NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE Bethesda, Maryland u V* e Ao'" *' it CONVERSATIONS \ ON THE 1. 1 SCIENCE OF THE HUMAN MIND. ^f !&- CONVERSATIONS ON THE SCIENCE OF THE HUMAN MIND. BY EZRA STILES ELY, D. D. Pastor of the Third Presbyterian Church in the City of Philadelphia. PHILADELPHIA: PRINTED FOR THE AUTHORS SOLD BT A. FIW1ET, CORNER OF CHESNUT AND FOURTH STIIEETS. William Fry, Printer. 1819. Eastern District of Pennsylvania, to wit: ******** BE IT REMEMBERED, that on the nineteenth day of * Seal. * April, in the forty-third year of the Independence of the • * United States of America, A. D. 1819, Ezra Stiles Ely, D *D? of the said District, hath deposited in this office the title of a Book, the right whereof he claims as author, in the words following, to wit: " Conversations on the Science of the Human Mind. By Ezra Stiles Ely, D. D. Pastor of the Third Presbyterian Church in the city of Philadelphia." In conformity to the Act of the Congress of the United States, entitled, " An Act for the encouragement of Learning, by securing the Copies of Maps, Charts, and Books, to the Authors and Proprie- tors of such Copies, during the times therein mentioned."—And also to the Act, entitled, " an Act supplementary to an Act, entitled, " an Act for the encouragement of Learning, by securing the Copies of Maps, Charts, and Books, to the Authors and Proprietors of such Copies during the times therein mentioned," and extending the be- nefits thereof to the Arts of designing, engraving, and etching histo- rical and other Prints." D. CALDWELL, Clerk of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. PREFACE. The writer of the following pages has endea- voured to exhibit, in a familiar manner, the Ele- ments oe the Science of the Human Mind. The sources whence he has drawn his doctrines, are his own consciousness, memory, and reflection; and the writings of Locke, Hume, Price, Hart- ley, Lord Karnes, Reid, Stewart, Duncan, Pre- sident Edwards, Beattie, Watts, Condillac, and Cogan. What he deems true, and most important in all these celebrated authors, will be found in this compendium. He disclaims all metaphysics but those of common sense. He flatters himself, that these Conversations will prove beneficial to Students in Law, Medicine, and Divinity; and to the most intelligent young ladies of our country. No science is so intimately connected with all other systematic arrangements of knowledge as that of which he has here treated; and he cannot but hope, therefore, that many who have neither time nor patience to peruse many volumes, will do him the honour of thoroughly examining one. Philadelphia, January 1st, 1819. A2 4 '^ CONTENTS. CONVERSATION I. Introduction.—The chief Obstruction to the Advancement of |the Science of the Soul.—Its utility. Page 13 CONVERSATION II. The Human Soul defined.—Consciousness.—Judgment.—Axioms.— Substances.—Attributes.—Mind and Matter distinct things. £1 CONVERSATION III. Faculty defined.—Body.—Simple and Complex Operations.—Essen-v. tial and Incidental Attributes.—Ten Faculties of the Human Mind enumerated.—All the Faculties of Man, requisite to account for all his Actions. 32 CONVERSATION IV. Definitions.—Genus and Species.—The Faculty of Perception.—Five kinds of Perceptions.—Instrumentality of bodily Organs.—Conscious- ness. 39 CONVERSATION V. The Faculty of Understanding or Conception.—Different Operations of this Faculty.—Imagination.—Discernment. Comprehension.— Apprehension.—Intuiti<£v—Some general laws of Conception.— The Importance of this Tacul /. 51 viii Contents. CONVERSATION VI. The Faculty of Judging.—Objects of Judgment.—A Truth.—A False- hood—Classification of Judgments.—They are Constitutional or Acquired.—The former are consequent on Consciousness, Percep- tion, Conception, Memory or Conscience.—The latter res;ilt from Reflection, Reasoning, or Testimony.—Believing considered. Page 5t CONVERSATION VII. The Faculty of Memory.—Objects of Memory.—Local Memory.— Classification of the Operations of Memory.—Recollection.—Re- membrance.—Memory essential to some Conceptions.—Time.— Duration.—Futurity.—Identity.—Knowledge of our own continued Mental Identity.—Personal Identity. 76 CONVERSATION VIII. The Faculty of Reasoning.—Premises.—Conclusion.—A Syllogism.— Classification of Reasonings.—Demonstrative and Probable Reason- ings.—Metaphysical and Mathematical Reasonings.—Analogical, Analytic, and Synthetic Reasonings.—Reasonings a priori, a poste- riori, ad absurdum, and ad hominem. 89 CONVERSATION IX. The Faculty of Conscience.—Proof that all men have this Faculty.— Other names for the same thing.—Some general Observations and Laws concerning the Operations of Conscience— Operations of Con- science always occasion certain Feelings. 101 CONVERSATION X. he Faculty of Feeling.—Feelings distinguished from other Mental Operations.—One general Law of Feelings.—Classification of all Human Feelings.—Sensations considered.—Three Appetites.— Contents. ix Uses of the word Taste.—Emotions.—Description of the principal Affection* of Man.—A rule concerning inordinate Affection.—Re- gard. ' Page 108 CONVERSATION XI. Account of the Human Passions.—Lawful Passions.—Some general Laws of Feeling.—Sympathy, Commiseration, Compassion, defin- ed.—Relative Importance of the Intellectual and Sensitive parts of our Mental Nature. 125 CONVERSATION XII. — The Faculty of Volition, or the Will.—Some contemplated ^action the object of every Volition.—Desire and Preference different from Volition.—The Will a dependent Faculty.—Perception and Con- ception the only independent Faculties of the Mind.—Definition of Volition and Motive.—Inducement and Motive distinguished.— Several general Rules concerning Volition.—An Inference concern- ing the importance of regulating our Thoughts. 135 CONVERSATION XIII. The Faculty of Agency or Efficiency.—An Operation of this Faculty distinguished.—Proof of the Existence of this Faculty.—Objects of our Efficiency.—Some Operations of Man that are ordinarily per- formed without Volition, may be performed from Voluntary Exer- tion.—How the Mind exerts an Agency on the Body is unknown by us.—The Operations of our Efficiency on our different Mental Faculties considered.—On the Consciousness, Perception, Concep- tion, &c. *** CONVERSATION XIV. Consideration of several Attributes of the Soul which are not inhe- rent.—Of Liberty, Capacity, Power and Necessity.—Of Physical Liberty and Necessity.—Of Moral Liberty, Moral Certainty, and Metaphysical Necessities. lo1 x Contents. CONVERSATION XV. Disposition of Mind.—Inclination.—Habit.—Imitation.—Consideration of several Principles of Human Actions.—Principles of Substances, Sciences, Actions, and Moral Actions.—Sentiments.—Instinct.— Instinctive, Animal, and Mechanical Operations. Page 173 CONVERSATION XVI. Several Complex Operations of Man considered.—Attention, Obser- vation, Reflection, Inquiry, Investigation, Consideration, Contem- plation, Meditation, Comparison, Association, and Abstraction.— Compounding not a Mental Operation, unless it be a name given to several successive Conceptions. 186 CONVERSATION XVII. Improvement and Injury of the Original Faculties of the Mind.—They have their Infantile state—Exercise and Discipline the chief means of their Improvement.—Insanity, a state of mind resulting from some Injury.—Dreaming. 200 CONVERSATION XVIII. Eomparative Mental Science. 208 CONVERSATION XIX. Recapitulation of the Principal Doctrines taught in the preceding Conversations 218 t CONVERSATIONS. CONVERSATIONS ON THE SCIENCE OF THE HUMAN MIND. CONVERSATION I. Introduction.—The chief obstruction to the advancement of the Science of the Soul.—Its utility. Pupil. You have proposed, Sir, to conduct me through the thorny maze of Metaphysics; and I design to follow you, if not with equal steps, at least with equal ardour. Once, I confess, that I hated every thing that could be denominated metaphysics. Professor. You would make me promise too much. I have only proposed to teach you the ru- diments of the science of the human soul, which de- partment of knowledge is expressed, in a modern classification of universal science, by the term An- thropsychia; but which is rather indefinitely called "The Philosophy of the Human Mind," by all our ancient writers. This specific science is only one branch of metaphysics^ which treats of the nature, B 14 Principal Obstructions to relations, and operations of all substances and their attributes. But tell me, why do you speak of the thorny maze of metaphysics; and why did you hate the name of this extensive science? Pupil. Because I thought all metaphysical reason- ings unintelligible and useless; especially if they re- lated to the human soul. Until you constrained me to study the works of Dr. Reid and his successor, Professor Stewart, I was ready to despair of obtain- ing any distinct and satisfactory conceptions on this subject. Professor. Whence arose your principal difficul- ties in attempting to acquire a thorough acquaint- ance with the human soul? Pupil. I had not learned, that in mental science a man must primarily regard his own consciousness of what passes within himself, and look to it for the facts from which he is to reason; just as the natural philosopher looks to his perception of external ob- jects for all the phenomena, whence he is to derive those general observations, which are called the laws of nature. In the next place, the writers with whom I was conversant, did not appear to be mas- ters of their subject. Professor. And what is your chief obstruction now? Pupil. It is either the imperfection of language, or else the imperfect use which metaphysical writers have made of the terms which they possess;* and I am not able at present to determine which. * A specimen of the improper use of terms, and of metaphysical jargon, may be given from Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, vol. i. Mental Science. 15 Professor. It will be my business to convince you, by actual experiment, I hope, that were the same precision of language to be adopted in teaching that which is known of the human soul, as has prevailed in natural philosophy and mathematics, there might be made as great advances, and enjoyed as much certainty in Anthrcpsychia, as in the two last sciences. The same word has been used by the same writer in two or three different senses, inter- changeably; and two terms have been adopted to denote jn some instances, the same, and in others different objects. Nothing has contributed so much p. 29. " An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat and cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain, of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may be properly called impressions of reflection, because derived from it. These again are copied by the memory and imagination, and become ideas; which, perhaps, in their turn, give rise to other impressions and ideas. So that the impressions of reflection are only antecedent to their correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of sensation, and derived from them. The examination of our sensations belongs more to anatomists and natural philosophers than to moral; and .therefore shall not at present be entered upon." Any body who can disentangle this skein of terms will obtain more credit for his patience than for his intelligence; and were all meta- physics like those of Hume, we should advise mankind to waste no time upon them. In the language of common sense, an Impression can be made, strictly speaking, on nothing but material objects. Impres- sions ate made on our bodily organs of sense; but in the mind there are no impressions, unless by a figure of speech we call our percep- tions or conceptions, by that name. In some places, Mr. Hume speaks of perceptions when he writes the word " impressions;" and of the conception of our perceptions, when he talks of " ideas or copies of impressions." 16 Precision in Terms to produce your thorny maze as the want of defini- tions for important terms, and a strict adherence to them when given.* Even President Edwards in his " Enquiry into the Freedom of the Will," uses the word necessity to denote a physical necessity, and sometimes nothing more than the certain futurition of an event; in such a manner as to produce no lit- tle obscurity. Locke uses the words understanding" and ideas without much precision; for the first he * "The difference in the meaning affixed to words, by different wri- ters, is one of the greatest impediments to the discoveries of moral truths, and the most difficult to surmount. Complex terms being fre- quently composed of many parts, and each part intermixing its own signification, they are frequently exposed to different constructions; and in controversial subjects, if two authors annex different ideas to the same term, they are taking different courses, and will soon steer out of sight of each others argument. Dr. Reid has justly expatiated upon the necessity of accurate definitions, without his having always made them; and his pupil, Dr. Beattie, has very seldom regarded them. Even that great master of reason, Mr. Locke, who has written ln so satisfactory a manner on the errors occasioned by the abuse of words, has involved some of his ideas in great obscurity, through the want of due attention to their precise import. Perhaps no philosopher, ancient or modern, has taken greater liberties with language than Mr. Hume."—Cogan's Ethical Questions. " I know that there are not words enough in any language, to an- swer all the variety of ideas that enter into man's dfscourses and rea- sonings. But this hinders not that when any one uses any term he may have in his mind a determined idea, which he makes it the sign of, and to which he should keep it steadily annexed, during that present discourse. When he does not, or cannot do this, he in vain pretends to clear and distinct ideas: it is plain his are not so. Therefore, there can be expected nothing but obscurity and confusion, when terms are made use of, which have not such a precise determination."—Locke. " There is no greater impediment to the advancement of knowledge than the ambiguity of words. To this chiefly it is owing that we find sects and parties in most branches of science; and disputes, which are carried on from age to age, without being brought to an issue."—- Reid. absolutely Necessary. It calls a single faculty in some places, and in others it includes the whole human soul, with the exception of the will. By ideas he sometimes intends notions, conceptions^or opinions, and sometimes images of the objects of perception, which he supposes to be conveyed to the mind. Reid and Stewart also use several terms, such as faculty and power, both as synonymous and not synonymous; while they employ many other words, about the meaning of which mankind do not agree, without accurately describing the meaning which they attach to those symbols of thought. I am sensible, that the preci- sion of language which I have prescribed to myself in our conversations, will render my style formal and dry; but I flatter myself, that what is lost in ease and sprightliness of diction, will be amply compensated for by the certainty of the knowledge acquired. Pupil. Before you proceed to propose your sys- tem, Sir, will you have the goodness to state wherein consists the usefulness of the science of the human soul? May we not think and reason, feel and act, while we remain in utter ignorance of it?* * "^Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less/ to human nature; and that however wide any of them ma> seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of Man; since they lie under the cognizance of man, and are judged of by their powers and faculties. 'Tis impossible to tell what changes and improvements we might make in these sciences, were we thoroughly acquainted with the, extent and force of human understanding, and could explain the na- ture of the ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform in reasoning. There is no question of importance, whose decision is not B 2 18 Utility of the Science Professor. Can you seriously ask, of what use is this science? Surely it must be profitable to man to understand the nature of his own bodily organs; for otherwise he could not employ them aright. You would laugh at him who should persist in attempt- ing to walk on his hands, to see with his ears, to hear with his eyes, and to write with his lips. Of how much greater importance must it be for him to understand the nature, number, and operations of the faculties of the intelligent, sensitive, and ef- ficient part of his complex being? The inherent parts of the constitution of our souls are like mental comprised in the science of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty, before we become- acquainted with that science. In pretending, therefore, to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a complete system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon whichjbey can stand with any security. And, as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and obser- vation."—Hume's Treatise on Human Nature. By quoting some admirable sayings from Mr. Hume, we shall not render ourselves responsible for his numerous errors. Mental science is built upon consciousness; which Mr Hume calls experience; and the testimony of others concerning their consciousness. Our know- ledge of the operations of our own minds and of the minds of other people, he would say we have by experience and observation. His re- mark, that mental science lays a foundation for " a complete system of the sciences," has been verified in the review of Judge Woodward's splendid work on Universal Science, contained in the Analectic Ma- gazine, vol. ix. p. 89, 105, 106. 1 have there evinced, that a systematic arrangement of all hu- man sciences may be founded on the operations of two faculties, perception and conception; for all our knowledge is of things per- ceived through the organs of sense, or of things conceived of by the mind. of the Human Mind. 19 organs, by which we perform our mental work and appropriate our own intellectual activity to the pro- motion of our happiness. To know ourselves, is to be prepared for profitable exertions, and a cheerful discharge of duty. If you are thoroughly versed in the science which you are now pursuing, you will be able to refer every duty enjoined to the ori- ginal constitution of your mind by which it is'to be performed; you will be able to make accurate dis- criminations; will profitably classify the objects of your thoughts; will be prepared to investigate every other, science, by knowing the foundation of human reasoning, and the talents which we have received for cultivating it; will be able to detect error and defend the truth; and in short will experience all the advantages which knowledge can boast over ig- norance. No man can reason well in any science^ or employ his knowledge to advantage, any farther than he is a good, practical metaphysician. The utility of the science of the human soul will, how- ever, best appear from the developement of the sci- ence itself.* Pupil. I can say in its favour, that the pursuit of it has begun to afford me more permanent pleasure * " We must, therefore, glean up our experiments in this science., from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they ap- pear in the common course of the. world, by men's behaviour in com- pany, in affairs, and in their pleasures. Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility to any other of human comprehension."— Hume. 20 A Desideratum. than all the works of taste; and I hope you will ex- hibit the elements of it so plainly as to banish from the world metaphysical jargon and nonsense, which usurping the names of philosophy, wisdom, and me- taphysics, have disgusted many, and induced the great body of the people to believe, that one who would become a metaphysician must renounce com- mon sense. Professor. A systematic treatise of the kind you describe, is greatly to be desired. Such an one does not exist; for Dr. Reid, who has excelled all other writers on this subject, employed himself rather in demolishing an old fabrick, than in building up a new one. Professor Stewart is but an elegant com- mentator upon Reid, without originality, and with- out any comprehensive arrangement of the topics of mental science. CONVERSATION 11. The Human Soul defined.—Consciousness.—Judgment.—Axioms.— Substances.—Attributes.