. : • • ■. ' • ■ ■ : * ** A n-: * - V 
SURVEY OF JAPANESE 
MEDICAL UNITS GENERAL HEADQUARTERS 
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS 
A.P.O. 500 
18 January 1947 
Published for the information of all concerned. 
By command of General MacARTHUR: 
P. J. MUELLER, 
Major General, United States Army, 
Chief of Staff. 
OFFICIAL: 
C. A. WILLOUGHBY, 
Brigadier General, G.S.C., 
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2. Allied Translator and Interpreter Section 
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS 
ft ft a 
RESEARCH REPORT 
SUBJECT: SURVEY OF JAPANESE MEDICAL UNITS 
I. G. No. 6160 
DATE OF ISSUE 18 January 1947 
No. 124 
SUMMARY: 
1. This report deals with Japanese Medical Units. 
2. Information is given on bacterial warfare, on medical and 
dental units, on malaria, plague, cholera, and dengue fever, and 
on cases of infringement of medical ethics. 
A. W. STUART 
Colonel, Infantry 
Commanding 
RS/TH/BH 
Distribution H 
SOURCES: Captured Documents. 
Statements of Prisoners of War. 
[Information should be assessed accordingly] 
i ii RESTRICTED 
CONTENTS 
Page 
Section I. MALARIA, PLAGUE, CHOLERA, AND DENGUE FEVER ... 1 
1. Malaria 1 
a. Failure of Japanese to Anticipate Malaria Losses 1 
b. Malaria Rate in Southwest Pacific Area 1 
c. Preventives and Treatment 2 
2. Plague and Cholera 8 
a. Preventive Measures for Troops 3 
b. Plague and Cholera in Civilian Areas 4 
3. Dengue Fever 4 
II. BACTERIAL WARFARE 5 
4. General 5 
6. Probable Targets and Methods of Attack 5 
a. Targets * • 5 
b. Methods of Attack 5 
6. Bacillus Bomb 5 
7. Japanese Propaganda Regarding Bacterial Warfare 6 
8. Bacteria Culture Media 6 
III. JAPANESE ARMY MEDICAL AND DENTAL UNITS 7 
9. Medical Units 7 
a. Field Hospitals 7 
b. Personnel 7 
c. Equipment and Supplies 7 
10. Dental Units 9 
a. General 9 
b. Personnel and Training 9 
c. Standards of Treatment 9 
IV. INFRINGEMENTS OF MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE RULES 
OP WARFARE 10 
11. Killings and Atrocities By Japanese Medical Department ... 10 
a. Killings of Wounded Japanese Soldiers 10 
b. Atrocities Upon Allied Prisoners of War 10 
12. Violations of International Agreements Regarding Markings and 
Use of Medical Facilities 10 
a. Abuses of Hospital Ships and Airplanes 10 
b. Hospitals Camouffaged 11 
c. Armed Medics 12 
Appendix A. LINE OF SUPPLY OF MEDICAL STORES 13 
iii 
RESTRICTED Section I. MALARIA, PLAGUE, CHOLERA, AND 
DENGUE FEVER 
1. MALARIA 
a. Failure of Japanese to Anticipate Malaria 
Losses 
The problem of malaria would seem to be 
one of the major considerations for an army 
about to invade tropical regions, yet most of 
the information derived from prisoners of 
war and from document translations indicates 
the failure of the Japanese to anticipate this 
menace. In their earlier campaigns the 
Japanese suffered heavily from the disloca- 
tion and mortality caused by malaria. Their 
efforts to correct the results of their short- 
sightedness were hampered by the inadequate 
training of medical officers in tropical dis- 
eases, by the inferiority and insufficiency of 
anti-malarial drugs and equipment, a]id by 
the irrational military psychology which 
required convalesce]it soldiers to return to 
regular duties and forced officers to “save 
face ” by avoiding early hospitalization. 
(ATIS Research Report No. 81, pages 26 
and 41) 
(1) Extract from loose, handwritten sheet, 
“ Medical situation during WAU Opera- 
tions ”, owner and unit unknown, undated: 
“ No matter whether in the valleys or 
on the ridges of the interminable moun- 
tains, the malaria mosquitoes flourish 
everywhere, a]id cases of fever occur every 
day. However, the correct treatment of 
rest and medicine cannot be given, and it 
is impossible to carry out most of the 
duties of the battalion. The standard treat- 
ment of administering quinine to reduce 
the fever temporarily has to be deferred.” 
(ATIS Bulletin No. 276, page 4) 
(2) Statement of Prisoner of War, meinber 
of 13 Infantry Regiment ,6 Division, captured 
BOUGAINVILLE, 30 June 1944: 
“ Majority of the men were afflicted with 
malaria but were required to perform- 
their duties and cany the same equipment 
as the healthy. Only serious cases were 
sent to the rear. There were some deaths 
resulting from malaria and dysentery.” 
(SOPAC Interrogation Report Serial No. 
0894, page 9) 
(3) Extract from undated mimeographed’ 
booklet, “ Principal Illnesses Among Com- 
batants in the South Seas Area (Data for 
Lectures) ”, dealing with malaria, issued by 
8 Army Medical Section. Owner and unit 
not stated. Place and date of capture not 
recorded; 
“ The principal wartime illness in the 
South Seas Area is malaria. Because of 
this disease the all-important fighting 
strength of our men is depleted, and in 
not a few instances the battle operations 
of the Army are greatly hindered.” 
(ATIS Current Translations No. 118, page 
11) 
b. Malaria Rate in Southwest Pacific Area 
Captured medical records indicate the 
malaria rate in the Japanese Army in SWPA 
was very close to 100,% and that the death 
rate was exceedingly high. In the BUNA 
campaigns 'the number of casualties from 
malaria was estimated at 16 times that of 
combat casualties. On LAE 5/6 of 51 Divi- 
sion were patients, with, malaria patients in 
the majority. Eighly-two percent of all 
patients in the ADMIRALTY Islands were 
malaria cases, and in western NEW BRI- 
TAIN the figures range from 60 to 90 percent 
at various times. During the PHILIPPINE 
campaign 50 to 60 percent of all troops had 
malaria. On RABAUL there was a 50 per- 
cent recurrency rate. 
