governed by the former. The nearest approach to a workable definition of responsibility is that of Rosanoff, a Freudian, who says: "Responsibility, in the sense of profitless retribution for wrong-doing, does not exist, scientifically, in any case. On the other hand, everybody is responsible in the sense of being liable to forfeit his liberty, property or the results of his labour, when necessary for the protection of others, or for the restoration of damage caused by him."⁸

And even this definition is, for obvious reasons, not fool-proof.

⁸ V. Rosanoff, *Manual of Psychiatry*.

CHAPTER XIII

RONALD TRUE

IN connection with my cursory survey of the history of the growth of the idea of criminal responsibility, the attempt, in the form of the McNaughten Rules, to define that very elusive phrase, and some subsequent applications of those Rules to cases tried in the courts, I propose, in this Chapter, to summarize the salient features of the trial, appeal and ultimate reprieve of Ronald True.

Such summary will, I feel, serve several purposes. It will illustrate the practical application of the McNaughten Rules in the most important and most recent case tried within their scope. It will demonstrate the manner in which the lawyers and the doctors tend, as it were, to speak in two different languages on this thorny point of criminal responsibility. It will, I trust, assist you in appreciating the enormous difficulties which both professions encounter at criminal trials of this sort. It will enable you to note the very guarded manner in which both sides take part in them, and it will, I venture to hope, demonstrate that the urgency of defining criminal responsibility in terms acceptable to both sides is only equalled by the difficulty of defining it.

From May 1-5, 1922, Ronald True, an airman, aged thirty, was tried at the Central Criminal Court, before Mr. Justice McCardie and a jury, on a charge of murdering a prostitute, Gertrude Yates (*alias* Olive Young), in her flat at 13a Finborough Road, Brompton, on March 6, 1922.

At the trial Emily Steel, the dead woman's daily maid, recounted the following facts, in evidence:—

At nine-fifteen on the morning of March 6th, she (Steel)

arrived at the flat, and let herself in with her key. On her way to the kitchen she had to pass the sitting-room, the door of which was ajar, and on the table she noticed a man's scarf and overcoat. On arriving at the kitchen she observed that there was some warm tea in a teapot, and two cups and saucers from which tea had been drunk. The milkman was in the habit of coming at seven-thirty every morning, and as it was then nine-fifteen she concluded that a man had spent the night with the woman Yates, that the coat and scarf were his, that the two had had tea together between seven-thirty and nine-fifteen, and that the man was presumably still in the flat.

Presently Ronald True emerged from the bedroom and said to Steel: "Don't wake your mistress. She is in a deep sleep. We were late last night. I will send the car round for her at twelve o'clock." True then departed. He was "quite calm and collected."

Steel then went to the bedroom, knocked, received no reply, so entered. She found two pillows arranged end-to-end under the bedclothes—the time-honoured device to convey the impression that some one was sleeping in the bed. At the foot of the bed she saw a rolling pin, and drawers had been opened and their contents left in littered disorder. Jewellery was missing from a cupboard.

Now alarmed, Steel went into the bathroom, which opened from the bedroom, and there found the naked corpse of Yates stuffed between the bath and the wall. She telephoned for the police. The police, on their arrival, found blood spattered over the ceiling and walls, and Dr. Leigh, the Divisional Surgeon, estimated that Yates had been dead for two hours. Though five wounds, inflicted with some force with a blunt instrument, were found on the head, the woman appeared to have been strangled with a towel and the girdle of a dressing gown, the wounds being inflicted *after* death.

Yates had about one hundred and ninety pounds in the Post Office Savings Bank, possessed a certain amount of val-

uable jewellery, and appeared to have carried about £8 or £10 in her purse as a matter of course.

Further evidence was given to the effect that True was pressed for money. He had borrowed money from a boxing referee within the previous month. He had tendered a worthless cheque to a firm of motor-car dealers. He had stayed at two hotels, and had left without paying his bills. He had pawned some belongings, and had cashed a cheque for £7 which did not belong to him.

On leaving Yates' flat he went in a taxi to some outfitters in New Coventry Street, and there bought a hat and a ready-made suit, drawing the shop-assistant's attention to some fresh blood-stains on his clothes, and "explaining" that they had been caused by an aeroplane crash which he had sustained that morning as pilot of the Marseilles-London air express. (There was no such service, nor was True the holder of the Air Ministry's commercial licence.) He went on to display some jewellery, which was identified at the trial as being that of Yates, and said he had brought it over from France. He then had a shave at a hairdresser's in Wardour Street, pawned two of Yates' rings, drove in a car to Hounslow, Feltham and Croydon, sat in a box at a performance at the Hammersmith Palace of Varieties, where he left the car waiting for him, and was there arrested. He was armed with a revolver loaded with three cartridges, two of which had been converted into expanding bullets by the usual process of filing.

At the trial, Luigi Mazzola, a chauffeur, testified that on Sunday, March 5th (the day before the murder), he drove True to Maidenhead and other places, finishing the journey at Yates' flat. On meeting True in the Strand by appointment on the following morning, the latter went out of his way to explain that he was sorry he had dismissed Mazzola on the preceding evening, as he "had only stayed at the flat for twenty minutes."

James Adolph William Armstrong, another witness, related

some stories with which True had regaled him concerning himself. One of these was that he had, while in France, been chased by five German airmen, and had been dangerously wounded. (True was never in France.) In another, he had been engaged on police work in Mexico, when two rival gangs of gunmen had entered a restaurant where he was sitting, and had opened fire on each other, True escaping with his life only through the presence of mind of a friend. In another, when abroad, he had taken a claim relating to some land from a German, had fought the German all day, had killed him with the aid of a Red Indian, and had written the claim in the German's blood.

It was also disclosed at the trial that while on remand in Brixton Prison he had tried to found a Murderers' Club among the prisoners, and had announced his intention of founding a Duds' Club, membership of which was limited to those who had vainly attempted to commit murder.

Mr. Robert St. Aubyn Sach testified that True has intimated to him his intention of "getting" (i.e., murdering) various people against whom he appeared to harbour grievances, one of these being a man whom he said he was going to see on the Sunday night (March 5th), and invited Mr. Sach to "look out for the papers on Monday morning." Mr. Sach added that True had from time to time told him various extravagant stories which he was not inclined to believe.

Sir Henry Curtis Bennett, who defended True, suggested that he was insane. Sir Henry went on to indicate that True had had two aeroplane crashes, and, in consequence of the pain he had suffered through the second one, had been given morphia, had thereby become a morphomaniac, and had, in fact, twice been an inmate of a home for the purpose of being cured of that vice. Dr. Henry Williams Jeans, of Portsmouth, subsequently gave it as his opinion that True was a morphomaniac.

True's aunt gave evidence that he had, even as a boy, been

abnormal, had consulted palmists in Buenos Aires, Shanghai and San Francisco, and had for some time presented a wild appearance which filled her with alarm.

True's wife volunteered the evidence that in 1919 he had lost a mining appointment in West Africa through illness and drug taking, that on his discharge, in September, 1920, from the home where he had undergone treatment for drug taking, he had disappeared for three days, and had written to her threatening to commit suicide, that in October, 1921, he was fined at Portsmouth for obtaining drugs by forged prescriptions, that in February, 1922, he vanished altogether, and that she instructed a firm of private detectives to find him and to place him under restraint if necessary. The next thing she heard of him was that he had been arrested.

Mr. Montague Vivian Morgan testified that he had been a fellow Flying Officer in True's unit (22nd Squadron R.F.C.), at Gosport, in 1916, that since his two crashes True had been erratic in conduct, and that on being granted his "wings" he had had a pair made thrice the regulation size and of variegated colours.

Mr. Guy Herbert Dent, an author, also a Flying Officer at Gosport in 1916, said that so impressed had he been by True's instability that on hearing of True's arrest he had written to the magistrate.

