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REPORT OF  THE SECRETARY
WITH REGARD TO THE PROBABLE ORIGIN OF THE RECENT
^
Demoralisation  of tlje Potato %xm$ at SEasljington,
DUTY OF THE SANITARVVCOMMISSION
WITH REFERENCE TO
CERTAIN DEFICIENCIES IN THE EXISTING ARMY ARRANGEMENTS,
                 AS SUGGESTED THEREBY.
Read before the Commission September 5th. Referred to the Committee of Enquiry, and ordered
            to bo printed for members only, September 11th, 1861.
       WASHINGTON :
McGILL & WITHEROW, PRINTERS.
            1861. 
 
REPORT
ON THE
DEMORALIZATION OF THE  VOLUNTEERS.
                              Washington, Sept. 5, 1861.

To the Sanitary Commission:

  Gentlemen : As soon as practicable after the battle of Bull's
Run, a series of seventy-five enquiries was prepared, intended to
elicit information as to the condition of the troops before^ during,
and alter the engagement, and as to the defects in the mode  of
providing for the necessities of the army which had been mani-
fested in the series of movements which were connected  with  it.
These questions were placed in the hands of the seven inspectors
of the Commission,  who were then employed in visiting the  regi-
ments which had been engaged, for the purpose of ascertaining
and administering  to their wants,  and  they were instructed  to
obtain answers to them, which would represent as nearly as possi-
ble the. knowledge and judgment of the most intelligent  officers
and  surgeons of these regiments with whom they were  able to
confer.  They were to present themselves for  this purpose  in
their official capacity,  with authority from the Secretary of War
to obtain information in all respects with regard to the  sanitary
condition of the forces, and were to make their return to the Sec-
retary of the Commission, with such  expressions of their. own
judgment as to the credibility of the statements, and such record of
their own  observations, and  of other information  obtained, as
would aid him in arriving at the truth.
  The returns  received comprise  about two thousand  items ot
evidence with reference to  the history of the battle, and have a
certain value otherwise than from a medical  or sanitary point of
view   The largest part of them were collected by physicians and 
4
examiners  of  life insurance companies, accustomed to an  exact
and searching method of inquiry.*
  These items, after having been  carefully studied and culled of
those which bore internal evidence of error or carelessness, have
been digested  and tabulated by E. B. Elliott, Esq'r, a gentleman
recently employed  by the  Boston  Life  Insurance  Companies,  as
an actuary for  scrutinizing and arranging evidence with regard to
the laws of mortality, and author of several papers  on this subject
published by  the American Association for  the Advancement of
Science, and the American Academy.  The complete tables  are
on file in the office of the Commission.
  The  following are the results which have the  most  obvious,
immediate practical bearing :

           EXTENT OP  THE FIELD OF OBSERVATION.

  Portions of each of the twelve brigades under the command of
Major General McDowell,  at the time of the  general  advance of
July 16, were  visited by the inspectors.
  The entire number of bodies of  troops visited was thirty.
  Of the twelve brigades comprising the army of the  Potomac,
seven only  crossed  the stream  known as  Bull Run,  on  the
occasion of the engagement of Sunday, July the  21st, and took
any active part in the main action  with the enemy.
  Certain regiments that crossed  the stream  and took important
part in the action of the  21st, (as,  for instance, the 69th and  the
71st,  New York State Militia,) were removed from Washington to
be mustered out of service so soon after the battle, that no reports
were obtained  from them.
  Concerning  several  of  the  regiments  visited, replies were
obtained to the entire series of  seventy-five  questions proposed ;
concerning others, replies were obtained to but  a portion  of the
series—the defect being due in  some instances to neglect on the
part  of inspectors, in others, to inability on the part of the regi-
mental officers consulted to give the information desired.

                   SKIRMISH OF THE 18th.

  From  the reports of the inspectors, confirmed by the official
reports of officers  commanding,  it appears  that  of  twenty-nine
bodies of  soldiers  visited,  four were  actively engaged in  the
"demonstration" of the 18th of July, (Thursday,) at Blackburn's
  * Messrs. Robert Tomes, M. D., J. II. Douglas, M. D., Philip Aigner, M. D.,
Win. P. Buel, M. D , C. L Brace, Frederick N. Knapp, and E. B. Elliott. 
5
Ford, (across the Bull Run,) three others were  engaged, but not
actively, and twenty-two were not engaged.*
ENGAGEMENT OF THE 21st.
  Of the same twenty-nine bodies of troops, twenty were actively
engaged  in  the  battle of the 21st of July, (Sunday,) seven were
engaged, but not actively, and two were not engaged.
CAMP GUARD.
  The average number left as camp-guard at the time of the gen-
eral advance, previous to  the engagements of the 18th and 21st,
from  each  of nineteen regiments  reporting on  this  point, was
sixty-eight, (more exactly, 68.2.)   From  ten of the twenty-nine
regiments visited, no report was made as to the number so left.
The smallest number so left behind by any regiment was thirteen ;
the largest number so left, one hundred and filty.

                  STRENGTH OP  REGIMENTS.

   The average number of troops that marched-for the battle field
at the time of the general advance, from each of twenty regiments
reporting on  this point, was (as stated by their officers) eight hun-
dred  and two ;f  nine of the twenty-nine bodies of troops visited
not reporting.   The smallest number so marching was six hun-
'dred, the largest number  nine hundred and fifty-one.

                          LAST MEAL.

   The last  meal before  the battle of the 21st, of sixteen of  the
twenty-nine  regiments, was on the evening of the day before; that
is, on the evening  of  the 20th.   Six  regiments had a regular
breakfast early (that is, before 2\  o'clock) on the morning of the
day of the battle; two regiments  breakfasted at six,  and  the bat-
talion of United  States  infantry is reported to have enjoyed a
regular  meal in the woods about  eleven a.  m.   The time of the
last  regular meal of three regiments is  not reported, but there
is reason for stating it to have been about 6  a. m.

                FIRST MOVEMENT ON THE 21st.

   The  troops, except those in the reserve, were aroused  from
  , ThP thirtieth body, previously referred to, was Blenker's Brigade, which also
wasno?™ed and^ichisfor the present disregarded, because the returns
from it are more imperfect than the average.
  + Tllis is Relieved t0 be somewhat over estimated- 
n
sleep between the hours of one and two o'clock on the morning of
the battle of July the 21st, the march being ordered to commence
with some at two, with others at half-past two.*

                    THE COMMISSARIAT.

   The troops had all been supplied at about 3 p. m., on the 16th of
July, with three days' rations in their haversacks, " which should
have lasted them to the afternoon of the  19th."   { See Report of
Captain Clark, Commissary of Subsistence.]   And again, in  a cir-
cular from headquarters,  dated  at Centreville,  July 20th,  1861,
an equal distribution of the subsistence stores on hand was required
to be immediately made to the different companies of each divi-
sion.   In  accordance with  this  last-mentioned order, " 160,000
complete rations were received by the army at and in the  vicinity
of Centreville—sufficient for its subsistence five days."   (Hence
there appears to have been a short interval unprovided for.)
   According to the reports  m^de to the inspectors, few  compa-
nies complied fully with these orders :  twenty-six of the  twenty-
nine regiments visited took at least  a partial  supply, say from
one to three days' rations, under  the former order ;  two regi-
ments, it is said,  taking  "no supply," depending for food upon
" forage."   An insufficient  supply in one case  was accounted
for by  the statement  that  "they had no expectation of  being
called  to march ;"  (that is,  therefore did not  obey the order?)
In  several  instances it is stated that  the supply of three  days'
rations taken by the troops was  " exhausted before  the close  of
the second day;" that is, the rations were wasted.   These con-
fessions of neglect or improvidence on the part of the volunteers
are confirmed by the report of Commissary Clarke, in which it is
stated that alter the distribution  had been properly made to the
several  divisions,  he (Captain  Clarke)  knew "of several  in-
stances in  which subsistence stores  remained  in possession  of
division and brigade commissaries, and of others in  which provi-
sions were left on the ground of the encampments on the morn-
ing of  the 21st of July."

         DISTANCE MARCHED BEFORE  THE BATTLE.

   The distance marched to the  field of battle on the morning of
the 21st by  those who became actively engaged, varied from four
to  twelve  miles ; of those in the vicinity  of  the  field  but not
actively engaged,  the  distance  generally was from  two  to four
Those regiments which breakfasted at six were of the reserve. 
7
miles, (Richardson's brigade remaining in the position it held on
the 20th, menacing the enemy at Blackburn's Ford.)

                       DOUBLE aUlCK.

   The portion of this march to the battle  field which was  at
double-quick, was, in the case  of fifteen of  the regiments, from
one and one-half to three miles—generally from two and  a half
to three miles ; in the case of thirteen of the  regiments there was
no portion of the march  at  dtuble-quick.   During the battle  a
few of the companies, and but a few, moved at double-quick for
one or two miles.
   It seemed to be generally considered by the volunteers that
their strength was unnecessarily and injudiciously wasted by the
extent of the double-quick advance.  To a certain extent this
appears to be true, yet the result could hardly have been affected
by it if the men had been in tolerable condition.

     DEGREE OF VIGOR AT COMMENCEMENT OF BATTLE.

   As to the  physical  condition of the troops on reaching the field
 of battle, it  is reported that  eight of the regiments  visited  were
 in " fair," " excellent,"  " good," " best" condition ;
   That  in eight others  " the men were somewhat exhausted,
 "partially exhausted," " evidently suffering ;"
   That  in twelve of the  regiments visited, the  troops  were
 said  to  be  " much exhausted,"  " generally fatigued," " many
 considerably exhausted;"  in  six  of  the regiments  from  one
 to twenty were " giving out," " giving completely out,  &c, one
 or two instances of " sun stroke" being specified.
   In eiaht  regiments none " gave out" before the battle ;   in
 from nine to eleven regiments  some gave  out before the battle ;
 and concerning the remaining regiments there  is no report
   (There  was  an evident disposition  to regard the exhausted
 physical condition of the men as a chief cause  of the defeat.)

        CAUSES OF EXHAUSTION BEFORE THE BATTLE.
   As to the causes  assigned for the exhaustion  it appears that
 of the regiments visited it was stated that three had not suffered
 at all from fatigue or heat, or want of food or drink or sleep ;  in
 seven ten of the regiments "fatigue" was assigned as a cause of
 exhaustion; in eleven  the  march at  "double-quick" was spe-
   ffied  as peculiarly  fatiguing; in eight of  the seventeen  the
 exhaustion \* attributed more to the double-quick th,n to want of
 food  md  drink ;  in sixteen of the regiments want of food was 
8
 assigned  as  a  cause  of exhaustion ;  in  eleven want of  drink
 was assigned as a cause ;  and in a few cases, the  exhaustion
 was attributed,  in part at least, to want  of  sleep, and  to a
 bivouac of three or four nights in the open  air, with  insufficient
 clothing, as was the case with the Fire Zouaves, who left  their
 blankets and rubber cloths in camp.
   So much as to the condition and movement of the troops before
 the battle.

                   TIME IN THE BATTLE.

   The time during which  the troops taking  part in the battle of
 the 21st were actively engaged (pushing toward the  enemy, or
 being temporarily on retreat, after first coming under fire,) appears
 to have varied  from twenty-five minutes to six hours,  being in
 most cases from five to six hours.
   To the  regiments most  actively engaged the time was thought
 to be  much shorter than actually elapsed, the five or six hours in
 which theywere engaged seeming to the men, as they state, scarcely
 one hour.   The time during which men stood under fire without
 being actively engaged themselves is, on the  other hand, found to
 be over-estimated by them.

           DEGREE OF  VIGOR DURING THE BATTLE.

   It  is  claimed that  in eight of  the  twenty-nine  regiments
 visited, there were no  symptoms of exhaustion manifest during
 the battle;  that in  eight there was evident  suffering and  fatigue
 evinced by men lagging behind, and by companies  breaking up,
 especially   after  double-quick, few  or  none giving  completely
 out; that  in ten regiments,  many (in some instances stated as
 high as one-fourth  or  one-third of  the number constituting the
 regiment,) gave completely out, "some few dropping down in  con-
 vulsions," or suffering from " sun stroke."   The evidences of ex-
 haustion in  other regiments are not assigned.

       CAUSES  OF EXHAUSTION DURING THE  BATTLE.

   In explanation of the alleged excessive exhaustion  of the  men
 toward the close of the battle, the officers consulted in  twenty-six
 of the twenty-nine regiments, referred to, attribute it to fatigue and
heat,  twenty-one to lack 'of food and  drink.   All the  reports
 which  assigned insufficiency of food and drink as a cause,  also
 assigned excessive fatigue.   Six of them assign fatigue, and espe-
 cially the march at  double quick,  as the main  cause of the exhaus-
 tion which was  manifest during and just after the battle. 
9
                     CAUSE OF RETREAT.