(1) Extract from diary of 2nd Lieutenant 
EBUCHI, Shigeru, 144 Infantry Regiment, 
NANKAT SHITAI, November 1942; 
“ Comparison of casualties and malaria 
cases. 
“Casualties: 34 (wounded 18) 
(bomb 16) 
“ Malaria : 552 
“ Casualties to Malaria—1 : 16 ratio.” 
(ATIS Current Translations No. 15r 
page 81) 
(2) Noteliook, owner unknown; dated 
11—15 May. 
Extract ; 
“ 5/6 of 51 Division are patients of which 
the greater part are malarial, 
“ Total personnel of MARUOKA BUTAI 
1 SURVEY OF JAPANESE MEDICAL UNITS 
(102 I] if Regt) 
“ Total personnel 1800 
“ Hospital, Malaria 700 
“ Medical care in quarters 800 (5/6) 
“Personnel working 300(1/6) 
“ Since landing, 1000 of 20 Division and 
600 of 41 Division have contracted malaria. 
(TN—This item is not dated.)” 
(ATIS Bulletin No. 438, page 8) 
(3) Medical Prisoner of War, member of 
RINJI SHIGHO TA1 (Revised Transport 
Tai), captured GIRUWA January 1943: 
“ PAPAKI—Malaria and other tropical 
diseases prevalent. PW estimated the 
incidence of malaria was practically 100% 
in forward areas. JTie death rate was not 
less than 10%. ' Relapses were universal,” 
(ATIS Interrogation Report Serial No. 86) 
(4) Prisoner of War, member of 120 Shore 
Duty Coy, captured December 1942, BUNA, 
“ Malaria and dysentery prevalent in 
NEW GUINEA. Malaria claimed victims 
as early as 3 days after landing. Certain 
medicines ran out 3 days after landing, 
and it appeared to him that only very 
limited supplies had been brought from 
RABAUL. 
“ Hospital accommodations very primi- 
tive. Patients left outside and even ac- 
commodated in trenches. Many died from 
exposure and lack of attention.” 
(ATIS Interrogation Report Serial No. 31, 
page 9) 
(5) The information below is contained 
in a research report concerning malaria 
conditions in the early months of 1942. 
Extracts from statements of three captured 
medical officers regarding malaria in the 
PHILIPPINES, dated 8 July 1944: 
“ Incidence of malaria in MANILA was 
extremely high. Patients had weekly re- 
currence. RYUKI (quinine), a substitute 
for ENKI (quinine), was Used to combat 
it. After coming to SWPA, recurrence 
was usually monthly. 
“ About 50 to 60 percent of troops had 
malaria. 
“ About 50 percent of troops had malaria 
and 10 percent of these had to be hos- 
pitalized.” 
(ATIS Research Report No. 81, page 40) 
(6) Statement of Medical Officer Prisoner 
of War—MAGARIAPPU, 3 January 1944— 
28 January 1944 : 
“ 50 to 60 percent of garrison troops 
had malaria, and 20 to 30 percent of these 
men required hospitalization. 60 to 70 
percent of combat troops had malaria, and 
20 to 30 of these troops had to be hos- 
pitalizod.” 
(ATIS Research Report No. 81, page 86) 
c. Preventives and Treatment 
(1) Media]deal Preventives 
As mechanical preventives the Japanese 
used nets, protective clothing, punk sticks 
and smoke. None of these repellents was 
especially effective, and it would seem that 
the discipline necessary for adequate protec- 
tion was lacking. The average Japanese 
soldier had very little training in malaria 
prevention. Special malaria control units 
were said to have been organized and train- 
ed in the Japanese Army and Air Forces, 
but information regarding their methods and 
extent of operation is lacking. 
(a) Statement of Prisoner of War who 
was a member of 18th Infantry Regiment, 
6 Division, captured BOUGAINVILLE: 
“ PW had never heard of special malaria 
control unit. Mosquito nets were brought 
from RABAUL but not used. No punks 
used and repellents were ineffective.” 
(SOPAC Interrogation Report Serial No. 
0894, page 8) 
(b) Medical Bulletin (Routine meeting), 
dated 5 May 1943. Conclusions after enforcing 
malaria prevention regulations. From file of 
Coy orders, presumably of No. 1 Maintenance 
Coy, 22 Airfield Battalion: 
“ Although during May the number of 
patients in the LAE Air Forces greatly 
decreased, there are still one or two forces 
i]i which the number is large. Due to 
the inconsistent manner in which some 
units are carrying on, it is necessary to 
take strict precautions to see that all units 
enforce malaria prevention regulations. 
“ The use of anti-mosquito punk sticks 
is not sufficiently enforced. Especially 
endeavor to place them in the patient's 
room; after doing this, put up mosquito 
nets. 
“ Diagnosis and isolation of patients are 
irregular. The staff will see to it that 
diagnosis and isolation are strictly carried 
out.” 
(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 83, pages 
8 and 9) 
(c) Extract from report of 41 Division 
Medical Unit, dated 26 May 1943 
“ In an effort to disseminate thorough 
knowledge of malaria, every Saturday is 
being designated hygiene day, and once a 
month a medical examination of the force 
will be held. Yet it is most regrettable 
that as the days go by there is an increase 
in the number of malaria patients. The 
monthly malarial situation is shown in 
2 MALARIA 
attached chart No. 1 (TN—Chart missing). 
Every month about of men contract 
malaria.” 
(ATIS Current Translations No. 118, page 7) 
(2) Medicines and Treatment 
In their earlier campaigns the Japanese 
used quinine and plasinochin in the preven- 
tion of malaria. Doses Were usually 1 tablet 
of quinine daily or 2 tablets daily with 1 
tablet of plasmochin every ten days. Later 
there was a tendency to change from quinine 
to atabrine. Three possible reasons for this 
are: 
Quinine supplies in SWPA were getting 
low. 
Their strong feeling that quinine given to 
malaria patients caused blackwater fever. 
In an effort to reduce their higli malaria 
rate they were experimenting with atabrine. 
(ATIS Research Report No. 81, page 9) 
(a) Statement of Prisoner of War, member 
of 1 Coy, 33 Indepeftlent Engineer Reg- 
iment, captured NAM BARI W A, January 
1944: 
“ One quinine bisulphate tablet per day 
was taken after evening meals as preven- 
tive. Atabrine was taken only after man 
became ill.” 