Mr. John George Thompson corroborated the evidence as to True's West African experience given by his wife, and stated that he himself wrote the letter discharging True. He bore witness to True's bombastic tendencies, and added that even the natives noticed True's abnormality, referring to him as "Massa what am sick by him head."

Frank Sims, a chauffeur, said that he had driven True about at Portsmouth in 1916, that True had complained that at times his mind was a blank, and that he did not know what he was doing, and that he had seen True being wheeled about in a bath-chair on which various toys were arranged,

The qualified mental nurse in charge of the home to which True had been admitted in order to be cured of his morphia mania testified that he was under the delusion that he was being impersonated by some one, and that on one occasion, when refused morphia, he flew into a paroxysm, throwing himself about and screaming.

A chemist who supplied morphia to True, according to a doctor's prescription, said that True continually came to him for more, but was, of course, refused. His general manner gave the impression that he was unbalanced, and even when those at the shop saw him, they used to say: "Here is that madman again for more drugs."

Mrs. Elizabeth Wilson, in her evidence, stated that True had threatened that if she danced with any one else there would be trouble. She added that True frightened her, and that she had come to the conclusion that he was mad because he acted strangely, carried a loaded revolver and had one day rung her up to say that he had found his mother with her head battered to pieces. When, next day, she asked him why the fact had not been reported in the newspapers, he replied: "I am keeping it quiet for the time being." She added that he was constantly talking about murder, and had on one occasion said to her: "There will be murder one of these days. I am certain I shall get off. I want to try it out."

Dr. East, Senior Medical Officer of Brixton Prison (the remand prison), said that he had arrived at the conclusion, after having seen True daily in prison from March 8th onwards, that he had suffered from mental disorder from birth or from early age, and that later this became complicated with morphia insanity, that he thought True had homicidal tendencies, that he had shown no consciousness of knowledge that he had murdered Yates, that he had always denied it, that he was under a genuine delusion that he was being impersonated, that if he had not been given a sleeping draught on two nights while in Brixton Prison some catastrophe would have occurred in the

prison, that True's untruthfulness, boasting, and general restlessness all pointed to abnormality, which both the aeroplane crashes and the indulging in morphia were likely to enhance. Dr. East added that, in his view, True was suffering from disease of the mind, that he probably understood the nature and quality of his acts, but was incapable of distinguishing the moral difference between right and wrong.

In cross-examination by Sir Richard Muir, representing the Director of Public Prosecutions, Dr. East said: "I think the act was the result of insanity due to morphia." He also said: "A sane person would have seen that the blows were sufficient, without the strangling and gagging," and added that he thought True knew he was committing a punishable offence, but not that it was morally wrong, and, in reply to Mr. Justice McCardie's question: "What is meant by 'morally wrong'?" he said: "The law on this subject is so beset by phrases that the substance is sometimes obscured by words." Later on, he expressed the view that True had been born with a deficient sense of what was morally right or wrong, and to Sir Henry Curtis Bennett's question: "Is it possible for one definite thing to be pointed to as the cause that will lead a homicidal maniac to murder?" he answered: "Quite impossible."

The proprietress of another nursing home to which True had been admitted, in March, 1921, for one week, and again from October 13 to November 28, said that True was very violent, suicidal and the worst case that they had had. Two male attendants had had to guard him.

Recalled, Dr. East expressed his opinion that True suffered from neither epileptic automatism nor epileptic mania, but said: "I still think that he is an extremely dangerous man, and if he were at liberty now I believe another murder would quite likely take place," and went on to affirm that if True had not been in custody there would have been every possibility of another tragedy.

Alfred Dickinson, a hospital warder at Brixton Prison, said that on one occasion, when True saw Jacoby (another murderer awaiting trial), he said: "There's another one to join our Murderers' Club. We are only accepting members who kill them outright." Dickinson went on to say that at the inquest on Yates, on March 27, True evinced no interest in the proceedings, toyed with a monocle and smiled on hearing the Coroner's verdict of "Wilful Murder."

Dr. Young, Assistant Medical Officer of Brixton Prison, said he considered True to be insane, and said he would then and there certify him to be insane, on the grounds that he was suffering from disease of the mind, and was dangerous to himself and to others. Continuing, Dr. Young said that he was of opinion that True understood the physical nature of the act—that he knew he was killing some one, and that he knew his act was punishable, because he took certain steps to avoid detection, but that he did not appreciate the difference between right and wrong. Dr. Young, in reply to Mr. Justice McCardie, said that he quite agreed with Dr. East that the tests embodied in the McNaughten Rules were inadequate, but added that he could not offer an alternative definition.

Dr. Robert Percy Smith, the mental specialist, said that he had personally examined True on April 13, and once since, and that he had come to the conclusion that True was insane when he saw him. "I think," Dr. Smith resumed, "he has homicidal tendencies, and suffers from mental disease," and Dr. Smith referred to True's craving for morphia, to his exalted opinions, and to his fixed delusion concerning some other "Ronald True," who, the accused wrongly imagined, wished to kill him. Dr. Smith expressed the opinion that True understood the physical nature of the act, but was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong, and was incapable of controlling his actions, and added that he was prepared to certify him as insane.

Dr. Stoddart, another mental specialist, said that he thought True had homicidal tendencies, suffered from delusions and definite disease of the mind, and was insane, though he rejected the theory that the crime had been committed by an epileptic.

Mr. Justice McCardie, summing up, observed that: "Insanity from the medical point of view is one thing; insanity from the point of view of the criminal law is a different thing. . . . I myself feel that the Rules that were stated in 1843 are not clear and are not exhaustive," and went on to intimate that though the doctors said that True was certifiably insane, both then and when the crime was committed, the jury had to consider whether he was insane at the time of the commission of the offence within the meaning of the criminal law.

The Judge then put four questions to the jury:—

1. Did the prisoner destroy the life of Gertrude Yates?
2. Did he at the time suffer from mental disease?
3. Did he at the time suffer from such defect of reason, from disease of the mind, that he did not know the physical nature and quality of the act?
4. Did he know that what he was doing was morally wrong according to the standards of his fellow-citizens?

Mr. Justice McCardie then took a humane step, which marks the beginning of a new chapter in the history of criminal responsibility, by indicating that even if the accused knew the physical nature of the act, and that it was morally wrong and punishable by law, yet was by mental disease deprived of the power to *control* his actions, then, in his view, the verdict should be "Guilty, but Insane." Further, the Judge dropped a significant hint to the jury that if they found an extreme verdict against the prisoner it was open to the King, by the Home Secretary, to consider the case, and exert, if he thought right, that prerogative of mercy which belonged to him alone.

The jury, after an absence of an hour and a half, found True "Guilty," and sentence of death was accordingly passed (May 5, 1922).

On May 25, 1922, the Appeal of Ronald True was commenced at the Court of Criminal Appeal, before the Lord Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Greer and Mr. Justice Acton.

The Appeal was based, in brief, on the grounds that the verdict of the jury was against the weight of the evidence, and Sir Henry Curtis Bennett argued that True's obvious lack of control over his actions generally implied his inability to control himself at the moment of the murder, and in respect of the murder, and that as True's "particular madness was murder," he should not be held responsible for an act performed under the influence of that particular madness.

The Lord Chief Justice observed, in this connection, that if you endeavour to extend the application of the McNaughten Rules "you seem to get into a sea where there is no shore," and pointed out that the trial Judge "did not restrict himself to McNaughten's case, and yet, in spite of that greater latitude, the jury found that the accused was guilty of murder," and observed, later, that although a doctor might say that True was insane from the time when he committed the act, the jury might not be of the same opinion. The Lord Chief Justice also ventured the supposition that True may have been preparing a defence beforehand in describing the fictitious injuries to his mother, and stressed the fact that True had said, on one occasion: "One day I shall commit a murder. I shall get off. I shall try it out."