  The proximate cause  of the retreat  is variously assigned—to
the attack  of  fresh reserves of the enemy upon our right—to
the rapid and apparently wild  return of the caissons for ammu-
nition—to the appearance of a retreat of our cavalry, who were
thought by some to be  riding over our  own infantry,  the rear
guard, at  the same time, mistaking them for secession  cavalry,
&c.  Certain more organic  causes of the defeat are frequently
stated.
   By some the defeat is attributed to the condition of the men,
exhausted by excessive  fatigue, and  by want of sufficient food,
drink, and sleep ;  by  others to " a feeling," on the approach of
the fresh reserves  of  the enemy,  " of the total inadequacy of a
small force to compete with  superior numbers  supported  by
masked batteries."  By others the defeat is attributed to  " causes
involving the whole command ;" " to the inefficiency of  the gen-
eral  commanding ;" " not due to previous exposure and fatigue,
but to the bad conduct of the  battle on the part of the leaders."
By others (regulars)  the defeat is attributed to " inefficiency of
volunteers;" by one (German) to " bad strategy and want of dis-
cipline."
   Through all the regiments there appears to have prevailed the
false idea of the vast  superiority  in point of numbers possessed
by the enemy, together with a lack of  confidence in the military
skill of  the leaders of the army of the Union as compared with
that of the leaders on  the part of the rebels ; also combined
to a certain extent with a dread of meeting an invisible  foe.

            OFFICERS LEAVING THEIR COMMANDS.

   In thirteen   of the  regiments the  officers are  said  not to
have been  much separated from their  commands,  except in the
case of wounded  officers ;  in eleven regiments it  appears  that
the  officers were,  to a considerable extent, separated from their
commands, the regiments  being " much  scattered,"   " badly
disorganized," " broken into fragments," the men  being, in rer-
tain  cases, "left  entirely to  themselves."  Concerning five  of
the  regiments  visited, no information  was given on  this point.
(The above report is that of the officers themselves in most cases.)

        THROWING AWAY  OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENTS.

   01 the twenty-nine bodies  visited, twenty-two threw away or
laid  aside blankets and haversacks before engaging in battle.
Some placed them in a pile under guard, others threw them aside 
10
 carelessly, either before arriving on the field, while approaching it
 at double quick, or immediately before engaging with the enemy.
 Three regiments threw off their blankets during  the battle  and
 the march at double quick on the battle-field ; one regiment threw
 aside blankets only, retaining  haversacks ;  and three only of the
 twenty-nine  bodies of troops visited retained possession of their
 blankets and haversacks during the engagement.
   During the retreat, it appears from the reports of the inspectors
 that the men of ten regiments did not throw  away any of their
 arms or accoutrements : that the men of nine regiments did  throw
 away portions,  no report being  made relative to the course of
 the  remaining ten regiments.'   There is  no reason to believe
 that these latter  averaged better in discipline than the former,  and
 it is piobable that there was some loss  of arms in, at least, half of
 them.   Colonel  Keyes, of 1st  brigade, 1st division, reports that
 his brigade bivouaced  on the night of the 23d  near Fort Corco-
 ran, " every  man with  his firelock."
   The number of muskets thrown away during the retreat was
 stated, in some  cases,  to be about fifty; generally  the number
 is. not mentioned.  [A considerable portion of  one regiment  are
 reported to  have exchanged their smooth-bore muskets for  those
 of a supeior kind left behind by regiments preceding.]
  The blankets and haversacks of many of the regiments, especi-
 ally of those actively engaged in the conflict of the 21st, were lost,
 being left on the field of battle wherever they were deposited  be-
 fore the engagement.   A small number of the  regiments, and a
 few individuals and companies in each  regiment, possessed them-
 selves again of their blankets and haversacks, it is stated, before
 ieaving the field.
  Overcoats  do  not appear to  have  been  so generally lost, as
 many of the regiments  left their camps at the time of the general
 advance, (July 16,) equipped in "light marching order," that is,
 with blankets, haversacks, and canteens, leaving overcoats in their
 camps.   Certain of the regiments, as for instance the Connecticut
 regiments and the 2d Maine  regiment  in the  brigade under  the
 efficient  command of  Col. Keyes, recovered much  property of
 other regiments,  including arms and  other equipments  thrown
 aside in flight, and also including the abandoned tents and  camp
 pquipage of two regiments, (of another brigade,) this latter  property
 being secured by his troops during the continued drenching rain
of the 22d.  Companies  in certain  other regiments (as in  the
 Massachusetts 1st) halted  on  retreat, and  picked up blankets,
camp kettles, &c, which they found thrown  aside on the  road.
 (The loss of blankets at this time led in certain regiments to a good
deal of subsequent sickness and increased demoralization.) 
11
                         BAD ARMS.

  One regiment complained of the bad condition of their smooth
bore  muskets  (the altered  muskets of 1840,) nipples  breaking,
cartridges too  small, so as to drop in, or too large, so as to require
to  be  forced  in by pressing the ramrod against  trees,  &c, &c.
This complaint does not seem to have been general, with certain
regiments the smooth bores working efficiently.

                   DISTANCE TRAVELED.

  The distance traveled by the several regiments on the night of
the retreat varied from twenty to thirty-five miles, generally it wns
about twenty-seven.   The average distance of the day's advance
and retreat, including movements on the field, was about forty-
four miles.

         PHYSICAL CONDITION AFTER THE RETREAT.

  The next morning, (the 22d,) according to the  almost univer-
sal report, there were few, if any, able men in the inlantry.  Blis-
tered  feet, rheumatic pains,  aching limbs, diarrhoea, and  nervous
debility being prevalent.
  The  physical condition  of  three of  twenty-nine  bodies  of
troops when visited  a few  days  later, was  reported  "unaltered
by exposure  and retreat,"   "not exhausted;"  the men of four
regiments were reported to be not much exhausted ; those of
fifteen were reported  to  be much exhausted, " physically pros-
trated," "prostrated," "exhausted and worn  out,"  "greatly
affected  by exposure  and  retreat," "terribly  fatigued,  could
not get rested," &c.   The physical condition  of seven of the
regiments was not stated.

                  CAUSES OF EXHAUSTION.

  The physical exhaustion  of the troops was attributed to exces-
sive fatigue, to heat, and to want of food and drink.

EXTENT  AND  DEGREE OF   DEMORALIZATION  AFTER  THE
                           BATTLE.

  At the time of making the inquiries, from  the 25th to  the 31st
of July, inclusive,  it appeared  that of the twenty-eight regiments
visited, eight  were considered  by their  officers  not to be essen-
tially demoralized ;*  one was  described  as " not discouraged ;"
* Subsequent reports have sometimes been less favorable. 
                             \1

another " full  of  courage and  ready for  an engagement;"  (1st
Mass.) "morale good,"  (2d R. I.) "in good spirits," (2d N.
H.)—eight were reported  to be  not much  demoralized, " some
few dispirited, but generally cheerful and  animated," " somewhat
depressed and  disgusted with needless (?)  exposure, otherwise
not much demoralized," (there is reason to think that the exposure
to rain, complained of as needless, was far from needless, was in
fact essential to the protection of property;)  "not much  disheart-
ened" " will re-enlist, &c.;" twelve were reported "as much de-
moralized," "much disheartened  and discouraged," "morally
prostrated by the rout," " low spirits,"  " one-half of the  regiment
demoralized, majority wish to go home," " wish to be disbanded
and return to fight under other leaders,"  "  completely demoralized,
discontented,  unwilling to serve, because, as they allege, ill-fed
and unpaid."
   The degree  of  demoralization does not appear to be coincident
with the degree of physical and nervous exhaustion.
   As a rule,  the best officered, the best disciplined, and the best
fed regiments, were obviously the least  demoralized.

                CAUSES OF DEMORALIZATION.

   The demoralization was  attributed, by  those making answer to
the inquiry, generally, in each case> to several causes combined.
Among these, in fifteen  cases physical  and nervous prostration
was mentioned ; in seven cases, discouragement  on account of
the result of the  battle,  accompanied  sometimes  with a feeling
of inadequacy  to  compete with  superior  numbers ; in two cases
the great mortality attendant upon the  late  engagements was
assigned among the causes ; in three cases, dissatisfaction  with
armament—smooth bore muskets; in  three, dissatisfaction  with
and  lack of confidence in  officers; in five, dissatisfaction  with
food ;  in one case, dissatisfaction on account of failure to receive
from Government pay promptly for services ;  in two dissatisfaction
in consequence of supposed needless exposure to  storm.

                     GENERAL SUMMARY.

   From these investigations, combined with information derived
from  official reports of the generals commanding; from published
statements in rebel as well as loyal journals;   from  previous
investigations  of  the inspectors of the Sanitary Commission as
to the  condition of the  troops, and  from other sources,  it is
manifest that  our army, previous to and at the time of the engage-
ment, was  suffering from want of sufficient, regularly-provided,
and suitable food, from  thirst,  from want  (in certain  cases) of 
VI
refreshing sleep, and from the exhausting effects of a long, hot,
and rapid march, the more exhausting because of the diminution
of vital force of the troops due to the causes above enumerated.
They entered the field of battle with no pretence of any but the
most elementary and imperfect military organization, and, in re-
spect of discipline, little better than a mob, which does not know its
leaders.  The majority of the officers had, three months before,
known nothing more of their duties than  the privates whom they
should have been able  to lead, instruct,  and  protect.   Nor had
they, in many cases, in  the  meantime, been gaining materially,
for they had been  generally permitted, and many had been dis-
posed, to spend much time away from their men, in indolence or
frivolous amusement, or dissipation.
   It appears that many were much exhausted on reaching the
field of  battle,  but that, supported  by the excitement of the
occasion, they rallied  fairly,  and gradually drove the opposing
forces  from  Sudley Spring  to the lower  ford, and from the
lower  ford  to beyond the Stone bridge and  the Warrenton
road;  that, at this time, (half-past three,) when  congratulated
by superior officers, and congratulating themselves  on  having
achieved a  victory, and when having  repulsed  reinforcements
sent from  the extreme  right  of  the  enemy to  support  their
retreating columns, they were just relaxing  their severely-tried
energies, there appeared in  the distance  " the residue" of the
forces of General  Johnston, (see McDowell's  report, Dr. Nott's
letter to a  Mobile  paper, and correspondence of Charleston Mer-
cury,) a single brigade (Elsey's) coming  from the Manassas Gap
Junction railroad,  marching at double-quick to engage our troops
at the right who had been hotly fighting unrelieved by reserves
during the  day.   This  brigade, joined  with the two  regiments
of Kershaw and  Cash,  " turned  the tide of battle."  (See  in
Richmond Dispatch, July 29, statement  "of a distinguished offi-
cer who bore a conspicuous part on the field of battle on the 21st