(ATIS Interrogation Report Serial No. 
401, page 9) 
(b) Statement of Prisoner of War, 2d 
Lieutenant Medical Officer, member of 65 
Brigade Captured March 44: 
“ First seven days one 0.8 gram atabrine 
ampoule per day by intramuscular injec- 
tion. Next five days one 0.03 gram plas- 
mochin ampoule per day by intramuscular 
injection. Quinine was not used because 
it was thought to cause malignant malaria 
or blackwatw fever. For malignant malaria 
the above treatment was given intrave- 
nously.” 
(ATIS Research Report No. 81, page 15) 
(c) Prisoner of War, Medical Orderly, 
238 Infantry Regiment, captured between 
LAE and STO, 13 October 43: 
“ Malaria treatment; Twenty-eight days 
were required for a patient to complete 
one course of treatment with atabrine, 
plasmochin, and quinine. After this course 
a blood test was taken to ascertain if all 
malaria germs had disappeared. If not, a 
further course was given. Most patients 
were cured by one exmrse. Every member 
of PW’s Company had contracted malaria 
at one time or another. 
“ For daily recurrence of fever half a 
tablet of plasmochin was given 3 times a 
day for 8 days; them 1 atabrine tablet 3 
times daily for 4 days. This course was 
repeated. 
“ For recurrence of fever on every third 
day or on every fourth day quinine was 
given.” 
(ATIS Interrogation Report Serial No. 831, 
page 8) 
(d) Prisoner of War, member of 1 Ship- 
ping Engineer Regiment, captured NATOMO, 
December 1943; 
“ Malaria patients received two atabrine 
tablets per day after meals. If they did 
not respond, an injection of plasmochin 
was given,” 
(ATIS Interrogation Report Serial No. 381, 
page 11) 
(e) Interesting clinical experiments in 
treating malignant malaria cases with intra- 
venous and intramuscular atabrine wore 
conducted by Major HIRAGA, Tsuyoshi and 
staff of 1st Field Hospital, 20 Division. 
Defaced clinical files of nine cases thus 
treated are reproduced in Appendix “ B ” of 
ATIS Research Report No. 81. • A summary 
of the document indicates: 
“All cases were malignant malaria and 
extremely ill upon admission. 
“ The maximum dosage for one day is 
0.6 grams, but the usual dosage was 0.2 
grams daily in conjunction with intramus- 
cular injection in buttocks. 
“ Cases were given supportive treatment 
of stimulants and Ringer’s solution. 
“ There was no secondary reaction from 
the use of intravenous atabrine. 
“ All cases were clear of delirium in 1 
to 14 days, with most of them having 
normal temperature in 7 days.” 
(ATIS Research Report No. 81, pages 12 
and 13) 
2. PLAGUE AND CHOLERA 
a. Preventive Measures for Troops 
The Japanese Army made adequate pre- 
parations to combat plague and cholera 
during the war. Military personnel were 
usually inoculated every six months*, and in 
epidemic areas, every three months. Strict 
quarantine regulations were enforced at the 
slightest signs of the diseases. Duo to these 
extensive measures there was no serious 
epidemic of plague or cholera among Japa- 
nese troops. 
(1) Prisoner of War, Corporal, member 
of 55 Infantry Regiment, captured 25 Dec- 
ember 1948, stated; 
“ About three weeks prior to leaving 
JAPAN for overseas, he received inocula- 
tions for the following diseases; -cholera, SURVEY OF JAPANESE MEDICAL UNITS 
bubonic plague, typhoid, and dysentery, 
lie received one injection for each of these 
diseases, given at 24-hour intervals, and 
finally one combined injection against all 
four. Troops overseas were reinoculated if 
there were any particular diseases pre- 
valent.” 
(ATIS Research Report No. 92, page 3) 
(2) Prisoner of War, medical orderly, 
member of 55 Division Medical Unit, cap- 
tured BURMA, 26 February 1944; 
“ When proceeding overseas all troops 
were given injections as protection against 
plague and cholera. The medical services 
were careful to provide ‘ booster ’ doses of 
inoculations at short intervals, usually of 
three months. This was not always pos- 
sible under active service conditions.” 
(ATIS Research Report No. 92, page 3) 
(3) ATIS Research Report contains ex- 
tracts from “ Report on Eradication of Infec- 
tious Cholera ” in South CHINA, of 02, 
presumably 66 Infantry Regiment (Medical 
General Affairs) No. 165, dated 9 October 1942. 
Stamped “ Secret ”. Detailed instructions on 
health measures are given, such as isolation 
of patients, bacterial examinations, disinfec- 
tion of buildings, clothing and bedding. 
(ATIS Research Report *92, page 10) 
b. Plague and Cholera in Civilian Areas 
There Were sporadic outbreaks of plague 
and cholera among civilians in territories 
occupied by the Japanese. Plague was 
encountered in JAVA, BURMA, MAN- 
CHURIA, and South CHINA. The majority 
of the cases seem to have been among the 
natives. There was an outbreak of cholera 
in SHANGHAI in 1943. The epidemic 
spread to TAKAO in FORMOSA by August 
1943 and from there to SINGAPORE, 
MACASSAR, PHILIPPINE Islands, and 
TRUK. It so alarmed the Japanese that 
they seriously considered the inoculation of 
natives in and around MANILA. 
(ATIS Research Report No. 92, pages 4 and 
6) 
(1) Extract from file of War Ministry 
Circulars, dated 10 June 1942—20 September 
1943; 
“In accordajice with No. 3, Item 1, 
Article 7, of Quarantine Regulations for 
ships under Army jurisdiction, RANGOON 
Area is designated for the time being as 
a plague epidemic area.” 
(ATIS Bulletin No. 766, page 4) 
(2) Prisoner of War, medical officer, 
member of 1st Amphibious Brigade, captured 
PARRY Island, 23 February 1944: 
“ Plague was epidemic in MANCHURIA 
about five years ago; the center of the 
epidemic was NOKIGAN, a city of Mongol 
population. As preventives the Japanese 
used powder made of vermifuge chrysan- 
themum, applying it to the body and 
clothes to kill lice. White birch oil spray- 
ed oil the body or used as soap was also 
employed.” 