He also pointed out that the jury might have argued, with reference to the medical evidence: "We attach a great deal of weight to the opinion that these gentlemen express as to the state of mind of the prisoner to-day, but we attach less importance to their opinion as to the state of his mind before they saw him."

Dismissing the appeal, the Lord Chief Justice defended the

right of the jury to base their verdict on the whole facts of the case, and not on the medical evidence alone, and upheld the trial judge's summing-up; but hinted, as Mr. Justice McCardie had done, that certain powers were vested in the Home Secretary for him to exercise if he thought fit.

Shortly afterwards a committee of three mental specialists was appointed by the Home Secretary (Mr. Edward Shortt) to decide whether True was sane or insane, and, he being certified by them as insane, he was accordingly ordered by the Home Secretary to be detained in the Criminal Lunatic Asylum at Broadmoor.

A public outcry was raised, on two grounds: firstly, that the committee of specialists need not have been set up, and, secondly, that although the committee had certified True to be insane, the Home Secretary need not have acted on that certificate.

Mr. Shortt defended his action in the House of Commons on June 13, 1922. With regard to the first criticism levelled against him, he pointed out that under section 2 (subsection 4) of the Criminal Lunatics Act of 1884 he had no alternative than to institute such inquiry. And the words of this subsection are these:—

“In the case of a prisoner under sentence of death, if it appears to a Secretary of State, either by means of a certificate signed by two members of the Visiting Committee of the prison in which such prisoner is confined, *or by any other means*,¹ that there is reason to believe such prisoner to be insane, the Secretary of State *shall*¹ appoint two or more legally qualified medical practitioners, and the said medical practitioners shall forthwith examine such prisoner and inquire as to his insanity; and they, or the majority of them, may certify in writing that he is insane.”

¹ The italics are mine.—J. C. G.

Mr. Shortt pointed out that he had "reason to believe such prisoner to be insane" on six grounds:—

1. The reports of the two prison doctors.
2. The evidence of the two prison doctors at the original trial.
3. The evidence of the two mental specialists at the original trial.
4. The inability of the prosecution to obtain rebutting medical evidence.
5. The fact that the trial judge "drew my special attention to the medical evidence as affording matter for my further consideration."
6. The words in a similar vein used by the Lord Chief Justice at the close of the appeal.

"If," declared Mr. Shortt, "in those circumstances, I had neglected to put the provisions of the statute into operation by directing a medical inquiry, I should have been guilty of a flagrant breach of public duty, and when challenged, as undoubtedly I should have been challenged, I should have had no defence."

Against the criticism that, in spite of the certificate of True's insanity, he (Mr. Shortt) need not have acted upon it, he quoted from the writings of six eminent jurists to the effect that it is an acknowledged principle of English law that an insane man shall not go to execution, and declared that "when they (the committee of specialists) reported to me that True was insane, and certified him as such, by the law of the land I was bound to reprieve him."

And a malicious suggestion that he had been swayed toward clemency by representations from persons of influence, Mr. Shortt completely demolished by a categorical denial of any such thing, affirming that, apart from the representations of

the trial judge and other authorized and proper persons, in accordance with their respective duties, he had had "no representation of any sort or description from any living soul about this case."

In considering the bearing of the McNaughten Rules upon the True case, we must contemplate only the facts.

And what are the facts? Had True a motive—the acid test in any criminal trial? Did the circumstances of the crime suggest deliberation and coolness? Did True's eccentricities (and they were many) explain away this particular crime?

I will take the last point first. True had no moral sense. This is evidenced by the forgery of the morphia prescription at Portsmouth, by his proposal to inaugurate the Murderers' Club and the Duds' Club, by his remark, in Brixton Prison, concerning Jacoby, and by his cynical tomfoolery at the inquest on Yates, when he fiddled with the monocle and received the coroner's verdict with a grin.

He was a pathological liar, for no other explanation covers his tall stories about his fictitious heroics. He was a homicidal maniac who was perpetually harping on the topic of murder, and carried a loaded revolver charged with bullets barbarously treated so as to inflict additional agony.

He was a morphomaniac of suicidal tendencies, whose eccentricity had furnished a subject for jocular comment not only among the chemist's assistants, but even among West African natives.

He was a delusionist under the erroneous impression that some man (*not* Yates) intended to kill him; and the episodes of the toys on his bath-chair, the grotesque pair of pilot's wings, and the extravagant motor trips here, there and everywhere complete the picture of insanity drawn at the trial.

So much for True's general mentality, as evidenced by his behaviour and record. I will return to this point later.

Secondly, had he a motive?

Obviously. His prodigal mode of life had drained his funds,

and he had raised money by borrowing, pawning and by converting a cheque for seven pounds to his own use. He had obtained free board and lodging by swindling two hotels. He had paid frequent visits to the prostitute's flat prior to the date of the murder, apparently knew that she possessed valuables, and he coveted those valuables. Two facts indicate that his crime was premeditated—his lie alleging that his mother had been savagely assaulted (which, as the Lord Chief Justice conjectured, may have been the prelude to his trying the effect of a plea of insanity when the time arrived), and his warning to Mr. Sach to "look out for the papers on Monday morning"; and that he knew the difference between moral right and wrong is indicated by his remark to Mrs. Wilson: "One day I shall commit a murder. I shall get off. I shall try it out." Further, that he "knew he was committing a punishable offence" was the opinion of Dr. East at the trial, while both Dr. Young and Dr. Smith agreed that he understood the physical nature of his act.

Thirdly, did the circumstances of the crime suggest deliberation and coolness?

They did. Though he went to the flat armed he did not shoot Yates, but strangled her, obviously because he realized that the noise of the shot would have aroused the neighbours. He had the cunning to rig the two pillows to represent the corpse, which he remembered to hide in the bathroom. He endeavoured to gain time in which to escape by instructing Emily Steel not to enter Yates' bedroom, as Yates was "asleep," and Steel swore that on his leaving the flat just after the murder (for the tea of which both True and his victim had partaken was not yet cold), True was "quite calm and collected." He sought to prove an *alibi* by informing Mazzola that he had stayed "only twenty minutes" at the flat on the previous evening, adding to his dust-throwing tactics his remark to the New Coventry Street outfitter that his blood-stains were the outcome of a (fictitious) air crash.

To return to my first point: True was undoubtedly abnormal before, during and after the crime. The sole question at issue was whether he was "responsible" according to the application of the McNaughten Rules.

The only possible loophole for him, under the McNaughten Rules was that if, at the moment of the crime, he was not able, owing to insanity, to distinguish between moral right and moral wrong, or to know the nature and quality of his act, he would be held irresponsible, but, as we have just noticed, both True's own statements before the crime, his tactics during and after it, and the evidence of the doctors at the trial show, in their assembled conclusiveness, that, insane though he was, he was responsible in the eyes of the law for the crime for which he was tried, since his particular abnormalities did not fall within the compass of Rules 2 and 3.

Even his delusions bore no reference to a grudge against or borne towards him by Yates. Had the defence been able to prove that he was under a delusion that Yates intended to kill him, and that he had killed her in "self-defence," he would unquestionably have been found "Guilty, but Insane," but if he harboured the delusion that Yates was merely persecuting him, and he had killed her as the outcome of that delusion, he would have been regarded as "responsible" under Rule 4, and since there is no evidence of the slightest friction between him and Yates, the very conjecture that any of his delusions may have referred to Yates is demolished.

Rule 1 would have afforded True no shelter, since the motive of his crime was not revenge, and, in any case, he knew full well that it was illegal, as the evidence already summarized proves. Rule 5 does not apply to this case, and even Mr. Justice McCardie's very liberal extension of the rules to include controllability could avail True nothing, for the deliberation, the astuteness and the really remarkable display of presence of mind which True gave before, at, immediately after, and in connection with the crime definitely explodes the hy-

pothesis that he was not able to exercise what we loosely term "self-control."