   Our troops, ignorant of the fact that they had been contend-
ing against and repulsing the  combined  forces of Beauregard
and Johnston; and believing that this inconsiderable remnant of
Johnston's  forces which they now saw approaching to  be  his
entire column; and feeling  their  inability without rest  or  re-
freshment,  to engage an additional force of fresh troops  nearly
equal  in number to those with whom they had been contending
during the day—commenced a retreat, not very orderly, but
quite as much so,  at first, as had been the advance in which they
had driven  back the  forces of  the  enemy.  Iheir (nominal) 
14
leaders,  who  too' often had followed them  in  battle, were, in   *
many cases, not behind them on retreat.
   As they retired, however,  a sense of disintegration began to
pervade  their ranks;  each  ceased  to rely on his comrade for
support,  and  this tendency  was augmented by the upturned
wagons blocking the road, which served to completely break the
imperfect columns.*
   The reports of  the  inspectors give no evidence that the panic
infected  the extreme left, or the reserves, to any sensible degree.
It was uncontrollable only with the troops on the extreme right,
among whom  it  originated.   Many at the  centre  and  the left
were surprised when the  order came to  retreat, and for a time
considered it as merely an  order to  change position in view of a
still further  general   advance.  Some  officers  state that  they
" warmly remonstrated"—" too warmly, perhaps"—when  they
received  the order to retire.
   The returns of  the inspectors are not conclusive on this point;
but from the result of subsequent specific inquiries by Mr. Elliott
and the  Secretary, it can be stated  with  confidence that indica-
tions of terror or great fear were seen in but a comparatively very
small part of  the  retreating force.   Most trudged along, blindly
following (as  men do   in any mob)  those  before them, but with
reluctance, and earnest and  constant expressions of dissatisfac-
tion and indignation, while no inconsiderable number retained,
through  all the length  of the privation  and  discomfort  of their
dreary return to Washington, astonishing cheerfulness and good
humor, and wTere  often heard joking at their own misfortunes,
and ridiculing the inefficiency of their officers.   The Germans
of the reserve were frequently singing.   None of the reserves
were  in  the  slightest  degree  affected by the panic,  and their
general expression with reference to the retreat Avas one of won-
der and  curiosity.
   The reserve, nevertheless,  suffered much  from fatigue, and
subsequently  exhibited most decided demoralization.
  * From a consideration of all the evidence,  Mr. Elliott states that he has
himself formed the following opinion :
  "The retreat was immediately due mainly to delusion, on the part of the troops
of the Union, respecting the force of the enemy, especially of* the reserves ad-
vancing from the railroad to engage our forces, combined with extreme physi-
cal exhaustion ; that the rout was due, in part at least, to the too near approach
of the wagons  of the volunteers to the field of battle, thereby dividing their
columns on retreat; and that the sense of disintegration, and consequent panic,
(so far as it existed,) was due to want of discipline, to physical exhaustion,
and to want of  all provision for securing an orderly retreat, combined." 
If)
  The  Commission met in Washington on the 26th of July, and
most of its members suffered the pain of witnessing something of
the general condition  of the army at that  time.  As there are.
no means  of recording it with exactness,  it is important to the
purpose of this report that the  impression then received should
be in a measure recalled, analyzed, and traced to its foundations.
   A victorious enemy was known to be within ten miles  of the
capital, and was presumed to be  cautiously advancing.   Never
could the  occasion  for military vigor, energy, promptitude, and
thoroughness  of action seem to be greater.   It was  the belief
that the utmost and best directed efforts of every one who had
to do directly or indirectly with  the army should be concentrated
at Washington ; that, without previous concert, brought the ma-
jority  of  the Commission  thither.  Arriving, as they did,  soon
after daybreak, and passing from the railroad station toward the
President's House, the aspect of the streets was in the strongest
possible contrast to that which would be imagined of a city placed
by a stern  necessity under the severe  control of  an effective
military discipline.  Groups of men wearing parts of military
uniforms,  and some  of them with muskets, were  indeed to be
 seen;  but, upon second sight, they did not appear to be soldiers.
 Rather they were a most wo-begone rabble, which had, perhaps,
 clothed itself with the garments of  dead  soldiers  left in a hard-
 fought battle-field.  No  two  were dressed  completely alike;
 some  were without caps,  others without coats,  others without
 shoes.  All  were  alike  excessively dirty,  unshaven, unkempt,
 and dank with dew.  The groups were formed around fires made
 in the streets, and burning boards wrenched from citizens'fences.
 Some were still asleep, at full length in the gutters  and on door-
 steps, or sitting  on  the curbstone, resting  their heads  against
 the lamp-posts.   Others  were evidently  begging for food  at
 house-doors.   Some  appeared ferocious, others  only sick and
 dejected  ; all excessively weak, hungry, and selfish.   They were
 mainly silent, and when they spoke it humiliated  a man  to hear
 them.  No  pack of  whining, snarling,  ill-fed, vagabond street
 dogs in an oriental city ever more strongly produced the  impres-
 sion of forlorn, outcast, helpless, hopeless misery.  There was no
 apparent organization;  no officers were  seen among them, sel-
 dom even a non-commissioned  officer.   At Willards  hotel, how-
 ever,  officers swarmed.                                   .
   They  too, were dirty and in ill-condition ;  but  appeared indif-
 ferent reckless, and shameless, rather than  dejected or  morose.
 They were talking of the battle, laughing at the incidents of the
 retreat   and there was  an evident inclination among  them  to
 exaggerate everything that was disgraceful.  Since they had not 
l(i
 a victory to boast  of, they made the defeat as  dramatic  and
 notable as possible.  They seemed  to  be quite unconscious of
 personal responsibility for the  results of  the battle.  " Where
 is your regiment?" one was asked.  " Completely demoralized,
 sir; completely demoralized."   "Where  is  it  now?"  "All
 disorganized—all  disorganized."  " But where  are  the men ?"
 " I'm  told  that there  are  two or three  hundred  of them
 together somewhere  near the  Capitol,  but I have  not seen
 them yet since the  battle."   A captain  sat with  his feet on
 the  window  grating,  smoking;  a man  outside  said  to him,
 " Captain, there are  two hundred of our men just  beyond the
 Long Bridge,  and  they have not had  anything to eat to-day."
 " Where's the Quartermaster?"  " I don't know : there isn't any
 officer  there."  " They don't want me, do they ?"  " They have
 not had anything  to  eat to-day, and there's no officer to get it
 for them."  " Well, it's too bad;"  and  the Captain continued
 smoking, and  ten  minutes afterward had  not put his feet to the
 floor.  It was not till a  Provost  Guard of regulars  drove these
 officers out of  the town, almost  at the point of the bayonet, that
 they seemed capable  of entertaining any  purpose of duty.  As
 to  the men, it was nothing but  starvation, in  many cases, that
 brought them back to their's.   In how many ways the humilia-
 ting confession of cowardice was heard;  how piteously the de-
 sire was expressed to go home ; how distrustful the officers were
 of  the men;  how universally  those who  did not acknowledge
 cowardice and home-sickness were disinclined to resume duty, or
 to continue under the same  officers as before, cannot be statisti-
 cally told.   It was enough  to  establish the  conviction that the
 army was, for the  time being, quite broken up and useless.  For
 a time it seemed as if there was no government, civil  or military,
 at the  seat of  government.   The  newspapers re-echoed the words
 of  the Secretary of  War, " the Capital  is  safe ;"  because, as
 every  one understood, the Capital could be defended with  no
 spirit, confidence, or  resolution, even by the large body of sol-
 diers in it who had not  directly  participated in the  battle.  To
 re-establish in them some degree of  confidence was the first ne-
 cessity.  With this the Capital would be safe.  But this was want-
 ing.   All power  of exercising  confidence,  all respect,  every
 social  sentiment seemed  to  have been for the time lost to them.
 This but feebly indicates the nature of that condition of the gov-
g ernment forces which was generally denominated their "deinor-
' alization," and which was considered the direct result of the bat-
 tle of  Bull Run.
    It did not seem sufficiently accounted for by the  simple facts
 of the battle as generally\elated; that is to say, by an advance 
17
against  the enemy, which was  everywhere successful, until  a
check to the right wing caused with some a panic, and led to  a
general  discontinuance of the aggressive  movement, both armies
resuming the position held previously, the enemy having suffered
much the  most, as was then generally believed, and, so  far as
yet appears, truly.
   Considering  that it was desirable that its real causes  should
be  more clearly  ascertained and  defined, the investigation was
set on foot, the results of which, to the present time, have  now
been  laid  before  the Commission.  Regarded as an attempt  to
find in  the minor  circumstances  attending the battle adequate
causes for  the condition of the army which  succeeded it,  the in-
vestigation has not succeeded.   Should it  warrant the convic-
tion,  however, that no sufficient cause of the demoralization was
to  be found in  the circumstances immediately attending the bat-
tle, it may be that  a further investigation would  be  induced,
which would yield results even  more important than were origi-
nally anticipated.
    The  Secretary has executed  the duty which he had  proposed
 to himself, in the analysis of the facts of the battle directly bear-
 ing on  the question.  The duty of a complete exploration of the
 causes  of  the demoralization of the army in July he trusts will
 be assumed by a committee of the Commission.
    That there  is  a broad field for such an exploration yet  re-
 maining to be  entered, and that it will involve the consideration
 of many questions, a satisfactory decision  of which will  have a
 direct  and important bearing  upon the welfare of  the country,
 the Secretary is  prepared to  give his reasons for believing.  In
 doing so, he will not attempt to reserve  an  expression of his own
 judgment upon  the questions  which  naturally arise, because it
 will be found that some of these  involve questions of his official
 duty, and in  regard to which  it is proper that the Commission
 should be informed how he is impelled to act;  for which reason
 also  he desires, as a constituent member of  the Commission, to
 be allowed to present views to which he has  no assurance that
 the Commission is prepared to assent.
  Where the phenomena are the most distinct, the causes should
be the most obvious.                                      f
  The most distinct and notable example of demoralization after
rhe battle of Bull  Run is  found in the regiment known as the
New York Fire Zouaves.  It so happens that the circumstances
of the battle, to which the general  demoralization is commonly 
18
ascribed, could have had very little effect on this regiment.  It
was  dispersed as a  regiment long before the reserves  of the
enemy, which led to the general retreat, and which immediately
induced the panic, were brought into action.
  Whatever the circumstances were which more immediately pre-
ceded its disorganization, the officers and members of it were not
found disposed to lay much stress upon them, but rather to refer
their demoralization to the bad  terms  on which  the men had
previously been with some of their officers, to  their having been
obliged to sleep for several nights without the protection of tents
or blankets, to excessive fatigue and exhaustion before they came
under fire,  and to the fact that they had never been paid.  It is
observed that more of this regiment than of others fell  out, ap-
parently from  physical exhaustion, but certainly exhausted in
courage, before the battle opened.
  This explanation  is less unsatisfactory than most which were
offered by  the various officers of other  regiments examined  by
the  inspectors.   Yet to one who knows the habits of the class
from which this  regiment  was recruited ; how  frequently they
voluntarily pass night  after night without sleep, and under cir-
cumstances most unfavorable to health ; to one who has seen
them at daylight of a winter's  morning  pressing forward, and
with no  possible mercenary motive, struggling for the privilege
of dragging a soaked hose up a ladder to the roof of a tall  ware-
house in a  biting northerly'wind, and this after they have been
standing all the night in freezing water, and when their clothing
is covered as with a mail of ice,—this explanation of the condi-
tion in which they were found a week  after the battle  of Bull
Run, can hardly be sufficient.  The sudden tap of a drum caused
numbers of them to start  and  turn pale.   They were confessed
cowards ; and whatever else they were, when they left New York,
cowards they were not.  No one in Washington called them cow-
ards during the fire  at Willards' hotel.
   Statements which have been  made  publicly,  attribute the
numerous  desertions and subsequent mutinous condition of this
regiment  mainly to certain alleged special causes of complaint
against its officers.   But why should a disgraceful imputation,
which in a large measure others  share with this regiment,  be as-
cribed to causes special to it ?   There were the men of Varian's
battery, for  instance, whose conduct was even more cowardly,
but who, after sneaking ofi', on  a paltry excuse, before  the bat-
tle,  instead of complaining of their  officers, had the  assurance
to come before the public with  a testimonial of their satisfac-
tion with them.   Weeks after the battle, the New York 79th—
a regiment which has since had an opportunity to show itself 
lil
really brave—was in actual mutiny, under circumstances which
led General McClellan to apply the term  " dastardly" to their
conduct.   The  same  was, in  fact, the  case,  at that time, with
many other  regiments, the  mutinous disposition in these  being
only more readily and completely  concealed.
   Thus, though there was  some  difference  of symptoms,  the
essential  disease of the  Fire Zouaves seems not to have been
peculiar to them,  but general. .  Is  it not probable that its causes
were also general ?   And if the disease of the Fire Zouaves ex-
isted  before the  battle,  must we  not  look for the causes of the
general  disease also  in  circumstances which existed before the
battle ?
   As  the reverse extreme,  the Second Rhode Island may be
taken.   This was one of  tho  regiments mentioned by the Sec-
retary in his report of July 9th,  as under exceptional  sanitary
conditions.  It was  so in the following  respects :  it was better
lodged than others;  it was better clothed than others ; it was
better fed.  The men had  fruit,   soft  bread, butter,  and a va-
riety  of  condiments, regularly and constantly, which  was the
case with scarcely any other than the Rhode Island troops.  They
frequently had roast meats,  baked meats,  puddings, and pies.
They had an  excellent band of music, which played frequently
for the  pleasure  of  the regiment,  and  not merely  as  a military
ceremony, as was the case  with most  of the regimental bands.
They had dancing and social  and  athletic recreations ; they had
 an industrious chaplain,  and regular daily religious services con-
 ducted with good taste, the strictest decorum, and real solemnity.
 They were famous for their singing.  They had singing societies,
 ami various other social organizations.   They received more visi-
 tors, including members of the  Cabinet and others  of distinction,
 and'especially they  were more visited by ladies than others.*
   Their  march  to the battle-field was as  fatiguing  as that  ot
 others ; they were as badly off for food as others, having nothing
 but a few crackers to eat for more than thirty-six  hours,   lhey
 were the first to  engage ; were severely engaged, and as long as,
  * Baron Larrey says :  " To prevent this sort of cerebral affection [nostalgia]
in soldiers whThave7 lately joined their corps, it is necessary to recruit their
in wu>o»™»       .  J Jh  d   t0 vary their occupations, and to turn
^'^ hnrfand recreSs to their own advantage as well as to that of society.
Thus af erthe^accustomed  military exercises, it is desirable  that they  should
lhus, auerine             gymnastic amusements, and some mode of use-
r V-n^ructton T s in tWsmYnner especially that mutual instruction, estab-
ful instructvon  nis m             beneficial to the soldier and the State.
wXimm2io^           or at their hours of recreation will  contri-
Warhke music, oi    »      v       &o]     ^ tQ fe        those  loomy