—Mind and'Matter distinct things. Pupil. Since you last admitted me to your cham- ber, Sir, I have paid some attention to Watts on " the Improvement of the Mind;" and I beg leave to read a passage from him. "If we would improve,our minds," he says, "by conversation, it is a great happiness to be acquainted with persons wiser than ourselves. It is a piece of useful advice therefore to get the favour of their conversation frequently, as far as circumstances will allow: and if they happen to be a little reserved, use all obliging methods to draw out of them what may increase your own know- ledge." Now Sir, I design to ask you questions, and shall plead the advice of Dr. Watts in justifi- cation of my conduct. Professor. I have known you, for some time past, to be an expert youth at interrogation; and so, with- out apology, proceed, to your full satisfaction. Pupil. Well, Sir, what is the human soul? Professor. It is that part of the complex being sailed man, which thinks, feels, wills, and acts,* Pupil. Why do you call man a complex being? * " By the mind of a man," says Reid, " we understand that in him which thinks, remembers, reasons, wills." It is true that mind would be distinguished from every oth^r substance,, should we merely affirm that it is that which thinks; but if the description is extended, it seems »o be desirable to characterize it by such terms as include all its opera- 22 Of Body and Mind. Professor. Because he evidently consists in part of a substance which does not think, feel, will, and act; which we call body; and of another part that does; which is called the soul, or the mind. Pupil. How do you know that you have a body? Professor. I perceive the properties of a body, on which I am conscious that 1 act. Pupil. How do you know you perceive proper- ties of a body? Professor. I am conscious that I perceive several of the properties of my body. Pupil. How do you know that you think, feel, will and act? Professor. I am conscious of every one of my mental operations. Pupil. It seems, then, that we have ultimately the same proof of a mental operation which we have of the properties and existence of a body. Professor. The very same; and therefore I as- sert, that the basis of natural history, natural philo- sophy, and the mathematics, is no firmer than the basis of mental science,* tions. This, Reid has not done, for the mind is a sensitive as well as a cogitative being. Besides, to remember and to reason, are operations that come under the general description of thinking. The reader wili soon conceive that every thing which the mind does may be reduced to the four classes of operations enumerated in the text. * " It is not matter, or body, which I perceive by my senses; but only extension, figure, colour, and certain other qualities, which the constitution of my nature leads me to refer to something, which is ex- tended, figured, and coloured. The case is precisely similar with re- spect to mind. We are not Immediately conscious of its existence, but we are conscious of sensation, thought and volition; operations, which imply the existence of something which feels, thinks, and wills. Even Of Body and Mind. 23 Pupil. But your have not proved yet, that you have a soul: you have only shown, that you are conscious of your own mental operations. How do you know you have a soul? Professor* Dr. Reid would have answered, that he was conscious of his own existence; but my opi-< hion is, that consciousness is the knowledge which one has of his own present mental operations, and I shall use the word only in this sense. That I exist, is a proposition which 1 judge to be true, so soon as it is stated to me, or framed by my own mind, without any reasoning or reflection on the subject. The proposition is self-evident to every man, and the act of the mind in judging it to be true, is a constitutional judgment. I am conscious that I judge myself to exist; and such is the make of our minds, that we cannot use a personal pronoun, or an actiye or passive verb, in the first person singular, or plu- ral, without having this constitutional judgment. There is not a man living, who really doubts his own existence: and the reason is, that the Creator has so formed, and so governs, the human mind, that it ever thus judges, concerning its own being. Should man too is impressed with an irresistible conviction, that all those sen- sations, thoughts, and volitions, belong to one and the same being; to that being which he calls himself; a being, which he is led, by the constit'tion of his nature, to consider as something distinct from his body, and as not li'.ble to be impaired by the loss or mutilation of any of his organs. From these considerations it appears, that we have the same evidence for the existence of mind, that we have for the exist- ence of body; nay, if there be any difference between the two cases, that we have stronger evidence for it; inasmuch as the one is suggest- ed to us by the subjects of our own consciousness, and the other merely by the objects of our own perceptions."— Stewart. 24 Foundations of Science. i any man Wish to judge otherwise, he would find himself incapable of doing it, and, therefore, we as- sert, that this constitutional judgment is necessary. Pupil. You.would have me understand, I appre- hend, that necessary, or constitutional judgments, lie at the foundation of the science of the human mind. Professor. They are the basis of every science: and the foundation on which all our systems of knowledge are erected. Do not the mathematicians begin their course by settling a few axioms? And what are axioms but self-evident propositions, to which every mind, necessarily, from its constitu- tion, gives assent, so soon as the meaning of them is apprehended? Pupil. Some of these constitutional judgments I hope to hear you state ere long; but will you now have the goodness to tell me, what is the real essence of this thing which thinks, feels, wills, and acts? Professor. Here I must confess myself unable to answer you in any other way, than by acknowledg- ing my own ignorance, and expressing my persua- sion, that no man in the present life, will ever enjoy the ability of perceiving the essence of any substance. One thing I may venture to promise, that when you, or any one else, will teach me to comprehend the essence of matter, I will explain to you the essence of mind. We know no more of the one than of the other. Pupil._ How, then, do you know that mind and matter are distinct things; and that there is any es- sential difference between them? Professor. Your question requires something of Attributes. 25 a dissertation, for an answer. I must give you some preliminary statements too, that you may not mis- understand me. Observe then, that I use the words mind and soul as synonymous: that any thing to which you truly ascribe thought, feeling, volition, or agency, or any or all of these, is what I call a soul or mind: and that any thing which is the sub- ject of inherent attributes is said to subsist, and is called a substance.* Pupil. But let me know what you intend by in- herent attributes, before you proceed. Professor. Any thing attributed to another, which appertains to its original constitution, and without which it would not be the same thing, is an inherent attribute.* Were all the inherent attributes of any substance to be taken away, we should have no knowledge of its existence. Thus, should the facul- ties of thought, feeling, volition, and agency be taken away from any thing which we call mind, we should no longer have any knowledge of the existence of that mind; nor can we even conceive of a substance which thinks, and yet has no faculty for thought; which feels, wills, and voluntarily acts, and yet has no faculties for performing these mental operations. * Substance I find a very convenient word, and having given the sense in which I shall use it, I see no objection to it, which will not equally militate against Reid and Stewart, when they speak of that ■which thinks, or of something extended. Mr. Hume tells us, that the idea of substance can be derived neither from " impressions of sensa- tion," nor from " impressions of reflection." We assent: what then? can we not conceive of substance, as well as of time, space, and a thou- sand other things? Mr. Locke and Mr. Hume were both erroneous in mantaining that all our ideas are derived either from sensation or reflection. c 26 Body and Mind Let me illustrate what I mean by inherent attri- butes, in speaking of matter. Gravity, extension, in- activity, insensibility, and divisibility are attributes of every particle of matter, which we call inherent; because we conceive them to inhere in the very na- ture of the thing; and were these all taken away, we could form no notion of the meaning of the word matter. Nothing extended, and inactive would then remain. Any number of particles of matter united, or organized, constitute what we call a body. Now you ask proof of the accuracy of the prevailing opi- nion, that body and mind are two distinct substances. Of the essence of any substance, you have already learned, that I do not design to speak. Now I af- firm, that I am conscious of perceiving some of the inherent attributes of one thing which is called an egg; and of another, which is called an apple; and I judge, that the objects of, my perception really exist. I cannot doubt their existence. This I find then to be a law of my nature, that I should judge the thing. which I perceive to have existence. The mental operation of judging implies the existence of the faculty which is denominated the judgment. This faculty, I am conscious, uniformly operates in the same way, in relation to some propositions; so that I no sooner understand the meaning of the proposition, that the things perceived through the bodily organs, called the five senses, really exist, than I judge it to be true. Every other man of a sane mind has, under similar circumstances, a similar judgment, which results from the original constitution, and the established government of the human soul. Of this judgment every rational man distinct Things. 27 is conscious; and testifies that he is conscious, to his companions. I judge, and I am conscious that I judge, therefore, that an egg, and an apple are be- fore me. But I also judge, with a like knowledge of my own judgment, that the egg is one substance, and the apple another substance; or that they are two distinct material substances. This judgment follows a previous judgment, that the inherent at- tributes of an egg are different from those of an apple; which last judgment immediately follows my perception of the attributes of one and of the other, and my discernment of the difference between those which appertain to the one, and those which inhere in the other. Thus, I perceive the shape and tex ture, the colour, taste, and fragrance of the apple; and then I perceive the shape, texture, colour and taste of the egg: I conceive of a difference between the things perceived in one, and those perceived in the other; and then follows my judgment, that they are differ- ent things; each of which is called a substance. Oi this judgment I am conscious, and therefore I say, " I know that an egg and an apple, are two different and distinct substances."- An egg is one thing that subsists, to which we attribute a certain number of things, that being deprived of, it would no longer be recognized as an egg; and an apple is another thing that subsists; that is, an apple is another sub- stance. In this manner we actually, and philosophi- cally discriminate between different individuals, whether inanimate, or animate; and between differ- ent classes of things. So universal is the practical operation of this philosophy, that in every land, he would be called a fool, who should affirm, that be- 28 Mind and Matter tween the sun and moon, earth and water, birds and men, there is no substantial difference. But you wish me to prove, that mind is one substance, and matter another. Every man may arrive at personal satisfaction on this subject, precisely in the way that I do. Thus, I judge involuntarily, and con- stitutionally, that something, which I call by the pronoun /, exists. I am conscious that I think, feel, will, and act; and I judge that /have faculties for thinking, feeling, willing, and acting; because think- ing is an effect, and a fatuity for thinking a cause; and because I judge moreover, that every effect must have some cause. These faculties are inherent attributes of that something, which I call I; and were they all taken away there would remain no- thing of which I could have any conception, or de- nominate by any personal pronoun. This something, which is the subject of these attributes, I call mind, or soul. I may give it this name to distinguish it from every thing, which has not some of the same attributes. If I find any thing which has any of these attributes, I determine to call that a mind too; but if I have knowledge of any thing which has other attributes, but not one of these, I resolve to call it matter, to distinguish it; because I judge that those are different substances which are the subjects of different inherent attributes; and that all thinking, feeling, willing, and acting substances should be classed under the .head of mental sub- stances; while all things not having in my judgment, any of the faculties that produce any of these men- tal operations, should be considered as forming an- other class, under the caption of material substances. distinct Substances. , 29 Do I, then, know of any thing in existence, which is to be excluded from the first class, and assigned a place in the second? I am conscious, that I per- ceive many different objects around me, in my chamber; and one of them, about two feet in length, I perceive to be in continual motion, while all the rest are stationary. The little moving thing looks me in the face, and (probably thinking that I am sulky, because I am studious,) cries out, with mean- ing forehead and eyes, " naughty papa!" I call the thing " my daughter." I am not conscious that she thinks, nor can I be conscious of any thing but of my own mental operations. But I am conscious, that I perceive her make such sounds, with her mouth, as I have made from volition, with my own; and I judge, that her speaking and my speaking are similar effects, that must have a similar cause. I know, that I speak from volition alone; and I judge, that no one thing could speak without volition: therefore I conclude, that my daughter speaks from volition. If she performs the mental operation of volition, I judge she must have the faculty of voli- tion; and if she has the faculty of volition, the thing in which that attribute inheres belongs to the class of mental substances. I have found, then, another mind besides my own. I judge that my soul exists, and I judge, that another soul exists; and the judg- ment in one case is as satisfatory to myself as in the other. The external actions of my little daughter, I call effects, of a thinking cause; and sometimes signs of thought, because every effect may be de- nominated the sign of a cause. It is a judgment that results from my mental nature, that J, who am C 2 30 Mind and Matter distinguished. conscious, exist; and that voluntary action proceeds from a zuilling agent. Pupil. I am not impatient, Sir, but it takes you a long time to come to the point. Professor. Well, I perceive on my paper a small thing, which I call a particle of sand; I know, or am conscious, that / perceive it; and such is -the frame of my mind, that I judge the object of per- ception to have a real existence. I am conscious too, that I perceive it to be tangible, solid, extended, and divisible; to have gravity, and to be capable of mo- tion, but not of action; for if left to itself it is sta- tionary; but if I act upon it, motion is the result. These are some of the inherent attributes of all those things which I would classify under the gene- ral term matter. Having perceived these attributes of the grain of sand, and discerning them to be dif- ferent from the attributes of mind, I judge that it is a different thing from that called mind; even a different substance. The perceptible difference be- tween that something which thinks, or feels, or wills, or acts, or does all these things, and the grain of sand, is certainly greater than the difference between fire and water; and because I perceive in the sand attributes which I find not in mind, and do not per- ceive in it any of the attributes which I have found in the soul, therefore I conclude that matter and mind are two distinct substances. In confirmation of my own judgment, I have the testimony of all of my fellow men, that they have always found in cer- tain things the attributes of a material substance, and have never found in any of these same substances the slightest indications of thought, feeling, volition, Mind and Matter distinguished. 31 or efficiency. The same remarks, which I have made concerning the grain of sand, will apply to every other thing, whether in a simple, or organized state; which is solid, extended, insensible, and moveable, but inactive. Pupil. And so you have made it appear, that we perceive nothing but the attributes of matter, and the external indications of mind; and that we are as well, and as clearly acquainted with the attributes of the former as of the latter.* Professor. Yes, and that our judgment concerning the existence of mental substances, is as solid and satisfactory, as that the material substances around us exist. * "The essence both of body and of mind is unknown to us. We know certain properties of the first, and certain operations of the last, and by these only we can define or describe them."—Reid. CONVERSATION III. Faculty defined.—Body.—Simple and Complex Operations.—Essen- tial and Incidental Attributes.—Ten Faculties of the Human Mind enumerated.—All the Faculties of Man, requisite to account for all his actions. Pupil. You have frequently made use of the term faculty; will you have the kindness to make me fully acquainted with the meaning which you attach to it? Professor. By a faculty, in general, I intend any inherent part of the original constitution of a sub- stance by which any distinct operation is performed. A body is any number of organized particles of matter;* and this may have many bodily faculties. Thus the body of a man consists of many members; each of which is a faculty for doing something: and were all these taken away, there would be no body subsisting; any more than if the particles of matter, out of which it was organized, were reduced to their native elements. A mental faculty is any inherent part of the ori- ginal constitution of a mind, by which it performs any simple mental operation. * Dr. Reid says, " we define body to be that which is extended, solid, moveable, divisible;" which is the description of matter in gene- ral, but not of body in particular. The definition whioh I have given, corresponds with the most general and approved use of the word. Mental Operations. 33 Pupil. Bat I would know what you mean by a simple mental operation. Professor. Any thing which the mind does, is a mental operation: any thing which it performs by one of its faculties is a simple mental operation. For example; if you see, hear, reason, feel, choose, and exert yourself, you' perform so many simple mental operations. Pupil. Your distinction would lead me to sup- pose, that some mental operations are complex. Professor. They certainly are: for it is the mind which reads a paragraph in the Freeman's Journal; and this implies the perception of the words, to- gether with the apprehension of their meaning. A little child might perceive the words before he could read at all. Should you read aloud, an act of the will to make articulate sounds, and the exertion of the faculty of agency, together with those already mentioned, would be included in reading. Pupil. It is evident then, because several facul- ties are concerned in the several acts, that declaim- ing, preaching, pleading, studying, running, fight- ing, and praying, are so many complex operations; but I wish to know if any of them but studying is a mental operation. Are running and fighting acts of the mind? Professor. Some actions are neither exclusively- mental, nor exclusively corporal; for mind and body both are essential to their performance. We ascribe them, therefore, to the complex being, man; and say that man reads aloud, declaims, preaches, prays audibly, pleads, runs, and fights. These actions, therefore, which require the co-operation of two or 34 xMental Operations. more faculties of man, whether they appertain to the body or the mind, we call complex operations: but if two or more mental faculties perform the act, without the necessary intervention of any cor- poral faculty, we call the action performed a com- plex mental operation. Pupil. It would seem to me, that seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, reasoning, and choosing, are all of them complex operations. Professor. In the proper place, perhaps I may convince you, that they are all simple mental opera- tions; or that they are distinct acts, which may every one of them be referred to some one mental faculty. Pupil. It would be strange, indeed, if you can convince me that eating is a mental act. Professor. Eating and tasting, young man, are two things, very easily distinguished; and the latter is consequent upon the former. Eating is a complex operation of an animal, who wills to receive food > into his mouth, and does what he wills, by his agency upon his corporal faculties, given him for the pur- pose. Tasting is a perception of the flavour, or of some quality, or qualities of the food eaten. You know that in a diseased state of the palate and fauces, a man may eat, and not taste his food. Hence he says, " I have no taste;" and sometimes, to express the same thing, " all things taste alike to me." Pupil- You have intimated, in a former conver- sation, that power and faculty are not convertible terms; because, I conclude, you have use for them to signify different things: but if no expression is Faculty and Power. 35 equivalent to that of mental faculty, we shall be sadly circumscribed in language. Professor. Our predicament will not be worse than that of the mathematicians, who always call a triangle a triangle. You. may, however, call a men- tal faculty a mental organ, if you choose; and then, you will have two names for one thing. Pupil. Your philosophy would restrict the mean- ing of the word faculty as Reid has done, when he says, " I apprehend that the word faculty is most properly applied to those powers of the mind which are original and natural, and which make a part of the constitution of the mind." Professor. I mean by faculty what Reid under- stood by " an original and natural power;" but I never call a faculty a power; because power is often and most properly used as synonymous with ability; and includes every thing essential to the production of an effect. You can distinguish, between the exist- ence of something m our mental constitution, where- by we reason, when we reason, and which exists when not in operation; which is the faculty of rea- soning; and that which puts the faculty into opera- tion, so that we actually reason, which together con- stitute the power of reasoning, can you not? • Pupil. I remember, at least, that you have else- where said, that any thing called a power, which is not adequate to the production of an effect, is a powerless power. What do you think, Sir, of Lord Karnes's use of the word faculty? He says, " man is provided by nature with a sense or faculty that lays open to him every passion by means of its ex- ternal expressions.