True, then, though insane, was legally responsible for the murder of Gertrude Yates, but since he was insane he could not legally be executed, for the very good reasons given above by the Home Secretary at the time of the reprieve.

In a nutshell, True was not a criminal lunatic. He was a lunatic criminal.

CHAPTER XIV

FACING FACTS

WHEN Faraday first invented his magneto, a fussy dowager asked him: "What is the use of it?" To this, Faraday replied: "Of what use, madam, is a new-born infant?"

And in this chapter, in which I hope to discuss psycho-analysis, and the theory of dream-interpretation on which it is largely based, I hope to show you the immense possibilities of this new-born baby, postponing the question of its application to criminals of doubtful normality until my next chapter.

Writing of the nature of the dreams of convicts, as related by themselves to Dr. Santo de Sanctis, the Italian alienist, Dr. Havelock Ellis says: "De Sanctis investigated the contents of the dreams with especial reference to their emotional or unemotional character. The former class dealt with quarrels, falls from a height, persecutions, fearful visions, often of mystical character, and were frequently concerned with the sexual sphere, while the latter class merely repeated the unimportant events of the day, or significant scenes from past life."¹

The observations of De Sanctis, valuable though they were at the time—many years ago—have of late been greatly improved upon, and, thanks to the unselfish labours of Freud and his adherents, the psychic significance of dreams has acquired an immense importance, and has given birth to the system of mind-probing which is now termed psycho-analysis.

In Chapter IV I mentioned that the Freudian Theory was an old doctrine newly presented. And Dr. Bernard Hollander tells us that "modern psycho-analysts were anticipated by Hippocrates, who thought some dreams belong to a special class that can only be understood by the interpreters who have

¹ Havelock Ellis, *The Criminal*.

a science of their own. In the dream state the soul acts freely; it is no longer disturbed by sensations, for the body sleeps. The soul then produces impressions instead of receiving them. Underlying these reflections seems to be the idea that the soul discovers in sleep what in the waking state goes on unnoticed. This amounts almost to the view of the modern Freudian school that a latent consciousness comes to the surface in dreams.”²

In my attempt to sketch the mental processes which occur in your dream-states, and to elucidate the use which is made of the knowledge of those processes, and the keys which they furnish to the riddles of your thoughts and conduct, I propose to take you to the fountain head—Freud himself—and to base my cursory review upon Miss Barbara Low’s most illuminating book: *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis*.

Says Freud: “The interpretation of dreams is the *Via Regia* to the knowledge of the Unconscious in mental life.” And by this he means to affirm that the investigation of your dream happenings constitutes the royal road linking your Unconscious with your Conscious, and along that road a skilled psycho-analyst can travel, in either direction, whenever it is in your interests that he should do so.

Your Unconscious manifests itself in other ways besides through the medium of dreams. This we noticed when we discussed hysteria, obsessions, phantasy and split personality in Chapter VI, all of which phenomena, we found, were the indices of psychic conflict which, again, we found ourselves forced to recognize as a very general cause of both criminality and insanity.

But since, fortunately, we are not all insane (I use the term in the popular sense), the psycho-analyst is able to peer into your Unconscious only when it does definitely manifest itself. I noted, in Chapter XII, that every man is insane for a definite period every day—when he is asleep. For in sleep the Cen-

² Bernard Hollander, *In Search of the Soul*, vol. I.

sorship between your Unconscious and your Conscious is removed, and your Unconscious, freed from control, runs amuck in your "dream mind" without let or hindrance.

Your Censorship, then, is relaxed. But since the unrestricted incursion of the contents of your Unconscious into your Conscious would be most alarming to you when you recollected them on waking, one of two fates befalls every dream when you do awake. Either you "forget" it, i.e., your Censor represses it into your Unconscious, or you recollect it only in the grotesque and pantomimic form which you relate to your family at the breakfast table next morning.

Every dream, then, represents the gratification of primitive unfulfilled wishes which your Censor has inhibited from traveling from your Unconscious into your Conscious, and it differs from day-dreaming or phantasy not in kind but in degree, in that your Censorship which in phantasy is less relaxed, owing to the partial Censorship of your mind when awake, is in your dream life wholly removed, and the free play of the urges of your Unconscious is the outcome.

In phantasy, too, there is intellectual activity which is absent from your dream life. In phantasy the subject deliberately allows his mind to construct for itself congenial situations in which he plays a pleasant part, but in dream-making, Freud points out, there is no intellectual activity whatever. Miss Low illustrates the intellectual distinction between dream and phantasy by observing that "the day-dreamer may with ease picture himself as Napoleon Bonaparte, world emperor, but not as a wild animal, an aeroplane or a Greek temple—situations common and normal to a dream proper."

In your dreams the Pleasure Principle, with its urge to achieve some egocentric desire, laughs at the Reality Principle, which, in turn, has been put out of action by the removal of the Censorship.

When we have grasped a rough working knowledge of the

mechanism of a dream—when we have seen what it is made of, and how its constituent parts work together in correlated association, like the works of a watch—we shall be able to comprehend the value of psycho-analysis.

Two groups of psychic processes are involved in dream activity: the Latent Content and the Manifest Content. The Latent Content of a dream signifies the actual dream itself before sublimation by the Censor. The Latent Content is the naked truth. The Manifest Content is your dream as it appears to and is narrated by you on waking. The Censorship has sublimated and masked it, and the result is the hotch-potch of fantastic allegories at which you smile next morning.

The process by which the revolting constituents of your Latent Content become metamorphosed into those of your Manifest Content is known as Symbolism. Every absurdity which you remember and relate on waking is the definite symbol of a definite idea, person or thing in your Latent Content. I do not propose to dwell in detail upon this point, for several reasons, one of which is that the ingredients of your Latent Content are generally of a phallic or pornographic character.

Should you, however, seek more detailed enlightenment, I would refer you to Chapter VI of Freud's book, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (translated by A. A. Brill), or to Chapter VIII of Dr. Ernest Jones' work, *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, where Dr. Jones points out that "the field of sexual symbolism is an astoundingly rich and varied one, and the vast majority of all symbols belong to this category."

Miss Low remarks that one of the greatest obstacles to a psycho-analyst who is endeavouring to analyze a patient is that in addition to recognizing and interpreting the more frequent symbols, symbols which belong to mankind and not to the individual man, he finds that the patient, influenced by clusters of his own recollections may, as Freud phrases it, "create for himself the right to use anything whatever as a

sexual symbol, though it is not ordinarily used in that way," and Miss Low goes on to illustrate this difficulty by reference to a dream experienced by one of her own patients.

There are three main dream-processes—Condensation, Displacement and Dramatization.

Condensation is the process by which various elements in your Latent Content are welded together in your Manifest Content, with the result that your dream before emerging into Consciousness is summarized or compressed to, say, a hundredth of its original size and significance. As Miss Low observes: ". . . One figure in a dream may be built up by fusion of the traits of various persons—proportions, face, hair, colouring, voice, dress, each of these may belong to different personalities, and be fused together to form a composite portrait in the dream." You may, for instance, dream of three persons, A, B and C, but on waking you may imagine that you have dreamed only of one—this one having the voice of A, the clothes of B, and the beard of C.

Condensation fulfils two functions. Firstly, the common attributes of several elements in your Latent Content can be conveniently transferred to your Manifest Content. Secondly, your Psychic Censor can be more completely evaded, since Condensation masks the real contents of your Unconscious.

Displacement, in brief, signifies the transference of significance from its proper place in your Latent Content to some trifling feature of your Manifest Content. You might, for instance, dream that a tiger was about to spring upon you and maul you, whereas your only recollection of the dream was that a kitten was about to jump on to your knee—the tiger being "displaced" by the kitten—though you would experience as much terror through the kitten's part in the dream as you would from the tiger's rôle. Displacement represents the dissociation of ideas.