"TecTons whi^qSlttJproduce the effects which have been traced above." 
20
or longer than, any others ; they were badly cut up, losing their
colonel and other officers, and sixteen per cent, of the  ranks in
killed.  They  stood  firm under  fire  while the panic-stricken
crowd swept  by and through them, and  until they received the
order to retreat.   They then wheeled steadily into column,  and
marched in good order, until the  road was obstructed by over-
turned wagons.   Here they were badly broken up by a cannon-
ade, scattered and disorganized, but  afterwards, having mainly
collected at Centreville, reformed and  marched the same night,
under such of their officers as remained alive,  to  and  through
Washington to a position  several miles to the northward—a post
of danger—where  they at once resumed  regular camp duties.
When visited by the  inspector, a few days afterwards, he  was
told and was  led to believe that the men had only wanted a day's
rest to be  ready and willing to  advance  again upon  the enemy.
He reported  the regiment not demoralized.*
   How is this to be accounted  for on the  supposition that the
general demoralization of the volunteers  was caused  by the fail-
ure of the battle ?  Is it not more rational to believe that pre-
existent circumstances had produced a latent general  demoraliza-
tion, and that the Fire Zouaves had suffered under an excess of
these, while the Rhode Island  Second had been so fortunate as
to entirely escape their action ?
   Let us, then, glance for a moment at the pre-existent circum-
stances of the volunteers.
   They had  hurried to Washington, in April, to offer  their ser-
vices to government to defend  the country against secessionists
and traitors.   They had done this with  a  generous  and manful
neglect to inquire on  what terms the service was to be rendered,
and with little regard to their own comfort or pecuniary interest.
All such considerations, if they occurred to them, were, at least,
made secondary to the consideration of  the first importance, the
secure defence of the  country against secessionists and traitors.
   Under a military organization, the country is  represented by
the government.  To the volunteer at the seat  of government,
the  country and government were soon interchangeable terms.
It was no confusion of ideas by which the volunteer  came  to re-
gard himself as serving the government; nor is it entirely a con-
fusion of ideas which  regards government as  a personality.  It
is an organization of persons.   It is  not to be expected of the
  * This regiment is now in admirable condition, physically and morally.  Its
sick list is less than one to a hundred.  On one occasion, on an order to advance
against the enemy, every man presented himself as fit to undertake a forced
march. 
                             2\

volunteer that he should comprehend this  organization, nor that
he should distinguish between that  for which  the  laws  are ac-
countable and that for  which those who administer  the laws have
to answer.   He presumes the government  to be much obliged to
him for the aid which he is so ready to give in its emergency,
and he understands that  government is only too glad to assume
certain duties in return toward him.  To provide tor him suitable
food and lodging, and to take care of him when sick or wounded,
are perhaps the best defined of these.
   That so  much was  undertaken by government,  and  that he
was to immediately risk his life in  the defence of government
against the secessionists  and traitors, was about   as far as the
volunteer,  on an average, had thought,  as in April he walked
out of the railroad station, with thousands of others, to stand
in the dreary streets of  Washington, patient  for  hours  in the
strength  of his great  new nobleness of purpose, waiting for the
country to find something  for him to eat,  and  to get some place
ready where he could be allowed to rest.   Sometimes he waited,
standing in the rain, all night for this; but at that time, though
he may have sickened bodily under it, he did not get soul sick.
   But two and  three  months after this it was an every-day oc-
currence for the agents of  the Commission to find  the volunteer
in a camp hospital very sick ; his only sustenance fresh bread and
salt pork ;  his only drink,  green coffee.   He  lies   on the damp
ground, with no covering but a blanket, which cannot  properly
be called a blanket.  He wants kind and constant attention, and
delicate food,  such as from  childhood, in  his northern home, he
has been accustomed to when sick.  But the regimental surgeon,
who may or may not be  properly called a surgeon, is too  much
absorbed in learning the intricate history  of official requisitions,
and in waiting for a personal interview with the government man
on the other  side of the town, who can supply an ambulance, to
see him often.  His comrades,  who  might be supposed  to be
ready to tend him to the best of their imperfect ability, have got
tired of doing chambermaid's work  for  the doctor, and at last
have refused to do it any longer, because  it is  not what they vol-
unteered for, and they think it's time government made  other
arrangements; and then it may very likely be that he has just
heard that his wife was, a week  ago, on the point of being turned
out of doors, because she  could not pay  her rent—that he had
promised to send her his pay, but has failed to  do  so, and is yet
unable to do so, because,  after nearly three months' service, he
has not seen the  first  dollar of his  pay.    Many case, like this
came to  the  knowledge of the  Secretary.  They  were extreme
cises  it  is  true; and  if it was the object of this report to 
arraign the government, it might not  be just to cite them.   But
the purpose now in view  is to  ascertain  what influences  were
acting on the character of the volunteers, and it cannot be said
that extreme cases do not  affect  character.   It may be that the
ignorance of the surgeon was  the  only cause of the apparent
neglect of the sick volunteer;  but  that  does not diminish the
neglect, nor the effect which that neglect will exercise  upon his
feelings, and which will be radiated from him, when he recovers,
upon others.   It may be that it is entirely owing to the neglect
of his colonel to render his muster-roll that he is not paid; but
he will hardly know this, and, if he does know it, it will but little
diminish his disappointment and sense of neglect. The Secretary
recollects that one colonel told  him in June that, if his regiment
did not soon get their pay, it  would be impossible  to prevent
many desertions—difficult to prevent mutiny; and he distinctly
remembers hearing a company  of sick men curse a government
which provided so inefficiently for its sick servants. The govern-
ment responsibility in the  matter may have been  no greater than
it is for an overturned government mail-coach ; but the irrespon-
sibility of the  government does  not lessen the pain of the man
who has his leg under the wheel, nor help in the least to cheer up
the sick volunteer lying neglected on the ground, disgusted with
salt pork and  acrimonious coffee, and heart-aching with appeals
from home,  to which  he  thinks he is unjustly  prevented  from
responding.   Let the skill of the surgeon at length set him on
his feet again, and he becomes a centre of influence for his com-
rades.   What  is that influence likely to be ?
  But if this was an  unusual condition, what was the  usual con-
dition  of the volunteer early in  July, and what  effect was  this
condition producing ?
   His  air, diet, drink—his habits in all respects—had been for
some time quite different from what they ever were before.   His
original excitement had all been exhausted.  He came fully ex-
pecting an immediate battle with the traitors.   There had been
some  assassination of pickets,  but nothing more.   He had no
experience of  anything so simply tiresome as this Avar.  It was
from no want of traitors  that  it  dragged  so slowly.   In  every
bar-room where volunteers  were daily drugged  in Washington
there were  traitors.   He  was told that they were yet in every
ship and  fort and public office—that the clerks of the depart-
ments and  of  the congressional committees, and the President's
servants themselves, were  traitors.  Female  traitors looked dis-
dainfully down from  windows  and out of  carriages  upon the
ragged  and hungry  and dirty  volunteer.   Secessionists  were
common enough ; but any fighting  of secessionists   was very 
23
uncommon.    Sumter had  been yielded to  them, and Harper's
Ferry, and  the  forts at Savannah,  at  Mobile,  and the Bulize.
•They had taken  the  navy yard at Norfolk, and that at Pensa-
cola ; the pirates had been let out, and scores of resigned officers
let in, and the army in Texas parolled; and, while  the blockade
was made game of, the secessionists were actually allowed to esta-
blish batteries between the navy yard at Washington and the sea.
 And yet he saw no sign of fighting them.   Would it be strange
 if the volunteer  began at length to feel  that when he " rushed
 to arms" he had been imposed upon?  That he began to suspect
 that the talk  of war was all for " buncomb ?"  War ?  War with-
 out artillery and without cavalry ?  Without shoes ?  With these
 antique smooth-bores?   With  that crazy bridge over the  Poto-
 mac, and that slab-sided old wood scow, to keep  up a commu-
 nication with Fort Corcoran ?  And when he has never yet seen
 a general officer, and when nothing is ever  found  for him  to do,
 but in guard duty over  his  own camp and the eternal manual
 of arms ?  If he  had been a less intelligent soldier, he would have
 known and cared less  about these things.  As  it was,  he talked
 of little else, except his personal grievances.
    Did the government really care at all for the " brave  volun-
 teer?"  If so, why did he sometimes have food  that  he could
 not eat,  and sometimes  none at  all, for days  together ?   Why
 should he be left to sleep in rotten  straw  and  shoddy blankets,
 and sometimes  for  months  Avith  nothing at  all,  on  the bare
 g, ound?  Why should he be required to  stand  for an hour at
 noon,  exposed to the sun of the hottest  day of the  year, in
 Pennsylvania avenue, while his  colonel takes a  drink with his
 friends at Willards', and there is the shade of  brick walls, forty
  feet in his rear?  Why should his captain be allowed to insult
  him with impunity, when, if he  speaks  a  word for himself, he
  may be sent to the guard-house, and put to work in filth .
    Did it answer this satisfactorily to say to him that his  officers
  were of his own selection ?—that his captain was a blackguard and
  a petty tyrant, his colonel a politician, his surgeon a quack, and
  his quartermaster a  knave?   He  did not know  them for this
  when he chose them.  Now he does, he would choose to be rid of
  them.  Why should not the government remove them and appoint
  better  men  ?  Is the difficulty in the laws?   But here  are the
  law-makers  in session : why not make better laws .
    All who were intimately associated with the volunteers about
  Washington in the early part of July will bear witness that their
  conversation was mainly of the tenor above indicated.  It is not
  at  all  improbable that  there were agents of the secessionists
  among them to encourage such conversation. 
24
  If the volunteer could have found precisely where and with whom
rested the responsibility of that which  offended him; if he could
have been made sure that the present administration had nothing
to do with it, and was doing its best to remedy it, it is doubtful if
it would have averted the effect of the continued disappointment
and humiliation of his patriotism.  It is  certain that this effect
was none the less because, to the  volunteer, the difficulties of the
case were "all a muddle."
  There was, at the same time,  a growing want of confidence
between  the men  and the more  immediate representatives and
agents of the Government—the officers—because the men were
naturally disposed to hold their officers, in the first place, respon-
sible for the causes of their discontent.   To a certain extent,
but not altogether, justly so.   They, however, could not distin-
guish between that for  which the officers were justly to blame,
and that which lay behind them.   The consciousness of this had
its effect on the  officers.   The company officers, especially, were
acquiring habits of treating their men,  some with familiarity,
others with an apologetic  manner, others with an insolent affec-
tation of sternness, each according to his character, responding to
the ill-will of the men in their duty to him.
  Thus,  while the  larger and nobler  purposes of the army had
no opportunity of action, but were rather  constantly being frus-
trated, of  the smaller, the everyday wants, the appetites, there
was also nothing but disappointment.  Drill and the dress parade
was no longer an amusement.  The only  obvious general resort
for recreation was the dram shop, and this only made the volun-
teer feel the more  angrily the want of  his pay.   The Commission
will remember that some  officers presented it  as  a reason why
it might not be  best to urge measures  to secure the more prompt
payment of the men ; that no recreation was open to them, except
such as would demoralize them, and they were  as well without it.
   The better men were tired of  this  sort of  soldier's  life ; were
disgusted with it,  and yet were  ashamed to acknowledge  this,
and strove to resist  and suppress a natural  and  truthful mani-
festation of it.
   But there really had  been pervading  all  classes in most regi-
 ments a sense of disappointment, of annoyance, humiliation, and
 vexation.   Consider  that co-existent with  this there  was the
 effect of an entire change of air and of habits, of food and drink ;
 irregular sleep, and  exposure to excessive heat, alternating with
 exposure to cool,  damp, and malarious night-air, or the mephitic
 atmosphere of crowded and unventilated  tents.*
* In June the director of one of the general hospitals called attention to the 
2r>
  The volunteer was in a transitional state physically.   He was
distinctly undergoing the process of acclimation.   Was he  not,
only as much less  distinctly as all diseases of " the moral facul-
ties"  being complicated with those of the body are more beyond
human comprehension than those of the body simply, undergoing
a demoralizing  process?    Was he  losing confidence  only,  or
was he  losing something of the  "faculty"  of confidence—the
power of exercising confidence ?
  A sick man is expected to be peevish, timid, weak, and  wilful.
Insist that he shall not be, demand of  him the usual exercise of
his mental and moral faculties, and you aggravate his disease.
To the soul-sick volunteer came, at length, a demand to advance
towards the  enemy.  With  some the  disease was  even then  so
deeply seated that they threw away the rations provided for the
advance, so little were they able to believe of the actual  fact of
war—so little confidence could they exercise in the judgment of
those placed  over  them.  But  actual war it was, not demanding
merely the usual exerciee of the virtues of courage and faith and
perseverance of the volunteer, but putting these  to the  severe
trial—for severe it  always is with every man—of his first  battle.
The  strong  excitement  overrides  the moral sickness  as  it does
fatigue, and hunger, and thirst, during the stormy advance; but
then  comes the check, the repulse, the retreat; obstacles  break-
ing column;  final  dispersion and military disintegration.   And
here  must come the relapse ; with some, as,'quite generally, with
the Fire Zouaves, it  will have come earlier; but with all there
at  length comes a relapse, and with the relapse a frightful aggra-
aggravation of the malady.