(ATIS Research Report No. 92, page 4) 
(3) Two loose mimeographed sheets, 
“ Reports on prevention of Diseases ”, com- 
piled by 18th Army Medical Section, dated 
15 Jun 1943: % 
“ Many cases of plague south and 
northwest of MANDALAY.” 
(ATIS Bulletin No. 658, page 3) 
3. DENGUE FEVER 
Information on the incidence or severity 
of dengue fever encountered by the Japanese 
in the Southwest Pacific Area is almost 
completely lacking in ATIS ; hut that this 
disease caused much concern is shown in a 
report by Captain (Med) NAGAOKA, Yutake. 
The report is based on two years of obser- 
vation of dengue fever cases and a study of 
the reinfection condition of 282 dengue fever 
patients over a one-year period. Included 
are descriptions of 13 experiments with 
hypodermic inoculation of dilute solutions 
of blood taken from dengue Jbver patients, 
with charts and graphs of results. 
NAGAOKA’s conclusion was that the 
hypodermic inoculation of 0.1 ml of 1000 to 
1 and 300 to 1 dilutions of blood of dengue 
fever patients with an interval of 16 days 
between inoculations is the dengue fever pre- 
ventive inoculation which should be carried 
out for all personnel. 
(ATIS Enemy Publications 354, page 12) 
4 Section II. BACTERIAL WARFARE 
4. GENERAL 
The use of bacteria, filterable virus, and 
other pathogenic organisms as weapons of 
war was a subject of profound interest to the 
Japanese military. These weapons, capable 
of being deposited by a single agent or 
sprayed from the air, could create sudden 
and violent epidemics. The difficulty in 
determining the source of, and adopting 
effective counter measures against, bacterial 
attack made its use a constant temptation and 
an ever present dread, 
(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 381, pages 
1 and 2) 
5. PROBABLE TARGETS AND 
METHODS OF ATTACK 
Information extracted from bom id mime- 
ographed file, “ Defense Against Bacterial 
Warfare”, issuing authority not stated, 
undated, captured Central LUZON, 14-21 
March 1945, lists possible targets and methods 
of attack * 
a. Targets 
(1) Troops 
Troops and headquarters make suitable 
targets. Closely billeted forces which do not 
have sufficient medical facilities are especial- 
ly susceptible to attack. 
(2) Rear Bases 
Attacks are made against military instal- 
lations, food supplies, forage dumps. 
(3) Cities 
Cities which are centers of government, 
business and communication may become 
targets. However, large cities usually have 
extensive medical facilities which helps 
prevent infection through the mouth by 
pathogenic organisms. 
(4) Water 
Sources of water are the best targets since 
they are suitable for organisms which cause 
contagious diseases of the intestinal tract, 
such as cholera, typhoid fiver, dysentery. 
(5) Factories 
(6) Cattle and agricultural products 
b. Methods of Attack 
(1) Spraying bacterial solutions by air- 
plane 
(2) Spraying powdered bacteria 
(8) Dropping ampoules containing bac- 
teria 
(4) Dropping infected insects, animals, 
animal tissues 
(5) Dropping bombs filled with bacteria 
(6) Firing shells and bullets containing 
pathogenic organisms 
(7) Leaving pathogenic organisms be- 
hind when retreating 
(8) Spreading bacteria by agents 
(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 381, pages 
6 and 7) 
6. BACILLUS BOMB 
Though the Japanese made no mention of 
it in their publications, extracts from docu- 
ments would indicate that they Were experi- 
menting with a bacillus bomb, 
a. An extract from a Japanese document 
captured at KWAJALEIN Atoll, translated 
19 May 1944, lists 9 types of bombs, among 
which is a “ Mark 7 Bomb ”, termed a 
“ Bacteria Disseminating Bomb ”. Further 
evidence of this is indicated in an extract 
from a chart, taken from a notebook belong- 
ing to a]i Air Corps Enlisted Trainee, which 
lists thirteen types of bombs, One of these 
was “ Special Bomb Mark 7 ”. The mark- 
ings were “ green-purple-gray-purple,” and 
it was described as “ (Bacillus Bomb) for 
special circumstances ”. There are no docu- 
ments in ATIS files which indicate the con- 
tents of the bacillus bomb. 
(ATIS Research Report No. 84, pages 17 
and 18) 
7. JAPANESE PROPAGANDA 
REGARDING BACTERIAL 
WARFARE 
From captured enemy documents it would 
seem that Japanese propagandists, in order 
to disguise their own intentions and to im- 
press the need for defensive alertness upon 
soldiers and citizens, accused the Allies of 
experimental ion with and use of bacterial 
warfare. 
a. Extracts from a Japanese pamphlet, 
5 SURVEY OF JAPANESE MEDICAL UNITS 
“ The Truth About Bacterial Warfare ”, cap- 
tured CAPE GLOUCESTER, 26 December 
1943: 
(1) “Especially in the SOVIET 
UNION experiments in the technique of 
bacterial warfare progressed most rapidly 
and on the largest scale in the world. In 
the vicinity of VLADIVOSTOK there is 
a great experimental station which holds 
some tens of thousands of scientists. Bacteria 
was clearly included in the strategy and 
tactics of the Red Army. Not every country 
has gone so far as the SOVIET UNION, 
but each, under such names as ‘ Special 
Tactics ’, ‘ Strategic W arfare ’, 1 XX War- 
fare ’, etc, has secretly been hard at work 
■developing the technique of bacterial war- 
fare. 
(2) “ Again, at the 1932 GENEVA 
Disarmament Conference, it was concluded 
that poison gas and bacterial warfare 
should not be permitted from the stand- 
point of humanity, and an agreement 
banning their use was reached. 
“ In order to wage war, all methods are 
used to the utmost. Practically speaking, 
the League of Nations today is completely 
defunct, and the agreement prohibiting the 
use of bacteria has no power. The Chinese, 
whom the League of Nations had backed 
and supported on all previous occasions, 
tried to stop the advance of the Imperial 
Army to NANKING after the break-through 
at SHANGHAI, by scattering cholera in 
the wells in the summer of 1987. 
“ Even hi KIUKIANG there* was a 
sudden epidemic of cholera because the 
fleeing Chinese Army scattered cholera in 
the wells. There was absolutely no harm 
to our soldiers because of rapid and efficient 
steps to prevent disease, but the innocent 
populace became the victims of the Chinese 
Army’s bacterial strategy and were attacked 
by the poisonous hands of the invisible 
death demon. When these techniques of 
bacterial warfare are observed, they closely 
resemble those of the SOVIET UNION. 