Dramatization, stripped of its side-issues, resolves itself into this: When you dream you visualize all that is happening in

your dream, as though you were in a theatre witnessing a drama being acted upon the stage. This process Freud has christened Regression, and, observes Miss Low, it is "characteristic of dreams which tend to assimilate in form to infantile psychic activity of a visual type." By means of visual symbols, Dramatization turns into presentable form the offensive elements in your Latent Content, or Unconscious, and correlates them, and, like Displacement, constitutes a means of Censorship evasion.

Of dream-formation in general, it may be said that "there is in the dream-making nothing but transformation of previously formed mental processes. Dream-making proceeds by methods quite foreign to our waking mental life; it ignores obvious contradictions, makes use of highly strained analogies, and brings together widely different ideas by means of the most superficial associations."³

The relationship, then, between a dream and your conscious psychic life may be indicated thus: In, and through, your dream, your repressed wishes are revealed, and as these wishes or impulses supply the motive power for your conscious actions, the processes employed in psycho-analysis unlock and reveal these wishes and motives, and disclose the source of your whole behaviour, and not only yours, but also that of all normal, semi-normal, abnormal and criminal persons.

What, then, is the bearing of psycho-analysis upon these various states of mind, with their processes and symptoms?

I have read most of the writings of Freud, and of several of his followers, without meeting with a more lucid definition of the aim of psycho-analysis than this of Miss Low: "Its purpose is to set free the Unconscious with a view to the discovery and comprehension of the patient's buried complexes." This process is not infrequently termed Psychic Catharsis, which signifies purging your Unconscious of its repressed complexes.

In Chapter VI I indicated the significance of energy-wast-

³ Ernest Jones, *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*.

ing psychic conflict in the cases of both normal and abnormal persons, and endeavoured to disclose its presence and activity in the minds of the borderland cases which I discussed in Chapter VIII. It is to the resolving of these conflicts that psycho-analysis is directed, to the end that the subject, or patient, may be helped to shake off the incubus of conflict, and acquire a new orientation in life and towards life.

The first and the most essential desideratum for a successful analysis is that the patient and the analyst should share each other's confidence. In psycho-analysis a most intimate relationship exists between the two—far more intimate than the relationships of ordinary friendship, or of priest and penitent. The analyst's task is to smash a way through all the conscious and unconscious resistances of his patient, and literally lay bare his soul.

It will be obvious that unless the patient is fully prepared to play the part assigned to him in this task of exploration, the analyst's time is being utterly wasted. Consequently, the patient must be made to feel that his analyst is one in whose sympathy and integrity he can place the fullest confidence.

It is disastrous for the patient to enter upon the analysis in a spirit of levity, or with the preconceived idea that he "knows all about it," and that if the analyst will put his specialized knowledge into his waste paper basket, listen to the patient's own account of his troubles, prescribe some magic remedy, draw his fee and withdraw his presence, that will be the end of the matter.

When a patient talks in this strain, the analyst at once knows that such an attitude is induced by the activity of those very complexes and resistances in the Unconscious whose existence the patient denies, and which the analyst must first of all demolish. As Freud himself says: "If the knowing about his unconscious thoughts were as important for the patient as those who are inexperienced in psycho-analysis believe, then for a surety it should be sufficient for the patient to listen to

lectures or read books. These measures, however, have just as much influence on the nervous sufferings as the distribution of menu cards in time of famine would have upon hunger."

When the patient, moreover, protests that he comprehends the psychic situation, and denies the need of further analysis, he is fighting against further psycho-analysis, and erecting (often unconsciously) yet another barrier across the road to his soul for the analyst to penetrate.

The three leading instruments in psycho-analysis are Dream Interpretation, Free Association and Transference.

In Dream Interpretation the patient recounts without interruption his latest dream, the analyst maintaining a passive and sympathetic attitude, and carefully noting obvious symbols, apparent resistances, emotional reactions, significant gestures, slips of the tongue and other clues provided by the operation of the patient's Unconscious.

The patient's narrative concluded, the analyst points out obvious (to him) connections between one part of the dream and another, or others, as evidenced by his own understanding of the part played by Symbolization, Condensation, Displacement and Dramatization. This generally draws further remarks from the patient, whose "explanations" of persons and events in the dream will furnish hints of other complexes inducing emotional reactions, which will assist the analyst in his interpretation of the dream.

In Free Association, the patient relaxes physically and (so far as he can) mentally. Reclining or sitting at ease, he utters all his thoughts, vagrant impressions and mental visualizings. These he refrains, so far as is possible, from treating intellectually. That is to say, he suspends criticism, comparison and judgment, and makes his mind nothing more than a vessel for the reception and transmission of the impressions and emotions constituting his stream of thought.

This mass of material the analyst scrutinizes in the light of his knowledge, and with the help of his technique, and if

the sifting process is conscientiously performed, thoughts that are apparently unrelated will be assigned their due significance and linked up with one another where their psychic kinship is apparent.

It is in Free Association that the patient's resistances are so stubborn. For one thing, he unknowingly hugs his neurosis, which is often his only outlet for the gratification of the urges in his Unconscious. His resistance may assume an unlimited number of forms. He may be unable to remember his dreams. He may protest that Free Association will, in his case, be futile as he has "nothing to relate." He may expostulate, criticize and express petulant impatience or he may present all his ideas with a running commentary embodying his own views of their significance or lack of it. The analyst's task is correspondingly complicated, and the analysis correspondingly prolonged.

Freud himself defines Transference in the following terms: "A whole series of earlier experiences are revived, not as past ones but in the form of a current relation to the person of the physician." . . . "Every fragment of his emotive life which can no longer be called back to memory is accordingly lived over by the patient in his relations with the physician."

Freudians maintain that the Transference is an essential feature of every successful analysis, that no effective analysis could be undertaken without it, nor could any psycho-therapy be accomplished without the accompaniment of Transference. On the other hand, as Freud points out, "the psycho-analytic treatment does not create the Transference, but simply uncovers it, as it does other hidden mental states."

When you consider the emotional and intimate nature of the Transference, as it occurs between patient and analyst, it will strike you that a situation arises which calls for consummate diplomacy on the part of the latter, for he is just as likely to be the object of the patient's passionate love as of his intense hate. In fact, he is bound to experience either the one or the other, or a blend of both. Be that as it may, the responsibility

resting on the analyst is a very heavy one, for in his hand lies the power of directing the patient's psychic future.

On the other hand, the analyst is not, as is sometimes erroneously supposed, a hypnotist, a teacher, a father confessor or a fortune teller. It is not his place to prescribe a moral or ethical code, to impose his own philosophy of life or to seek to acquire domination over the patient in any way whatsoever. He seeks only to lend a comrade's hand to the patient, to help him to rediscover himself and to acquire a new orientation towards life, no matter how greatly such orientation may diverge from the analyst's own ideals. Dr. Ernest Jones definitely states that "if the physician goes beyond this aim, and, assuming the position of a moralist, teacher or guide, proffers a solution of the difficulty based on his own judgment and necessarily influenced by subjective factors, he thereby oversteps the limits of psycho-analysis, mistakes its mode of operation and stultifies its purpose."

And at this point I conclude my cursory survey of Freud's system and its application in practice.

There are, of course, opponents of psycho-analysis. Those who object to Freud's theory naturally take exception to his system of psycho-therapy as well. This they do on four main grounds.