fact that a  remarkable proportion of his patients were from Maine, and that
they seemed to  be suffering under no distinct disease, but from general deblity
 and depression of spirits.   He attributed this to the fact of their having ex-
 perienced a greater change of nir than any of the others.  The regiments in
 which demoralization  has since been most obvious are from Maine, Minnesota,
 and that class of the population of New York who would be selected as peculiarly
 subject to the sweep of an  epidemic.  Nostalgia seems more evident in one of the
 Maine regiments than elsewhere.  A private of this regiment, a few days since,
 placed a check for $150 in the hands of his surgeon, as an inducement to him
 to obtain his discharge.
   Baron Larrey says:
   "The inhabitants of moist and cold climates, as Holland, or mountainous
 regions, as Switzerland and Brisgau, are very susceptible of the moral impres-
 sions which produce  nostalgia ;  a remark which  has been already made by
 many celebrated  physicians.  The troops of these nations, in consequence of
 susceptibility,  suffered most from  the cruel vicissitudes to which  we were
 exposed during the campaign of Moscow."
   Since this note was written, above 100 men of the Maine regiment referred
 to have thrown down  their arms, and demanded  to be sent home.  They are
 under arrest.  The Minnesotans, who are the  finest men,  physically,  in the
 army, seem to  have recovered, and are now "ready for anything." 
26
  Thus, by accepting, as a condition in the case, the essential
deep-seated demoralization of the volunteers before the battle,
the degree of  their demoralization after the battle becomes less
extraordinary, because more analagous to a common experience.
  If this  view be  not adopted, then we seem left to accept it as
a fact that thousands of men, as enthusiastic, and, the Secretary
believes, as brave by nature,  as  any that can  ever  be drawn
from among a civilived people, became, practically, good for
nothing for any warlike purpose,  under a trial of battle and of
campaigning such as would have had scarcely the least depress-
ing effect  upon soldiers proper; which, in fact, did have no per-
ceptible depressing effect upon the regular soldiers taking part
in it,* and which really was but little more severe than the  dan-
gers and fatigues,  and privations and hardships that, as seamen
and whalers and fishermen, and lumbermen and miners and quar-
ters, thousands of these very men had been  accustomed to un-
dergo without  discomposure or complaint;  which was not at all
more terrible than  the dangers and privations and hardships that
men of delicate nurture frequently encounter in following a mere
purpose of recreation, and  which,  beyond a  day, has  no  other
effect upon them than to cheer  and invigorate their spirits.
  If not  in the nature of  a disease, that  is  to  say,  if not as-
signable to special local causes, which can be traced out, defined,
and  in  future guarded against,  but a condition natural, normal,
and always to  be reckoned  upon in dealing with volunteers,  is it
not the  duty of the Commission to apprize  the nation upon what
a game  of chance  its liberty is staked ?
  The Commission had abundant personal observation of the vol-
unteers  a fortnight after the battle of Bull Run, and will judge
whether regiment upon regiment of them, whose  losses had  been
in less proportion to their  numbers than the average  losses of
the Massachusetts fishing  craft in every heavy easterly gale,
would have been of the smallest value in the practice of the sci-
ence of war as an exact science.
  There is every reason to believe that a parallel state of things
existed, it is true, in the  rebel army.   That man for man, the
force of the nation is now  stronger, less liable to panic, and less
liable to demoralization, under similar circumstances, than that of
its  enemy's ;f but this fact affords but  insufficient assurance of
safety.  If properly presented to  them, the people will  not allow
that the subjugation  of this land to the purposes of the dealers in
  * See, in Appendix, a comparison of regulars and volunteers in and after the
battle.
  f See a comparison in the Appendix. 
a certain kind of property and its products shall be hazarded on a
game of cards, even if their generals hold the better hand.
  Must the nation, which depends mainly on volunteers for a de-
fence of its liberties and independence, be at the mercy of any
powerful  enemy ?   Certainly no man  of  military  experience
would have  considered  it impracticable to have  compelled an
early surrender of  the capital, with all the  heads of the nation,
and its  central legislative bodies, together with the whole volun-
teer  army, with all its equipments and stores, to form which the
energies and patriotism of the loyal States had been for three
months devoted, if he  could have occupied  the position  of the
enemy at that time with but a score of regiments of the disciplined
soldiers of any European army.   It is  mortifying to acknowledge
it, but the Commission will hardly find reason to refuse to do s^
And unless it can be seen that there were circumstances preced-
ing  this affair of Bull  Run, peculiarly calculated  to undermine
the strength of a volunteer army, which circumstances may, in
future,  be surely guarded against, the Commission cannot too soon
or too earnestly protest against the further  waste of the national
resources in the attempt to maintain a system so inherently weak
and worthless. That it is and must be weak  and worthless, is well
known  to be the judgment of nearly all the  officers  of the regular
army who had experience of the volunteers in the  Mexican war.
 Whatever the result of the present war, it can hardly reverse the
judgment of the regular officers,  inasmuch as the final success of
the volunteers, however complete it is, must be a success  only
 against volunteers, not against a regular army. Yet it is extremely
 doubtful if the American  people will  submit, however strongly
 advised to do so, to the  maintenance of a standing  army as large
 as the  regular officers would  deem to be adequate for the pro-
 tection of the country in all contingencies.  The  volunteer  sys-
 tem is, in truth,  a  part of our system  of government, and when
 we wholly give it up, we surrender with it something of our dis-
 tinctive national life.   It is obvious that every hour this war con-
 tinues, intensifies our national life, and increases the devotion of
 the  people to whatever is essentially distinctive in it.  The volun-
 teer-system  is not, then, likely to be wholly given  up in any case;
 but  it  may be, and it must be,  placed upon a  firmer and  more
 trustworthy foundation than  it has hitherto had.
   If, therefore, the volunteer army at Washington, in June last,
 was  undergoing  a process of gradual but  sure demoralisation,
 it is of the  first importance  that this  should  be distinctly  es-
 tablished  and made known,  and the causes defined  as fully as
 possible, in order that they  may be  forever hereafter  avoided.
 The Commission at that time formally called attention to certain 
2S
dangers which it recognized,  and suggested remedies for them.
Informally, in interviews of the members of the Commission with
the leading  persons of the military administration, many such
suggestions were made.  A few can readily be recalled, together
with the substance of the answers which were received.
  1st.  A general order requiring a stricter physical examination
of recruits ?   Answer.  The volunteers would not submit to it.
  2d. A general order placing a limit on the number of absences
to be allowed from the camp  of  each regiment?   Answer. The
colonels ought to know enough not grant leave injudiciously.
  3d. A general  order limiting the hours during which officers
and men should be allowed leave of absence from  their camps ?
Answer. It could not be enforced.
  4th. An order  to prevent  men from  purchasing intoxicating
liquor, and from bringing it into the camps?   Answer. It could
not be enforced.
  oth. A general order calling attention  to various infractions
of the army regulations and  of the articles of war, which were
then constantly witnessed, and  which passed  without rebuke ?
Answer. Nothing better is  to be expected of volunteers.
  6th. The issue of detailed instructions to captains, with regard
to certain  duties which were almost universally  neglected  by
them?  Answer.  It is the duty of their colonels  to instruct
them.
  7th. The issue of  instructions to colonels as  to certain  duties
almost universally neglected  by them ?   Answer. If they don't
know the duties of their office, they have no business in it.
  8th. The modification of certain rules  to meet the special dif-
ficulties of officers ignorant of their duties ?  Answer.  These rules
work well in the regular army.
  In fine, while  the volunteer officers were nearly all ignorant
and  inexperienced  in   military  affairs,  and  were known and
acknowledged to  be so, scarcely the  slightest  variation, abate-
ment, addition, or  explanation  was thought  practicable 'to  be
made, in their favor, to the laws, regulations, rules, and customs
applicable to the carefully prepared,  thoroughly trained, and
well-tried officers of the regular army.  But one important ex-
ception  is recollected.   Absolute physical starvation of the vol-
unteers could not be permitted ; and as this would have inevitably
resulted to thousands from  the ignorance of the captains of their
duty, if the officers  of the Subsistence Department had  refused
to go beyond the requirements of the regulations, this part  of
the  duty of the captains was  anticipated and in a measure exe-
cuted for them.  Unquestionably, it  was still  executed imper-
fectly, and not nearly as well or as  economically as it would have 
L'i)
been had  it been left to captains who had enjoyed the benefit of
a West Point education, or  who, by any other  means, had been
able and willing to perform the full service required of captains,
under the regulations.   For all that, it was much better than if
it had been entirely  neglected.   But various other services little
less important  to the vigor and spirit of the army were also en-
tirely neglected by the  captains, and were not in the  least  pro-
vided for by higher authority.  The result has been less tangible
and obvious, perhaps, than would have been the result of neglect
to distribute food to the men, but it has scarcely been less ca-
lamitous to the nation.
   These  remarks are  not  made with  a fault-finding purpose
toward  the regular officers as a body.   They generally performed
all their duty,  and more than all  the duty required of them by
the laws, under the circumstances.   It was  their duty to be
 governed by the army regulations, and the army regulations did
 not require of them  to become  the schoolmasters  of the volunteer
 officers, nor to interfere to obviate the natural  results of  their
 ignorance and  neglect.   They believed (and, perhaps, they  were
 right) that it was necessary that the volunteers  should be made
 to understand  their duty through an  experience of  the incon-
 venience which  a neglect of  it would occasion.  At all  events,
 with the opinion they had always had and been ready to express
 of the fatuity of the nation in  depending so entirely npon volun-
 teers, and in maintaining so small a regular  force, it was hardly
 in common human nature to make the best they  could under the
 circumstances  of that which they deemed incorrigibly wrong and
 weak from its  very  starting point, viz : the organization  of com-
 panies by an election of officers.
    The sagacity and courage  of two very uncommon men, Gen-
 eral McClellan and General Meigs, cutting through, over-riding,
 and  superseding the old  traditions and customs of the  army
 wherever the interests of the  nation made it necessary, yet using
 ten times the  rigor of enforcement in regard to the regulations
 that had  been previously used with volunteers, has, since July,
 made the best of an ineffective  system, and  shown  what might
 have been done with volunteers before  July.  Even the demor-
 alized  regiments, with but  very few exceptions, are now in better
 condition, in better spirit,  in better health, than they were when
 they received the order for the advance to Bull Run.  The very
  measures which the Commission urged, which it was said could
  not  be  enforced, would not  be submitted to, and would be use-
  less with  volunteers, are now rigidly enforced,  are  submitted to
  with manifest satisfaction by volunteers, and are obviously pro- 
:*n
 ducing  the  most beneficent effects, and this equally in the new
 and the older regiments.   It is found not impracticable to attempt
 discipline with  volunteers.   On  the contrary, the most thorough
 enforcement of discipline leads  to the best results.   The most
 exact disciplinarians are the favorites of the volunteers ;  the best
 disciplined regiments are the most contented regiments.
   All that it was possible, under the laws, for good generalship
 to do in  the time which has elapsed since  General McClellan
 assumed command of the army of the Potomac, has been done to
 make the  best of the national military system ; but the great im-
 provement that has been effected must not lead us to shut  our
 eyes to  that which is still reprehensible, or prevent us from ask-
 ing how far this is due to inefficiency of administration, and how
 far to inherent vices of the system.
   To revert again to the  hypothesis of disease, there is still room
 for the inquiry, Has  it been entirely eradicated ?  The Secretary
 suspects that certain regiments are hardly yet convalescent.  In
 one of those which suffered most, and'most unaccountably, on  the
 theory that  the demoralization  was  the result of  the battle, a
 medical inspector of the  Commission reported this  week that
 fully one-half the extraordinary  number of men reported  as sick,
 were sick, in his judgment, in no  otherwise than homesick.   Even
 the nominally well men, though  in the presence of the  enemy,
 it  was  confessed, had no  stomach for fighting;—in this respect
 being in remarkable  contrast to. others camped adjoining them,
 who were  impatiently  anticipating an   immediate order  to
 engage.
   If the disease is thus deep-seated,  we can hardly  imagine that
 its causes  have been  destroyed at a blow.   Let us look the facts
 fairly in the face without fear or flattery.
   The volunteers are now abundantly, yet  far from wholesomely
 fed ; they are lodged as well as the laws provide that soldiers
 shall be lodged, yet no sensible  farmer  lodges his beasts nearly
 as unwholesomly—the government lodges its  own horses in some
 respects better.  They are beginning to be well clothed; but some
 regiments are  yet objects of charity in this particular.   With
 typhus increasing, no means  are available—at least none at all
 adequate—to keep them clean ;  and many of the camps  are yet
 really in a  filthy condition.   It would be a poor farmer who
 would offer the same invitation to vermin and cutaneous diseases
 to  enter his stables that are offered in some of our volunteer reg-
iments.   The sick frequently suffer for want of proper medicine,
 food, attendance, shelter,  and professional advice.
   Congress  did, in its extra session, in  some sort recognize the 
31
fact that volunteers were not as. regulars.*   The volunteers were
badly fed, and therefore Congress increased the ration.  But Avas
not the ration abundant in quantity before V   Did not this Com-
mission most satisfactorily ascertain in June, that there Avas food
enough provided by the laAv, and the only difficulty was that  the
volunteer could  not get it, and  that when he got it he could not
cook it?f
   These, the real  defects of the army system in  its application
to volunteers, Congress did  nothing to remedy.   The agents of
this Commission verbally and by printed documents have labored
to make  commanders of companies acquainted with their func-
tions (as established for the regular army) in respect to the sub-
sistence of  the  men; and  in some  measure by these  means, and
probably much  more  by  the gradual  teaching of necessity, in
experience, a considerable and quite general  improvement is be-
lieved  to have occurred both in  the distribution and in the cook-
 ing of food.  It has been, however, by adapting the  knife to the
 case, not the case to the knife.
   Some improvement in the method of payment, by Avhich vol-
 unteers could meet their special obligations at home, was also au-
 thorized by the last Congress, at the suggestion of  the  Commis-
 sion.   It  has  not  yet gone  into operation, and  has probably
 been found impracticable  to be carried  out Avith the present or-
 ganization of the volunteers.!   Something was done by Congress
 also  about the  grand difficulty with the volunteers,  their  alleged
 disposition to take the most unfit men for officers.   To this time,
 however,  no method  has  been put  in operation for subjecting
 either  candidates or officers already elected, to an examination by
 those competent to judge of their qualifications ; and officers Avho
 are  not only notoriously ignorant, but who  are notoriously bad
 men—bad men among bad men—are allowed to retain responsi-
 ble commands.   Are the difficulties in the way of remedying these
 evils of the volunteer  system insurmountable ?       ...
    The Secretary is every day  called  upon  to give information
 to the surgeons of volunteer  regiments, as to how they shall pro-
 ceed in order  to  obtain the simplest medicines  and other sup-