^ 36 Different Attributes. Professor. 1 think he undoubtedly intended, thai every man is so constituted, that he has the faculty of judgment, by which he involuntarily judges cer- tain external expressions to be signs of internal pas- sions. This faculty he considered to be as natural to the mind as the faculty for smelling; and there- fore he calls it a sense, or faculty; and would it not lead to confusion, I would sometimes call a mental faculty a mental sense too. Pupil. In our last conversation, you taught me, that some attributes of mind and matter are inhe- rent: pray do you class all other attributes under some general term? Professor. All attributes are inherent, or such as may be called incidental and extraneous. Any thing, which you ascribe to another, which is not essential to its subsistence, and which therefore may be considered as being without its essence, I call an incidental, or an extraneous attribute. For in- stance, a man may have the faculty of reason, with- out actually reasoning: the faculty I call an inherent attribute; but the act of reasoning is incidental or extraneous. Solidity, gravity, extension, and divisi- bility are inherent, or essential attributes of a body; but the colour, the particular figure, the location, and the motion of the same body, are incidental; for an ivory ball will have the former attributes, whether it is in one place or another; whether it be stained red, or is white, and whether it move, or is stationary. From this example you will not find it difficult to class most of the attributes of subjects with which you are intimately acquainted. If you please, I shall now claim the privilege of Ten Mental Faculties. 37 interrogating you, on subjects which have been fre- quently presented to your attention; and if you have doubts about the truth and propriety of any part of the system which I have inculcated, you are at perfect liberty to express them. What are the principal inherent attributes of the human mind? Pupil. They are ten mental faculties; which, for the want of some new scientific terms, frequently bear the names of the operations which they per* form. They are denominated, I. The Faculty of Perception. II. The Faculty of Consciousness. III., The Faculty of Understanding* IV. The Faculty of Judging. V. The Faculty of Memory. VI. The Faculty of Reasoning. VII. The Faculty of Conscience. VIII. The Faculty of Feeling. IX. The Faculty of Volition. X. The Faculty of Agency or Efficiency. To one, or other of these, may be attributed all our simple mental operations; and to some two or more of them, all the complex mental operations, with which we are acquainted.* * " Upon a slight attention to the operations of our own minds," says Professor Stewart, "they appear to be so complicated, and so infinitely diversified, that it seems to be impossible to reduce them to any general laws In consequence, however, of a more accurate examination, the prospect clears up; and the phenomena, which ap- peared, at first, to be too various for our comprehension, are found to be the i-esult of a comparatively small number of simple and un- compounded faculties." Goxdiliac remarks, that "Centuries must D 38 Mental Operations. Professor. What is wanting to account for all the operations of a man? Pupil. Would we analize, and reduce to their proper faculties, all the operations of man, we must consider his bodily as well as mental faculties; for many things are performed by the co-operation of corporal and mental organs. We must also consider his powers, as well as faculties. You could not walk, for instance, without legs, a volition to use them, and the exertion of the faculty of agency over them. Neither could you eat without a mouth, and the activity of those mental faculties which are requi- site to put it in motion. Professor. Well, let us defer the consideration of the mental faculties till after dinner. have passed away before men could have suspected that thought can be subjected to laws; and even at this time the greatest number of mankind think, without conceiving how it is done." CONVERSATION IV. Definitions.—Genus and Species.—The Faculty of Perception.—Five kinds of Perceptions.—Instrumentality of bodily Organs.—Conscious- ness. / Professor. We resume the consideration of the Ten Faculties of the Human Soul; and I shall ex- pect my pupil in giving definitions, to remember the opinion of Dr. Reid, "that there are many words, which, though they need explication, cannot be logically defined;" and that " a logical definition, that is, a strict and proper definition, must express the kind of thing defined, and the specific difference, by which the species defined, is distinguished from every other species belonging to that kind." Hence, " no word can be logically defined, which does not denote a species; because such things only can have a specific difference; and a specific difference is es- sential to a logical definition. On this account there can be no definition of individual things, such as London and Paris." They may, however, be de- scribed in such a way as to distinguish them from all other cities. Pupil. I have found some difficulty result from the use of the words genus, species, and individual: I should like, therefore, to have them explained before we proceed* 4-0 Genus, Species, and Individuals. Professor. The explanation is easy. We have perceived many objects, whose essential attributes are alike; but whose incidental attributes are un- like; and we wish to class them, for our own con- venience. If the essential attributes of any number of things are alike, we class them together, and say, they are of one genus, or race. Thus we perceive fifteen persons, who indicate by their actions, the existence of the same mental faculties within; and they have evidently the same essential corporal members. We say that they are of one genus. For this genus we wish a name that shall denote any one of the fifteen; and which shall distinguish any one, and each one, from any thing which belongs to another genus; to the one, for instance, consist- ing of animals with four legs; and we call the name man; by which any one of the fifteen persons is distinguished from a quadruped; and indeed, from every thing else, but one of his own genus, or gene- ral class of things. When I call a being a man, there- fore, every one, who understands the language, knows what kind of a thing I mean; but he knows not whether I intend a white man, a black man, or a red man; that is, he knows not what species of the genus I would designate. We find it convenient, therefore, to make subordinate classes; and the common rule is, to put those things together which ,tre alike in some of their principal incidental attri- butes. The colour of a man is an attribute of this description; and we say, therefore, that five of these fifteen men, being of a white colour, shall constitute the species of xvhite men; the five that are black, the species of black men; and th$ five which are red, Genus, Species, and Individuals. 41 the species of red men. Thus, in the genus, which contains, by the supposition, fifteen, we have three species. Suppose that each species contains a person by the name of John. Now I wish to designate one of these, so that the person to whom I speak, may fix his thoughts on one; that is, on an individual. If I call him a man, I point out only his genus, so that my auditor knows I do not mean a quadruped, or reptile; but he knows not which of fifteen indivi- duals I mean. If I call him a white man, he knows the genus and the species of the thing of which I speak, but he knows not which of five white men, that constitute the species of the genus, I mean. Let me speak, then, of John, the white man, and he understands me to designate an individual, who is neither John the black man, nor John the red man, nor any one else but the identical one person, of whom I designed to have him think. In like manner, you may class any number of things, in which you can perceive, or apprehend to be, some similar and some dissimilar- attributes; especially if some of them are essential, and others only inci- dental. Pupil. Might we not have more classes of things? Professor. Undoubtedly: you might have the provinces, classes, and orders of Judge Woodward; and to them add, if you please, a genus and species. Thus, a person might be your provincial term; a human person, your classical name; ^female hu- man per sori, your ordinal iistinction; a white female human person, your generic appelJXon; a tall white female human person, your specific description; and then Jane, a tall white female human person, would D2 42 Classifications. point out the individual, and distinguish her from every thing not a person; from all persons superior or inferior to human persons; from all males, who might make another order, of the same class and province; from all females, that are not white; from all females that are short; and from all tall females of any other name than Jane. Pupil. Were these classifications to be generally made, would Dr. Reid's description of a logical definition be correct? Professor. You define a word when you clearly' describe the thing of which that word is a symbol. Of course, you may invent a term, and then define it; that is, point out the limits of its use, by clearly stating what you mean by it. You may define an object of which any word is the sign, by clearly de- scribing that object, so as to distinguish it from everv Other object. If you will do this I shall be satisfied with your answers to my questions. What is the faculty of Perception?* Pupil. The faculty of Perception in man, is that inherent part of the original constitution of his soul, by which he has knowledge, through the instru- mentality of his bodily organs. * " The perception of external objects by our senses, is an opera- tion of the mind of a peculiar nature, and ought to ihave a name ap- propriated to it. It has so in all languages And in the English, I know no word more proper to express this act of the mind than per- ception. Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching, are words that express the operations proper to each sense; perceiving expresses that which is common to them all."—Db. Reid. Perceptions. 43 Professor. Give some example of the mental operations called perceptions; or, show what this facultv does. Pupil. I perceive the sun, through the instru- mentality of my eyes; I perceive a sound, through my ears; I perceive the hardness of a ball, through my hand, which touches it; I perceive the fragrance of a rose, through my olfactory organs; and I per- ceive the acidity of vinegar, through my organs of tasting; so that seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, and tasting are so many mental operations, per- formed through the instrumentality of different parts of the body. Professor. Can you classify all the perceptions of man? • Pupil. All our perceptions are reducible to five classes, which take their names from the organs of sense, through which we have them. Professor. I presume that you use the expression organs of sense, in this case, as synonymous with organs of perception. Be careful always to use it in this manner, and then I have no objection to your asserting, that man has five senses, or five kinds of perceptions; and of course that he becomes acquaint- ed with the attributes of matter only by the men- tal faculty of perception. Sense always means either perception or conception. But why do you speak of perceiving through the instrumentality ofthe bodily faculties?* * " That nothing external is perceived till first it make an impres- sion upon the organ of sense, is an observation that holds equally in 44 Perceptions. Pupil. Because the bodily organs do not them- selves perceive; and because we find, by experience, -that the soul of a wakeful and sane man does not perceive without them. Sometimes, in figurative language, the operation of the agent is ascribed to the instrument; and hence our eyes are said to see; but every one knows, that the eye does not in reality perceive even the inverted image of the object, which is formed on its retina. Every one knows, too, that were the faculty of perception wanting, were the soul absent from the material part of the complex being, man, the eyes could not see, nor the nose smell, nor the hands handle, nor the palate taste, nor the ears hear. Hence it is common, and strictly philosophical, to say, / see, I hear, I taste, I smell, 1 touch; while by the pronoun used we in- tend something evidently different from our bodily organs. Here I wish, however, to question my teacher. Pray, Sir, if the soul has the faculty of perception, which is an essential part of itself, are any bodily organs indispensable to the mental ope- rations of that faculty? Might we not see, hear, touch, taste, and smell, without the instrumentality of eyes, ears, and the other members of the body? every one of the external senses. But there is a difference as to ouf knowledge of that impression: in touching, tasting, and smelling, we are sensible of the impression; that, for example, which is made upon the hand by a stone, upon the palate by an apricot, and upon the nostrils by a rose: it is otherwise in seeing and hearing; for 1 am not sensible of the impression made upon my eye, when I behold a tree; nor of iVic- impression made upon my ear, when I listen to a song."— Lord Karnes. Perceptions. 45 Might not the soul, if separated from the body, see material objects? Professor. You are running furiously into the re- gions of speculation. Stop a little, and I will tell you all philosophy knows on this subject. When man is awake, and in a sane state of mind, he constitu- tionally judges, that he perceives only through his bodily organs: but when sleeping, a man often has mental operations, which he at the time judges to be perceptions; which are so much like the percep- tions he has had when awake, that he cannot dis- tinguish them, either by any difference in their own nature, or in his feelings, which are consequent on them; but when he awakes, he knows that his eyes were closed, and that light did not shine on them, when he was conscious of seeing; that no material lips uttered sounds, when he heard; and that no real object was present, when he embraced and kissed a friend. The consciousness which accom- panied these nocturnal perceptions, was like the con- sciousness of his wakeful hours; and gives proof of the actual performance of mental acts of seeing and hearing, touching, smelling, and tasting, or of nocturnal actions resembling them, without the in- tervention of material organs. A man who is insane, in like manner has perceptions, wh,ich are purely mental, and without the instrumentality of the ex- ternal organs; for he sees angels and devils in the air, and hears them address him; or he performs such mental operations as a sane man would, were visible forms of celestial beings presented to his vision; were they to utter real, but seraphic sounds in his ears. 46 Perceptionst Pupil. Is not this wholly the work of imagina- tion? Professor. The imagination of sleeping and in- sane persons is frequently very active; but when they see a house with their eyes closed, or the face of a friend; and are conscious of the act, it would be unjust to say, that they are not conscious of a perception, when they readily distinguish between perceptions and^the work of the imagination. If bodily organs were absolutely essential to perceiving, we should undoubtedly see objects in the position of their images on the retina; so that we should see all the heads of our friends occupying the place of their feet.* * " There is no phenomenon in nature more unaccountable, than the intercourse that is carried on between the mind and the external world: there is no phenomenon which philosophical spirits have shown greater avidity to pry into and resolve. It is agreed by all, that this intercourse is carried on by means of the senses; and this satisfies the vulgar curiosity, but not the philosophic. Philosophers must have some system, some hypothesis, that shews the manner in which our senses make us acquainted with external things. All the fertility of human invention seems to have produced only one hypothesis for this pur- pose, which, therefore, hath been universally received: and that is, that the mind, like a mirror, receives the images of things from with- out, by means of the senses: so that their use must be to convey these images into the mind."—"There are laws of nature by which the operations of the mind are regulated; there are also laws of nature that govern the material system; and as the latter are the ultimate conclusions which the human faculties can reach in the philosophy of bodies, so the former are the ultimate conclusions we can reach in the philosophy of minds."—" It is evident, therefort.-, that the pic- tures upon the retina are, by the laws of nature, a mean of vision; but in what way they accomplish their end, we are totally ignorant." —JDa. Reid. Consciousness. 47 Pupil. It would be a very natural inference from your doctrine, that a disembodied spirit could per- ceive visible and material objects, as truly as any man who has bodily organs at his command. Professor. I shall not object to such an inference. At any rate, we know that God is a Spirit, without bodily organs, and that he beholds the works of his hands. He has mental perceptions of material ob- jects; and has formed men in his own image; but while they continue in the world, his good provi- dence has connected their ordinary intercourse with matter, with material organization. Pupil. Have you not, dear Sir, restricted too much the use of the words perceive and perception? It is customary for a person to say, " I perceive your meaning: I perceive the truth." In short, men talk about perceiving every object of thought, whe- ther visible or invisible. Professor. It is true: and they use the words very indefinitely, or else figuratively. It is not improper to use the word perceive as we do the verb see, figu- ratively, for mental seeing. Thus we see or perceive a truth, when we conceive of the meaning of a propo- sition, and judge it to be true. But in philosophical discussions, we should avoid indefinite and figura- tive expressions as much as. possible, if we would arrive at certaintv in mental science. I never use, therefore, perception, for any act of conception, or mental seeing of immaterial things. W h it is the faculty of Consciousness? The tacu''!y of Consciousness in man, is that in- herent part of the original constitution of his soul 48 Consciousness. by which he has immediate knowledge of all his own mental operations.* Professor. We are conscious in every instance, by an act of consciousness, or a mental operation, bearing that name. Now I would ask, have we as manv acts of consciousness as we have other men- tal operations? Pupil. Undoubtedly we have an act of conscious- ness, for every other mental operation, of which we are conscious. Professor. Is every act of consciousness subse- quent to, or co-existent with, the mental operation, of which it is the object? Pupil. You have taught me, that consciousness is the only ultimate source of knowledge upon the subject of mental science; and I cannot say, that I am ever conscious of performing two mental ope- rations at once. I must conclude, therefore, that an act of consciousness is immediately consequent upon everv other mental operation. Thus, I perceive and am conscious that I perceive; I conceive, and am conscious that I conceive; I remember, and am con- - scious that I remember. The act of consciousness, however, is performed so immediately after each • " Consciousness is a word used by philosophers, to signify that immediate knowledge which we have of our present thoughts and purposes, and, in general, of all the present operations of our minds. Wh- nee we may observe, that consciousness is only of things present. To apply consciousness to things past, which sometimes is done in populav discourse, is to confound consciousness with memory; and all such confusion of words ought to be avoided in popular discourse. It is likewise to be observed, that consciousness is only of things in the mind, and not of external thin s."—Dn. Reid. Consciousness. 49 other operation, that lam insensible of any lapse of time; and should not wonder if some should deem consciousness and the object of it, in any par- ticular case, simultaneous. Professor. Of what use. is the faculty of con- sciousness? Pupil. Without it, we could not know that we think, feel, will, and have efficiency. Consequently we could never have knowledge of our own existence, or of our mental identity. We could never predicate any thing of ourselves, nor act as responsible, moral agents. Besides, consciousness is as essential to men- tal science, as perception to our knowledge of per- ceptible objects, and of the phenomena of natural philosophy. We could not testify ^concerning any thing done by the mind, without consciousness, any more, than concerning things extraneous to the mind, without the faculty of perception. Professor. Which source of knowledge is the most satisfactory, perception or consciousness? Pupil. At first thought, people would generally say, "perception; for we are more certain of no- thing, than of what we see, hear, smell, touch and taste." Yet, upon reflection, every one will judge, that there is no higher certainty in our perceptions than in our consciousness; for we may with pro- priety ask a man, how he knows, that he sees the sun, hears the sound of a cannon, smells the fra- grance of a rose, tastes the flavour of an orange, and touches a marble surface; and he must answer, " I am conscious that I do these things;" so that the certain knowledge of our perceptions themselves consists in our consciousness. We know that we E 50 Consciousness. see, hear, smell, taste and touch, only by our fa- culty of consciousness. Could we doubt concerning the operations of this faculty, we might doubt whe- ther we perceive at all; and consequently whether any external objects of perception exist. Professor. And thus we should be driven to Bishop Berkeley's theory, that there is no material substance in existence: and thence to Hume's, that impressions and ideas are the only things that exist. Pupil* Pray, Sir, is our consciousness the result of volition, or not? Professor. If I will to perform an act, and to be conscious of it; I find an act of consciousness fol- lows the determined act; but I cannot suspend my consciousness by a volition; and generally I am conscious without any volition on the subject. Could we cease to be conscious at pleasure, it would be equivalent to the power of destroying our own men- tal existence, by a volition. Should such a power be given to man, he could escape from the world, and the government of his Maker. CONVERSATION V. The Faculty of Understanding or Conception.