Firstly, they deplore the prominence which the psychoanalysts give to the idea of sex and its direct and indirect operation in psychic life. In this connection I have only one observation to add to the explanations which I offered in Chapter VI. Freud, in the face of bigotry, hostility and cheap calumny, patiently set to work to unearth the foundations of our psychic life, and, consequently, of our behaviour. These foundations he discovered to be sex, and, be it said to his everlasting credit, he had the courage of his convictions, and publicly announced those convictions to a humdrum world. Had he discovered that the foundation of our conduct was, say, charity (which it is not!), he would have published the result

of those labours with equal completeness and with equal candour, and would have been invited to bask in the adulation of the smug, the self-complacent and the obscurants. In plain English, Freud has told us some home truths about ourselves, and the sight of ourselves as we are, and not as we thought we were or hoped we were, has wounded our vanity. We are like the ugly woman who flung her mirror upon the floor and stamped upon it because it told her the truth!

The second objection is that "amateur dabblers" in psycho-analysis may do harm. They may; they will; and they do. But none recognizes this more fully than the Freudians themselves, and none is more determined to restrict the practice of psycho-therapy to those who are qualified by knowledge, skill and practical instruction, to undertake this vitally important but extremely thankless task. Freud insists, in addition, that every practitioner of his system shall himself, or herself, submit to a thorough analysis as an essential condition of recognition.

The third objection is that many cases are unsuitable for treatment by psycho-analysis. It may help to reassure the apprehensive by observing that in such cases none are quicker to recognize such unsuitability than qualified psycho-analysts, and none are more anxious (if only for their own sakes) to discontinue the treatment of persons on whom their skill and patience is obviously being wasted.

The fourth objection is that the unearthing of a buried complex may induce the patient to govern his actions by it, and to use it as a justifying shield for all his future deeds and misdeeds. But psycho-analysis does not cease with the removal of the irritant complex or complexes. It is the most important part of the analyst's treatment to assist the patient to look life in the face, and to acquire a fresh and a fuller orientation towards the world and the people in it. Further, whether the patient was or was not swayed by the offending complex when it lay uncontrolled in his Unconscious, he is

certainly not likely to allow it such dangerous licence after it has been levered up into his Conscious. The accumulated evidence of the results of innumerable successful cases completely disproves such an assertion, which is on a level with the fatuity that a patient might suffer from appendicitis after the removal of his appendix.

Psycho-analysis is being practised, with wonderful results, in almost every part of the civilized world. It numbers among its practitioners mental and other specialists of international repute, unsullied integrity and wide experience. Its truths are being adopted and practised among an ever-growing body of medical men, and its principles are appealing with the irresistible impetus of a great cause. It has penetrated the strongholds of orthodox psychology and sociology, and has been adopted, in some of its applications, by the War Office and the Ministry of Pensions in the cure of ex-soldiers suffering from the effects of "shell shock" and other war neuroses, while the study of the Unconscious now occupies a place in the prescribed syllabus of study for the degree of B.A. at the University of London where candidates seek Honours in Psychology.

It has made its mark in every sphere of social, political and intellectual activity, including literature and the drama. Our psychologists are becoming romantic, and our romanticists are becoming psychologists. Already the psycho-analyst has made his appearance in the novel which, when all is said and done, is the richest available treasure house of psychological enlightenment. As Arnold Bennett tells us, "The novelist is he who, having seen life, and being so excited by it that he absolutely must transmit the vision to others, chooses narrative fiction for the relief of his feelings." And from a novel of merit you can learn more practical psychology in one day than you can from the text-books in one year.

We find the shell-shocked officer in Miss Rebecca West's *The Return of the Soldier* miraculously cured by the chubby-faced analyst, and a lapse in courage lucidly explained by psy-

cho-analysis in Miss May Sinclair's *The Romantic*. H. G. Wells introduces us to Dr. Martineau, another analyst, in *The Secret Places of the Heart*, and Gilbert Frankau, in his *Peter Jackson, Cigar Merchant*, describes the cure of Peter, an agoraphobic, by Dr. Heron Baynet; while as "counsel for the prosecution" we have Miss Rose Macaulay good-humouredly attacking Freud in her brilliant satire, *Dangerous Ages*.

And psycho-analysis has now invaded the stage. Several plays have been produced on the Continent, while in *Beltane Night*, by Miss Vera Beringer, we encounter a modern descendant of Lady Macbeth who repeats the crime of her ancestress, and the dialogue of the play embodies a discussion of the pros and cons of psycho-analysis, with the psycho-analyst's whimsical observation that "Shakespeare invented Lady Macbeth, but he did not have to cure her!"

Psycho-analysis has come to stay, to grow and to heal. In the meantime, the libellers of Freud would do well to meditate upon the difference between their own attitude and that of Voltaire, who concluded an attack upon his sworn foe Helvetius by saying: "I wholly disapprove of what you say, but will defend to the death your right to say it!"

CHAPTER XV

WHITHER?

A CENTURY ago the lunatic was regarded as a criminal. Less than a century hence the criminal will be regarded as a lunatic. And while it is difficult, if not rash, to forecast the adoption of any definite programme of a detailed character, it is not difficult to interpret obvious tendencies of to-day, and to estimate their development by to-morrow.

Science, including medico-psychological science, is rapidly revolutionizing our conceptions of our bodies and our minds alike, and within our lifetime developments will have been achieved upon which our grandparents would have poured scorn and ridicule.

In the course of my preceding chapters I have endeavoured to show the part played by Conflict in the psychic life of us all. The sane man experiences it. The lunatic experiences it. The borderland case experiences it. The revolutionary and other social misfits experience it. The causes of this insistent intrapsychic conflict are manifold. Sometimes it represents the collision between the Unconscious and the Conscious. It may constitute the index to the clash between heredity and environment. It may represent the friction between one complex and another. And it may be the outcome of stress induced by any one of the numerous other causes of mental duress to which I drew your attention at the appropriate points, and with which I will not weary you by a recapitulation. You cannot, in any case, escape from Conflict, and the mental strain which it inevitably induces.

This being the case, one thing, at any rate, is certain. Judges, magistrates and the public alike will, ere long, begin

to appreciate that it is possible to pay far too much attention to the particular crime with which a particular individual is being charged; and they will accustom themselves to looking beneath the surface to see whether or not some distressing experience, perhaps half a century old, is not at the bottom of the whole trouble.

In the not very distant future, psycho-analysis will accordingly take its proper place in the investigation of criminal abnormality. Dr. André Tridon, of New York, records that "from the observations gathered by a few psychiatrists on the mental condition of the inmates of reformatories, workhouses, penitentiaries and other penal institutions, one derives the impression that crime is a symptom of mental disease, whether the individual who commits the crime is a so-called habitual criminal or one who yielded once to some irresistible prompting. . . . Crime may be considered as an abnormal form of compensation for repressed Ego promptings."¹

And conduct being the outcome of mental life, it is certain that whenever an offender who is accused of a crime is found to have committed the same crime in the same way on previous occasions, that offender is far more likely than not probably being impelled, willy-nilly, to do what he does in the way in which he does it by the motive force of a repressed complex. And in such cases treatment, or investigation, by psycho-analysis is most hopeful.

Is psycho-analysis a practical proposition?

It is. Dr. M. Hamblin Smith, Medical Officer of Birmingham Prison, writing in the *Howard Journal* of October, 1921, on the employment of psycho-analysis in the examination of offenders, says: "This great subject, as yet only in its infancy, will play an immense part in the mental examination of the future." Later on, he writes: "In all cases which are suitable I apply a scheme of mental tests which I have selected after prolonged experimentation. . . . Careful mental examination

¹ André Tridon, *Psycho-Analysis: Its History, Theory and Practice*.

sometimes gives a clue to buried difficulties, the finding and relief of which may alter the whole of the subject's life."