Here we must recall the late .Spanish 
War. Also, we must consider tlie changed 
tactics of the Red Army after NO M 0 NHAN 
and the progress of the Rod Army moun- 
tain-warfare after the Russo-Finnish War. 
But bacterial warfare has not been carried 
out in the Russo-German War as yet. 
Judging by the above, is the SOVIET 
UNION letting the Chinese Army carry 
on experiments in bacterial tactics, and is 
the SOVIET UNION planning to develop 
bacterial warfare on a largo scale as a 
decisive step in the Russo-German War ? 
Or is it abandoning bacterial warfare in 
EUROPE because of the high development 
of thought and of medical facilities, and 
building a strategy with the main stage 
for bacterial warfare in China and Man- 
churia, which are comparatively inferior 
in those respects ? Or is it planning to 
combine both the above factors for thfc 
next war ? ” 
(ATIS Research Report No. 84, pages 4 
and 6) 
8. BACTERIA CULTURE MEDIA 
The following bacteria culture media in- 
formation is taken from an enemy publica- 
tion entitled “ Methods of Making Culture 
Media ”, Issued by No. 1 Section of SA- 
SAKI, KO dated June 1941. Captured 
BUTIBUM Village 3 December 1943. Part- 
icular attention is paid to discussions of: 
a. Peptone used for cholera cultures 
Gelatine culture medium for cholera 
bacilli 
Alonzon’s culture medium, used for 
cholera bacilli 
b. Concerning tubercle bacilli 
Details are given of LOWENSTEIN 
medium 
The following are mentioned: 
SASAKI’s culture medium 
PETROF’s culture medium 
HONE’s culture medium 
BERTRAM’S culture medium 
Glycerine and potato medium 
Glycerine and bouillon medium 
(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 96, page A) 
6 .Section III. JAPANESE ARMY MEDICAL AND 
DENTAL UNITS 
Line officers commanded li t medic} ■ 11 > 
except in circumstances where they were 
needed in more urgent capacity. The duties 
of most medical officers were purely profes- 
sional, but they were required to keep 
complete medical records, particularly at 
regimental and battalion levels. The division 
surgeon’s duties were advisory; the re- 
mainder of his staff dealt with personnel 
and supply. 
(ATIS Research Report No. 83, page 11) 
(2) Nurses 
Nurses (female) were of non-commissioned 
rank only. They were not trained by the 
army but drawn from civilian life. The chief 
nurse had the rank of NCO and others that 
of private. They drew the pay of their rank. 
Most of them were assigned to army hos- 
pitals, hospital ships, and hospital trains; 
occasionally they were stationed at line of 
communication hospitals. They did not 
assume the responsibilities or duties assigned 
to Allied nurses. 
(ATIS Research Report No. 83, Page 11) 
c. Equipment and Supplies 
(1) Supply Procedure 
Statement of Prisoner of War, Lieutenant 
Colonel (Pharmacist), 2 Army Field Freight 
Depot, captured between SARMI and 
MANOKWARI, 9 July 1944: 
“ Medical Department was responsible 
for supply ai d manufacturing of drugs 
and for procurement of drugs from con- 
tractors. Requisitions were placed accord- 
ing to rate of consumption and usually 
three months in advance. Amounts carried 
• by Field Freight Depots were established by 
the Medical Section of Army Headquarters, 
(See Appendix “A”) 
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 
663, page 5) 
(2) Emergency Supply to Front Lines 
Packages which contained medical material 
for emergency supply in the southern area 
were specially marked and Were given pri- 
ority over the general supplies. They were 
to be used for <mergency supply of front 
line troops only and not for rear lines ex- 
cept in rare instances. Contents were such 
9. MEDICAL UNITS 
a. Field Hospitals 
A striking feature of the organization of 
medical units was the high degree of flexi- 
bility achieved in some of the more forward 
commands. Even division medical units 
were exceedingly adaptable. They seem to 
have been so well organized that any section 
could have been assigned to function as a 
separate unit, 
(1) Extract from ATIS Research Report; 
“ The organization of field hospitals is 
extretuely flexible. The field hospital is 
so organized that it can easily be divided 
into sections which can operate independ- 
ently. Splitting the unit in half to func- 
tion in different areas is common practice 
in jungle warfare. Their equipment being 
lighter and extremely well packed, a sec- 
tion of a field hospital can be compared 
to the U. S. Army Portable Surgical 
Hospital. This comparison is not entirely 
satisfactory because the Japanese have 
more personnel an el care for a larger 
number of patients.” 
(2) In certain areas field hospitals were 
inadequate, and equipment was primitive. 
Prisoner of War SAWATARI, Zengoro, 
Medical 2d Lieutenant, Provisional Transport 
Tai, captured 20 January 1943 at GIRUWA: 
“ Agreed that field equipment was pri- 
mitive. No beds were provided for patients 
in forwarel areas. Beds had been con- 
structed at the hospital at RABAUL, and 
during the earlier part of the NEW 
GUINEA campaign patients were evacuat- 
ed from forward areas to GIRUWA and 
then on to RABAUL. PW believed 
patients were then sent back to JAPAN. 
PW was not a (qualified surgeon, but 
performed many minor operations owing 
to the absence of qualified men. No special 
buildings were available for ope*rations, but 
tents were used.” 
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 
143, page 8) 
b. Personnel 
(1) Line Officers 
7 SURVEY OF JAPANESE MEDICAL UNITS 
items as surgical life-saving equipment, 
malaria medicines, vitamins, hemoglobin- 
producing medicine, etc. One package re- 
presented the' necessary amount for about 200 
men per month. 
(ATIS Bulletin No. 1614, pages 7 and 8) 
(a) Extract from a copy of report on Medi- 
cal Material for Einergency Supply to Front 
Lines, 22 September 1943, GO Force Chief 
of Staff: 
“ The contents of each package is divid- 
ed into two parts and put in rubber bags, 
which makes the packages waterproof and 
buoyant. Each rubber bag is to weigh 
aboui 8 kg. 
“ When these packages are to be thrown 
down from the air, the outside box must 
be removed, and the contents, in a paper 
box, must be attached to a parachute. A 
list of the contents and instructions for 
use will be attached to each package.” 
