| j ,/r H \ I £F 0(£E-RS(L,t» ) |j P-79C J |i - * 0 W ^^^ % w M r 1853 r-~* 1 k a- v. T»TSfHTSSTON -■ ■ . . i ON THE 1 AUTOMATIC POWERS ■ • - '■-'''■ i THE BRAIN; w BEIKG X : w DEFENCE AGAINST REV. CHARLES BEECHER'S ATTACK UPON vf ■".; THE PHILOSOPHY OF MYSTERIOUS AGENTS, IN HIS m REVIEW OF "SPIRITUAL MANIFESTATIONS." i m 1! BY E. C. ROGERS. || i! ij i-i H Render unto C«#ar the things that are Char's, and unto God the things that an ', '''■-'''\ God's. — Christ. ■*&a*i- ■> ' i (*( i 1 ■ h ■--■■■■ '".'■■'"■'■ BOSTON: V ■ ! 1 JOHN P. JEWETT AND COMPANY. - fei CLEVELAND, OHIO: "^:Jfi JEWETT, PROCTOR & WORTHINGTON. ' 811 LONDON: LOW & CO. 1 pPf 185 3. I' ^ ■T: 3% Z^f*- / DISCUSSION AUTOMATIC POWERS THE BRAIN; BEING A DEFENCE AGAINST REV. CHARLES BEECHER'S ATTACK UPON THE PHILOSOPHY OF MYSTERIOUS AGENTS, IN HIS REVIEW OF "SPIRITUAL MANIFESTATIONS." BY E. C. ROGERS, Render unto Ceesar the things that are Csesar's, and unto God the things that are God's. - Christ._______________ y ^^j|j-*SO/>N BOSTON: ^LlBBj. JOHN P. JEWETT AND COMPANY. CLEVELAND, OHIO: JEWETT, PROCTOR & WORTHINGTON. LONDON: LOW & CO. 1853. 3F . I*? 53 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1853, by John P. Jewett and Company, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of Massachusetts PEEFACE. In accounting for the phenomena of the present day (by some attributed to spirits in another state of existence), the author has never, from the beginning, made it his aim to originate a theory. His object has been to find the truth, without respect to preconceived notions either of his own mind or that of others, whether ancient or modern. " The Philosophy of Mysterious Agents" is, in part, the result of his honest endeavors. The favor with which it has been received by a large class of discriminating minds, the demand for additional facts, the confirmation which the author has of late received from one of the most distinguished physiologists of Europe as to cerebral automatic powers in man, and the attack that has just been made upon precisely this principle by a learned clergyman of the Congregational church,— these have induced the author to put forth the present pamphlet. The author can demand of the reader simply his candid attention; but will beg in addition, and as a favor, his thorough investigation before rejecting what are presented as demonstrated propositions. 38861S CHAPTER I. Allowing the phenomena of the "Manifestations'' and their analogies in past history, what can be proved 1 In order to discover the immediate cause of any of the phenomena that appear in nature, science has always found it necessary to follow certain rules — not arbitrarily estab- lished by dogmatic minds, but growing out of laws of rela- tion between mind itself and the principles of external nature, and the relations of external nature to herself. Before these rules were much known and followed, the progress of the race in the arts and sciences was exceed- ingly slow, and men were learned mostly in one another's a priori processes, and the conjectures and poetical fancy- ings of classical imaginations. Now, one of the most important of these rules of scien- tific research is the following, which we have endeavored to follow in our investigations into the present phenomena. We give it in the language of the great Herschel: " If the analogy of two phenomena be very close and striking, while, at the same time, the cause of one is very obvious, it becomes scarcely possible to refuse to admit the action of an analogous cause in the other\ though not so ob- vious in itself." In the modern phenomena, we have one class consist- ing in the movement of objects,— such as tables, chairs and the like,— on the mere proximity of certain persons, without their contact. Let this class be represented by an individual, and call it a phenomenon, consisting in the movement of objects on the proximity of a particular per- 1* 6 CEREBRAL AUTOMATIC ACTION. son; let us then bring down our rule for finding its cause. To do this, we must cast about for another analogous case, very close and striking in the likeness, " while at the same time its cause appears obvious;" and here we are met with the case of Angelique Cottin. She, when standing in rela- tion to the earth, became so charged with a physical power as to sensibly affect tables, chairs and the like, on coming into proximity with them, so that without contact they moved — nay, were overthrown, at times, with great vio- lence. Not only her organism, but her dress, partook of it; so that, on passing a chair, the touch of her apron was sufficient to cause a discharge that would overthrow the former. Now, if the phenomena in the two cases are to be admitted at all, this last explains thus much, undeniably — that the immediate cause is physical. For the legitimacy of this deduction (admitting the two phenomena) we appeal to the decision of the scientific world,— not excepting our friend Davis, who has offered the thousand dollars reward for a natural theory of expla- nation.