We are told that prevention is better than cure. But the application of psycho-analysis both prevents crime and cures it. By uprooting repressed complexes, it cures the offender's impulse to offend, and, *a fortiori*, prevents him from offending again. It is an axiom among detectives that their work is enormously helped by the fact that the habitual criminal practically always confines himself to one form of delinquency. A safebreaker is a safebreaker, and nothing else. He would no more think of combining, as sides lines, forgery or blackmail with his own speciality than he would contemplate changing the colour of his skin. This seems to indicate that there is something which drives him towards safebreaking, and that something is, in Freudian terminology, a repressed complex. When this is unearthed and destroyed it must, if the word Logic is to be anything more than a word, signify that his leaning towards safebreaking is destroyed with it. Whether psycho-analysis is likely to be of general use in investigating such crimes as safebreaking, which demands coolness and thought, it is too early in the day to conjecture; but it seems to a growing number of us that it would certainly be invaluable in assisting analysts and magistrates alike in getting to the root of crimes of passion, violence, arson and kleptomania.

Dr. Hamblin Smith, indeed, relates a case in which he practised psycho-analysis with the happiest results. A young girl was sent to him, on remand, charged with attempted suicide. She was quite unable to produce any motive for her act, and vigorously denied that there was any reason for her attempt. As a result of his analysis, Dr. Smith found that she had been anxious to marry a certain man, but that the marriage had been opposed by her father. The result was intrapsychic conflict, and the girl, hovering in distressing uncertainty between her feelings towards her suitor and her position with regard to her father, had been impelled to attempt suicide as the only ap-

parent way out of her dilemma. As a result of Dr. Smith's efforts, the girl was mentally eased, saved from the stigma of prison or the asylum, and, the suitor's antecedents having been investigated, the father's approval of the marriage was secured, and the girl's future rendered tranquil. Truth is stranger than fiction.²

It may be, as it has been, objected that were psycho-analysis officially adopted and inaugurated in our prisons and in connection with police court work, it would be grossly unjust to an accused person remanded for mental observations who has been analyzed, and a revolting complex revealed and demolished, were the court, on his reappearance, informed by the analyst of the nature of his complex. The solution is obvious. Magistrates must take it for granted that the analyst is a man of honour, and must believe his word when he says that he has unearthed a complex which actuated the crime in question, and that the catharsis which the patient has undergone at his hands will far more likely than not free him from the itch to repeat his offence at some future time. The medical profession is the most honourable of all. A man will deposit secrets with his doctor which he would on no account entrust to his parson or his solicitor, and there is no reason whatever to imagine that those doctors who will devote themselves exclusively to psycho-analysis will do or say anything which is not in accord with the high traditions of their profession, and, at the same time, not loyal to the interests both of the community and of those whom they are required to analyze.

In years to come we shall witness a systematization of criminological study on the scientific lines which have been followed for many years in Austria. Sir Wilmot Herrington, at one time Vice-Chancellor of the University of London, writing to the *Lancet*, said: ". . . Some one or more of the bodies who grant a Diploma in Public Health might allow criminology as one of the subjects in its Course. I confess that I am think-

² Vide M. Hamblin Smith, *The Psychology of the Criminal*.

ing of Birmingham, where unusual facilities exist, and teachers who have made it a special study could be found."

Since and partly because of the publication of the letter, the Senate of the University of Birmingham have been contemplating the possibility of inaugurating a post-graduate course in Medicine as it affects penology, the course being planned as an avenue to a qualifying examination for a Diploma, and there is reason to believe that another two of our more progressive universities are about to follow suit. It is as significant as it is gratifying to find that Dr. Hamblin Smith is the Lecturer on Criminology at the University of Birmingham.

The next decade will also witness a revolution in prison administration. Thanks to the enterprise of Mr. Winston Churchill, when Home Secretary, an effort has already been made to brighten the lives of prisoners by means of concerts, though these are lamentably infrequent except, perhaps, at Camp Hill; to qualify for admission to which prison the convict must be a habitual criminal. In February, 1923, a wireless concert was given at Leicester gaol to two hundred selected prisoners, and there is reason to believe (the British Broadcasting Company having expressed their readiness to co-operate) that in the near future such concerts will be a regular feature of prison life.

Up to now it has been disappointing to find that, while none of us grudges the prisoners such relaxation, the Local Prisons have been far more generously catered for than the inmates of the great convict prisons in this and other respects, and it must be remembered that the prisoners at our convict prisons are in greater need of some such relaxation, since they are doomed to be where they are for a number of years, in some cases for more years than some Local Prisoners are for months.

Other reforms are on the way.

Professor Kavannah, of Swansea University, assisted by some of his colleagues, has arranged vocational courses for the inmates of Swansea Prison, while courses in science and min-

ing have been planned for the benefit of the prisoners in Cardiff Prison, through the efforts of Captain Henry Davies, and lectures in hygiene are being organized by the People's League of Health, under the direction of Miss Olga Nethersole, with Home Office sanction, for the inmates of Borstal institutions and prisons throughout the country.

Such activities, though excellent in every way, should not be dependent upon the generosity of private individuals. They should be organized, as in the United States of America, under the direct auspices of the State, and should be paid for by the State.

In the near future the State will probably have adopted Dr. Hamblin Smith's suggestion, and have mapped the country out in areas, the chief prison in each of which will be purely a remand prison, and will include a resident psycho-analyst on its staff, in addition to the usual prison Medical Officer. The latter will examine all cases sent there for observation by courts acting on the advice of the divisional police surgeon. He will attend to all cases whose crimes have probably been committed as the outcome, or partial outcome, of physical illness or malnutrition, handing over to the analyst delinquents of doubtful mental stability and the alleged perpetrators of emotional crimes. Freud, in fact, is strongly opposed to psycho-analysis being undertaken by general practitioners.

Should it be found that such a plan is impracticable, on the ground that, in sparsely inhabited districts especially, the number of remands will be insufficient to keep a resident analyst fully occupied, the areas could be combined, or grouped, or enlarged, or a travelling analyst could be appointed to visit the remand prisons of several areas. This plan is, in fact, followed in the State of Illinois.

Here the question of expense arises.

When a Government department is urged to sanction some reform, the first question asked is: "What will all this cost?" And in prophesying the official adoption of some scheme on

the lines which I am outlining, I do so in the fullest confidence that it will be a saving—a saving of money, and, what is of far greater importance, a saving of human beings. Dr. Hamblin Smith undertook, in two years, the examination of three hundred and seventeen cases at Birmingham, twenty-four per cent. of which were eventually imprisoned, and seventy-six per cent. saved from prison. Here you have facts, facts which prove that through a psycho-analyst's efforts the taxpayers were saved the expense of keeping some two hundred persons in unproductive "employment" for a period of some months!

There will, of course, inevitably be cases where too short a sentence will render psycho-analysis impracticable, while an increased sentence for the purpose of facilitating analysis would do more harm than good, besides being unjust. Probably remand colonies on the cottage hospital plan will be set up, where remand cases deemed suitable for analysis will be able to do useful work (and be paid for doing it) amid healthy surroundings, while attending daily for analysis. Then our prisons, or their successors and substitutes, will cease to be "crime factories," and will become instead "crime hospitals."

At the same time, we must remember that results from psycho-analysis can be, and have been, achieved in a few days. An old woman of sixty was arrested on a charge of damaging property. Dr. Hamblin Smith, after only four days' analysis, discovered the existence, in the prisoner's Unconscious, of the memory of a forty-years-old sexual experience of a distressing nature. This complex, repressed in the interim, had induced her crime, and when she had been helped to recognize this, her whole outlook on life was changed. Moreover, the essentials of her case having been explained to the court, her case was dismissed.

In cases where the period of treatment required turned out to exceed the period spent in the remand colony, either the period of supervision in the colony could be extended for

the purpose of treatment, or some system of after-care could be devised, whereby the delinquent could periodically visit a prescribed hospital, or clinic, as an out-patient, or be analyzed at stated intervals in his own home. Extension of the period in the remand colony would, of course, be preferable, if only for the reason that it is unwise, if not dangerous, to change the analyst in the middle of treatment.

But what of the army of hopelessly incurable cases, such as imbeciles, dangerous maniacs and chronic epileptics of dangerous inclinations?