(ATIS Bulletin No. 1614, page 8) 
(3) Distribution 
Statements of Prisoners of War would 
indicate an adequate store of medical sup- 
plies in some sections, a very definite lack 
in others. 
(a) Prisoner of War AOKI, Tsunoo, 
Medical NCO assigned to KYOTO Army 
Hospital, captured GOODENOUGH Island, 
8 March 1948: 
“ Thought that there were ample supplies 
of medical equipment in JAPAN and in 
RABAUL. Any lack of equipment in 
NEW GUINEA might be put down to 
inadequate supplies during latter stages of 
operations. There was a plentiful supply 
of gauze in JAPAN, as well as cotton 
bandages.” 
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 
218, page 8) 
(b) Prisoner of War YADA, Nobntaro, 
P. 0. 2c, Kure No. 6 SNLF, captured 21 
July 1943 at R END OVA, stated: 
“ While at RABAUL medical supplies 
always seemed sufficient, including quinine, 
atabrine, and plasmochin.” 
(SOPAC Interrogation Reports, Serial No. 
02103, page 8) 
(c) Notebook, dated 24 May 1944-6 March 
1945, owner and unit not known. Writer 
notes lack of medical supplies in MANILA: 
“ One cannot afford to get sick here, for 
the supply of medicine is said to have 
been exhausted a year ago.” 
(ADVATIS Bulletin, Serial No. 589, page 
1) 
(d) Extracts from “ Medical Report on 
FINSCHHAFEN Force ”, by Army Medical 
Captain MORI, Kiyosuke of ASA No. 2055 
Force. Directed to Army Medical De- 
partment Commanders, MO Force, ASA 
Force. Date unknown, received ATIS SWPA 
26 October 1943 : 
“The medical supplies nowon hand at 
FINSCHHAFEN consist of one medical 
pannier for gas a] id three bales of medical 
supplies (for use of HQ Unit only). The 
materials for each battalion have not ar- 
rived as yet. Medical supplies are practi- 
cally depleted. We are suffering particular- 
ly from lack of malarial medicine. (A 
telegram has been sent for the immediate 
delivery of medical supplies for each batta- 
lion.) Also, due to sinkings and the 
exhaustion of all medical supplies, the 
attached units (21st Infantry, 51st Engineer, 
30th Engineers, Independent light Trench 
Mortar Unit, and a field construction unit) 
have no medical supplies at all. The 
1st Medical Regiment of the 41st Di- 
vision and the 238 Infantry possess only 
meager medical supplies 
“ Furthermore, there is no warehouse or 
hospital at FINCHHAFEN, and the supply 
of medical materials is almost depleted. 
We have a feeling of great uneasiness.” 
(ATIS Current Translations No. 92, page 
11) 
(4) Contrast Between Quality of Equip- 
ment aj id Treatment 
According to ATIS Research Report No. 
83, the medical equipment of the Japanese 
Army was of high quality. But there seems 
to have been a great contrast between the 
high quality of the equipment and the treat- 
ment (especially post-operative) given to 
patients. 
(ATIS Research Report No. 83, page 7) 
(a) Prisoner of War, Superior Private 
of 55 Engineer Regiment, captured 25 Jan- 
uary 1943, GIRUWA: 
“ There has been a hospital near KO- 
KODA and another near GIRUWA. They 
were; situated along the line of communi- 
cation and made of wood. There were 
about 20 patients to a ward but no medical 
officers. When patients went to the hos- 
pital, they got worse instead of better. 
Part of the time they ate grass roots.” 
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No, 
264, page 7) 
(b) Prisoner of War YAKUSHIJI, Haji- 
me, Superior Private, 6th Division, 45 In- 
fantry Regiment, captured 15 March 1944 
in TOROKINA Area: 
“ Medical facilities were inadequate on 
BOUGAINVILLE. He had heard hos- 
8 DENTAL UNITS 
pitals were virtually divested of all medical 
supplies, and proper care could not be 
taken of patients. Frequently wounds were 
merely bandaged because of lack of medi- 
cine and medical help.” 
(SOPAC Interrogation Report No. 01229, 
page 15) 
10. DENTAL UNITS 
a. General 
Dental work in the Japanese Army was 
done by civilian dentists until 1942 when a 
Dental Corps was organized under- the 
Medical Department with a Major-General 
as Chief Dental Surgeon. 
(ATIS Research Report No. 91, page 3) 
b. Personnel and Training 
The system of commissioning trained per- 
sonnel who volunteered and of giving only 
non-cominissioned ratings to those who were 
drafted probably caused friction. 
(1) Statement of Prisoner of War (JA 
147935), a civilian bacteriologist employed 
by the Army and Navy since 1939, captured 
at HOLLANDIA, 12 May 1944: 
“ Graduate dentists who volunteered were 
given commissions and sent to the Army 
Medical College at TOKYO, where they 
received training for three months to a year. 
Following that they were assigned to hos- 
pitals, where they instructed enlisted per- 
sonnel for a three to six months’ period. 
They did only professional work and were 
3lot assigned extra duties. 
“ Graduate dentists who were drafted 
received non-commissioned rank only. 
Their duties and responsibilities were the 
same as the volunteer (therefore commis- 
sioned) officers. For this reason it was 
often found that non-commissioned officer 
dentists did better work than the commis- 
sioned dentists.” 
c. Standards of Treatment 
Evidence would indicate that the Japanese 
standard of dental treatment was inferior to 
that of the Allies. There seems to have been 
a shortage of trained personnel, and obviously 
dental treatment in the field was of the 
simplest type. 
(1) Prisoner of War (JA 147102), 2d 
Lieutenant, Medical Officer, 141 Infantry 
Regiment, captured TALASEA Area March 
1944 : 
“ There was no dental officer in this 
regiment*nor in the field hospital. All dental 
work was done at Regimental Headquar- 
ters by Superior Private FUJISAWA, in 
civil life a graduate dentist. There was a 
dental officer in the line of communication 
hospital.” 
(ATIS Research Report No. 91, page 5) 
(2) Prisoner of War (JA 147935), civil- 
ian bacteriologist, captured at HOLLANDIA 
12 May 1944: 
“ There were approximately two dentists 
in a division. There were enlisted person- 
nel trained in dentistry in a regiment, but 
not in a battalion since trained dental 
enlisted personnel were scarce. There 
were usually two enlisted men in each 
regiment.” 