* Now, as we have shown in the " Philosophy of Mysteri- ous Agents," if it be admitted that these phenomena have and do still occur, it must be by virtue of some hitherto un- known law of relation existing between the organism and external objects, and between the earth and the organism ; and that, inasmuch as the phenomena take place only with particular persons, and only when these persons are under peculiar conditions, as in mediums after certain processes of nervous induction, and the bewitched after nervous derange- ment, it must be by some hitherto undiscovered relation between this physical agent and the nervous system. This we have demonstrated, in the '' Philosophy of Mysterious * We would here say, in justice to Mr. Daniel Davis, above alluded to that, without our own seeking, he called upon us after the publication of the second number of" The Philosophy of Mysterious Agents," and pri- vately renewed his assurances that the sum offered was in perfect good faith, and should be forthcoming when we had satisfied any fair number of disinterested scientific minds that we had given an adequate natural theory. He did not require that they be convinced that the phenomena really occurred. CEREBRAL AUTOMATIC ACTION. 7 Agents," by a close analysis and comparison of the phe- nomena, allowing their veritability. Having thus arrived at the immediate agent of the phe- nomena, and found it a physical power belonging to the earth and to man's body,— that it charges the human organ- ism from the earth, and acts with the physical forces of the body, and from this point, under a certain modified form, reacts upon objects standing in relation to the body; that it has association with the nerve-force of the sympathetic, the spinal, and the cephalic or brain centres, according to their conditions,— it seems somewhat apparent that the outward action of the agent must be more or less, according to the state and action of the nerve-centres where it stands at the time in the closest relation. If, for instance, it be the sympathetic and spinal systems, and these are in a state of derangement, as in hysteria and chorea (exhibited in spasms), the phenomena of the agent will be irregular, spasmodic,— the things will more or less move by starts and sudden jerks. Accordingly, we find precisely these cor- respondent movements to have taken place in Angelique Cottin. (For the details of this very curious case, see "Philosophy of Mysterious Agents," Chap. II.) And as for similar correspondences in the case of mediums, we have invariably observed that in all these cases where the movements of objects have taken place in the proximity of spasmodic mediums, they have acted by jerks, rather than by steady movements, as when the medium's nervous sys- tem is more harmonious. This has not only been observed by ourself, but every candid and intelligent spiritualist who has spoken upon these matters has declared the same thing. If this correspondence between the subjective and ob- jective phenomena obtains by virtue of a law of relation between the agent that acts upon external things and the nervous system, it should hold good as well of the cerebral centre as of the sympathetic and spinal. Accordingly, we find that precisely as we have the har- monious cerebral condition, will be the harmonious results in the objective phenomena; thus proving that the objective 8 CEREBRAL AUTOMATIC ACTION. physical agent corresponds in its action to the subjective "play impulse" of the brain. For example, when any tune is played in a circle where the phenomena are con- fused and irregular, it has been everywhere observed that the phenomena would fall in the harmony of measured time. Now, it is impossible to play a tune in a circle with- out at once exciting the action of that part of the brain at which centre and from which radiate the regular succes- sion of time impulses; and every brain in the circle standing in the mundane relation, or in relation with the " medium " brain, will propagate the time impulse; hence, there will be more unitary action in the brains of the circle during the performance of timely airs than at any other period. Hence, too, it is everywhere observed that those circles succeed the best which have the least discrepant feeling. Thus, by a new class of observations, and their legitimate deduction, we have arrived at precisely the same result as in the previous course, namely, we have found that the object- ive phenomena are the representative of cerebral action. This is admitted by all the spiritualists who acknowledge that the harmony or discord of the phenomena have been observed to correspond to the harmony and unitary action of the "circle," or that no consonant results can be obtained by an unharmonious circle; and nearly every spiritual work containing anything on the rules and con- duct of "circles" touches more or less upon these facts. Now, it matters not by what name you call the physical agent that we have thus found to act directly in the pro- duction of the outward phenomena,— be it electricity, od magnetism, diamagnetism, nerve-force; it is settled that its actions represent cerebral or cerebro-spinal movement ac- cording to whichsoever the agent stands most in relation at the time, or according to whichever is most prominently disturbed. J Having arrived at the brain and spinal centres as the points of action in the disturbance of the physical agent whose action produces the phenomena under consideration it now comes up as a matter of inquiry, concerning the nature and power of the nerve-centres, Do they possess CEREBRAL AUTOMATIC ACTION. 