   * In  the revised army regulations,  issued since this report was written two
     in  the revisea    y  g           devoted to " volunteers and militia in
 ^^ofthTu^S^   ™ey relate exclusively to the.recruiting, mus-
 !  ■   •  „„H miwterine out and payment of volunteers and militia.
 ^"^ThelMnce  Napofer.  saiS to have observed, after visiting a camp at
 xr t-  ,1   -What is here wasted would feast a French regiment." A con-
 ttashingtoo    What   J«. w            ^^      .^ mogt regiments
 HSSiff« made and Tuch was th/answer.  There is now  reason to
 hope, how/ver, that the practical difficulties will be overcome, and the law go
 into effect. 
'M
plies  necessary for the treatment  of the  commonest  cases  of
camp disease.*
  This constant experience as to a matter which must be consid-
ered of vital importance to volunteers who are in  the field, and
exposed to all the vicissitudes of a life in the field, illustrates the
grand fact of danger which everywhere presents itself.
  If, at this period of the Avar, it is a necessary danger attending
the employment of volunteers, then the convection is irresistible
that the present should be the last volunteers to be employed by
the United  States.  If a  remedy, if an  alleviation of the evil
can be found, its application is surely too  long delayed.
  Some  reference  must, in justice, here  be  made  to .the  com-
plaints received at this office from the volunteer surgeons, of the
inadequacy of the government supplies for the sick.   The Secre-
tary admits that  the  volunteer surgeons  are generally too  much
inclined to make inordinate requisitions and to keep cases under
field-treatment which ought to be transferred to general hospi-
tals;  but  if, as is  stated, the  force in the medical purveyors'
Avarehouse is so  small that, at this period of the Avar,  the  delay
of a  fortnight occurs in  answering a surgeon's  requisition for
medicines—and this statement is understood to be admitted  to
be true—and if the supply of medicines  in store  is so limited
that, without any inquiry as to the peculiar circumstances to meet
which each requisition is  made, he arbitrarily reduces the quan-
tities, and varies the assortment of medicines supplied in  each
case,  the Secretary cannot but think the. Commission has a duty
before it  of a different kind  to  that Avith which it  has hitherto
occupied itself.
  Another  matter  of complaint constantly  addressed to the
Secretary  must be  alluded to.   It is, that patients far too  ill
to be properly kept  in camp are  often  refused admittance  to
the general hospitals.  Regimental surgeons being, as they as-
sort,  thus  forced to  keep a certain class of patients under can-
vas, call for various articles—wine, for  instance—which other-
wise it would not be thought proper to supply for camp  use.   In
the majority of cases of this kind which have  been  investigated
by the Secretary, the failure to get the patient into the general
hospital  has been  owing to ignorance  of  the proper forms  to  be
observed for that purpose.  In not a few, however,  it appears to
  * According to the reports of the surgeons themselves  to the Commission's
Inspectors, 21 per cent, of the volunteer surgeons ^received their appointments
and entered  upon  their duties without having been  subjected to any official
inquiry as to their medical qualifications or their knowledge of the army medi-
cal regulations. 
have  been because  the hospitals  Avere full.  Considering  the
rapid increase of severe illness, which is liable to occur in an
army; considering, too, the liability to battles, is  it right that,
under ordinary circumstances, the hospital  accommodations of
the army should become anywhere near exhausted ?  The Secre-
tary feels it his duty to say that, regarding the question from an
unprofessional point of view, but regarding it as he is confident
ninety-nine in a hundred tax-paying citizens would regard it, the
hospital preparations are yet manifestly inadequate and unsuita-
ble for the volunteer army.   Can it be right, for  instance,  that
there should  be  but  one surgeon  and tAvo young assistants to
attend to from 160 to 180 patients, a large part of these being
surgical cases  or  illness of a typhoid character ?  This  is  the
case  at Alexandria, with the disadvantage of buildings  not in-
tended for hospital  purposes, and without the ordinary modern
conveniences of even citizens' dwellings in northern towns.
   The occasional very great  unfitness of  the  surgeons for their
posts is an evil which will be the subject of a special  report to
the Commission.   It is alluded to here as being  the chief cause
of another great evil—the want of confidence in the regimental
surgeons by their superior medical  and other officers.  This, at
the present time, is painfully illustrated by the measures to which
it has given rise to prevent improper  discharges of invalids.  A
statement on this subject, just received, is as follows:
   " There are men in  this camp who,  to my knowledge,  have
been held in  suspense for weeks, and are dying by inches, because
they cannot be released.  They are  unfit for duty, and have the
surgeon's certificate that they are unfit for service, and probably
ever will be,  and yet the papers that have been forwarded  have
been held back.  There is some clog  in the wheel; what it is we
do not know.
   " Some of the men have been summoned  before the medical
board at Alexandria, but what can they know about the man I
pointed out in the tent, who is made blind by the  rush of blood
to the head.   In a short interview thdy can learn nothing.  Yet
he has been lying in the tent for weeks, perfectly unfit for duty."
                       (Signed by a  Chaplain of Volunteers.)

   Is not the existence of this Commission based on an assumption
of the insufficiency of the regular army organization to meet the
wants of the volunteers ; and if so, is it not the first duty of the
Commission to inquire what those wants are, and advise the  gov-
ernment how  they  can be regularly,  systematically, and  ade-
quately provided for directly by government ?
   The Secretary confesses that it does not appear to hiai to be
           3 
34
right that certain offices for  the  volunteers, undertaken by  the
Commission, should rest on the uncertain means upon Avhich the
Commission is obliged to depend.   When a man who has, through
a patriotic impulse, volunteered to serve his  country  in the field
of battle, falls dangerously ill, or has a leg shot off, he cannot
feel that it is right that an adequate supply—a generous supply
—of proper clothing, delicate and nourishing food, wine*, surgical
attendance, nursing, or of anything  else which  will materially
contribute to a reasonable assurance of saving his life, should be
dependent on the  success  of any number  of persons who  are
obliged to solicit the means to procure  these articles and  these
services as if for charity.
  This is precisely the way in which the case stands  at present.
If it is not, the  Commission is spending a great deal of energy,
and a great number of benevolent persons throughout  the country
are laboring with it, for an unnecessary purpose.
  In the judgment of the Secretary,  the Commission should  not
be content  with leaving this business where it is.   Either  the
government should do a great deal more or the Commission should
do a great deal more.   To illustrate the matter as it stands :
  The Commission, at its  last session  in Washington, had its
attention called  to the case of a man  in one of the general hoat
pitals who had just suffered amputation of a leg. As it was thought
that his chances of recovery would be enhanced if he  could be
placed on a Avater  bed, an article not included in the government
hospital supplies, the Secretary was directed to procure one for
him, which was done, by ordering it from New York.  The sur-
geon in charge lately reported that, in his judgment, the  man's
life was saved by the  Avater-bed.  What constitutes a necessity
of a military hospital, if this was not an instance of it ? Six other
water-beds have since been  called for by different surgeons, each
being required for special cases.   Through the generosity of cer-
tain noble women in New York and on Staten Island, the Secre-
tary has been able to  promptly supply four of them.  On tele-
graphing for the fifth,  an answer was received that  it would be
necessary to wait for it to be manufactured, as the stock in store
was exhausted.
  Should such cases be dealt with only in this retail way ?
  The Secretary may be misinformed as to  the  value of water-
beds.  He may  be equally mistaken as to intrinsic value of  the
thousands of other articles which he has supplied, at  the request
of the hospital surgeons, for the  wounded and sick,  during  the
last month.   In that case the Commission is imposing upon  the
public  in asking  to be supplied with these articles, and in solicit-
ing funds  to  purchase them.   But if water-beds, for instance, 
 are ever a necessity in a military hospital, then, in the judgment
 of the  Secretary, it was  a  national sin that there should have
 been not one such thing  in  the  government stores at the break-
 ing out of the war ; and he can, at this period of the war, in no
 way justify a neglect to put hundreds of them Avithin  easy reach
 of the headquarters of every column of the army.
    The proper function of the Commission, appears to the Secre-
 tary, in  this case,  to have  been,  on discovering the need of a
 water-bed, to procure it by  the  most ready means available, but
 to provide for future cases, by calling upon the government to at
 once supply not only this  but every other proper appliance of the
 best of civil hospitals abundantly to every medical purveyor of the
  army.
    The Secretary, with the greatest possible respect for the Com-
  mission  and for the government,  feels  it necessary to urge this
  suggestion.  If the government fails in its duty toward  the vol-
  unteers, he is convinced that it is  from  no want of disposition  to
  thoroughly execute their duty on the part of those who administer
  the government.  Government  is  in the predicament which the
  master of a small craft would be, were he suddenly forced to take
  command of a shipof-the-line, with a crew of green-horns, and
  no officers but those he had had on his little trader to assist him.
  There is great danger  that habits formed  on the coaster, and
  which were excellent habits for the coaster, will bring  the liner to
  grief.   Government depends for information and advice about the
  army, and the wants of  the army, almost entirely on a class of
  gentlemen who have, for the greater part of their lives, been under
  a systematic training deliberately intended by the nation  to make
  them adapt themselves to that which should be given them, and
  not to look out  for that which would be best for them;  deliber-
  ately intended to confine the energies of each of them to his own
  special responsibility.   This has been the time-honored and much
  boasted policy of the country towards the army.  An officer of
  the army or of the navy is disqualified  for every legislative and
  administrative duty, except with reference to his own command ;
  and for  that,  the  limits within which his ambition  may range
• have been more closely defined  than those of  a  shop-boy s.  For
  instance, a lieutenant colonel of the regular army is restricted by
  law in  making  his official memorandums and reports to the use,
  annually  of "one  piece of red tape, the quarter of an ounce of
  wafers,"the quarter of a quire  of envelope  paper, 12 quills, or,
  in lieu thereof,  12  steel  pens,  and one  pen  holder,   c-.c.  Ine
  same close calculations and  parsimonious spirit rule the modiea
  reo-ulations; and when you  propose to a surgeon who has adapted
  \n< habits to them, that he shall call for the same degree of  com- 
:36
 fort for a sick soldier which you are accustomed to see offered  a
 sick  laborer in every respectable  civil hospital,  you will learn
 from his answer what the  effect  has been.   No member of the
 Commission is without a sufficient experience of this kind.
   To make the government dependent on the  information that
 Avill be transmitted to it by  regular officers,  of the wants of the
 volunteer army, and to suppose that it will thus be able  to anti-
 cipate these wants,  and to  make such timely and  abundant pro-
 vision for  them,  as the  people  expect at this time, is to de-
 pend on  the  fleetness  of  a  horse that has been kept in fetters
 since he was a colt.  These gentlemen—the  Secretary says it
 with the  most sincere and  unqualified respect  for them—these
 gentlemen  cannot get over the habit of putting off every demand
 upon the government to the last moment,  and of reducing every
 demand  upon government  to the least possible amount which
 will meet the immediate  imperative  necessities of carefully se-
 lected and thoroughly trained soldiers. The nation has always
 insisted that in that way they should do business, or not at all.
   This  the Secretary deems to  be the true explanation of  the
 false  economy Avhich had so  manifestly been practised before  the
 battle of Bull Run, and, so far as the army now suffers from mal-
 administration rather than bad laws, this  still explains the most
 of it—this, and not  an indisposition  to provide  adequately for
 the suppression of the rebellion on the part of the government.
 And hence he deems it proper, hence he deems  it the first duty
 and the most important service which  a body constituted as this
 has been, representing  the  feelings,  the plans, the temper,  and
 the demands of the people;  constituted by government, and yet
 independent of the favor of  government, and constituted by gov-
 ernment  for  the  express  purpose of  inquiry and  advice, that it
 should freely consider and determine the wants of the army,  and
 freely and  frankly represent them to the government and to  the
 people—to  the government, that it may be  led to  endeavor to
 supply them ; to the people, that they may the more heartily  sus-
 tain the government in its efforts to supply them.
  But if the Commission is not disposed to take this wide view of
 its duty,  then the Secretary begs leave to urge, as the practical 9
 conclusion  of this  Report, that at  least it is within  its duty to
 advise the Government to adopt a much more liberal, thorough,
 and effective policy with reference to  the medical department of
the army;  and if,  finally, the Government cannot  be induced te
 act what  seems to the Secretary to be the  proper part of  a civil-
ized Government towards  its sick soldiers,  then, he further urges
that, unless the Commission  has been going all wrong heretofore,
it Avill unquestionably become its duty to undertake a far larger 
business than its present organization  is adapted to meet; and
measures should at once  be initiated to canvass the country for
subscriptions to establish its treasury on a much stronger basis
  If, however, the Government, upon the representations  of the
Commission, shall  be found ready to abundantly provide for the
care of its sick and  wounded  soldiers and sailors, then the field
of duty of the Commission may be correspondingly curtailed; its
functions  being  mainly  reduced to  that  of procuring statistics
which will be of service to the world with reference to disease and
mortality in war, and that of  the preparation and distriuution of
information and advice calculated  to improve the sanitary condi-
tion of the forces  engaged.
   It may be asked, why should not  these duties be  undertaken
 also by Government  under its paid agents ?
   The answer is, with regard to procuring information, that a cer-
 tain class of facts may be desirably investigated and classified by
 the Commission,  which  it does not necessarily come within the
 duty of a  government to  deal with.   It  is considered a  part  of
 the contract which government enters into with the soldiers that
 it shall provide  water-beds and such like articles, if these are ne-
 cessary for the saving of their life.  Government is  under  no obli-
 gations to procure statistics, which would only have  a general phil-
 anthropic value ;  and  at such a crisis as the present, the heads  of
 Government are  supposed to be too much needed  in  meeting  its
 immediate  essential duties to undertake the responsible superin-
 tendence of measures of general philanthropy.
    And with reference to the dissemination of information, the
 whole system of government in dealing  with  the  army is based
 on the assumption that  its officers are well informed in certain
 respects, and its privates in the main well drilled and disciplined.
 As has already been said, the Secretary questions if  this system
 is not a mistaken one, where the volunteer army is concerned ; but
 though  it may  be gradually somewhat modified, it cannot  be
 entirely changed in a day nor  a month; probably not during the
 present war. There is then, and there is to be a large number of
 officers in the employment of government, who have had no means
 of informing themselves of  the  conditions of health of soldiers
 in camps, and a vast  army of  men,-the preservation of whose
 health depends far  more on their own prudence in certain respects
 than  upon those safe-guards for which  government relies solely
 unon discipline and acts of routine.   Hence a field of operations
 exists which can only be entered  in co-operation with  govern-
 ment  and yet which cannot be fully occupied by  government.
    The  Secretary has been  thus particular in defining what he
 deems to  be the possible duties of  the Commission, because he 
:;s
considers it is no longer right for the Commission to proceed on
the supposition that it is meeting a Avholly temporary emergency.
  It should  be determined, at this  session of the Commission,
if practiable, what duties shall be undertaken for the war; and
the organization of the Commission, for all other purposes than
these, should be wound up.  Measures should also be taken to
establish the organization of the Commission for the duties Avhich
it shall undertake for the  war on  a firm basis.
  If the Commission is to undertake to meet the deficiencies of
the government supply for the  care of the sick and wounded,
the government supply not being assuredly enlarged in its scope
and variety, it should establish depots for this purpose at various
points in the  country, and should be prepared to use for this pur-
pose a capital stock of at least $50,000, and to be assured of a
monthly revenue also for this purpose of $5,000.
  For the  efficient performance of the  other duties  which have
been indicated, it should be assured of a monthly revenue to con-
tinue without abatement during the Avar, of about $4,000.  This is
on the supposition that  the accomodations at present afforded the
Commission by the Government continue to be enjoyed.
  The  Secretary  respectfully  requests determinate action, if
practicable, at  this session, upon these suggestions, and recom-
mends the  passage of the following resolutions :
  Resolved, That the Committee of Inquiry be requested to pre-
pare a report to the Commission  on  the moral and sanitary in-
fluences  resulting  in the  demoralization observed  among  the
troops of this department in the latter part of July.
  Resolved, That the Committee of Inquiry be requested also to
report Iioav far  the  causes contributing to the demoralization of
the troops still exist, and  how far and in what way they may be
modified or removed.
  Resolved, That a special committee  be appointed to visit the
Surgeon  General,  the  Medical Director, and  the  Medical Pur-
veyor of the department of the Potomac, and repo.-t to the Com-
mission what, if any, additional provisions of any kind are needed
for the proper care of  the sick and Avounded of the army.
                       Respectfully,
                         ■  FRED. LAW  OLMSTED.
                                                 St'Ti'tary. 
APPENDIX.
                             BULL  RUN.