—Different Operations of this Faculty.—Imagination.—Discernment.—Comprehension.— Apprehension.—Intuition.—Some general laws of Conception.— The importance of this Faculty. Professor. What is the Faculty of Understand- ing? Pupil. The faculty of understanding in man, is that inherent part of the original constitution of his soul, by which he has knowledge of things which are not perceived through the instrumenta- lity of the senses.* Professor. Do you distinguish The Understanding from a faculty of understanding? Pupil. By a faculty of understanding we intend that particular faculty which has just been described; but the expressions, The Understanding, and The Intellect, are often used to comprehend all the fa- culties of the human mind, except those of feeling, volition, and agency. To the understanding, or the intellect, belong the faculties of Consciousness, Per- * " It is plain that one sense cannot judge of the objects of another; the eye, for instance, of harmony, or the. ear of colours. The faculty therefore, which views and compares the objects of all the senses, cannot be sense." Price's Review, p. 18. In other words, he might. have said, conception is an act of mind distinct from perception^ 52 . The Understanding. ception, Understanding, Judgment, Reasoning, Me- mory, and Conscience. Professor. The understanding or the intellect, then, comprehends seven faculties, called intellectual, of which that of understanding any thing is one. Has this faculty any other name? Pupil. It is called Conception by Dr. Reid and others; for by it we take in a subject, form a notion of a thing, or have an idea of it. We conceive of the meaning of a term, a clause, a proposition, and a sentence. Mathematical points and lines, are ob- jects of conception, which cannot be perceived. All abstract terms, such as virtue, vice, goodness, state, faculty, power, liberty, and man, denote objects of which we have knowledge only by this faculty. The science of numbers, or arithmetic, and all the sciences commonly included under the terms mathematics and metaphysics, morals and theology, have their origin in the operations of Conception. We cannot perceive, but we can conceive of number, space, quantity, time, spirit, substance, relation, moral obligation, guilt, and the Deity. Professor. The operations of the faculty of un- derstanding are numerous: can you classify them? Pupil. I have never attempted it; and think it would be very difficult to do it, in any other manner than by referring them to the objects upon which they terminate. Thus, for instance, all conceptions of images formed by the mind, of things which do not really exist, I would put together in one class, and term them imaginations.* * " I may conceive or imagine a mountain of gold, .or a winged horse; but no man says that he perceives such a creature of imagina•■ Acts of Conception. 53 Professor. So that The Imagination is nothing but the faculty of conception employed informing images. I frankly confess, that The Imagination is not, in my opinion, a faculty distinct from that which con- ceives, or forms notions of things. Can you name some other principal operations of this faculty of understanding? Pupil. Discernment is an operation of the mind, in which it conceives of some difference between two or more objects. Comprehension is a firm conception of some extensive or complex object. We discern differ- ences: we comprehend difficult and complicated things. Apprehension is any act of the mind in under- standing the meaning of- a statement. Thus, a per- son speaks to me; I will to attend to him, that I may understand him; and when I do it, I say, " / apprehend your meaning." It is a figurative expres- sion, and literally signifies to take hold of any thing. I may apprehend the meaning of a proposition with- out passing any judgment upon it. Intuition is any such conception of the meaning of a proposition, as is immediately folio wed by a judgment that it is true. This is also a figurative expression, taken from the act of looking into any thing. tion. Thus perception is distinguished from conception or imagina- tion." " Let it be observed therefore, that to conceive, to imagine, to ap- prehend, when taken in the proper sense, signify an act of the mind which implies no belief or judgment at all."—Reid. E 2 54 Complex Ideas. Professor. When the mind, therefore, imagines, discerns, comprehends, apprehends, or performs an act of intuition, it is the subject of different species of conceptions. Pupil. Pray, Sir, has man any complex ideas? Professor.- Every idea is a conception; and every act of conception is a simple operation. Man has, therefore, no complex ideas. He conceives,'however, of complex objects; even as he may see a complex object; and yet the act of seeing is simple. Pupil. Has man any abstract ideas? Professor. Man conceives of the meaning of ab- stract terms, or has ideas of certain things, which he resolves to consider as abstracted from certain other things that he knows to be connected with the former. For instance, I conceive of the figure of an ivory ball, abstracted from the colour, and other attributes of the ball. Here the idea is one simple thing, that may be conceived of as abstract- ed from all other mental operations,'and even from the efficient of it; and the object of the idga is a figure, which, is a term that denotes something that may be considered abstractedly from all other attri- butes of any substance. Abstract terms, or names of things that may be considered abstractedly from other things with which they are always connected, there certainly are; but of complex, and abstract ideas, I know nothing by my own consciousness, besides what I have here disclosed.* * "A great philosopher," Dr. Berkeley, " has disputed the received opinion in this particular, and-has asserted, that all general ideas are Laws oj Conception. 55 From your own consciousness of what passes in your mind, can you give any general laws of con- ception? . .' Pupil. A few, I think; for I find, that I conceive. of every mental operation which I remember to have performed: and I can renewedly conceive of any remembered past conception, by a voluntarv exertion to do it. Professor. And hence, you naturally conclude, that other persons whose minds are similarly con- stituted, can do the same, and lay it down as a ge- neral observation, or law of mental operation. Pupil. An example may be given, thus: I per- ceive a fair female form; I close my eyes, and per- ceive it no longer; but I remember that I did per- ceive it; I will to conceive of it; and immedistely I do conceive of it; so that the feeling consequent upon the conception, is hardly distinguishable from that which followed the perception. Professor. Can you conceive of all objects of per- ception? Pupil. Every object of perception is an object of conception. This is another general'rule; but all ob- jects of conception are not objects of perception. Thus, I conceive of seeing, hearing, smelling, tast- nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recal upon oc- casion, other individuals, which are similar to them." "'Tis a princi- ple generally received in philosophy, that every thing in nature is individual, and that it is utterly absurd to suppose a triangle really existent, which has no precise proportion of sides and angles. If this, therefore, be absurd in fact and reality, it must also be absurd in idea."—Hume. 5*» Laws of Conception. ing, and touching, but I cannot perceive a thought, a circle around the earth, or the distance between the sun and our planet. Moreover, I find, that one man in his present state, often has different conceptions of the same object; and that similar conceptions of the same ob- ject differ in the degree of their vigour and vivacity. The state of my body and of my mind, I find by experience also affects the conceptions of the human mind, both in their nature and degree. Professor. Can you give any general laws con- cerning the origin of our conceptions?* Pupil. I can account for them generally, in no other manner than by saying, that man has a facul- ty of conception, and therefore it is as natural to him to foi;m conceptions as to breathe. From what * "Upon a slight attention to the operations of our own minds, they appear to be so complicated, and so infinitely diversified, that it seems to be impossible to reduce them to any general laws. In consequence, however, of a more accurate examination, the prospect clears up; and the phenomena, which appeared, at first, to be too various for our comprehension, are found to be the result of a comparatively small number of simple and uncompounded faculties, or of simple and un- compounded principles of action. These faculties and principles are the general laws of our constitution, and hold the same place in the philosophy of mind, that the general laws we investigate in physics, hold in that branch of science. In both cases, the laws, which nature has established, are to be investigated only by an examination of facts; and in both cases,,a knowledge of these laws leads to an explanation of an infinite number of phenomena "—Stewart. " Now, as the act of moving large masses, has its laws in the facul- ties of the body, and in the levers which our arms acquire the power of using; so the act of thinking has its laws in the faculties of the mind, and in the levers [power*'] which our understanding has like- wise learned to use."—Condillac. Origin of Conceptions. 57 has been already said, it will be evident, that many of our conceptions are occasioned by our percep- tions; as those perceptions are occasioned by the existence of external objects. Our social relations give rise to other conceptions; and we never attend to the use of our own language by any one, without having some apprehension of the meaning of the speaker, or some conceptions concerning him, and the subject of his discourse. Hence, the notions of men very much depend upon education, taken in its most extensive sense; upon the times in which they live; the events which occur; the temperament of their constitution; and the circumstances of their existence. Professor. Are our operations of understanding the result of our volitions or not? Pupil. Many of them result from volition, and many of them do not. The same is true of percep- tions. Now when I perceive something without willing it; or even when I will not to perceive it; I find that an act of conception involuntarily succeeds it. Thus, I will not to see an obscene picture; some one unexpectedly presents ^before my eyes; I see it: I close my eyes, and conceive of it, even in op- position to my volition never to think of it again. So far, therefore, as our perceptions are involun- tary, our conceptions may be originated without, or even against our will. Were it otherwise with us* a man could not be placed in a state of trial by his Maker, unless the man should previously will to be put into a state of trial for probation. Professor. Your remarks are just. This faculty 58 Conceptions. of conception, and its operations, are peculiarly im- portant to man; for without it he would have no science, or systematic arrangement of knowledge, concerning any subject. He might, indeed, were his other faculties to continue in operation, perceive external objects, feel, will, and act, but he could have no language superior to that of brutes. Be- sides, it will soon appear, that our judgments, rea- sonings, emotions, conscience, and most important volitions, are dependent on our conceptions. CONVERSATION VI. The Faculty of Judging.—Objects of Judgment.—A Truth.—A False hood.—Classification of Judgments.—They are Constitutional or Acquired.—The former are consequent on Consciousness, Percep- tion, Conception, Memory or Conscience.—The latter result from Reflection, Reasoning or Testimony.—Believing considered. Professor. What is the Faculty of Judging?* Pupil. The faculty of judging, or The Judgment in man, is that inherent part of the original consti- tution of his soul, by which he decides that any proposition is true or not true. Professor. You intentionally make a proposition, in every case, the object of an operation of the judgment, I presume. Pupil. I do; because every operation of the mind, except it be a feeling, terminates on some object, distinct from the operation itself; and because I am conscious, that when I judge, some proposi- tion, some statement, expressed or understood, is the object of it. Not to judge some proposition to * Of the act of judging, Dr. Reid remarks, that it " is an operation of the mind, so familiar to every man who has understanding, and its name is so common and so well understood, that it needs no defini- tion." We are all conscious of judging, and we can have no stronger evidence of the fact. Still, we think a correct definition, would prevent or silence objections. Judging is a mental decision that a proposition is true or false. Go Acts of the Judgment. be true or false, would in our apprehension be, not to judge at all.* Professor. Can we perform any operation of judg- ing, without some previous mental act? Pupil. We must conceive of a proposition, before we can judge that the proposition is true or not true; so that there can be no act of judgment with- out some previous conception. This is one general law of mental operation. Professor. Is there not some reason to suppose, then, that judging is rather a complex, than a simple operation of the human mind? Pupil. No more than there is reason to think, be- cause a horse goes before the cart, and the cart comes after him, that they are not distinct things.f * The proposition which is the object of judgment, need not be expressed by sounds or letters. It is sufficient that it is conceived of by the mind. "There may be judgment which is not expressed. It is a solitary act of the mind, and the expression of it by affirmation or denial, is not at all essential to it. It may be tacit and not expressed. Nay, it is well known that men may judge contrary to what they af- firm or deny; the definition," (that judging "is an act of the mind, whereby one thing is affirmed or denied of another,") " therefore must be understood of mental affirmation or denial, which indeed is only another name for judgment."—Reid. ■f" Although there can be no judgment without a conception of the things about which we judge; yet conception may be without any judgment. Judgment can be expressed by a proposition only, and a proposition is a complete sentence; but simple apprehension may be expressed by a word or words, which make no complete sentence. "When simple apprelrension is employed about a proposition, every man knows that it is one thing to apprehend, a proposition, that is, to conceive what it means; but it is quite another thing to judge it to be true or false. It is self-evident, that every judgment mubt be either true or false; but simple apprehension or conception can neither be true nor false, as was shown before. One judgment may be contradic- Acts of the Judgment. 61 The fact, that our Maker has so constituted our minds, that we perform our mental operations in a certain order, no more destroys the distinctness of them, than the order observed in the production of flowers and fruits evinces that they are the same. Professor. What is the object of every true judg- ment? Pupil. A truth. Professor. And what is a truth? Pupil. 1 shall quote my teacher's language. " Any proposition in which is predicated any thing which was, is, or will be, in relation to an object, is a truth. On the other hand, that proposition in which any thing is predicated of an object which neither was, nor is, nor will be, is a falsehood." Of course, every untrue judgment has for its object a falsehood. "The adjective true denotes something pertaining to truth. A true proposition is a truth." Professor. Can you classify all human judgments? Pupil. They are either true or false, and thus may be divided into two classes. Professor. These two classes would include all; but such a classification would be of little service tory to another; and [but] it is impossible for a man to have two judg- ments at the same time, which he perceives [conceives] to be contra- dictory. But contradictory propositions may be conceived at the same time without any difficulty. That the sun is greater than the earth, and that the sun is not greater than the earth, are contradictory pro- positions He that apprehends the meaning of one, apprehends the meaning of both- But it is impossible for him to judge both to be true at the same time. He knows that if the one is true, the other must be false. For these reasons, 1 hold it to be certain, that judgment and simple apprehension are acts of the mind, specifically different."-— Reid. F 62 Classification of Judgments. - to the cause of science, unless you would give ub a list of truths and falsehoods. Do you think of no classification more important to the science of mind? Pupil. All judgments of the • human mind are either constitutional or acquired. Professor. Distinguish these two classes. Pupil. Constitutional judgments are such as im- mediately follow some previous mental operation, without requiring any induction, or experience. They result from the constitution of our minds, and are common to all men of sound mind. Acquired judgments result from some voluntary, inductive process, from testimony, or from experience. Professor. Can you reduce constitutional judg- ments to specific classes? You know they are nume- rous. Pupil. We may refer them to the different men- tal operations upon which they are consequent, and from which they seem spontaneously to arise. 1. The consciousness of the mind is followed in every man, by the constitutional judgments, that he exists; thai he performs the mental acts of which he is conscious; that another did not perform them; and that his mental operations are not all alike in species and degree. No man ever doubted these proposi- tions, if we may judge from the universal language of mankind; and all men decide that they are true, so soon as they form any just notions of conscious- ness. 2. Perception is immediately followed by many constitutional judgments. We are so constituted, that we no sooner perceive external objects, than we judge, that they exist; that they exist without Classification of Judgments. 63 us; that they have such qualities as we perceive in them; and that they are perceived through the or- gan, which is the instrument of their perception. For instance, when I see a horse running full speed towards me, I judge that there is a horse, that he is running towards me; that he is of a bay colour; and that he is not something else than I perceive him to be. In like manner, when we know the names of things, and perceive them, we judge that whatever we perceive really exists, and that our senses do not deceive us. These judgments are com- mon to all; and hence Berkeley and Hume, while they adopted a theory which excluded the actual being of all material objects, as firmly judged, in spite of their efforts to the contrary, as any men, that the ground was under them, and the sky over them; that the bodies of their fellow men were around them; and that all the objects of their per- ception existed, and were such as they perceived them to be. Were these constitutional judgments not to result from our perceptions, these perceptions would be of no practical use in life; for should we see a precipice in our path, and not judge, that a precipice was there, we should never will to avoid it; nor could we conceive of danger from any mate- rial substance. 3. Memory gives rise to other constitutional judg- ments; for without any effort, learning, or experi- ence, we judge, that our own mental actions, which we remember, actually had existence: and that we, who remember, did exist. If we remember to have heard any one speak, we judge that he did speak; and hence in giving testimony, we are said to affirm 64 Constitutional Judgments. or deny. In testifying, we publish our constitutional judgments, that result from memory; for, when we affirm, that an arraigned person murdered his bro- ther in our presence, we declare that we remember to have seen the murderous act performed, and that we judge the fact to correspond with our remem- bered perception. If we should not judge things to have been as we remember to have perceived them, our memory would be of no practical utility. All men, however, are constitutionally constrained to judge, that they actually have perceived, conceived, judged, inferred, felt, willed, approved, remember- ed, been conscious, and acted, as they remember they have acted, been conscious, remembered, ap- proved, willed, felt, inferred, judged, conceiyed, and perceived. 