9 within themselves a power of action? In other words, have they automatic functions ? If so, how far are they modified in their action by external influences, and how far may one nervous system be sympathetically related to another? These, and many other related questions of great importance, come up before us for investigation. Most of these, however, have been already discussed, more or less, in the "Philosophy of Mysterious Agents." The great question we would wish to settle here is that of cerebral automatic action. The facts and deductions put forth by us in our work on this subject have lately been attacked by Rev. Charles Beecher, in his paper read be- fore the Congregational Association of New York and Brooklyn, and demand some attention. CHAPTER II. REVIEW OP REV. CHARLES BEECHER'S ARGUMENT AGAINST THE AUTOMATIC POWERS OF THE CEREBRUM, AS EX- HIBITED IN THE MODERN SO CALLED " SPIRITUAL MANI- FESTATIONS." Rev. Charles Beecher's only argument against the natural explanation I have given of the "modern phenome- na," and their like, is that presented to overthrow the fact of automatic cerebral action. He admits " the odylic (mes- meric-magnetic) character of the phenomena," but assumes "that spirits act in their production by odylic law." The numerous phenomena presented in the " Philosophy of Mysterious Agents," demonstrating automatic and " un- conscious cerebration," seem to have had no convincing weight in his mind; and I am sorry to say that he does not exhibit an over-abundance of fairness in presenting the facts and arguments I have offered on this subject. This will be particularly noticed, as we review his objections. In Chap. IV. of his pamphlet, he sets forth the spirit- ual argument against the natural, thus: "The theory of automatic cerebral action is objection- able : "1. Because it is equally valid against the existence of the soul as distinct from the brain. If God has endowed that form of matter which composes the brain, the organs of the mind, with exactly those properties which enable it under whatever irritant, to represent in its action pre- cisely those characteristics which the mind possesses then external irritants alone can account for all mental phe- CEREBRAL AUTOMATIC ACTION. 11 nomena. True, there may be an internal spiritual irritant, a soul. Dr. Rogers believes there is one. But "a posse ad esse non valet consequential' It is as unphilosophical to suppose a spiritual irritant or soul for all mental phe- nomena, as to suppose spiritual irritants for the manifesta- tions, provided both can be accounted for without." Now, every person of common sense knows that no a priori argument can overthrow a fact of nature. If it can be proved, then, that automatic cerebral action is a fact of physiology, the reverend gentleman's a priori objec- tion can only prejudice the minds of a few individuals against it, as certain facts in geology and astronomy,* as well as in physiology, have been served before it. It remains, then, as a question of fact, as a matter of rigid scientific scrutiny, whether automatic function is a property of the brain. The decision of the theologian cannot affect this question in itself; and, as it is a matter of science, an appeal to Scripture cannot alter it. What Mr. B. says about this cerebral power being a valid argument against the separate existence of the soul is as premature and uncalled for as the like objection made against certain facts in astronomy and geology. If his a priori argument for his soul cannot be sustained without his denying a palpable fact of nature, an admitted fact in science, his argument must be a rotten one, or he has no soul. For nature never lies, but a prioris are extremely fallible, since they are commonly founded upon conjectural or hypothetical bases. This fact may afford him some hope of finding that he has a soul. Had Mr. B. taken the part of a disinterested investi- gator, instead of that of an interested and prejudiced advo- cate, he would have seen a great gulf between the character and tendency of my views and the arguments of absolute materialism. I have exhibited two distinct classes of hu- man phenomena: 1. Those of a responsible personal agent. * The theory of the earth's revolution, when first propounded, was met with a theological a priori. The latter, for a time, frightened many timid minds, but soon grew stale, and the philosopher prevailed, for he had merely asserted a simple fact of nature. 12 CEREBRAL AUTOMATIC ACTION. 2. Those of an irresponsible automaton, or machine. The former is as distinct from the latter as it is possible for distinction to be made; and the whole argument against the pneumatic hypothesis of the modern phenomena I have built upon the facts of this distinction. But Mr. Beecher nowhere states this in his attempted criticism of my explan- ation. In this he is like all the other spiritual advocates who have offered it combat — never the thing, but their hasty and distorted idea of it. Mr. B. says (how may it frighten the Christian world !) Dr. Rogers' is precisely the argument against the " mani- festations " that avowed materialists' is against the soul. To prove this, he quotes a paragraph from the "Philosophy of Mysterious Agents," and then places in juxtaposition with it a quotation from the celebrated Thomas