                COMPARISON OF REGULARS AND VOLUNTEERS.
  The following statement of the condition and conduct of a battalion of regu-
lars, as compared with the volunteers generally, is furnished by Mr. Elliott in
answer to the inquiry, Precisely what advantages, if any, do the returns show to
have been possessed by the regulars during and after the battle, as the result of their
better discipline ?  It is an important fact that one-half of the regulars were raw
troops, having been under drill a shorter time than the volunteers, on an ave-
rage.  In the judgment of the regular officers, their chief advantage was in the
circumstance that they were appointed to their duties, while the volunteer offi-
cers had been elected by the men whom  they had to command, and over whom
it was, consequently, impossible  to exercise that determined control which is
the first necessity of  all successful military movements.
  The returns yield the following information respecting  the condition and
conduct of Major  Sykes'  battalion of United States Infantry, which is here
given at length, for the purpose of showing, as precisely as possible, the actual
advantages of the  more complete discipline of the  regulars, as compared with
that of the volunteers, so far as demonstrated in this engagement.
  It appears that the battalion of United States Infantry under Major Sykea
(the  only infantry of  regulars  at Bull Run)  marched twelve miles to the
battle field on the morning of Sunday, July 21st;  that no portion  of this dis-
tance was at double-quick; that they breakfasted from their haversacks as they
marched from Centreville; that, at eleven o'clock,  during a halt,  before the
battle, on  the bank of Bull Run, they had a regular meal;  that their supply-
wagon was not taken into the battle field, but was left at Centreville; that they
were actively  engaged, and were  under fire from  half  past eleven a.  m. to
half  past .five p>m. ;  that they  marched  at  double-quick  only about  five
minutes, during a charge; that they gave no sign of exhaustion till they had
been in the fire about an hour;  that, then, they were taken by Major Sykes into
a wood near by, and  given ten or fifteen minutes rest, which did "great good;"
that, during the fight, many were " terribly tired," but none fell out of the ranks;
that but one man threw away his accoutrements, (and then, on return, himself
ran away for fear of punishment;*) that fifteen  are  known to be killed,
twelve to  be wounded, and ten  missing;  (the  official report of Major Sykes
announces thirteen killed, twenty wounded, of whom twelve are missing; and
the surgeons who returned from Richmond about the 12th of August, report
        «,„;.) that the instruments of most of the band were left behind, and that its members
bave siTe supplied themselves with new, at their own expend 
o
among the list of wounded prisoners the names of eleven who  are believed to
belong to this batallion ;) that all who returned were able men the next morning,
except three, who were  on the sick list;  that the wounded were removed from
the field to the hospital as fast as they fell and could be obtained, and were there
left; that the  ambulance corps consisted of the hospital  steward and attend-
ants, two from each company, (not the band,) that the men were well fed that
night (Sunday) at Centreville, from their provision wagon, which had there been
left; that their blankets and haversacks were laid aside and stacked, in charge
of a guard, (the band;) but returning by another route were left behind; that
when the retreat commenced, the men were "calm and ready for work;" that
" they retreated by order, to cover the retreat of the others;"  that they left the
field defending the rear of the retreating columns; were closely pursued by cav-
alry ; went to Centreville, resting there for a short time; and that, accompanied
by their provision wagon, they reached their camp at Arlington  at half past ten
a.  m.  on Monday,  "in  good  order;" that the men experience no serious ill
effects from the result of the battle—provoked and annoyed, but not discour-
aged ;  and that they are cheerful  and animated.  One-half of the number of
these regulars were raw recruits, having been enlisted but three months.
  So much for the experience and action of the regular infantry.   Let us now,
for comparison, consider the experience and course of the  volunteers.
  From the reports of inspectors  under  the  Sanitary Commission, relative to
twenty-eight of the regiments of volunteers, it appears that, as a general rule, the
number of miles marched to the battle field on the morning of Sunday, the 21st
of July, was about nine or ten, (not differing much from the distance marched by
the regulars;) that from one to three miles of this distance was at double-quick,
(no portion of this march of the  regulars being at double-quick ;) that the last
regular meal before the  battle, of about three-fourths of the troops, was on  the
evening of the day before the battle,  the other fourth breakfasting before 1\ a.
m.  of  the 21st, (the last meal of the regulars being at  eleven o'clock on  the
day of the battle,  in the woods near the battle field ;) that the men breakfasted
from their haversacks,  as they marched; the haversacks, in  consequence of
the negligence of the regimental officers, or ths negligence or  improvidence of
the men themselves, not being uniformly supplied with a  sufficiency ; that the
canteens were ordered to be filled with water on commencing the march, but that
the drink of the men during the  day was mainly " muddy water" (roadside sup-
ply;) that they suffered much from thirst; and that, in passing streams of pure
water, they were not in certain cases permitted to stop and fill their canteens;. (it
does not appear that the regulars suffered from thirst before engaging in battle;)
that the supply wagons followed  the volunteers nearly to the field of battle, but
not leaving, it is believed, the traveled road, (the wagon of the regulars was
left at Centreville, a distance from the battle-field of several miles ;) that there
were frequent marches  at double quick upon the battle-field; that those of the
troops who were actively engaged were constantly engaged for several hours,
(say from three to four hours,) unrelieved by periods of rest, or by fresh troops
from the reserves to  take  their places, when sensibly fatigued or exhausted,
(the regulars, it will be recollected, after being actively eDgaged about an hour,
retired for rest into the woods for ten or fifteen minutes,  thereby giving great 
3
relief to the wearied troops;) that several of the regiments are said to have
been thoroughly exhausted and  conquered before reaching the field, in conse-
quence of the rapid march and  the insufficiency of their supplies of food and
drink; that, as evidences of exhaustion, some lagged behind,  others were
Bun-struck, and others brought to the surgeon in convulsions; that, however,
in general, the exhaustion was less apparent  upon the field when actively en-
gaged than just before the engagement, and just after its termination—their
"courage" and "the excitement" supporting them  while the  conflict lasted;
that, when marching at  double-quick, on approaching the field, many of the
men threw away their blankets and haversacks, some of the troops themselves
falling  by the roadside  overcome; that  on  reaching the field,  blankets and
haversacks were, in general, deposited  under guard—some  regiments, how-
ever, throwing them aside without reference to a  guard;  that, in respect to
twenty of these twenty-eight regiments visited, (the  twenty comprising about
 15,300  men,)  there are  reported  to  have been from 2,215  to  2,462 killed,
 wounded, and missing,  (the inquiries by the  inspectors were mostly made
 during  the interval from the  25th to the 31st, inclusive, of  July;)  that very
 few, if  any, who returned were  able men the next morning ;  that the wounded
 were many of  them taken from  the field to the hospital,  (a stone church
 near,) and that, generally, the wounded were  left either  at the hospital or
 on  the  field;  that the surgeons  were, in  general,  efficient while  they  re-
 mained, and that several of the  surgeons remained with the wounded, and were
 taken prisoners, the majority of them, however, returning with the main body
 of the army ;  that  the regiments were generally, though not universally, poorly
 supplied with  ambulances, (many having none;) that the band as a rule did
 not perform the duty of ambulance corps ; that the men were badly fed that
 night and the  following day, many  having  nothing to eat;  that in the hurry
 of retreat, blankets and haversacks were in  most cases left behind, as also the
 wagons of provision and ammunition, (the regulars, it will be recollected,
 obtained on retreat a supply of food from  their wagon at Centreville, which
 was afterwards returned safely  with them to  camp;) that the men left the
 field exhausted, depressed, irresolute, and it is doubtful whether the depres-
 sion was most due to  the defeat, or to the physical exhaustion  arising from
 over fatigue, and  extreme  thirst  and hunger ;  that the retiring and exhausted
 combatants were not encouraged and reassured by a systematic and judicious
 advance of reserves of  calm and vigorous troops to  their relief, and to defend
 their retreat,  (such retreat being but partially protected;) that their suffer-
 ings on retreat, in physique  and morale, exhausted as they already were by
  hunger  and thirst and fatigue, and by the  consciousness of defeat, and urged
  on  as some of them were, by vague fear-that most enervating of incentives-
  a retreat continued without sleep  or food  or cessation for a distance of not
  less than twenty-seven miles  in a  semi-hostile country-were vastly greater
  than their previous sufferings from all depressing  and dispiriting  influences
  combined • and that, in each regiment, there are some who  are still dispirited
  and demoralized:  others who  are cheerful, animated, and ready for a renewal
  of the conflict; and still others who are fast regaining health and spirits under
  the recuperative  influences  of rest, improved diet,  recreation, and judicious
  discipline. 
4
  Mr. Elliott presents the following estimate,  from evidence in  his hands, of
the
             PROBABLE PRESENT CONDITION OF THE TWO ARMIES.
  From a close observation of the work of the Sanitary Commission; a perusal
of the reports of the inspectors, received daily, and a frequent conference with
the inspectors, a very exact knowledge is had of the present condition of the
army of the Union.  A judgment of the condition of the rebel army rests on
the scattered evidence contained in Southern newspapers, and in certain pri-
vate letters  received from the South, and in  the reports of prisoners, Union
men escaping from the enemy, and deserters.  It appears that at no time has
the rebel army been nearly as well provided as those of the Union; it has suf-
fered much more from disease; and in this  respect the work of  the  Sanitary
Commission itself is an element of no small importance in the advantage pos-
sessed by the national forces.
  Both armies were disappointed in the late  contest.  Ours that in consequence
of our own folly, while victors, we were routed, panic stricken.   Their's be-
cause it was, step by step, repulsed by an enemy whom  it believed would not
fight. The cause of our disappointment was  unsubstantial and temporary ; the
oause of their disappointment was real and permanent.
  Our army is rapidly convalescent, and has nearly recovered ; their recovery
will doubtless prove much less complete.
  The following official report of Major Henry J. Hunt has never before been
printed.   Major Hunt, as will be seen,  occupied a position favorable to obser-
vation on the extreme left, and having been at resf during the greater part  of
the battle, his report contains a clearer account of certain circumstances of the
battle than any which has hitherto been published.