4. Many of our conceptions are followed by judg- ments, for which we can account in no other manner, than by saying, that we are so constituted that we thus judge, without reasoning, or any voluntary effort. All those conceptions which are properly call- ed acts of intuition, are of this description; while other conceptions may, or may not be followed by judgments, according to the circumstances of those conceptions. Thus, I conceive of the meaning of the proposition, " / read yesterday;" and from the cir- cumstance that / remember to have done it, or am told by a credible witness that I did it, I judge it to be a truth. But intuition, without any thing else connected with it, is the occasion of all those judg- ments, which being expressed in words, are called axioms, or self evident propositions. For example; by barely looking into the thing, by intuition, I discover Constitutional Judgments. 65 and judge, that there can be no effect without an adequate cause. We no sooner conceive of the meaning of this proposition, by looking into it, that is, by intuition, than we judge that it is a truth. Professor. Let us callXhese acts of the judg- ment, then, that immediately result from intuition, intuitive judgments. In most sciences these are the most important of our judgments, because all sys- tematic arrangements of knowledge are founded on axioms. The constitutional judgments, however, that are consequent upon perceptions, are most im- portant to the common transactions of life. Proceed in your account of constitutional judg- ments. Pupil. I can think of only one other source of them; and therefore I remark, 5. That an act of conscience is not only preced- ed by some judgment, but is also followed imme- diately by some constitutional judgment. The action of which we disapprove, we judge ought not to have been done. Now conscience approves or disapproves of actions, when compared with some moral law. If we approve of any contemplated action, we judge that it ought to be done. We find too, by consult- ing our own consciousness, that we judge a moral agent to be praiseworthy or blameworthy, commend- able or censurable, according as we approve or dis- approve of his moral conduct. Professor. Are you satisfied, that these are con- stitutional judgments? Pupil. I am; for while a man's conscience per- forms different operations at different times, rela- tive to the same object; and while different men [#F2] 66 Constitutional Judgments. mutually oppose each other, in their acts of appro- bation, and disapprobation; still, every man judges, at the time in which he really disapproves of any moral action, that it ought not to be done. It is common to all men, to judge immediately after the operation of conscience on the subjett, that men are to be justified or condemned, accordirvg to their ap- probation or disapprobation of their moral conduct. Professor. Hence if the conscience is erroneous, our judgment, concerning the obligation to perform certain moral actions, will be erroneous also. Are not some constitutional judgments imnjedi- 'ately consequent upon reasoning, feeling, willing, agency, and even judging? Pupil.. W'ere feeling used for that species of per- ception which you have called touching, as it some- times is, but not by yourself, I should say, that every feeling through the instrumentality of a bo- dily organ, is followed by a judgment, that we feel, through that particular organ. It is probably, how- ever, more correct to say, that the consciousness and conception of a feeling are followed by a judg- ment, that something has occasioned it. Professor. It is true, we judge, that there can be no feeling without some cause of feeling; but this is an intuitive judgment, tantamount to our intui* tive knowledge of the truth, that there can be no effect without a cause. You have already stated, than our consciousness of judging, reasoning, feeling, willing, and agency, is followed by constitutional judgments, that we, who are conscipus, exist; and that we perform the mental operations of which we are conscious. Constitutional Judgments. 67 You have before stated too, that immediately after perception, we judge concerning the bodily organ of perception, that we have perceived through it. Hence, if you prick a man in the thumb or great toe, he instantly perceives it by the sense of touch, and has both a judgment that he was pricked in the toe, or thumb, according as the fact may have been, and a feeling consequent upon the perception. This instantaneous judgment concerning the place and the mode of our being touched; and indeed, concerning the organ, or part of an organ employed as an instrumental cause of any perception, is de- signed, by our Maker, to regulate our voluntary exertions, for the preservation of the body. Without it, we should not know to what part of the body we should apply preventives or remedies. The painful sensations that immediately follow some percep- tions, are designed to make us immediately will to apply some remedy or defence to the part, which we judge to be the organ of that perception which occasions the sensation. Thus I perceive that I touch some sharp instrument. This act of perceiv- ing is in my mind. Instantly I have a painful sen- sation; and I judge that I touch it with the hollow of my right foot. The painful sensation induces me to will the removal of the sharp instrument; and my judgment directs my hand to the place affected. Were I destitute of a painful sensation in this case, I might not choose to remove the offending object; were I destitute of judgment concerning the organ touching the instrument, I should as readily move my hand for relief to my left elbow as to the hollow of my right foot. 68 Judgment. Pupil. Is not every sensation immediately fol- lowed by a constitutional judgment, concerning the cause of that sensation? Professor. From intuition we judge, that there is no effect without a cause; and consequently so soon as we conceive of sensation as an effect, we judge that it must have a cause; and hence we learn to look for the cause. These constitutional judg- ments, I have before said, are the result of concep- tions and not of sensation. If any constitutional judgment were immediately consequent upon sen- sation, we should naturally expect it would relate to the perception which occasioned it. Thus I per- ceive the drawing of a blister plaster on my wrist, and I feel a painful sensation. If any judgment should constitutionally follow the sensation, it would naturally be this; that my perception, through the wrist, is the occasion of my painful sensation. Now I find, by my own consciousness, that I no sooner have a perception through the wrist, which is a part of my organ of touch, than I judge from perception that my wrist is the part affected; but I find I must have some reflection, and must conceive of some connexion between my perceptions and, sensations, or between the application to my wrist, and the painful sensation, before I judge that my pain is produced by the blister plaster. I should think, therefore, that this judgment concerning the cause of sensation is acquired, and is dependent upon ex- perience, and some previous intuitive judgment. Pupil. But why should not sensation be followed by a judgment concerning the.instrumental cause of it, as well as perception? Acquired Judgments. 69 Professor. Our business is to ascertain, in mental science, what mental operations actually are per- formed, and not to conjecture what might be. It will appear, however, in its proper place, jhat our sensations themselves are all consequent upon perceptions; so that if a judgment concerning the organ of perception immediately follows the per- ception, there is no need of another judgment, to the same effect, consequent upon sensation. Pupil. I wish to know, if we could ever have any correct judgments concerning the nature of Reasoning, Feeling, Willing, Agency and Judg- ment, without having first performed these mental operations? Professor. I think not; but then you will please to remember, that our judgment concerning the na- ture of these operations is consequent upon our conception of them; immediately after the perform- ance of the acts themselves. We judge; then are con- scious of judging; then judge that we actually have judged; then conceive of the nature of, the act of judging; and then judge that the act is such as we conceive it to be. The same is true of the other operations just mentioned; and without conceiving of the nature of them, we never form any judg- ment concerning their nature. Let us now hear what you have to offer concern- ing acquired judgments. Pupil. Acquired judgments include all operations of the judgment which do not result immediately from our constitution. We denominate them ac- quired, because we learn to form them. We arrive 70 Reflective Judgments. at them by reflection, reasoning, and attention te testimony. Professor. Judgments resulting from reflection, may be called reflective judgments. Of this descrip- tion are the judgments formed on the bench, and in the common acts and intercourse of life, from the consideration of a variety of circumstances. Our experience is a common subject of reflection; and from the two, we judge, that fire will burn us; that water will flow down an inclined plane in future; that the wringing of the nose will bring forth blood; that the sun will rise to morrow; and thousands of of similar judgments. The result of every course of reasoning is an in- ductive judgment; and of all our judgments, these, even while they are most applauded among men, are most liable to impeachment, and subsequent condemnation. Constitutional judgments are never reversed by us; reflective judgments sometimes are; inductive judgments frequently are. Have you any distinct appellation for those judg- ments which have some testimony for their object? Pupil. Believing is an operation of the faculty of judging, which has some proposition which is a matter of testimony for its object. The proposition, " I think," I judge to be true, because I am con- scious of thinking. It is constitutional with every man, who thinks and is conscious, thus to judge, so soon as he conceives of the proposition. But if you assert, that you are now thinking of faith, I believe the assertion to be a truth. I cannot know that it is true, by any other faculty which I possess than that of judgment. The ground of my judgment Believing. 1\ is your testimony; and my previous judgment con- cerning your veracity. Professor. Is an act of believing or of faith, an acquired judgment? Do we not constitutionally ac- credit testimony? Pupil. The utterance of truth or falsehood, is a voluntary act. Indeed, if men speak at all, it is from volition. If they speak what they judge to be truth, or falsehood, it is from volition to do so. Now we find it to be a fact, that all men choose to speak the truth, until they think that some benefit will result from speaking falsehood, or from con- cealing the truth. This is a general law of human nature. Professor. But why do men naturally choose to speak the truth, under the circumstances which you have stated? Pupil. I am conscious, that the utterance of what I think to be truth, and the recollection that I have spoken the truth, are followed by pleasing emotions; while the utterance of known falsehood is attended with painful ones. I choose, therefore, to speak the truth, and not to speak falsehood, because of the pleasure consequent upon the former, and the pain that I know by experience attends the latter. I judge, moreover, that the experience of other per- sons corresponds with my own. Hence all men blush and feel shame, at the consciousness of lying, unless they have become in some measure hardened by habit. Hence, men naturally feel anger at the person who accuses them of intentional falsehood. Professor. It is the constitution of our minds which has connected painful emotions with con- 72 Believing. sciousness of lying, and agreeable ones with the consciousness of personal veracity; and it is our ex- perience of this constitution, which induces us to form the habit of uttering truth at all times, unless when we conceive that some advantage, which we prefer to these agreeable emotions, or on account of which we are willing to endure the painful ones, will result from telling an untruth. Pupil. This constitutional connexion, I remem- ber to have heard you say, constitutes a predisposi- tion in all men to utter truth. There is also in men, a constitutional predispo-' „ sition to believe the testimony which they hear. It is constituted by the natural connexion which sub- sists between the painful feelings consequent upon the discovery that we have been deceived, and the agreeable feelings which we find consequent upon the discovery, and even the accrediting of truth. To believe our neighbour, when he speaks, is natu- rally agreeable; to disbelieve him, unpleasant. Hence children believe the testimony of their parents, and of all who speak to them until they learn to doubt, in consequence of having experienced deception. Professor. If then, mankind have a natural pre- disposition in their mental constitution to speak truth, and to accredit testimony, I ask again, if be- lieving is not a constitutional, rather than an ac- quired judgment? Pupil. Had no obliquity of the human mind oc- curred, perhaps it might have been constitutional with us to give our assent to every statement made; and credulity would never have been known: hut the facts now are these; that we find in mankind a Believing. 76 constitutional predisposition to veracity and confi- dence; and that, nevertheless, no article of testimony, when proposed to us, is at once, from the consti- tution of our minds, judged to be true. I affirm, therefore, since every act of believing terminates on some proposition which is a matter of testimony, and since we do not constitutionally judge the tes- timony to be true, that believing is not a constitu- tional judgment. It is acquired, and commonly in the following manner. We consider the character of the testifier; and if we judge that he neither can, nor will utter false- hoods, then we subsequently judge that which we know he has testified to be true. Hence, the act of believing any one's testimony, is commonly subse- quent to some prior judgment concerning the author of the testimony. It is owing to this, that a judge considers the character of a witness, when he wishes to form a just estimate of the testimony which he gives; for we well know, that the solemnities of an oath will not induce some men to tell the truth to their own real, or conceived disadvantage. When a person is previously judged by us to be a competent witness; to be a man of integrity, des- titute of an unwise credulity, and well acquainted with the subject of which he speaks, we very readily judge that his testimony is true. On the other hand, if a notorious liar, a foolishly credulous person, and one manifestly ignorant of the subject concerning which he testifies, should utter the truth in our presence, his testimony would not be accredited, unless in our judgment some other circumstances, G 74> Believing and Assent. with which we are acquainted, should corroborate it. If we judge a proposition to be true from our own reflection on it, or from intuition, we ought not to call this judgment an act of believing. Professor. Yet men frequently say, that they be- lieve any proposition, which they judge to be true; whether it be a matter of testimony or not. Is this correct language? Pupil. Certainly not, if they would desire to dis- tinguish things by a difference in words, which are, or should be, the signs of conceptions, or ideas, or of some other mental operations. I think the word belief has -been _ very generally used for other acts of judgment than those of which it is properly de- scriptive, in consequence of our figuratively as- cribing acts of testimony to objects that cannot lite- rally testify. Thus we say, that our senses testify; when really they speak nothing; and hence we talk of believing them. This will do well enough in figu- rative, poetical, rhetorical discourse; but not in scientific discussions, or didactic theology. Professor. What we personally know to be true, we should say we judge or know to be true; and when we judge that some statement is true, which another declares is true, not because we have per- sonal knowledge on the subject, but for some other reasons,'we should use the language of belief. Pupil. What is assent? Professor. Ic is a judgment, resulting from re- flection, that some proposition which another states to us is true. Pupil. Whatis.ofmeral?' Conviction and Persuasion. 75 Professor. It is a judgment that some proposition which another declares to be true, is not true. Pupil. Is consent a judgment? Professor. It is generally used to denote a voli- tion to comply with some proposed agreement, or to acceed to some proffered terms. It is net a judg- ment. It may not be superfluous to remark, that an act of belief, and an act of faith are synonymous ex- pressions; that any judgment of the truth of a pro- position, which results from meditation or the exer- tions which others make to produce the judgment in our minds, is called A conviction; and that any judgment, which moves us to a volition to act in conformity with that judgment, is called a persua/ ston. CONVERSATION Vll. The faculty of Memory.—Objects of Memory.—Local Memory.— Classification of the Operations of Memory.—Recollection.—Re- membrance.—Memory essential to some Conceptions.—Time.— Duration.—Futurity.—Identity.—Knowledge of our own continued Mental Identity.—Personal Identity. Professor. What is the Faculty of Memory? Pupil. The Faculty of Memory in man, is that inherent part of the original constitution of his soul, by which he has present knowledge of his past mental operations. Professor. You make mental operations the ob- jects of memory: are there no other objects upon which the acts of this faculty terminate? Pupil. I judge, that there are not; because I am conscious of remembering nothing but mental ope- rations. Professor. Do you not remember your absent fa- ther's face? Pupil. It is very commonly said, that we remem- ber material objects; but when I carefully examine my own mind, I find, that I am conscious of re- membering my perceptions, and even my conceptions of my father's face. I remember too, the feelings which were consequent upon the sight of his face. I remember, moreover, that I have formerly remem- bered these things. In short, I remember, at differ- jent times, the simple operations of each faculty; and Memory. 77 those complex ones which result from two or more faculties; but I remember nothing but what has passed in my own mind. Professor. I cannot say that I am conscious of remembering any thing else: for had I never seen West's celebrated painting of Christ healing in the temple, I should not say that I remember it; and when I use such language, my meaning is, that I remember my seeing it. In the same manner, when we commit words to memory, so as to repeat them, memoriter, we remember our perception of them, either by the eye or the ear. Hence, a memoriter preacher, when delivering his discourse, remembers the perceptions which he has had of the words, pa- ragraphs, and pages of his manuscript; so that he " turns over leaves in his mind;" as I have heard one say he did, when reciting it to the people. Be it remembered, however, that it is a much more profitable employment to remember concep- tions, judgments and reasonings, than perceptions of words, or other things. A man who remembers his perceptions through his eyes, more readily than any other mental opera- tions, is said to have a local memory; or a memory that is particularly exercised about positions and places. A man who can more easily remember concep- tions, judgments, and reasonings, than his percep- tions of words, has acquired one of the most im- portant habits of memory. Pupil. I know a person who can remember the date of the birth of every relative which she has, and they are numerous; but hardly any thing else. G2 7B Different Operations Professor. She will serve as an example of local memory. I knew a man too, who, from the inspec- tion of maps, could accurately describe the position of every known country, river, sea, lake, ocean, and mountain under the sun; and he hardly remembered any thing else. The origin of this local memory will be explained when we treat of habit. Can you classify the operations of human me- mory? Pupil. They might be arranged into ten classes, corresponding with the ten faculties bf the human mind, whose operations are remembered. Professor. That would be a very natural classifi- cation. Do you think of any other? Pupil. All our operations of memory are per- formed either without, or with, voluntary effort to . produce them: and thus may be divided into two classes. Any act of memory which is consequent upon some volition, is called an act of reminiscence or RECOLLECTION. Any act of memory not resulting from some vo- lition to recollect, is called remembrance. Recollection, therefore, is consequent upon some volition to recollect; but I may remember without willing to do it; and even when I desire and xvill not to do it. An act of memory may be either recol- lection or remembrance. Professor. Do you conceive of any resemblances between the faculties of Consciousness and Memory, and their respective operations? Pupil. Consciousness has for its objects nothing but our own mental operations. The same is true of Memory. rs of memory. Could we cease to be conscious, or to remember, at pleasure, in consequence of simply willing not to be conscious, and not to remember, we might escape from all punishment; and even from the moral government of parents, civil rulers, and our Maker himself. These are resemblances. Professor. State the most prominent difference between Consciousness and Memory. Pupil. We are conscious of present mental ope- rations; we remember the past. Thus consciousness makes us know what we are now doing; and me- mory, what we have done. Memory gives per- petuity, or at least continuance to our knowledge. Professor. Could we have any knowledge of time, or duration, without memory? Pupil. We conceive of time and duration: we do not remember them: but as we should probably have no conceptions of perception without having actually seen, heard, smelt, touched, and tasted; so it is most likely we should never have conceived of time and duration, had we never remembered past men- tal operations. At any rate, should we conceive of perceptions, of time, of duration, and of futurity, without having exercised our senses and memory, our conceptions would be of that class which we have termed imaginations. - Professor. We find it to be a law of our consti- tution, that some conceptions of some things, shall be subsequent to some acts of perception or of me- mory. I have particularly observed in children in- dications, that they had no conceptions of the mean- ing of the terms, to-day, yesterday and to-morrow; no conceptions of time past, duration, and futurity; until they had exercised the faculty of memory. 