On June 29th, 1922, Walter Green, of Manchester, killed his imbecile son, on the ground that "he would be better dead." Green had fretted over the hopeless condition of his son for many months prior to his act, and, his mental poise obviously disturbed by his son's own state, he put him out of his misery. Green was found "Guilty but Insane," and was ordered by Mr. Justice Rigby Swift, who tried the case at Manchester Assizes, to be detained during His Majesty's pleasure.

Commenting on this case, the Judge observed that "in the interests of the State, it can never be left to the private individual to decide as to whether another shall die or not." But circumstances may arise in which it is desirable that the State itself should assume that responsibility. It has already assumed it by insisting on the literal application of the *lex talionis* to the cases of convicted murderers, whom it kills for killing another.

Let another Judge speak. At the conclusion of the trial of an epileptic at the Central Criminal Court, on October 13th, 1922, Mr. Justice Roche said: "In my judgment, the medical profession of this country would be performing a public service if they studied earnestly the feasibility of sterilizing both men and women with tendencies such as this man has. To allow them to produce is breeding from the worst of all stock, and propagating disease and crime." And, a month later, on November 21st, Dr. Preston King, addressing a meeting at

Bath, asked why the State should keep alive gibbering idiots and cases of general paralysis. "Surely, a lethal dose is the proper answer," continued Dr. King; while in his charge to the Grand Jury at Durham Assizes, on February 21, 1923, Mr. Justice Roche repeated the substance of his observations made at the Old Bailey.

In the more enlightened days to come, the painless destruction of criminal lunatics suffering from incurable diseases will be recognized and prescribed, while those whose afflictions do not prevent them from rendering useful service to the State will be compulsorily sterilized.

Another point now arises. On April 9, 1919, Lieut.-Colonel Cecil Norman Rutherford, R.A.M.C., was ordered to be detained during His Majesty's pleasure, he having been found "Guilty but Insane," when tried for the murder of Major Seton. On June 14, 1921, Mrs. Rutherford was granted a divorce from her husband, though this decree was rescinded by the Court of Appeal on November 30, 1921. Mrs. Rutherford thereupon took her case to the House of Lords, which, on November 3rd, 1922, dismissed the appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, on the ground that there had been no misconduct between Colonel Rutherford and the lady cited as the alleged partner in his alleged misconduct.

With this verdict, as the law stands, no one can quarrel, though the fact that Mrs. Rutherford, to quote from Lord Birkenhead's judgment, "should be tied for life to a dangerous, violent and homicidal lunatic" makes us wonder why there are still some people who oppose divorce reform. "We are bound to note," resumed Lord Birkenhead, who has since become President of the Divorce Law Reform Union, "that during many more years, unless death removes him or releases her, she must look forward to a loneliness from which she can escape only by a violation of the moral law. . . . It rests with Parliament, if and when it thinks proper, to end a state of things which, in a civilized community and in the name of

morality, imposes such an intolerable hardship upon innocent men and women."

Writing to *The Times*, on October 10, 1922, on the unnecessary hardships inflicted by the antiquated English divorce laws on the respective wives of the criminal lunatic, Lieut.-Colonel Rutherford, and the lunatic criminal, Ronald True, Lord Buckmaster said: "Within the last few months two women have been left eternally widowed, with their husbands fast immured in criminal lunatic asylums, and in this unnatural state they will remain while the shadow of the years lengthens, and life's day grows dim. . . . Our divorce laws have been condemned by the most competent authority as immoral and unjust."

Commenting on this last phrase in Lord Buckmaster's letter, *The Times*, in a leading article, said: "This is strong language, but it is that of a man who has been trained to logic and the calmness of reason which avoids rhetoric, and it makes the mind uneasy to contemplate the social consequences of such a system," and Sir George Lewis, the head of the firm of solicitors with the largest Divorce Court practice in this country, said, to a representative of *The Evening News*: "I strongly agree with all that Lord Buckmaster says."

There are in England and Wales alone approximately sixty thousand married lunatics at present under restraint in asylums, and as, according to Dr. Coupland, one of the Commissioners of the Board of Control, "about ninety per cent. of those detained in the asylums are the subjects of chronic, and probably incurable, forms of insanity," we may estimate that of these sixty thousand married inmates fifty-four thousand are where they are for the rest of their lives. In other words, there are fifty-four thousand spouses of incurable lunatics condemned to an enforced celibacy until the deaths of their lunatic partners.

To the apprehension that the possibility of being divorced on the ground of insanity might still further injure the mental health of the confined lunatics concerned, I can only reply

that the evidence of distinguished alienists before the Royal Commission of 1912 indicated that it would not affect them; and their views have been confirmed in practice by official opinions on the operation of a law of this nature in Prussia.

With the late Lord Gorell as chairman, the Royal Commission on Divorce sat for two years (1910-1912), and in 1912 the Majority Report was issued recommending, *inter alia*, that the following should constitute statutory grounds for divorce:—

1. Incurable insanity after five years' confinement.
2. Habitual drunkenness found incurable after three years from the first separation order.
3. Imprisonment under commuted death sentence.

The Majority Report also recommended that a Decree of Nullity should be obtainable, on petition, on, *inter alia*, the following grounds:—

1. Where the respondent was of unsound mind at the time of the marriage, or in a state of incipient mental unsoundness, which became definite within six months after marriage, of which the first party was then ignorant, provided that the suit was instituted within one year of the marriage, and that there had been no marital intercourse after the discovery of the defect.
2. Where the respondent is, at the time of the marriage, subject to epilepsy or to recurrent insanity, and such fact is concealed from the first party, who remains ignorant of the fact at the time of the marriage.

Though ten years have elapsed since the publication of the recommendations of the Majority Report, no progress has been made towards freeing persons from the bondage of marriage with persons with whom life is impossible. Every social

worker, every magistrate, every man or woman of the world knows full well that separation, without the freedom to remarry, where it does not lead to irregular "marriages," frequently results in promiscuity or prostitution. There are whole tracts of London where there are more mistresses than wives! The Majority Report of the Royal Commission itself said: "The present Divorce Law is the cause of much needless suffering and immorality," and "Separation is an unnatural and unsatisfactory remedy, leading to evil consequences."

Sir T. S. Clouston, the alienist, in his book, *The Hygiene of Mind*, said, concerning this vital question: "So far as Science has any say in the matter—and it has a large say, when all is said and done—the answer would be that as a man and a woman have only their lives to live once over, there can scarcely be any moral or religious consideration that should tie two human beings together indissolubly, when the effect is continuous unhappiness and absolute interference with the ends of life." And, giving evidence before the Royal Commission on Divorce, he said, in answer to the question: "What do you think should be done with the criminal lunatics?" "Divorce them all, every one of them; there are well over a thousand."

It is to be hoped—and many of us feel quite confident of the ultimate fulfilment of our hopes—that the steps towards a solution of the urgent problems of insanity, and its bearing upon crime, and, indeed, upon the numerous byways of everyday life which I have invited you to contemplate in these chapters, will have ceased to be conjectures before many more years have passed, and will have become transformed into accomplished facts.

What is needed more than anything else is knowledge, understanding, enlightenment, without which progress is impossible. Freud and his disciples, in the course of their crusade against error and obscurantism, have lit for us a lamp which will burn steadily for all time—a lamp which will cheer the faint, heal the sick, inspire the broken. When the fault-

findings of the petulant have been reasoned out of existence, nothing will stop, for nothing can stop, the application of his system of healing to those who, above all others, need the healing consolations which it brings, and which it is criminal folly to deny to them.

Humanity, a stricken, lacerated humanity, is pining for light on the dark places of the mind, to the end that the sadness, the poverty, the wrong, the wasted efforts and aimless lives that are such a blot on our country, and are expressed in the muttered resentment of helpless folk, may be lifted gently from the shoulders of all who, like the dying Goethe, cry for "light—more light!"

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
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