(ATIS Research Report No. 91, page 5) 
(8) Only temporary dental treatment was 
given at line of copimunication and field 
hospitals. Extractions and fillings were done 
in the field. Dentures were available only 
in the homeland. 
(ATIS Research Report No. 91, page 4) Section l¥. INFRINGEMENT OF MEDICAL ETHICS AND 
THE LAWS OF WAR 
422, page 11) 
b. Atrocities Upon AlKed Prisoners of War 
There is evidence that medical personnel 
were as guilty of atrocities upon Allied 
Prisoners of War as any other branch of the 
Japanese Army. Accounts exist of decapita- 
tion and of vivisection for the purpose of 
anatomical demonstration. 
(1) Informant, Captain, Indian Medical 
Officer, recovered Japanese Prisoner of War, 
stated: 
“ On more than one occasion in SIN- 
GAPORE, the Japanese used largo num- 
bers of Prisoners of War as subjects for 
experiments they were carrying out with 
regard to certain diseases, particularly 
dysentery and malaria.” 
(ATIS Research Report No. 117, page 4) 
(2) Extract from diary, dated 19 June— 
20 November 1942, presumably belonging to 
leader of a Pioneer Unit. Following entry 
made while at BASA; 
“ 19 November 1942—A patrol from No. 2 
Sentry Group encountered an enemy patrol 
near No, 2 plantation, fired 2 shots, a]id 
took 2 prisoners. These prisoners were 
disposed of by Medical Captain KATO, 
Medical Officer of 14th Pioneer TAI.” 
(ATIS Bulletin No. 66. page 2) 
(3) Information contained in ATIS 
Research Report No. 117, page 4: 
“ While B-363 was at KHANDOK, he 
saw the following committed on a healthy, 
unwounded African Prisoner of War : ‘ The 
man was tied to a tree outside the HIKA- 
RI KIKAN Office. A Japanese doctor and 
four Japanese medical students stood 
around him. They first removed the finger 
nails ; then, cutting open his chest, remov- 
ed his heart on which the doctor gave a 
practical d( monstration.” 
(CSDIC Information Section Report No. 
40, page 3) 
12. VIOLATIONS OF INTERNA- 
TIONAL AGREEMENTS 
REGARDING MARKINGS 
AND USE OF MEDICAL 
FACILITIES 
a. Abuses of Hospital Ships and Airplanes 
11. KILLINGS AND ATROCITIES 
BY JAPANESE MEDICAL 
DEPARTMENT 
a. Killings of Wounded Japanese Soldiers 
While Western medical equipment has 
been ably copied by the Japanese, they have 
retained their native ethical standards. Even 
medical personnel have a callous disregard 
for human life. Many incapacitated soldiers, 
not seriously wounded, were disposed of on 
the ground that they were useless to the 
Emperor. 
(ATIS Research Report No. 117, pages 2 
and 9) 
(1) Extract from mimeographed file of 
17 Division Operation Orders, issued at 
GAVOVU, dated 12 January—18 February 
1944. Issuing authority not stated. Stamped 
Military Most Secret.” 
“ Arrangements to send the wounded 
and sick to the rear are being made, but 
if this causes too obvious an obstruction 
to the efficient execution of the withdrawal, 
unavoidable instances when wounded and 
sick must be disposed of are to be ex- 
pected.” 
(ATIS Bulletin No. 883, page 5) 
(2) Prisoner of War ENDO, Ishimatsu 
(JA 147072), Superior Private, member of 
23 Field Artillery Regiment, captured near 
KARA-AT, 24 February 1944 : 
“ The lack of stretcher bearers resulted 
in 'many suicides when men were told 
they could not be evacuated and that, rather 
than risk being taken prisoners of war, it 
was their duty to do away with themselves. 
Hand grenades were distributed, and some 
officers offered loan of revolvers. Those 
who pleaded for a chance were given a 
hypodermic, ostensibly an opiate, placed 
on a stretcher as if for evacuation, and 
carried out of the compound. They died 
within ten minutes. Prisoner was unable 
to state who gave orders for such injec- 
tions, but assumed it was a responsible 
medical officer whose decision was pro- 
bably actuated by humane motives.” 
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 
10 VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
Throughout the war the Japanese violated 
international agreements regarding markings 
and use of medical facilities. Hospital ships 
were used to transport combat personnel and 
non-medical supplies. In some instances, 
airplanes bore insignia similar to standard 
Red Cross Markings, apparently to deceive 
Allied pilots and to seek immunity from 
Allied attacks. 
(1) Prisoner of War ISHIHARA, Chuji 
(JA 147185), Sergeant Major, member of 2 
Field Hospital, 17 Division, captured enroute 
from I OKI to TALASEA, 24 March 1944, 
stated: 
“ Ships converted into hospital ships 
carried troops from JAPAN to battlefronts, 
but were painted the same as ordinary 
transports. Hospital ship on which Pri- 
sojaer of War travelled from UJINAHAN- 
KOW, August—September 1939, carried 
approximately 20 sick personnel and about 
500-600 other troops, including infantry, 
“ A few were painted white with a red 
cross for identification, and these also 
carried troops to battle stations.” 
{ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 
584, page 3) * 
(2) The following statement is found in 
ATIS Research Report 117; 
“ Informants, repatriated Prisoners of 
War, stated; ‘ In 1942 the Japanese 
transport CHUKI MARU was akmgside 
at TANDJOENG PERAK SOERABAJA 
(EAST JAVA). Informant with about 300 
other Prisoners of War worked day and 
night loading this vessel with, rails, scrap 
iron, 7.5 cm guns, ammunition, tanks, 
trucks, anti-aircraft guns, largo quantities 
of cement in paper bags, diverse material 
from demolished houses. 
“ Before loading, a large red cross 
painted on cloth was stretched across the 
superstructure about the level of the cap- 
tain's bridge.” 
(NEFIS Interrogation Report No. 7915, 
page 17) 
(3) Prisoner of War FUJITA, Mutsumi 
(JA 148328), First Class Private, member of 
1 Air Route Department, captured at sea 
near MOEMI, 12 July 1944, stated: 
“ He understands four captured Douglas 
transports were used periodically in South- 
west Pacific Area and that all of them bore 
a red cross. He believes that two of them 
were destroyed while at HOLLANDIA. 