80 Of Memory. Often I told my little daughter, when two years of age, that "to-morrow I would do something if we should live;" and she has answered, "yes, Papa, we live;" and for a considerable time could not conceive of the difference between living now, and at some future time. Memory, therefore, is actually exercised by children, before they learn to conceive of time. Pupil. Does personal identity consist in conscious- ness, as Mr. Locke affirms that it does; or in Me- mory? Professor. In neither. Identity is an object of con- ception; not of consciousness, nor of memory. In forming an idea of identity, we conceive of some being as having existed in past time, and as existing at present, or at some subsequent time; so that with- out having some notion of past and of present time, we could not conceive of identity. Memory, there fore, is as necessary to our conceiving of identity, as it is to our conceiving of past and present time. We next conceive, that this being which now exists, is the same which did exist; and this is our conception of the identity of a being. If we conceive, that any thing now is, and from any past time has continued to be essentially what it was, we conceive of iden- tity; and if we judge that this conception is a con- ception of a truth or of a falsehood, we judge con- cerning the identity of the thing; that it is the same thing that it was, or that it is not the same thing that it was. I perceive a watch hanging over the mantle-piece. I conceive of the meaning of the proposition, that watch is the same which hung there yesterday. This Of Identity. 81 is a conception concerning identity. I judge the pro- position to be a truth; and this is a judgment con- cerning the identity of the watch. Now let me arise and examine the watch. It has the same appearance externally, which I remember I perceived it had yesterday. I still judge it to be the same. Let us open it. The wheels that I ex- pected to find within are not to be seen. I reverse my judgment concerning identity, and say, this is not the same watch which hung here yesterday. The identity of the case I recognize; but it is not the watch that it was; for some of the essential parts of the watch are gone. Now let me take it to a watch-maker; and let him supply all the internal parts of a watch. I still recognize th -* identity of the case; but I judge that the internal parts are new. It is no longer the same watch; unless by watch I mean merely the case of a watch. Again, let us suppose that on opening the watch, instead of finding any wheels gone, every thing appears within and without, as I remember the watch I took down from the same nail did yester- day. I now judge this to be the very same watch I took down yesterday; because it looks like the same and I know there is no other silver watch in my house. Under present circumstances I cannot doubt its identity. But I may have a wrong judgment in this ease, for here come ten audible witnesses, who all testify, that one of them took down my silver watch ('rom that nail last night; that they took it to an artist; that he melted the silver case, in their prrseuce; and that he melted every internal part se- parately; but having done all this, he refashioned 82 Of Identity. the whole again, in the very mould in which it was made, so that every part now appears just as it did before it was reduced to a fluid; and that they re- stored it to the nail. I believe the witnesses: can I predicate identity of this watch, and of the watch that hung there yesterday? I cannot. Had I seen each part in the crucible, in a fluid state, I might have said, these are the identical particles of silver which composed my case; and these the identical particles of brass that composed the wheels; and so of the rest: but this is a new, another watch; formed out of the materials of the old one. Want of con- tinued existence as a watch has destroyed its iden- tity as a watch. Let us now change the subject, and instead of a watch, speak of a particular human soul, or mind. This mind now exists: and has the ten constituent faculties of every human mind. If we judge this same mind existed at some time before the present, and has now the same faculties which it then had, without having ceased to be, between the two given points of time, we predicate of it identity. Should this mind, however, be annihilated, or cease to be; and should another be erected like it, it would be another, and not the same mind. Pupil. I remember you have said in your Quar- terly Theological Review, " that mental identity con- sists in the continued existence of all the constituent mental faculties of that mind of which we predicate identity. Take away any one of the ten faculties from any human mind, and the identity of that mind would cease." The identity of the other faculties might be continued, but the mind constituted by Mental Identity. 83 ten faculties would cease to exist; and the being that should retain the nine would be a different mental being from any now called human. Professor. Can you discriminate between mental identity, and the knowledge which the mind has of its identity? Pupil. Very easily; for a man may be in a swoon; he may be destitute of all mental operations; and yet his mental faculties may all continue in exist- ence, and be the very same that had being before the swoon. " Our knowledge of our own mental identity we have by the operations of consciousness and memory; which has led many erroneously to suppose, that personal identity consists in consciousness, or in memory, or in both. We might as well say that the identity of a table consists in consciousness, as that the identity of a moral agent consists in knowing, that he is the same being, to-day, that he was yes- terday!" Quarterly Theological Review. Professor. Tell me, then, since you have ex- plained what you mean by mental identity, how a man comes by his knowledge that he is the same mental being that existed and acted yesterday? Pupil. I perform a mental action; I am conscious of it; and upon being conscious, constitutionally judge, that I now exist. Again, I remember that I was conscious in some past moment; and I consti- tutionally judge, that I did then exist. Now should the question be started, whether this thing denoted by I, that I call myself, be a mind or not, I should answer, that by /, or myself, I mean one individual mind. Should it be demanded, Is your mind that 84 Mental Identity. did exist, and now exists, one and the same mind? I answer, that I judge it, upon reflection, to be the same, in all its constituent faculties; for I am con- scious of now performing all the different mental operations which 11 remember that I did perform; whence I infer, that the mind is possessed of the same faculties, and is essentially the same. Professor. But how do you know, that you have not ceased to exist between the time of your present consciousness, and that past time in which you re- member that you did perform certain actions? Pupil. I now remember, that when I was two years of age, I saw my paternal grandfather incline his chair backwards, until he tumbled over; and from my constitution I judge, without being able to doubt the truth of my judgment, that I, who now remember, now exist; and that /, who now exist, did then exist, when I remember to have seen what occurred. That I, who now exist, am the same in- dividual that did then exist, is implied in the con- stitutional judgment, that I, who now remember, did then exist. Now, if I state the proposition, / have continued to exist from the time of the most remote mental operation which I remember, until the present time, in which I remember it, without any cessation of being; I conceive the meaning of it, and judge that it is a truth. Professor. You do indeed thus judge, and so does every other rational man. All, who remember, judge, that they have continued to exist, uninter- ruptedly, from the time in which, they remember any thing; but the question is, how come they by Mental Identity. 85 this judgment? Is it a constitutional or an acquired judgment? Answer this question, and you will then show, how a man obtains knowledge of his continued mental identity. If the judgment is constitutional, it will be in- stantly formed in your mind, without any reasoning or deliberation on the subject. If it is constitutional, no circumstances can make you seriously doubt it. To assist you in forming a correct opinion on this subject, let me state a fact. Some vears ago, a man in Northampton in Mas- sachusetts, took his axe, his beetle and wedges, and went into the woods to cut, and split, some fencing stuff. He went alone, and soon after returned in a state of delirium. He continued an active, ingenious, crazy person, for seven years. Near the expiration of that time, he began to indicate approaching sanity of mind; when one day, standing by his fire, and instantly turning round, he asked, " Boys, have you brought in that axe, the beetle and wedges?" " What axe, father?" asked his sons. " Why, the one I just left in the woods," said he: I had a pain in my head, and came home, and left it, with the beetle and wedges." His sons and fa- mily told him, that seven years ago, he went into the woods; that he had been disordered in mind ever since; and that they never had been able to find the implements which he then carried with him. He went with his sons to the spot, on vyhich he had left his farming utensils. The helve of the axe, and the whole of the beetle, except the iron rings, had mouldered under the leaves, and returned to H 86 Mental Identity. dust. The axe, and the wedges, and the rings were brought home; but the restored man never was able to remember any thing that occurred during seven years; and could judge, only from testimony, and refection, that he had continued to exist during that portion of his life. His judgment of his con- tinued identity was certainly acquired. The truth of the anecdote may be relied on: I had the account from the late President Dwight, a native of North- ampton. Pupil. This man constitutionally judged, that he existed, at each, and every time, in which he re- membered any one of his mental operations. Professor. All men do the same. Pupil. Could we then remember something for every moment of our existence, we should consti- tutionally judge, that we had existed in every mo- ment, from the present, to the most remote, time, in which we remember any thing done. Professor. True; but then no man does remem- ber something done by himself, in every moment of time, during which he judges that he has continued to exist; and hence no man constitutionally judges himself to be the subject of a continued mental identity. Pupil. Then the judgment that a man has con- cerning his own continued mental identity, must be acquired; and I am confident that all men have it; for no man judges, that he has at any one time ceased to exist, since his existence began; and all, from time to time, remember certain things, which induce the judgment, that they existed at each par- ticular time referred to by memory. All remember Mental Identity. 87 too, some of their mental operations which were performed during sleep; and hence judge that they exist in time of sleep. In this way they seem to ar- rive at the judgment, that they have never ceased to exist, since they can remember any thing. Professor. One thing, then, is certain, that if a man has ever,"for a moment, ceased to exist, since his mental existence began, he does not know it; for he judges that he existed at every time of per- forming any remembered act; nor can he believe it, for no one has ever testified to his temporary ex- tinction of mental being. Pupil. I should like to hear your account of per- sonal identity. Do you distinguish it from mental identity? Professor. When we speak of a human person, we mean an individual man, consisting of body and soul. Neither the one nor the other alone consti- tutes a person. Now the question may be asked, can personal identity be predicated of any one who passes from infancy through all the usual changes to old age? The most important part of the human being, the mind, continues essentially the same, from the cra- dle to the grave. The body undergoes numerous changes; but there are portions of it, which continue from the birth to the dissolution of the frame, by a process of corruption. Perfect personal identity, therefore, cannot with truth be predicated of any man, at two different periods of his lift; and yet the identity of' the mental being, the moral agent, may be predicated of one from his birth, to any fu- ture period of his existence. 88 Personal Identity. Pupil. What, then, does an old man mean, when he says, " I am the very same person that you knew, when I was a little boy?" Professor. He intends to assert his mental iden- tity, and the fact, that he who now thinks and speaks, was once the inhabitant of the little frame of the boy mentioned; which frame has grown and changed, from time to time, until it presents its present appearance of an old man. CONVERSATION VIH. The Faculty of Reasoning.—Premises.—Conclusion.—A Syllogism.— Classification of Reasonings.—Demonstrative and Probable Reason- ings.—Metaphysical and Mathematical Reasonings.—Analogical, Analytic, and Synthetic Reasonings.—Reasonings^a priori, a poste- riori, ad absurdum, and ad hominem. Professor. What is the Faculty of Reasoning? Pupil. The faculty of Reasoning in man, is that inherent part of the original constitution of his soul, by which he infers conclusions from premises. Professor. What is the result of every operation of reasoning? Pupil. An inferred judgment.* In reasoning we always deduce something before unknown from something previously known. Professor. What is logic? Pupil. The science of Reasoning: or a systematic arrangement of all we know about the operations of the Faculty of Reasoning. * " Reasoning is the process by which we pass from one judgment to another, which is the consequence of it. In all reasoning, therefore, there must be a proposition inferred, and one or more from which it is inferred. And this power of inferring, or drawing a conclusion, is only another name for reasoning; the proposition inferred, being call- ed the conclusion, and the pioposition or propositions, from which it is inferred, the premises."—Reid. H2 90 Reasoning. Professor. Could any .man reason without having some previous operations of judgment? Pupil. He could not, for reasoning implies some previous judgments and an inference from them. Without admitted axioms, or self-evident proposi- tions, or acquired judgments, reasoning could never commence; but when by reasoning we have estab- lished any judgment, it may be used as one of the premises, from which we derive another conclusion. Professor. Your account would make every act of reasoning imply a syllogism, expressed or under- stood. J^upil. A syllogism is nothing more than the ex- hibition of a process of reasoning. It consists of three propositions, the two first of which are called premises, and the last the conclusion. It very frequently happens, however, that we state one truth, and infer another from it, without naming one of our premises, because it is so obvious as to be understood by every one. An argument of this kind is called an Enthymeme. Thus we might say, " because God is a just being, the just man will be justified by him." The last clause of this sen- tence is an inference; the first clause is one of the premises, from which it is derived; and the other is understood. The whole chain would be express- ed «hus: By a just being a just man will be justified: God is a just being: Therefore, a just man will be justified"by him. The first of these three propositions is a truth, so generally known and admitted, that in reasoning from it, few would take the trouble to state it: and Reasonings. 91 in like manner, we omit thousands of axioms, and generally admitted principles of reasoning. Professor. Can you classify human reasonings? Pupil. They are either true or false. The rea- soning of any one, in any particular instance, is false, when the inference from the premises is not a le- gitimate one, or when either of the premises is false. An inference may be legitimate, and yet false, when either of the premises is false; and the reasoning may be false, when an illegitimate conclusion is drawn from true premises. Professor. What is the usual difference between the reasonings of a fool and a. madman? Pupil. The fool states true premises, and infers from them an illegitimate conclusion. His infe- rences do not naturally, and in the view of rational men, flow from his premises. The madman, on the other hand, states false premises and argues conclu- sively from them. Should we admit his premises we could not avoid admitting his inferences. Professor. You may give another classification of human reasonings. Pupil. Dr. Reid has said, " The most remarkable distinction of reasonings is, that some are probable, others demonstrative." Hence, I should say, that in probable reasonings, the conclusion is probably true; but in demonstrative reasonings, the conclu- sion is demonstrably true. Demonstrative reason- ing is called demonstration. Professor. What is the prominent distinction be- tween probable and demonstrative reasonings? Pupil. In demonstrative reasoning, each of the premises is judged to be certainly true, and the con- 92 Logic. Definition. elusion is judged necessarily to result from them: but in probable reasonings one at least of the pre- mises admits of some doubt. Professor. Give an instance of demonstration. Pupil. Things which are equal to the same, are equal to one another: The sum of seven and three, and the sum of five and five are equal to the same number, ten: Therefore the sum of seven and three, and the sum of five and five are equal to one another. The first proposition in this syllogism is a ma- thematical axiom; the second is an intuitive judg- ment, and neither the one nor the other of these premises can be doubted by any one, who under- stands the meaning of the terms used. The conclu- sion necessarily follows; and a different conclusion cannot be judged even possible. Professor. In Duncan's Elements of Logic, we have a similar example. " Every number that may be divided into two equal parts, is an even number: The number eight may be divided into two equal parts: Therefore the number eight is an even number." Here the first proposition is a definition of a utprd; and if you judge it to be correct, from a conception of the meaning of the terms, the conclusion will inevitably follow; for every man will, from intuition, judge, that the second proposition is true. Pupil. But I judge, that the definition.'^ «ot cor- rect; for it would prove every number to be an even number. Thus five as well as eight may be divided into two equal parts. Two and a half, are a part of Reasonings. 93 five, equal to two and a half, the other part of five. Thus every number may be divided into two equal parts. He would have been correct had he said, " Every number, the units of which may be di- vided into two equal parts, is an even number:" for we could not divide the units composing the number five into two equal parts. One unit would remain after we had made two equal parts, each of which should contain two; and by the definition we are to make two even parts by the units, without di- viding a single unit into halves. Hence two, four, six, eight, and ten are called even numbers; for they can be equally divided without leaving a unit for the remainder; and one, three, five, seven, and nine, are called uneven or odd numbers; because the units that compose them cannot be divided into two equal numbers of units. Professor. You are correct. Duncan's Logic might, without any detriment to the cause of science, be dismissed from our colleges. Can you give as good a criticism on Dr. Reid's division of demonstrative reasonings into metaphysical and ma- thematical reasonings. You know he says, " The reasonings I have met with that can be called strict- ly demonstrative, may, I think, be reduced to two classes. They are either metaphysical, or they are mathematical." Pupil. Mathematics, strictly speaking, are things learned; and metaphysics include all things known concerning the nature, relations, operations and at- tributes of all beings which exist. Mathematical rea- sonings, therefore, ought to include all reasonings concerning things learned; and metaphysical rea- 94 Reasonings. sonings, all reasonings concerning all beings, of every descriptiDn. Some have restricted the mean- ing of mathematics and metaphysics; so as to denote by the former, the sciences of arithmetic, algebra, geometry, trigonometry, spherical trigonometry, astronomy, and the mensuration of solids; and by the latter, the science of all immaterial substances. But such a restriction would not suit Dr. Reid's classification of reasonings; for the axioms of ma- thematical science, (using mathematical in the re- stricted sense,) are such propositions as the mind of man, from intuition, judges to be true; and so partake of a metaphysical nature. It is extremely difficult, therefore, to class our reasonings of a de- monstrative kind, under the two heads of metaphy- sical and mathematical, whether these words be used in a restricted, or in their most extensive sense. The fact is, demonstrative reasoning may be em- ployed in any, and every science, which contains axioms, or is founded on constitutional judgments. Professor. Well: give me an example of Proba- ble Reasoning. Pupil. What the sun has done uninterruptedly for a thousand years past it will do to-morrow: The sun for a thousand years past has uninter- ruptedly illuminated the portion of earth on which we live: Therefore the sun will to-morrow illuminate it. Of the truth of the first proposition in this conca- tenation, we cannot be certain, unless the Creator of the sun and earth should assert it. It is possible the sun may not illuminate Philadelphia, and the ad- jacent country. It is possible, in the nature of things, Reasonings. 