Cooper, M. D. (formerly President of South Carolina College), in his translation of Broussais on Insanity. He then goes on to say, " Were there time, it might be shown that every point made against ' the spirits' by Dr. Rogers — for ex- ample, from drugs, sickness, insanity, intoxication, &c. &c. — is made with equal force by Dr. Cooper against the soul. The same keen thrusts are made by both. Thus, to a medium, a physician "at once prescribed a few blue pills, and then a dose of calomel and rhei; it is sufficient to say that through the medium of these smart cathartics the spirits made their exit, in high dudgeon.' " By the side of this is given a quotation, made by Dr. Cooper, from Judge C, in his Medical Jurisprudence: — " ' How can you ex- hibit a dose of glauber-salts to the soul ?' Nor is Dr Cooper alone," he continues. "So reason Hartley, Cabanis, Destut, Tracey, Lawrence, and others of physiological W-so the whole class of psycho-pannichists, from Priestly down to Dobney. Nor could the disciples of the latter school in any way more effectually promote their ends than by a republication of Dr. Rogers' book condensed, with Dr. Cooper's tracts on materialism appended The argument, therefore, proves too much, and falls'to the ground." c Now, the truth is, that neither Broussais, Cooper, CEREBRAL AUTOMATIC ACTION. 13 Hartley, Cabanis, Destut Tracey, Lawrence, nor any of the like class of materialists, made that thorough analysis of human phenomena that true philosophy requires. Like my reverend reviewer, they "lumped the whole." But having tested a few, and found them cerebral material, they inferred that all were material — the mere play of nervous matter, which, when decomposed, left no trace of an imma- terial entity. Now, the only difference between Mr. Beecher and the material philosophers is in the idea he entertains that all the phenomena originating in the brain are from a spiritual and immortal entity. But he entirely agrees with them in supposing but one class of phenomena in this direction. Here is just where Mr. B. becomes infidel to me; for here it is he sides with the materialists against me. The truth is, that my view is no more opposed by Mr. B. than by the materialists themselves, excepting where the latter have taken more care to study and understand my views, and have more faithfully represented them. So far, then, instead of my philosophy being consonant with that of materialists, it is Mr. Beecher that sides with them, in opposition to me. Why, then, should he represent me as a materialist, or as advocating materialism, denying to man an immortal spirit 1 What reason had he for hitch- ing upon me that name, at which all Christendom hisses and utters anathemas ? Why, he saw that on one side of my analysis of human phenomena there was a class of facts which materialists have been wont to quote as evidence that man has no " soul." Forthwith he is frightened,— smells the stench of sepulchres, dead men's bones,— stops not to examine further, but flies precipitately. He had seen enough, scented enough; 't is all death, sheer annihilation, complete destruction, and he must report it to the world; and so he tells the spiritual rappers and community that the disciples of the material school could not " in any way more effectually promote their ends than by a republication of Dr. Rogers' book condensed, with Dr. Cooper's tracts on materialism appended." From this, he learnedly con- cludes that "the argument for the natural theory of the 2 14 CEREBRAL AUTOMATIC ACTION. ' manifestations,' without disembodied spirits, falls to the ground." Strange to say, Mr. B's. fright and flight precipitate takes place at the sight of a class of facts * that at this moment is being admitted, not by the material physiologists merely, but even by many who are as orthodox as himself, and as firmly hold to a distinct spiritual entity constituting man's immortal nobility. Among these, I may quote Wilk- inson and Carpenter. Is it not quite too late to raise an alarm on matters of science ? Are not facts too broad-cast ? Have not men heard the sound infidel materialist too often repeated, in reference to -scientific facts, to suspect much evil? Do not these names appear now rather as badges of honor ? Are not dis- coverers growing proud of these titles ? For, on all extra occasions of their bestowment, is it not for some new and very important discovery in the sciences, or its advocacy ? Have not people thought somewhat of Galileo and the Pope, Harvey and his brethren, geology and the clergy ? Have not too many good things been called bad names ? It is certain, then, judging from the history of the past in these matters, that all opinion must be tried in foro con- scientiaz. hi hoc signo spes mea. A second objection made by Mr. Beecher ao-ainst the automatic argument is, that it fails, because " automatic contingent operations involve a self-contradiction " This will be reviewed in a future chapter, where the fact of automatic cerebral power is further explained. befoSthe^ToSfSJ'i™0^ materialism> ^ Joh* ^iss, delivered betore the i 11st Congregational Society in New Bedford, July 28 lSi>-> I find quite an opposite course pursued to that generally by the cler^' mae^sfs'Ssriir01/" V1 8^^g^e/acVadva^^ matenalists against the independent existence of the soul Mr Wri