PW saw two of them arrive together at 
WAKDE in either April or May 1944. 
They came from "MANILA via AMBON 
and BABO, one arrivhig empty, the other 
carrying a radio transmitter, one motor 
generator, and a quantity of ropes and 
cloth. The empty Douglas refueled and 
took olf immediately for IT OLLANDIA. 
He was told by his commanding officer 
that this airplane was to pick up person- 
nel of 4 Air Army at HOLLANDIA and 
transport them to MENADO. He did 
not know whether these personnel were 
hospital cases or not. The second airplane 
unloaded at WAKDE and departed, he 
understood, for MANILA the day after 
its arrival. 
“ Each of the two airplanes had a red 
cross painted on each side of the fuselage 
and located about halfway between wings 
and tail. This red cross was about 3 feet 
square. The airplanes themselves were 
not painted. Rising suns were painted on 
the top and bottom of each wing. 
“ PW had not heard of hospital air- 
planes being in use, and this is the only 
instance that he had seen a red cross on 
. an airplane.” 
(ATIB Research Report 117, page 8) 
(4) Prisoner of War ISHIHARA, Masa- 
yoshi (JA 145484), Sergeant, member of 50 
Anti-Aircraft Battalion, captured GOOD- 
ENOUGH Island, ,9 March 1943, stated : 
“ At RABAUL, up to date of his depar- 
ture, he had noticed that approximately 
one-third of the fighters observed in the 
air had a red cross on a white background 
within a red circle on both sides of the 
body of the planes. 
“ Same size and in place of usual in- 
signia. He had noticed this marking on 
planes which he knew were going on 
operations against MORESBY. 
“ Planes with this red cross markiJig 
were identical with others in the flight, 
and the markhig was considered by PW 
to be unusual.” 
(ATTS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 
151, page 1) 
b. * Hospitals Camouflaged 
Japanese hospitals in forward areas were 
usually camouflaged and seldom had Red 
Cross markings. These hospitals were rarely 
distinguishable from the air as non-opera- 
tional installations. 
(AITS Research Report No. 117, page 9) 
(1) Prisoner of War MARUYAMA, Eizo 
(JA 148274), Civilian Employee (technician), 
member of 12 Field Meteorological Unit, 
captured GEMJEN, 13 June 1944: 
“ YOTENDAI, PW stated that this term 
was used in reference to surrounding hill 
as well as mission at WEWAK. “ Yo ” 
11 SURVEY OF JAPANESE MEDICAL UNITS 
comes from code name for 6 Flying Divi- 
sion and “ TENDAI ” means “ rolling 
hills”. Mission was being used in Nov- 
ember 1943 as headquarters of 4 Air 
Army. 
“ It was a concrete building with a red 
roof and white sides; There was a white 
cross painted on the roof. It was used 
until March 1944, when it was destroyed 
by Allied air raids.” 
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 
655, page 14) 
(2) Prisoner of War MINAMI, Shigeo 
(JA 14570), Corporal, member of unidentified 
field artillery regiment, captured near TALA- 
SEA, 9 April 1944; 
“ He heard that Allied airplanes attacked 
TSURUBU mid-September 1943. 2876 
Force Field Hospital suffered heavy casual- 
ties when hospital buildings hidden in 
jungle and without Red Cross markings 
were demolished. Hospital equipment was 
lost and food depots destroyed.” 
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 
583, page 6) 
c. Armed Medics 
Medical personnel did not wear Red Cross 
§rm bands, but carried them in their pockets. 
They were usually armed, officers with 
swords and pistols, while enlisted *meu had 
bayonets or rifles. These were said to be for 
self protection only, or for use in committing 
suicide should there be danger of capture. 
Yet on one occasion 60 rounds of ammuni- 
tion were issued to corpsmen of a field 
hospital. There is other evidence that 
wounded could not be evacuated because 
medical personnel wtu-e engaged in combat. 
(ATIS Research Report 83, page 29) 
(1) Prisoner of War YOSHIHARAr 
Tatsutaro, First Class Private, member of 2 
Field Hospital, 2 Division, captured CAPE 
ESP FRANCE, 10 February 1948 : 
“ The officers and non-commissioned 
officers of the 2 Field Hospital carried 
pistols and swords. The medical corpsmen 
carried Model 38 rifles and about 60 
rounds of ammunition.” 
(SOPAC Interrogation Report. Serial No. 
01893, page 26) 
(2) Prisoner of War HIWATARI, Kazuo, 
Superior Private, member of 45 Infantry, 
captured TOROKINA Area, 25 March 1944, 
stated : 
“ Ordinarily all battle casualties were 
evacuated to the rear by stretcher bearers, 
but during the battle of TOROKINA this 
could not be done because ajl available 
men, including medical personnel, were 
used in direct combat.” 
(SOPAC Interrogation Report, Serial No. 
01647, page 52) 
(3) Extract from document entitled 
“ Operations of Reorganized Division Medical 
Units ”, undated, marked “ Most Secret ” : 
“ The main duty of the casualty clearing 
unit is to advance to the front line and 
collect the wounded and evacuate them 
promptly to the field hospital. Medical 
troops attached to clearing units are as- 
signed the duty of first aid during collec- 
tion and evacuation. When necessary, they 
will assume the duty of strengthening the 
front line defense as a combat relief 
squad.” 
(ATIS Enemv Publications No. 247, page 
4) 
12 Appendix A. LINE OF SUPPLY OF MEDICAL STORES 
(AXIS SWPA Serial 663 Appendix D) 
Supplies 
Army Med School 
Contractors 
Med Store Depot—TOKYO 
Med Store Branch Depot—OSAKA 
Details of organization were supplied by a 
PW and should be assessed accordingly 
Army Hosps 
Line of Supply of Med Stores 
Med Dept Army HQ 
2 Area Army Fd Freight Depots 
2 Army Fd Freight Depots 
A 
Requisition 
—-Flow of Supplies 
Med Dept 2 Area Army 
A 
Med Dept 2 Army 
A ' 
L of C Hosps 
Fd Hosps 
U nit*Requirements 
(Fd Dressings etc) 
13