95 that it should be annihilated. Were this first propo- sition infallibly certain, as a self-evident truth is to our minds, the inference could not be doubted; the first could not be otherwise than as it is stated. The reasoning, therefore, is not demonstrative: and it cannot be demonstrated that the sun will shine here to-morrow. He may be completely shorn of his beams, for a day, or a month, or for ever. Probably, therefore, might with propriety be inserted in the first of these premises, and in the conclusion; as it may in every instance of probable reasoning. What the sun has done uninterruptedly for a thousand years past, it will probably do to-morrow. There- fore, it will probably shine on us to-morrow. Professor. Were it deducible from any self-evi- dent truth, that day and night, seed time and harvest, summer and winter, should never cease while the world exists, that they should not cease would probably never have been made a matter of direct revelation. Probable reasonings admit of many degrees of probability; and upon judgments which are probably true, we are obliged to act in the greater part of our affairs.* * " Probable evidence is essentially distinguished from demonstrative by this, that it admits of degrees; and of all variety of them, from the • highest moral certainty, to the very lowest presumption. We cumot indeed say a thing is probably true upon one very slight presumption for it, because, as there may be probabilities on l>oth sides ot a ques- tion, there maybe some against it; and though there be not. vet a slight presumption does not beget that degree of conviction which is implied in saying a thing is probably true. But that the slight st pos- sible presumption is of the nature of a probability, appears from hence, 96 Analogical Reasonings. Analogical reasonings are nothing more than a species of probable reasonings, in which one or both of the premises is a matter of analogy. The syl- logism you have just given is an instance; for the proposition, that what the sun has done it will con- tinue to do, is a judgment which we learn to form from analogy. A few other distinctions I will name. They re- spect modes of reasoning. When we form judgments by observation and experience, or in any other way, concerning indivi- dual things, and make them the premises whence we infer general or universal truths, we are said to pursue the analytic mode of reasoning. Thus, we judge from observation, that one gravid substance gravitates to the centre of the earth; as Sir Isaac Newton judged, that the apple did. Again, we judge from what we perceive, that another, and another, and another, similar substance does the same; until we have formed this judgment concern- ing every gravid body, with which we are acquaint- ed. Then we reason thus, Wood, stone, lead, water, earths, &c gravitate towards the centre of the earth: Wood, stone, lead, water, earths, &c. are all the gravid bodies with which we are acquainted: that such low presumption, often repeated, will amount even to a moral certainty. Thus a man's having observed the ebb and flow of the tide to-day, affords some sort of presumption, though the lowest imaginable, that it may happen again to-morrow; but the observation of this event for so many days, and months, and ages together, as it has been observed by mankind, gives us a full assurance that it will." Butler's Analogy. Modes of Reasoning. 97 Therefore, all the gravid bodies with which we are acquainted gravitate towards the centre of the earth. The first of these propositions should enumerate in the place of the &?c. which we have introduced for the sake of brevity, every gravid substance, with which we are acquainted, and then the inference would be as certain as those constitutional judg- ments which follow our perceptions. Should we choose to adopt the synthetic mode of reasoning, we might now make some general truth one of our premises, and from it infer some parti- cular truth; thus: All the gravid bodies with which we are ac- quainted gravitate towards the centre of the earth: Stone is one of the gravid bodies with which we are acquainted: Therefore, stone gravitates towards the centre of the earth. You will readily apprehend, that many sciences are reared by analytical reasonings; but that being already established they may be taught in the syn- thetic method. I do not affirm that every systematic arrangement of knowledge, on any subject, called a science, is made by analytical deductions; for many constitutional judgments are themselves general principles. Those sciences which are generally in- cluded under the title of natural philosophy and na- tural history, are all formed originally by analy- tical reasonings: but arithmetic, algebra, geometry, trigonometry, spherical trigonometry, astronomy, and mensuration of solids, have grown out of the synthesis of axioms and definitions. I 98 Modes of Reasoning. Pupil. Do not the sciences of natural philosophy and history depend very muoh upon analogical, probable reasonings? Professor. Undoubtedly they do; and therefore I wonder, that men of sense should deem natural philosophy any more capable of certainty than men- tal science. The conclusion, that all gravid bodies will gravitate to the centre of the earth to-morrow, is derived from nothing more certain than analogy; and from analogy alone can the natural historian judge, that all human bodies which he has not dis- sected, have viscera essentially similar to those which he has dissected; and that the same medi- cines in similar circumstances, will produce similar effects, on the living subject to-morrow, which they have done to-day. Pupil. I have heard old logicians talk much about reasonings a posteriori, a priori, ad absurdum, and ad hominem. Will you explain them? Professor. Reasonings a priori, are inductions . concerning effects from their causes. The premises, of course, in a priori reasonings, must predicate something concerning the cause of a thing; and the conclusion from the premises, some inference con- cerning an effect of that cause. I give an example, from Dr. s! Clark, on the being and attributes of God. A Being in his own nature infinite, omnipresent, and intelligent, must be infinitely wise: The Supreme Being is in his own nature, infi- nite, omnipresent, and intelligent: Therefore the Supreme Being must be infinitely wise. Modes of Reasoning. 99 Here the nature of the Supreme Being is consi- dered as the cause of his infinite wisdom; which is an infinite, unchangeable effect, of this Infinite, Unchangeable Cause. Reasonings a posteriori, are inductions concern- ing causes from their effects. The premises, in reasonings of this kind, must predicate something concerning effects. One example will suffice. Every intelligent creature must have had an in- telligent Creator; Man is an intelligent creature: Therefore man must have had an intelligent Creator. Here man is the effect, concerning which it is predicated, that he must have had an intelligent Creator: and the Creator is the cause of man's ex- istence; concerning which cause we infer, that he is intelligent. Reasoning ad absurdum, is an act of reason in which you infer some absurd proposition, with a design to establish the converse of that conclusion. This mode of reasoning is adopted, because it is an Undisputed principle of reasoning, that if a. proposi- tion be false, the converse of it must be true: and if a proposition be true, the converse of it must be false. Thus we may assert, That God is a good being, or That God is not a good being. Each of these propositions is the converse of the other; and every one will readily judge, upon the slightest examination, that if either is true, the other must be false. Reasoning ad hominem, is a reasoning at a man; 100 Reason. or an act of reasoning in which you take a man's own propositions, whether true or false, for your premises, with a design to refute some of his asser- tions, or to convince him of some truth. Pupil. Do you make any distinction between Reason, and the faculty of reasoning? Professor. The faculty of reasoning is sometimes called the Reason of a man; but reason more com- monly denotes the result of our intellectual opera- rations. Hence we say, that our reason teaches us, such and such a truth. A reason for an action, is a motive; and the reason of an event, means the occa- sion or instrumental cause of that event. CONVERSATION IX. The Faculty of Conscience.—Proof that all men have this Faculty.— Other names for the same thing.— Some general Observations and Laws concerning the Operations of Conscience.—Operations of Con- science always occasion certain Feelings. Professor. What is the faculty of Conscience? Pupil. The faculty of conscience in man, is that inherent part of the original constitution of his soul, by which he performs mental operations of a re- ligious character. Professor. You would have it understood, I pre- sume, that the religion of which you speak in this case may be either true or false, rational or absurd; Scriptural, Deistical, or Atheistical. Pupil. I would; because all men have a religion of some sort, as we judge every rational being, who has a conscience, must have; but I should be far from deciding, that all religions are equally good, or that one may be contradictory to another, and both be true. Professor. How do you know that all men have a conscience? Pupil. All men with whom we are acquainted, or of whom we have ever read, approve of some moral actions, and disapprove of others; according to the moral law which they have either formed or 12 102 Conscience. adopted. The law may, in the judgment of others, be reasonable or unreasonable; but so long as a man approves of the law, in his own mind, he will ap- prove of conformity to it, and disapprove of the transgression of it. Now every act of mental approbation, or disap- probation, is a mental operation of which a man is conscious; and which, every man may readily be convinced, is distinct from any operation of any Other f^cultv. It is because men are conscious of these acts of conscience, and judge them to be dif- ferent from other simple operations of the soul, that they have given them distinct names. From the general principle, that there can be no effect without an adequate cause, we infer, that all men who approve or disapprove of any moral action, must have a faculty of mind by which they perform these operations: and this faculty we call Conscience. Some denominate it the Moral Faculty, and others the Moral Sense. Professor. Hdwdo men commonly express their approbation or disapprobation of moral actions? Pupil. They affirm or deny, that they are right or wrong. They say, that such particular actions oughts'or ought not to be done: and that they are either morally good, or morally evil In short, their modes of expressing the dictates of their consciences are very numerous. Had they no consciences, they would never speak of a sense of moral obligation, rectitude, virtue, piety, and religion; unless they were to imagine things, of which, from experience, thty could form no conceptions. Professor. The fact that men either mentally ac- Conscience. 103 cuse or excuse themselves^ for their own conduct, is another proof that they have consciences: and their attempts to make other men approve or disapprove of certain courses of conduct, are evidence that they think other men have consciences as well as them- selves. Pupil. May not every operation of conscience be resolved into judgment and feeling, and so be ac- counted a complex, instead of a simple operation? Professor. After mature reflection upon what passes within me, I feel constrained to express my judgment, that the approbation or disapprobation of a moral law or action, is neither a judgment, nor a feeling, but a single act, that seems to partake of both. I am conscious that I judge the proposition, men ought not to steal, to be true: I am conscious of certain feelings too, consequent upon this judg- ment; and I am conscious, moreover, of approving of the proposition as a rule. The acts of judging this moral rule to be true, and of feeling content- ment with it, or love for it; appear to my mind to be as distinct from a conscientious approbation of it, as any acts of memory from those of reasoning. As a particle is a word distinct from every other part of speech, and yet partakes of the nature of a verb and of a noun, so it appears to me, that an act of conscience partakes of the nature of a judgment and of a feeling, and yet is distinct from each, and every other kind of mental operation. It is by this faculty that I experience what is called a sense of obligation, and a sense of account- ability. Perhaps you are able to enumerate some general 1©4 Conscience. laws concerning the operations of conscience, which will serve to distinguish them from other mental acts. Pupil. I am conscious of approving or disapprov- ing actions only when I remember that I have com- pared them with some rule of moral conduct, and judged them to be conformable or not conformable to it. Professor. Every operation of conscience, then, relative to moral actions, presupposes an act of the judgment. Pupil. Certainly; for I never approve of any ac- tion without previously judging that it is right; that is, conformable to some rule of action, which I have laid down. Again; I never, judge any law to be reasonable, equitable, and obligatory, without some previous conception concerning it: the same is true of my judgment concerning actions; it is consequent upon some conception of them, and of their relation to a law: so that my moral approbation is consequent upon my judgment, and my judgment upon my con- ceptions. Professor. Ultimately, then, our dictates of con- science are dependent on our conceptions1; and hence we learn the importance of having right concep- tions, or a right understanding of things; for if a man verily thinks, (conceives and judges,) that he ought to do many things against Jesus of Nazareth, his conscience will approve of the action. Hence we hear of the blinding and perversion of conscience. It is by having a darkened understanding, that men approve of what is wrong in the judgment of more Conscience. 105 enlightened and exalted minds. If you would pro- duce in a man a good conscience, rectify his con- ceptions and judgments. Pupil. It must be owing to this connexion be- tween the operations of Conception and Judgment, and those of Conscience, that the most ignorant people, generally speaking, are the most vicious. Professor. Undoubtedly; their consciences in many cases are not exercised at all; and in other instances, from wrong notions concerning law, duty, and the nature of moral actions, they approve of moral evil. Pupil. It is another peculiar law of Conscience, that if a man acts contrary to his own moral appro- bation, he immediately disapproves of his own trans- gression. In figurative language, Conscience always makes a man condemn himself, for not doing what she approves, and for doing what she condemns. A similar law exists in relation to no other mental ope- ration. We may act contrary to any other mental operation, and she will not infallibly condemn us. Indeed she often approves of our yielding our own judgment, for the sake of peace; and requires oppo- sition to some of our most ardent emotions; but if any man dare to act contrary to his Conscience, however uninformed, or misinformed, she may be, ^ mscience will surely scourge him. It is for this reason she has been called the Vicegerent of God in the soul; and is often compared to an impartial Judge. Professor. Dr. Reid has very well remarked; " Conscience prescribes measures to every appetite, affection, and passion, and says to every other prin- 106 Conscience. ciple of action, so far thou mayest go, but no fur- ther. We may indeed transgress its dictates, but we cannot transgress them with innocence, nor even with impunity. We condemn ourselves, or, in the language of Scripture, our heart condemns us, when- ever we go beyond the rules of right and wrong, which Conscience prescribes. Other principles of action may have more strength, but this only has authority. Its sentence makes us guilty to ourselves, and guilty in the eyes of our Maker, whatever other principle may be set in opposition to it. It is evi- dent, therefore, that this principle has, from its na- ture, an authority to direct and determine, with re- gard to our conduct; to judge, to acquit, or to con- demn, and even to punish; an authority which be- longs to no other principle of the human mind." Pupil. It is another law of Conscience, that every act of disapproving of our own past conduct, should be immediately followed by some emotion of shame, self contempt, or disgust with ourselves: and ano- ther, that disapprobation of the past conduct of others should occasion in us the emotions of disgust, aversion, discontentment, contempt or indignation in relation to them. On the other hand, approbation of our own or our neighbour's past moral actions, is immediately fol- lowed by some agreeable affection in our own mind a Professor. Operations of Conscience, then, are always productive of pleasure or pain. Pupil. And in this way Conscience rewards or punishes men in the present life. Professor. Is there any distinction between those Conscience. 107 Operations of conscience, which respecV the conduct of other men; and those which regard ourselves? Pupil. When we approve or disapprove of our own conduct, our consequent emotions are more ardent, than those which ordinarily follow our ap- probation or disapprobation of the conduct of our fellow men. This has led Dr. Wylie to divide the operations of conscience into those of seoscience and heteroscience; or into acts of conscience that respect ourselves, and acts of conscience that respect others. These may be considered as two classes of opera- tions performed by one faculty. Our general rule, therefore, may be expressed thus: acts,of seoscience are commonly followed by emotions more pleasing or more painful than those which are consequent upon heteroscience. K CONVERSATION X. The Faculty of Feeling.—Feelings distinguished from other Mental Operations.—One general Law of Feelings.—Classification of all Human Feelings.—Sensations considered.—Three Appetites.— Uses of the word Taste.—Emotions.—Description of the principal Affections of Man.—A rule concerning inordinate Affection.—Re- gard. Professor. What is the faculty of Feeling? Pupil. The faculty of feeling in man, is that inherent part of the original constitution of his soul, by which he experiences feelings. This is the sen- sitive faculty.* Professor. Can you define those mental opera- tions that you c^ll feelings? Pupil. If I cannot define them, I am conscious of them, and therefore I know that I am the sub- ject of them. I can distinguish them from all other mental operations, by stating this fact, that they have no object distinct from themselves; whereas every other mental operation has some object upon which it terminates. If I perceive it is some object without the mind, which is presented through our * " It is the mind that feels; it is to the mind alone that the sensa- tions belong," says Condillac, very truly; but feeling he unhappily uses for perceiving, and sensations for perceptions. Hence he says, " we have five sorts of sensations. The mind feels through sight, hearing, smell, taste, and chiefly through touch." Pleasure and Pain. 109 bodily senses; if I conceive, it is of some substance, or attribute, or image, or meaning of a word, clause, or sentence; if we judge or reason, some proposition is the object; if we are conscious or have memory, it is of some mental operation; if we approve or dis- approve, it is something of a moral nature; if we will, it is to do, or not do, some action; and if we exert our efficiency, it is upon some mental faculty or bodily organ; but if we feel, it must be some feeling, and nothing else. Professor. In what consists all human happiness or unhappiness? Pupil. In human feelings. Were we destitute of these, we should feel neither pleasure nor pain. All the happiness or unhappiness, which we derive from our thoughts, is inherent in the feelings which they produce; for, if we have any degree of the one or the other, we feel it. Professor. It seems necessary for you**to define the word thought; that no misconception may arise from the manner of your using it. Pupil. Any operation of any one of the seven fa- culties of The Understanding, I call a thought. Agency, volition, and feeling are mental operations, which we exclude from the catalogue of thoughts; and they are excluded in all languages. Professor. You would assert then, I suppose, as a general rule, that men never have any feeling ex- cept in consequence of some thought, volition, or efficiency.