                      Light Battery M, 2d Artillery,
                                 Camp near Fort Albany,  July 25,  1861.
Capt. J. B. Fry, A. A. G.
  Sir :  I have the honor  to submit a report of the operations of my battery on
the 21st instant.
  The company arrived at New York on the 12th instant from Fort Pickens,
Fla., with its battery, but without horses.   A large portion  of the men were
recruits,  and no opportunity for instruction  as field artillery had been afforded
them.  The company reached Washington by rail on Sunday, the 14th, and on
Wednesday morning the  battery, which came by sea,  was  received at the
Arsenal.   Necessary repairs and refitting were at onae commenced ; ammuni-
tion and other stores drawn and packed;  horses procured ; and on Friday, the
19th, we  marched  from Capitol Hill to Col. Richardson's position in  front of
the enemy's works at Blackburn's ford, a distance of 28 miles.  Saturday was
devoted to instructing the recruits, shoeing horses, &c. ; and on that evening
Lieut. Piatt's section was  detached to join the advanced guard.  On Saturday
night, Lieut. Edwards, 3d artillery, reported to me with a section of two heavy
rifled guns.  On  Sunday morning,  the 21st, Lieut.  Thompson's section was 
placed in position on the right of the main road overlooking the ford, and com-
manding the road by which the enemy's advance was looked for.  A few shells
were, by direction of Col. Richardson, dropped into the woods and amongst the
buildings which were  supposed  to contain  the  enemy, but no answer was re-
turned,  and the firing ceased.  Soon after this,  an infantry column was seen
pushing into the wood skirting Bull run.  Lieut. Thompson moved forward a
piece, and after a few rounds they disappeared.   At about 10  a. m. Col. Miles
ordered both sections of my battery to the extreme  left, occupied by Davies'
brigade.  Edwards' section had  been  sent  early in the morning to that posi-
tion, from which he had opened his fire  upon the woods and houses in front.
I transmit herewith his report of the operations of his section, in which he
describes the nature of the ground.
   The firing was continued at intervals by the whole battery " as a demonstra-
tion," but  produced little or no  effect,  as there was no definite object, except
when the enemy's moving columns came from time to time within our r ujge.
We were supported by two  infantry battalions drawn up in  line behind the
battery.
   On inquiry,  made immediately after my arrival on the ground, I was informed
that a brigade of infantry was posted in the wood to  our left and rear, com-
manding a deep  and wide  ravine on our left flank,  and watching the road
beyond it, which leads from below the ford to Centreville ;  and as we had skir-
mishers pushed forward into the ravine, I felt no apprehension of danger from
that quarter, but still requested, as a precaution,  that the battalion on the left
should be formed on the brink of the ravine, and in column, so that it might be
readily deployed  tc  front in any direction.  No attention was paid to this
request, and the regiment remained in line.
   About 4£ or 5 p. m., after the  battle was apparently gained on the right, and
whilst large reinforcements of infantry and cavalry were observed hurrying up
 from the direction of Manassas,  a strong force  of infantry and some cavalry,
 variously estimated at from 2,000 to  5,000 men  in all,  appeared on our left,
 approaching parallel to our front by the lateral openings into the great rayine
 on our flank.  The infantry only was first seen, and  as they approached with-
 out any apparent attempt  at concealment, preceded by our skirmishers, they
 were supposed to be our own troops.  As the numbers increased I  rode down
 the ravine with my first sergeant to reconnoitre them.   Some of our skirmishers
 stated that they had seen no troops; others said they were the 34th New Yorkers
 coming in.  They carried no colors, and their numbers increasing to an alarm-
 ing extent, I hurried back and  changed the front of the battery, so as to com-
 mand all'the openings into the ravine,  and the  approaches  to our position.
 Col  Davies, at the same time, detached a couple of companies into the ravine
 as skirmishers.   The latter had scarcely deployed when a sharp rattle of mus-
 ketry removed all doubts as to the character of the advancing troops.  We had
 been surprised, and the enemy was close upon us in large force.  Our infantry
 reeiment had changed front with the battery, but unfortunately closed their
 intervals behind it.   Precious time was now lost in getting them on our flanks.
 Had they remained in our rear, they would have been unnecessarily exposed
 to the fire directed on the battery ;  and in case of a determined charge for our 
()
capture, which I confidently expected, they would have been apt to fire through
us, destroying men and horses, and  crippling the  guns.  At length they were
moved to the right and left, and ordered to lie down and await the approach of
the enemy, who by this time were closing up in apparently overwhelming num-
bers.  I now directed the gunners to  prepare bhrapnel and cannister shot, and
in case the enemy persisted in  his advance, not  to lose time in sponging the
pieces—for minutes were now of more value than  arms—but to  aim low, and
pour in a  rapid fire wherever the men were thickest or were seen advancing.
The enemy having by this time completed his preparations, and driven in our
skirmishers, now rushed forward and opened a heavy musketry  fire on  the
battery ;  but  from the shortness of range,  or from aiming upwards as they
ascended  the ravine, their  shots mostly passed over us.  The command was
then given to the battery to fire.  Under the directions of Lieuts. Piatt and
Thompson, 2d artillery,  and  Edwards, 3d artillery, commanding sections, tho
most rapid, well-sustained, and destructive fire I have ever witnessed was now
opened.   The men took full advantage of the permission to omit sponging, yet
no accident occurred from it.   The guns  were all of large calibre, two 20-pdr.
Parrott rifle guns, and four light Impounders, and they swept the  field with a
perfect storm of cannister.  No troops could stand it, and the enemy broke and
fled in every direction, taking refuge in the woods and ravines, and in less than
fifteen minutes not a living man could be  seen on  the ground, which so recently
had swarmed with them.  The infantry  regiments had not found it necessary
to fire a single shot.
  Believing now that there was no support on the  left, (original rear,)  I exe-
cuted a flank movement, so as to bring  the left of the battery close to the wood,
and in front of the lateral road by which  it had reached the ground.  This
movement threw the regiment on our left into the wood, and thus  secured its
possession.  The fire was now re-opened  ; the rifle guns throwing shell, and the
others round shot, so  as to  sweep the wood and reach  the ravines into  which
the enemy had been driven.
  In a few minutes orders were given to  retreat;  and I sent an officer to Col.
Davis to inquire if such were his directions; that the enemy were defeated, and
that they would be unable to reform.   The answer returned was, " to retire at
once on  Centreville."   The pieces were limbered up, and, Lieutenant Edwards'
guns leading, moved off.  Scarcely was the column in the road when a scatter-
ing fire was opened on the rear, doubtless by those who,  having taken  refuge
in the wood, observed the withdrawal  of our troops.  The cry to the battery to
trot, was now clamorously raised from the rear, and confusion was fast spread-
ing, when I directed a deliberate walk should .maintained, and  pushed forward
myself to the place where the ambulances  and wagons  were  standing  in the
main  road.
  The teamsters had taken the alarm from the rapid firing and the  cries, and a
pani: w.is rapidly growing, when my assurances of our having beaten the enemy,
and that there was no necessity for hurry, together with the appearance  of the
head of  the battery emerging at a walk  from the wood,  reassured them, and
calmed the excitement.
  The whole column now retired in good  order, and was formed, together with 
all the disposable field artillery,  in front of Centreville, under the immediate
direction of General McDowell, in person, and in so imposing  an attitude as to
deter  the enemy from  any advance in that direction,  and to hold him com-
pletely in check.
  During the night, the  troops were put  in  motion for their  former  camp  on
the Potomac.  Barry's battery,  under Lieut. Tidball,  and my own, were  the
last we could perceive on the ground.   Just as I was leaving, I received a mes-
sage from Colonel Richardson, stating  that his brigade was drawn up in column
on the road, and that he wished me to  pass him with the battery, but to remain
near him, and that we would constitute the rear guard.   This was  accordingly
done, but a mass of stragglers collected around the guns,  and could not be pre-
vailed upon to pass them, or move without them.  I was thus  constrained to
move forward, until some 2,000 or 3,000 men  interposed  between  us, when I
received a message from Col. R.  stating that a force of the enemy's cavalry and
horse artillery was in our rear, and threatening  an attack.  I now drew up at
the side  of the  road—to turn back in such a crowd was  impossible—and only
by representing that the rear  was about being attacked, could  I urge them
forward.   On Col. Richardson coming up, he stated that the  demonstration of
the enemy was very feeble,  and we saw them no more.  It is but just to  say
that the disorder and mob-like mixture of the volunteers did not appear to pro-
ceed from fear, but from  sheer  fatigue.   They were  foot-sore,  lame, hungry,
and tired,  but seemed  to be in good heart; and on my representing that it was
important that a certain position in our advance  should  be occupied, some of
Blenker's German and of Montgomery's  New Jersey regiments, formed in good
order, and took the position indicated.   Had we been attacked  by  any force, I
have little doubt that a stout resistance would have been made.
   The officers of the  battery,  Lieuts.  E. R. Piatt, and  James Thompson, 2d
artillery,  commanding  sections, performed  all the duties devolved upon them
with promptness, skill, and gallantry.  Their labors in bringing the battery into
 good condition had been untiring, and  to the thoroughness of the  instruction they
 had imparted to their sections before  they were dismounted in Texas, is mainly
 attributable the efficiency with which the pieces were served on the field,  and
 the successful result of the action.
   First  Lieutenant Presley  O. Craig,  2d artillery, on sick leave, on account of
 a badly sprained foot, which prevented his  marching with his own  company,
 having heard of the sickness of my second lieutenant, volunteered  for the  per-
 formance of the duties, and joined the battery the day before it left Washington.
 He was constantly and actively employed during  the night preceding, and on
 the day of the battle, and his services were  very valuable.   When the  enemy
 appeared, he exerted himself in perfecting the preparations to receive him,
 and conducted himself with the greatest gallantry when  the onset was made.
 He fell early in the action,  whilst in the  active discharge of his duty,  receiving
 a shot in his forehead, and  dying in a few minutes afterwards.  This was  the
 only casualty in the battery.
   Cadet John It. Meigs, of  the U. S. Military Academy, being in Washington on
 furlough, also  volunteered his  servicer, and was employed actively from the
 time  he joined at  Washington until the close of the  battle.  On  the  death
 
8
of Lieut. Craig,  Cadet Meigs performed his duties until the close of the
action, with spirit and  intelligence, and was very useful after the affair was
over, in conveying orders, observing the enemy, and rallying our troops.
  Lieut. Edwards commanded  his section with skill and efficiency ;  and I can
endorse the favorable report he  makes of his Lieuts., Benjamin and  Babbitt,
and  of the conduct of his men.
  The behavior of the men of my battery was all that could be desired.   They
were cool, collected, prompt, and obedient, and not an instance of misconduct or
neglect occurred during the action in the whole battery.  The  first sergeant,
Terence Rielly, was very efficient, as were also the chiefs of pieces, sergeants
Smith,  Pfeffer, Flood, and Relinger.
  A  detachment of twenty recruits, under Lieut. Brisbane, had been dispatched
from Carlisle barracks to fill up my  company.  Lieut. B.  did not reach Wash-
ington until after we had left, but he followed us up, and sought us  on the field.
He did not  succeed in finding the battery, but  employed his men usefully in
endeavoring to stop the retreat of our forces, and in resisting the pursuit of the
enemy.   In the performance of these duties he was twice wounded.   He speaks
favorably of the services of sergeants Bowman and Rogers, of his detachment.
                       Respectfully, your ob't servant,
                                                HENRY J.  HUNT,
                                   Bvt. Maj.  2d Arfy, Comdg. Lt. Co. M. 
 
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