* * "It is a fact universally admitted, that no emption or passion < ver starts up in the mind without a cause: if 1 love a person, it is for good K 110 Classification of Human Feelings. Pupil. Upon self-examination, I judge, that every feeling I ever had, was preceded by some thought, volition, or efficiency, which was the occasion of it. If our feelings were not dependent on some previ- ous mental operation, or upon some antecedent, it would be very absurd to inquire, what is the occa- sion of our having one feeling and not another; or why we feel as we do. If we give the reason for our feeling in any particular instance, it will uni- formly prove to be some thought, volition, or men- tal agency. Professor. Human feelings are very numerous: can you classify them? Pupil. I can recite your classification, which seems to me to be correct. " All human feelings may be divided into sen- sations and emotions. " Our Sensations* are those feelings which are immediately consequent upon our perceptions of ob- jects without the mind, through the five bodily organs of sense. " Our Emotions are those feelings which are con- sequent upon other mental operations than our per- ceptions, by the organs of sense. qualities, or good offices: if I have resentment against a man, it must be for some injury done me: and I cannot pity any one who is under no distress of body nor of mind."—Lord Katnes. We must conceive, we should say, of some good quality, or office; of some injury, or of some distress, before we can feel love, resentment, or pity; for we may feel if all these are imaginary things; but we cannot feel without some conception of them as real. * " Sensations," says Price, " is only a mode of feeling in the mind."—Review of Morals, p. 19. Classification of Human Feelings. Ill "Emotions are subdivided into Affections and Passions. u Affections are those emotions of the mind which are naturally pleasurable to us. " Passions are those emotions of the mind which are naturally painful to us. " This brief classification includes every feeling of which we are conscious."* Professor. According to this account of sensa- tions, they are always consequent upon perceptions. How do you know that men do not feel through their bodily organs when they have no perceptions? Is it not common for men to say, " I feel that this is smooth, this rough, this soft, and this hard?" Do they not tell you, that they feel pain in their eyes, when oppressed with too much light; and in their fingers when they are cold? Pupil. It is customary, indeed, for people to say, that they feel, whenever they perceive any thing; and they speak of feeling, as if it were equivalant to perception, because every perception is followed instantly by a feeling of some kind. Feeling too is often used for touching; but because a feeling, dis- tinct from the perception of a thing by the touch, is consequent upon every act of touching, we should distinguish in our language between touching and feeling. Professor. Now, for the proof that the particular kind of feeling which we call sensation is always consequent upon perception. * Quarterly Theological Review, vol. i. p. 454 112 Sensations. Pupil. WelL, then, when I put my finger upoti a polished, surface, I am conscious that I touch or perceive something smooth; and I am conscious that I have an agreeable sensation immediately following the perception. When I touch a rough, and espe- cially a prickly substance, I am conscious that a very different feeling, or sensation, immediately fol- lows the act of touching, from what I experienced when I touched something smooth and polished. I find the same to be true, when I attend to any ope- ration of seeing, hearing, smelling, or tasting: so that my consciousness teaches me, that every per- ception to which I attend, is followed by some sen- sation: and no man can say that his perceptions to which he does not attend, are not thus followed, unless he can testify to that of which he knows no- thing. That I never have a sensation,* but in consequence of some perception, I deduce from the fact, that I • Dr Hartley has well said, « Sensations are those internal feel- inn of the mind, which arise from the impressions made by externa Objects upon the several parts of our bodies." Another sentence that deserves from its obvious truth, to be cited, can scarcely be found in S « Observations on Man » That work is a fanciful attempt to ex- Ulain how all mental operations may be imputed to the instrumental Lncy of vibrationsin the infinitesimal white medullary particUs in the tutoLe of the brain, spinal marrow, andnerves. '1 ^t there are any such vibrations he has not proved; and no one can affirm, from his own observation, feeling, reason, consciousness, or expenence of any Z" D Hartley, however, admits, that these ribrations .re mere y Zinstrumental and not the efficient causes, of sensations, and oth mental operations; so that he no more accounts for the intercourse TetwenThe soul and body than those who confess it to be mcompre- hensible Sensations. 113 am able to trace my sensations to some antecedent perceptions. Again, I know that objects of perception have been sometimes presented to my bodily senses, and that I had no sensations in consequence of their physical action on my body, until I perceived them. For example, I have been walking the streets in such a state of mental occupation, that I have not perceived a friend whose image, I subsequently learned, must have been formed on the retina of my eyes; and not perceiving him, I had no such a sen- sation of a pleasurable nature as always follows the perception of his animating face. Had my sensation been immediately dependent on physical impression, I should have had a pleasing sensation from the image of my friend in my eye, without perceiving him. I give another instance. I have been so en- gaged in study for some time, as not to perceive the pricking of a pin; and I felt no painful sensation until I had perceived it. Professor. All who have attentively examined their own mental operations, must have found, that the faculty of Conception, and several other facul- ties, are often so busily engaged as not to afford the faculty of Perception leisure, or opportunity, to operate. Hence a very thoughtful man may ride through a fine country, and perceive very few of its beauties. Such a person is frequently called an absent man; for indeed he seems to be like one ab- sent from the objects of perception that surround him. When engaged in writing, I do not hear the conversation, which passes in the usual tone, in my chamber; and very frequently mental science so K2 114 Sensations. engages my Reason, Judgment, Memory, and Con- ception, that the shrill voices of my children, pulling at my knee, to ascend into my lap, are scarcely per- ceived, while the same action of the modulated at- mosphere on my ears, at other times, would be the occasion of my hearing every syllable. So long as I do not hear the noise of my children, it gives me no painful sensation. Pupil. Your remarks have brought to my re- membrance this fact, that men who feel acute sen- sations of pain, from the gout, rheumatism, or other disease, may for a time, by close attention to some important, interesting study or business, avoid feel- ing the pain. Professor. By their energetic attention to some intellectual subject, they preclude, for the time, all perception of objects through their senses; especially the operation of inflammation, or other disease, upon the organs of touch; and so have no sensations, be- cause they have no perceptions. Not long since, I was wounded on the knee; and the pain was intense so long as I perceived any thing through my knee; but for a little time, when I could deeply engage my mind in the study of mental science, or theolo- gical inquiry, or devotional exercises, I had no sen- sations of pain from my knee, because I ceased to perceive through the wounded part. I lay it down, therefore, as a fundamental law, that man has no sensation except in consequence of some antecedent perception. Can you reduce our sensations to classes? Pupil. Thty may be divided into as many classes as we have species of perceptions, or bodily organs Sensations. 1U of sense. They are sensations consequent on seeing, hearing, smelling, toufhing, or tasting.* In each of these classes we may find as many sensations as we have ever performed acts of perception. Every distinct colour, when seen, is the occasion of a dis- tinct sensation; and so is every modification of figure, with every other visible object. Professor. What do you mean by The Appetites of man? Pupil. Any sexual sensation, any sensation from hunger, and any sensation from thirst, is an appe- tite. The appetites of course include three species of sensations, which are the most powerful and influ- ential. The word appetite is derived from appeto, to catch at, or earnestly seek any thing. The appe- tites, figuratively speaking, may be said, to catch at, or earnestly seek, that which will gratify them. "Our other sensations generally derive their names, when they have any, from the qualities of external things, which, being perceived, occasion those sensations. Usually we couple an adjective, descriptive of the quality, with the verb feel. Thus we say, I feel hot, I feel cold, I feel warm, &e."+ The philosophical explanation of these expressions • « 'Every feeling, pleasant or painful, must be in the mind; and jet, because in tasting, touching, and smelling, we are sensible of the im- pression made upon the organ, we are led to place there also the plea- sant or painful feeling caused by that impression; but, with respect to seeing and hearing, being insensible of the organic impression, we are not misled to assign a wrong place to the pleasant or painful feelings caused by that impression; and therefore we naturally place them in the mind, where they really are."—Lord Karnes. f Quarterly Theological Review, vol. i. p. 457. 116 Sensations. is this. I perceive hot air, or some other hot sub- stance; I have a sensation of a peculiar kind, conse- quent upon the perception of heat: I perceive cold air, water, ice, or some other cold substance, and have a sensation from the perception of coldness: I perceive warm air, or something else of a warm quality, and I have a sensation of warmth. Cold, hot, and warm are adjectives, that must agree with some noun, or name of a thing, of which they denote some quality. " If we touch a rough object, the feeling conse- quent upon the perception of the roughness by the touch, we call a sensation of roughness. In like manner, we speak of feelings, or sensations, of smoothness, hardness, softness, and the like. A great multitude of sensations are consequent upon our perceptions through the eye, for which we have no distinguishing terms. Every different effect pro- duced in or upon the body, being perceived, occa- sions a distinct feeling. Thus from the pricking of a pin we have one sensation; from the act of pinch- ing, another; from the gout in the system, another; from tasting twenty different liquors, twenty more; and instead of naming each distinct and different sensation, we merely say, that we feel pleasure or pain, in the part of the body, which we judge to be the organ affected, or the bodily instrument of the particular perception, that occasions the feeling."* Professor. What do you mean by pleasure and pain? * Quarterly Theological Review, vol. i. p. 458. Taste. Emotions. 117 Pupil. " Pleasure and pain are attributes of feel- ing', and the feeling really is in the mind. We say the pain is in one of our bodily organs of percep- tion, merely because we have the painful sensation through the instrumentality of that organ. For the same reason we say the pleasant taste is in our mouth."* Professor. What do you mean by taste? Pupil. An act of tasting is a mental perception through the mouth, palate, and tongue. An act of tasting is sometimes called a taste; and the sensa- tion consequent upon this act of tasting is also fre- quently called a taste. The term moreover is figu- ratively used to denote nice discernment, especially in works of imagination, and the lively emotions consequent upon that nice discernment. Accurate discrimination upon moral subjects, ac- companied by lively emotions, is frequently called moral taste. To apply taste to the operations of Conception, Judgment, Emotions, and the works of Imagina- tion, such as painting, music, and sculpture, will answer in figurative, but not in philosophical dis- course. Professor. Under the general term feeling, you have included sensations and emotions', and under the term emotions you include affections and pas- sions. Let us have your account of the affections. Pupil. Every one is conscious of having those mental operations which we call affections, and is * Quarterly Theological Review, vol. i. p. 458. i 18 Various Affections able to conceive of them. It is only requisite to de- scribe, and distinguish them as clearly as possible. All of them we cannot be expected to enumerate; for not all of our emotions have distinct names. Many of them require a circumlocution to express them. The account which I give is but a recitation, with a few interpolations, from the Quarterly Theological Review. Among the AFFECTIONS we enume- rate, I. Love, which is a pleasing emotion, consequent upon the conception and judgment, that some ob- ject is lovely, either on account of some of its in- herent attributes, or because it is calculated to pro- mote some agreeable feeling in ourselves. The emotion of love, is a generic expression, which includes several species; which are designated, gene- rally, according to the object upon which the men- tal operation terminates, or else according to the relation of the person who loves. Hence we have, 1. Paternal love, which is the love a father exer- cises. 2. Maternal love, which is the love a mother feels. 3. Conjugal love, which is the love married persons exercise towards each other as partners. 4. Filial love, which a sister exercises. 5. Fraternal love, which a brother feels. 6. Social love, which is the love of society. 7. Personal, or Self-love; which is the love of ourselves. 8. Selfishness, which is the inordinate love of one's self. 9. Benevolence, which is love of the happiness of others. 10. Complacency, which is the love of an object for its inherent attri- butes, or for its own sake. 11. The love of fame, A •f the Human Mind. 119 the love of knowledge, the love of poxver, and the love of happiness, which need no explanation. II. Joy is another strong affection, consequent on some thought of an event or object, past, pre- sent, or expected, which we deem very desirable for ourselves, or in relation to others.* When we think again of any source of joy, and feel a new, similar emotion, we are said to rejoice. " Gladness is an inferior degree of joy; it may be excited by incidents, agreeable or disagreeable in themselves, which are not of sufficient moment to raise the ec- stasies of jov."f III. Contentment is an affection consequent up- on our judgment, that the thing with which we are contented, is not to be dispraised, blamed, or high- ly commended. It is a feeling which often results from contemplating conduct, circumstances, cha- racters, or events that neither displease, nor afford much, if any, positive gratification. IV. Satisfaction is an emotion which we ex- perience, when we judge, that any object is fit, suitable, reasonable, or what might have been ex- pected; or in consequence of thinking of the accom- plishment of some desire. Hence we say, " we are satisfied with your conduct," when any one has conducted as we should have desired him; and hence the Christian says, in relation to the Supreme * " In no situation doth joy rise to a greater height, than npon the removal of any violent distress of mind or b idy; and in no situation doth sorrow rise to a greater height, than upon the removal of what makes * expression of the features, as well as the distinction of sex, when we say, " God made man upright." Of the meaning of this term, man, we conceive, or have an idea. We conceive that it denotes any one individual, in whom certain attributes meet, without regarding certain other attributes that may be peculiar to some one, and not com- mon to other individuals called men. Abstraction. 195 of in relation to their shape, to the exclusion of every thing else perceived in them, and so I invent, or adopt, the name of cube. By subsequent compari- sons, I am induced to call every other object, which in shape resembles one of these things, a cube; whatever may be its other attributes. Hence any thing that is judged to be like another thing in shape which we have previously called a ball, we denominate, when considered in relation to shape alone, a ball. Now put, for the first time, five balls of wood, five of ivory, five of marble and five, of lead into a child's hat, who by comparing and judging has learned to call them balls in distinction from all ob- jects of a different figure. Let him now be taught to compare these balls in some other respect than that of figure. Let them be all of the same size, and he will soon judge, that while alike in shape and size, they are not all alike in weight. By handling them, he will have such perceptions as will induce the judgment, that five may be put into one class, from being like each other, and un- like the other fifteen in weight. In this way, con- templating them for some time, he will make four classes, each of which will consist of five indivi- duals. Now he will want a name to designate each, and every one of the five, as belonging to one of these four classes. There is, however, no name in our language to designate each of a class of objects, merely from regard to their specific gravity. We must therefore turn the attention of the child to other things in which each ball of the five in each class is like all in its own class, and unlike all in 196 Abstraction. the other classes. The five in one class look alike, and differ in appearance from those of each other class. The five in one class are alike elastic, and the five in each of two other classes are also elastic; but the five in one class are less elastic than the five in the other class. The five in the last class are not elastic. Besides, one class of the balls were cut out of a tree, another out of an elephant's tusk, another out of a gritty block of a certain kind of stone, and the fourth were run out of a substance rendered liquid by heat. The child still wants a name for each thing of each class, that shall serve for every one of five in its own peculiar class. He is taught therefore, to call the five balls, that have a peculiar appearance, texture, and degree of elasticity, that were cut out of a tree, wooden balls; and any one of the five is a wooden ball. In proceeding thus far, there has been no attention paid to the kind of a tree from which each wooden ball was cut, nor to its colour, nor to many other of its attributes. When, therefore, the child sees any other object, that is a ball, and that has the attributes of wood, he calls it a wooden ball, abstracting, or taking away voluntarily, from his contemplation of the thing, its size, colour, and all other things, which are not common to every thing in the class of things called wooden^balls. The five balls that have the highest degree of elasticity, with a peculiar texture, appearance, and origin, the child calls ivory balls; and each and every one of them an ivory ball. In like manner he ob- tains a notion of a marble, and of a leaden ball. Pupil. In abstracting, it appears to me, that we Abstraction. 197 voluntarily conceive of a part of a complex object, of which as a whole we have previously conceived, with a design to classify that complex object, ac- , cording to the part of which we voluntarily con- ceive, to the exclusion of its other parts, with ob- jects that resemble it in this selected feature, while they differ from it in others.* Professor. Every class of things is a complex whole, constituted by constituent parts which have more or less resemblance to each other. Mankind for example, is an abstract term, designed to de- note all beings collectively which would indivi- dually be called a man, without any regard had to those attributes in which one man may differ from • " We must here beware of the ambiguity of the word conception, •which sometimes signifies the act of the mind in conceiving, some- times the thing conceived, which is the object of that act If the word be taken in the first sense, [as it always should be,] I acknowledge that every act of the mind is an individual act; the universality there- fore is not in the mind, but in the object, or thing conceived." Db. Reid. What Dr. Reid calls a general conception, is nothing but a complex object, of whose distinct attributes we have so many distinct concep- tions. We adduce a passage from this author which perfectly expresses our opinion. "I apprehend that we cannot, with propriety, be said to have abstract and general ideas, either in the popular or in the philo- sophical sense of that word. In the popular sense an idea is a thought; it is the act of the mind in thinking, or in conceiving any object This act of the mind is always an individual act, and therefore there can be no general idea in this sense. In the philosophical sense, an idea is an image in the mind, or in the brain, which, in Mr. Locke's system is the immediate object of thought; in the system of Berkeley and Hume the only object of thought. I believe there are no ideas of this kind, and therefore no abstract general ideas. Indeed, if there were really such images in the mind, or in the brain, they could not be general, because every thing that really exists is an individual."—Reid's Works, &: