THE RIDDLE OF THE RHINE THE LIVENS PROJECTOR—I. 
A completed battery of projectors in the foreground, with a battery on the left rear, half dug in. Suitably camouflaged with 
brush, the batteries are not observable by aircraft, and, being in “No-Man’s-Land,” neither party can detect them by day. 
Frontispiece THE RIDDLE 
OF THE RHINE 
CHEMICAL STRATEGY IN PEACE AND WAR 
An account of the critical struggle for power 
and for the decisive war initiative. The cam- 
paign fostered by the great Rhine factories, and 
the pressing problems which they represent. 
A matter of pre-eminent public interest con- 
cerning the sincerity of disarmament, the 
future of warfare, and the stability of peace. 
BY 
VICTOR LEFEBURE 
\n 
Officer of the Order of the British Empire (Mil.) 
Chevalier de la Legion d’Honneur, Officer of the Crown of Italy 
Fellow of the Chemical Society, etc. 
WITH A PREFACE BY 
MARSHAL FOCH 
AND AN INTRODUCTION BY 
FIELD-MARSHAL SIR HENRY WILSON, Bart. 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
NEW YORK 
E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY 
681 Fifth Avenue Published, 1923, 
By E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY 
All Rights Reserved 
Printed in the United States of America PREFACE 
My motives in writing this book are sufficiently 
explained in the first chapter. The silence surround- 
ing the true facts of the chemical campaign, the tardy 
realisation of the real forces behind it in Germany, 
and our failure to grasp the significance of the matter 
in the Treaty, all pointed to the need for an early 
statement. More recently, this need has been empha- 
sised by inaccurate public utterances oil the matter, 
and by its vital importance for the full and fair 
treatment of certain legislative measures before 
Allied countries. 
A unique experience of chemical warfare in all its 
aspects, first with a combatant gas unit on the British 
front in France, then as Liaison Officer with France 
and other Allies on all Chemical Warfare and allied 
questions, has afforded me an exceptionally complete 
survey of the subject. Later post-armistice exper- 
ience in Paris, and the occupied territories, assisting 
Lord Moulton on various chemical questions in 
connection with the Treaty, and surveying the great 
chemical munition factories of the Rhine, has pro- 
tided a central view of the whole matter which can 
have been the privilege and opportunity of very few. 
Further, my association with the dye industry, 
since commencing this book, leaves me with a deep 
conviction of the critical importance for disarma- 
ment, of a world redistribution of organic chemical 
production. It is inevitable that such a step should 
benefit the growing organic chemical industries of 
5 Preface 
countries other than Germany, but this issue need 
not be shirked. The importance of the matter is so 
vital that it eclipses all reproach that the dis- 
armament argument for the maintenance of the dye 
industry is used on selfish grounds. Such reproach 
cannot, in fairness, be heard unless it destroys the 
case which we have established. We are faced 
with the following alternatives. Safety demands 
strong organic chemical industries or cumbersome 
and burdensome chemical warfare establishments. 
The stability of future peace depends upon the 
former, and the extent to which we must establish, 
or can abandon, the latter depends entirely on the 
activity and success of those whose special duty it is 
to organise against war. 
A recent visit to America revealed the consider- 
able publicity and public interest surrounding 
chemical warfare, strengthening my conviction 
that the facts, now noised abroad, should be 
presented in their proper setting. They are 
supremely significant at the present time and for 
the future, hence the chapters which follow. 
V. Lefebure. 
Hampstead, October 12,1920. 
6 PREFACE BY FIELD MARSHAL FOCH 
In 1918, chemical warfare had developed con- 
siderably in our army. Before 1914. Germany 
possessed chemical factories which permitted her to 
manufacture in great quantities chemicals used at the 
front, and to develop on a large scale this new form 
of fighting. 
The Allies, to retaliate, had to experiment and 
organise important centres for production. Only in 
this way, though starting late, were they able to put 
themselves in a position to supply the growing 
necessities of their armies. 
To-day, the ability for aviation to carry increasing 
weight furnishes a new method for abundantly 
spreading poison gases with the aid of stronger and 
stronger bombs, and to reach armies, the centres of 
population in the rear, or to render regions unin- 
habitable. 
Chemical warfare is therefore in a condition to 
produce more formidable results over more extended 
areas. 
It is incontestible on the other hand that this 
growth will find an easy realisation in one country, 
Germany, addicted in times of peace, to wholesale 
manufacture of chemical products, which a simple 
modification in reactions can transform into war 
products. 
This country, deprived, partially at least, of its 
former methods of fighting, and its numerous forces 
of specially trained soldiers, regularly organised and 
7 Preface by Field Marshal Foch 
strongly armed, will be more drawn toward the new 
systems of attack—that of chemical warfare. 
Chemical warfare must therefore enter into our 
future provisions and preparations, if we do not wish 
to experience some terrible surprises. 
The work of Major Lefebure gives an exact idea 
of the possibilities he finds to-day in Germany, and 
through them the dangers with which she threatens 
us. In this form it constitutes a warning, and infor- 
mation of the highest order, for the minds who 
remain anxious for the fate of their country con- 
fronted by the inefficience of the old fighting methods 
which the progress of industry out of date renders 
daily. 
By sounding the alarm in both our countries, I find 
myself in company with my faithful friend Field 
Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. This is an old habit, 
contracted by both of us, many years ago, which we 
still maintain at the present time to insure for our- 
selves once again, peace in the future. 
Together, we say, read this work of Major 
Lefebure. 
F. Foch. 
8 CONTENTS 
PAGE 
CHAPTER I—Explanatory 
The Riddle of the Rhine—A Critical Point in Dis- 
armament—Need for a Balanced View of Chemical 
Warfare—Some Preliminary Explanation—“Poison 
Gas” a Misleading Term—The French Physiological 
Classification—Asphyxiating Substances—Toxic Sub- 
stances—Lachrymators—Vesicant or Blistering Com- 
pounds—Sneezing or Sternutatory Substances—The 
Tactical Classification—Persistent Substances—Non- 
persistent Substances—Penetrants—Special Gas Wea- 
pons and Appliances—Gas Shell 17 
CHAPTER II—The German Surprise 
The First Cloud Gas Attack—The Element of Surprise 
—Lord Kitchener’s Protest—German Preparations— 
Research—Production—Field Preparations—German 
Opinion of Results—Germany Prompted by Production 
Monopoly—Standard Uses for Gas—Gas Shell—Fur- 
ther German Cloud Attacks—Hill 60—Origin of Ger- 
man Gas Shell—Early German Gas Shell—A Successful 
Experiment—Lachrymators at Loos, 1915—The Flam- 
rnenwerfer—German Phosgene Clouds—Gas and the 
Eastern Theatre—Conclusion 31 
CHAPTER III—The Allied Reaction 
The Need of Retaliation—First Signs—The Loos 
Attack, September, 1915—The Somme Battle, 1916— 
Reasons for British Cloud Gas Success—Our Casualties 
—Exhausting Preparations for Cloud Attack—The 
Livens Projector—British Gas Shell—German Gas Shell 
Development, 1916—Main Features of the Period. . 48 
CHAPTER IV—Intensive Chemical Warfare 
The Mustard Gas Surprise—Blue Cross—German 
Emphasis on Gas Shell—The German Projector—Ger- 
man Projector Improvements—Dyes in Gas Shell— 
German Flame Projectors—Their Origin—Further 
Flame Development—The 1918 Offensive—Luden- 
dorff’s Testimony—Preparations for Assault—Gas 
Defensive Flank at Armentieres—Fixed Gas Barrage 
at Kemmel—Percentage of Chemical Shell—Gas Re- 
9 Contents 
PAGE 
treat Tactics—General Hartley’s Analysis—Percent- 
age of German Gas Shell in Enemy Dumps—Forced 
Exhaustion of Stocks—Yperite, French Mustard Gas— 
Effect on German Gas Discipline—Allied Gas Statistics 
—Critical Importance of Rapid German Production . 66 
CHAPTER V—Chemical Warfare Organisations 
German Research—Leverkusen—Hochst—Ludwigs- 
haven—Early Formulation of Policy—Movements 
of Personnel—German Simplicity of Organisation— 
German Organisation at the Front—The Gas Regi- 
ment—Early German Gas School—New Gas Regi- 
ments—Gas Shell Experts—Inspection of Protective 
Masks and Method—British Field Organisation— 
“Breach” Organisations—Central Laboratory—New 
Type of Casualty—Directorate of Gas Services— 
British Home Organisations—The Royal Society— 
Royal Society Chemical Sub-Committee—The Trench 
Warfare Department—Scientific Advisory Committee 
—Commercial Advisory Committee—Split Between 
Research and Supply—Munitions Inventions De- 
partment—Imperial College of Science—The Chem- 
ical Warfare Department—The Anti-Gas Department 
—Designs Committee—French Organisation—Italian 
Developments—Supply Organisations—British Supply 
Organisation—Allied Handicaps—The German Solu- 
tion—Departmental Difficulties—Allied Success 
Against Odds—Allied Lack of Vision in Production— 
British Lag in Organisation—French and American 
Characteristics—Inter-Allied Chemical Warfare Liaison 
—Inter-Allied Supply—Nature of Chemical Warfare 
Research—Discovery of New Substances—Technical 
Method of Preparation—Filling Problem—Protection 
—Half Scale Investigation—Two Classes of Research 
—Conclusion—The “Outer and Inner Lines.” . . 85 
CHAPTER VI—The Struggle for the Initiative 
Meaning of the Chemical Initiative—Controlling Fac- 
tors—Rapid Manufacture—Rapid Identification Essen- 
tial—Propaganda and Morale—Peculiar Peace-time 
Danger—War Fluctuations of Initiative—The Tense 
Protective Struggle—The German Mask—Enforced 
German Modifications—Shortage of Rubber—Gas Dis- 
cipline—Summary—New German Attempts—Yellow 
and Blue Cross—Yellow Cross—Blue Cross—“Particu- 
late” Clouds—Potential Production and Peace. . . 111 
10 Contents 
PAGE 
CHAPTER VII—Review of Production 
Critical Importance of Production—Significance of 
the German Dye Industry—The Interessen Gemein- 
schaft—War Production by the I.G.—Allied Difficul- 
ties—Conclusion. 143 
CHAPTER VIII—American Developments 
Special Attention Justified—Special Value of American 
Opinion—Early American Activities—Field Activities— 
Special Difficulties—Edgewood Arsenal—Research— 
Production—Post-Armistice Developments—Views of 
General Fries—The Gas Cloud Inescapable—Impor- 
tance of Smoke—Casualty Percentages—Short Range 
Projectors—Vast Expansion in Personnel. . . .173 
CHAPTER IX—German Chemical Policy 
Origin of German Chemical Monopolies—German 
Chemical Commercial Policy—Evidence of the U. S. A. 
Alien Property Custodian—Pre-war American Situa- 
tion—German Price Cutting—Salicylic Acid—Full 
Line Forcing—Bribery and Corruption—German 
Patent Policy—Propaganda and Information— 
Espionage—Activities of the Dye Agencies—Manoeu- 
vring Raw Materials—Chemical Exchange Association 
—Doctor Albert’s Letter—Dye Agency Information 
System—Dr. Albert on Chemical Warfare—The Moral 
Aspect—Report of the New York World—German 
Policy Regarding Dye Supplies to the U. S. A.— 
Professor Stieglitz’s Evidence—Ehrlich’s Discovery— 
Drugs and Medicinal Products—The German Monop- 
oly—National Health Insurance Commission—The 
Royal Society — Novocain — Beta-Eucaine — Photo- 
graphic Chemicals—War Activities of the I.G.—The 
Rhine Factories and the Armistice—War Mentality of 
the I.G.—German Attitude towards Inspection—The 
Rhine and Chaulny Contrast—German Revolution and 
the Industrial Leaders—The German Peace Delegation 
—Recent Signs of Government Interest—Nitrogen Fix- 
ation—The German Nitrogen Syndicate—Haber Proc- 
ess Prominent—The New German Dye Combine— 
Aggressive Nationalist Policy 186 
CHAPTER X—Lines of Future Development 
The Element of Speculation—Chemical Tactics and 
Strategy—New War Chemicals—“Camouflage” Chem- 
icals—Functions Hitherto Immune—Chemical Con- 
stitution and Physiological Action—Unsolved Prob- 
11 Contents 
PAGE 
lems of Mustard Gas—A New Type of Obstacle— 
The “Persistent Lethal” Substance—The Critical 
Range—The New No-Man’s-Land—The “Alert Gas 
Zone”—Gas and Aircraft—Protective Development 
—Individual Protection—Collective Protection—Con- 
clusion. 215 
CHAPTER XI—Humane or Inhumane? 
Nature of Gas Casualties—Sargent’s Picture—Need for 
Safeguards. . 238 
CHAPTER XII—Chemical Warfare and Disarmament 
The Treaty of Versailles—German Information—Limi- 
tation of Armament—Report of the Hartley Mission— 
New Conceptions in Chemical Disarmament—Limi- 
tation Mechanical and Chemical—Tank Disarmament 
—Chemical Limitation—Research—Production—Me- 
chanical and Chemical Preparations for War—Recent 
Disarmament Proposals—The Covenant of the League 
—Need for Guarantees—Viscount Grey, Germany 
must disarm first”—Suggested Methods—“ Vested 
Interests”—“Handing Over” Inventions—Neglect of 
Chemical Disarmament in the Treaty .... 242 
CONCLUSION—The Treaty of the Future . . . 264 
12 ILLUSTRATIONS 
The Livens Projector—I Frontispiece 
A completed battery of projectors in the foreground, 
with a battery on the left rear, half dug in. Suitably 
camouflaged with brush, the batteries are not observ- 
able by aircraft, and, being in “No-Man’s-Land,” 
neither party can detect them by day. 
FACING 
PAGE 
Typical Gas Shell Bursting 30 
The Livens Projector—II 61 
A working party fitting electric leads and adjusting 
bombs prior to discharge. This work occurs at night. 
The Livens Projector—III 133 
Explosion of Livens bombs on the objective. 
Smoke Barrage 181 
Note the sharp curtain which is formed, behind which 
the infantry advance. 
13 INTRODUCTION 
No one who has the welfare of the country at 
heart can fail to share Major Lefebure’s anxiety that 
a clear, accurate, and unbiased account of chemical 
warfare should be presented to the public, so that 
the many erroneous ideas now prevalent in regard 
to poison gas and its uses may be dispelled. 
The whole subject of chemical warfare is at 
present sub judice, and there is great danger that 
the future safety of this country may be jeopardised 
by the almost universal ignorance of the peculiarities 
and potentialities of this class of warfare. Recent 
publications in the Press have shown a tendency 
to deal with the subject on purely sentimental 
grounds, and attempts have been made to declare 
this form of warfare illegitimate without full and 
careful consideration of all the facts and their 
significance for the future. 
Major Lefebure has therefore attempted in his 
book to make it quite clear that no convention, 
guarantee, or disarmament safeguard will prevent 
an unscrupulous enemy from employing poison 
gas, especially if that enemy has discovered some 
new powerful agent, or possesses, as Germany 
does in her well-organised and strong chemical 
industry, a ready means for producing such 
chemicals in bulk at practically a moment’s notice; 
further, that the safety of this country makes it im- 
perative that the study and investigation of the sub- 
ject should be continued and that our chemical and 
15 Introduction 
dye industry should be developed, so that when an 
emergency arises we may have the necessary facilities 
for supply read to hand. 
It is not for me to express any opinion here either 
as to the desirability of using gas as a weapon or as 
to the possibility of preventing an enemy from using 
it. But I am convinced that a decision come to 
without full knowledge of the facts may involve grave 
danger and heavy preventable loss of life. I am 
further convinced that Major Lefebure, by his 
special knowledge and long experience as chemical 
liaison officer during the war, is well qualified to 
speak, and that his opinion is entitled to full con- 
sideration. For these reasons I think that his book 
will do a much needed public service. I wish it every 
success, and the greatest possible number of readers. 
Henry Wilson, F.M. 
16 CHAPTER I 
EXPLANATORY 
The Riddle of the Rhine.—The Great War chal- 
lenged our very existence. But with the tension re- 
leased, and the Allies victorious, the check to the 
German menace appears crushing and complete. Few 
realise that one formidable challenge has not been 
answered. Silently menacing, the chemical threat 
remains unrecognised. How, asks the reader, can 
this be? Are we not aware of the poison gas cam- 
paign? Indeed, we have not yet grasped the simple 
technical facts of the case, and these are merely the 
outward signs of a deep-rooted menace whose na- 
ture, activities, and potentialities are doubly impor- 
tant because so utterly unsuspected by those whom 
they most threaten. 
How many of us, for example, realise that the 
Germans relied mainly on gas for success in the great 
March assault of 1918, which threatened to influence 
the destinies of the world. Yet Ludendorff goes out 
of his way to tell us how much he counted upon it. 
How many understand that the 1918 hostilities 
were no longer a war of explosives. German guns 
were firing more than fifty per cent, of gas and war 
chemical. But a deep study of such war facts re- 
veals a much more significant matter. 
All are aware of the enormous national enter- 
prises built to fulfil our explosives programme. 
17 The Riddle of the Rhine 
With mushroom-like growth chemical establishments 
of a magnitude hitherto unknown in England arose 
to meet our crying needs. What was the German 
equivalent, and where were the huge reservoirs of 
gas and war chemical which filled those countless 
shells? Krupp, of Essen, loomed large in the mind 
of every Allied citizen and soldier. There lay the 
sinews of war in the making. But the guns were 
useless without their message. Who provided it? 
A satisfactory answer to this question demands an 
examination of the great German I.G., the Inter- 
essen Gemeinschaft, the world power in organic 
chemical enterprise, whose monopoly existence threat- 
ened to turn the tide of war against us. This or- 
ganisation emerges from the war with renewed and 
greater strength. Our splendid but improvised fac- 
tories drained the vital forces of the nation, and 
now lie idle, while German war chemical production 
fed new life blood and grafted new tissue to the 
great pre-war factories of the I.G., which, if she 
will, she can use against us in the future. I do not 
claim that this German combine has at present any 
direct economic or military policy against world 
peace. In any case, the facts must speak for them- 
selves. But the following pages will prove that the 
mere existence of the complete German monopoly, 
represented by the forces of the I.G., however free 
from suspicion might be the mentality and morals of 
those directing its activities, constitutes, in itself, a 
serious menace. It is, if you will, a monster camou- 
flaged floating mine in the troubled sea of world 
peace, which the forces of reconstruction have left 
unswept. The existence of this giant monopoly 
raises vital military and economic questions, which 
are, indeed, “The Riddle of the Rhine.” 
Impersonal Examination of Fact.—In a sound 
18 Explanatory 
examination of the subject it becomes necessary to 
examine the activities of our former enemies very 
closely. Even adopting a mild view of the case, their 
reputation has not been unattacked, and is not left 
untarnished. We, however, have no desire to renew 
such attacks, but we wish our statement to be coldly 
reliable. National and international issues are at 
stake which require a background unprejudiced by 
war emotion. 
Placed in a similar predicament, in reporting to 
his Government of the methods of German economic 
aggression in the United States of America, Mr. 
Mitchell Palmer, the Alien Property Custodian, ex- 
pressed himself as follows: 
“I do not advocate any trade boycott out of spirit 
of revenge or in retaliation for injuries done to the 
United States. I do not want to continue the war 
after the war. I am for peace. I believe that the 
great overshadowing result which has come from this 
war is the assurance of peace almost everlasting 
amongst the peoples of the earth. I would help to 
make that an absolute certainty by refusing to permit 
Germany to prosecute a war after the war. The 
military arm of her war machine has been palsied by 
the tremendous hammering of the allied powers. 
But her territory was not invaded, and if she can get 
out of the war with her home territory intact, rebuild 
a stable government, and still have her foreign mar- 
kets subject to her exploitation, by means no less 
foul and unfair than those which she has employed 
on the field of battle, we shall not be safe from future 
onslaughts different in methods, but with the same 
purpose that moved her on that fateful day in July 
when she set out to conquer the world.” 
Ours is a fair standpoint. Let us know the facts 
of the chemical war into which Germany impelled us. 
19 The Riddle of the Rhine 
Let us examine its mainsprings, in conception and 
action, see how far they can be explained in terms of 
pre-war Germany, and how far they remain ready to 
function in the much desired peace which they 
threaten. If the result be unpleasant, let us not hide 
our heads in the sand, but exercise a wise vigilance, 
choose what precautions are available and consistent 
with our plans for world peace. 
A Critical Point in Disarmament.—Probably 
never before in the history of man has Disarmament 
figured as such a vitally urgent national and inter- 
national measure. Discussions and official utter- 
ances reveal a very disquieting tendency. 
When compared with the methods, armament and 
materials of the war in 1914, those of 1918 reveal 
basic changes which a hundred years of former peace 
could not have brought about. These developments 
are not merely of fact, but they represent the open- 
ing of new fields, visions of possibilities previously 
undreamed of by the practical soldier. By the con- 
centrated application of electricity, chemistry, and 
other sciences to war two dominating factors have 
emerged, whose importance to war, and danger for 
world peace, can only gain momentum with time. 
The scientific or technical initiative, the invention of 
a deadly new chemical, wireless-directed aeroplane, 
or other war appliance and their incidence on war 
through large scale production in the convertible in- 
dustries of peace constitute a challenge which, if un- 
answered by practical schemes for world disarma- 
ment, will render the latter worse than useless, by 
aggravating the danger of sudden decisive attack in 
an otherwise disarmed world. 
There is a tendency to ignore this aspect of dis- 
armament. We appear to be thinking in terms of a 
world still organised for war on 1914 lines. The 
20 Explanatory 
disbanding of the German army and semi-military 
organisations, and the reduction of her artillery and 
small arms seem to occupy all our attention. Such, 
it might be urged, is the immediate need; we can 
leave the future to find answers to the other prob- 
lems. This answer is dangerous, for it ignores the 
disarmament aspect of what is perhaps the most 
important development in the modern offensive cam- 
paign. We refer to poison gas or chemical warfare. 
This, the crux of all disarmament, is dealt with at 
some length in the chapters which follow. 
A curiously illogical attitude of mind has arisen in 
certain quarters. There is a tendency among strong 
adherents to the ideal of world peace to regard them- 
selves as its sole possessors. Every thinking civilian 
and soldier must adhere to such an ideal; the only 
point at issue is the method of approaching it. The 
mere fact that a League of Nations is called into 
being to attain world peace implies recognition of 
the fact that a definite mechanism and definite meas- 
ures are required for the purpose; this is self-evident. 
There are those who, having established their League 
of Nations, feel that they can attain chemical peace 
by merely prohibiting chemical war, in other words, 
they expect their mechanism to achieve its object 
without functioning, to attain peace by its mere ex- 
istence. Just as special measures are required to 
control disarmament in the older branches of war- 
fare, in the same way special measures, but not the 
same measures, are required to control the chemical 
peace. Chemical peace guaranteed by a mere signa- 
ture is no peace at all. 
In a recent Press utterance we find an appeal to 
prohibit chemical warfare and to “trust the general 
sentiment of the civilised world to say that the lesson 
has been learnt in that sense.” “There is the League 
21 The Riddle of the Rhine 
of Nations to furnish that sentiment with a mouth- 
piece and a sanction.” We agree, but to stop there 
is dangerous, the most important thing which it must 
furnish is a mechanism of control, a check, or guar- 
antee. This question is one of the most important 
which confronts us for world peace. It merits the 
most careful consideration. 
Even responsible and relevant officials who admit 
that their League must do more than issue edicts, 
that their mechanism must function, are ignoring 
the specific technical aspect of the war methods whose 
use we wish to limit. This matter will receive later 
attention. 
The following pages, therefore, are an attempt to 
represent the salient points in the development of 
chemical warfare, its causes, results, and future. Such 
an attempt cannot limit itself to merely British de- 
velopments, and this is not a final detailed memoir 
of British chemical warfare. Further, in consider- 
ing the future, we examine another aspect of chem- 
ical warfare. Facts lead us to believe that it was 
purely the most open and obvious activity in a whole 
campaign of chemical aggression which had effective 
unity of conception and direction long before the war 
started. 
Need for a Balanced View of Chemical Warfare. 
—The facts of chemical warfare have probably been 
less ventilated than those of any other important 
war development. Yet no subject has aroused more 
general and intense feeling. Tanks, aircraft, the 
different campaigns, enemy memoirs, and a variety 
of war subjects, have received a considerable meas- 
ure of publicity, some more than full measure. 
Grave questions are pending in which the chemical 
aspect of national defence is a prominent factor. 
However willing the individual concerned, he cannot 
22 Explanatory 
make a sound judgment on the brief technical or 
popular garbled versions which have appeared. One 
searches in vain for balanced and detailed statements 
on the question. This may be due in no way to lack 
of intention, but to lack of opportunity. Therefore, 
no excuse is needed for this contribution, but rather 
an apology for the obscurity which has so far sur- 
rounded the subject. What is the cause of this emo- 
tional or almost hysterical background from which 
a clear definition of the matter is only now beginning 
to emerge? Circumstances are to blame; the first 
open act of chemical warfare decided the matter. 
This event, the first German cloud gas attack at 
Ypres, arriving at the peak of allied indignation 
against a series of German abuses, in particular with 
regard to the treatment of prisoners, left the world 
aghast at the new atrocity. Further, its use against 
entirely unprotected troops was particularly revolt- 
ing. The fact that such a cloud of chlorine would 
have passed the 1918 armies untouched behind their 
modern respirators, could not be known to, nor ap- 
preciated by the relatives of the 1915 casualties. But 
the emotion and indignation called forth by the first 
use of gas has survived a period of years, at the 
end of which the technical facts would no longer, of 
themselves, justify such feeling. We would hesitate 
to do anything which might dispel this emotional 
momentum were we not convinced that, unaccom- 
panied by knowledge, it becomes a very grave danger. 
If we felt that the announcement of an edict was 
sufficient to suppress chemical warfare we would 
gladly stimulate any public emotion to create such an 
edict. But therein lies the danger. Owing to certain 
technical peculiarities, which can be clearly revealed 
by examination of the facts, it is impossible to sup- 
press chemical warfare in this way. As well try to 
23 The Riddle of the Rhine 
suppress disease by forbidding its recurrence. But 
we can take precaution against disease, and the fol- 
lowing examination will show clearly that we can 
take similar precautions against the otherwise per- 
manent menace of chemical war. Further, backed by 
such precautions, a powerful international edict has 
value. 
It is, therefore, our intention to present a reasoned 
account of the development of poison gas, or chemi- 
cal warfare, during the recent war. But to leave 
the matter there would be misleading and culpable, 
for, however interesting the simple facts of the chem- 
ical campaign, they owed their being to a combina- 
tion of forces, whose nature and significance for the 
future are infinitely more important. The chief 
cause of the chemical war was an unsound and dan- 
gerous world distribution of industrial organic chem- 
ical forces. Unless some readjustment occurs, this 
will remain the “point faible” in world disarmament. 
We, therefore, propose to examine the relationships 
between chemical industry, war, and disarmament. 
Some Preliminary Explanation.—The chemistry 
of war, developed under the stress of the poison gas 
campaign, is of absorbing chemical and technical in- 
terest, but it has none the less a general appeal. 
When its apparently disconnected and formidable 
facts are revealed as an essential part of a tense 
struggle in which move and counter-move followed 
swiftly one upon the other, its appeal becomes much 
wider. Therefore, in order not to confuse the main 
issue in the following chapters by entering upon tire- 
some definitions, it is proposed to conclude the pres- 
ent chapter by explaining, simply, a number of chem- 
ical warfare conceptions with which the expert is 
probably well acquainted. 
24 Explanatory 
“‘Poison Gas” a Misleading Term.—Poison gas 
is a misleading term, and our subject is much better 
described as “chemical warfare.” Let us substan- 
tiate this by examining briefly the types of chemicals 
which were used. In the first place they were not 
all gases; the tendency during the war was towards 
the use of liquids and solids. Even the chemicals 
which appeared as gases on the field of battle were 
transported and projected as liquids, produced by 
compression. As the poison war developed, a large 
number of different chemicals became available for 
use by the opposing armies. These can be classified, 
either according to their tactical use, or according 
to their physiological effects on man. 
The British, French, American, and German 
armies all tended to the final adoption of a tactical 
classification, but the French emphasized the physio- 
logical side. Let us use their classification as a 
basis for a review of the chief chemicals concerned. 
The French Physiological Classification;—As- 
phyxiating Substances; — Toxic Substances. — 
Chemicals or poison gases were either asphyxiating, 
toxic, lachrymatory, vesicant, or sternutatory. It is 
perfectly true that the asphyxiating and toxic sub- 
stances, used during the war, produced a higher per- 
centage of deaths than the other three classes, but 
the latter were responsible for many more casualties. 
The so-called asphyxiating gases produced their effect 
by producing lesions and congestion in the pulmonary 
system, causing death by suffocation. The best 
known substance of this type was chlorine, employed 
in the liquid state in cylinders on the occasion of the 
first German gas attack, but the most formidable 
were phosgene (an important substance required in 
the manufacture of dyes), diphosgene, chlor-picrin, 
made from bleaching powder and picric acid, brom- 
25 The Riddle of the Rhine 
acetone, which was also a powerful lachrymator, and 
diphenylchlorarsine, known as sneezing gas, the first 
sternutatory or sneezing compound to appear on the 
front in large quantities. The toxic compounds were 
so called because of their specific effect upon par- 
ticular parts of the organism such as, for example, 
the nervous system. The chief example, with regard 
to the military value of which there has been much 
dispute, was prussic, or hydrocyanic, acid. The 
French had definite evidence of the mortal effect of 
this compound upon German gunners, but it was 
doubted by other Allies whether French gas shell 
produced a sufficient concentration of gas to be of 
military value. It was a kill or cure compound, for 
recovery was rapid from any concentration which did 
not produce death. 
A prominent Cambridge physiologist, in the heat 
of the controversy on this matter, made a very brave 
and self-sacrificing experiment. He entered a cham- 
ber of prussic acid which was sufficiently concentrated 
to cause the death of other animals which were pres- 
ent. They were removed in time, and he escaped 
because the concentration was not a mortal one for 
man. This was, in a sense, an experimentum crucis 
and, although it did not disprove the extreme danger 
of prussic acid, if employed in high concentrations, 
it showed, on the other hand, that it was difficult to 
gauge the military value by field experiments; battle 
results were necessary. The Germans’ disappoint- 
ment with the use of arsenic compounds confirms this 
need for battle evidence. 
Lachrymators.—There is hardly need to dwell 
on the next class, the lachrymator. These com- 
pounds were employed on a large scale to produce 
temporary blindness by lachrymation, or weeping. 
We give later some interesting examples of their use 
26 Explanatory 
on the front. It is an arresting thought that even 
as early as 1887 Professor Baeyer, the renowned 
organic chemist of Munich, in his lectures to ad- 
vanced students, included a reference to the military 
value of these compounds. 
Vesicant or Blistering Compounds.—It was the 
introduction of the fourth, the vesicant class, which 
revealed, more than any other enemy move, the great 
possibilities inherent in chemical warfare. These 
compounds, the chief of which was mustard gas, pro- 
duced vesicant, or skin burning, effects, which, al- 
though rarely mortal, were sufficient to put a man 
out of action for a number of months. Mustard 
gas resulted from pure scientific investigation as early 
as i860. Victor Meyer, the famous German chemist, 
described the substance in 1884, indicating its skin- 
blistering effects. There is evidence of further in- 
vestigation in German laboratories a year before the 
outbreak of war, and whatever the motive for this 
work, we know that mustard gas must have received 
the early attention of the German War Office, for 
it was approved and in production early in 1917. 
Although the Medecin aide-major Chevalier of the 
French services drew attention to its importance in 
1916, the French had no serious thought of using 
mustard gas, and did not realise its possibilities until 
the German battle experiment of July, 1917. It is 
not generally known, however, that other vesicant 
compounds were employed, notably some of the 
arsenic compounds, and the Germans were research- 
ing on substances of this nature which gave great 
promise of success. Mustard gas provides a striking 
example of the organic way in which chemical war- 
fare is bound up with the dye industry. The com- 
pounds required for its manufacture were those which 
had been made on a large scale by the I.G. for the 
27 The Riddle of the Rhine 
production of indigo. World indigo monopoly meant 
possession of a potential mustard gas surprise on 
the outbreak of war. 
Sneezing or Sternutatory Substances.—The last 
class, the sternutatory substances, produced the fa- 
miliar sneezing effect which was accompanied by in- 
tense pain and irritation of the nose, throat, and 
respiratory channels. They were mostly arsenic com- 
pounds and were not only sternutatory but also 
toxic, producing the after effects of arsenic poisoning. 
The Tactical Classification.—From the point of 
view of our account of chemical warfare, however, 
the physiological classification of these substances is 
not so important as the tactical and, indeed, once this 
grouping of the substances is understood, a profound 
knowledge of their chemical nature is not necessary. 
Persistent Substances.—Two main classes exist 
from the tactical point of view. There are those 
“persistent” substances which remain for a long time 
on the soil or on the object on which they are sprayed 
by shell, while retaining their dangerous effect. Mus- 
tard gas was the chief example, but some of the 
lachrymators were just as persistent. By their use 
it is possible to render ground uninhabitable or in- 
effective for military movement. The combination 
of the vesicant and persistent properties of mustard 
gas rendered it a powerful military factor. 
Non-Persistent Substances.—On the other hand, 
there are the relatively volatile substances, such as 
phosgene, which can be used immediately before an 
attack. The chief sternutatory compound, diphenyl- 
chlorarsine, although not volatile, could also be used 
in this way, for, being a solid and in a very finely pul- 
verised state, its presence on the ground was not a 
distinct danger, and it invited chemical decomposi- 
tion. 
28 Explanatory 
Penetrants.—The Germans introduced an addi- 
tional tactical group. This comprised pulverised 
substances able to penetrate the mask on account of 
their existence as minute particles. The Germans 
expressed these tactical conceptions by their shell 
markings. The familiar Green Cross represented 
the slightly persistent, volatile, lethal compounds, 
such as phosgene and diphosgene. The German gun- 
ner had no need to know the content of his gas shell 
so long as he could identify the cross. Yellow 
Cross, representing mustard gas, was the most 
highly persistent type. It is interesting to specu- 
late whether a new persistent compound, whose mili- 
tary value was due to some other property than 
the blistering, would have been grouped under Yel- 
low Cross. Logically, this should have been done. 
Blue Cross covered the arsenic group of compounds, 
which were non-persistent and were expected to pen- 
etrate the mask. So strong was this tactical con- 
ception that the Allies were on the verge of adopting 
a uniform shell marking based on this principle 
throughout their armies. 
Special Gas Weapons and Appliances.—It is a 
popular misconception that gas was only discharged 
from cylinders in huge clouds, or used as artillery 
shell. A number of special weapons developed, 
which were particularly adapted for gas. Thus, the 
Livens projector, which was a great Allied advance, 
produced a gas cloud a long distance from the point 
of discharge, while the Stokes and other short range 
guns were used for rapid fire of large numbers of 
gas shell. 
The primary conceptions with regard to protec- 
tion have been brought home to so many, through 
the fact that the mask was a part of the equipment 
of every soldier, that we need not dwell on them 
29 The Riddle of the Rhine 
here. It is not generally realised, however, that 
every modification introduced by either side was a 
vital and direct counter to some enemy move planned 
to render the protection of the opponent ineffective. 
Gas Shell.—A word is necessary to define the use 
of gas shell. The point which must be realised is 
that gas, and in particular gas shell, fulfilled a spe- 
cial purpose in warfare, for which it was much more 
suitable than explosives. The use for neutralising 
batteries, cross roads, and rendering whole areas 
uninhabitable, is developed fully in our reference 
to the great German attacks in 1918. 
With this brief sketch to clear the ground, we 
can embark more freely upon the account of chem- 
ical warfare which follows. 
30 To face page 30 
TYPICAL GAS SHELL BURSTING. CHAPTER II 
THE GERMAN SURPRISE 
Ypres, April, 1915, to the Somme, August, 1916. 
The First Cloud Gas Attack.—The critical factor 
of surprise in war was never nearer decisive success 
than on April 22nd, 1915. Of this, the occasion of 
the first German gas attack at Ypres, Field-Marshal 
Sir J. D. P. French stated: 
“Following a heavy bombardment, the enemy at- 
tacked the French Division at about 5 p.m., using 
asphyxiating gases for the first time. Aircraft re- 
ported that at about 5 p.m. thick yellow smoke had 
been seen issuing from the German trenches be- 
tween Langemarck and Bixschoote. What follows 
almost defies description. The effect of these poison- 
ous gases was so virulent as to render the whole 
of the line held by the French Division mentioned 
above practically incapable of any action at all. It 
was at first impossible for any one to realise what 
had actually happened. The smoke and fumes hid 
everything from sight, and hundreds of men were 
thrown into a comatose or dying condition, and 
within an hour the whole position had to be aban- 
doned, together with about fifty guns. I wish par- 
ticularly to repudiate any idea of attaching the least 
blame to the French Division for this unfortunate 
incident.” 
31 The Riddle of the Rhine 
The Element of Surprise.—The enemy just 
missed colossal success rendered possible by the use 
of an entirely new war method; one contrary to en- 
gagements entered into by them at the Hague Con- 
vention. 
There were elements in this first gas attack which 
were absent even from the situation created by our 
first use of tanks. Unfamiliarity amongst the 
troops, or the staff, for that matter, created an 
atmosphere of unparalleled confusion. Men at- 
tempted to protect themselves by burying their 
mouths and nostrils in the loose earth. Those chem- 
ists, on the spot, not immediately struck down, made 
frantic efforts to bring up supplies of any suitable 
and available chemical or material which might as- 
sist resistance and movement in the affected zone. 
Paying every homage to the heroic sacrifices and 
brave actions which characterised the Allied re- 
sistance, we cannot ignore the fact that morale must 
have been very severely shaken locally, and that 
a general disquiet and uneasiness must have per- 
meated the whole front until measures were known 
to be effectively in progress, not only for protection, 
but for retaliation. The enemy had but to exploit 
the attack fully to break through to the channel 
ports, but failed to do so. The master mind behind 
this new and deadly attack was not, let us remem- 
ber, that of a soldier. It was very strongly ru- 
moured that this monstrous conception and its exe- 
cution were due to one or, at the most, two re- 
nowned German Professors. The first hammer 
blow in the enemy chemical campaign was a two- 
party conspiracy, led by world-famous scientists and 
the powerful I.G. with the German army uncon- 
vinced but expectant, little more than a willing 
dupe. 
32 The German Surprise 
Lord Kitchener’s Protest.—In his spirited protest 
in the House of Lords, Lord Kitchener stated: 
“The Germans have, in the last week, introduced a 
method of placing their opponents hors de combat 
by the use of asphyxiating and deleterious gases, 
and they employ these poisonous methods to pre- 
vail when their attack, according to the rules of 
war, might have otherwise failed. On this sub- 
ject I would remind your Lordships that Germany 
was a signatory to the following article in the 
Hague Convention: 
“ ‘The Contracting Powers agree to abstain from 
the use of projectiles the object of which is the dif- 
fusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.’ ” 
This protest circulated amongst neutrals 
prompted numerous attempts at vindication in the 
German Press. In several cases we find important 
newspapers arguing that the German attack was not 
contrary to the Hague Convention, while others 
admitted the breach, but claimed that the Germans 
merely followed Allied example. The main techni- 
cal excuse was that the effect of the German gas was 
merely stupefying (Colniche Zeitung, June, 1915). 
It is incredible that the German nation was, or could 
allow itself to be, so hoodwinked. Scientific Ger- 
many was certainly aware of the true nature of 
the gases used. Even scientific neutrals in Berlin 
at the outbreak of war, and during the ensuing 
winter, were aware of the German poison gas work, 
which commenced, in an organised wray, almost as 
soon as war broke out. The Germans have argued 
that they only entertained the idea of gas after 
Allied use. The facts revealed below are a suf- 
ficient answer. Whatever legal arguments may be 
33 The Riddle of the Rhine 
involved, there is no doubt as to German intention. 
We do not wish to enter into a comprehensive 
examination of the legal aspect of the first use of 
cloud and shell gas by Germany. Whatever com- 
plicated arguments may turn upon the strict reading 
of a phrase in the records of the Hague Convention, 
we have no doubt whatever as to the desires and 
intentions of the Assembly, and we regard Germany 
(and the Allies) as morally engaged not to venture 
upon the series of chemical enterprises which she 
openly commenced with the Ypres cloud attack. 
The Versailles Treaty also renders fruitless any 
such discussion. Article 171, accepted by Germany, 
is deliberately based on her breach of International 
Convention. 
German Preparations.—A significant phrase oc- 
curs in the Field-Marshal’s despatch. “The brain 
power and thought which has evidently been at work 
before this unworthy method of making war 
reached the pitch of efficiency which has been dem- 
onstrated in its practice shows that the Germans 
must have harboured these designs for a long time.” 
This is a most important point. It was argued 
by many generous and fairminded people in April, 
1915, that the German use of gas was the result 
of a sudden decision, only arrived at in a desperate 
effort to terminate the war. This point of view 
would give us maximum hope for the future. But 
the actual truth ? What do we know about German 
preparations, and how far back do they date? Any 
preparations which occurred must have covered re- 
search on the compounds to be employed and on 
the protection required for the German troops, their 
training for the cloud attack, and the design and 
production of the special appliances to be used. 
34 The German Surprise 
Finally, the production of the chemicals themselves 
had to be faced. 
Research.—We have obtained an insight into the 
German research preparations, which leaves no doubt 
as to their intention. There is evidence that the 
Kaiser Wilhelm Institute and the physico-chemical 
institute near by were employed for this purpose as 
early as August, 1914. Reliable authority exists 
for the statement that soon after this date they 
were working with cacodyl oxide and phosgene, both 
well known before the war for their very poison- 
ous nature, for use, it was believed, in hand gre- 
nades. Our quotations are from a statement by 
a neutral then working at the Institute.- “We could 
hear the tests that Professor Haber was carrying 
out at the back of the Institute, with the military 
authorities, who in their steel-gray cars came to 
Haber’s Institute every morning.” “The work was 
pushed day and night, and many times I saw ac- 
tivity in the building at eleven o’clock in the eve- 
ning. It was common knowledge that Haber was 
pushing these men as hard as he could,” Sachur 
was Professor Haber’s assistant. “One morning 
there was a violent explosion in the room in which 
most of this war work was carried out. The room 
was instantly filled with dense clouds of arsenic 
oxide.” “The janitors began to clear the room by 
a hose and discovered Professor Sachur.” He was 
very badly hurt and died soon after. “After that 
accident I believe the work on cacodyl oxide and 
phosgene was suspended and I believe that work 
was carried out on chlorine or chlorine compounds.” 
“There were seven or eight men working in the In- 
stitute on these problems, but we heard nothing 
more until Haber went to the Battle of Ypres.” 
Rumours to this effect circulated in 1915. 
35 The Riddle of the Rhine 
Production.—Preparations for production can 
easily be imagined. The Germans first used chlorine 
for cloud gas, and certain lachrymators for shell. 
The chlorine was readily available. At about this 
time British liquid chlorine capacity had a maximum 
daily output of about one ton, while along the Rhine 
alone the production was more than forty times 
greater. The question of German chlorine produc- 
tion was, therefore, already solved. The lachry- 
mators were mainly raw materials and intermedi- 
ates of the dye industry submitted to a process, the 
technique of which the German dye factories read- 
ily mastered. Here, again, production presented 
no real difficulties. Cylinders were also probably 
available from the industry. 
Field Preparations.—There remains the last 
question of gas attack technique and personnel. 
Those of us who remember the difficulties involved 
in creating our own organisation in the summer of 
1915 have no illusions on the question of German 
preparation. Giving the Germans every credit for 
their technical and military efficiency, some months 
must have been occupied in establishing and train- 
ing the special companies required, and in arriving at 
a satisfactory design for the discharge appliances. 
Schwarte’s book, Die Technik Im Weltkriege,1 tells 
us “specially organised and trained troops” were 
required for the purpose. Prisoners taken later re- 
vealed the German methods. Gas officers and 
N.C.O.’s, after making a careful survey of the front 
line trench, organised the digging of deep narrow 
trenches at suitable places below the surface of 
the main trench, just underneath the parapet. The 
heavy gas cylinders, weighing as much as ninety 
pounds, were carried to the front line by the un- 
1 Die Technik Im Weltkreige. Publisher: Miltler, Berlin, 1920. 
36 The German Surprise 
fortunate infantry. The discharge valves were care- 
fully protected by domes which screwed on to the 
cylinder. The latter were introduced into the holes, 
tops flush with the trench bottom, and covered by 
a board on which reposed the “Salzdecke,” a kind 
of long bag stuffed with some such material as peat 
moss and soaked in potash solution to absorb any 
slight gas leakages. Three layers of sandbags were 
built above the salzdecke to protect the cylinder 
from shell fragments and to form a firestep for 
the infantry. This concealed the cylinders so effi- 
ciently that, in our own trenches, I have often found 
the new occupants of a sector ignorant of the pres- 
ence of gas cylinders under their own firesteps. On 
the favourable night the dome was removed and a 
lead pipe was connected to the cylinder and di- 
rected over the parapet into No Man’s Land, with 
the nozzle weighed down by a sandbag. The pion- 
eers stood by the batteries of twenty cylinders each 
and let off the gas a fixed few minutes after a rocket 
signal, at which the infantry retired to leave the 
front line free for the pioneers, who not only ran 
the risk of gassing from defective appliances but 
were subjected to almost immediate violent bom- 
bardment from the opposing artillery. When sur- 
prise was complete artillery retaliation was very 
late in developing. This gives a faint idea of the 
elaborate preparations required. They must have 
been doubly arduous and lengthy on the very first 
occasion of cloud gas attack. 
German Opinion of Results.—We can now re- 
gard the chlorine attack of April 22, 1915, as the 
first and successful result of a huge German experi- 
ment on a new method of war, the pioneer work of 
which actually began at (if not before) the out- 
break of war. Quoting again from Schwarte: 
37 The Riddle of the Rhine 
“G.H.Q. considered the attack near Ypres to be a 
successful experiment. The impression created was 
colossal and the result not inconsiderable, although 
it was not fully utilised from the tactical point of 
view. It was obvious that we had gained a great 
advantage; the enemy was not sufficiently prepared 
with defensive measures against gas.” Indeed, we 
were absolutely unprepared, so much so, that after 
the German attack nearly every household in Eng- 
land contributed to our first inefficient and impro- 
vised mask. Is not this suggestion of our prepara- 
tion a deliberate attempt to deceive the German pub- 
lic? They seem to have been as easily hoodwinked 
on gas questions as on many others. 
Germany Prompted by Production Monopoly. 
—An important point arises. The Germans failed 
to exploit their initial success. This is not very 
surprising. Whatever the opinion of the chemists 
behind the movement, the German General Staff 
must have retained the elements of precaution in 
its opinion. It could not have taken for granted 
the formidable success which the chemists proved 
justified in prophesying. This being so, we can 
fairly assume that had there been very serious dif- 
ficulties in carrying out this huge war experiment it 
might never have materialised. Such difficulties 
might have been found in production. But as we 
have seen, the question of production was the most 
easily forged link in the chain of events which led 
to the use of poison gas by Germany. In other 
words, this monopoly in ease of production was an 
inducement to the Germans to proceed with their 
experiment. 
The earliest German cloud gas attacks estab- 
lished beyond a doubt the enormous value of gas 
against unprotected troops, in other words, its value 
38 The German Surprise 
as a complete surprise. These conditions were again 
approached in the first German use of mustard gas. 
The most telling examples will probably be found 
in the future, unless the correct precautions are 
taken. The whole history of chemical warfare dur- 
ing the war was a struggle for this initiative, a 
struggle between gas protection and aggression. 
Standard Uses for Gas;—Gas Shell.—But gas 
found an important use besides that of strategic 
surprise. It became a standard weapon for certain 
clear and definite tactical purposes. (For some of 
these, indeed, the factor of local surprise was im- 
portant.) We refer to the specific use of gas shell 
for the neutralisation of batteries, roads, and areas, 
and to the use of cloud gas, prior to offensives for 
the production of casualties, and wearing down of 
reserves. The Ypres attack had not by any means 
established the use of gas for such purposes. There 
is no doubt that, from this point of view, the ex- 
perimental period carried on for many months. 
Naturally, in some respects, there was always an 
experimental element in the use of gas. 
Further German Cloud Attacks.—Two days after 
the first cloud gas attack the Germans launched a 
second against the Canadians, with similar results. 
Quoting from official despatches: “On the early 
morning of the 24th a violent outburst of gas against 
nearly the whole front was varied by heavy shell 
fire, and a most determined attack was delivered 
against our position east of Ypres. The real attack 
commenced at 2.45 a.m. A large proportion of the 
men were asleep, and the attack was too sudden 
to give them time to put on their respirators.” 
These latter were hurriedly improvised after the 
first Ypres attack. 
39 The Riddle of the Rhine 
Hill 60.—Four more attacks occurred in May, 
notably in the region of Hill 60. “On May ist an- 
other attempt to recapture Hill 60 was supported 
by great volumes of asphyxiating gas which caused 
nearly all the men along a front of about 400 yards 
to be immediately struck down by its fumes.” “A 
second and more severe gas attack under much more 
favourable weather conditions enabled the enemy 
to recapture this position on May 5th. The en- 
emy owes his success in this last attack entirely to 
the use of asphyxiating gas.” “It was only a few 
days later that the means which have since proved 
so effective of counteracting these methods of mak- 
ing war were put into practice.” (Official des- 
patches, 1915.) The despatch further described 
how violent bombardments, the confusion and de- 
moralisation from the first great gas surprise, and 
subsequent almost daily gas attacks, prevented the 
proper reorganisation of the line in question. 
Origin of German Gas Shell.—After May a long 
period elapsed during which the Germans confined 
their war chemical activities on the front to the 
use of gas shell. Schwarte’s book describes their 
origin as follows:—“The main idea wThich influ- 
enced the first construction of a German projectile 
containing chemicals (October, 1914) was that of 
adding to the charge an irritant substance, which 
would be pulverised by the explosion of the projec- 
tile, and would overwhelm the enemy with a cloud 
of dust. This cloud would hover in the air and 
have such an effect upon the mucous membranes 
that, for the time being, the enemy would be unable 
to fight in such an atmosphere. By altering the 
construction of the 10.5 c.m. universal shell for 
light field howitzers, the ‘N.i’ projectile was created 
in the form of 10.5 c.m. shrapnel, the bullets of 
40 The German Surprise 
which were embedded in a sternutatory powder 
(double salts of dianisidine) well stamped down, 
instead of an explosive. By means of the propelling 
charge and the grinding effect of the bullets, this 
powder was pulverised on explosion. The irrita- 
tion caused was not very intense, lasted only a short 
time and affected only a limited area and therefore 
it was of no importance in the field, but the initial 
step had been taken. Liquid irritants soon came to 
the front—xylyl bromide and xylylene dibromide— 
a mixture used later under the name of T. stuff, 
bromo-acetone and brominated methyl ethyl ketone, 
later introduced under the name of B. stuff and Bn. 
stuff.” 
During experiments they gave such improved re- 
sults in intensity, in power of lasting and of affecting 
an increased area, that practical results in the field 
were ensured. The use of these liquids in projectiles, 
however, was contrary to the accepted idea with re- 
gard to artillery, according to which liquid materials 
should not be used for ballistic reasons. Specially 
arranged shoots were required to prove that the pro- 
jectiles in use in the German Army could also be 
used from the ballistic point of view when filled with 
liquids. 
In this way the first effective German gas pro- 
jectile, the T. shell for heavy field howitzers, was 
evolved (January, 1915). 
Early German Gas Shell.—The first important 
use of German gas in shell was that of brominated 
and chlorinated organic compounds, T. and K. stuffs. 
Schwarte’s book tells us “the use of these projectiles 
was continually hampered by lack of understanding 
on the part of the troops which was difficult to over- 
come. In the summer of 1915 it was practically in 
the Argonne alone that any considerable results were 
41 The Riddle of the Rhine 
attained by the new projectiles.” And he describes 
how the first elements of the new gas tactics were 
developed there. 
A Successful Experiment.—The development of 
the gas shell, the use of which, generally speaking, 
is independent of, but co-ordinated with, wind direc- 
tion, may have received stimulus from the fact that 
the prevailing wind, so important for cloud gas, fa- 
voured the Allies. It is clear that this period was 
an experimental one, but we know that by August, 
1915, German military opinion had crystallised out 
to the extent of formulating certain rules, issued as 
Falkenhayn’s orders for the employment of gas shell. 
These early orders defined two types of shell, one 
persistent, for harassing purposes, and the other non- 
persistent, to be used immediately before an attack. 
They specified the number of shell to be used for a 
given task. But in this they were unsound and it 
is clear that the Germans had an exaggerated opinion 
of what could be achieved with a small number of 
shell. They adhered too closely to high explosive 
practice. Various documents reveal the fact that 
the Germans were much more satisfied with their 
gas tactics than they would have been had they pos- 
sessed information with regard to our losses from 
their shell. They attached insufficient importance to 
the value of surprise and highly concentrated shoots, 
and had a mistaken idea of the actual specific aggres- 
sive value of their early types. 
Lachrymators at Loos, 1915.—Germany com- 
menced the manufacture of lachrymators, crude 
brominated xylene or brominated ketones, early in, 
or perhaps before 1915. These substances caused 
great inconvenience through temporary blindness by 
lachrymation, but were not highly toxic. In June, 
1915, however, they began to produce lethal gas for 
42 The German Surprise 
shell. Falkenhayn’s orders for the use of gas shell, 
mentioned above, although they represent by no 
means the best final practice, were definite evidence 
that gas had come to stay with the Germans. The 
writer has vivid recollections of their use of lachry- 
mators in the Loos Battle. Batteries in the open, 
under the crest near the Lens road, were in position 
so that the wind direction practically enfiladed them, 
sweeping along from the direction of Le Rutoire 
farm. Gas from German shell, borne on the wind, 
was continually enveloping the line of batteries, but 
they remained in action. It was on this occasion 
while watching the bursting gas shells from the out- 
skirts of the mining village of Philosophe that- 
Major-General Wing was killed outright by a high 
explosive shell. These gas shell certainly did not 
achieve the results which the Germans expected, al- 
though they were not without effect. Demolished 
villages, the only shelter for troops in a desolate 
area, have been rendered uninhabitable for days by 
a concentrated lachrymator enemy shoot of less than 
one hour. Again, walking into gas “pockets” up a 
trench one has been stopped as by a fierce blow across 
the eyes, the lachrymatory effect was so piercing and 
sudden. The great inconvenience which was oc- 
casioned to parties engaged in the routine of trench 
warfare, on ration or engineering duties, and the 
effect on movement in the rear after an assault, taken 
cumulatively, represented a big military factor. 
The Flammenwerfer.—There can be no doubt 
that this period marks increasing German willingness 
to live up to their “blood and iron” theories of war, 
and, in July, 1915, another device with a considerable 
surprise value was used against us: the flame pro- 
jector, or the German flammenwerfer. Field-Mar- 
shal Sir John French signalled the entry of this new 
43 The Riddle of the Rhine 
weapon as follows: “Since my last despatch a new 
device has been adopted by the enemy for driving 
burning liquid into our trenches with a strong jet. 
Thus supported, an attack was made on the trenches 
of the Second Army at Hooge, on the Menin Road, 
early on 30th July. Most of the infantry occupying 
these trenches were driven back, but their retirement 
was due far more to the surprise and temporary con- 
fusion caused by the burning liquid than to the actual 
damage inflicted. Gallant endeavours were made by 
repeated counter-attacks to recapture the lost section 
of trenches. These, however, proving unsuccessful 
and costly, a new line of trenches was consolidated 
a short distance farther back.” 
Although this weapon continued to be used right 
through the campaign, it did not exert that influence 
which first acquaintance with it might have led one 
to conclude. At the same time, there exists a mis- 
taken notion that the flame projector was a negligible 
quantity. This may be fairly true of the huge non- 
portable types, but it is certainly not true of the very 
efficient portable flame projector which was the form 
officially adopted by the German, and later by the 
French, armies. On a number of occasions Germany 
gained local successes purely owing to the momentary 
surprise effect of the flame projector, and the French 
made some use of it for clearing out captured trench 
systems over which successful waves of assault had 
passed. Further, the idea of flame projection is not 
without certain possibilities for war. 
German Phosgene Clouds.—Germany had by no 
means abandoned cloud gas, however. She had 
merely been planning to regain what the Ypres at- 
tacks had lost for her, the cloud gas initiative. We 
have seen how phosgene had occupied the attention 
of the German research organisation in the first 
44 The German Surprise 
months of the war. Once alive to its great impor- 
tance, they must have strained all efforts to obtain 
an efficient method of using it at the front. Phos- 
gene was remarkable for its peculiar “delayed” effect. 
Relatively small quantities, inhaled and followed by 
vigorous or even normal exercise, led to sudden col- 
lapse and fatal effects sometimes more than twenty- 
four hours after the attack. The case of a German 
prisoner in a First Army raid after a British gas 
attack was often quoted on the front. He passed 
through the various Intelligence headquarters as far 
as the Army, explaining the feeble effect of the Brit- 
ish gas and his own complete recovery. But he died 
from delayed action within twenty-four hours of his 
last interrogation. This effect imposed strict condi- 
tions of discipline, and men merely suspected of ex- 
posure to phosgene were compelled to report as 
serious casualties and carried as such even from the 
front line. 
The successful development of the phosgene cloud 
probably arrived too late for the Ypres attacks, and 
a variety of reasons must have led to the postpone- 
ment of its use until such time as it might once again 
give Germany the real initiative. Accordingly, on 
December 19, 1915, a formidable cloud gas attack 
was made on the north-east of the Ypres salient, 
using a mixture of phosgene and chlorine in a very 
high concentration. Fortunately, by this time we had 
established an anti-gas organisation, which had fore- 
stalled the production of cloud phosgene by special 
modifications in the British respirator. The condi- 
tions were similar to those of April 22nd, 1915. 
Instead of the first use of cloud gas, we had the first 
use of the new gas in highly concentrated cloud. In 
both cases the Germans reckoned on our lack of pro- 
tection, correctly in the first case, but incorrectly in 
45 The Riddle of the Rhine 
the second. In both cases they were sure that great 
difficulties in production would meet our attempts at 
retaliation. In general this proved true, but in this 
case and increasingly throughout the war, they reck- 
oned without Allied adaptability. The French de- 
velopment of phosgene manufacture was indeed re- 
markable. 
Very interesting light is thrown on this attack by 
Major Barley, D.S.O., Chemical Adviser to the 
British Second Army. It appears that in November, 
1915, the French captured a prisoner who had at- 
tended a gas school in one of the factories of the 
I.G. Here lecturers explained that a new gas was 
to be used against the British forces, many thousands 
of casualties were expected, and an attack would 
follow, which correcting the errors of the effort at 
Ypres, would lead to the capture of the Channel 
ports. Efforts were at once made to obtain infor- 
mation on gas preparation by the Germans in front 
of the British sectors. In this way a sergeant-major 
was captured on the morning of December 16th, and 
he revealed the date and front on which the cylinders 
were installed. About 35,000 British troops were 
found to be in the direct line of the gas, but owing 
to the timely warning and to the protection which 
had recently been adopted, we experienced very few 
casualties. The Germans had prepared a huge in- 
fantry attack, and used a new type of gas shell on 
this occasion. German troops massing must have 
received huge casualties owing to our preparation 
and the failure of their gas attack. 
The last German cloud attack on the British front 
occurred on August 8, 1916. There were later 
attacks against the French, but the Germans were 
replacing the cloud method by other methods which 
they considered more suitable. These will be dis- 
46 The German Surprise 
cussed later on, when considering our own reaction 
against the chemical offensive. 
Gas and the Eastern Theatre.—The German sur- 
prise was not limited to activities on the Western 
front. In fact, apart from the first Ypres attack, 
cloud gas probably reaped more casualties in the 
East against Russia. We learn from Schwarte’s 
book: “From reliable descriptions we know that 
our gas troops caused an unusual amount of damage 
to the enemy—especially in the East—with very 
little expenditure of effort. The special battalion 
formed by Austria-Hungary was, unfortunately, of 
no special importance for various reasons.” 
Had the nature of the Russian campaign been 
different, with a smaller front, and nearer critical 
objectives to the front of attack, we have no doubt 
that gas would have assumed enormous importance 
in the East. Russia, even more feebly organised for 
production than ourselves, would have been at a 
tremendous disadvantage, both from the point of 
view of protection and of the retention of satisfac- 
tory morale by retaliation. 
Conclusion.—This, then, was the period of the 
German surprise, during which the first big shock 
occurred, and which promised most success for fur- 
ther attempts owing to the lack of comprehensive 
protection by the Allies. Looking at the matter in 
a very broad way, ignoring the moral and legal as- 
pects of the case, we can describe this period as an 
example of brilliant chemical opportunism. Accord- 
ing to plan or otherwise, conditions for this experi- 
ment were ripe in Germany as in no other country. 
Overcoming whatever prejudices may have existed, 
the German authorities realised this, seized the op- 
portunity, and very nearly succeeded. 
47 CHAPTER III 
THE ALLIED REACTION 
Loos, September 1915, to Ypres, July, 1917. 
The Need of Retaliation.—The conclusive sign of 
the Allied reaction to the German poison gas attack 
appeared at the battle of Loos. “Owing to the re- 
peated use by the enemy of asphyxiating gas in their 
attacks on our positions,” says Field-Marshal French 
in his despatch of October 15, 1915, “I have been 
compelled to resort to similar methods, and a de- 
tachment was organised for this purpose, which took 
part in the operations commencing on the 25th Sep- 
tember for the first time.” Five months thus elapsed 
before retaliation. From a military point of view 
there can be no doubt as to the wisdom, in fact the 
absolute necessity, of using gas in order to reply to 
the many German attacks of this nature. The ques- 
tion of morale was bound up in this retaliation. Had 
the Germans continued their chemical attacks in 
variety and extent as they did, and had it been real- 
ised that for some reason or other we were not able 
to retaliate in kind, none but the gravest consequences 
could have resulted with regard to morale. It must 
be remembered that the earlier use of cloud and 
shell gas by the Germans was of local incidence, when 
compared with its tremendous use along the whole 
of the front in the later stages of the war. 
48 The Allied Reaction 
First Signs.—Our preparatory period was one of 
feverish, if somewhat unco-ordinated, activity. The 
production of a protective appliance, the gas mask, 
was vital. This development will be considered 
later. Allied chemical warfare organisations arose, 
to become an important factor in the later stages of 
the war. The history of Allied gas organisation is 
one of the gradual recognition that chemical warfare 
represented a new weapon with new possibilities, new 
specific uses, and new requirements from the rear. 
Its beginnings are seen in the English and French 
Scientific Advisory Committees appointed to examine 
the new German method. One could always trace 
an element of reluctance, however, in Allied develop- 
ment, signs that each move was forced upon us by 
some new German surprise. We find the other ex- 
treme, the logical outcome of war experience, in the 
completely independent Chemical Warfare Service 
now actually adopted in the United States of Amer- 
ica. This is dealt with in a separate chapter. 
The decision to retaliate once made, our difficulties 
commenced. We required gas, weapons, and meth- 
ods for its use, trained personnel, and the association 
of certain scientific with military standards without 
losing the field efficiency of the latter. The German 
staff found this in their co-operation with eminent 
scientists, notably Professor Haber. Without draw- 
ing invidious distinctions between pre-war military 
and public appreciation of chemical science in Eng- 
land and Germany, it would be merely untrue to state 
that the Germans were not in a position of advan- 
tage in this respect. However, chemical mobilisation 
and co-operation proceeded sufficiently rapidly to 
provide us with personnel and material for the Loos 
attack. 
The assembly and organisation of personnel oc- 
49 The Riddle of the Rhine 
curred in three directions. In the first place the 
Royal Society had already begun to mobilise promi- 
nent scientists for other war purposes. In the second 
place, different formations in the field, realising the 
need for specialist treatment of the gas question, 
after the first German attack, created staff appoint- 
ments for certain chemists chosen from infantry regi- 
ments and other formations on the front. Thirdly, 
men were collected at a depot in France to form the 
nucleus of the offensive gas troops. For this purpose 
chemists were specially enrolled and chosen men from 
infantry and other front line units were added. 
Early gas attacks and gas organisation did not ap- 
pear to justify the immobilisation of so much chemi- 
cal talent in the offensive gas troops, when chemists 
were needed all over England for munition produc- 
tion so vital to war. But later events justified the 
mobilisation and military training of these specialists. 
The expansion of the advisory and offensive organi- 
sations at the front necessitated a large number of 
officers, whose chemical training was of great value. 
It is difficult to see where they would have been found 
had they not been mobilised with the Special Com- 
panies. Moreover, their offensive and battle ex- 
perience gained with the latter was of great value. 
Six or seven weeks’ training witnessed the conversion 
of a few hundred men of the above type into one or 
two so called Special Companies. The spirit and 
work of these men in the Loos attack cannot be 
spoken of too highly. 
The Loos Attack, September, 1915.—The Field- 
Marshal bears testimony to its success as follows: 
“Although the enemy was known to have been pre- 
pared for such reprisals, our gas attack met with 
marked success, and produced a demoralising effect 
in some of the opposing units, of which ample evi- 
50 The Allied Reaction 
dence was forthcoming in the captured trenches. The 
men who undertook this work carried out their un- 
familiar duties during a heavy bombardment with 
conspicuous gallantry and coolness; and I feel con- 
fident in their ability to more than hold their own 
should the enemy again resort to this method of 
warfare.” 
There is evidence, however, that this early at- 
tack, inefficient as it appeared to be to participants, 
met with considerable success. Schwarte’s book 
tells us: “The English succeeded in releasing gas 
clouds on a large scale. Their success on this oc- 
casion was due to the fact that they took us by sur- 
prise. Our troops refused to believe in the danger 
and were not sufficiently adept in the use of defen- 
sive measures as prescribed by G.H.Q.” 
On the occasion of a cloud attack a few weeks 
later, at the storming of the Hohenzollern re- 
doubt, Sergeant-Major Dawson, in charge of a sec- 
tor of gas emplacements in the front line trench, 
won the Victoria Cross. The German reply to our 
bombardment was very severe and under stress of 
it a battery of our cylinders, either through a direct 
hit or faulty connections, began to pour gas into 
our own trenches. In order to prevent panic and 
casualties among our own troops at this critical 
time, a few minutes before zero, the moment of as- 
sault, Sergeant-Major Dawson climbed on to the 
parapet under a hail of shell, rifle, and machine-gun 
fire, and, hauling up the cylinders., in question, car- 
ried them to a safe distance into the poisoned at- 
mosphere of No Man’s Land and ensured their 
complete discharge by boring them with a rifle bul- 
let. In addition to the Hohenzollern attack cloud 
gas was used in December, 1915, in the region of 
Givenchy. 
51 The Riddle of the Rhine 
The Somme Battle, 1916.—My impression as an 
eyewitness and participator, however, was that the 
real British gas offensive began after, and as a re- 
sult of, the Loos experience. Material, organisa- 
tion, and numbers of personnel, both at the front 
and at home, co-operation with staffs and tactical 
conceptions all improved vastly in time to contribute 
largely to the efficiency of preparations for the 
Somme offensive in July, 1916. During the early 
months of 1916, a Special Brigade was created by 
expanding the four Special Companies, and the 
4-inch Stokes mortar was adopted, training being 
vigorously pursued. As many as no cloud gas dis- 
charges, mainly of a phosgene mixture, occurred 
during the Somme battle, and evidence of their suc- 
cess is seen in German reports. These successes 
were due not only to the magnitude of our opera- 
tions, but to the carefully developed cloud attack 
tactics which aimed at obtaining maximum results 
from the gas employed. The factor of surprise 
governed all other considerations. Attacks oc- 
curred at night and depended for success upon the 
concentration of the maximum amount of gas in the 
given sector for a short, sharp discharge under the 
best wind conditions. There is abundant evidence 
of our success in these attacks. Probably the most 
marked feature of the captured documents or of 
prisoners’ statements during the later stages of the 
Somme battle was the continual reference to the 
deadly effect of British cloud gas. The captured 
letter of a German soldier writing home stated: 
“Since the beginning of July an unparalleled slaugh- 
ter has been going on. Not a day passes but the 
English let off their gas waves at one place or an- 
other. I will give you only one instance of this 
gas; men 7 and 8 kilometres behind the front line 
52 The Allied Reaction 
became unconscious from the tail of the gas cloud, 
and its effects are felt 12 kilometres behind the 
front. It is deadly stuff.” 
The accuracy of this reference to the long range 
effect of our gas clouds is borne out in a number 
of other statements. For example, we learnt from 
a prisoner examined by the French: “The men 
were thrown into disorder and raised their masks 
because they were suffocated. Many fell in running 
to the rear; a number did not become ill until the 
next day. Vegetation was burnt up to a depth of 
8 kilometres.” Again, prisoners taken at Maurepas 
stated that one of the English gas attacks was ef- 
fective 10 kilometres back. 
There are also marked references to the surprise 
nature of our gas attacks, which are an unconscious 
tribute to the successful tactical developments which 
have already been referred to, and also numerous 
other references to the “delayed” action of phos- 
gene. The prisoner mentioned above, taken at 
Maurepas, gave testimony that some were only 
taken ill after several days, and one died suddenly 
two days after, whilst writing a letter. One pris- 
oner, pointing to Les Ayettes on the map, stated 
that about the beginning of September when gas 
came over suddenly in the late evening, they thought 
it was from artillery fire because it was so sudden. 
No one was expecting gas and very few were carry- 
ing their masks. Another one stated: “The at- 
tack was a surprise and the cloud came over and 
passed fairly quickly. The whole thing did not 
occupy more than ten minutes.” More than thirty 
per cent, of the battalion was put out of action. 
Finally, to show what a serious imposition this 
constant cloud gas attack was upon the German 
Army, we will quote from the Special Correspondent 
53 The Riddle of the Rhine 
of the Fossiches Zeitung. He said: “I devote a 
special chapter to this plague of our Somme war- 
riors. It is not only when systematic gas attacks 
are made that they have to struggle with this devil- 
ish and intangible foe.” He refers to the use of 
gas shell, and says: “This invisible and perilous 
spectre of the air threatens and lies in wait on all 
roads leading to the front.” 
In a despatch dated December 23rd, 1916, from 
Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, G.C.B., the situ- 
ation is ably summarised: “The employment by 
the enemy of gas and of liquid flame as weapons 
of offence compelled us not only to discover ways 
to protect our troops from their effects but also to 
devise means to make use of the same instruments 
of destruction. Great fertility of invention has been 
shown, and very great credit is due to the special 
personnel employed for the rapidity and success 
with which these new arms have been developed and 
perfected, and for the very great devotion to duty 
they have displayed in a difficult and dangerous 
service. The army owes its thanks to the chemists, 
physiologists, and physicists of the highest rank who 
devoted their energies to enable us to surpass the 
enemy in the use of a means of warfare which took 
the civilised world by surprise. Our own experience 
of the numerous experiments and trials necessary be- 
fore gas and flame could be used, of the prepara- 
tions which had to be made for their manufacture, 
and of the special training required for the per- 
sonnel employed, shows that the employment of 
such methods by the Germans was not the result 
of a desperate decision, but had been prepared for 
deliberately. 
“Since we have been compelled, in self-defence, to 
use similar methods, it is satisfactory to be able to 
54 pThe Allied Reaction 
record, on the evidence of prisoners, of documents 
captured, and of our own observation, that the en- 
emy has suffered heavy casualties from our gas at- 
tacks, while the means of protection adopted by us 
have proved thoroughly effective.” 
One of the causes which leads to a lack of under- 
standing of the chemical weapon is the fact that 
the results of chemical attack are not, like those 
of a huge assault, obvious to the mere visual ob- 
server. A period of months often elapsed during 
the war before the immediate effect of a gas at- 
tack was known. It was inspiring to witness the 
assault of the 18th Division near Montauban on 
July ist, 1916. But few realised the part played 
by the preparatory gas attacks in that and other 
sectors of the line, in weakening the numerical 
strength and battle morale of effective reserves. It 
is, therefore, of great interest to follow up a par- 
ticular 'case and to obtain a connected idea of the 
series of events associated with some particular at- 
tack. 
The early stages of the Somme battle were char- 
acterised by a number of cloud gas attacks which 
served the double purpose of a feint, and reducing 
the strength of available reserves. These attacks 
occurred chiefly along the part of the line north 
of the Somme battle zone, and they extended as far 
as the sea. One of them occurred on the 30th 
August, 1916, at Monchy, between Arras and 
Bapaume. About one thousand cylinders were dis- 
charged during the night. The usual careful or- 
ganisation preceded the attack and it is quite likely 
that it shared the advantage of surprise common 
to a large number of these attacks. Three German 
regiments were holding the line directly in front 
of the British sector concerned. Before December, 
55 The Riddle of the Rhine 
1916, the following reliable information was col- 
lected from prisoners and confirmed by cross-ex- 
amination. One Company of the 23rd regiment 
was in training and had no gas masks with it. The 
gas came along quickly and about half the Com- 
pany were killed. After that there were more strin- 
gent rules about carrying masks. They had no 
recollection of a gas alarm being sounded. An- 
other man said that in his Company no special drill 
or training was being done, and a large number of 
men were put out of action through not being able 
to adjust their respirators in time. There was 
no warning, although after this gas alarms were 
given by ringing church bells. Other prisoners, from 
the 63rd regiment, had such vivid recollections of the 
attack that they said: “The effects of the English 
gas are said to be appalling.” Collecting informa- 
tion from prisoners belonging to this or that Com- 
pany, and carefully checking by cross-examination, it 
is clear that this attack must have been responsible 
for many hundreds of casualties. 
Reasons for British Cloud Gas Success.—The fact 
that the British persisted with cloud gas attack and 
attained so much more success than the Germans, 
after the first surprise, was due to a curious combina- 
tion of causes, quite apart from the prevailing 
favourable wind. 
Our Casualties.—In the first place, we knew from 
bitter experience the deadly effect of a successfully 
operated cloud gas attack. We knew, for example, 
that in the first attack at Ypres there were more than 
5000 dead with many more times that number of 
casualties. On the other hand, the Germans, left to 
speculate on our casualties, retained the conviction 
from apparent non-success, that cloud gas was not a 
suitable form of preparation behind which to develop 
56 The Allied Reaction 
big infantry attacks. Quoting from Schwarte: 
“Large gains of ground could hardly be attained by 
means of an attack which followed the use of gas 
clouds, therefore such clouds were soon merely em- 
ployed as a means of injuring the enemy, and were 
not followed up by an attack.” This represented 
German policy, and it lacked vision. They did not 
realise that their difficulty was the method of form- 
ing the cloud, and that if a more mobile and long 
range method of cloud formation materialised, with 
correspondingly less dependence on wind direction, 
the object which they once sought and failed to attain 
would again be within their reach. 
Exhausting Preparations for Cloud Attack.— 
The second reason accounting for the relatively early 
cessation of German cloud attacks is one constantly 
referred to in the German war memoirs. It was the 
enormous mechanical and muscular effort required in 
preparing for such an attack. Few people realise 
what hours of agonised effort were involved in pre- 
paring and executing a cloud gas attack. The 
cylinders had to be in position in specially chosen em- 
placements in the front line within certain time limits. 
The “carrying in” could not be spread over an in- 
definite period and usually took from two to six 
nights, according to the magnitude of the attack and 
the local difficulties. Naturally, all the work occurred 
in the dark. Picture the amount of organisation and 
labour required to install 2000 cylinders on, say, a 
two mile front. These cylinders would have to be 
assembled at a number of points in the rear of the 
given line where the roads met the communication 
trenches. No horse or lorry transport could 
assemble at such points before dark, nor be left 
standing there after dawn. To carry this number 
of cylinders more than fifty lorries would be required 
57 The Riddle of the Rhine 
or, say, perhaps, 90 G.S. wagons. All the points 
of assembly would be under possible enemy shell fire. 
These points would be normally in use for the un- 
loading of rations and trench engineering materials, 
etc., with which cylinder transport would have to be 
co-ordinated. Once arrived at the unloading points, 
parties had to be provided for unloading the 
lorries and for conveying the cylinders up to the front 
line trench. In a normally difficult trench system, 
for a carry of a mile to a mile and a half of com- 
munication trench, at least four men per cylinder are 
required to give the necessary margin for casualties 
and reliefs, etc. This implies the organisation of 
more than 8000 officers and men for the installation, 
with a fundamental condition that only small groups 
of these men be assembled at any one point at any 
given time. The installation of gas for an attack on 
this scale would have been a matter of vast and 
complicated organisation if there were no other 
activities in the trench system, and no enemy to harass 
the work. But to co-ordinate such an enterprise with 
the busy night life of the trench system and to leave 
the enemy unaware of your activities was a task which 
tried the patience, not only of the Special Companies, 
who organised, guided, and controlled these opera- 
tions, but much more so of the Infantry Brigades and 
Divisions whose dispositions were interfered with, 
and who had to provide the men for the work. 
Add to this even more acute difficulties. The front 
line trench is nothing but a series of traverses, thus 
to avoid the enfilade effect of shell and machine-gun 
fire. A straight trench is a death-trap. But to carry 
hundreds of pole-slung cylinders, already weighing as 
lead, round traverses on a dark night, is a feat re- 
quiring superhuman endurance. Therefore many 
“carries” finished with a hundred yards “over the 
58 The Allied Reaction 
top” through the parados wire, to the near locality 
of the appropriate emplacement in the front line. 
This last carry was critical; a false step, the clatter 
of falling metal, meant drawing the fire of some 
curious and alert German machine gunner. The 
sudden turning of darkness into day by enemy Very 
lights imposed instantaneous immobility. Yet all the 
time tired men were straining at their heavy burden 
and any moment a cylinder might be pierced by inten- 
tional or unaimed rifle fire. 
But the spirit of the infantry in this work, as in 
all they undertook, is to their everlasting credit. 
These tasks were an enemy challenge and they 
accepted it successfully, albeit with much cursing. 
The work was indeed beyond description and the 
country, colonial, and London troops expressed their 
opinion equally emphatically in their own peculiar 
way. Think again of the need of systematic wind 
observation along the whole front of attack, the dis- 
organization and “gas alert” conditions imposed on 
the favourable night, the possibility of postponement, 
and we can only draw one conclusion. There must 
have been some imperative need or justification of 
cloud gas attack for the army to have encouraged or 
even tolerated its continuance. There is no difficulty 
in understanding why gas attack was so exceedingly 
unpopular among the staffs in the early stages of the 
war. Later, however, when they realised the enemy 
casualties that were being created by the gas, and 
what a large part it was taking in the war of attrition, 
the opposition and lack of appreciation vanished. 
Further, when the projector arrived to produce 
similar effects with less demand upon infantry per- 
sonnel, and less dependence on the wind, the whole 
tone of the army towards gas was changed, and it 
became almost popular. 
59 The Riddle of the Rhine 
The peculiarity of cloud gas attack was the con- 
centration of all this effort of preparation within a 
few days. In terms of military efficiency, the amount 
of energy expended was fully justified by the 
casualties produced. We know that some of our 
cloud attacks were responsible on one night for many 
thousands of casualties, and the amount of artillery 
effort to give such a result would probably have been 
considerably larger. But under normal conditions of 
warfare, such artillery effort would have been ex- 
pended over a much longer period of time. 
The Livens Projector.—The Somme offensive 
witnessed the use of a new British gas weapon which 
became of the utmost importance. This was the 
mortar known as the Livens Projector. Its origin 
dates back many months, however, and is of con- 
siderable interest. A British engineer, Lt. Livens 
(afterwards Major, D.S.O., M.C.) of the Signal 
Corps, was inspired to constructive and aggressive 
thought on the gas question by a double motive. He 
quickly realised the tactical weakness of the German 
method at Ypres, once shorn of its vast initial 
possibilities of surprise. He saw the advantage of 
being able to command the point or locality of inci- 
dence of the cloud, instead of being limited to the 
actual trench front. Prompted by a direct personal 
interest in the huge loss sustained by the Lusitania 
outrage, he determined to find a practical outlet for 
his feelings by developing his views on the future 
of gas clouds. In a few months the general prin- 
ciples of the projector were defined and a crude 
specimen resulted. Caught up, however, in the gas 
organization, preparations for the cloud attack at 
Loos absorbed all his attention and energies and the 
consequent reorganization found him developing a 
flammenwerfer and training a company for its use. 
60 THE LIVENS PROJECTOR—II. 
A working party fitting electric leads and adjusting bombs prior to discharge. This work occurs at night. 
To face page 61 The Allied Reaction 
It was really the Somme battle which gave him the 
first opportunity to carry his idea into offensive 
practice. This arose in front of High Wood, which 
was a veritable nest of German machine gunners in 
such a critical tactical position as to hold up our ad- 
vance in that region. The huge stationary flammen- 
werfer had recently been used by Major Livens and 
his company against a strong point in front of 
Carnoy in the assault of July ist. Here again the 
effect of flame was limited even more than that of 
cloud gas by dependence on a fixed emplacement. It 
was quickly grasped that the solution was to be found 
in the application of the projector principle to the 
use of oil for flame and a crude projector was de- 
vised for the emergency, using oil cans as mortars, 
burying them in the earth for two-thirds of their 
length and employing water cans as bombs. 
As soon as the possibilities of the weapon were 
seen its development was pressed. The usual Livens 
Projector consisted of a simple tube mortar or pro- 
jector closed at one end, and fitted with a charge 
box on which rested the projectile. By an electrical 
arrangement and suitable communications, large 
numbers, sometimes thousands, of these projectors 
could be discharged at a given moment. In this way 
quantities of gas, comparable with the huge tonnages 
employed in the normal stationary cloud attack, could 
be used to produce a cloud which would originate, as 
cloud, as far as a mile away from the point of dis- 
charge. In other words, the advantages of cloud 
attack could be used with a much smaller dependence 
on wind direction, and with a much greater factor of 
local surprise. Thus when the partially perfected 
and efficient weapon was used in large quantities dur- 
ing the British Arras offensive in April, 1917, the 
German Army was thrown into great consternation. 
61 The Riddle of the Rhine 
But for the fact that protection had developed so 
strongly on both sides, the use of the Livens Pro- 
jector would have gone far towards a decision. 
The simplest way to illustrate the peculiar value 
of the projector will be to quote from one or two 
of the many Intelligence reports collected. Thus 
from a captured document dated July, 1917, be- 
longing to the mth German Division, signed Von 
Busse, we have: “The enemy has combined in this 
new process the advantages of gas clouds and gas 
shells. The density is equal to that of gas clouds, 
and the surprise effect of shell fire is also obtained. 
For the bombardment the latter part of the night 
is generally chosen, in a calm or light wind (the 
direction of the latter is immaterial). The enemy 
aims essentially at surprise. Our losses have been 
serious up to now, as he has succeeded, in the ma- 
jority of cases, in surprising us, and masks have often 
been put on too late. ... As soon as a loud report 
like a mine is heard 1000-1500 metres away, give the 
gas alarm. It does not matter if several false alarms 
are given. Masks must not be taken off without 
orders from an officer. Men affected, even if ap- 
parently only slightly, must be treated as serious 
cases, laid flat, kept still, and taken back as soon as 
possible for medical treatment. Anti-gas officers 
and Company Commanders will go through a fresh 
course of training on the above,principles.” The 
influence of gas discipline is borne out by another 
captured statement that they could only attempt to 
“reduce their losses' to "a minimum' by the strictest 
gas discipline.” Again, from a prisoner we learn 
that “every time a battalion goes into rest, masks 
are inspected and a lecture is delivered by the gas 
officer on British gas projectors, which are stated to 
be the most deadly form of warfare.” So great was 
62 The Allied Reaction 
the impression formed by the introduction of the 
projector that uneasiness at the front was reflected 
later on in the Press. Thus, quoting from reference 
to the military discussion before the main committee 
of the Reichstag. “Casualties from enemy poison 
gas admit on the whole of a favourable judgment, 
as the harm involved is only temporary, and in most 
cases no ill after-effects persist” (Tdgliche Rund- 
schau, 24.4.18). “Cases of gas poisoning are not 
as a rule accompanied by harmful consequences, even 
though the treatment extends sometimes over a long 
period” (Forwarts, 25.4.18). Based on the later 
mustard gas casualties these statements would have 
been more truthful. As it was, they afforded poor 
consolation to the German people. 
British Gas Shell.—The British first used shell 
gas as lachrymators, in trench mortar bombs, in small 
quantities, during the battle of the Somme, but for 
the first time, during the battle of Arras, 1917, our 
supplies of gas for shell were sufficient for extensive 
and effective use. Our success can be measured by 
the report dated April nth, 1917, from the General 
Commanding the first German Army on “Experi- 
ences in the Battle of Arras,” in which he says: 
“The enemy made extensive use of gas ammunition 
against our front positions as well as against 
batteries.” “The fighting resistance of the men 
suffered considerably from wearing the mask for 
many hours.” Artillery activity seems to have been 
paralysed by the effects of the gas. 
In a general comparison of British and German 
methods of gas warfare,1 General Hartley tells us 
“our methods improved rapidly during 1917. At 
first we neglected, almost entirely, the question of 
rate of firing, but we soon arrived at the method of 
1 Journal of the Royal Artillery, February, 1920. 
63 The Riddle of the Rhine 
crashes of lethal shell. These got the surprise con- 
centrations of gas which proved so effective, and we 
realised that the number of shells required to produce 
an effect was much bigger than we thought originally. 
At Messines gas was used in much the same way as at 
Arras.” 
German Gas Shell Development, 1916.—The 
main evidence of Allied reaction was to be found in 
the intensive development of cloud gas attacks, but 
during the same period the Germans who appeared to 
be abandoning the use of cloud gas, were making 
steady efforts to regain their initiative by the compre- 
hensive development of shell gas. Thus, to quote 
from General Hartley’s report to the British Associa- 
tion, “In the Summer of 1916 chlor-methyl-chloro- 
formate with toxic properties similar to those of phos- 
gene wras used against us in large quantities during the 
battle of the Somme. Later this was replaced by tri- 
chlor-methyl-chloro-formate, a similar liquid, which 
was used until the end of the war as the well-known 
Green Cross shell filling. The use of phosgene in 
trench mortar bombs also began in 1916.” Many 
of those on the front in 1916 will remember the sur- 
prise gas shell attack of December of that year, on 
the Baudimont gate at Arras. We were fortunately 
let off lightly with little over 100 casualties, but the 
effect was to tighten up gas discipline all along the 
line. The appearance of the new substances repre- 
sented definite German progress and had definite mili- 
tary results, but they lost decisive value owing to the 
relative inefficiency of German gas shell tactics. 
Consideration of the Allied reaction must include 
some reference to the appearance of the American 
Army in the field. The Americans during their more 
or less educational period gave serious attention to 
the gas question, and showed almost immediately, by 
64 The Allied Reaction 
their preparations, that they attached enormous im- 
portance to the new weapon. 
Main Features of the Period.—It is difficult to 
generalise. But the following features appear to 
characterise the period under discussion. In the first 
place we see German policy tending towards the use 
of gas projectiles containing a variety of organic 
substances. Secondly, we have the British exploita- 
tion of cloud gas attack both in magnitude and 
method. The Livens Projector provides the third 
important feature. Fourthly, we note the somewhat 
tardy development of the British use of gas shell. A 
number of causes, no doubt, unite in responsibility 
for the above. But whether due to definitely framed 
policy on our part, or merely to the hard facts of the 
case, one important factor seems largely responsible. 
It is the relative ease of production by Germany as 
compared with ourselves. When German military 
opinion tended towards the development of gas shell, 
a variety of substances came quickly to hand, not 
only from German research sources, but in quantity 
from the dye factories. No such quick response 
could have met, or actually did meet, the demands 
of Allied military policy. Whatever ideas emanated 
from our research organisations, there was no quick 
means of converting them into German casualties. 
It is true that we could obtain chlorine and later 
phosgene in bulk and devote them to the exploita- 
tion of the older gas appliances in cloud methods. 
But British chemical supply was weak, owing to the 
absence of a strong organic chemical industry. In 
other words, German flexibility of supply meant flex- 
ibility in meeting the requirements of military policy, 
and, given sound military policy, this flexibility meant 
surprise, the essence of successful war. 
65 CHAPTER IV 
INTENSIVE CHEMICAL WARFARE 
The chemical struggle became very intense in the 
Summer and Autumn of 1917. Projector attacks 
multiplied, the use of chemical shell increased on 
both sides, allied and enemy gas discipline was tight- 
ened up, officers and men acquired a kind of gas 
sense, a peculiar alertness towards gas. The home 
front was strengthened in England and France by 
reinforced and sounder organisations, and by the 
vigorous steps taken by America. The Germans be- 
gan to reap the benefit of their gas shell policy. At 
the end of 1916, as a result of a review of the pro- 
duction situation, they had arrived at the so-called 
Hindenburg Programme. This included a large out- 
put of gas for shell, and from its realisation the Ger- 
mans acquired a momentum which kept them ahead 
well into 1918. It is a very clear indication of the 
progress made by Germany in research, that the 
sudden expansion in manufacture required by the 
Hindenburg Programme found a number of new 
efficient war chemicals ready for production. 
The Mustard Gas Surprise.—The next big sur- 
prise came from Germany. Units in the line at Nieu- 
port and Ypres in July, 1917, were the first to ex- 
perience it. Some were sprinkled and some deluged 
with a new type of German shell chemical which, in 
many cases, evaded the British gas discipline, and 
mustard gas, unrecognised, caused many serious cas- 
66 Intensive Chemical Warfare 
ualities. Even those who wore the mask were at- 
tacked by the vesicant or blistering influence of the 
gas. The matter is vividly expressed in a letter, 
given below, which I received from an officer 
wounded in the Nieuport attack: 
“I was gassed by dichlor-diethyl sulphide, com- 
monly known as mustard stuff, on July 22nd. I was 
digging in (Livens Projectors), to fire on Lom- 
bartzyde. Going up we met a terrible strafe of H.E. 
and gas shells in Nieuport. When things quietened 
a little I went up with the three G.S. wagons, all 
that were left, and the carrying parties. I must say 
that the gas was clearly visible and had exactly the 
same smell as horseradish. It had no immediate' 
effect on the eyes or throat. I suspected a delayed 
action and my party all put their masks on. 
“On arriving at the emplacement we met a very 
thick cloud of the same stuff drifting from the front 
line system. As it seemed to have no effect on the 
eyes I gave orders for all to put on their mouthpiees 
and noseclips so as to breathe none of the stuff, and 
we carried on. 
“Coming back we met another terrific gas shell 
attack on Nieuport. Next morning, myself, and all 
the eighty men we had up there were absolutely blind. 
The horrid stuff had a delayed action on the eyes, 
causing temporary blindness about seven hours after- 
wards. About 3000 were affected. One or two of 
our party never recovered their sight and died. The 
casualty clearing stations were crowded. On August 
3rd, with my eyes still very bloodshot and weak and 
wearing blue glasses, I came home, and went into 
Millbank Hospital on August 15th.” 
These early mustard gas attacks caused serious 
gaps amongst the troops assembling for the Northern 
offensives. The gas was distinctly a new departure. 
67 The Riddle of the Rhine 
Effective in low concentrations, with very little odour, 
and no immediate sign of discomfort or danger, very 
persistent, remaining on the ground for days, it 
caused huge casualties. Fortunately, its most fatal 
effects could be prevented by wearing a respirator, 
and only a very small proportion of mustard gas 
casualties were fatal. 
The insidious nature of the gas and the way in 
which it evaded the gas discipline is shown in the 
following example from an official report: “A bat- 
tery was bombarded by the new gas shell from 
io p.m. to 12 midnight and from 1.30 to 3.30 on 
the night of 23rd-24th July. The shelling then 
ceased and at 6 a.m., when the battery had to carry 
out a shoot, the Battery Commander considered the 
air free from gas, and Box Respirators were accord- 
ingly removed. Shortly afterwards several men 
went sick from gas poisoning, including the Battery 
Commander. On previous nights they had been 
fired at with gas shell in the same way, but found it 
safe to remove Box Respirators after a couple of 
hours. On the occasion in question the air was very 
still and damp.” In another case an officer in the 
Boesinghe sector, during the gas bombardment on 
the night of the 22-23 July, adjusted the mouthpiece 
and nose-clip, but left the eyes uncovered. His eyes 
were seriously affected, but he had no lung symp- 
toms on the morning of the 24th. 
Mustard gas (or Yellow Cross, as it was called 
officially by the Germans) was the war gas par 
excellence for the purpose of causing casualties. In- 
deed, it produced nearly eight times more Allied 
casualties than all the various other kinds of German 
gas. It was used for preparation a considerable 
time before the attack, or during the attack, on local- 
68 Intensive Chemical Warfare 
ities and objects with which the attackers would have 
no contact. 
Blue Cross.—Another new type, the German Blue 
Cross, was introduced about the same time. This 
represented at different times diphenylchlorarsine, 
diphenylcyanarsine and other arsenic compounds. 
The Blue Cross compound was contained in a shell 
with high explosive. The enemy expected that the 
shell burst would create such a fine diffusion of the 
compound that it would penetrate our respirator 
mechanically, and then exercise its effects. These, 
violent irritation of the nose and throat, nausea and 
intense pain, would cause the removal of the respi- 
rator and allow other lethal gases to have full play. 
Fortunately, the German hopes of penetration were 
not realised, but they were, no doubt, continuing to 
develop the vast possibilities of the new method. 
German Emphasis on Gas Shell.—The Green 
Cross or lethal filling was another type of German 
gas shell. Green Cross covered such compounds as 
phosgene and chlor-methyl chloroformate. Al- 
though these caused fewer casualties than mustard 
gas, they were relatively more fatal. Schwarte’s 
book tells us that, “After the introduction of the 
Green Cross shell in the summer of 1916, at Verdun 
over 100,000 gas shell were used to a single bom- 
bardment.” 
From the time of the first use of mustard gas 
until the terrific gas shell attack of March, 1918, 
the Germans persistently used their new types against 
us with considerable effect. Even when the period 
of surprise effect with mustard gas was over, the 
number of casualties caused by it was considerably 
greater than during the months when the Germans 
were firing only non-persistent lethal shell of the 
Green Cross type. The Germans regarded these 
69 The Riddle of the Rhine 
shell gas developments as largely responsible for 
our failure to break through in the Autumn of 1917. 
The German Projector.—During this period they 
also developed a projector. Their first use of it was 
again co-ordinated with an attempt at surprise. For- 
tunately, protection and gas discipline had reached 
such an efficient state that normal “alert55 conditions 
of the front line system were largely able to counter 
the use of this new device by Germany. The first 
attack was against the French at Rechicourt on the 
night of December 5th-6th. 
On the night of December ioth-nth, 1917, they 
fired several hundred projectiles on the Cambrai and 
Givenchy sectors of the British line. In both cases 
the gas bombs were fired almost simultaneously into 
a small area including our front and support lines. 
The bombs appeared to have been fired from the 
enemy support line, as observers state that they saw 
a sheet of flame run along this line, followed by a 
loud explosion. The bombs, which emitted a trail 
of sparks, were seen in the air in large numbers and 
made a loud whirring noise. They burst with a large 
detonation, producing a thick, white cloud. The dis- 
charge was followed immediately by a bombardment 
with H.E. shrapnel and gas shell, and a raid was 
attempted south of Givenchy. We learn that so 
strong was the gas discipline that in many cases res- 
pirators were adjusted before the arrival of the 
bombs, the resemblance to our projector attacks hav- 
ing been established at once. When this was done 
practically no casualties occurred. Again, to show 
the efficiency of British protection against projector 
gas, we learn from official reports that, “At one 
point five bombs burst in a trench without harming 
the occupants. It should be remembered that the 
British box respirator protects against very high con- 
70 Intensive Chemical Warfare 
centrations of gas which pass at once through the 
German mask.” Similar discharges were made 
against the French on two occasions in December, 
and against the Lens sector on December 30th. The 
compounds used in the bombs were phosgene and a 
mixture of phosgene and chlorpicrin. These attacks 
increased in number during the ensuing months. 
German Projector Improvements.—The Ger- 
mans developed a longer range modification and 
would undoubtedly have exploited this weapon very 
considerably but for the trend of the campaign. The 
Allied advance in 1918 uncovered a number of enemy 
dumps. Amongst the most interesting was one 
which contained a number of a new type of pro- 
jector. 
A prisoner of the 37th pioneer gas battalion, cap- 
tured on August 26th, had said that they were to 
practise with a new type of projector with a range 
of 3 kilometres, the increased range being obtained 
by rifling the bore of the projector. He stated that 
the intention was to use the longer range weapons 
in conjunction with the old short range projector, 
using the new type to deal with the reserve positions. 
The capture of the dumps referred to above revealed 
the truth of his statement. Two kinds of bombs 
were used, one containing H.E. and the other small 
pumice granules impregnated with phosgene. This 
was an ingenious attempt to produce a persistent but 
highly lethal gas by physical means, for hitherto the 
highly lethal gases had only been slightly persistent. 
The new projector had a calibre of 158 mm. and 
was termed the “Gaswerfer, 1918.” The impor- 
tance of this new projector cannot be overestimated. 
Its large scale use would, undoubtedly, have resulted 
in imposing stringent gas alert conditions at greater 
distances from the front line. 
71 The Riddle of the Rhine 
Dyes in Gas Shell.—Another interesting German 
development of this period was the use of certain 
dyes or stains in gas shell. After gas bombardments 
in the winter of 1916-17, the snow was seen to be 
covered with coloured patches. These coincided 
with the bursts of the shell. Analysis of the earth 
showed that the colour was due to the presence of 
an actual dyestuff. A number of explanations were 
advanced to account for the use of the colour, of 
which the most probable claimed its employment for 
the identification of affected localities several hours 
or even days after the bombardment. This was 
especially the case with persistent types. As the ex- 
plosive charge of chemical shell was feeble, some 
such means of identification was necessary. It may 
be that the Germans expected that troops advancing 
after such bombardments would be helped by the 
splashes of colour, and that these earlier attempts 
were purely experimental. 
German Flame Projectors.—We have already re- 
ferred to the use of flame projectors by the enemy, 
and a picturesque account of their development and 
use in the later stages of the campaign is found in 
an extract from the Hamburger Nachrichten of the 
9th of June, 1918: 
Their Origin.—“Our Flammenwerfer troops owe 
their origin to a mere incident. Their present com- 
mander, Major R., when an officer of the Reserve, 
received the order, during peace manoeuvres, to hold 
a certain fort at all costs. During the sham fight, 
having employed all means at his disposal, he finally 
alarmed the fire brigade unit, which was under his 
orders as commander of the fort, and directed the 
water jets on the attacking force. Afterwards, dur- 
ing the criticism of operations in the presence of the 
Kaiser, he claimed that he had subjected the attackers 
72 Intensive Chemical Warfare 
to streams of burning oil. The Kaiser thereupon 
inquired whether such a thing would be possible, 
and he received an answer in the affirmative. 
“Long series of experiments were necessary before 
Engineer L. succeeded in producing a combination 
of various oils, which mixture is projected as a flame 
on the enemy by means of present day Flammen- 
werfer. 
“Major R. occupied himself in peace time with 
fighting fire as commander of the Munich Fire 
Brigade. The ‘Prince of Blades,’ as he is called by 
his ‘fire spouters,’ enjoys great popularity among his 
men as well as among the troops to whose assistance 
he may be called. He can look back on an important 
development of his units. Whereas in January, 
1915, Flammenwerfer troops consisted of a group 
of 36 men, to-day they constitute a formation with 
special assault and bombing detachments, and are 
furnished with all requisites for independent action. 
In reading Army Communiques, we often find men- 
tion of these troops. If difficulty is experienced in 
clearing up an English or French Infantry nest, the 
‘Prince of Hades’ appears with his hosts and smokes 
the enemy out. That conditions of membership of 
this unit hardly constitute a life insurance policy 
is obvious; nor is every man suitable. Special men 
who are physically adapted and who have given 
proof of keenness in assault are necessary for such 
work.” 
Further Flame Development.—Specimens of a 
very neat portable German Flammenwerfer were 
captured in August, 1917. It contained three essen- 
tial parts: a ring-shaped oil container surrounding 
a spherical vessel containing compressed nitrogen, 
which was used to expel the oil, and a flexible tube 
of rubber and canvas carrying the jet. The whole 
73 The Riddle of the Rhine 
was arranged to be carried on the back. At about 
this time prisoners stated that men were transferred 
to the Flammenwerfer companies as a form of 
punishment. 
The Germans were fond of using the Flammen- 
werfer during counter-attacks and raids in which the 
morale factor is so important. Thus in September, 
1918, in a raid against the British during our great 
offensive, the German raiding party was heralded by 
a shower of stick bombs and the Flammenwerfer 
men followed. The bombing party advanced under 
cover of these men, the smoke from the flame throw- 
ers acting as a screen. British experience was that 
the calm use of machine-gun fire soon put German 
flame throwers out of action, and it is clear that the 
Germans themselves realised this weakness of iso- 
lated flame attacks for, in one of their documents 
issued by German G.H.Q. in April, 1918, they said: 
“Flammenwerfer have been usefully employed in 
combats against villages. They must be engaged in 
great numbers and must fight in close liaison with 
the infantry, which helps them with the fire of its 
machine-guns and its grenades.” 
The 1918 Offensive.—Some idea of the impor- 
tance of these developments and of the scale on 
which they were exploited in the later campaigns of 
the war can be obtained by briefly examining the 
German plans for the use of gas in their 1918 of- 
fensive, and their execution: Die Technik im fVelt- 
kriege tells us: “During the big German attacks in 
1918, gas was used against artillery and infantry in 
quantities which had never been seen before, and 
even in open warfare the troops were soon asking 
for gas.” 
The Yellow and Blue Cross shells first introduced 
into operation in July, 1917, were not incorporated 
74 Intensive Chemical Warfare 
into comprehensive offensives until March, 1918. 
Owing to the exigencies of the campaign, the initial 
surprise value of these gases was subordinated to 
the later large scale use in the great offensive. In 
December, 1917, the German Army was instructed 
anew regarding the use of the new gas shell types for 
different military purposes, laying great stress on the 
use of non-persistent gas for the attack. Fortunately 
for us, the gas shells destined for this purpose were 
not relatively so efficient as the German persistent 
types, which were devoted to the more remote prep- 
aration for attack and to defensive purposes. Their 
penetrating Blue Cross types were a comparative 
failure. Although plans emphasised the importance 
of this gas for the attack, facts later gave greater 
prominence to the use of the persistent Yellow Cross 
shell for defensive purposes in the great German 
retreat. 
Ludendorff’s Testimony.—Ludendorff, himself, 
emphasised the great importance which was attached 
to gas in this offensive. He says1: “And yet our 
artillery relied on gas for its effect, and that was de- 
pendent on the direction and strength of the wind. 
I had to rely on the forecast submitted to me at 
II a.m. by my meteorologist, Lieutenant Dr. 
Schmaus. Up till the morning of the 20th strength 
and direction were by no means very favourable; 
indeed, it seemed almost necessary to put off the 
attack. It would have been very hard to do. So I 
was very anxious to see what sort of report I should 
get. It was not strikingly favourable, but it did 
indicate that the attack was possible. At 12 noon 
the Army Groups were told that the programme 
would be carried out. Now it could no longer be 
stopped. Everything must run its course. G.H.Q. 
1 My War Memories. Hutchinson & Co., 1919. 
75 The Riddle of the Rhine 
higher commanders and troops had all done their 
duty. The rest was in the hands of fate, unfavour- 
able wind diminished the effectiveness of the gas, 
fog retarded our movements and prevented our su- 
perior training and leadership from reaping its full 
reward.” 
Preparations for Assault;—Gas Defensive at 
Armentieres.—For twelve days prior to their 
March assault the Germans used mustard gas over 
certain areas, and the non-persistent types for other 
localities. As an example of the first method, we 
can state that nearly 200,000 rounds of Yellow Cross 
shell were used on the 9th March, and caused us 
heavy casualties. The actual attack at once con- 
firmed our suspicions of enemy intention to break 
through on the territories which were not infected 
by the persistent mustard gas. In the second case, 
of the non-persistent types of Blue and Green Cross, 
bombardments of tremendous intensity occurred for 
several hours before the assault, on all defensive 
positions and organisations for several miles behind 
the front line. Millions of rounds must have been 
used. Although not without serious effect on the 
campaign, this furious gas attack did not fully justify 
expectations. The failure of mask penetration by 
the Blue Cross shell prevented the full possibilities 
of Green Cross coming into play. To illustrate the 
specific use of gas in this great offensive, and the 
organic way in which it was co-ordinated in the plan 
of attack, we quote from a recent statement by Gen- 
eral Hartley.1 Referring to the gas shelling imme- 
diately before the extension of the attack to the 
north of Lens on 9th April, he explains, “Between 
the 7th April and 9th April there was no gas shelling 
between the La Bassee Canal and Armentieres, 
76 
1 Journal of the Royal Artillery, February, 1920. Intensive Chemical Warfare 
while there was heavy Yellow Cross shelling imme- 
diately south of the Canal, and Armentieres had such 
a heavy bombardment that the gutters were running 
with mustard gas. This indicated the probability 
of an attack on the front held by the Portuguese, 
which occurred on 9th April, Blue and Green Cross 
being used in the preliminary bombardment.” The 
Portuguese front lay between the two Yellow Cross 
regions. 
Fixed Gas Barrage at Kemmel.—Another most 
interesting example is also quoted, dealing with the 
shelling preceding the attack on Kemmel on 25th 
April. “This is an interesting case, as non-persistent 
Blue Cross shell were used within the objective and 
Yellow Cross just behind it, indicating that on 25th 
April the enemy did not intend to go beyond the 
line they gained.” 
Percentage of Chemical Shell.—Some idea of the 
importance which the Germans attached to their 
chemical ammunition, as distinct from explosives, 
can be gathered from the following extract from a 
captured order of the Seventh German Army, dated 
May 8th, 1918, giving the proportion of chemical 
shell to be used in the artillery preparation for the 
attack on the Aisne on 27th May, 1918. 
“(<?) Counter-battery and long range bombard- 
ments. 
For 7.7 c/m field guns, 10.5 c/m and 15 c/m 
howitzers and 10 c/m guns; Blue Cross 70%, 
Green Cross, 10%; H.E. 20%, long 15, 
c/m guns fire only H.E. 
(b) Bombardment of infantry positions. 
(i) Creeping Barrage. 
For 7.7 c/m field guns, 10.5 c/m and 15 
c/m howitzers; Blue Cross 30%, Green 
77 The Riddle of the Rhine 
Cross 10%, H.E. 60%, 21 c/m howitzers 
fire only H.E. 
:(ii) Box Barrage. 
For 7.7 c/m field guns, 10.5 c/m howitzers 
and 10 c/m guns; Blue Cross 60%, Green 
Cross 10%, H.E. 30%.” 
What more striking demonstration is needed than 
these extraordinarily high percentages? 
Gas Retreat Tactics;—General Hartley’s Analy- 
sis.—No Yellow Cross shell were to be used in the 
bombardment, but, as mentioned above, there was 
a complete change of tactics in their retreat, during 
which they attempted to create a series of barriers 
by literally flooding areas with mustard gas. 
This defensive use of mustard gas was most impor- 
tant. Again, quoting General Hartley, “Yellow 
Cross shell were used much farther forward than 
previously, bombardments of the front line system 
and of forward posts were frequent, and possible 
assembly positions were also shelled with this gas. 
On more than one occasion when an attack was ex- 
pected the enemy attempted to create an impassable 
zone in front of our forward positions by means of 
mustard gas. Their gas bombardments usually oc- 
curred on fronts where they had reason to fear an 
attack, with the idea of inflicting casualties in areas 
where troops might be massing. It was instructive 
to note how supplies of Yellow Cross shell were 
switched from the Third to the First Army front late 
in August when they became nervous about the latter 
sector. In Yellow Cross they had an extremely fine 
defensive weapon, which they did not use to the best 
advantage, for instance, they neglected its use on 
roads and did not hamper our communications nearly 
as much as they might have done. As our offensive. 
78 Intensive Chemical Warfare 
progressed their gas shelling became less organised, 
and one saw very clearly the superior value of a 
big gas bombardment as compared with a number 
of small ones. In the latter case it was usually 
possible to evacuate the contaminated ground and 
take up alternative positions, while in the case of a 
bombardment of a large area such as the Cambria 
salient, the difficulty of doing so was greatly in- 
creased, and consequently casualties were higher. 
During our offensive it was not possible to exercise 
the same precautions against gas as during stationary 
warfare, and the casualties were increased on this 
account.” 
Percentage of German Gas Shell in Enemy 
Dumps.—A test of the importance attached by any 
army to the different types of ammunition which it 
uses can be made by examining the percentage of 
such types of shell in a number of ammunition dumps 
assembled behind the front line for some specific 
operation, or part of a campaign. An examination 
of German production from this point of view is very 
interesting, and also brings out a significant point. 
The normal establishment of a German divisional 
ammunition dump in July, 1918, contained about 
50 per cent, of gas shell. The dumps captured later 
in the year contained from 30 per cent, to 40 per 
cent. These figures are significant, for they show 
how much importance the German Army attached to 
gas shell. When we think of the millions of shell 
and of the huge quantities of explosives turned out 
by our own factories to fill them, and when we realise 
that for a large number of gun calibres the Germans 
used as many shell filled with gas as with explosive, 
some idea of the importance of gas in the recent war 
and of its future possibilities can be obtained. 
Further, when we realise that the production of ex- 
79 The Riddle of the Rhine 
plosives can be controlled and inspected during peace, 
but that no such control can exist for chemical war- 
fare products, the significance for the future stands 
revealed. 
Forced Exhaustion of Stocks.—It might be 
thought that the lower percentages found later on in 
the year were an indication of the decreasing impor- 
tance of chemical shell. Examining the case less 
superficially, however, we soon see that this lower 
percentage has an entirely different meaning. In the 
first place, we know that the German factories were 
still pressing on to their maximum output at the 
time of the Armistice. New units were being 
brought into operation. Secondly, we have seen how 
huge quantities of mustard gas were diverted to those 
particular German armies which were most threat- 
ened by the final Allied offensive, indicating that 
certain portions of the German front were being 
starved for chemical shell. The truth of the matter 
is that the Germans had accumulated enormous 
stocks for their great offensive and that they had 
expended these stocks at a greater rate than their 
factories could replace them. We learn from 
Schwarte’s book that, “Although the production of 
Yellow Cross almost reached 1000 tons a month, 
yet finally the possibilities of use and the amount 
required were so great that only a much increased 
monthly output would have been sufficient.” 
Yperite, French Mustard Gas.—During this 
period the volume of allied gas activities also in- 
creased considerably. But until June, 1918, our suc- 
cess was due to the development of more successful 
tactical methods rather than to any specific chemical 
surprise. 
Very great credit is due to the French for having 
80 Intensive Chemical Warfare 
produced large quantities of mustard gas by the 
above date. 
Judging from the German Intelligence Reports 
the surprise effect of the French production was 
almost as great as that obtained by the earlier Ger- 
man use. It again evaded the gas discipline of the 
troops, and we find the German staff laying enormous 
emphasis on this question, which was already very 
prominent in their general and operation orders. 
The occasion provided a very striking example of 
German belief in their absolute predominance in 
production. They were largely justified in this be- 
lief, but it carried them too far. They explained 
the use of mustard gas by the French as due to the 
use of German mustard gas obtained from “blind” 
German shell! 
Effect on German Gas Discipline.—British mus- 
tard gas was not in use in the field until September, 
1918, but the French was a great success, and probably 
contributed to no small extent to the final allied suc- 
cess in the 1918 campaign. The French termed 
mustard gas “Yperite” after Ypres, the place where 
it was first used. As far as such terms can be ap- 
plied to any weapon, Yperite arrived to spread panic 
and terror amongst the German formations. A 
document captured by the Sixth French Army shows 
that Yperite used on the 13th June against the nth 
Bavarian Division was the chief cause of the precipi- 
tate retreat of this Division. The Seventh German 
Army refers to another bombardment on the 9th 
of June, in which the casualties exceeded five hun- 
dred. 
It is curious to note that although the Germans 
had so preached the superiority of their gases and 
gas methods, serious blows by the Allies found the 
German gas discipline unequal to them. It is no 
81 ,The Riddle of the Rhine 
exaggeration to say that the use of mustard gas by 
the French, and later by the British, and the British 
projector, produced, on each occasion, in the 
German ranks feelings allied to panic. This is re- 
flected in the many orders which have been captured 
from army and other headquarters enforcing and 
even appealing for gas discipline amongst the 
troops. Thus, almost immediately after the first 
French use, Ludendorff, chief of the German General 
Staff, issued a special detailed order on the subject, 
and the German document captured by the French 
can be taken as representative. “Our Yellow Cross 
has caused much damage to the enemy, formerly less 
protected than now. But as a natural sequence he 
had developed through it a gas discipline which can 
certainly be taken as model. On this account enemy 
troops have been able to cross, at once and without 
loss, areas which their artillery had just bombarded 
with gas. We also must train our troops to an ex- 
cellent standard of gas discipline if we expect to 
avoid the grave dangers which threaten the fighting 
forces of our army.” By the time of the Armistice 
France had produced nearly 2000 tons of mustard 
gas, British and American production was rapidly 
increasing, so that the output was attaining stupend- 
ous proportions. Some idea of the importance of 
chemical warfare in the campaigns of 1917-1918 can 
be obtained from the following figures: 
Allied Gas Statistics.—Between November, 
1917, and November, 1918, France produced more 
than five millions of her latest type of respirator. 
The British figure was probably higher. From April 
to November, 1918, the French filled nearly two and 
a half million shell with mustard gas. From the 
1st of July, 1915, to the latter date more than seven- 
teen million gas shell were completed by the French. 
82 Intensive Chemical Warfare 
In addition to these huge gas shell figures we must 
remember the chemical operations from projectors 
and as cloud gas. During the period the British 
averaged fifty large scale operations of this type 
per month, sometimes discharging monthly three 
hundred tons of gas. The total French production 
of chlorine and poison gas for chemical warfare 
approached 50,000 tons, a large proportion of which 
production occurred during 1917 and 1918. The 
British was of the same order, but German produc- 
tion was at least more than twice as high, showing 
what great use they made of gas shell. The huge 
American programme might have reduced the mar- 
gin, but no limits can be placed on German possibil- 
ities and elasticity in production. 
Critical Importance of Rapid German Produc- 
tion.—These figures are misleading inasmuch as they 
give no indication whatever of the relative difficulties 
and corresponding rapidity of action on both sides. 
As a general rule, where the German lag between the 
approval of a substance and its use in the field cov- 
ered weeks, our lag covered months. Owing to effi- 
cient production, chemical warfare was an infinitely 
more flexible weapon in German hands than in ours. 
This will be readily understood when we analyse, 
later, the methods of production of some of the chief 
German war gases. In general, German develop- 
ment of these complicated substances provided a 
series of examples of the ease and rapidity of produc- 
tion of organic substances by the dye industry. On 
the other hand, except in very few exceptional cases, 
British and French production, although we cast no 
reflection on the energy or skill of any concerned, was 
exceedingly slow and costly by comparison. The 
Germans used mustard gas in July, 1917. We identi- 
fied it a few days afterwards. But the first fruits of 
83 The Riddle of the Rhine 
allied production were not in the field for eleven 
months. British material was not used until a month 
or two before the Armistice. Further, in this case, 
we were convinced of the value of the substance 
almost from the first day of its use by the enemy. We 
will endeavor to throw light upon this in our review 
of production. 
The period of intensive chemical warfare may be 
regarded as the proof of the German experiment of 
1915-1916. Shed of their trial nature, the chemical 
weapons played a logical and increasingly dominating 
part in the campaign. They were surely destined to 
play a much more prominent part had the period of 
stabilised warfare continued. Projector cloud gas 
would have assumed greater importance as a casualty 
producer. But we will leave such considerations for 
a future chapter. 
84 CHAPTER V 
CHEMICAL WARFARE ORGANISATIONS 
We have no desire nor intention to give a detailed 
historical account of the above. The ramifications 
of Allied organisations were so numerous, the number 
of persons concerned so great, the sacrifices made so 
heavy, that only an exceedingly lengthy account could 
hope to do justice to individuals. In addition, such an 
account would not serve our purpose. We wish to 
show, as briefly as possible, how the different Allied 
organisations were bound up in an organic way with 
the campaign, how they compared with those of the 
enemy, and what lesson the comparison may contain 
for the future. 
Two facts stand out in such a comparison. We are 
struck with the extreme simplicity of the German 
organisations, as we know them, and the great com- 
plexity and multiplicity of the Allied departments as 
we saw them. We must admit from the beginning 
that we know least of the German home organisations 
for research and production, but our knowledge is 
sufficient to reveal their simplicity. The Inter-Allied 
Commission of Control may, and certainly should, 
obtain full information, but at present the matter 
stands as follows. 
German Research.—The Germans relied upon 
two main and very strong centres for research. They 
have already been indicated as the Kaiser Wilhelm 
Institute, under the direction of Professor Haber, 
85 fThe Riddle of the Rhine 
and the enormous research organisations of the I.G. 
There are various references to internal gas organisa- 
tion in captured documents. It appears that they 
received their final form late in 1917. A great gas 
school (Heeres-Gaschule) was instituted in Berlin 
where there were also central depots for anti-gas 
inspection and material. Rather earlier than this the 
Kaiser Wilhelm Institute was definitely appointed as 
the official research centre. The War Ministry had 
a chemical section named A. 10, which dealt with gas 
questions. It is rumoured, and there is strong reason 
to believe, that the I.G. was largely staffed by officers 
of the Reserve before the war. Whatever their pre-war 
associations, if any, with the War Ministry, hostilities 
must have found them keenly alive to the possibilities 
of their unique research and organic chemical pro- 
ducing facilities. It is inconceivable that this military 
personnel should not have greatly assisted the I.G. in 
its operations, inventions and general assistance for 
the army. 
It appears that the subdivision of work left the 
direction of chemical research in Berlin, possibly at 
the above Institute, while the bulk of the work of 
preparing the new compounds, and developing manu- 
facturing processes for approved substances, occurred 
in the laboratories of the I. G. 
Leverkusen.—We know, for example, that a very 
large number of substances was produced at Lever- 
kusen and samples forwarded to Berlin, of wrhich only 
a few were finally approved for production. The 
physiological work and field tests were certainly as- 
sociated with the Berlin organisation, but it is not 
clear how much of this work occurred within the I.G. 
An allied mission to Leverkusen reported as fol- 
lows:—“It was emphatically stated that no means of 
testing the products were resorted to beyond inhala- 
86 Chemical Warfare Organizations 
tion and testing the effect of the substances on the 
•staff, but this statement must be accepted with re- 
serve.” This is particularly so as we know that large 
numbers of respirator-drums had been made in this 
factory, and that a gas school existed at Leverkusen 
in 1915. 
A member of another Allied mission was informed 
by one of the staff at Leverkusen that the authorities 
there were well aware of the difficulties in chemical 
warfare, apart from production, for they had some 
experience in the designing and testing of chemical 
shell. It may be that the German Government relied 
upon the I.G. for such work in the early stages of the 
chemical war, pending the development of official or- 
ganisation. When we remember, however, that at 
Leverkusen alone there was a staff of 1500 technical 
and commercial specialists, apart from thousands of 
workpeople, before the war, and that the latter were 
increased by 1500 during the war, we find it difficult 
to place a limit on the services which might have been 
rendered by this research centre alone. The opinion 
of the members of the Hartley Commission1 was, that 
much thought and attention had been given to chem- 
ical warfare by the chemists of the Company. 
Hochst.—A great volume of chemical warfare 
research occurred also at Hochst. “The admission 
was made that the research department of the factory 
was continuously employed during the war on the 
preparation of substances suitable for chemical war- 
fare, many hundreds being prepared and sent to 
Berlin for examination. The firm employed 300 
academically trained chemists in peace time, but dur- 
ing the war many more were engaged, partly for 
'A post-armistice inter-allied mission of experts, to the Rhine 
chemical factories, March, 1919. 
87 .The Riddle of the Rhine 
research and partly because all shell filling was car- 
ried out under the supervision of trained chemists.” 
Ludwigshafen.—The most influential branch of 
the I.G. was, undoubtedly, the Badische Anilin und 
Soda Fabrik. It might have been expected, as they 
shared largely in production, that a considerable 
amount of chemical warfare research would occur at 
these works, but this was emphatically denied to 
Allied missions. It may be, however, that as the 
nitrogen fixation enterprise was developed there, re- 
quiring a large amount of technical development and 
control, this was considered a sufficient contribution 
to the general cause. 
Early Formulation of Policy.—In examining 
what signs we have of the organisation and policy 
underlying chemical warfare research and production 
in Germany, we are struck by the fact that all the 
substances used with such dire effect against us during 
the war must have been approved for production by 
the Government at a relatively early date. The fol- 
lowing table, assembled from information supplied 
by the German factories, brings this point out very 
clearly. 
War Chemical. 
Factory. 
Production Began. 
First use 
in the Field. 
Diphosgene 
Hochst 
Sept., 1916 
Summer, 1915 
(Green Cross) 
Leverkusen 
June, 1915 
Mustard Gas 
(Yellow Cross) 
Leverkusen 
Spring, 1917 
July, 1917 
Diphenyl- 
chlorarsine 
(Blue Cross) 
Hochst 
May, 1917 
July, 1917 
Diphenyl- 
cyanarsine 
(Blue Cross) 
A.G.F.A.? 
Feb., 1918 
June, 1918 
Ethyl-dichlor- 
arsine 
(Blue Cross) 
Hochst 
Aug., 1917 
March, 1918 
88 Chemical Warfare Organizations 
We have chosen the later products to establish the 
point, for it is self-evident for the earlier products, 
some of which were made before the war. 
Movements of Personnel.—The movements of 
German chemical personnel give us a clue as to the 
main tendencies in their chemical warfare policy. 
The factories were called upon to produce, as we 
have already shown, towards the end of 1914, but 
this production largely involved the use of substances 
already manufactured on a certain scale. Large scale 
production of the more advanced types of war chem- 
ical seems to have been directly stimulated by the 
Hindenburg programme, in connection with which the 
Companies withdrew large numbers of their skilled 
workers from the front. 
German Simplicity of Organisation.—We can 
safely conclude from the above that Germany re- 
quired no cumbersome government mechanism for the 
preparation of new war chemicals, for the semi- 
industrial work in developing processes for approved 
substances, nor for their production. By relying on 
the I.G., the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, and probably 
some other organisation for field and physiological 
tests, Germany escaped the necessity for comprehen- 
sive government organisation, the development of 
which was such a handicap to Allied countries. It is 
certainly very suggestive that we only met, in the field, 
substances approved before the summer of 1917. It 
is with great interest and a certain amount of appre- 
hension that we speculate upon the research develop- 
ments after that period with which the war did not 
make us immediately acquainted. If this early period 
produced such effective results as mustard gas, Blue 
Cross compounds, and the different cloud substances, 
what hidden surprises were matured in the later 
period? This feature of simplicity, of linking up a 
89 The Riddle of the Rhine 
new war with an old peace, activity was paralleled 
somewhat in the field organisation. We have seen 
how Germany created special formations for cloud 
attacks, but for a time practically abandoned them, 
throwing most of her chemical warfare production 
into shell. In other words, she substituted a normal 
weapon, the artillery. We, on the other hand, largely 
impelled by the enforced simplicity of our production, 
tended more towards the development of special 
formations and special weapons for cloud production, 
but with such success that the German Pioneer forma- 
tions, after being practically dropped, found a use in 
developing and using our new weapon, the Livens 
projector. 
German Organisation at the Front;—The Gas 
Regiment.—It is probable that the earliest form of 
German organisation at the front consisted in the 
liaison between Professor Haber and the German 
G.H.Q. It will be remembered that Ludendorff, dis- 
cussing cloud and shell gas, refers to this co-operation, 
stating:1 “Geheimrat Haber proved of valuable 
service in this connection with the use of gas.” It 
was also rumoured soon after the first German attack 
that the organisation and preparation of the latter 
were under the scientific guidance of this renowned 
Professor. The attack was carried out by the 35th 
and 36th Pioneer Regiments, each furnished with 
chemically trained officers who were specially detailed 
for gas warfare. 
The importance of protection was realised very 
early, and a gas school for officers of all armies was 
organised at Leverkusen for training in protection. 
We cannot but regard it as significant that Lever- 
kusen is also the site of the enormous Bayer2 organic 
xMy War Memories, page 338. 
2 A branch of the great German dye combine, the Interessen 
Gemeinschaft, known as the I.G. 
90 Chemical Warfare Organizations 
chemical works which played such a large part in 
poison gas production. The school dealt mainly with 
protection. 
Early German Gas School.—Apparently, at the 
end of November, 1916, special gas staffs were 
created and attached provisionally to the head- 
quarters of formations entrusted with large scale gas 
operations. In addition, these staffs had the normal 
routine function of supervising inspection and instruc- 
tion in gas warfare at the front. At about this time 
each regiment or larger unit was given a gas officer 
(gasschutzoffizier) with similar duties to those out- 
lined above. In other words, the arrangement was 
generalised throughout the army. This officer was 
assisted by non-commissioned officers and men spe- 
cially chosen for the purpose in the smaller units. 
The great need for these staffs is brought out in Ger- 
man official documents. 
New Gas Regiments;—Gas Shell Experts.—In 
1917 two new Pioneer battalions, the 37th and 38th 
respectively, were created for the express purpose of 
carrying out projector attacks. These developments 
in organisation, both advisory and combatant, led, at 
about this time, to the centralisation of the gas 
services at the front under a Kommandeur der Gas- 
truppen at G.H.Q. It would thus appear that the 
Germans achieved the centralisation of their gas 
services some months later than ourselves. Further 
developments in organisation, of which we are aware, 
were connected with two main tendencies in German 
gas warfare. In the first place, the vast employment 
of gas shell led the Germans to create special gas 
experts on the Divisional artillery staffs. We have 
this on the authority of an order by Ludendorff dated 
June 16th, 1918. This gas shell expert was not 
necessarily an imported specialist, but was usually a 
91 The Riddle of the Rhine 
specially trained officer chosen from the staff in ques- 
tion. This was a very important move, for it gave 
the artillery a paternal interest in gas shell. This 
artillery specialist maintained a very close liaison with 
the Divisional Gas Officer. 
Inspection of Protective Masks and Method.— 
The second tendency was towards stricter protective 
standards and inspection. The gas inspection centre 
at Berlin was given more responsibilities in the field 
and the protection of horses, dogs and carrier pigeons 
received great emphasis. 
British Field Organization;—“Breach” Organi- 
sations.—Our own field development followed very 
similar lines. The immediate need in April, 1915, 
was for organisations on the front to advise forma- 
tions on temporary methods of protection, to ascer- 
tain quickly the nature of any new German chemical 
attack, and to provide special means of examining the 
treatment of the new kind of casualty. These were 
“breach organisations,” so to speak, countering the 
immediate effects of enemy attacks while more com- 
prehensive and permanent cadres were created to 
absorb them. The personnel of these breach organ- 
isations was largely composed of chemists already at 
the front who had in some cases taken part in the first 
German attacks. Efforts were soon on foot to 
mobilise British chemists for offensive purposes. So 
remote from the old army standards and training 
were the conceptions of the new scientific warfare, 
that there was no scientific cadre or outstanding scien- 
tific soldier to take over the direction and organisation 
of these matters at the front or at home. Accord- 
ingly, in June, 1915, Brigadier-General C. H. 
Foulkes, C.M.G., D.S.O. (then Major, R.E.) was 
given the difficult task of assembling and training an 
offensive gas formation, and acting as Gas Adviser 
92 Chemical Warfare Organizations 
to G.H.Q. The Special Companies thus created have 
already been referred to in quotations from des- 
patches. In addition to this combatant personnel a 
number of specialists and advisory organisations came 
into being. Additional gas officers were appointed by 
various divisions, and chemical advisers by higher 
formations. 
Central Laboratory.—A central laboratory was 
instituted at G.H.Q. under the late Colonel W. 
Watson, C.M.G., F.R.S., which did particularly val- 
uable work in connection with the rapid identification 
of new enemy chemicals. With the development of 
gas shell, the chemical advisers included this subject 
in their province. Reference must also be made to the 
medical and physiological side. 
New Type of Casualty.—After the introduction of 
gas warfare the army was always faced with the possi- 
bility that some entirely new chemical would produce 
a new type of casualty which would require special 
and sometimes unusual treatment A new element 
was thus introduced into army medical work. The 
effects of a new gas used in large quantities on the 
front was often just as serious a threat to organisation 
as the sudden development of a strange epidemic. 
Reaction to meet these new conditions took the form 
of the development of medical research organisations 
at home, and of the appointment of a special medical 
and physiological advisory staff incorporated later in 
the Directorate of Gas Services. It was thus possible, 
after any enemy gas attack, and with little delay, to 
institute inquiries with regard to treatment of casual- 
ties, stimulate special investigations, and prepare for 
any reorganisation in personnel and equipment, and, 
in general, introduce satisfactory alert conditions 
throughout the medical organisation along the whole 
of the Allied front. In this connection the effective 
93 The Riddle of the Rhine 
liaison between the medical specialists of the British 
and French armies must be mentioned. 
Directorate of Gas Services.—These various 
services were centralised in the Directorate of Gas 
Services, in the Spring of 1916, under Major- 
General H. F. Thuillier, C.B., C.M.G., R.E. It is 
interesting to note that although in their rear organ- 
isations for research and supply the French preceded 
us in the adoption of a logical symmetrical arrange- 
ment, yet in the field we were the first to produce the 
centralised chemical warfare service which was so 
essential. 
British Home Organisations;—The Royal So- 
ciety.—After the battle of the Marne, Germany rap- 
idly realised the need for scientific and industrial 
mobilisation for the new stage into which the war had 
passed. Many signs and definite statements by Fal- 
kenhayn and others in authority have shown us how 
this realisation found outlet in various schemes for 
research and production. The need for scientific 
attention to various war problems was also realised 
in England, and found expression in the mobilisation 
of prominent scientists by the Royal Society, which 
constituted a number of committees to deal with 
specific activities and to assist various Ministries or 
administrative government departments in connection 
with scientific matters. 
Royal Society Chemical Sub-Committee.—The 
Chemical Sub-Committee included such prominent 
names as Lord Rayleigh, Sir William Ramsay and 
Sir Oliver Lodge. Retaliation, decided on early in 
May, 1915, was reflected in organisation. Lord 
Kitchener entrusted Colonel Jackson, C.M.G., R.E. 
(later Major-General Sir Louis Jackson, K.B.E., 
C.B., C.M.G., R.E.), then in charge of a fortification 
section of the War Office, with the task of examining 
94 Chemical Warfare Organizations 
and taking action on the possibilities of retaliation, 
and a liaison with the above chemical committee of 
the Royal Society was soon established. Protection 
became a part of the duties of the Medical Services 
and was placed under the direct control of Colonel, 
afterwards'Sir William Horrocks, who became chair- 
man of the specially appointed Anti-Gas Committee. 
Further, a little later, the Chemical Sub-Committee 
above referred to became an advisory body to Colonel 
Jackson. This was the origin of the Chemical War- 
fare Department, but it was destined to pass through 
many difficult and hampering transformations before 
reaching its final, more or less efficient and sym- 
metrical form. 
The Trench Warfare Department.—With the 
formation of the Ministry of Munitions late in May, 
1915, Colonel Jackson’s section was transferred to 
it. At this stage there was definite recognition of the 
absolute need of keeping chemical warfare research, 
design, and supply under one head. Probably this 
was the chief reason which prompted Lord Kitchener, 
then Secretary of State for War, to agree to the trans- 
ference of this section to another Ministry, and con- 
sent to the birth of the Trench Warfare Department. 
Scientific Advisory Committee;—Commercial 
Advisory Committee.—Even at this stage activities 
were growing and government organisation was 
found necessary to cover such functions as in Ger- 
many were rendered unnecessary by the existence of 
the I.G. It became clear that the new department 
would require strong permanent scientific advice, and 
this was found in the formation of the Scientific Ad- 
visory Committee. This included the most active 
members of the former relevant Royal Society Com- 
mittee, amongst whom were Professor A. W. Cross- 
ley, the Secretary, and Professors H. B. Baker, J. F. 
95 The Riddle of the Rhine 
Thorpe, and Sir George Beilby, all of whom rendered 
great services in the later development of this new 
branch of warfare. A parallel Commercial Advisory 
Committee was appointed, composed of representa- 
tives of some of the leading manufacturers of the 
country. 
Split Between Research and Supply.—We can- 
not follow in detail the many fluctuations experienced 
in the organisation of the department. They repre- 
sent a constant struggle between a definitely expressed 
policy of centralisation and symmetry for supply and 
research, and circumstances imposed upon the depart- 
ment by the reorganisation and fusion of Ministries 
and departments. There were brief periods, notably 
at the commencement, and in the final stages when the 
desired centralised organisation was approached, but 
there were also periods when there was a complete 
split between research and supply with feeble and 
unsatisfactory liaison between the two. Speaking 
generally, the break between research and supply 
occurred in December, 1915, when the Trench War- 
fare Department was split up into two parts. These 
were the Trench Warfare Research Department, in 
which was included the Scientific Advisory Commit- 
tee, and, shortly afterwards, changed its name to that 
of the Chemical Advisory Committee, and the Trench 
Warfare Supply Department. The relationships 
between those two departments remained practically 
unchanged until the formation of the Chemical War- 
fare Department in October, 1917. This statement 
must be qualified, however, by a reference to the 
services rendered by Professor, later Sir John Cad- 
man, K.C.M.G., in bringing about this liaison, not 
only with supply in England, but also with that in 
France. 
During the early period the Royal Society Com- 
96 Chemical Warfare Organizations 
mittee of Physiology became active and was later very 
closely co-ordinated with the Chemical Warfare De- 
partment, as the Chemical Warfare Medical Com- 
mittee. 
Munitions Inventions Department.—Another 
feature which is worthy of notice because it was com- 
mon to Allied organisations other than the British, 
and because it formed part of the slow realisation of 
the essential unity of chemical warfare activities, was 
the duplication of effort by the Munitions Inventions 
Department. Suggestions wThich could only have 
value when considered as part of the definitely di- 
rected chemical warfare policy were constantly raised 
with the Inventions Department, but this difficulty 
was overcome later by the growing importance of 
chemical warfare and the effecting of a liaison be- 
tween the two departments by Colonel Crossley. 
Imperial College of Science.—During the early 
period the Imperial College of Science rendered great 
services by assisting in research. It continued to do 
so during the rest of the war, but was later associated 
with a large number of British university chemical 
and scientific departments in pursuing a huge pro- 
gramme of chemical warfare research. We can only 
make passing reference to the development of the 
training and experimental grounds which formed such 
an important part in assisting decisions on chemical 
warfare policy. The Porton ground, however, was 
a model of its kind, a pioneer amongst Allied experi- 
mental grounds, and a tribute to the creative and ad- 
ministrative efforts of Lt.-Colonel Crossley, C.M.G., 
C.B.E., who was its commandant from its inception 
to the end of the war. 
The Chemical Warfare Department—The grow- 
ing importance of chemical warfare, the vigorous 
chemical initiative assumed by Germany in the sum- 
97 The Riddle of the Rhine 
mer of 1917, and various other reasons led to re- 
organisation of the Chemical Warfare services in this 
country in October, 1917, and the Chemical Warfare 
Department, under Major-General Thullier, for- 
merely Director of Gas Services, B.E.F., was consti- 
tuted. This reorganisation witnessed a great increase 
in research and other activities of the department and 
a still greater mobilisation of the chemists of the 
country. Although this change witnessed further cen- 
tralisation by the incorporation of the Anti-Gas 
Department, thereby settling once and for all the 
inherent association between offensive and defensive 
research, a fact which had been apparent to many long 
before, yet it still ignored the fundamental connection 
between offensive research and supply. This had 
been recognised in French organisation as early as 
1915, yet we did not reach the ideal solution even at 
the end of the war. 
The Anti-Gas Department.—We have men- 
tioned the origin of the Anti-Gas Department. Al- 
though separate in organisation from chemical 
warfare research, yet the remarkable work and per- 
sonality of the late Lt.-Colonel E. F. Harrison, 
C.M.G., overcame the disadvantages by energetic 
liaison and a great capacity for the internal organ- 
isation. General Hartley has paid a tribute which we 
cannot refrain from repeating: “Colonel Harrison 
was one of the great discoveries of the war. It is 
often stated that he was the inventor of the box 
respirator, but this he would have been the first to 
deny. His great merit was as an organiser. Fie 
gathered round him an enthusiastic group of young 
chemists and physicists, and the box respirator repre- 
sents the joint result of their researches, carried out 
under his inspiration and controlled by his admirable 
practicable judgment. He organised the manufacture 
98 Chemical Warfare Organizations 
of the respirator on a large scale, and it is a great 
testimony to his foresight and energy that in spite of 
all the difficulties of production, the supplies promised 
to France never failed. Fifty million respirators 
were produced by the department, and of these nine- 
teen million were box respirators.” 
Anti-Gas research was at first centred in the 
R.A.M. College, Millbank, and from the beginning 
of 1917 in the Physiological Institute, University 
College, London. The work done in research and 
production not only protected the whole of the British 
Army, but formed the backbone of American and a 
large part of Italian protection. Further, the sacri- 
fices made in connection with this work are not suf- 
ficiently known. Numbers of young scientists sacri- 
ficed their health and sometimes life, in carrying out 
the critical tests upon which the safety of millions of 
Englishmen and Allies depended. 
Designs Committee.—We cannot leave this 
branch of the subject without referring to the Chem- 
ical Warfare Designs Committee. An important 
trend in chemical warfare was its growing independ- 
ence of the normal weapons of war, and its special 
requirements when adapted for use with both the 
normal and newer types. This tendency found ex- 
pression in the above Committee under the direction 
of Professor Jocelyn Field Thorpe. The develop- 
ment of satisfactory chemical shell was an enormous 
problem, and the importance of entirely new forms 
of the chemical weapon will be brought out in dealing 
with the limitation of armaments. 
French Organisation.—French development fol- 
lowed very similar lines. 
From April 28th, 1915, a Commission of military 
representatives and scientists was organised under 
General Curmer. This gave place in June to a 
99 The Riddle of the Rhine 
Chemical Warfare Research Committee under M. 
Weiss, Directeur des Mines au Ministere des 
Traveaux Publics. In August, 1915, three special 
Committees were formed; one under M. Kling for 
problems from the front, whose organisation was 
responsible for a volume of exceedingly reliable iden- 
tifications of enemy chemicals of great use to the 
Allies; another under M. Moureu for offensive re- 
search, whose brilliant organic investigation charac- 
terised later French developments, and the other 
under M. Vincent, for research on protection. But, 
in the meantime, the importance of gas shell was im- 
pressed upon the French and, on the 1st July, 1915, 
this organisation passed into M. Albert Thomas’s 
new Ministere de L’Artillerie et des Munitions. 
Manufacture passed into the hands of the Directeur 
du Materiel Chimique de Guerre. In September, 
1915, these sections were centralised under General 
Ozil, attached to the same Ministry. General Ozil’s 
service was strongly supported by a number of em- 
inent French scientists, and achieved unusual success 
in the face of great practical difficulties. 
A very close liaison was maintained with the army, 
and the initiative, energy, and devotion of all con- 
cerned cannot be too highly praised. In production 
alone the difficulties were enormous. There was no 
highly organised dye industry available. The pre- 
war German monopoly had seen to that. Elaborate 
organisations and continuous research work under 
difficult conditions were necessary to replace the 
smooth running normal activities of the great German 
dye combine. The salient points in French produc- 
tion are dealt with more fully in another chapter. 
In research and protection French activities were 
no less handicapped and just as creditable. The pro- 
tection of the French armies was largely achieved 
100 Chemical Warfare Organizations 
through the genius and tireless industry of Professor 
Paul Lebeau. 
Quick to realise the need of retaliation against the 
new German weapon, the French developed their 
chemical offensive and defensive with characteristic 
elan and intuition. Contributing largely to Allied 
research, they took the lead in Inter-Allied co-opera- 
tion and liaison, and their activities in this field were 
due to much worthier causes than mere geographical 
position. 
Italian Development.—The Italians were alive 
to the importance of chemical warfare. World 
famous names such as those of Senator Paterno and 
Professor Villavecchia were associated with their 
organisation. Once again, however, although not 
lacking in invention and initiative, they were contin- 
ually hampered by production, which imposed such 
grave disadvantages upon them as to endanger seri- 
ously the success of their campaign. The success of 
the great German offensive against Italy in the 
autumn of 1917 was largely ascribed to the German 
use of gas of such types and in such amounts that the 
Italian protective appliances were outmanoeuvred. 
Further, in spite of the offensive qualities of the 
Italian gas organisation under Col. Penna, lack of 
supplies prevented large scale gas retaliation, so 
essential in maintaining gas morale. 
Towards the end of the war, when the French and 
British production improved, and with the entry of 
America and the promise of supplies therefrom, it 
was possible to assist the Italians from Allied sources, 
and arrangements were made to supply them with the 
British Respirator, to assist them in the development 
of the livens Projector, to supply large quantities of 
mustard and other gases, and to assist them in pro- 
duction. The use of the British box respirator was 
101 The Riddle of the Rhine 
undoubtedly a great factor in repelling the Austrian 
offensive of June, 1918. Their experimental fields 
and research organisations were particularly well 
staffed, and, backed by production, Italian chemical 
genius would have been capable of producing very 
serious results. 
Supply Organisations.—What a marked contrast 
between the organisation required for German and 
Allied Chemical warfare production! Such organisa- 
tion implies cadres and arrangements for co-operation 
with research organisations, for semi-scale work, com- 
mercial functions, priority, raw material supply, trans- 
port, and all their concomitants. In Germany, the 
self-contained dye industry simplified all these func- 
tions. The Government addressed itself to one 
producing organisation which was responsible for 
most of the relevant research. Whole Government 
departments were rendered unnecessary by this cen- 
tralised production. 
British Supply Organisation.—In England the 
situation was entirely different. Even before the 
advent of mustard gas the Government was com- 
pelled to apply to at least twenty contractors. The 
products required were foreign to the normal activi- 
ties of many of these. They required assistance in 
raw materials, transport, technical methods, either 
the result of the work of other factories or of re- 
search. The latter again involved complex official 
organisation, cumbrous :even if efficiently carried out. 
This at once introduced difficulties. The centre of 
gravity of supply was in government offices instead 
of in the centres of production. Much depended 
upon the co-ordination of the official departments. 
Quite apart from the Government plants finally en- 
gaged in chemical warfare production, more than 
102 Chemical Warfare Organizations 
fifty plants were used in private organisations, of 
which a very high percentage were entirely new. 
Allied Handicaps.—The functions of the allied 
Government supply departments were or should have 
been much more than those of an individual nego- 
tiating a contract. Owing to the fact that these were 
new plants, and that the products were foreign to the 
production of many of the firms concerned, two alter- 
natives had to be faced. Either the technical and 
service departments of each firm had to be consider- 
ably strengthened, or else a special organisation had 
to cover these functions by employing a considerable 
government technical and liaison personnel. For rea- 
sons of secrecy and general efficiency the latter pro- 
cedure evolved, but neither represented the ideal 
solution. 
The German Solution.—This was the German 
arrangement in which these functions were all em- 
bodied in the centralised producing organisation, the 
I.G. The German Government took the role of a 
pure contractor, the only additional function being 
the choice of product and method, a question of 
policy. This implied the existence of a Government 
experimental organisation, but purely for this pur- 
pose. 
Departmental Difficulties.—The Allied task 
would have been much simpler if the only war weapon 
had been a chemical one, in which case an efficient 
organisation could have been decided upon at first, 
and need have suffered no very radical changes. As 
it was, however, the British supply organisation had 
to administer some seventy plants, which were really 
in private hands, and found its chief difficulties quite 
apart from the external perplexities of the problem. 
They arose in its relationships with other Govern- 
ment departments. 
103 The Riddle of the Rhine 
Allied Success Against Odds.—Taking a broad 
view of the case, although nobody who knew the facts 
could regard our poison gas production with any- 
thing but dismay, except in a few cases, yet the main 
feeling was one of amazement that we succeeded as 
well as we did with these entirely new substances. 
The whole story of chemical warfare supply amongst 
the Allies is one of devoted effort by ail concerned, 
against overwhelming odds, and although the level of 
results was poor compared with Germany, yet we find 
here and there brilliant examples of Allied adapt- 
ability and tenacity amongst which the French devel- 
opment of mustard gas stands pre-eminent. 
What we have already said about supply organisa- 
tion may be summed up in one sentence. The Ger- 
mans were already organised to produce. We had to 
create Government departments to administer a large 
number of plants in private hands, and they had to 
cope not only with the external difficulties of the situa- 
tion but with the almost overwhelming difficulties of 
internal organisation. The checquered career of the 
British supply department provides a good example. 
The French and Americans suffered less than our- 
selves from these troubles, the latter having the bene- 
fit of the combined experience of the other Allies. 
Allied Lack of Vision in Production.—A survey 
of the earliest supply organisation of this country 
reveals another difficulty which later events have ob- 
scured. Few people realised the developments which 
chemical warfare would produce. The early pro- 
ductions of chemicals for gas warfare was grouped 
under some such designation as trench warfare stores, 
and graded in order of importance, from the point 
of view of supply organisation with catapults and 
spring guns, flame projectors and body shields! 
It is no unfair criticism to state that hard facts rather 
104 Chemical Warfare Organizations 
than vision forced the importance of chemical war- 
fare upon those responsible for munition production 
in the early stages of the war. Chemical warfare 
production remained under the Trench Warfare Sup- 
ply Department for many months, where it was one 
of ten Trench Warfare sections. The vicissitudes of 
trench warfare supply are too numerous and compli- 
cated to be dealt with here, but chemical warfare 
supply has suffered accordingly. 
British Lag in Organisation.—Examining Allied 
organisations, we find that the French and Americans 
approached this ideal solution more rapidly than our- 
selves, and we can trace in our own development a 
number of unsuccessful attempts to reach this central- 
ised control, although the last configuration, under 
the direction of Major-General H. F. Thuillier, was 
the nearest approach. French organisation for sup- 
ply provides another example of their national char- 
acteristic of logical thinking and love of symmetry. 
As early as September, 1915, the French centralised 
their research organisation, the Inspection des Etudes 
et Experience Chimiques, and their supply organisa- 
tion, the Direction du Materiel Chimique de Guerre, 
in their Service Chimique de Guerre under General 
Ozil. 
French and American Characteristics.—Their 
early concentration on gas shell shows that this sym- 
metrical organisation was due not only to the above 
characteristic but also to vision in war development. 
American supply organisation again provides evi- 
dence of the national characteristic. They had no 
I.G. but they had plenty of money and material, and 
the total of Allied experience in production. They 
therefore proceeded at once to build an enormous 
producing centre known as Edgewood Arsenal. We 
refer to this later. The tremendous potentialities of 
105 The Riddle of the Rhine 
this Arsenal will readily be seen, although they 'did 
not become effective during the war. 
It would be poor testimony to the tremendous 
efforts and sacrifices made by the various firms and 
officials connected with chemical warfare to leave the 
matter at this stage, or to make a minute analysis of 
the different internal causes for lack of success. We 
may say that although the efforts of all concerned 
were beyond praise, yet they were so initially handi- 
capped that it was practically impossible even to 
approach the German efficiency. In France and Eng- 
land we were suffering from the faults of past years, 
our lack of attention to the application of science to 
industry. The Americans would also have suffered, 
for they were in the same plight, but they adopted the 
drastic solution of Edgewood Arsenal. As we show 
later, however, this solution was really only a very 
necessary and valuable attempt to treat the symptom 
rather than the disease. We cannot regard the prob- 
lem as settled for any of these countries. If it is, 
then the outlook is very poor. 
Inter-Allied Chemical Warfare Liaison.—Chem- 
ical warfare offered, in theory, a splendid opportunity 
for co-ordination amongst the Allies. The new 
methods, unhampered by tradition, seemed, at first 
sight, admirably suited for exploitation against the 
enemy by an allied Generalissimo and staff. Co- 
ordination never reached this stage, although strong 
liaison organisations were developed. Inter-allied 
research conferences occurred periodically in Paris, 
where decisions for co-operation were taken after full 
discussion of allied work. The continuity of these 
relationships was maintained by an active secretariat 
on which each ally was represented. The contact, so 
close between actual allied scientific workers in this 
field, became less evident in the application of their 
106 Chemical Warfare Organizations 
results to field warfare, for several reasons. In the 
first place, close scientific contact in research was re- 
placed by the actual field relationships of the armies, 
and, as is well known, the central inter-allied com- 
mand did not materialise until the spring of 1918, 
and even then it was only possible to apply the new 
principle to the actual battlefield. The traditional 
differences between the methods of the different 
services of each ally still existed to a large extent, and 
they found expression in type of armament, equip- 
ment, and military standards, such as, for example, 
gun calibres and shell design, to which chemical war- 
fare had to conform. No inter-allied gas mask 
materialised, although this would have been of in- 
estimable advantage. Probably the example of most 
complete co-ordination occurred on the supply side, 
where absence of the above traditional difficulties and 
the crying need to make the most of available raw 
materials compelled a very close co-ordination. 
Inter-Allied Supply.—The writer was responsible 
for initiating, in 1917, an Inter-Allied Chemical Sup- 
ply Committee, whose function was to pool effectively 
the allied raw materials, and to arrange their distribu- 
tion in accordance with allied programmes, the ex- 
change of which implied a considerable step. Later 
this Committee became one of a number, similarly 
constituted, forming part of the Inter-Allied Muni- 
tions Council. 
Thinking over the difficulties of the inter-allied 
supply, now that the emergencies of the situation have 
passed, an important contrast emerges. After three 
years of war, and although protected by the powerful 
arm of the blockade, we were still resorting, for 
chemical warfare supply, to measures which, com- 
pared with the German methods, were complicated, 
clumsy, and inefficient. This was, in a sense, forced 
107 The Riddle of the Rhine 
upon us by the number of the allies, and the fact that 
they held the outer lines. But it is easily forgotten 
that Germany also had a number of allies, and that 
German supply organisation was sufficient to feed 
them all. 
Nature of Chemical Warfare Research.—So 
much has been vaguely said, and is vaguely known, 
about research in chemical warfare that a brief 
analysis will be of value. 
Discovery of New Substances.—Research for 
this purpose has a number of very distinct functions. 
The most obvious is the discovery of new substances. 
But there are others in connection with which research 
work represents a much greater volume. Very few 
new substances which found valuable application dur- 
ing the war were revealed by chemical warfare re- 
search. The bulk of the important substances were 
already known as such, although their importance for 
war was probably not realised. It is most important 
to emphasize the fact that even in the future, should 
there be no direct attempts to reveal new chemical 
warfare substances, they will undoubtedly arise as a 
normal outcome of research, even if, without excep- 
tion, every chemist in the world became a most pro- 
nounced pacifist. A valuable substance once dis- 
covered or decided upon, however, whole series of 
research investigations become necessary. 
Technical Method of Preparation; — Filling 
Problem;—Protection;—Half-Scale Investigation. 
•—The substance must be prepared in the most effi- 
cient manner for manufacture, which may not be the 
mode of its discovery. It must be used in shells, 
cylinders, or some other war chemical device. Each 
device represents a different filling problem, different 
difficulties with regard to contact of the war chemical 
and the envelope of the container. If a projectile is 
108 Chemical Warfare Organizations 
in question the ballistics become of importance. 
More important than any of these, except production, 
is the question of protection. It is axiomatic that an 
army proposing to use a new offensive chemical must 
be protected against it. It may, therefore, be neces- 
sary to modify the existing mask or protective appli- 
ance, or to create an entirely new one. If research 
reveals the necessity for the latter course of action 
it may provide sufficient reason for abandoning the 
substance. In addition, according to productive diffi- 
culties, it may be necessary to undertake compre- 
hensive and very expensive research on half-scale 
methods for production. It is impossible in many 
cases to proceed directly from the laboratory process 
to large scale manufacture without serious risk of 
failure. 
Two Classes of Research.—Broadly, these re- 
search functions form two classes, those concerned 
with policy and approval of a substance and those 
concerned with work which follows automatically 
upon such approval. There must be, of course, a 
certain amount of overlapping and liaison between 
the two classes. 
Herein lay one of the great advantages enjoyed by 
the Germans. Their great producing organisation, 
the I.G., was able to take over automatically certain 
of these research functions, in particular all those 
with regard to preparation and production, even of 
protective appliances. The Government reserved 
what we have called the policy functions, and was 
responsible, we assume, for the mass of physiological 
and design research which must always precede ap- 
proval or a decision on policy. 
Signs were not lacking, further, that the I.G. was 
even employed on certain occasions for this latter type 
of research. 
109 The Riddle of the Rhine 
Conclusion.—From the facts at our disposal there 
can be no doubt that the total material facilities at the 
disposal of the Allies for chemical warfare investiga- 
tion were considerably more extensive and expensive 
than those of Germany with the one notable exception 
of trained technical organic chemists. It is very 
doubtful whether the German field experiments were 
as largely provided for as those of the Allies. When 
we think of the French grounds at Versailles and 
Entressin, the British at Porton, the American 
grounds in France and in America, and the Italian 
organisations, there can hardly be any doubt that the 
total German facilities were much smaller. Under 
the actual circumstances of the war, however, it was 
difficult to develop more co-operation than was pos- 
sible by a very close liaison. The fact that all the 
experimental developments from these grounds re- 
quired special modification to meet the peculiar needs 
of artillery and other equipment for each ally, pre- 
vented the adoption of uniform types of projectile or 
other appliances. Even uniform shell marking was 
found impracticable. 
The “Outer and Inner Lines.”—The Allied situ- 
ation compelled the multiplication of cumbersome 
organisations in the different countries. Lack of a 
strong organic chemical industry placed each ally at a 
considerable disadvantage, compared with Germany, 
in the development of such organisations. Using a 
strategic comparison, we can say that Germany not 
only possessed the “inner lines” in the chemical war, 
but an exceptionally efficient system to exploit them, in 
the shape of the great I.G. 
110 CHAPTER VI 
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE INITIATIVE 
Meaning of the Chemical Initiative.—The Ger- 
man invasion of Belgium in 1914 was a direct appeal 
to the critical factor of surprise in war. By dis- 
regarding their pledge, a “ scrap of paper,” they 
automatically introduced into this attack the ele- 
ments of military surprise. We, the enemy, were 
unprepared, and a complete rearrangement of dis- 
positions became necessary. 
A recent writer has admirably summarised the 
facts.1 
“ Germany began the war on the Western front 
before it was declared, and on 1-2 August, German 
cavalry crossed the French frontier between Lux- 
embourg and Switzerland at three points in the 
direction of Longwy, Luneville, and Belfort. But 
these were only feints designed to prolong the 
delusion that Germany would attack on the only 
front legitimately open to warfare and to delay 
the reconstruction of the French defence required 
to meet the real offensive. The reasons for German 
strategy were conclusive to the General Staff, and 
they were frankly explained by Bethmann-Hollweg 
to the British ambassador. There was no time to 
lose if France was to be defeated before an effective 
Russian move, and time would be lost by a frontal 
1 A. F. Pollard. A Short History of the Great War. Methuen, 
1920. 
111 The Riddle of the Rhine 
attack. The best railways and roads from Berlin 
to Paris ran through Belgium; the Vosges protected 
more than half of the French frontier south of 
Luxembourg, Belfort defended the narrow gap 
between them and Switzerland, and even the wider 
thirty miles’ gap between the northern slopes of 
the Vosges and Luxembourg was too narrow for 
the deployment of Germany’s strength; the way 
was also barred by the elaborate fortifications of 
Verdun, Toul, and Nancy. Strategy pointed con- 
clusively to the Belgian route, and its advantages 
were clinched by the fact that France was relying 
on the illusory scrap of paper.” 
The first German cloud gas attack was the second 
attempt to gain the decisive initiative, by the un- 
authorised use of a surprise of an entirely different 
nature. 
Modem writers are at great pains to establish 
how the world war, although leaving the final 
function of the infantry unchanged, rendered them 
and their staffs subservient to mass munition pro- 
duction. Mr. H. G. Wells explains this to the 
Kaiser in a delightful imaginary interview between 
that august person and an hypothetical manufac- 
turer.1 Professor Pollard tells us how, when the 
first German surprise had failed, the war became 
“ a test of endurance rather than generalship.” 
We will leave a clear field for any military challenge 
to such a point of view. Our objection is that it 
is not fully developed. The war was still a test of 
generalship, that of directed production. This 
war has shown, and future wars may unfortunately 
confirm, that the type and secrecy of production 
is as important as its volume. There will still be 
the purely military surprise and manoeuvre, but 
1 JFar and the Future. Cassel, 1917. 
112 The Struggle for the Initiative 
superimposed, co-ordinated, and sometimes pre- 
dominant will appear the technical surprise, the 
result of the generalship of production. 
Such a surprise is achieved by the sudden intro- 
duction on a large scale of some entirely new war 
weapon, capable of achieving a strategic or tactical 
objective in an unsuspected manner. 
Although the general idea of this second type 
of surprise existed before the war, particularly in 
naval warfare, it required the coincidence of the 
Great European War and modern scientific develop- 
ment to demonstrate its great importance on land. 
Thus the first German gas attack found the 
opposing troops entirely unprotected, not merely 
through the absence of a mask, but in training and 
technical discipline. The case is quoted of an 
indignant gassed soldier who, in an early gas attack, 
when reproached for not protecting himself, there- 
upon opened his tunic and revealed a mask firmly 
tied round his chest! It is a far cry from such a case 
to the inculcation of strict gas discipline into an 
army of millions. The attack reaped the corre- 
sponding results in casualties and morale. It found 
the opposing medical services unequipped, not only 
to treat the new type of casualty, but even to deter- 
mine its nature rapidly and efficiently. In short, 
it found the enemy utterly unprepared, either in 
theory or practice, to counter its effect. The im- 
portance of this second type of surprise lies in its 
peculiar potentialities. It may affect a given mil- 
itary result with an extraordinarily small expendi- 
ture of material, energy, and eventually human life, 
when compared with the older military weapons. 
Chemical warfare is a weapon, par excellence, to 
achieve this second type of surprise. Therein lies 
its chief importance. 
113 The Riddle of the Rhine 
As a result, the history of chemical warfare 
becomes one of continual attempts, on both sides, 
to achieve surprise and to counter it by some accurate 
forecast in protective methods. It is a struggle for 
the initiative. 
More than this, as the use of chemical warfare 
becomes an organic part of operations, as it did 
during the war, these operations become corre- 
spondingly dependent upon conditions imposed 
by the chemical campaign. One can imagine the 
case of an army unprotected against a new gas, 
aware that the enemy is ready to employ the latter, 
compelled to postpone some huge offensive until 
its protective methods were equal to countering the 
new chemical. General Fries, the American au- 
thority, states, in reference to mustard gas, and 
the Northern offensives in 1917: “It is no dispar- 
agement of the British, nor of any one else, to 
say that they held up the date of their attack for 
two weeks pending further investigations into the 
effects of this new gas.” Ludendorff, referring to 
the German offensive in March, 1918, tells us, 
“Our artillery relied on gas for its effect. Up till 
the morning of the 20th strength and direction (of 
the wind) were by no means favourable, and it 
seemed almost necessary to put off the attack.” 
Such a point becomes of greater importance as the 
influence of other arms decreases. If we assume 
international arrangements for the limitation of 
other types of armament in the future, chemical 
warfare at once stands out as decisive. 
Controlling Factors;—Rapid Manufacture.— 
Certain well-defined factors hold a controlling posi- 
tion in the chemical initiative. Before any chem- 
ical discovery can be used for surprise on the front 
a second step must occur; this is large scale manu- 
114 The Struggle for the Initiative 
facture. This period is vital to surprise. Success 
in chemical warfare is largely dependent on secrecy, 
which means achieving production in the shortest 
possible time, and this is particularly important at 
the commencement of hostilities. Throughout the 
war the Germans possessed this advantage and, in 
the future, unless certain steps are taken, it will be 
theirs again. A very simple example will suffice to 
show the importance of the combination of these 
two factors. Let us assume the not remote possi- 
bility that Germany had refrained from using poison 
gas until she had reached the stage of development 
which existed at the time of her 1918 offensive. 
There is little room for doubt that the big scale use 
of cloud attacks which would then have been avail- 
able, and of shell gas, in particular mustard gas, 
would have achieved decisive success. The Allies 
would have been totally unprotected, the moral effect 
would have been enormous, and, even if we ignore 
the latter, the number of casualties would have 
produced a gap the size of which was only dependent 
on German wishes. 
Rapid Identification Essential.—It is important 
to remember, however, that once a chemical cam- 
paign has commenced, certain factors may militate 
against any lengthy retention of the initiative by 
either party. Organisations develop whose func- 
tion is to ascertain the nature of new enemy chemical 
devices so that protective research and production 
can commence with the minimum delay. This 
assumes the existence of a protective appliance and 
organisation. The very efficient collaboration of 
the British Central Laboratory in France for the 
examination of new gas shell with the French organ- 
isation centred in Paris provide numerous examples 
of the functioning of this safeguard. No time was 
115 The Riddle of the Rhine 
lost in identifying the nature of the various chemicals 
employed by Germany in her shell fillings. Speed 
was vital. The use of a new type of chemical in 
shell, bomb, or other contrivance, in any sector of 
the front, on whatever scale, however small, was 
reported without delay. Then followed instanta- 
neous collection and examination, after which all 
front line formations, other formations, allies, and 
rear organisations were expeditiously warned. The 
harmless trial flight of the few shell of a new type 
might be followed by the use of hundreds of thou- 
sands in a deadly attack one hundred miles away or 
on another allied front. Not only were captured 
offensive contrivances of value for this purpose, but 
the rapid examination of new enemy masks was of 
prime importance, for it could be assumed that the 
enemy would be protected against his own surprises 
in store for others. 
Attempts to ascertain the enemy’s gas activities 
were not confined to examining captured material 
after their first use. Raids and artillery fire were 
both used to obtain intelligence regarding prepara- 
tions, or to break up the gas emplacements. The 
Germans have provided us with a particularly 
gallant and interesting attempt. 
Near Nieuport the front penetrated a region 
inundated by the Belgians during the desperate 
German offensives of 1914. The trench system, 
winding through a mile or so of sand dunes, passed 
in a southeasterly direction through the marshy 
sector known as Lombartzyde. Here the bogged 
front lines were intersected by the Yser canal, the 
German front trench being some 80 yards away. 
Allied gas was installed in the Lombartzyde and 
neighbouring sectors ready for discharge on the 
first favourable opportunity. For some reason or 
116 The Struggle for the Initiative 
other the Germans suspected this, and at night 
a raiding party swam down the ice cold Yser, and, 
negotiating the submerged wire, landed in the 
Allied support line. Stunning the sentry with a 
bomb which, fortunately, refused to explode, they 
proceeded to the front line to seek gas emplace- 
ments. Either through unexpected disturbance, 
or for some other reason, they were compelled to 
leave before completing their inspection, and suc- 
cessfully swam the Yser canal back to their own 
trenches. This hazardous enterprise represents but 
one of many raids whose function it was to ascertain 
the presence of enemy gas. 
Propaganda and Morale.—Another factor in- 
tended to facilitate the attainment of the chemical 
initiative was the German use of propaganda. 
Rumours, reflected in the Press, were often current 
at the Front, at home, and in neutral countries, 
that some particularly fiendish chemical contrivance 
was about to be launched against the Allies by Ger- 
many. Thus, in January and February of 1916, 
vigorous propaganda activity of this kind in Swit- 
zerland preceded the great German offensive at 
Verdun. The new gas was heralded by fantastic 
stories. Certain death was threatened for all within 
one hundred yards of the shell burst. The origin 
of the report was traced to various sources. In one 
case rumours concerned a conscientious worker in a 
German factory, desirous of warning the French 
through Swiss friends, in other cases German sci- 
entists were reported to be influencing Francophile 
neutrals in order that they might warn the French. 
But an analysis of the propaganda reveals some- 
thing more than its sensational nature. The infor- 
mation arrived at well-defined periods, which usually 
preceded the actual use of a new gas or chemical 
117 The Riddle of the Rhine 
device by Germany. But when the actual effort is 
compared with the prophecy we find that in no case 
was there any real clue as to the nature of the gas. 
Thus, before the use of phosgene by the Germans 
at the end of 1915, definite reports reached the 
Allies regarding the projected use of at least ten 
new gases by Germany, which were described not 
only chemically, but as being colourless, odourless, 
powerful, blinding, and instantaneously deadly! 
No such volume of propaganda was experienced 
before the first German cloud attack at Ypres. 
Indeed, one would not have expected it, for the mere 
fact of the use of cloud gas was then new to war, 
and of military value. 
This propaganda was not without its effect, and, 
but for the excellent Allied gas discipline, would 
have been an effective precursor to the gas itself. 
Cases were not absent, at the Battle of Loos, for 
example, in which the German use of lachrymators 
found British soldiers so mentally unprepared, or 
rather let us say “prepared” by propaganda, as to 
spread ridiculous rumours on the battlefield as to 
the all-powerful nature of the new German gas shell. 
These were, in fact, bursting a few yards away, with 
no more serious results than lachrymation and vom- 
iting. The extended use of shell gas by the Germans 
in the summer of 1916 was again preceded by inten- 
sive propaganda during the early months of that 
year, in which the promise of prussic acid was prom- 
inent. The influence of a name is very curious. 
Prussic acid probably accounted for fewer casualties 
than any other gas. This fact became apparent 
with the increasing use of the French Vincennite, 
which contained prussic acid. Yet German propa- 
ganda redoubled its efforts as time went on to inspire 
fear in the Allied soldier by the threat to use prussic 
118 The Struggle for the Initiative 
acid. It is clear that armies cannot abandon gas 
discipline, and that an important factor in strength- 
ening this discipline is a wise distribution of gas 
knowledge. The use of mustard gas and newer 
shell gases in 1917 was again preceded by a burst 
of propaganda. In this period we find the first 
reference to long-range gas shell and aircraft gas 
bomb, and, curiously enough, a certain amount of 
propaganda with regard to a blinding chemical, 
which partially described mustard gas. 
As further confirmation of the General Staff 
origin of this propaganda we find that the 1918 
outburst occurred two or three months earlier in 
the year than in 1917. This was accounted for, 
no doubt, by its intended influence upon Allied 
morale in the great German offensive of early 1918. 
This last wave of propaganda includes one very 
interesting example. It is better known than other 
cases through its association with the International 
Red Cross at Geneva. This body represented in 
February, 1918, that Germany was about to use a 
really terrible gas which would have such disastrous 
effects that it was absolutely essential to make a 
last attempt to get both sides to abandon gas war- 
fare. The official wire reads as follows:—“Protest 
of International Red Cross against the use of Poison 
Gas. I have received private letter from Mon- 
sieur X., President of International Red Cross, 
which I think that I ought to lay before you. He 
says that Red Cross were induced to make protest 
by what they had heard of new gas Germans are 
preparing although Red Cross understands that the 
Allies are aware of the gas and are taking their pre- 
cautions. As they did not wish to draw an indict- 
ment of Germany they appealed to both groups of 
belligerents to pledge themselves not to use this 
119 The Riddle of the Rhine 
weapon. Red Cross asks whether the Entente 
leaders through Inter-Allied Council at Versailles 
could not make a loud declaration which would reach 
the peoples of the Central Empires as well as their 
rulers, pledging themselves not to use such gas on 
condition that the two Emperors similarly bind 
themselves not to employ it. If the latter refuse, 
all the guilt will rest with them.” Although there 
can be no doubt that the International Red Cross 
and the Swiss involved in this move were absolutely 
bona fide, yet whoever was responsible for initiating 
the move on the German side played his hand very 
well. If, as actually occurred, the protest did not 
result in the cessation of gas hostilities, it still served 
its purpose as propaganda aimed at Allied morale. 
Knowing his dispositions for gas defence, and our 
own offensive preparations, it is probable that the 
enemy was willing to withdraw before being over- 
whelmed by Allied and American production. After 
three years of costly improvised production by the 
Allies, Germany could no longer securely enjoy the 
fruits of the initiative provided by the plants and 
factories of the I.G. 
Peculiar Peace-Time Danger.—There can be no 
doubt therefore that the mere contact of two armies 
during war acts as a check against the decisive use 
of chemical warfare, except in the very early stages. 
During peace this contact will be practically non- 
existent, and it would be possible for any country 
so to diverge in its lines of research and discovery 
that, given rapid means of production, it could 
repeat the German surprise of 1915, this time with 
decisive results. Should such a nation possess a 
monopoly in the means of rapid production, the 
world is practically at her mercy. Should she be 
prepared to break her word, the usual means of 
120 The Struggle for the Initiative 
controlling disarmament are impotent against these 
developments. 
War Fluctuations of Initiative.—In the light of 
the above remarks the fluctuations in the initiative 
during the recent war are very significant. The 
first marked feature was the development of British 
and Allied protection to counter the enemy attacks 
which would presumably follow the first German 
use of cloud gas. Immediately after the German 
chemical surprise, and while the Allies were still 
undecided whether to retaliate, work proceeded 
feverishly on the development of some form of pro- 
tection for the hitherto unprotected soldier. In 
response to Lord Kitchener’s dramatic appeal to 
the women of England and France, masks were sent 
to France in sufficient quantity within a few days. 
They were of a very primitive type, and consisted 
of a pad of cotton wool impregnated with certain 
chemicals, to be held in place over the mouth, which 
was superseded, in May, by a very similar contriv- 
ance, slightly more efficient with regard to the length 
of time of protection. Dr. Haldane and certain 
other prominent chemists and physiologists worked 
on the different improvised types. With this feeble 
protection, or, in the first case, with none at all, our 
armies had to face the first German cloud gas attacks. 
The idea of the gas helmet which covered the 
whole head was brought to England by Captain 
Macpherson of the Newfoundland Corps, early 
in May. Suitably impregnated, it made satisfactory 
tests. The helmet type of respirator made of 
flannel was first tested in the Anti-Gas laboratories 
on May ioth, 1915, and was a great success com- 
pared with previously suggested types. Arrange- 
ments for its manufacture were accordingly made, 
and this began in June, 1915. This protective 
121 The Riddle of the Rhine 
device consisted of a flannel helmet with a celluloid 
film eyepiece, and was called the hypo helmet. The 
fabric was impregnated with the same solution as 
the cotton waste pads described above, the dipping 
being carried out largely at Oxford Works, but 
partly in the Royal Army Clothing Department, 
Pimlico. Its manufacture was continued until Sep- 
tember, 1915, about two and a half millions being 
made in all. From June, 1915, we never really 
lost the initiative in the matter of defence, although, 
at different times, the struggle was very intense. 
It was this helmet, with the modified phenate im- 
pregnation, which, known as the P. helmet, formed 
the first line of defence against the probable employ- 
ment of phosgene by Germany. It became known 
as the “Tube Helmet” when fitted with a mouth- 
piece for exhaled air, and, in this form, countered 
the formidable enemy phosgene attack in December, 
1915. The later addition of hexamine, suggested 
from Russia, greatly improved the efficiency against 
phosgene and led to the P.H. helmet, which was 
issued from January, 1916. It was not withdrawn 
until February, 1918, but in the later stages was 
used as a second line of defence. The magnitude 
of this manoeuvring for protection can be judged 
from the facts that two and a half millions of hypo 
helmets, nine millions of P. helmets, and fourteen 
millions of P.H. helmets were issued during the cam- 
paign. 
There is no doubt that this early period, however, 
was a very costly experiment on the use of the 
different masks, the success of which involved the 
loss of numbers of men who were compelled, through 
reasons of supply or uncertain design, to use the less 
efficient types. In one case, for example, the trial 
of mica eyepieces rendered otherwise efficient masks 
122 The Struggle for the Initiative 
absolutely useless by breaking, and caused losses. 
We cannot afford to repeat such experiments in 
future. Failure to develop protective appliances 
fatally implies large-scale experiments in future wars 
in which unnecessary loss of life is bound to occur. 
If steady research in peace can diminish this pos- 
sible loss, shall it be stopped? 
The urgency of these developments can be under- 
stood from a case quoted by General Hartley:1 
“A certain modification of the respirator was con- 
sidered necessary in France, and officers were sent 
home to explain what was needed. Within forty- 
eight hours of their arrival arrangements were made 
to modify the respirators, and within a few weeks 
the fighting troops had been re-equipped with the 
new pattern. Less than three months after the 
change had been recommended three attacks were 
made by the Germans which would certainly have 
had very serious consequences if our troops had not 
been in possession of the improved respirator, as 
the older pattern would not have withstood the con- 
centration of gas employed. This was only one of 
many changes that were made in the respirator to 
meet new developments.” 
How urgent was the need for these developments? 
It was vital. Here is a case showing frightful losses 
sustained by partially or inefficiently protected 
troops. Between May and July of 1915 the Ger- 
mans made at least three cloud gas attacks upon the 
Russians, immediately west of Warsaw. In all 
these attacks, taken together, gas was discharged 
for a total time of not more than one hour, and they 
were all practically from the same position, on a 
front of about six miles. The affair seems relatively 
small, yet what was the result? The Russians lost 
1 Report before the British Association, 1919. 
123 The Riddle of the Rhine 
not less than 5000 dead on the field, and their total 
casualties were of the order of 25,000 officers and men. 
A Siberian regiment had, before the last attack, a 
ration strength of about forty officers and 4000 men. 
This was reduced by a twenty minutes gas discharge 
to four officers and four hundred men. No other 
weapon could have reproduced, under the most 
favourable conditions for its use, in as many days, 
what gas was able to do in as many minutes. 
Although our protection had countered the later 
German attacks with cloud gas, yet it threatened 
to fail to meet the situation created by the use of a 
variety of organic chemicals in shell. In order to 
counter the use of lachrymatory compounds by the 
enemy, compounds which penetrated the helmet 
insufficiently to cause serious casualties but suffi- 
ciently to hamper the individual by lachrymation, 
goggles were introduced in which the eyes were 
protected by rims of rubber sponge. This remedied 
the weakness of the P.H. helmet and produced the 
P.H.G. helmet, of which more than one and a half 
millions were issued during 1916-1917. 
Towards the end of 1915 the standard protection 
was the P. and P.H. helmet, but the use of lachry- 
mators compelled us to use the P.H.G. Even this 
helmet was not satisfactory against the high concen- 
trations of phosgene or lachrymators, and after much 
research the opinion gained ground that further 
development must be on other lines. In addition, 
the need for a more general form of protection was 
emphasised by the German adoption of a mask of 
cartridge design. In other words, the fabric of the 
helmet, or facial portion of the mask, was made 
impermeable, and the filtration of the poisoned air 
occurred through a cartridge, or filtering box, 
attached to the fabric in the form of a snout. The 
124 The Struggle for the Initiative 
cartridge provided a much greater protective range 
and capacity. It was clear that such German pro- 
tection was evidence of their plans for the further 
use of gas. The new German cartridge mask ap- 
peared in the autumn of 1915. Doctor H. Pick, 
reviewing German protective measures in Schwarte’s 
book, enumerates the various desiderata of the ideal 
mask and explains, “It was only our early recog- 
nition of these requirements which gave us an advan- 
tage over the enemy from the first in the sphere of 
defensive measures against gas, and which spared us 
from having to undertake radical alterations in the 
apparatus as the English, French, and Russians had 
to do more than once.” This early adoption of a 
comprehensive view on protection by Germany is a 
testimony to both German thoroughness and their 
definite intention to proceed with a vigorous chem- 
ical war. The latter is not mere inference, for it is 
borne out by the dates at which they commenced 
production in their dye factories. Further, even if 
the German cartridge mask was only decided upon 
after Loos, which is not probable, our feeble reply 
in that battle would hardly have justified such a 
radical advance in protection. 
It was thus forecasted that not only would new 
ranges of compounds be employed which it would be 
most difficult to counter individually, but aggressive 
methods would arise, either entirely new or modi- 
fications of the cloud method, which would enable 
much higher concentrations to be obtained than 
those in evidence hitherto. Accordingly the first 
type of the well-known British Box Respirator was 
designed, giving a big capacity of highly efficient 
filtering material, or granule, contained in a canister, 
with an improved face-piece and breathing arrange- 
ments. Without going into details, it may be said 
125 The Riddle of the Rhine 
that Colonel Harrison and Major Lambert were 
associated with a number of other enthusiastic 
workers in developing the Box Respirator. 
Here again the question of chemical supply threat- 
ened to influence our retention of the initiative. 
Without going into the development of the granule 
in the respirator, the supply of potassium perman- 
ganate was of prime importance, and the country 
was woefully deficient in the production of this sub- 
stance. The determined efforts of British manu- 
facturers overcame this difficulty. It was now pos- 
sible to work on general lines for the improvement 
of this canister to increase its protective range, and 
to modify the canister specifically in accordance 
with intelligence as to what the enemy had recently 
done or was about to do. In this way, and suc- 
cessively, the army was successfully protected against 
the higher concentrations employed and the newer 
substances introduced. The issue of the large Box 
Respirator commenced in February, 1916. It was 
replaced by the small Box Respirator which came out 
in August, 1916, and of which over sixteen millions 
had been issued before the signing of the Armistice. 
At one time over a quarter of a million small Box 
Respirators were produced weekly. The chief mod- 
ifications were the use of a smaller box or canister, 
the margin of protection being unnecessarily large in 
the former type. 
It became necessary in the spring of 1917 to pro- 
vide more efficient protection against irritating 
smokes which tended to penetrate the respirator as 
minute particles, and the first form consisted in the 
use of two layers of cotton wadding in the canister 
of the small box respirator. The use of Blue Cross 
compounds by Germany in the summer of 1917 ren- 
dered this matter more urgent, and a special filter 
126 The Struggle for the Initiative 
jacket was designed which fitted round the small box 
respirator. A million were made and sent to France. 
Developments proceeded on these lines. Altogether, 
more than fifty million masks and respirators of dif- 
ferent kinds were manufactured by the British 
Anti-Gas Department for our own and Allied 
armies. 
We thus have some idea of the importance of pro- 
tection in chemical warfare and of the absolutely 
imperative need of deciding whether or no work on 
protection must go on. There can be no doubt as 
to the answer to this question. It is not only in 
the interests of the army, whether a League of 
Nations or a national army, but also in those of the 
civil population. 
The Tense Protective Struggle.—Few people 
realise how the development of Allied and enemy gas 
masks and protective measures was forced upon each 
side in a number of critical steps. At each of these, 
had research and production been unequal to the 
task, the armies would have found themselves more 
uncovered and exposed than if the whole trench and 
dug-out system had been suddenly rendered unusable 
in some peculiar way, thus removing cover from high 
explosive and shrapnel, rifle, and machine-gun fire. 
The army has an apt expression. An officer or man 
parading incompletely equipped is dubbed “half 
naked.” To be within reach of enemy gas without a 
mask was true nakedness. A modern army without 
a gas mask is much more helpless and beaten than 
one without boots. More than this, it must be 
clearly understood that a gas mask of efficient design 
and production will remain of very little use unless, 
supported by comprehensive research which, itself, 
gains enormously in efficiency if related to enemy 
offensive activities. 
127 The Riddle of the Rhine 
The German Mask.—Consider the German mask 
for a moment. We have seen how Germany adopted 
the canister drum or cartridge form before any of the 
other belligerents, and in good time to protect her 
own men against their own use of phosgene, at the 
end of 1915. Indeed, Germany probably held up the 
use of phosgene until her own protection against it 
was developed, although Schwarte’s book claims that 
the German mask issue in 1915 was mainly a pro- 
tection against chlorine. The filling consisted of 
some such material as powdered pumice-stone sat- 
urated with a solution of potash, and powdered 
over with fine absorbent charcoal in order to pro- 
tect against organic irritants and phosgene. These 
were the familiar one-layer drums. Then came the 
British concentrated cloud gas offensive in the sum- 
mer of 1916, which undoubtedly found the German 
mask unequal to some of the higher concentrations 
which were obtained under most favourable condi- 
tions. The Gas Officer of the Sixth German Army 
stated in a document issued in November, 1916: 
‘‘Considerable losses were caused by the gas attacks 
which have taken place latterly. The casualties 
were mainly due to the men being surprised in dug- 
outs, to the neglect of gas discipline, masks not 
being at hand, to faulty masks, and to the use of old 
pattern drums which could not afford protectioji against 
the type of gas employed by the enemy”—(The italics 
are our own.—V.L.) 
Evidence is found in the introduction of the 
German three-layer drum in the autumn of 1916. 
An army does not undertake the manufacture of 
millions of new appliances without very good 
reason. This new drum was specially aimed at 
phosgene protection. The middle layer consisted 
of granulated absorbent charcoal, which had the 
128 The Struggle for the Initiative 
property of absorbing large quantities of organic 
irritants and phosgene. In the three-layer drum 
the latter gas was adequately guarded against for 
most field purposes, although we have reason to 
believe that the German staff was always appre- 
hensive, and German soldiers suspicious of the 
actual penetration of their mask obtained in the 
immediate locality of projector discharges. 
Dr. Pick explains in Schwarte’s book what is 
already well known, that the charcoal layer has a 
wide, “non-specific effect, and it retains almost all 
materials of which the molecular weight is not too 
small, even if very strongly neutral in character 
(as, for example, chlorpicrin).” He goes on to say 
“the progressive development of gas warfare led to 
the use of these very materials, whilst substances 
with acid properties, such as chlorine, fell more and 
more into disuse. The three-layer drum went 
through all sorts of changes in consequence. When 
the use of chlorpicrin mixtures gained in importance 
in 1917, the layer of charcoal was increased at the 
expense of the other two layers. This stage of 
development ended in 1918, when the other layers 
were done away with altogether, and the entire three 
sets were filled with ‘A’ charcoal.” “‘A’ charcoal 
was a particularly efficient form. We learn from the 
same source that the increased protection against 
phosgene was very welcome to the Germans in view 
of the danger arising from gas projector attacks. 
Further, the capacity for absorption of the German 
charcoal was never equalled by any of foreign pro- 
duction.” This was certainly true for the greater 
part of the war. But Dr. Pick continues, in a sen- 
tence which is full of significance: “In consequence 
of the high quality of the drum’s absorption, we were 
able to carry on to the end of the war with a drum of 
129 The Riddle of the Rhine 
relatively small proportions.” This point is so 
important as to demand further explanation. 
Enforced German Modifications.—The most im- 
portant disadvantage of a gas mask is its resistance 
to breathing. Men undertaking arduous and dan- 
gerous duties in the presence of gas must wear a 
mask, but they cannot undertake these duties if 
their breathing is seriously interfered with. This 
is particularly so in trench engineering and in the 
heavy work of the artillery. Now the resistance 
depends, for a given type of filling, upon the area of 
the cross-section of the drum. Breathing will be 
easier through a very large area than through a very 
small one. The British appliance was a frank 
admission that, with its filling, a large drum was 
necessary, so large that the weight of it could not be 
borne by the mask itself, but by attachment to the 
chest, the actual mask being connected with the 
drum or box by a flexible rubber tube. But the 
Germans adopted from the beginning a form of 
protective appliance in which the drum or cartridge 
was attached to and supported by the mask. In 
other words, their development was limited by the 
weight of their drum, unless they completely changed 
their type on British lines. It is quite clear that 
they realised this, for Doctor Pick tells us, referring 
to the large size of the British box: “For this reason 
the weight of the box is so great that it is no longer 
possible to attach it directly to the mask. It is, 
therefore, carried on the chest and joined to the 
mouthpiece of the mask by a flexible tube.” 
The development of British cloud gas compelled 
the Germans so to modify their filling that the 
resistance to breathing increased considerably. They 
countered this, however, by introducing an exceed- 
ingly active charcoal, realising that the weight of 
130 The Struggle for the Initiative 
their drum had already reached the limit possible 
with that type of apparatus, and that they could 
not, therefore, get better breathing capacity by 
increasing its size. When, however, the Blue Cross 
compounds were introduced, it was necessary for 
both armies to take special precautions. These 
precautions involved introducing a layer of filtering 
material into the canister or drum. Dr. Pick tells us: 
“When the material of the Blue Cross type became 
of greater importance, a supplementary apparatus 
had to be issued. A thin disc filter prepared by a 
special method from threads of cotton was fastened 
to the tube of the drum by means of a spring lid. 
This arrangement provided adequate protection 
against materials of the Blue Cross type used by the 
enemy, as, for instance, stannic chloride, whilst the 
German Blue Cross gas, which was more penetrating, 
was only retained to a moderate degree.” This is a 
direct admission that, in order to counter the Allied 
use of Blue Cross gas, further filtering arrangements 
would have been necessary. But the resistance to 
breathing of the German apparatus was already 
strained to the utmost. It is exceedingly improb- 
able that the Germans, having already reached the 
limit of size of the canister or drum, and being unable 
to obtain better breathing by increase in size, could 
have introduced any such device without carrying 
their resistance beyond the possible limit. In other 
words, the use of Blue Cross by the Allies would have 
compelled them to adopt the British type of appa- 
ratus, that is, a bigger box supported by the chest 
and connected to the mask by a flexible rubber tube. 
This would have led them into an impasse. 
Shortage of Rubber.—We know how, in the be- 
ginning of 1917, they were compelled to substitute 
leather in the substance of the mask. Dr. Pick 
131 The Riddle of the Rhine 
admits that this was due to lack of raw material, 
rubber, and there are many other signs that this was 
so. Although leather was not altogether a bad substi- 
tute for this purpose, rubber would have been essential 
for the flexible tube, and the millions required to 
refit the army would have completely broken the 
German rubber resources. Many facts, including 
their feverish development of synthetic rubber, small 
quantities of which they obtained at enormous cost, 
go to prove this conclusion. The submarine, Deutsch- 
land, returning to Germany in 1916, from its historic 
trip to America, carried shipments of the most sorely 
needed commodities, including large quantities of 
raw rubber. Stringent measures were adopted later 
to collect waste rubber and prevent its use for such 
purposes as billiard tables and tyres for private 
vehicles. The first naval expedition to Baltic 
ports after the Armistice found the hospitals in a 
pitiable plight for lack of rubber. The Germans were 
being driven into an impossible position. In other 
words, the Allies, by a proper use of Blue Cross 
compounds, could have regained the gas initiative. 
There is no doubt that they were within a few months 
of doing so. Once again we see the importance of 
production. Lack of raw materials for protective 
purposes was endangering the German position, 
but delay in offensive production by the Allies re- 
moved that danger. Although their pressing need 
was obvious, the Blue Cross arsenic compounds were 
not available. The chemical war involves manoevr- 
ing for position just as definitely as the older forms, 
but in it production, formerly a routine activity, 
assumes critical strategic importance. 
Gas Discipline.—This constant vigilance against 
enemy surprise imposed more conditions upon the 
troops than the permanent adoption of a protective 
132 To face page 133 
THE LIVENS PROJECTOR—III. 
Explosion of Livens bombs on the objective. The Struggle for the Initiative 
appliance which, in itself, was a very big thing. 
Given the mask, the army had to be taught how and 
when to use it. A gas sense had to be developed 
which ensured rapid use of the mask at the right time 
with the least hampering of operations. Gas dis- 
cipline thus became one of the most important fea- 
tures of general training, a feature which can never 
be abandoned by the armies of civilised nations in the 
future without disastrous results. This discipline, 
like all other protective work, was dependent in its 
nature and intensity upon the struggle for the initia- 
tive. One example out of many is found in the 
numerous German Army Orders which followed our 
introduction of the Livens projector. This weapon 
gave the possibility of much higher concentrations 
at much greater ranges from the front line than were 
formerly possible and for a time German gas dis- 
cipline was severely shaken, and the staffs had to 
react violently to meet the situation. The intro- 
duction of this weapon, in fact, was the first clear 
case of the gaining of the chemical initiative by the 
Allies. A telegram from German General Head- 
quarters stated: “The English have achieved con- 
siderable success by firing gas mines simultaneously 
from a considerable number of projectors on to one 
point. Casualties occurred because the gas was 
fired without warning, and because its concentration 
was so great that a single breath would incapacitate 
a man.” 
This is a further example of the fact that the 
decisive initiative was very difficult to obtain after 
two years of war, whereas by the same means it 
would have been ensured at the commencement. 
The general development of German protection was 
a partial safeguard, but the value of the weapon 
could be seen from the fact that an order was issued 
133 The Riddle of the Rhine 
for all German working parties to wear gas masks 
when within 1000 yards of the front line on nights 
not obviously unsuitable for Allied gas discharges. 
It is difficult to exaggerate the military importance 
of such an imposition. 
Summary.—We have thus covered a period, the 
main features of which were attempts at the cloud 
initiative by Germany and our rapid and successful 
protective reaction. The conditions surrounding the 
first attack were entirely peculiar. The complete 
surprise attending it could only be repeated at the 
commencement of another war. It failed for entirely 
different reasons from those which prevented the 
decisive use of phosgene by the Germans. But 
our reaction carried us further, and we developed 
the final form of cloud gas attack, the Livens pro- 
jector, which, in its turn, taxed the German protec- 
tion to the utmost, and threatened to overcome it. 
History repeated itself with a vengeance in this 
protective struggle. 
Two attempts at the cloud initiative, the German 
phosgene attempt and the Livens projector, were 
both partially successful. Had either of those 
attempts shared the surprise of April 22nd, 1915, 
their success would have been many times greater. 
It was contact on the battle front that developed a 
protective appliance and organisation, by giving us 
an insight into enemy appliances and projects. 
We cannot emphasise too strongly the significance 
of this for the future. Apart from remote excep- 
tions, contact will be entirely absent. We can have 
no guarantee whatever that new devices will be 
revealed, either between nations or to a central 
body. Suppose the Germans had been more fully 
aware of the possibilities of cloud gas, and, realising 
the dependence of their one method upon wind 
134 The Struggle for the Initiative 
direction and caprice, had developed our method 
of producing cloud at a distance. The combinations 
of the two methods at Ypres could hardly have left 
a margin of chance for failure. This is a feeble 
example of what may occur. 
New German Attempts.—By this time it was not 
easy to see how either side could obtain a decisive 
surprise by the use of chemicals aimed at the respira- 
tory system. It appeared very difficult to penetrate 
the different forms of respirators by conditions 
obtainable in the field. 
Professor F. P. Kirschbaum, writing on gas war- 
fare, in Schwarte’s book, reveals how Germany 
counted on obtaining the gas initiative against the 
French at Verdun. He explains how the decision 
to use Green Cross on a large scale coincided with 
certain modifications in the design of the German 
gas shell, which made its large-scale manufacture 
much simpler and more rapid. “The manufacture 
of Green Cross,” he also tells us, “was assured in 
the special progress in technical chemistry, and the 
output was adequate,” and goes on to explain, “The 
first use of per stuff1 found the enemy unprepared 
with any suitable protection. The French had 
equipped their troops with protection against chlo- 
rine, but had provided no protection against phos- 
gene,”—“the results of Green Cross ammunition 
were, recognised by the troops. During the big 
operations before Verdun, however, the enemy 
did their very utmost to substitute the gas mask 
M2 for the respirator XTX. Gas mask M2 was a 
protection against Green Cross. For this reason 
Green Cross ammunition alone could not be expected 
to have an effect, as soon as the enemy carried out 
defensive measures by means of gas mask M2 or 
1 Diphosgene or Green Cross constituents. 
135 The Riddle of the Rhine 
some better apparatus. This reverse spurred on 
the Germans to renewed efforts.” The writer pro- 
ceeds to explain how in 1916 these efforts resulted 
in finding two important substitutes, mustard gas 
or Yellow Cross and the arsenic compounds of the 
Blue Cross type. 
Yellow and Blue Cross.—The Germans had, 
somewhat hastily, laid aside their cloud activities. 
But they! were very keenly pursuing another 
line, the development of shell gas. Thus, in 
July, 1917, they made two distinct attempts 
to regain their by the use of shell 
gas, and were very largely successful in one 
case. We refer to the Yellow and Blue Cross shell, 
containing mustard gas and diphenyl-chlorarsine 
respectively. 
Captain Geyer, writing in Schwarte’s book, relates: 
“Gas was used to a much greater extent, over 100,000 
shells to a bombardment after the introduction of 
the Green Cross shell in the summer of 1916 at Ver- 
dun. From that time the use of gas became much 
more varied as the number of types of guns firing 
gas projectiles was increased, field guns having also 
been provided with gas projectiles. The most tre- 
mendous advance in the use of gas by the artillery, 
and indeed in the use of gas in general, came in the 
summer of 1917 with the introduction of the three 
elements, Green, Yellow, and Blue, one after another. 
This introduced the most varied possibilities of 
employing gas, which were utilised to the full in 
many places on the front during the successful 
defensive operations of 1917, above all in Flanders 
and at Verdun. The hardly perceptible poisoning 
of an area by means of Yellow Cross shell and the 
surprise gas attack became two of the new regulation 
methods of using gas.” 
136 The Struggle for the Initiative 
Yellow Cross.—The respirator afforded complete 
protection against the attacks of mustard gas on the 
respiratory system, but this gas evaded protection 
in other ways. In the first place, its early unfamiliar- 
ity evaded the gas discipline of the Allies, and it was 
not realised in many cases that the respirator was 
necessary. This was speedily corrected, but its 
second line of attack was not easily, and never finally 
countered. We refer to its vesicant action. Mus- 
tard gas could produce severe blistering and skin 
wounds in such slight concentrations, even through 
clothing, that it was a tremendous casualty producer, 
putting men out of action for several weeks or months, 
with a very low rate of mortality. Used in large 
quantities against an entirely unprotected army, its 
results might well have been decisive. 
This was the first example of chemical attack 
upon a new function. We had too readily assumed 
that gas, or chemical attack, would be restricted to 
the respiratory system, or to the eyes. We had 
assumed that if our mask protection was ahead 
of enemy respiratory attacks our situation was safe. 
Mustard gas was a rude awakening. It was impos- 
sible to protect fully against mustard gas, unless we 
protected the whole body, and it was never possible 
to do this during the war without too seriously influ- 
encing the movements of the soldier. 
Blue Cross.—The Blue Cross Shell was a delib- 
erate attempt to pierce the respirator. It repre- 
sented to the German mind such an advance of 
aggression over protection that the effect on the 
enemy would be almost as if he were entirely unpro- 
tected. Some idea of the German estimate of its 
importance can be found in the following quotation 
from Captain Geyer: “The search for new irritants 
in the sphere of arsenic combinations led to the dis- 
137 The Riddle of the Rhine 
covery of a series of effective substances. In view 
of the obvious importance of highly irritant com- 
pounds capable of existing in a very finely divided, 
pulverised, or particulate form, research was made 
in the domain of little volatile substances with boiling 
points up to 400°. This led to the astonishing dis- 
covery that diphenylarsenious chloride when scat- 
tered would penetrate all gas masks then in use, 
even the German, practically unweakened, and 
would have serious irritant effects on the wearers. 
This discovery could only be explained by the sup- 
position that the irritant works in the form of par- 
ticles which it is difficult to keep back by means of a 
respirator, even a completely protecting respirator, 
such as the German and English gas masks were at 
that time. Further analysis showed that the mix- 
ture of air and gas examined revealed a concentration 
of gas greatly in excess of the point of saturation for 
the vapour given off by this stuff. Finally, ultra 
microscopic examination showed the existence of 
smoke particles. A new type of fighting material 
had been discovered.” 
He also tells us how, following this discovery, 
production rose to 600 tons monthly, and used up 
all the arsenic obtainable in Germany. The Allies 
were fully alive to the importance of this matter, 
and we have already explained that, had they been 
in possession of large quantities of Blue Cross 
compounds, they might have forced German pro- 
tection into an impossible position. No better 
example could be found of the immense superiority < 
enjoyed by Germany owing to her flexible and effi- 
cient producing organisation. Captain Geyer goes 
on to explain how the military value of these pro- 
jectiles was considerable, and, therefore, the monthly 
production reached a figure of over one million shell. 
138 The Struggle for the Initiative 
We have already emphasised the question of design 
in chemical warfare, and its importance is borne out 
by the comparative failure of these German projec- 
tiles. Geyer explains how only minute particles 
less than i/io,oooth of a millimetre in diameter are 
of any use to penetrate a mask, and he develops the 
difficulties experienced by Germany in obtaining 
such fine pulverisation without decomposing the 
substance. He explains the difficulties which they 
had in arriving at a suitable shell, and their unsuc- 
cessful struggle to overcome the necessity of a glass 
container, which, he says, demanded “a considerable 
advance in the technical work of shell production.” 
This attempt at the chemical initiative by the 
use of Blue Cross illustrates another method of 
attack. Geyer says, “Blue and Green Cross ammu- 
nition were used simultaneously in the field—called 
coloured cross (Buntkreuz) in order, by the use of 
Blue Cross, to force the enemy to remove gas masks, 
whereby they exposed themselves to the poisonous 
effects of Green Cross. Matters seldom reached 
that point, however, for as soon as the enemy realised 
the effect of ‘coloured cross’ ammunition, they 
withdrew troops which were being bombarded with 
it from their positions to a zone beyond the range of 
artillery fire. The English in particular had tried 
to protect the troops against the effects of diphenyl- 
arsenious chloride, and of diphenylarsenious cyanide 
(which followed it and was even more effective) by 
the use of filters made of woollen material and wad- 
ding. They were to a great extent technically suc- 
cessful, but the most effective defensive apparatus, 
the ‘jacket’ to the box, was unsatisfactory from 
the military point of view, as the troops could only 
make a limited use of it owing to the difficulty of 
breathing or suffocation which it occasioned.” 
139 The Riddle of the Rhine 
The reference to the withdrawal of troops is a 
picturesque misrepresentation. The relative inef- 
ficiency of the German shell rendered this unneces- 
sary. In addition, as Captain Geyer explains, our 
troops were specially protected in anticipation of 
the use of particulate clouds. An examination of our 
protective device by the Germans obviously led 
them to believe that resistance to breathing v/as too 
great for the protective appliance to be practicable. 
But here the exceptional gas discipline of the British 
troops became effective. There is no doubt that 
the new mask was worn just as constantly and satis- 
factorily as the old. Captain Geyer’s remarks are 
also interesting from a point of view to which we 
have already referred: they show how much this 
question of resistance to breathing was exercising the 
minds of those responsible for German protection. 
“Particulate” Clouds.—The principle of particu- 
late clouds was not entirely new, both sides having 
used smoke combined with lethal gases with the 
object of forcing the removal of the respirator. It 
was thought that the particulate form of the smoke 
would penetrate a respirator designed purely to hold 
up vapours and gases. The reasoning was perfectly 
sound. It was only a question of using the right 
smoke in the right way. There were good grounds 
to believe that such substances would penetrate the 
respirator, and either produce a casualty or compel 
the removal of the respirator by the paroxysms pro- 
duced, to allow some lethal gas to complete the 
work on the unprotected soldier. Fortunately for 
us, these objectives were not attained, but this 
was rather due to some hitch or miscalculation in 
the German preparations than to any inherent 
impossibility. 
After this period, although chemical warfare 
140 The Struggle for the Initiative 
became increasingly an organic part of German (and 
Allied) operations, yet there is no serious field evi- 
dence of a deliberate attempt at the gas initiative. 
It must be remembered, however, that gas figured 
very largely indeed in the March, 1918, attempt, by 
Germany, to regain the general initiative. It is 
stated authoritatively, for example that in July, 
1918, the German Divisional Ammunition Dump 
contained normally 50 per cent, of gas shell and, in 
the preparation, in May, 1918, for German attacks 
on the Aisne, artillery programmes included as much 
as 80 per cent, gas shell for certain objectives. 
Potential Production and Peace.—Enough has 
been said to show the general nature of the chemical 
warfare struggle. The question of the chemical 
initiative is vital at the commencement of hostilities. 
Unless, then, we completely rule out any possibility 
whatever of a future war, it is vital for that occa- 
sion. We have indicated sufficiently clearly the 
factors upon which such initiative depends, to show 
the critical importance of manufacturing capacity, 
and protective preparedness. 
A further quotation from Schwarte’s book is very 
much to the point. It tells us: 
“Whilst on our side only a few gases were intro- 
duced, but with successful results, the use of gas 
by the enemy presents quite another picture. We 
know of no less than twenty-five gases used by the 
enemy, and of fifteen types of gas projectile used 
by the French alone, and we know, from “blind” 
(dud) shells which have been found, what they 
contain. The only effective gases amongst them 
were phosgene and dichlorodiethyl sulphide. The 
other substances are harmless preparations, used 
most probably for purposes of camouflage, a method 
141 The Riddle of the Rhine 
highly esteemed by the enemy, but which did not 
enter into the question with us, owing to the capacity 
of our chemical industry for the production of 
effective materials.” 
This is true to a considerable extent. Our de- 
pendence on improvised and relatively inefficient 
production imposed conditions upon Allied policy, 
whereas, in Germany, they had but to command a 
flexible and highly efficient producing machine. 
The world movement towards disarmament will 
hardly countenance the maintenance of permanent 
chemical arsenals. In the face of war experience 
and further research developments the laborious 
war improvisation of these arsenals will not save 
us as it did in the last struggle. Any nation devoid 
of the means of production invites enemy chemical 
aggression and is helpless against it. This, and the 
need to keep abreast of chemical warfare develop- 
ment—particularly in protection—are the chief 
lessons of the struggle for the chemical initiative. 
142 CHAPTER VII 
REVIEW OF PRODUCTION 
Critical Importance of Production.—Our analysis 
of the struggle for the initiative reveals the critical 
importance of production. In the chemical more 
than in any other form of warfare, production has a 
tactical and strategic importance and functions as 
an organic part of the offensive scheme. A tendency 
in modern war is to displace the incidence of initiative 
towards the rear. Staffs cannot leave the discov- 
eries of the technical workshop or scientific laboratory 
out of their calculations, for their sudden introduc- 
tion into a campaign may have more influence on its 
result than the massing of a million men with their 
arms and equipment for a surprise assault. The 
use of a new war device may shake the opposing 
formations more than the most cunningly devised 
attack of this sort. 
When, after the first brilliant assault on the 
Somme on July ist, we began to lose men, material, 
and the initiative, in an endless series of local attacks, 
we were even then regaining it by the home devel- 
opment of the tank. Even before the colossal 
German effort was frustrated by the first Marne 
battle and the development of trench warfare, the 
German laboratories were within an ace of regaining 
the initiative by their work on cloud gas. After 
the lull in their gas attacks, when the Germans 
sought to gain the initiative and a decision by the 
143 The Riddle of the Rhine 
use of phosgene, the quiet work of our defensive 
organisations at home had completely countered 
the move weeks before. 
But in all these cases the counter idea could not 
become effective without large-scale production. 
This was absolutely fundamental. Had we taken 
six years to produce the first type of tank, had the 
Germans failed to manufacture mustard gas within 
a period of years instead of succeeding in weeks, and 
had the box respirator taken longer to produce, 
all the brilliant thinking and research underlying 
these developments would have had practically no 
influence on the campaign, for they would have 
had no incidence upon it. We could go on multi- 
plying examples. But what is the conclusion ? 
From this rapid development of methods a new 
principle emerges. The initiative no longer remains 
the sole property of the staffs unless we enlarge the 
staff conception. Vital moves can be engineered 
from a point very remote in organisation and dis- 
tance from the G.H.Q. of armies in the field. But 
there is a critical step between the invention and its 
effect on military initiative. This is production, 
which for these newer methods becomes an organic 
part of the campaign. 
But the future is our chief preoccupation. What 
would be the supreme characteristics of the early 
stages of a future war? It would be distinguished 
by attempts of belligerents to win immediate and 
decisive success by large scale use of various types 
of surprise. Three factors would be pre-eminent, 
the nature of the idea or invention, the magnitude 
on which it is employed, and its actual time of 
incidence, that is, the delay between the actual 
declaration of war and its use. Now the invention 
is of no use whatever without the last two factors, 
144 Review of Production 
which are entirely dependent on production. When, 
in 1917, the Allied staffs pressed repeatedly for 
gases with which to reply to German Yellow Cross, 
their urgent representations met with no satis- 
factory response until nearly a year had elapsed. 
This was not due to lack of invention, for we had 
simply to copy the German discovery. Failure to 
meet the crying demands of the Front was due to 
delay in production. 
Any eventual chemical surprise will, under genuine 
conditions of disarmament, depend on peace industry, 
for no such conditions will tolerate the existence of 
huge military arsenals. We have already indicated 
the type of peace-time industry par excellence, which 
can rapidly and silently mobilise for war. It is 
the organic chemical industry. Therefore, whatever 
the war may have taught us as to the value of chem- 
ical industry, its importance from the point of view 
of a future war is magnified many times. The 
surprise factor is responsible. The next war will 
only commence once, however long it may drag on, 
and it is to the start that all efforts of a nation plan- 
ning war will be directed. It is, therefore, of impor- 
tance to examine in detail the development of chem- 
ical production during the recent war. 
A close examination is of more than historical 
significance, and should provide answers to certain 
vital questions. German chemical industry was 
the critical factor in this new method of war which 
almost led to our downfall. How did the activities 
of this industry compare with our own production? 
To this an answer is attempted below, but graver 
questions follow. Was our inferior position due 
to more than a combination of normal economic 
conditions, and were we the victims of a considered 
policy? If so, who directed it, and when did it 
145 The Riddle of the Rhine 
first give evidence of activity? An answer to 
these questions will be attempted in a later 
chapter. 
Significance of the German Dye Industry.—At 
the end of 1914 the nation began to realise what it 
meant to be at the mercy of the German dye monop- 
oly. Apart from the immediate economic war dis- 
advantages, the variety and sinister peace ramifi- 
cations of this monopoly had not been clearly 
revealed. Mr. Runciman, then President of the 
Board of Trade, stated with regard to the dye in- 
dustry: “The inquiries of the Government have 
led them to the conclusion that the excessive de- 
pendence of this country on a single foreign country 
for materials of such vital importance to the industry 
in which millions of our workpeople were employed, 
constitutes a permanent danger which can only be 
remedied by a combined national effort on a scale 
which requires and justifies an exceptional measure 
of State encouragement.” Measures were defined 
later. 
In the debate in the House of Commons in Feb- 
ruary, 1915, on the aniline dye industry, a member 
prominent in the discussion, referring to “taking 
sides on the question of Free Trade,” stated that, 
“It was a great pity that this should occur when 
the attention of the House is occupied with regard 
to matters connected with the war” and proceeded to 
draw a comparison between the national importance 
of the manufacture of dyes and that of lead pencils. 
Fortunately he prefaced his remarks by explaining 
his ignorance of the “technical matters involved 
in this aniline dye industry.” These are two out of 
many references to the pressure due to the absence 
of German dyes, which illustrate the purely economic 
grounds on which the issue was being discussed, on 
146 Review of Production 
the one hand, and reveal the prevailing ignorance of 
its importance on the other. 
Exactly one month later came the first German 
gas shock. Such statements as the above tempt 
us to ask who, at this time, realised the common 
source of the direct military and indirect economic 
attack. It can hardly be doubted that the existence 
of the German dye factories was largely responsible 
for the first German use of gas on the front. We 
have already seen how, from the first month of the 
war, the chemical weapon was the subject of definite 
research. Falkenhayn leaves us in no doubt as to 
the chief factor which finally determined its use. 
Referring to difficulties of production, he says, 
“Only those who held responsible posts in the 
German G.H.Q. in the winter of 1914-15 . . . can 
form any estimate of the difficulty which had to be 
overcome at that time. The adjustment of science 
and engineering . . . took place almost noiselessly, 
so that they were accomplished before the enemy 
quite knew what was happening. Particular stress 
was laid upon the promotion of the production of 
munitions ... as well as the development of gas 
as a means of warfare.” Referring to protective 
methods of trench warfare, he continues, “Where 
one party had gained time . . . the ordinary meth- 
ods of attack often failed completely. A weapon 
had, therefore, to be found which was superior to 
them but which would not excessively tax the lim- 
ited capacity of German war industry in its pro- 
duction. Such a weapon existed in gas.” 
The Germans had themselves shown us where 
this production occurred, and Ludendorff supple- 
ments our information by telling us how he dis- 
cussed the supply of war material with Herr Duis- 
burg and Herr Krupp von Bohlen in Halbach, 
147 The Riddle of the Rhine 
‘‘whom I had asked to join the train” in the autumn 
of 1916. The former was the Chairman of the I.G., 
the great dye combine. 
Those producing a new weapon of war must 
always consider the possibilities possessed by their 
opponents to exploit the same weapon after the 
first shock. For the Germans the answer was 
obvious. The Allies would be held at a material 
disadvantage for months, if not years. Without 
the means of production available in Germany, we 
are not at all convinced that the gas experiment 
would have been made, and had it not been made, 
and its formidable success revealed, Germany’s hes- 
itation to use this new weapon would probably have 
carried the day. This, at least, is the most generous 
point of view. In other words, the German poison 
gas experiment owed a large part of its initial 
momentum to ease of production by a monopoly. 
The combination of this factor with the willingness 
to use gas led to the great experiment. The future 
may again provide this combination, unless the 
monopoly is removed. 
Following up this line of thought, we can see 
how tempting was the German course of action. 
Falkenhayn has told us what a violent strain was 
imposed upon Germany by the stabilisation of the 
Western Front early in 1915. The tension between 
the Great General Headquarters and the Home Gov- 
ernment was already in evidence, and would have 
caused difficulty in attaining suitable home and 
liaison organisations, in particular with regard to 
supply. We can well understand this when we 
remember the drastic changes which occurred in our 
own ministries and departments. But what organ- 
isation was required for chemical warfare supply? 
Very little! Quoting from the report of the Hartley 
148 Review of Production 
Mission to the chemical factories in the occupied 
zone, we know that when the Government wished 
to produce a new gas “a conference with the various 
firms was held at Berlin to determine how manu- 
facture should be subdivided in order to use the 
existing plant to the best advantage.” The firms 
referred to were the constituent members of the 
highly organised I.G. There was no need to create 
a clumsy and complicated organisation with an 
efficient one existing in the I.G. ready to meet the 
Government demands. The path could not have 
been smoother. Ludendorff states in his memoirs 
that the Hindenburg programme made a special 
feature of gas production. Increased supply of 
explosives was also provided for. He says: “We 
aimed at approximately doubling the previous pro- 
duction.” And again: “Gas production, too, had 
to keep pace with the increased output of ammuni- 
tion. The discharge of gas from cylinders was used 
less and less. The use of gas shells increased cor- 
respondingly.” This programme represented a de- 
termined effort to speed up munitions production in 
the autumn of 1916. It included not only gas but 
explosives, both of which could be supplied by the 
I.G. Explosives demanded oleum, nitric acid, and 
nitrating plants, which already existed, standardised, 
in the factories of the dye combine. The unusual 
speed with which standard dye-producing plant was 
converted for the production of explosives is instanced 
in the operation of a T.N.T. plant at Leverkusen, 
producing 250 tons per month. The conversion 
only took six weeks. The factories of the I.G. sup- 
plied a considerable proportion of the high explo- 
sives used by Germany. 
In the field of chemical warfare the relationship 
between war and peace production was even more 
149 The Riddle of the Rhine 
intimate. Chemical warfare products are closely 
allied and in some cases almost identical with the 
finished organic chemicals and intermediates pro- 
duced by the dye industry. Therefore, in most 
cases, even when the suggestion of the new chemical 
may come from a research organisation entirely 
apart from the dye research laboratories, the prod- 
ucts fall automatically into the class handled by 
the dye industry. 
Is there any doubt that the I.G. was a terriby 
effective arsenal for the mass production of the 
older war chemicals, explosives, and the newer types, 
poison gases? Is there even a shadow of exagger- 
ation in our claims? There may be those who 
would see a speedy resumption of friendship with 
Germany at all costs, regardless of the honourable 
settling of her debts, regardless of her disarmament 
and due reparation for wrongs committed. Can 
even such concoct material to whitewash the mili- 
tary front of the I.G. ? If they would, they must 
explain away these facts. 
The plants of the I.G. produced more than two 
thousand tons of explosives per week, at their 
average pre-war rate. This is an enormous quan- 
tity. How can we best visualise it ? In view of the 
chapters on Disarmament which follow, we will 
use the following comparison. The Treaty of Ver- 
sailles allows Germany to hold a stock of about 
half a million shell of different stated calibres. How 
much explosive will these shell require? They 
could be filled by less than two days’ explosives pro- 
duction of the I.G. at its average war rate. Between 
two and three million shell could be filled by the 
result of a week’s production in this organisation. 
Further, the average rate of poison gas production 
within the I.G. was at least three thousand tons per 
150 Review of Production 
month, sufficient to fill more than two million shell of 
Treaty calibres. Unless drastic action has been 
taken, the bulk of this capacity will remain, and 
Germany will be able to produce enough poison gas 
in a week to fill the Treaty stock of shell; this in a 
country where the manufacture and use of such sub- 
stances are specially prohibited. 
It is appropriate at this stage to describe as 
briefly as possible the origin and composition of this 
great German combination, the Interessen Gemein- 
schaft, known as the I.G. There is no need to go 
into the gradual self-neglect, and the eventual root- 
ing out by Germany, of the dye-producing industry 
in other countries, notably England, France, and 
America. 
The Interessen Gemeinschaft.—By the end of the 
nineteenth century the manufacture of dyes on a 
large scale was concentrated almost exclusively in 
six great firms. These were the Badische Anilin 
und Soda Fabrik, Ludwigshafen on the Rhine, 
known as the Badische; the Farbenfabriken vorm. 
Friedr. Bayer & Co., in Leverkusen, known as 
Bayer; Actien-Gesellschaft fur Anilin-Fabrikation in 
Berlin; Farbwerke vorm. Meister Lucius & Briining 
in Hochst am Main, referred to as Hochst; Leopold 
Casella G.m.b.H. in Frankfort; and Kalle & Co., 
Aktien-Gesellschaft in Biebrich. 
Each of these six great companies had attained 
enormous proportions long before the war. Only 
two other concerns had carried on manufacture on 
a comparable scale. These were the Chemische 
Fabrik Greisheim-Elektron of Frankfort A.M., a 
company which has absorbed a number of smaller 
manufacturers, and the Chemische Fabriken vormals 
Weiler-ter Meer, Uerdingen. 
The position of all these establishments, with 
151 The Riddle of the Rhine 
one single exception, along the Rhine and its trib- 
utaries is well known. Their growth has been illus- 
trated in their own prospectuses. Hochst was 
organised in 1863 and started with five workmen. 
In 1912 it employed 7680 workmen, 374 foremen, 
307 academically trained chemists, and 74 highly 
qualified engineers. The works of the Badische, 
which was organised in 1865, covered, in 1914, 500 
acres, with a water front of a mile and half on the 
Rhine. There were 100 acres of buildings, 11,000 
workmen, and the company was capitalised at 
fifty-four million marks. The establishment of 
Bayer was on a scale entirely comparable. Quoting 
from an official American report.1 “Griesheim Elek- 
tron, prior to the war, had enormous wTorks chiefly 
devoted to the manufacture of electrolytic chemicals 
and became an important factor in the dyestuff 
business only within recent years, when by absorp- 
tion of the Oehler Works and the Chemikalien Werke 
Griesheim, its colour production reached a scale 
approaching that of the larger houses.” This move 
on the part of the Greisheim Elektron is interesting 
as an example of the general tendency which has 
characterised the development of the German dye 
industry. This firm, producing inorganic materials 
and intermediates, absorbed the Oehler Works in 
order to find an independent outlet for its inter- 
mediate products, thus becoming directly interested 
in dyestuffs production. This move towards inde- 
pendence in the whole range of products involved is 
referred to elsewhere, owing to the manner in which 
it simplified German production for chemical war- 
fare. 
Combination, however, did not cease in the cre- 
ation of these enormous establishments. The cartel 
152 
1 Alien Property Custodian’s Report, 1919. Review of Production 
fever raged here as in other German industries. By 
1904 two immense combinations had been formed in 
the dyestuff industry. One of these comprised 
Bayer, Badische, and Berlin; the other Hochst, 
Cassella, and Kalle. “By pooling profits, by so 
arranging capitalisation that each company held 
stock in the other companies of its own cartel, and 
by other familiar means, the risks incident to the 
enormous expansion of the business and the immense 
increases of export trade were minimised. The 
centripetal tendency, however, did not stop here. 
In 1916, the two pre-existing cartels were combined 
with Griesheim Elektron, Weilerter Meer, and vari- 
ous smaller companies in one gigantic cartel, repre- 
senting a nationalisation of the entire German dye 
and pharmaceutical industry.” The combination 
was extremely close. Profits of the companies were 
pooled, and after being ascertained each year on 
common principles were divided according to agreed 
percentages. Each factory maintained an inde- 
pendent administration, but they kept each other 
informed as to processes and experiences. “There 
was also an agreement that in order to circumvent 
tariff obstacles in other countries materials were to 
be produced outside of Germany by common action 
and at common expense whenever and wherever 
desirable. 
“At the time of the formation of this enormous 
organisation the capitalisation of each of the prin- 
cipal component companies was largely increased. 
Hochst, Badische, and Bayer each increased their 
capitalisation by 36,000,000 marks, bringing the 
capital of each up to 90,000,000 marks.” “Berlin 
increased its capital from 19,800,000 to 33,000,000 
marks. Other increases brought the total nominal 
capital of the group to over 383,000,000 marks. For 
153 The Riddle of the Rhine 
many years a large part of the enormous profits of 
these concerns has been put back into the works with 
the result indicated by the stock quotations. The 
real capitalisation is thus much greater than this 
nominal figure. In fact, it is estimated that the 
actual investment in the works comprising the cartel 
is not less than $400,000,000. It cannot be doubted 
that this enormous engine of commercial warfare 
has been created expressly for the expected war 
after the war, and that it is intended to undertake 
still more efficiently and on a larger scale the various 
methods by which German attacks upon all compe- 
tition were carried on.” 
Two additional features must be indicated. A 
policy to which we have referred was most actively 
followed, aiming at complete independence and 
self-sufficiency in all matters relevant to production, 
especially regarding raw materials. We mention 
later how the war has strengthened the strong pre- 
war position of the I.G. in heavy chemicals needed 
as raw materials for the intermediates and finished 
dyes. 
Recent information reveals a further widening of 
their basis of operation, including a strong hold on 
the electro-chemical industry and on the new syn- 
thetic processes from carbide, for acetic acid and 
the other products normally obtained by wood dis- 
tillation. Again, the policy of the I.G. appears to 
have moved towards more complete unity since the 
war. Exchanges of directing personnel and of cap- 
ital amongst the branches have been recorded for 
which the term “cartel” is no longer a fair descrip- 
tion. In addition, considerable increases in capital 
have occurred which not only reveal the vision and 
activity of the I.G. but which indicate its close con- 
tact with the German Government. With such an 
154 Review of Production 
organisation in existence and with the complete 
liaison which had developed between the directors 
and the German Government for other purposes than 
chemical warfare, and in agreement with the paternal 
policy adopted by the latter towards this chemical 
industry, production became simplicity itself. 
War Production by the I.G.—Let us, therefore, 
examine in some detail the actual production of war 
gases and chemicals by the I.G. In order to obtain 
an idea regarding ease of production, we will later 
make a comparison with the magnitude and rapidity 
of that of the Allies. 
From the point of view of this statement, there 
are two main classes of production, that in which 
the majority of the steps involved were actual 
processes employed for the manufacture of some 
dye, pharmaceutical or other chemical product, 
and, in the second place, that in which no such 
coincidence occurred, but in which the general 
technique developed, and the varieties of existing 
plant covered the needs of the case. Without 
stretching the point, every war chemical employed 
came easily under one of these two categories. In 
order to assist the less technical reader, we will 
consider the production of the chief war chemicals 
in the order in which they appeared against us on the 
front. 
Chlorine.—This important raw material, used in 
a variety of operations, notably for the production 
of indigo and sulphur black, two highly important 
dyes, was produced along the Rhine before the 
war to the extent of nearly forty tons a day. The 
only serious expansion required for war was an 
increase of already existing plant at the large factory 
of Ludwigshaven. The following table of pro- 
duction illustrates the point: 
155 The Riddle of the Rhine 
Chlorine (Metric Tons per Day) 
Leverkusen.......... 
1914 
. . .. 20 
1918 
20 
Hochst 
.... 4 
8 
Ludwigshafen 
••• 13 
35 
Total 
•••37 
63 
Chlorine was important, not only as a raw material 
for most of the known chemical warfare products, 
but also, in the liquid form, for cloud attack. Owing 
to the development of protection, the use of liquid 
chlorine for the latter purpose became obsolete. 
Phosgene.—This was produced in considerable 
quantity before the war at Leverkusen and Lud- 
wigshafen, leading to many exceedingly important 
dyes, amongst the most commonly used at present 
being the brilliant acid fast cotton scarlets so largely 
used in England. More expansion of plant was 
necessitated. At Leverkusen the existing plant can 
produce at least thirty tons a month, and we learn 
“the plant remains intact ready for use.” At 
Ludwigshafen the capacity was considerably higher, 
amounting to 600 tons per month. As production 
was commenced before the war, there were no dif- 
ficulties in developing the process, expansion alone 
being necessary. 
Xylyl Bromide.—This was one of the early lach- 
rymators, and was produced at Leverkusen in a 
plant with a maximum monthly output of sixty tons. 
Production began, according to a statement on the 
works, in March, 1915. Its ease can be judged 
from the fact that this compound was used almost as 
soon as the first chlorine cloud attack at Ypres. 
The Germans undoubtedly attached considerable 
importance to their brominated lachrymators. In 
156 Review of Production 
this connection their persistent efforts to retain 
the bromine monopoly with their Stassfurt product 
and to crush the American industry before the 
war are significant. The success of these efforts 
certainly placed us in a difficult situation during 
the war, both with regard to production of drugs 
and lachrymators. 
German bromine was associated with potash in 
the Stassfurt mineral deposits, whereas the American 
product was produced from numerous salt springs 
and rock salt mines. Although Germany had not 
succeeded in crushing the American industry, yet 
the outbreak of war found her in a predominant 
position, for her two chief opponents, France and 
England, were cut off from their supplies, which 
were German; and American production was of 
little use, owing to the great excess of demand over 
supply, and the manipulation of output by German 
agents in America. A possible source of bromine 
existed in the French Tunisian salt lagoons, whose 
pre-war exploitation had been considered by an 
Austrian combination. The French wisely devel- 
oped a Tunisian bromine industry sufficient for their 
own needs, and, on different occasions, supplied us 
with small quantities. But the development of 
such an enterprise in time of war was a severe handi- 
cap. 
Diphosgene or Trichlormethyl Chloroformate.—This 
substance was toxic, a lachrymator, and slightly per- 
sistent. It attained a maximum monthly uutput 
of 300 tons at Leverkusen, and about 250 tons at 
Hochst. This was not a simple compound to make, 
and had no direct relationship with the stable product 
of the peace-time industry. At the same time, it 
provides an example of the way in which general 
technique developed by the industry was rapidly 
157 The Riddle of the Rhine 
used to master the new process. In particular their 
method of lining reaction vessels was of value here. 
The reaction occurs in two stages by the production 
of methyl formate and its subsequent chlorination. 
The methylformate plant was part of an existing 
installation, but the chlorination and distillation 
plant were specially installed. 
Chlorpicrin.—This was mixed with diphosgene 
and used in the familiar Green Cross shell. The 
production was very readily mastered and attained 
the rate of 200 tons per month. Picric acid, chlorine, 
and lime were required, all three being normal raw 
materials or products of the industry. At Hochst 
no new plant was installed, the manufacture being 
carried out in the synthetic indigo plant. 
Phenylcarbylamine Chloride.—This was used in 
German chemical shell, and was not particularly 
effective against us, although produced in large 
quantities by the Germans, in vessels used in peace 
time for a very common intermediate, monochlor- 
benzene. The ease of production of this substance 
may account for its use in large quantities by the 
Germans, in order to increase their gas shell pro- 
gramme. 
Mustard Gas or Dichlordiethyl Sulphide.—This 
was prepared in four stages: 
(1) Preparation of Ethylene—by heating alcohol 
with an aluminium oxide catalyst at 400° C. 
(2) Preparation of Ethylene-chlor-hydrin, by pass- 
ing ethylene and carbon dioxide into a 10 
per cent, solution of bleaching powder at a 
temperature below zero centigrade, and sub- 
sequent concentration of the product to a 
20 per cent, solution. 
(3) Conversion of the chlor-hydrin into thio- 
158 Review of Production 
diglycol by treatment with sodium sul- 
phide. 
(4) Conversion of the thiodiglycol into mustard 
gas (dichlordiethyl-sulphide), using gaseous 
hydrochloric acid. 
The thiodiglycol was produced at Ludwigshafen and 
provides one of the best examples of the adaptation 
of the German dye works for the purpose of producing 
war chemical. Technically, ethylene is a fairly dif- 
ficult gas to produce in large quantities, but, for the 
Ludwigshafen works, these difficulties were a thing of 
the past. There were twelve big units before the 
war, and, by the time of the Armistice, these had 
been increased to seventy-two in connection with 
mustard gas manufacture. In a similar way, the 
number of the units for chlorhydrin, the next step, 
was increased from three to eighteen. These two 
processes had all been worked out very thoroughly 
in connection with the production of indigo. These 
new plants were identical with the peace-time units. 
The expansion was a mere question of repetition 
requiring no new designs or experiments and risking 
no failure or delay. Success was assured. The last 
step, the production of thiodiglycol, occurred in the 
causticising house, to which no substantial altera- 
tions or additions appear to have been made for the 
purpose. As sodium sulphide is used in large quan- 
tities as a raw material in the dye industry, and was 
already produced within the I.G., no difficulty was 
presented in connection with its supply. 
The thiodiglycol was forwarded to two other 
factories, one of which was Leverkusen, where 300 
tons of mustard gas were produced monthly. The 
reaction between thiodiglycol and hydrochloric acid 
was one which required very considerable care. 
159 The Riddle of the Rhine 
At one stage of the war the Allies viewed with much 
misgiving the possibility of having to adopt this 
method. But the technique of the German dye 
industry solved this as satisfactorily and as steadily 
as other chemical warfare problems, bringing its 
technical experience to bear on the different diffi- 
culties involved. 
Diphenychlorarsine.—This was the earliest and 
main constituent of the familiar Blue Cross shell. 
It was prepared in four stages: 
(1) The preparation of phenyl arsinic acid. 
(2) The conversion of the above to phenyl arseni- 
ous oxide. 
(3) The conversion of the latter into diphenyl 
arsinic acid. 
(4) The conversion of the latter into diphenyl- 
chlor-arsine. 
This is another example of a highly complicated 
product which might have presented great diffi- 
culties of production, but the problem of whose 
manufacture was solved, almost automatically, by 
the German organisation. 
The first step, that of the manufacture of phenyl 
arsinic acid, was carried out at Ludwigshafen in one 
of the existing azo dye sheds without any alteration 
of plant, just as a new azo dye might have been 
produced in the same shed. It is believed that 
another dye factory also produced this substance. 
At Ludwigshafen the conversion to diphenyl arsinic 
acid occurred. This was again carried out in the 
azo colour shed, with no more modification than 
that involved in passing from one azo dye to another. 
This chemical mobilisation of a huge dye unit 
was, and could still be, practically invisible in opera- 
tion. Not only was the process practically the same 
160 Review of Production 
as azo dye production, but, as the compounds were 
not particularly poisonous in the intermediate 
stages, there was no risk to the workers, and no need 
to violate secrecy by indicating special precautions. 
The final stage, the preparation of diphenyl- 
chlorarsine, the actual Blue Cross shell constituent, 
occurred at Hochst, which also carried out the 
first three stages, already outlined as occurring at 
Ludwigshafen and Leverkusen. The last stage was 
a simple one and was carried out in plant and build- 
ings previously used for peace purposes. 
The other substances employed provide further 
examples of this ease of production. Ethyl-dichlor- 
arsine was produced in homogeneously lead-lined 
vessels, identical with those used for diphosgene. 
Dichlor-methyl-ether presented difficulties which 
were solved by applying the German method of using 
tiled vessels. 
The part played by the LG. in the German chem- 
ical warfare organisation has already been outlined, 
and we have seen how the German Government 
was content simply to place its demands before the 
directors of the dye combine. The latter were left 
to choose the process and exploit it by making the 
best use of their organisation, which was done after 
reviewing the plant at their disposal in the different 
branches. An interesting feature of the production 
of war chemicals by the I.G. is thus revealed by 
examining the actual locality of the separate opera- 
tions leading to any one of the individual poison 
gases. The attached table shows us how the pro- 
duction of any particular war chemical involved a 
number of stages, each of which occurred in a dif- 
ferent factory. The directors of the I.G. simply 
chose a particular plant in a particular factory which 
was most suited for the operation concerned. They 
161 The Riddle of the Rhine 
WAR CHEMICAL 
RAW 
FIRST STAGE 
M. A1 ERiALb 
FROM THE I.G. 
PROCESS 
FACTORY 
Phenyl Carbylamine 
Chloride 
1. Aniline 
2. Chlorine 
3. Caustic 
soda 
Condensation of aniline 
with carbon bisul- 
phide to phenyldithio- 
carbamic acid 
Kalle 
Mustard Gas 
x. Carbon 
dioxide 
2. Bleaching 
powder 
3. Sodium 
sulphide 
4. Hydro- 
chloric 
acid 
Preparation of Ethy- 
lene from Alcohol 
Ludwigs- 
hafen 
Diphenylchlorarsine 
x. Aniline 
2. Sodium 
nitrite 
3. Sodium 
bisulphite 
4. Sodium 
hydrate 
5. Sulphur 
dioxide 
6. Hydro- 
chloric acid 
Conversion of Diazo- 
benzene to Phenylar- 
sinic acid 
Ludwigs- 
hafen 
Kalle 
Hochst 
Ethyl-dichlorarsine 
1. Ethyl 
chloride 
2. Caustic 
soda 
3. Sulphur 
dioxide 
4. Hydro- 
chloric 
acid gas 
5. Iodine 
Production of Ethylar- 
sinic acid from Ethyl 
chloride 
Ludwigs- 
hafen 
Sym-dichlor-methyl- 
ether 
1. Chlorsul- 
phonic 
acid 
2. Sulphuric 
acid 
Production of Formal- 
dehyde from Methyl 
alcohol 
Mainz 
Hochst 
162 Review of Production 
SECOND STAGE 
THIRD STAGE 
FOURTH STAGE 
PROCESS 
FACTORY 
PROCESS 
FACTORY 
PROCESS 
FACTORY 
Conversion of 
Phenyldithio- 
carbamic acid 
to Phenyl Mus- 
tard Oil by 
zinc chloride 
Kalle 
Chlorination of 
Phenyl Mus- 
tard Oil giving 
Phenyl Carby- 
lamine Chlo- 
ride 
Hochst 
Conversion of 
Ethylene into 
Ethylene 
Chlorhydrin 
Lud- 
wigs- 
hafen 
Conversion of 
Chlorhydrin 
to Thio-di- 
glycol 
Lud- 
wigs- 
hafen 
Conversion of 
Thiodiglycol 
to Mustard 
Gas 
Lever- 
kusen 
Reduction of 
Phenyl arsinic 
acid to Phenyl 
arsenious oxide 
Lever- 
kusen 
and 
Hochst 
Conversion to 
Diphenylar- 
sinic acid by 
treatment 
with Diazo 
benzene 
Lever- 
kusen 
and 
Hochst 
Reduction of 
Diphenylar- 
sinic acid to 
Diphenyl- 
chlor-arsine 
by Sulphur 
dioxide in 
HC1 solution 
A.G.F.A. 
Hochst 
Reduction of 
Ethyl arsinic 
acid to Ethyl 
arsenious oxide 
by sulphur 
dioxide 
Lud- 
wigs- 
hafen 
Conversion of 
Ethyl arseni- 
ous Oxide to 
Ethyl dichlor- 
arsine by 
HC1 and iodine 
Hochst 
Conversion of 
paraformalde- 
hyde to sym 
dichlor methyl 
ether by means 
of chlorsul- 
phonic acid 
Hochst 
163 The Riddle of the Rhine 
aimed at the minimum conversion, and in a number 
of cases none was required. The above analysis 
can leave us with no doubt in our minds that the 
organic chemical industry is the logical place for 
efficient chemical warfare production. It cannot 
leave us unconvinced as to the vital importance of 
the dye industry in national defence. 
Allied Difficulties.—Our own production was 
nothing but a series of slow and relatively inefficient 
improvisations. We have already referred to the 
fluctuations in chemical warfare organisation for 
research and supply during the war. These added 
to the difficulties of the supply department, just as 
they did to its complement, the research depart- 
ment. Only great patriotic endeavour could have 
made possible the relative success achieved, not only 
by the departments, but in particular by the firms 
with whom they were called upon to co-ordinate. 
We wanted mustard gas, and realised its need in 
July, 1917. Research work began almost from that 
date, yet successful large scale production did not 
materialise in England until more than a year 
later. We must admit, however, that the French 
were in a position to use their product on the front 
in July, 1918. Let us examine some of our diffi- 
culties. 
The first efforts were directed towards the process 
by which, as we eventually ascertained, the Germans 
produced the whole of their mustard gas. The 
actual chemical laboratory details of the process 
presented no serious obstacle, but difficulties multi- 
plied as soon as we attempted large scale work. 
We wanted ethylene-monochlor-hydrin. Some work 
had been done on this during the war for the National 
Health Insurance Commissioners in connection with 
the production of novocain. Half scale work had 
164 Review of Production 
occurred at the works of a Midland chemical firm, 
and experience so gained was freely offered and used in 
a scheme for the large scale production of mustard 
gas by the co-operation of a number of big chemical 
manufacturers. Pressing requests for the material 
were continually coming from G.H.Q., the pro- 
grammes outlined being more and more ambitious. 
We had to reproduce the result of years of German 
effort spent in developing their monochlor-hydrin 
process for indigo. As a consequence, large sums of 
money were expended on the process, although it 
never eventually operated. Its difficulties, and 
other reasons, led us to research on other and more 
direct methods which the French were also investi- 
gating. The successful outcome of this early re- 
search was due, in particular, to Sir William Pope 
and those associated with him in the work. The 
process was so promising that the long and cumber- 
some chlor-hydrin method was abandoned. As a 
result our five or six months’ work on the German 
method meant so much time lost. The new direct, 
sulphur monochloride method was taken up actively 
and several private firms attempted to develop the 
small scale manufacture. The work was dangerous. 
Lack of that highy developed organic chemical 
technique, which was practically a German monop- 
oly, rendered the task much more dangerous than it 
would have been if undertaken by one of the I.G. 
factories. 
The French, realising the importance of the new 
methods, spared nothing in their attempts to develop 
them. Their casualties multiplied at the works, 
but the only reply was to put the factories concerned 
under the same regime as the front, and the staffs 
were strengthened by well-chosen military personnel. 
The French realised the nature of their task, and 
165 The Riddle of the Rhine 
organised for it. When the difficulties of produc- 
tion were pointed out in August, 1917, in the British 
Ministry of Munitions, reports were instanced that 
the Germans had used forced labour. The French 
in their production at Rousillon, on the Rhone, 
employed volunteer German prisoners. It was a 
curious contrast to see mingling together amongst 
the producing plants representatives of the American, 
Italian, and British Missions, with French officers, 
French technical men, and German prisoners. The 
latter appeared to be perfectly satisfied in their 
work. They were used for certain limited pur- 
poses, such as handling raw materials, and were 
not, as a rule, exposed to the dangerous operations 
against which the French struggled so heroically and 
successfully. It was as though a small section of the 
front had been transferred to the heart of France. 
We saw the minister visiting a factory and pinning 
the Legion of Honour on to the breast of a worker 
blinded by yperite. We saw messages of congratu- 
lation from the front to the factories themselves. 
The morale was wonderful. As a result, the French 
mastered the technical difficulties of mustard gas 
production and shell filling by June, 1918. They 
shared information with us, but the race had started 
neck and neck, and it was impossible to discard 
completely the large plants to which we were already 
committed. Without disparaging our own efforts, 
we must pay a tribute to the achievement of the 
French yperite producing and filling factories. It is 
impossible to give personal credit in this matter 
without going beyond our scope, and we can only 
draw general comparisons. But we must draw 
attention to the following. The German factories 
passed with ease to mustard gas production by a 
process which, compared with the final Allied 
166 Review of Production 
method, was clumsy and complicated, but which 
suited their pre-war plant. Their policy was, 
therefore, sound from the point of view of the cam- 
paign. The Allies experienced great difficulty and 
danger in attaining large scale manufacture with a 
simpler process. 
The same self-sacrificing zeal and patriotic en- 
deavour was shown in this country, but we were 
handicapped in mustard gas production by the 
energetic way in which we had pressed forward the 
industrial realisation of themonochlor-hydrin method. 
The French, less committed in terms of plant and 
finance, could more readily adjust their energy, 
materials, and money to the new method. It must 
not be forgotten, also, that, at this period, chemical 
warfare supply organisation was experiencing cer- 
tain critical changes which could not but reflect upon 
our efficiency. Here again the earlier centralisation 
of research and production by France was a great 
factor in her favour. 
Our difficulties with phosgene, and in particular 
with the arsenic compounds described above, were 
of the same nature, involving us in casualties, great 
expenditure, and little success, when compared with 
German production. The great need for these 
arsenic compounds was realised as early as Feb- 
ruary, 1918, and investigations began even at that 
date, but they had not appeared in the field by the 
time of the Armistice. Whatever mistakes we may 
have made locally during the war, they are small 
compared with the big mistake which was respon- 
sible for our comparative failure in chemical warfare 
production. We were almost completely lacking 
in organic chemical industrial experience. 
It is interesting to note that the activities of those 
elements of organic chemical industry which did 
167 The Riddle of the Rhine 
exist in France and England fully justified the 
conclusions we have drawn. Thus, although enter- 
ing late into the field of chemical warfare produc- 
tion, Doctor Herbert Levinstein, Professor A. G. 
Green, and their collaborators of the firm of Levin- 
stein Limited were able to develop rapidly a suc- 
cessful industrial mustard gas process which was of 
considerable assistance to England and America. 
This work, both in research and production, deserves 
the greatest credit. Again, the dye factories were 
called upon much earlier to assist in French produc- 
tion and were of considerable assistance. 
It would be well at this juncture to review very 
briefly the other war activities of our own dye indus- 
tries. The outbreak of war found them by no 
means inactive. In this country, for example, our 
own dye factories were able to keep pace with the 
increasing demand for dyes created by the rapid 
mobilisation of military and naval equipment. In 
particular the rapid large-scale production of indigo 
by the Levinstein firm, at Ellesmere Port, was a 
considerable achievement. In addition, the new 
State-aided enterprise at Huddersfield was largely 
diverted to explosives production, and rendered 
very valuable services in the supply of Tetryl, 
T.N.T., synthetic phenol, picric acid, and oleum. 
For such reasons, the need for essential dyes, and 
the use of dye capacity for explosives, the important 
part which the rapidly expanding industry could 
have played in chemical warfare production was 
not recognised quickly enough by the relevant au- 
thorities. This is not surprising, for the war sig- 
nificance of the German dye industry was not fully 
realised until the Armistice. It required the Hartley 
Mission to drive this fact home. When, however, 
the brilliant researches, referred to above, on the 
168 Review of Production 
mustard gas method had decided our policy, the 
dye factory of Levinstein Limited vigorously con- 
verted the process into a technical success, and what 
was still a laboratory reaction in the spring of 1917 
became a successful manufacturing process in July 
of that year. 
Released from its war responsibilities at the time 
of the Armistice, the British industry developed 
so rapidly that Lord Moulton, in a speech to the 
Colour Users Association on November 28th, 1919, 
stated: “A few months before the war broke out 
England produced only one-tenth of the dyes she 
needed, but the amount which I am informed we 
shall be able to turn out at the end of this year 
would, in weight, be within one-fifth of the amount 
which England used before the war.” 
But the Allies were not only in difficulties with 
regard to the lack of suitable peace-time plant, 
and industrial organic chemical experience—they 
were hindered at almost every turn by difficulties 
with regard to raw materials and intermediates, 
the products of other chemical manufacture. They 
had to create a liquid chlorine industry. In April, 
1915, the only liquid chlorine plant in England was 
in the hands of the firm of Castner Kellner, whose 
maximum output was not more than a few tons per 
day. Increase in capacity was rendered necessary 
by chemical warfare developments. Chlorine was a 
raw material for mustard gas and practically every 
important substance employed in chemical warfare 
including bleaching powder. Tremendous tonnages 
of bleach were involved in the manufacture of chlor- 
picrin and for use as an antidote against mustard 
gas on the front. We refer elsewhere to the devel- 
oping use of bleach in order to create lanes for troops 
and transport through areas infected by mustard 
169 The Riddle of the Rhine 
gas. A very simple calculation will show what quan- 
tities would be required for such an operation. It 
is true that, as regards chlorine, we were more favour- 
ably situated than France, and forwarded her con- 
siderable supplies in exchange for phosgene. This 
chlorine was essential for phosgene production. New 
plants were brought into being at different places, 
largely through the energy and experience of the 
above-mentioned firm, but so great was the demand 
that it finally became necessary, in order to protect 
the trade users and war interests at the same time, 
to institute a control of chlorine. More than 20,000 
tons of liquid chlorine were produced under the ad- 
ministration of the supply department concerned. 
When we consider the effort which such an increase 
in production must have involved, and the fact that 
expansions occurring did not do so under the steady 
and well-regulated influence of a simple demand, 
but were continually being modified to meet expan- 
sions or diminutions of programme, we can realise 
what a great advantage was possessed by the Ger- 
mans owing to their large initial experience and pro- 
duction. 
We have no hesitation in stating that great credit 
is due to the old Trench Warfare Supply Depart- 
ment and the firms with which it was in contact, 
notably the one referred to above, in connection 
with the Loos attack. But for them, we would not 
have been in a position to retaliate, even at that date. 
The Allied lachrymator campaign was terribly 
handicapped by lack of bromine. The French per- 
formed the phenomenal task of creating a bromine 
industry in Tunis, the development of which reads 
like a romance. Apparently this industry is dying 
out, and German predominance in bromine is again 
asserted. 
170 Review of Production 
French mustard gas production, for which they 
made such huge sacrifices, was threatened by the 
lack of carbon-tetra-chloride, and examples can be 
multiplied. The Germans were in a very different 
position. The development of their dye industry 
had followed the policy of absolute independence 
of external chemical industry. This independence 
was acquired either by the absorption of other enter- 
prises or by the definite development of processes 
and plant for raw materials and intermediates. In 
every case the war has strengthened these factories 
for the manufacture of these products. In 1918 
they produced nearly thirty times as much ammonia 
as in 1914, three times as much nitric acid, fifty per 
cent, as much again of sulphuric acid, and twice 
as much liquid chlorine. This was not purely a 
commercial question. Our lack of such products 
was due to the fact that the Allies, in pre-war times, 
possessed few or feeble industries whose consump- 
tion would stimulate the production of these raw 
materials. They lacked these industries because of 
a blameworthy disregard for the fundamental im- 
portance of science, and particularly chemical science, 
in industry. 
Conclusion.—We have shown how, during the 
war, chemical warfare proved its surprise value and 
how manufacture figured repeatedly as a critical 
factor. We have also shown how the importance of 
production is magnified from the point of view of the 
future. The only logical conclusion is that the 
country which does not possess a strong dye indus- 
try, or enormously comprehensive and expensive 
chemical arsenals, cannot hope to escape serious mil- 
itary results, possibly defeat, from enemy chemical 
surprises. The situation is aggravated by the fact 
that this critical producing capacity exists as a 
171 The Riddle of the Rhine 
monopoly in the hands of Germany. No patriotic 
and thinking person can, therefore, conclude other- 
wise than to encourage the creation of dye indus- 
tries in countries other than Germany, particularly 
in our own. It is true, however, that patriotic 
sentiment and political views do not always lead to 
the same solution. But we must insist that there can 
be no two opinions on the national defence aspect of 
this question, and any political forces opposing the 
logical outcome of patriotic sentiment in this case 
are incurring an exceedingly grave responsibility. 
Further, there is a definite tendency to obscure 
the wrhole issue by inaccurate thinking. When we 
find a Member of Parliament seriously discussing 
disarmament, endeavouring to deal with the matter 
in detail, and yet classing gas as one of those methods 
of warfare in connection with which production can 
be easily prevented,1 we can only stand in amaze- 
ment before our traditional fault, deliberate side* 
tracking of expert guidance. When we realise that 
it was not until after the Armistice that the Hartley 
Commission opened our eyes to the war importance 
of the German dye industry, we see how blind a 
nation may be in matters vital to its defence. 
From the point of view of results on the front, 
for which all were working, the German dye factories, 
when considered as a war weapon, were as much in 
advance of Allied improvised plants as a military 
quick-firing gun is ahead of the old muzzle-loader. 
Further, for progressive and flexible organic 
chemical production, some such difference will 
always exist between the modern dye industry and 
factories or arsenals improvised or maintained to 
meet specific emergencies. 
1The Flaw in the Covenant and the Remedy, Major David Da- 
vies, M.P. 
172 CHAPTER VIII 
AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS 
Special Attention Justified;—Special Value of 
American Opinion.—Various reasons prompt us to 
pay special attention to the development of chemical 
warfare by the United States of America. In the 
preceding chapters we have attempted a more or less 
connected account of its development during the cam- 
paign. Such an account must necessarily make con- 
stant reference to French and British developments. 
But American preparations, although on a colossal 
scale, were not in time to influence the campaign seri- 
ously and directly. Therefore, purely for the sym- 
metry of our account, special reference should be 
made to America. But a more serious reason is to 
be found in the great importance attached by America 
to this branch of warfare. As everybody knows, the 
arrival of the American troops in large numbers was 
preceded by an educational period, during which 
American staffs, officers, and men became acquainted 
with Allied staffs, operations, and methods on the 
Western Front. They were less biased by military 
tradition, and not under the same necessity as the 
European Allies to organise in an improvised way for 
different violent emergencies. Their opinions of war 
methods on the Western Front are, therefore, of 
great interest. 
Chemical warfare at once assumed a place of prime 
importance in their schemes, receiving a stimulus and 
173 The Riddle of the Rhine 
a momentum which, rather than losing force during 
peace, appears to have gathered intensity. There 
was at first no particular background of emotion, or 
desire for specific retaliation in this American devel- 
opment. It was purely a question of deciding on 
technical grounds the relative importance of different 
methods of warfare. Solid facts determined the mat- 
ter later. We have it on the best authority that 
75,000 out of the total 275,000 American casualties 
were due to gas. 
Early American Activities.—The earliest Ameri- 
can activities consisted in attaching various officers to 
the British formations in France and to the French 
research and producing organisations centred in 
Paris. A period ensued of remarkably rapid and 
efficient assimilation of the best developments in allied 
chemical warfare. Two American gas companies 
were attached to ours for instruction in the first month 
of 1918, and they assisted in several gas attacks on 
the British front. 
Field Activities.—In a sense the development of 
chemical warfare organisations by the Americans was 
deprived of its promised success. The Allies re- 
gained the general and final offensive before Ameri- 
can plans matured. But if the latter were prevented 
from participating in various types of cloud and 
stationary attack along the front, yet the coincidence 
of their organisation with the development of more 
open warfare gave them an opportunity, which they 
readily seized, to demonstrate the possibilities of 
mobile chemical attack. Two gas companies, known 
as the 30th Engineers, were assembled, partially 
trained, and embarked for France at the end of 1917. 
They entered upon a course of training with the Brit- 
ish Special Brigade R.E. while further units were 
being organised in America. The projector attracted 
174 American Developments 
the Americans, and they were ready, as General Fries 
informs us, to launch a big projector gas attack, when 
Marshal Foch’s counter attack disorganised the front 
concerned. They then turned their attention to the 
use of the four-inch Stokes mortar in an attempt to 
neutralise the German machine-gun nests, using phos- 
phorus for smoke and thermit shell, and continued to 
assist the infantry either by taking part in the prepara- 
tions for attack or in subsequent operations. 
Special Difficulties.—The great length of the 
American lines of communication led them to develop 
certain research and experimental organisations near 
to the front. These had to deal with the “short 
range” problems, those of immediate importance, 
without referring them back to America. The 3000 
miles of ocean represented a necessary loss of contact 
which prevented the home workers, however willing, 
from fully realising the needs of the problems con- 
cerned. Accordingly a strong experimental station, 
Hanlon Field, was developed near Chaumont, and a 
well-equipped laboratory was established at Puteaux, 
near Paris. 
Edgewood Arsenal.—The organisations devel- 
oped in America were of very great interest. The 
American officers in the field, through their contact 
with the British and French, realised early that we 
were extended to the utmost in the matter of produc- 
tion, that our demands and programmes were far 
ahead of our output, and that they could not reason- 
ably expect serious help from us, either with regard to 
the results or the material means of production. 
They, therefore, made surveys of our methods and 
wisely determined to concentrate on production in 
America. As a result, they developed the phenom- 
enal chemical warfare arsenal of Edgewood. Had 
the war lasted longer, there can be no doubt that this 
175 The Riddle of the Rhine 
centre of production would have represented one of 
the most important contributions by America to the 
world war. Probably had production been conceived 
on a smaller scale, however, its results would have 
materialised sooner and produced greater actual in- 
fluence. 
A few facts with regard to Edgewood suffice to 
confirm its potentialities. We learn 1 that the arsenal 
organisation comprised a huge chlorine plant, prob- 
ably the largest in the world, various chemical plants 
for the manufacture of the chief chemical warfare 
substances adopted by the European belligerents, and 
shell-filling plant capable of filling a total of more 
than 200,000 shell and bomb daily. 
Research.—Supporting this production, and in 
connection with the other branches of chemical war- 
fare, a tremendous research organisation developed 
which, with the exception of the combined research 
facilities of the I.G.,2 was probably the largest re- 
search organisation ever assembled for one specific 
object. It grew until it contained 1200 technical men 
and 700 service assistants, and we are told that its 
work covered exhaustive research on more than 4000 
different materials. Nor were the Americans less am- 
bitious on protection. Wisely adopting the British 
Box Respirator during the early stages, they made 
vigorous attempts at the same time, with considerable 
success, to develop a form of their own. 
Production.—An American opinion on the im- 
portance of Edgewood Arsenal at the time of the 
Armistice is worth quoting.3 “Here is a mammoth 
plant, constructed in record time, efficiently manned, 
1 Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, January, 
iqiq. 
2 The great German organic chemical combine. 
3 Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, January, 
1919- 
176 American Developments 
capable of an enormous output of toxic material, and 
just reaching its full possibilities of death-dealing at 
the moment when news is hourly expected of the sign- 
ing of the Armistice. What a pity we did not possess 
this great engine of war from the day American 
troops first sailed for France, for, had we been so 
prepared, how many of our boys who ‘have gone 
West’ could have returned for the welcome home! 
Shall we forget this lesson of preparedness? Is this 
great plant to be scrapped ? Possibly wise heads may 
find a solution of the problem which will add this 
great resource to American chemical industry, at the 
same time preserving its value to the nation as a 
greater asset, in case of future war, than a standing 
army.” 
Although mainly dependent on Edgewood Arsenal 
for their war schemes, it is perfectly clear that the 
Americans realised that theirs was not the ideal way, 
in fact was a very wasteful and inefficient way to 
produce poison gases or chemical warfare substances. 
Indeed, even during the war, in spite of their huge 
arsenal they established contact with various Ameri- 
can chemical producers. At the present time, except 
in connection with its use for emergencies during the 
next few years, this huge source of production at 
Edgewood must be regarded as an unnecessary bur- 
den upon the State. To be of any use, it requires 
costly maintenance. It is only capable of producing 
a limited number of organic substances. Some of 
these are likely to become obsolete as time goes on. 
This reliance upon a huge fixed arsenal is not only 
out of accord with any international scheme for dis- 
armament, but it is altogether too ponderous, and not 
sufficiently flexible for reliance in future emergencies. 
This is fully realised in America. General Fries, ad- 
dressing the American Chemical Society, said: “The 
177 The Riddle of the Rhine 
magnificent plant at Edgewood may soon be a thing 
of the past. We do not believe the Government 
should attempt to manufacture poisonous gases on a 
huge scale.” He explains how, by reliance upon nor- 
mal chemical industry, “We believe we can build up 
more quickly and to a greater extent than by any other 
method the necessary large output of poisonous gases 
required in a war with a first-class Power.” Refer- 
ring to the mobilisation of industry for this purpose, 
he says: “We believe that if this is done satisfactorily 
it will be one of the greatest possible guarantees of 
future peace.” 
Post Armistice Developments.—But perhaps the 
most interesting and significant aspect of American 
chemical warfare development concerns what has 
occurred since the Armistice. Valuable and success- 
ful attempts have been made to educate not only the 
public but also political leaders to its real meaning. 
No one examining the American daily and scientific 
press, or reading the records of the various Govern- 
ment Committees on the proposed bills of chemical, 
or chemical warfare, interest can doubt that the 
Americans are probably as a whole much more alive 
to the importance of this matter than any other ally. 
Discussions on the Longworth Bill and on the new 
chemical warfare service have provided full ventila- 
tion for the facts of the case, in their proper setting. 
It was a striking contrast to land in America early 
in 1920 and find New York plastered with recruiting 
posters setting forth the various reasons why Ameri- 
cans should join their Chemical Warfare Service. It 
was not only a sign of American methods but also one 
of their appreciation of the importance of the matter. 
This is amply borne out by their final step in recon- 
struction during the last few months. A separate 
Chemical Warfare Service has been reorganised in 
178 American Developments 
America in such a way as to give it a position of inde- 
pendence equivalent to that of the older branches of 
the service. The specific possibilities in the develop- 
ment of this form of warfare are acknowledged by 
the action of the American Congress, and this result 
is very largely due to the creation of an intelligently 
informed political and public opinion. Large grants 
of money have been placed at the disposal of the new 
Chemical Warfare Service, and its research facilities 
promise to equal the war establishments of the older 
services of other Allied countries. 
Views o£ General Fries.—In view of the creation 
of this independent Chemical Warfare Service in 
America and of its importance when measured in 
terms of financial and material facilities, it is of in- 
terest to summarise some of the views already ex- 
pressed by General Fries,1 the head of the new 
service. With regard to the general function of 
chemical warfare, he tells us: “In the first place, 
chemical warfare is a complete science in itself. No 
other invention since that of gunpowder has made so 
profound a change in warfare as gas is making, or 
will make, in the future. 
“To-day there are only four really distinct arms of 
the Service, viz.: the Infantry, the Artillery, Avia- 
tion, and Chemical Warfare. All other forms of 
warfare are a combination, more or less complete, of 
these. The gases, smoke, and incendiary materials 
that make up chemical warfare are used to a greater 
or lesser extent by other arms, but wherever gas is 
used it compels precautionary measures that are 
found in no other branch of the Service. 
“Considering its power, it has no equal. Physical 
vigour is one of the greatest assets in any army. 
Gas, used properly and in quantities that will be easily 
1 Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, 1920. 
179 The Riddle of the Rhine 
obtainable in future wars, will make the wearing of 
the mask a continuous affair for all troops within two 
to five miles of the front line, and in certain places 
for many miles beyond. If it never killed a man, the 
reduction in physical vigour, and, therefore, in effi- 
ciency of an army forced at all times to wear masks, 
would amount to at least 25 per cent., equivalent to 
disabling a quarter of a million men out of an army of 
a million.” 
The Gas Cloud Inescapable.—He goes on to ex- 
plain some of the more specific military needs which 
can be met by chemical means, and refers independ- 
ently to a point which the Germans have mentioned 
repeatedly in their memoirs. “One great reason why 
chemical warfare will continue is that it fills a long-felt 
want on the part of the soldier, that of shooting suc- 
cessfully around a stump or rock. The gas cloud is 
inescapable. It sweeps over and into everything in 
its path. No trench is too deep for it, no dug-out, 
unless hermetically sealed, is safe from it. Night 
and darkness only heighten its effect. It is the only 
weapon that is as effective in a fog or in the inky 
blackness of a moonless night as in the most brilliant 
sunshine. Only the mask and the training that go 
with it protect. Terror, confusion, lack of discipline 
and control are fatal.” 
Importance of Smoke.—General Fries is insistent 
on the future importance of smoke in warfare: 
“Chemical warfare includes gas, smoke, and in- 
cendiary materials, and they can’t well be subdivided. 
As before stated, all the early gas attacks were in the 
form of clouds. The value of that cloud, not only 
for carrying gas but for screening purposes, began to 
be realised in the fall of 1917. Clouds of smoke may 
or may not be poisonous, and they will or will not be 
poisonous, at the will of the one producing the smoke. 
180 To face page 181 
SMOKE BARRAGE. 
Note the sharp curtain which is formed, behind which the infantry advance. American Developments 
For that reason every cloud of smoke in the future 
must be looked upon as possibly containing some 
deadly form of gas. When you consider this for a 
moment, you can realise the tremendous possibilities 
for ingenuity that gas and smoke afford the attacker. 
“The American, trained for 300 years in meeting 
nature on her great plains and in her vast forests, was 
early appealed to by this side of chemical warfare. 
As early as November 3, 1917, the United States was 
urged, in a cablegram from the Chemical Warfare 
Service in France, to push the development of a large 
phosphorus supply for use in smokes. Not only were 
the early intuitions of the value of gas borne out by 
later events, but to-day the future of smoke appears 
greater still. The battle-field of the future will be 
covered with smoke—not the all-pervading black 
smoke of the battles of the Civil War and of earlier 
wars before smokeless powder came into use, but a 
field covered with dots and patches of smoke, big and 
little, here and there and everywhere. 
“Every man who has hunted ducks and been caught 
in a dense fog with ducks quacking all round, and who 
has tried to get ducks by firing at the quack in the fog, 
can realise the difficulty of hitting a man on the battle- 
field when you cannot see him, and have only a quack, 
or less, by which to locate him. The smoke will be 
generated in candles or two or three-pound cans that 
can be thrown out in front of trenches; by knapsacks 
that can be carried and which will give off dense white 
smoke in large volume for many minutes; by grenades 
which, while they may be thrown by hand, will gen- 
erally be fired from rifles; by artillery shells reaching 
ten, fifteen, twenty miles back of the main battle line; 
and finally, from aeroplane bombs whose radius of 
action is limited only by the size of the earth. And 
thus smoke becomes one of the great elements of war 
181 The Riddle of the Rhine 
in the future. It is more or less wholly protective in 
its nature, but as it costs more and takes longer to 
train a man in the various problems involved in mod- 
ern war than ever before in this history of the world, 
it is worth while taking every precaution to protect 
him, once you have him trained.” 
Casualty Percentages.—He also brings out very 
clearly the unique possibility possessed by gas warfare 
of increasing its military efficiency, while decreasing 
its relative atrocity: 
“The death rate in the first gas attack was prob- 
ably in the neighbourhood of 35 per cent, of all 
casualties—and everybody in front of the wave was 
a casualty. With the development of masks and 
training in the use of the mask and in taking advan- 
tage of the ground, the death rate fell. At the same 
time the total number of casualties fell, but not at all 
in the same ratio as the decrease in the death rate. 
From a probable death rate of 35 per cent, in the first 
attack it fell to 24 per cent., then to 18 per cent., and, 
as gas attacks by artillery became general, to 6 per 
cent., and finally, with the extended use of mustard 
gas, the rate fell to 2.5 per cent, or less.” 
Again referring to casualties, he gives us the 
startling fact that 75,000 out of the 275,000 Ameri- 
can casualties were caused by gas, “And yet,” he says, 
“the Germans used it in a halting, comparatively 
feeble manner.” 
Short Range Projectors.—Very much alive to the 
future of the short-range projectors developed in con- 
nection with gas warfare, he tells us, “The Gas Regi- 
ment in the St. Mihiel battle fired on the Cote des 
Esparges one hundred of these high explosive bombs 
at the zero hour on the morning of the attack. That 
hill, famous for its strength through four years of 
struggle between the French and Germans, dis- 
182 American Developments 
appeared completely as an enemy standpoint. Noth- 
ing remained but torn and broken barbed wire, bits 
of concrete pill-boxes, and trenches filled with debris, 
and a few scattered fragments of clothing. 
“The gas troops will, in the future, handle all 
short-range methods of firing gas, smoke, or high 
explosive. They will deliver the greatest quantities 
of material possible up to ranges of a mile and a half 
or a mile and three-quarters. So effective and so effi- 
cient are these short-range methods of projection that 
the No-Man’s-Land of the future will be the width 
covered by these projectors and mortars. They can’t, 
and never will, compete with the artillery, where 
range and great accuracy are the most important 
factors. The efficiency of artillery gas shell or artil- 
lery smoke or high explosive shell is only one-fifth 
that of the projector. Hence, for economy and effi- 
ciency, the artillery will be used to fire gas, smoke, 
high explosive, and incendiary materials only at 
ranges beyond those reached by the gas troops.” 
Again, showing how the American authorities were 
seized with the importance of the matter, we read: 
Vast Expansion in Personnel.—“So greatly were 
these possibilities appreciated in the summer of 1918 
that the number of gas troops authorised for use 
against the Germans was increased from six com- 
panies to fifty-four. Back of all this, however, was 
the productive capacity of the United States, which 
ensured that those troops would be able to fight day 
and night, summer, winter, and fall, until the war was 
over. No wonder the German quit—it was time, and 
he knew it.” 
And in conclusion General Fries tells us: 
“The universal adoption of gas warfare on sea 
and land and in the air, combined with its persistent 
quality, will make that nation able to produce and 
183 The Riddle of the Rhine 
use gas in the largest quantity superior in war to any 
other nation on the globe. The United States can 
reach that position and maintain it, and I believe that 
we are going to get such encouragement from the 
War Department that we can do it. I feel sure that 
the army appreciates the value of chemical warfare, 
and that it appreciates also the value of the chemists 
to chemical warfare. 
“So long as there is any danger of other nations 
continuing these methods of warfare, research and 
experiment in chemical warfare must be pursued. 
Research must not only be directed towards the gases 
and apparatus likely to be employed in the future, 
but also towards protection against all possible gases. 
Training in the use of gas will be confined to appro- 
priate branches, but training in defensive measures 
will include the whole army. 
“We must continue our studies of what is known 
as chemical warfare. No nation has renounced the 
use of poison gases as the result of the Peace Con- 
ference. There are nations whose word we could 
not respect if they did renounce it. It is essential to 
study the offensive side of chemical warfare if we are 
to be prepared for defence. The great importance 
of adequate defensive appliances arises from the fact 
that preparations for the offensive use of gas can be 
made in peace-time with great secrecy, and may have 
far-reaching and even fatal results in the early stages 
of a war. 
“. . . For these reasons it is necessary to make 
adequate provision for research, experiment, and 
design in connection with war material. It is equally 
necessary to avoid overlap, duplication of effort, and 
the setting up of military institutions for scientific re- 
search which can better be done by existing civil 
institutions.” 
184 American Developments 
He also quotes from a statement from General 
Debeney, Director of the French College of War- 
fare: 
“Should war begin now, aviation, and especially 
gas, would play one of the most important parts. 
The progress of aviation would make the rear of 
each front, and very far in rear, extremely danger- 
ous, and the progress of chemistry would permit the 
use of gas on zones of such an extent as cannot be 
imagined. 
“Making gas is naturally rapidly done, because 
all the manufacturers of chemical product—still so 
numerous in Germany—can be requisitioned, but to 
make airplanes is much slower. 
“The defence against gas seems to be more 
difficult than against airplanes. I believe that 
igainst airplanes, the anti-aircraft artillery is suscep- 
tible of making rapid progress, and perhaps in that 
very instance gas will be one of the best ways, if with 
appropriate shells the air can be poisoned all around 
the attacking airplanes. 
“It would be much more effective to create, for 
example, a sphere of poisoned air a mile round the 
airplane, instead of trying to hit the machine directly 
with bits of the shell.” 
British, French, and even German opinion, 
while not underestimating the importance of the 
matter, may not agree in an unqualified way with all 
the above statements. But we claim that they show 
vision in a branch of war which, on account of its 
scientific basis, may, more than any other, speedily 
prove the visionary a true prophet. 
185 CHAPTER IX 
GERMAN CHEMICAL POLICY 
The preceding account of chemical warfare leaves 
the impression of a successful Allied struggle against 
persistently unfavourable circumstances. We were 
constantly compelled to accelerate to attain the pace 
set by the enemy. There were exceptions, undoubt- 
edly, but in the main Germany kept ahead in the 
chemical struggle. 
So far, in examining the root of our troubles, we 
have been content to refer to the existence of the 
I.G., to describe its chemical warfare activities, and 
to indicate, briefly, its unique power to produce large 
quantities of organic chemical products at short 
notice. The close connection between the German 
dye industry and chemical warfare is now well recog- 
nised in official circles, and, to some extent, by the 
general public. Its belated exposure was almost 
entirely due to the facts revealed by the Inter-Allied 
Mission to the German chemical factories some 
months after the Armistice. 
But the situation thus revealed was not created in 
a day, nor by chance. Indeed, one of the military 
features of industrial chemical development in the 
I.G. has already been traced to pre-war activities. I 
refer to the Haber process for the production of 
synthetic ammonia. It would be short-sighted policy 
to accept the set of conditions against which we strug- 
gled, and to explain them in terms of the I.G., with- 
out looking more closely into the pre-war activities 
186 German Chemical Policy 
of this organisation. Such an examination may 
reveal the basic forces which determined our inferior 
position in chemical warfare at the outbreak of war. 
It is true that we can explain away our inferiority by 
referring to the German breach of faith, which auto- 
matically created conditions for which we were un- 
prepared. This is a comfortable solution. But had 
chemical warfare been a strongly developed and ac- 
cepted method of war before the outbreak of hos- 
tilities, would we then have been prepared? The 
records of the past, before April, 1915, must be 
consulted to answer this question. We may find that 
our position is due to more than a mere negative 
attitude, to more than our simple neglect of the 
organic chemical industry. It may be that there were 
forces which definitely exploited this national char- 
acteristic to our disadvantage. The pre-war policy 
and activities of the I.G. must be examined from this 
point of view. In no country has such an investiga- 
tion been more complete than in America, and official 
statements have been issued by the American Alien 
Property Custodian1 which throw a flood of light 
on the pre-war activities of the constituent branches 
of the I.G. They conclusively reveal the existence 
of a carefully directed German chemical policy mak- 
ing for world domination in the organic chemical 
industry, which greatly hampered the military effect- 
iveness of other countries, and directly strengthened 
the military resources of Germany. On broad lines, 
the pre-war and war activities of the I.G. produced 
the same result as an attempt to strangle the eco- 
nomic life of possible opponents, enfeebling their 
resistance to the subsequent delivery of a hammer 
blow designed to take maximum advantage of the 
1 Alien -property Custodian Report, Washington. Government 
Printing Office, 1919. 
187 The Riddle of the Rhine 
situation thus created. Twenty years or more under 
the regime of a forceful economic policy, not with- 
out its sinister aspects, prepared the ground by weak- 
ening us in the concentrated chemical warfare which 
ensued. The success of this policy manoeuvred us 
into such a position that we barely escaped defeat 
under the hammer blows of German chemical aggres- 
sion. This, in fact, appears to have been the 
German conception of modern war in its relation to 
industry, and American reports have shown that it 
was carried through with typical thoroughness by 
familiar German methods. 
Origin of German Chemical Monopolies.—The 
completeness of our organic chemical deficiencies, and 
the thorough way in which we had failed to develop 
organic chemical industries, creates such a sharp 
impression, when thrown into relief by the outbreak 
of war, that we are led to inquire into the methods 
by which these monopolies were established. Let us 
admit, without any further delay, that Germany owed 
the origin and assertion of these monopolies in part 
to her scientific development, fostered by a vigorous 
policy of applying scientific research to industrial 
enterprise. So far as her success depended upon 
such factors, it merits our unqualified admiration and 
envy. But stimulating these developments was a 
very definite general and commercial policy which 
requires close examination. 
German Chemical Commercial Policy;—Evi- 
dence of the U.S.A. Alien Property Custodian.— 
Giving every credit to German initiative and thor- 
oughness in the application of science to industry, 
we are still prompted to inquire how this monopoly 
came to be so complete. We can rely on more than 
mere rumor, when examining the commercial 
methods of the great I.G. The American Alien 
188 German Chemical Policy 
Property Custodian, Mr. Mitchell Palmer, and, 
later, Mr. Francis P. Garvan, had occasion and op- 
portunity to make minute examination of the German 
dye agencies in America in connection with general 
investigations on the reorganisation of alien prop- 
erty. Their revelations truly merit the term, showing 
remarkably clearly the unity of conception, determi- 
nation of purpose, and co-operation with the German 
Government which characterised the policy of the 
I.G. 
Pre-war American Situation.—Let us briefly con- 
sider the relevant aspects of the prewar American 
situation. According to fairly well-known facts, 
confirmed by the reports of the two American 
officials mentioned above, the American pre-war 
organic chemical industry consisted of little more 
than a series of small assembling plants. Although 
enormous supplies of coal-tar products were avail- 
able, yet the dye intermediates derived from them 
were not made in America, but imported from Ger- 
many. After various attempts to establish the dye 
industry, it seemed, at one time, about 1880, to have 
definitely taken root, but, within the space of five 
years, there were only four dye producing establish- 
ments remaining. 
German Price-cutting; — Salicylic Acid. — In 
every instance the manufacture was almost immedi- 
ately brought to an end by German price-cutting. 
The same source reveals the direct and indirect 
methods used by Germany to prevent, at all costs, 
the development of an independent organic chemical 
industry. There are many pointed examples of the 
direct method, and we will glance at the case of 
salicylic acid. This is a very important chemical, 
used not only for certain important drugs but also 
as an intermediate for dyes and photographic chem- 
189 The Riddle of the Rhine 
icals. In 1903 the United States possessed five 
manufacturers of this product. In ten years’ time 
three of these had failed, and one of the survivors 
was a mere branch of a German house. During this 
fatal ten years, the product was being sold in that 
country at a price twenty-five per cent, lower than 
in Germany. The manipulation of the prices of the 
other products of the German monopoly enabled 
them, by such methods, to maintain it. Many other 
examples, including such important products as bro- 
mine, oxalic acid, and aniline, could be quoted to 
show the results of the German price-cutting policy. 
The direct significance of bromine for chemical war- 
fare must be borne in mind. 
Full Line Forcing.—Besides directly attacking the 
production of raw materials and intermediates, the 
Germans used an indirect method which has been 
described as “full line forcing.” They were the sole 
producers of certain specialties, such as alizarine 
colours, anthracene colours, and synthetic indigo. 
These were indispensable to the textile manufac- 
turers, and by refusing to supply them, except to 
houses which would buy their other supplies from 
German manufacturers, the latter could squeeze out 
home producers of simple dyes, however efficient 
their production. 
Bribery and Corruption;—German Patent Pol- 
icy.—The dyeing industry was peculiarly susceptible 
to corruption. It was so simple for the head dyer 
of a mill to show a partiality for dyes from any par- 
ticular source of supply. The American Alien Prop- 
erty Custodian very frankly tells us1: “The 
methods of the great German houses in carrying on 
their business in this country were from the first 
honeycombed with corruption. Bribery of dyers was 
1 Alien Property Custodian Report, 1919, p. 34. 
190 German Chemical Policy 
carried on almost universally on a large scale. . . . 
So extensive was this corruption that I came across 
only one American consumer that had escaped its ill 
effects.” Such were hardly the methods of decent 
commercial competiton, although it appears that the 
strong patriotic sense of the German was able to 
justify, in his own eyes, what might be regarded as 
reprehensible methods. This is not a question of 
bringing up old reproaches, but merely of coldly 
examining facts. We have already referred to their 
patent policy, whereby thousands of patents were 
taken out, the only value of many of them being to 
cramp the productive initiative of possible rivals. 
Professor Stieglitz explains how the German patents 
were useless in developing large scale manufacture. 
“The patent protects the product, but does not reveal 
the method.” Sir William Pope has also brought 
out this point, showing how the Germans use thou- 
sands of bogus patents to protect their chemical in- 
dustry. He tells us,1 “In fact, some German patents 
are drawn up for the purpose of discouraging investi- 
gation by more practical methods; thus, any one who 
attempted to repeat the method for manufacturing 
a dyestuff protected by Salzman & Kruger in the 
German patent No. 12,096 would be pretty certain 
to kill himself during the operation.” 
Propaganda and Information;—Espionage;— 
Activities of the Dye Agencies.—But another 
method which was used in this commercial offensive, 
to which we must draw further attention, dealt with 
propaganda and information. In his comprehensive 
report, the American Alien Property Custodian ex- 
amines a number of large industries and reveals how 
the German interest in these industries through their 
1 Science and the Nation. A. C. Seward, F.R.S. Cambridge 
University Press, 1917. 
191 The Riddle of the Rhine 
American ramifications were active, “sowing the 
seeds of German propaganda,” and collecting in- 
formation, both commercial and military, for the 
use of the German Government and its agents. 
Quoting again from this report, “In many of the 
large German-owned companies taken over by the 
Alien Property Custodian, after investigation it was 
found that espionage was one of the chief functions. 
Every scrap of information of commercial or mili- 
tary value to Germany was carefully gathered by 
the representatives of these concerns in this country 
and quickly forwarded to the home office in Ger- 
many. The German agents were particularly keen 
on gathering information that would be helpful to 
Germany’s commercial warfare. Once in Germany, 
this information was carefully card-indexed for the 
use of the manufacturers. Bulletins of commercial 
information were also prepared and placed at their 
disposal. In Germany, the collection of all commer- 
cial information is under a bureau which is controlled 
and financed by the great German banks, such as 
the Dresdner, Disconto, and Reichs Bank.” This 
statement is not mere generalisation, but is backed 
by innumerable examples. Thus we find a light rail- 
way equipment manufacturer, a projectile company, 
a wireless company, various magneto companies, 
insurance companies, and German shipping compan- 
ies, all engaged in spreading propaganda, acquiring 
information, and influencing public opinion in favour 
of Germany. But, undoubtedly more important than 
any of these, and taking a leading part in the general 
scheme, was the German dye organisation. The 
American publications make this quite clear. Mr. 
Garvan goes so far as to say: “As long as you were 
supplied by the big six (i.e. the I.G.), your business 
had no secret unknown to Berlin. In Berlin you will 
192 German Chemical Policy 
find the card index system which recites every fact 
connected with each and every one of your sources 
which can be of any possible value to your rivals 
over there.” Referring to assistance rendered by 
various American and Allied departments, including 
Military, Naval, and War Trade Intelligence, we 
learn from the same sources: “All these bodies 
worked in close co-operation and their mutual as- 
sistance was of inestimable value. Information 
derived from these sources demonstrated that the 
chemical industry was a natural centre for espionage 
and that this had been true long before we entered 
the war—indeed, before the war began. The rela- 
tion between the German Government and the great 
German chemical houses was so close that represen- 
tatives of the industry were naturally almost direct 
representatives of the Government, and their work 
in this country gave them unequalled opportunities 
for examining our industries from within.” 
With the outbreak of war, this organisation be- 
came more clearly defined. It was, perhaps, difficult 
before the war to know where to draw the line be- 
tween purely commercial and actual governmental 
German activities. The outbreak of war left no 
room for doubt. The German dye agencies became, 
at once, the active agents of their Government in 
various schemes, the nature of which we shall out- 
line, and their “information” functions became very 
definitely describable as espionage. 
Manoeuvring Raw Materials.—In the first place, 
the Alien Property Custodian found unexampled 
evidence of a definite German scheme to corner and 
divert certain important war materials destined for 
the Allies. 
Chemical Exchange Association;—Doctor Al- 
bert’s Letter.—Many such plots could be quoted, 
193 The Riddle of the Rhine 
but we will limit ourselves to one,1 chosen because 
on its stage move the chief figures of this espionage 
system. This case has been described under the 
name of the “Chemical Exchange Association,” and 
is much more fitted for the pen of a Conan Doyle. 
The move appears to have been initiated by Dr. 
Albert, the financial adviser of the German Govern- 
ment in America, in collaboration with von Bern- 
storff. Its purpose was to corner the immediate 
supplies of American phenol in order to prevent its 
manufacture into high explosives, including the well- 
known picric acid. The outbreak of war instantly 
stopped the entry of phenol into the country. 
Further, this product was not manufactured there to 
any extent before. Large supplies were required for 
the production of synthetic resins, for the gramo- 
phone industry. This led to the development of a 
phenol industry by the Edison works, and there ap- 
peared, automatically, a phenol surplus. Dr. Albert, 
aware of the probable fate of this surplus as raw 
material for allied munitions, determined to seize 
it for the German Government, and he did this 
through Dr. Hugo Schweitzer, one of the most 
prominent members of the American agency of the 
great Bayer works. In June, 1915, Dr. Schweitzer 
contracted with the selling agents of the Edison Co. 
for the entire surplus of phenol available for sale, 
offering a large cash security which was furnished by 
Dr. Albert. A lapse of a week witnessed another 
contract with the Heyden Chemical Works, a branch 
of the German house, by which this phenol was pur- 
chased for conversion into salicylic acid and other 
products. To avoid exposing the nature of the deal, 
Dr. Schweitzer registered as the “Chemical Ex- 
change Association.” The profits amounted to 
194 
1Alien Property Custodian Report, 1919, p. 43. German Chemical Policy 
nearly a million dollars, half of which belonged to 
Dr. Schweitzer. This, we are told, went immedi- 
ately to the German Government. As a suitable 
climax to such a venture, a dinner was given at the 
Hotel Astor by Dr. Schweitzer in honour of Dr. 
Albert, and is described as a typical gathering of 
the most active German propagandists in the coun- 
try. It was as a result of this deal that Dr. Albert 
sent Dr. Schweitzer a memorable letter in which he 
praises his “breadth of highmindedness,” and com- 
pares his work with “a military coup accomplished by 
an army leader in destroying three railroad trains 
of forty cars containing four and a half million 
pounds of explosives.” 
Dye Agency Information System;—Dr. Al- 
bert on Chemical Warfare.—Although a great deal 
has been said in America with regard to the activities 
of Dr. Schweitzer and his followers, very little has 
been heard on this side. Explaining the complete 
information system possessed by the Germans, Mr. 
F. P. Garvan informs us that the head of the system 
in America for years before the war was Dr. Hugo 
Schweitzer, President of the Bayer Company there, 
and he even quotes his secret service number given 
him by the Imperial Minister of War, stating that 
he came to America, became a citizen on the instruc- 
tion of the German Government, and led the espion- 
age and propagandist movements down to the day 
of his sudden death in November, 1917. The rela- 
tionships between Dr. Albert and Dr. Schweitzer, 
when the former was leaving for Germany in 1917, 
are very illuminating. We learn from the same 
source how Dr. Schweitzer received from the former 
nearly one and a half million dollars, all to be spent 
in espionage and propaganda. Dr. Albert, leaving 
Dr. Schweitzer a letter of appreciation, to which we 
195 The Riddle of the Rhine 
have referred in connection with the Chemical Ex- 
change, makes a very significant reference to chem- 
ical warfare. “Of still greater and more beneficial 
effect is the support which you have afforded to the 
purchase of bromine. We have a well-founded hope 
that, with the exclusion of perhaps small quantities, 
we shall be in a position to buy up the total produc- 
tion of the country. Bromine, together with chloral, 
is used in making nitric gases, which are of such great 
importance in trench warfare. Without bromine 
these nitric gases are of slight effect: in connection 
with bromine they are of terrible effect. Bromine 
is produced only in the United States and Germany. 
While, therefore, the material is on hand in satis- 
factory quantities for the Germans, the Allies are 
entirely dependent upon importation from America.” 
Making due allowance for the fact that Dr. Albert 
was not a technical man, this information possesses 
an element of truth, indeed France was driven to 
the extreme of establishing a bromine industry in the 
wilds of Tunis in order to counter the German at- 
tack. 
The Moral Aspect.—Such facts tempt us to think 
hardly of these representatives of German culture. 
But they were, no doubt, fiercely patriotic Germans, 
and it is not difficult for us to understand their ac- 
tivities after the outbreak of war. An American, 
however, can hardly adopt such a lenient view, if, as 
has been claimed, many of these agents were natur- 
alised Americans, for they were abusing the privi- 
leges and the confidence of their adopted country. 
We have no wish, however, to dwell on this aspect 
of the matter, and have no doubt whatever that 
many good Germans could justify all these activities 
according to their own codes. It would have been 
196 German Chemical Policy 
better not to have given this information the light 
of day, were it not of some value for the future. 
Report of the New York World;—German 
Policy Regarding Dye Supplies to the U.S.A.— 
How far can the parent organisation of these dye 
agencies be regarded as aware of their activities? 
They were largely responsible for their inspiration. 
Mr. Garvan says, “Practically all the dye salesmen 
were only nominally in the employ of the branches 
here; all had secret and personal contracts with the 
Home Office.” From these facts alone there can 
hardly be any doubt as to the connivance of the home 
organisation. Again, on April 28, 1915, The New 
York World printed an editorial explaining that two 
large German chemical and aniline dye concerns are 
reported to be establishing factories in New Jersey, 
to supply American demands hitherto supplied from 
Germany.” This statement apparently alarmed 
Captain Boy-Ed, the German Naval Attache, and 
he communicated with Dr. Albert, the financial rep- 
resentative in New York, for the establishment of 
these factories would have countered the German 
policy of bringing political pressure by refusing dye 
shipments. Dr. Albert’s reply to Boy-Ed contains 
the following phrase: “With regard to the dyes, I 
got into touch with local experts in order to de- 
termine what truth there is in the news. According 
to my knowledge of things, the matter is a fake, inas- 
much as our factories have hound themselves orally 
and by word of honour to do nothing in the present 
situation which might help the United States.” As 
further evidence of this definite policy, witness a 
letter from Consul-General Hossenfelder to the Im- 
perial German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Holl- 
weg. This letter is dated New York, March 3, 
1916, and, after a detailed examination of the eco- 
197 The Riddle of the Rhine 
nomic relationships between Germany and America, 
states: “Further, we should, according to my con- 
viction, hold ourselves absolutely passive in relation 
to the proposals for the exportation of potash, 
chemicals, and dyestuffs, and if the opportunity 
arises, make the sanction for them, not dependent 
upon the consent for an exchange of articles, but 
upon the abolition en bloc of all hindrances to inter- 
course contrary to international laws which have 
been instituted by England.” Further, Dr. Albert, 
cabling to the German Government in April, 1916, 
on the export of dyestuffs, tells us: “The hope was 
entertained of bringing American industries which 
were solely dependent upon German deliveries of 
dyestuffs into a position that they would have to in- 
sist on the importation of dyestuffs under the condi- 
tions demanded by Germany.” There can then be 
no doubt that the parent organisation of the I.G. was 
in close touch with the activities of its agencies. 
This, then, is a brief account of the methods by 
which Germany created the monopoly whose exist- 
ence threatened our success in the world war. Be- 
fore leaving the question of the monopoly, let us 
inquire a little more closely into its exact nature and 
range. Various American official reports have re- 
vealed the desperate measures necessitated in that 
country in order to meet deficiencies in vital products 
when the German source of supply was removed. 
Professor Stieglitz’s Evidence.—Professor Stieg- 
litz, of the University of Chicago, giving evidence 
before the United States Senate, stated:1 
“I have come to the conclusion that we would have 
saved a great deal of suffering and a great many 
lives in this country, if we had had an organic chemical 
industry, as they have in Germany, before we started 
198 
1 Hearings before the Committee on Finance, U. S. Senate, 1920. German Chemical Policy 
the war.” Characterising the dye industry as the 
source of war chemicals, including explosives and 
poison gas, he emphasises the drug question and 
shows how their development depends absolutely 
upon the existence of certain raw materials, and fa- 
cilities for comprehensive organic chemical research, 
which only find a raison d’etre in the existence of a 
flourishing dye industry. 
Ehrlich’s Discovery.—Pointing out the difficulties 
in developing the manufacture of salvarsan, he ex- 
plains how the process was originally discovered by 
an organic chemist, Dr. Paul Ehrlich, co-operating 
with a German dye company, the crude material com- 
ing from the dye plants, the product itself strongly 
resembling dyes, “containing arsenic instead of part 
of their nitrogen.” The great importance of this 
drug is brought out by another witness before the 
same committee, Mr. Francis P. Garvan, who ex- 
plains how, by refusing or neglecting to ship salvar- 
san, Germany wanted the United States “to starve 
to death” for lack of it, and he continues: “Think 
what an extension of disease and what an intensifi- 
cation of suffering and distress Germany was willing 
to impose upon her best market in order to obtain 
her imperial will.” 
Germany had monopolised the production of the 
important synthetic drugs, including the derivatives 
of salicylic acid, of which aspirin had developed wide 
use in Allied countries. After every household had 
learnt the value of German produced aspirin, its 
supply was cut off at the outbreak of war. The 
same disadvantages applied in the field of anaes- 
thetics. For a long period America had no local 
anaesthetics for hospital surgical work, being com- 
pelled to use what were termed “Bulgarian Oper- 
ations,” that is, operations without anaesthetics. Pro- 
199 The Riddle of the Rhine 
fessor Stieglitz claims that the lack of drugs and 
anaesthetics threw back American surgery some fifty 
to seventy years in civilisation. 
But what of this country? We have already out- 
lined how the outbreak of war found us with, at 
the most, two or three relatively small producing 
centres, which did valiant service during the war 
and amply proved the importance of the dye industry 
by revealing what could have been done had we 
been many times stronger. Was the same German 
chemical policy responsible for our pre-war posi- 
tion? As far as we know official investigations have 
not been pursued to the same length as in America, 
but it is beyond doubt that the German dye compan- 
ies took every possible step to stifle the development 
of our organic chemical production. When the war 
broke out, our comfortable commercial contact with 
the I.G. became a strangle-hold. It could not be 
otherwise. Whatever the German attitude, and we 
could hardly expect it to be friendly, the strangle- 
hold at the outbreak of war was inevitable. But 
this dye menace facing our textile industries, and 
weakening our power of retaliation in the chemical 
war, was not the only danger from the I.G. We 
were in a critical position through failure to produce 
other commodities than dyes. 
Drugs and Medicinal Products;—The German 
Monopoly;—National Health Insurance Commis- 
sion.—The question of drugs assumed critical impor- 
tance at the outbreak of war. Germany had been 
asserting her monopoly for years in the field of 
medicinal chemicals. Cessation of supplies at the 
outbreak of war caused grave apprehension of a 
serious shortage in these products, so important for 
the adequate treatment of disease. In some cases 
we possessed neither the raw materials nor the tech- 
200 German Chemical Policy 
nical knowledge to undertake rapid home production. 
But in the important group of the synthetic drugs 
derived from coal-tar products, the raw materials 
were produced in quantity in the United Kingdom, 
only to be exported to Germany, thus contributing 
to her monopoly. British manufacturers, on the 
olher hand, held their own in the production of cer- 
tain kinds of drugs, such as the alkaloids, gaseous 
anaesthetics, and some inorganic salts of bismuth and 
mercury. In a summary of certain war activities of 
the National Health Insurance Commission, we 
read: “It was chiefly in the making of the coal-tar 
synthetic remedies that Germany was pre-eminent, 
and that position was due not to any lack of skill or 
invention on the part of the British chemists, but to 
the high degree of organisation attained by the 
German chemical industry, which made it possible 
to convert the by-products of the aniline factories into 
medicaments of high therapeutic and commercial 
value.” 
The Royal Society;—Novocain.—So serious was 
the situation that for some time we existed on feeble 
stocks. But during this period the utmost efforts 
were made to develop our own production. The 
Royal Society promptly came forward with a scheme 
to link up would-be producers with appropriate cen- 
tres of research. The latter not only assisted pro- 
duction but actually produced sufficient quantities of 
important drugs to tide us over the difficult period. 
Thus, for example, for the production of novocain 
the assistance of about forty university laboratories 
throughout the country was invoked, and they pro- 
ceeded to produce the intermediates, diethylamine 
and ethylene-monochlor-hydrin. These substances 
were converted into diethyl-amino-ethanol, and the 
final step, the production of novocain, was undertaken 
201 The Riddle of the Rhine 
by manufacturers, including a prominent dye firm. 
We have referred to one of these substances in con- 
nection with the German production of mustard gas, 
and need only say that in England, in a time of 
national emergency, the Government had to depend 
on the improvised assistance of forty teaching and 
research institutions for the production of small 
quantities of drug intermediates. Further, this work, 
although to the permanent credit of those who under- 
took it, did not enable us later to produce rapidly 
war quantities of mustard gas, itself dependent on 
the same important intermediate, ethylene-mono- 
chlor-hydrin. Germany settled the drug and mustard 
gas question by a simple demand to the I.G., because 
the latter, holding the indigo monopoly, possessed 
actual large-scale ethylene chlor-hydrin production. 
Other cases, although equally creditable to those 
actually engaged in the work, also reflect our national 
unpreparedness and neglect of chemical industry. 
Beta-Eucaine.—Beta-eucaine is a very important 
local anaesthetic. Before the war we obtained it al- 
most exclusively from Germany. When urgently 
needed in 1915 for the War Office and Admiralty, 
the Government discovered that it could not obtain 
this substance from commercial sources. Seventeen 
laboratories co-operated to produce two hundred and 
sixteen pounds of the material. Such examples 
would be ludicrous did they not possess such a serious 
national aspect. Our position was almost as desper- 
ate regarding chloral-hydrate, the important hyp- 
notic, and the rare carbo-hydrates required for bac- 
teriological purposes. Sir William Pope’s compre- 
hensive statement1 supplies further examples. 
Photographic Chemicals.—Our dependence upon 
1 Science and the Nation, A. C. Seward, F.R.S. Cambridge Uni- 
versity Press, 1917. 
202 German Chemical Policy 
German monopoly, so drastically revealed at the out- 
break of war, was not limited to dyes and drugs. 
Photographic chemicals were of special importance 
for war purposes, yet, when the development of avi- 
ation increased our demands for photographic chem- 
icals, we had no normal sufficient source to which to 
turn. We needed not only the essential bulk chem- 
icals, such as amidol, metol, para-amidophenol, and 
glycine, but also certain rarer substances, such as the 
photographic sensitisers, which were so essential for 
the Air Force. By calling upon chemical industry 
and research institutions both needs were satisfac- 
torily met, but the contrast with Germany leads per- 
force to the same conclusion, their ease and speed 
of production as compared with ours. 
This examination shows the fine texture of the 
tenacious web by which Germany had entangled and 
stifled the organic chemical industries of other coun- 
tries. Although at the outbreak of war the Allies 
were slow to realise the war significance of the dye 
industry, yet they were quick to determine that the 
resumption of peace would not find them in such an 
ignominious position. Steps were taken to establish 
dye industries in England, France, and America. 
Not only did plants spring up to meet the immediate 
needs of the textile industries of the world outside 
Germany, but the question received considerable 
Government attention. Promises were made and 
steps taken to encourage the growing industries. But 
these cannot be examined in detail here, and the main; 
facts are common knowledge. Two points emerge, 
however, which are of prime importance from the 
point of view of our discussion. In the first place, 
the acute needs of the armies prevented the maxi- 
mum use of the war opportunity for developing 
Allied dye industries on a sound basis. No sooner 
203 The Riddle of the Rhine 
was producing capacity installed, than it was taken 
over for the production of urgently needed organic 
chemicals for explosives. Dye enthusiasts would 
have regarded the war as a supreme opportunity for 
a period of concentrated organic chemical research 
to make up the leeway which existed, owing to forty 
years of German development. But the research 
energies of the country were occupied on more press- 
ing problems. In Germany, the war chemical activ- 
ities of the dye factories all contributed to their 
future post-war strength. In England and France 
it was otherwise. Our equivalent energies were con- 
centrated on developing improvised processes and 
plant, absolutely necessary to counter the German 
attacks, but almost without exception of no direct 
ultimate value to our peace organic chemical indus- 
tries. This is a point which merits careful consider- 
ation. These industries voluntarily threw aside 
what was, logically, a great opportunity for them to 
push their research investigations so necessary for 
eventual success. The state-aided Huddersfield fac- 
tory represented national vision, whose fruits were 
stolen by our ceaseless need to improvise counters to 
German aggression. But we owe to our dye industry 
the national recognition of these facts. Stress of war 
gave us true vision, but prevented its logical out- 
come. War needs are now removed, and everything 
should be done to place at the disposal of the dye 
industries those facilities which they necessarily, but 
gladly, sacrificed in time of emergency. 
The brief survey of the preceding pages reveals 
the existence of a German chemical policy pursued 
vigorously for many years before the war. It also 
shows how this policy developed in America, the 
chief neutral country, during the war period, for two 
years before her entry. 
204 German Chemical Policy 
The Americans have also established beyond 
doubt the active co-operation between the German 
Government and the I.G. But, if the policy of the 
German Government and of the organic chemical 
industry had many points in common before the war, 
they became one before hostilities were many months 
old. The part played by the I.G. in munitions pro- 
duction, in which it was virtually a tool of the Gov- 
ernment, has already been seen. It must be remem- 
bered that, after the first Battle of the Marne, the 
German Government turned to the I.G. for a large 
part of its explosives and practically all its poison 
gas, and, as has been stated on many occasions, and 
with reason, Germany would not have been able to 
continue the war after the summer of 1915 but for 
the commercial development of the Haber process 
by the I.G. The story is too well known to repeat 
at length. The basic element of explosives is nitro- 
gen, which is introduced by nitric acid. This was 
produced from imported Chili saltpetre, but the 
blockade cut short these imports, and but for the 
Haber method, the vital step in producing nitric acid 
from the air, Germany would have been compelled 
to abandon the struggle. 
There is striking coincidence between the com- 
mencement of the Great War and the successful com- 
pletion of certain vital German chemical develop- 
ments. As late as 1912 Germany still depended on 
other countries, chiefly England, for her phenol, the 
basic raw material for picric acid as well as a dye 
necessity. Soon after that date the development of 
the Bayer plant made her independent in that prod- 
uct, and gave her, in fact, an exportable surplus. 
War Activities of the I.G.—Reviewing all these 
activities and realising how they all emanate from 
205 The Riddle of the Rhine 
this one organisation, we are overwhelmed by its 
formidable nature as an offensive and defensive 
weapon in time of war. Here we have an organisa- 
tion, the I.G., whose sinister pre-war ramifications 
dominated the world by their hold on the supply of 
organic chemicals vital for peace and war. This 
organisation functioned, in a sense, as the life blood 
of German offensive warfare. German sources tell 
us very little of the war activities and future sig- 
nificance of the I.G. A veil of secrecy seems to be 
cast over the whole matter, but behind this veil must 
exist an acute realisation of the value of the I.G. 
as a trump card for the future. Krupp is uncovered, 
the whole world was alarmed at its meaning for war, 
but heard with a comfortable sense of security how 
Krupp was exchanging the sword for the plough. 
But the gigantic I.G. controls in its great hand a 
sword or plough for war or peace at will. This is 
no far-fetched metaphor. 
The Rhine Factories and the Armistice.—It 
therefore becomes important to inquire into the at- 
titude and activities of the I.G. since the Armistice, 
and to examine its position in world reconstruction. 
For one brief period, the few weeks following the Ar- 
mistice, the German dye industries appear to have been 
without policy, its leaders in confusion. But with the 
confidence inspired by the Allied Rhineland occupa- 
tion, with the assistance provided by the Allied con- 
trolling organisations with regard to labour, fuel, 
and commercial transactions, the industrial morale 
speedily recovered. 
The tide of revolution which accompanied the 
German debacle in the autumn of 1918 swept over 
the Rhineland chemical factories. Colonel Norris, 
writing on his visit in February, 1919, tells us that 
206 German Chemical Policy 
after peace was restored by the Allied forces:1— 
“the managers of several factories agreed that the 
occupation of the territory was the best thing that 
could have happened. On the other side of the 
Rhine, labour refused to work, and demanded un- 
heard-of pay—everything was topsy-turvy. In fact, 
before the Allied armies arrived, revolutionary no- 
tions were growing rapidly along the Rhine. One 
director of a well-known chemical plant is said to 
have escaped by night with his life by way of the 
river, when his employees were especially menacing. 
When the British Army came he returned, and is 
now at his old post.” Thus, although the I.G. was 
model in its institutions for the welfare of employees, 
at least one of its most prominent directors was 
compelled to take refuge from infuriated labour. 
What with danger from the latter, and the uncer- 
tainty of action by the oncoming Allied troops, the 
future of the factories appeared very gloomy. In 
fact, there are fairly credible rumours that the Ger- 
man directors were willing to dispose of their assets 
to the Allies while they remained intact. But the 
same Allied troops, whose advent was feared, rolled 
back the tide of revolution from the banks of the 
Rhine, and restored industrial security. It is doubt- 
ful whether the investing armies realised the full war 
significance of these factories, except the French. 
The latter instituted a fairly thorough control al- 
most at once. But, judging from reports of differ- 
ent missions to these factories, we were even back- 
ward in organising inspection of the purely munitions 
plants. Thus the Hartley Mission did not material- 
ise until three months had elapsed. 
War Mentality of the I.G.—We watch a vivid 
1 Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, Vol. XI., 
1919, page 817. 
207 The Riddle of the Rhine 
impression of the war mentality of the I.G. in a few 
phrases from Colonel Norris’s account: “Around 
the walls of the director’s room was a beautifully 
painted and artistic frieze which pictured the various 
plants of the Bayer Company and their activities. 
Dr. Duisberg, the director, pointed out proudly to 
the Americans the view of the company’s plant on 
the Hudson River. We were not surprised to see 
it, although pre-war advertisements had assured us 
at home that Bayer aspirin had been made on the 
Hudson for years by an American company. During 
the war an ante-room had been decorated in a similar 
way, with pictures illustrating the activity of the 
plant in the preparation of war-gas materials. One 
saw how gas was made, shells were filled, and gas 
masks assembled. The work was done by an artist, 
and has a permanent value. The fact that the thing 
was conceived and executed during the stress of war 
throws an interesting sidelight on German charac- 
ter.” Incidentally, it also throws a further sidelight 
upon the part played by Leverkusen in the chemical 
warfare campaign. 
German Attitude towards Inspection.—As was 
quite to be expected, the German factories did not 
receive our missions with open arms, and they were 
particularly jealous of any inspection at Oppau, the 
site of the wonderful Haber synthetic ammonia 
plant. Lieut. McConnel, of the U.S. Navy, tells 
us:1 “Upon arrival at the plant the Germans dis- 
played a polite but sullen attitude. They seemed 
willing to afford the opportunity of a cursory inspec- 
tion, but strongly objected to a detailed examination. 
On the third day of the visit the writer was informed 
that his presence had become a source of serious 
1 Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, Yol. XI.. 
I9i9» Page 837. 
208 German Chemical Policy 
objection and that if his examination were prolonged 
a formal complaint would be submitted to the Peace 
Conference.” The Allies had only themselves to 
blame. Their facile yielding to the argument that 
this great arsenal was principally of peace signifi- 
cance, owing to the fertilisers which it would event- 
ually make, and the feeble backing provided for 
inspecting missions, were reflected in the semi-resist- 
ant attitude of the I.G. personnel. 
The Rhine and Chaulny Contrast.—It was a curi- 
ous contrast, however, to pass through Chaulny on 
the way to the Rhine. At Chaulny, the oldest chem- 
ical works in France, quoting again from Colonel 
Norris, “where Gay-Lussac did his famous work on 
the manufacture of sulphuric acid, where Courtois 
discovered iodine, and where plate glass was first 
made, had grown with the times, and was amongst 
the largest factories in France. Around it was a 
thriving town of about 13,000 inhabitants, with some 
excellent public modern buildings. When the Ger- 
mans in their first retreat were forced to leave the 
place, they dismantled the factory and carried away 
everything that was portable. The fortunes of war 
brought them back, and before they left a second 
time a regiment of soldiers wras put to work to destroy 
systematically the factory and the entire town. For 
a month they kept at work, and when they withdrew 
but a few bricks were left standing. Every boiler had 
been blown up with dynamite, and every tank too 
heavy to be carted away rendered useless. About 
half an acre was covered with chemical stoneware of 
all kinds; each piece had been broken with a sledge- 
hammer. Nothing was too small or too large to 
escape destruction. And to make sure of a good 
job, everything that would burn was set on fire.” 
Yet within twenty-four hours one met Germans, in- 
209 The Riddle of the Rhine 
directly or directly responsible for this policy of 
destruction, resenting peaceful allied inquiries on the 
munition activities of their own plants. We hardly 
know whether to attribute such effects of Allied policy 
to our own integrity in respecting the peace activities 
of these arsenals or to official ignorance of their war- 
like nature. 
German Revolution and the Industrial Leaders. 
—It is curious how the leadership of the captains of 
German industry was left untouched by the revolu- 
tionary disturbances of the post-Armistice period. 
Evidence is to be found in the composition of the main 
German delegation to Paris for the settlement of the 
Versailles Treaty. Many of the members were big 
industrial magnates, several had direct connection 
with chemical industry, and at least one was a prom- 
inent director of the I.G. 
The German Peace Delegation.—Commenting on 
the composition of the main German delegation in the 
spring of 1919, we find the German press deploring 
the omission of any “visible representative” of Army 
or Navy. Does this imply the presence of invisible 
representation? Whether intended or not, there is 
truth in the implication. The list contains the name 
of one of the leading representatives of the big dye 
combine. Others of the delegates have chemical in- 
terests. This is significant. It more than implies the 
German official acknowledgment of the importance 
of the dye industry in general for the future of Ger- 
many, and of its prime importance for war. 
Recent Signs of Government Interest.—Recent 
developments have merely strengthened the dye com- 
bine and provided further evidence of Government 
interest in its welfare. The chief signs of reviving 
German Government interest in the I.G. are to be 
found in the loan for the nitrogen enterprise and in 
210 German Chemical Policy 
the privileges which it enjoys with regard to Govern- 
ment taxes. An American source,1 a witness before 
a Senate Committee, reveals that the dye plants 
“have to pay no direct Government taxes. According 
to an understanding with the present Government, all 
organic chemical productions, the companies them- 
selves, as well as all dependencies, without exception, 
for the next ten years, are freed from all direct State 
tax. In so far as community taxes come into con- 
sideration, I believe we will obtain a remission for 
our profession.” The latest sign of Government sup- 
port is to be found in the preferential treatment ob- 
tained by the German dye industry in coal deliveries. 
Coal is a critical factor in the German attempt to 
regain their monopoly. 
Nitrogen Fixation.—The industrial fixation of 
nitrogen by Germany to form ammonia has great im- 
portance from the point of view of our discussion. 
Statements by various prominent Germans, such as 
Dr. Max Sering, of the University of Berlin, and Dr. 
Hugo Schweitzer, already referred to, leave no 
doubt. The former, writing in 1915, tells us: “The 
complete cutting off of the supply of Chili saltpetre 
during the war has been made good by our now taking 
nitrogen directly out of the air in large factories built 
during and before the war. With extraordinary 
rapidity the question has been solved how the enor- 
mous quantities of the needed ammunition were to be 
produced, a question which in England still meets 
with difficulties, in spite of the help from America.” 
The German Nitrogen Syndicate.—The two 
great Haber plants at Oppau and Merseburg are 
both constituent parts of the I.G., and they introduce 
a new element of Government interest into the I.G. 
1 Hearings before Committee on Finance, U. S. Senate, 1920, 
page 195. 
211 The Riddle of the Rhine 
policy. Giving evidence before the Committee on 
Agriculture and Forestry of the United States Senate, 
Colonel Joyce develops this question of Government 
interest in detail. He tells us how war nitrogen sup- 
ply was energetically and specifically fostered by the 
German Government through an Imperial Commis- 
sioner under the War Department. One of the three 
advisers of this campaign was Doctor Bueb, repre- 
senting the Badische Anilin- und Soda-Fabrik. Colo- 
nel Joyce tells us: “That was a strictly wrar control 
organisation, but even before the war closed, Ger- 
many, with her usual foresight, was giving considera- 
tion to the future commercial aspects of her nitrogen 
works, and in August, 1919, there was definitely 
formed an association of the producers which was 
called the Stickstoff Syndikat G.m.b.H. or Nitrogen 
Syndicate. This designation is a commercial one, and 
the organisation is along commercial lines, but it is 
reliably stated that the establishment of this syndicate 
was largely due to governmental influence. This will 
be more easily understood if it be realised that the 
German Government had given financial assistance to 
many of the new plants and plant increases which the 
war had necessitated.” 
Haber Process Prominent.—The Badische Co. 
holds a large part of the capital stock of this syndi- 
cate, whose Board contains a Government nominee. 
In addition the Board of Managers will have a Gov- 
ernment chairman. Through such arrangements, 
Government interest in the I.G. nitrogen enterprise is 
clearly revealed. In conclusion, Colonel Joyce in- 
forms us, “This information, which comes from most 
reliable sources and is not to be disputed, shows that, 
beyond question, any one outside of Germany pro- 
ducing or desiring to purchase nitrogenous fertilisers 
or similar compounds, will have to deal with a single 
212 German Chemical Policy 
organisation, essentially a branch of the German Gov- 
ernment, which will have an absolute monopolistic 
control of all such products produced in Germany or 
whatever surplus there may be for export. (Hearing 
before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 
U.S. Senate, S. 3390, Mar. 22nd, 1920, p. 52.).” It 
is reported that the preliminary allotment of pro- 
duction to the Badische Co. in the Syndicate is three 
hundred thousand tons per annum, which should leave 
a considerable exportable surplus. This would con- 
stitute a formidable weapon in any price-cutting 
campaigns entered upon by the I.G. in order to pre- 
serve her various monopolies. We learn from the 
Colour Trade Journal of August, 1920, that the Ger- 
man Government has advanced something over ten 
million pounds for the construction and operation of 
the Haber plant. 
The New German Dye Combine.—Internal 
changes have accompanied the development of these 
external relationships. The interchange of capital 
and directors between the different branches, the use 
of all assets for a common purpose, and the pooling 
of all profits effected in 1919, has brought about a 
closer union. From the relatively loose pre-war com- 
bination held together by common price interests, the 
organisation has passed through the cartel to what is 
now practically a form of trust. The German dye 
industry is now a closely woven, almost homogeneous 
institution. It has added economic cohesion to tech- 
nical efficiency, and is to-day the largest technically 
efficient potential instrument of war in the world. 
We have thus revealed the existence, and indicated 
the nature, of the resultant activities of the chemical 
policy guiding the pre-war German combination of 
organic chemical or dye producers. Further, it is 
seen how the war stimulated and sealed closer rela- 
213 The Riddle of the Rhine 
tionships between the constituent firms, and between 
the resultant organisation, the I.G., and the German 
Government. Continuing, we find the above tenden- 
cies intensified since the Armistice, from unmistakable 
signs briefly referred to above. 
Aggressive Nationalistic Policy.—Both in peace 
and war, the combination of interests, known as the 
I.G., has successfully pursued an intensely national- 
istic and aggressive chemical policy. We might ig- 
nore what some have regarded as the sinister side of 
the I.G. activities, considering the whole as a wonder- 
ful monument to German science, thoroughness and 
patriotism, which it undoubtedly is in many respects. 
But the significance to the Allies and associated coun- 
tries remains the same. Even without any thought or 
intention on the part of present day Germany to use 
this thing for war, it remains a serious menace. But 
the direct evidence which we possess does not actually 
support such a peaceful view. Her press confidently 
prophesies the resumption of the pre-war German 
monopoly, reassuring its readers by careful analysis 
of the causes of the eventful failure to establish or- 
ganic chemical industries in Allied countries. 
Are we to yield in this field of economic war? If 
so, then one of the chief lessons of the Great War 
will remain unheeded, and the future cannot fail to 
prove this to the hilt, to our cost. 
214 CHAPTER X 
LINES OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
The Element of Speculation.—It is of consider- 
able interest to introduce an element of speculation 
into our discussion of chemical warfare. In glancing 
at future possibilities, we can adopt one of two 
courses, follow up the clearly marked lines of recent 
development, or give the imagination play within the 
whole field of scientific possibility. The former 
course lies more within the scope of this book. 
Chemical Tactics and Strategy.—Two basic 
military conceptions come to our assistance in 
attempting to characterise types of chemical warfare 
development. With a little explanation it is possible 
to place this or that method in the tactical or strategic 
class. Any new chemical warfare development 
capable, under a given system of individual protec- 
tion, of successfully attacking the hitherto protected 
individual, may be termed strategic. The method 
may be aimed at a protected or hitherto immune 
human function, but if it overcomes protection it is 
then capable of effecting strategic results by its use on 
a sufficiently large scale. Thus we regard the first 
introduction of cloud gas by Germany, or their use 
of mustard gas, as examples of strategic chemical 
warfare moves. Any fundamental discovery of this 
sort, applicable to chemical warfare, is capable of 
strategic effects. Used only on a small scale, how- 
ever, these possibilities may be lost and tactical ad- 
vantages may alone accrue. 
215 The Riddle of the Rhine 
The tactical type of chemical warfare method 
involves the use of some new or old war chemical 
device in achieving a tactical objective which may, 
itself, form part of a larger scheme with strategic sig- 
nificance. Examples were plentiful during the recent 
war. We may refer to the use of smoke, of gas shell 
for neutralisation, or of cloud gas as preparation for 
a local infantry advance. 
The same classification can be applied to the pro- 
tective as to the offensive side of chemical warfare. 
The equipment of an army of millions with a gas 
mask has a strategic value, if it counters the large- 
scale use of gas by the enemy. The mere fact of this 
protection may serve the same purpose as a violent 
resistance to a huge enemy attack. It may render 
the attack, and, therefore, the resistance, out of the 
question. By permitting the individual soldier to re- 
tain the efficient use of his weapons in gas, the mask, 
or other form of individual protection, may render 
a costly counter-attack unnecessary. In this way pro- 
tective methods in chemical warfare may be the de- 
termining factor in some strategic campaign or 
tactical activity. The distinction between tactics and 
strategy in chemical warfare cannot be made by 
grouping substances, or their methods of application 
to war, any more than one can say that certain in- 
fantry or artillery formations or weapons have a 
purely strategic or tactical function. The distinction 
lies rather in the magnitude and incidence of use of 
the chemical appliance on the battle-field, while de- 
pending on its novel nature. A new substance, 
possessing potential strategic value, may be wasted, 
and its surprise effect lost, in some local affair. This 
applies to the use of mustard gas by the Germans 
and to our own use of the Livens projector. Our 
armies were surprised and our plans modified by the 
216 Lines of Future Development 
German use of mustard gas at Ypres and Nieuport. 
We were not clear where this new thing was tending. 
Think of its strategic and psychological value had it 
been used on a scale and front twenty times larger. 
Leaving the chemical field, we can say that the first 
British use of the tank provided another example. 
New War Chemicals.—The question of entirely 
new war chemicals is of general interest. The first 
main group of substances with which we were faced 
during the war contained such types as chlorine and 
phosgene, whose chief line of attack was directed 
towards the respiratory system. Specific protection 
rapidly developed and, once obtained, led to violent 
attempts to penetrate it or “break it down.” In other 
words, the attempts to penetrate the mask by using 
higher concentrations of phosgene were analogous, 
from our point of view, to similar attempts by the 
use of an entirely new substance aimed again at the 
respiratory system. The introduction of mustard 
gas confirmed, what the use of lachrymators had sug- 
gested, that the most fruitful line would be found by 
attacking human functions hitherto immune. First 
the lungs, then the eyes, then the skin of the human 
being came under fire, so to speak. What further 
developments appear possible on these lines? 
Assuming that means are found to protect satis- 
factorily the respiratory system, and the eyes, what 
other vulnerable points can the war chemical find in 
the human organism? Some more specific vesicant, 
some modification of mustard gas, might arise, 
limited in attack to certain portions of the human 
being. The Germans were already at work on these 
lines. 
“Camouflage” Chemicals.—It is by no means 
visionary to picture the loss of the sense of taste and 
smell by the use of some chemical. Partially success- 
217 The Riddle of the Rhine 
ful efforts were made by both sides during the war 
to mask the odour of the harmful constituent of a 
shell filling by introducing an appropriate “camou- 
flage” compound. Whole series of chemicals were 
examined from this point of view by the American 
field laboratory at Puteaux near Paris. The step 
from specific camouflage compounds to a single gen- 
eral type is by no means unbridgeable in theory. 
An insight into work of this kind has been given 
by Colonel R. F. Bacon of the American Chemical 
Warfare Service. He says: “The gas-camouflage 
is of particular interest. It has been found that 
malodorous compounds (butyl mercaptan, dimethyl 
tricarbonate, etc.), are useful to mask the presence 
of other ‘gases’ or to force the enemy to wear 
respirators when no other ‘gases’ are present. As 
in the case of lachrymators, such ‘stink gases’ must 
frequently be accompanied by other ‘gases,’ in order 
that the enemy may never know when toxic gases are 
actually absent. Camouflage gases are also useful in 
that they save ‘mustard gas’ and the highly lethal 
gases. Their value has been demonstrated in trials 
at Hanlon Field and also at the front.” The use 
of such compounds has an obvious value. By remov- 
ing the possibility of detecting the dangerous chemi- 
cal, they enforce the permanent use of the protective 
appliance or encourage a fatal carelessness in the 
individual soldier. 
Functions Hitherto Immune.—In this field of 
chemical attack upon hitherto immune human func- 
tions, it is particularly easy to class suggestions as 
visionary and to be wise only after the event. But it 
must be borne in mind that any nation in a position to 
effect such a surprise would be in a commanding 
position. It is believed, for example, that the human 
being maintains his equilibrium through the proper 
218 Lines of Future Development 
functioning of the semi-circular canals, organs 
situated behind the inner ear. It does not appear 
possible to attain them chemically directly, but they 
might be reached by the absorption of some suitable 
chemical into the system in the very small concen- 
trations now possible on the field of battle. We 
doubt whether any physiologist would go further than 
to say that such a mode of attack is improbable in the 
near future. No qualified person would class it as 
impossible. It has been advanced that the control of 
equilibrium occurs through the movement of certain 
hairs through a liquid within these canals. If this be 
so, then one would simply require to solidify or 
change the viscosity of this liquid. Would this be 
difficult? Probably not, for most of the body fluids 
are of that colloidal nature in which coagulation 
occurs in the presence of small quantities of special 
agents. Such a result might cause the individual to 
lose his equilibrium. This would prohibit all 
organised movement. An army thus attained would 
be less mobile than a colony of cripples. 
Picture for a moment such a battle as the great 
German attack of March 1918—millions of men 
urged forward from fixed positions under highly 
centralised control—they advance, say, two or three 
miles beyond this control and are largely dependent 
on local initiative for the attack. They then enter 
clouds of shell chemical and in less than fifteen 
minutes a fair percentage becomes incapable of ad- 
vancing in a fixed direction, of obeying local orders, 
or of anything more than a sort of drunken move- 
ment. By this time their supporting artillery would 
have been identified and attained, and the whole 
attack reduced to almost farcical conditions. Such a 
compound may never develop, but who will class it as 
beyond the realm of eventual possibility? 
219 The Riddle of the Rhine 
Every one is acquainted with the peculiar effects 
produced by various anaesthetics. The emergency 
uses to which they are put and our personal acquaint- 
ance with them may have dulled the imagination. 
Think for a moment of the possibilities which they 
unfold. Gaseous anaesthetics, in certain concentra- 
tions, produce temporary unconsciousness, other 
anaesthetics, so called local, produce absolute im- 
mobility without loss of consciousness. Chloroform 
and ether are common forms of the first type, but 
they are required in such concentrations as to render 
their battle use impracticable. But the second type, 
of which stovaine, the new synthetic drug, is a good 
example, produces its effects in very small concentra- 
tion. A few drops injected into the spinal column 
are sufficient to prevent all movement for a number 
of hours. We cannot expect to obtain the conditions 
of the operating table on the battle-field, but 
chemicals which are effective in very small quantities 
or concentrations may find another channel into the 
human system. For this reason the development of 
the mask, the protection of the respiratory channels, 
is of great importance, for it blocks the way to sub- 
stances which by mere absorption might produce 
valuable military results. 
Chemical Constitution and Physiological Action. 
—It is impossible to adopt a more than speculative 
outlook in this field. So little is known regarding 
the relationships between chemical constitution and 
physiological action and very few sound generalisa- 
tion have been made. A considerable amount of 
scientific work occurred on these lines in various coun- 
tries before the war on the connection between the 
chemical nature of compounds and their taste and 
smell, but the relationships are still obscure. 
220 Lines of Future Development 
Unsolved Problems of Mustard Gas.—The use 
of a chemical which attacks some unexpected human 
function introduces many disturbing and disorganis- 
ing factors. Thus the introduction of mustard gas 
has left us with a number of unsolved problems. By 
employing this substance Germany departed from her 
usual caution and violated one of the first principles 
of chemical warfare. It is unsound for any nation 
to introduce a new weapon, unless that nation is, 
itself, furnished with the means of protection against 
its eventual employment by the enemy. The Ger- 
mans have, themselves, explained this breach of the 
principles of war. They were convinced that we 
could not retaliate with mustard gas, because we 
could not produce it. It was a miscalculation but 
based on grounds of which they were sure, having 
been largely instrumental in determining them 
through their aggressive chemical policy. 
Mustard gas attacks the respiratory system and 
the outer skin of man. The armies were efficiently 
protected against the first line of attack, but they 
never developed efficient protection against the 
second. Protection of the skin of the individual 
soldier against mustard gas was theoretically possible 
in three ways. In the first place a number of 
chemical solutions were devised which, applied to 
the affected skin, would destroy the poisonous chemi- 
cal. This was a bad method, and was never efficiently 
employed. German army orders after the French 
introduction of mustard gas were bristling with 
references to chloride of lime or bleaching powder. 
It was to be kept in every conceivable place where 
the gas was likely to penetrate. Soldiers were pro- 
vided with boxes of bleach called “Gelbolin.” Per- 
manganate of potash was carried as an alternative for 
a brief period. A wire from the Third German 
221 The Riddle of the Rhine 
Army to the War Ministry, Berlin, dated 17th July, 
1918, stated: “Chloride of lime has all been issued 
in boxes to the troops. Reserves exhausted.” One 
had the impression of a drowning man catching at a 
straw. Supply on a sufficient scale to cover most 
cases was practically impossible. Each soldier would 
have to carry the protective chemical as part of his 
equipment, and its proper use depended on training. 
There was no time to identify and assemble the 
thousands of affected cases for central treatment. 
Mustard gas penetrated thick clothing, even boots, 
and was often only identified hours after the dam- 
age was done. The second method which was 
attempted on a large scale was the protection of each 
soldier by special mustard gas-proof clothing, but a 
man, fighting for his life on the battlefield, will not 
tolerate such a handicap to movement, and, although 
hundreds of thousands of oiled suits were prepared 
and were of definite use in certain special cases, for 
example in certain artillery formations, yet the 
method must be rejected as unsuitable from a mili- 
tary point of view. The third solution, which was 
tried experimentally on a large scale, was to cover 
soldiers going into action with a cream or paste of 
protective chemical. This, again, could only be 
applied in special cases, prior to an assault, for 
example, and could not be regarded as a permanent 
form of protection. 
As we have seen, mustard gas infected whole areas 
for many days, owing to its great persistency. It 
was often necessary to cross such zones for attack or 
counter-attack. How was this to be effected without 
huge losses? It was found possible, literally by 
creating roads of bleach, that is, by sprinkling 
bleaching powder on chosen lanes through the in- 
fected area, to pass columns of troops through such 
222 Lines of Future Development 
areas, but this cannot be viewed as a practicable solu- 
tion. Carried to its logical conclusion, it would have 
taxed the possibilities of supply beyond their utmost 
capacity. Here, then, we have a case in which it is 
not possible to protect a soldier by some specific 
appliance, and the war found us embarking on 
schemes of protection by the use of chemicals in quan- 
tities which threatened to carry us out of the range of 
possible manufacture. 
A New Type of Obstacle.—Chemical warfare has 
introduced a newT type of strategic and tactical 
obstacle. Mediaeval methods of war relied largely on 
natural and man-built barriers. Rivers, moats, forts 
were, and still are, to a certain extent, critical factors 
in war. The conceptions of a Vauban could de- 
termine the issue of a campaign. Such obstacles were 
only effective, however, when properly manned and 
armed. The Hindenburg Line and the Canal du 
Nord were tremendous obstacles when backed by 
German artillery, rifles, and machine-guns, but, with- 
out the latter, they would have been mere incon- 
veniences for the passage of an army. The massing 
of a multitude of guns, used for the first time during 
the recent war, produced another form of temporary 
obstacle, but troops could be trained to, and actually 
did, advance through the barrage. Further, the ulti- 
mate limits of supply and the use of counter artillery 
introduces time and quantitative limitations to the use 
of the really intensive barrage. Chemical warfare, 
however, has introduced a method of blocking out 
chosen areas of the battlefield in such a way as to pre- 
vent their effective use for military defence, com- 
munications, or other purposes. It is now possible, 
by chemical means, to give a normal piece of country 
the same value as a natural obstacle, or one organised 
for defence by formidable engineering construction, 
223 The Riddle of the Rhine 
and manned by rifles and machine-guns. This can be 
achieved by the use of a highly persistent dangerous 
gas or war chemical of which, so far, mustard gas is 
the most effective example. We have seen how the 
Germans formed defensive flanks during their 
March, 1918, offensive, by spraying certain areas 
between their fronts of attack with mustard gas. • It 
is true that, in the quantities in which it has, so far, 
been used, mustard gas has not converted open areas 
into absolute obstacles against the movement of a 
determined individual, platoon, or even larger unit. 
But even in the quantities which have already ap- 
peared on the battle-field, it has rendered whole zones 
practically unusable for huge masses of men, owing 
to the certainty of a very high percentage of casual- 
ties. Up to the present its value has been rather as a 
serious factor in Staff consideration of losses than as 
an actual physical barrier. Many of the casualties 
are only incurred a few hours after contact with the 
gas. This may not deter a man from crossing an 
affected zone, but it may deter the Staffs from using 
that zone, when they realise that this would imply the 
certainty of many thousands of casualties amongst 
the troops. The choice is between two evils, tactical 
acquiescence to the enemy’s plan, blocking out a 
certain area, or the certainty of huge casualties. A 
very interesting case occurred in the German attack 
near Mt. Kemmel in the spring of 1918, where large 
quantities of German mustard gas were used some 
distance in front of the original line of German 
attack. In this case, not only was it clear that the 
Germans would not attempt to advance beyond a 
limited objective (and they did not), but the develop- 
ment of their attack left them organising their de- 
fences behind their own mustard gas barrage. 
224 Lines of Future Development 
The “Persistent Lethal” Substance.—The im- 
portance of these considerations can hardly be 
exaggerated when we realise that, at any time, a sub- 
stance possessing the same strategic value as mustard 
gas, but much more violent casualty effects, may be 
discovered. The Germans were certainly aware of 
these possibilities. According to the statement of an 
apparently reliable prisoner of the 30th R.I.R., July, 
1918, the Regimental Gas Officer stated in a lecture 
that, as the Allies had used a new gas, the Germans 
were going to employ a “White Cross” gas shell. 
This gas was “stronger” than any of the gases at 
present in use; it possessed a persistence up to eight 
days, and could, therefore, not be used on the front 
for an assault. Its persistence was favoured by damp 
or misty weather and by the nature of the ground. 
Neither the German drum nor the masks of the 
Allies afforded protection against it. The last impor- 
tant German development consisted in the use of 
pumice impregnated with phosgene in their Livens 
bombs. It was clear that the Germans were attempt- 
ing to produce a gas which was not only highly lethal 
but persistent. Following up this idea, we can fore- 
cast the use of a chemical which will not only permit 
the formation of defensive flanks, or pockets, in the 
enemy front, or in our own defensive positions, 
through their influence on Staff considerations with 
regard to casualties, but, by replacing the relatively 
mild casualty effect of mustard gas by a highly and 
rapidly lethal effect, will render these areas not only 
strategically, but physically, impassable. One of the 
most significant possibilities in chemical warfare de- 
velopment is the arrival of this type of the compound, 
the highly lethal, highly persistent chemical. 
The Critical Range.—These considerations are 
very interesting from the military point of view. 
225 The Riddle of the Rhine 
Consider the phenomenal amount of muscular energy 
required to organise any captured stretch of territory 
against counter-attack. The type of compound we 
have outlined is likely to change completely the aspect 
of attack and counter-attack. The Somme battle- 
field, for example, gave the impression of a series of 
defensive positions organised by the one side or the 
other after attack or counter-attack, in order to hold 
small gains of ground, which were never intended to 
represent the final advance. Successful progress from 
one trench system meant building another, under the 
pounding of the enemy’s artillery, and the deadly fire 
of machine-guns, exposing, in this improvised system, 
large numbers of troops, among which casualties con- 
stituted a continuous drain upon eventual reserves. 
The arrival of the highly persistent lethal compound 
should provide an effective substitute for this 
laborious constructional protection in the shape of the 
persistent lethal barrage. This will render immediate 
counter-attack and near machine-gun fire very difficult. 
Automatically, fewer men will be needed to hold the 
advanced positions. It is true that, with the next 
attack, “kicking off” and assembly positions will be 
required, but these can be much more efficiently de- 
veloped behind a deep chemical barrage and will de- 
mand the exposure of fewer men where more time 
is available for preparation. Such conditions, how- 
ever, can only occur if one side possesses some distinct 
advantage with regard to surprise by, or efficient pro- 
tection against, the persistent lethal compound. 
When both sides are equally matched in this respect, 
a duel will arise in which the winner will be the one 
who can throw the critical concentrations of chemical 
into a given area at the greatest range. This might 
be called the “critical range.” Herein lies the im- 
portance of the development of such weapons as the 
226 Lines of Future Development 
Livens projector, and the Germans had certainly 
grasped an important principle, when they used our 
own modified weapon against us with a much greater 
range than our own. If we admit the possibility of 
a persistent lethal compound, this question of critical 
range assumes outstanding importance. 
The New No-Man’s-Land.—The recent war 
witnessed a rather sudden adoption of trench war- 
fare, during a period in which the artillery strengths 
of both sides were relatively feeble, when compared 
with the later stages of the war. Accordingly, there 
arose very definite lines of field fortifications, and 
strongly held trench systems, separated from each 
other by a comparatively narrow No-Man’s-Land. 
With the development of the formidable artillery 
strengths of belligerents, there was a tendency to 
form a much wider No-Man’s-Land, and the front 
line systems were lightly held, approximating, in many 
cases, to an outpost line. 
The discovery and mass production of a persistent 
lethal substance is likely to convert No-Man’s-Land 
into a permanently infected gas zone, manned by 
special outposts of permanently protected troops. 
Combined with the development of smoke, this may 
render unnecessary the highly organised trench 
assembly systems of the recent war, used before the 
assault, and, with the development of the tank as a 
fast fighting machine, and for the transport of troops, 
one can obtain a glimpse of the nature of the new 
attack and counter-attack. A recent writer1 has 
shown us the future tank carrying war into the 
enemy’s country and destroying his nerve centres by 
actually reaching and paralysing the G.H.Q.s. of 
armies and smaller formations. Such operations will 
have to occur through a wide zone of the new gas and 
1 Tanks in the Great War, Col. J. F. C. Fuller, D.S.O. 
227 The Riddle of the Rhine 
will necessitate the anti-gas tank. Indeed, one of the 
most important functions of the tank will be to 
carry the advance guard of an army beyond the in- 
fected No-Man’s-Land, and such an advance will 
occur behind a series of smoke barrages created, in 
the first place, by the artillery, and, later, by the ad- 
vance of tanks themselves. 
The “Alert Gas Zone.”—The development of the 
“gas alert” idea has definite interest for the future 
of chemical warfare. It is well known how the de- 
velopment of gas shell and surprise gas shoots by the 
Germans led to the necessity for “gas alert” conditions 
between certain times and within certain distances of 
the front line. The mask had to be worn in the so-called 
ready position, in order that swift adjustment might be 
possible in case of surprise attack. The summer of 
1917 witnessed a great increase in gas shell activity. 
This was reflected in important changes in the “gas 
alert” regulations. In the autumn of that year all 
periods of readiness were abolished and replaced by a 
constant state of readiness. In the forward area 
absolute readiness was required within two miles of 
the front line, and special precautions were taken as 
far back as twelve miles. That the Germans suffered 
under the same restraints is witnessed by many cap- 
tured documents. In particular, a divisional order 
taken in December, 1917, gave the gas danger zone 
as within fifteen kilometres of the front line, and 
within this region every one must carry a mask. The 
alert position of the mask was insisted upon within 
two kilometres of the front line. By July the alert 
zone had increased in depth in both armies. This 
tendency must have increased, had the war continued, 
for both sides were employing gas in guns of larger 
calibres, and weapons were being devised, such as the 
improved German Livens projector, which gave high 
228. Lines of Future Development 
concentrations at much greater distances from the 
front line, i.e. with greater critical ranges. 
We have seen how the possible development of a 
persistent lethal compound may produce an infected 
and wide No-Man’s-Land. Imposed on this, there 
will, no doubt, be “gas alert” conditions of great 
depths. How do these conceptions work out for the 
war of movement? It would appear that the posses- 
sion of such a compound and the means of producing 
and using it on a very large scale could determine the 
stationary or open nature of warfare, if other forces 
were not too unequal. A new military factor 
emerges, the artificial, permanent, unmanned obstacle, 
which can be laid down at will on areas -whose magni- 
tude depends finally on manufacturing capacity. The 
germ of the idea appeared during the war at Kemmel 
and in the various mustard gas barrages formed by 
artillery or delayed mines used by the Germans in 
their great retreat. The sudden development of such 
barriers will be equivalent in effect to the creation of 
strong trench systems, but these could never result, 
under war conditions, in time to approach the 
strategic flexibility and importance of the persistent 
lethal infected barrier. 
Gas and Aircraft.—The combination of gas and 
aircraft presents the possibility of attaining strategic 
effects by chemical means. Many rumours were 
afloat, towards the end of the war regarding the use 
of gas by enemy aircraft, and there was apprehension 
amongst the civil populations, which has been re- 
flected in numerous public utterances. Evidence on 
the matter is very scanty. In July, 1917, the use of 
gas in aeroplane bombs by the Germans was reported, 
but not confirmed. Further reports in August indi- 
cated the use of Blue Cross, owing to the sneezing 
.effects which were produced on those within reach 
229 The Riddle of the Rhine 
of the air bomb. In October, the evidence was more 
conclusive. But the German aeroplanes left no blind 
or dud shell, and, beyond the violent nasal and sneez- 
ing effects of Blue Cross, evidence was again absent. 
This report was very persistent, for, in July, 1918, 
there were again rumours that Blue Cross bombs 
had been dropped on the British near Ficheux. The 
Air Forces of the different armies were, perhaps, the 
last to feel the effects of the gas campaign, but the 
pilots of low-flying aeroplanes in the 1918 offensive 
were constantly crossing pockets of gas, and this, 
added to the fact that the pilots were often compelled 
to land in gas, led to their equipment with gas masks. 
A respirator of special type was taken from a German 
aviator in April, 1918, after the fighting at 
Passchendaele. But the war gave us no direct evi- 
dence of the successful use of gas and war chemicals 
from aircraft. This, however, is no criterion as to 
its eventual importance. The Allies definitely re- 
frained from employing the combination until 
Germany should give them the start in what was re- 
garded as a new atrocity. The main reason for their 
lack of development on these lines was probably the 
fact that the most suitable type of gas only developed 
during the later stages of the war, when it was re- 
quired exceedingly urgently on the front. No really 
harmful persistent compound appeared before the 
advent of mustard gas, and the dangerous non-per- 
sistent types, such as phosgene, could not have been 
used with great success, owing to the fact that very 
considerable quantities would have been required to 
produce any serious effect. Mustard gas, however, 
which could have haunted a city for days, would not 
have been required in such large quantities. But its 
more urgent need on the front, and the fact that soon 
after it arrived the Germans were sending out feelers 
230 Lines of Future Development 
to see whether the Allies would consider the cessation 
of chemical warfare, were probably sufficient reasons 
to explain their failure to use it from aeroplanes. 
Another point must be raised in connection with 
the use of gas from aircraft which has not yet re- 
ceived much attention. We must remember that the 
use of projectiles from aircraft over a city was a very 
different proposition from their use over a battle-field. 
One of the advantages of gas over explosives on the 
field of battle was its greater range of action. It 
produced effects at longer distances from the point of 
impact, but no such incentive existed for the use of 
gas from aeroplanes over large cities. Explosives, 
which might miss their objective on the field of battle, 
could not do so in a city. They were bound to hit 
something. The load of the aeroplane is always im- 
portant, and the essential is to carry, weight for 
weight, the material which will produce the most 
effect. There is no doubt what this will be when the 
persistent lethal compound arrives, and mustard gas 
would probably have been superior to explosives for 
use by German aircraft on British cities. 
Protective Development; — Individual Protec- 
tion.—The question of protection against chemical 
attack presents some knotty problems for the future. 
Let us glance at the broad lines of war development 
in this field and forecast their future in a speculative 
way. Protection developed along two main lines. 
Individual protection covered the mask and any other 
protective appliance used by the individual soldier, 
while the term collective protection was applied to 
any method or appliance which afforded simultaneous 
protection for a number of individuals. 
In general, the former represented an attempt to 
purify the poisoned air actually inspired by the 
soldier, whereas the latter was an attempt to purify 
231 The Riddle of the Rhine 
the atmosphere of a locality or to prevent its initial 
poisoning. How far can the individual form of pro- 
tection develop to meet the possibilities of the chemi- 
cal attack? It certainly seems to have countered 
satisfactorily all the war attacks upon the respiratory 
system, although, as we have pointed out, the Ger- 
mans might have failed, had we been sufficiently 
prompt in introducing our arsenic compounds. But 
we have forecasted the use of chemicals which may 
attack human functions hitherto immune. For the 
sake of our argument, we can divide these into two 
classes, those attained through the respiratory and 
digestive systems and those attained through contact 
with some other part of the body. The former can 
probably be satisfactorily met by developments in the 
mask. Even that does not appear certain, when we 
remember the emphasis laid by Germany upon the 
possibility of penetrating the mask by using a par- 
ticulate cloud. The last word has certainly not been 
spoken in the struggle between the mask and the 
chemical attempting to penetrate it. But both the 
introduction of mustard gas and general speculative 
grounds justify us in concluding that attacks may 
materialise upon other parts of the human organism. 
We cannot foresee the actual point of attack and can, 
therefore, only view with assurance some form of 
protection which covers the whole body. 
Collective Protection.—All parties dabbled in 
such a form of protection, but the French were the 
only ones to make a large-scale experiment on the 
front. It was not very successful, for the burden of 
these oilskin suits was intolerable. It may be that 
some successful form of protection for the whole 
body will materialise, but on general grounds we can 
assume that development will follow other lines. 
What are the possibilities? They all lie in the di- 
232 Lines of Future Development 
rection of collective protection. The individual can- 
not be satisfactorily protected from the new gas and 
remain an efficient soldier. We must, therefore, see 
whether it is not possible to protect numbers of men 
by removing them from contact with the poisoned 
atmosphere. A stationary form of such protection 
was used by all the armies, but emphasised by the 
French, by the creation of a large number of enor- 
mous underground chambers, some capable of hold- 
ing more than a thousand men, the entries to which 
were carefully protected by special filtering devices to 
prevent the entry of the poisoned external atmos- 
phere. On the British front these enormous dug-outs, 
although not absent, were largely replaced by the 
efficient gas-proof organisation of the smaller dug- 
outs. The use of impregnated blankets for this pur- 
pose must be well known to any who visited the front 
or took part in hostilities. But you cannot imprison 
a whole army in this way. The value of these collec- 
tive protective chambers depended on the fact that 
a certain number of men were always on the alert in 
the defensive systems outside and around the 
chambers, exposed to those gases against which the 
latter chambers were devised. 
In my opinion, the further intensive development 
of gas warfare, such as would have accompanied, say, 
the doubling or quadrupling of the German factory 
output, would have forced us into realising the limit 
of this collective protection. It would have com- 
pelled us to immobilise, in these shelters, more men 
than was consistent with the safety of the zone in 
question. Undoubtedly, the future of collective pro- 
tection lies in some form which will leave the soldier 
his combatant powers, in other words some mobile 
form. This has already been forecasted by Colonel 
Fuller in his book on Tanks in the Great War. But 
233 The Riddle of the Rhine 
he passes lightly over the protection of the tank 
against gas. With the increase in depth of infected 
zones, through the increasingly lethal nature of the 
persistent compound, the tank will be compelled to 
rely on filtration methods of protection, instead of the 
use of compressed oxygen in a gas-tight compartment. 
Once committed to the use of oxygen, the only safe 
procedure will be to close up the tank and employ 
the oxygen while there is any suspicion of the presence 
of gas, and, under these conditions, oxygen transport 
would become a factor militating against the prime 
purpose of the tank, the transport of troops and arms. 
It is safe to forecast a tense struggle between chemical 
weapons and protective tank devices in the event of 
future wars. 
Conclusion.—The facts which we have surveyed 
in early chapters, and the development foreshadowed 
above, form part of a much wider subject, for they 
are but one aspect of scientific warfare. In what 
main directions has science modified or revolutionised 
modern war? Its influence has touched practically 
every weapon in manufacture or design, introducing 
profound modifications in many cases. The sum total 
of such changes may be claimed to have revolution- 
ised warfare, but the term revolution should be 
reserved for some more specific scientific innovation, 
which threatens to change the nature of war rather 
than merely improve existing weapons. Modern 
wars have all echoed the popular cry for some new 
scientific principle or device to settle hostilities with 
one sharp stroke. This conception has been the sport 
of writers of fiction and others for many years. The 
“electric” death-dealing ray, the all-powerful gas, the 
deadly bacteria, and the “explosion” wave have all 
shared in buoying up the hopes or quickening the 
fears of warring peoples. Contrary to popular sup- 
234 Lines of Future Development 
position, a decisive scientific military surprise of this 
nature is not likely to follow close on the heels of the 
discovery of a new phenomenon. It is more than 
eighty years since the mind of a Faraday delved so 
fruitfully into electrical science, yet the oft prophesied 
large scale direct use of high voltage electricity, or 
some other form in war has not materialised. Or- 
ganic chemistry was a well-founded branch of science 
early in the nineteenth century, and flourishing indus- 
tries, fostered by it, were in existence thirty years 
ago, yet it was not until the early twentieth century, 
and the recent war, that we witnessed the rapid 
growth of organic chemical warfare, which, I claim, 
was as revolutionary as any other war development. 
The physical sciences have left their mark on every 
weapon and mechanical appliance, and the cumulative 
effect of these changes is indeed large, but the most 
revolutionary upheaval in warfare, with permanent 
results, came from chemistry. The flexible nature of 
organic chemistry must not be lost sight of. In the 
physical sciences, electricity, for example, years of 
co-ordinated world progress are required to produce 
an epoch-making discovery which might have critical 
and direct war significance. Radioactivity has shown 
us what undreamt-of energy is bound up in the atom, 
and many are the prophecies regarding the harnessing 
of these forces for constructive activities. At least 
one prominent novelist has pictured their destructive 
use in the radioactive bomb. But the use of this won- 
derful store of energy for peace and war can only 
result from years of costly and voluminous research, 
and we have no idea of the difficulties involved in pro- 
duction, without which any invention, however telling 
and revolutionary, has no incidence on war. But in 
organic chemistry a single worker, following up some 
rare family of compounds, may stumble upon a sub- 
235 The Riddle of the Rhine 
stance not far removed chemically from related com- 
pounds yet infinitely more potent for war. Mustard 
gas, or B: B-dichlor diethyl sulphide, is a member of 
a group of compounds differing only slightly in chem- 
ical structure the one from the other. Yet its nearest 
chemical relative is comparatively harmless. The 
persistent lethal compound which will vastly change 
the nature of warfare will probably be but a slight 
chemical modification of some harmless substance. 
Thus, by comparison with other branches of science 
as the handmaids of war, organic chemistry is sym- 
pathetic, flexible, and theoretically capable of yielding 
revolutionary discoveries in a relatively short time. 
We can only base such speculations on general 
grounds. Circumstances may disprove our contention 
over a short historical period, but it will be borne out 
in the long run. This is not the only reason, however, 
for the unique war importance of organic chemicals. 
It so happens that many of them are essential to our 
daily life as dyes, drugs, photographic and other syn- 
thetic products. Industries, therefore, have arisen 
for their manufacture. And this is not all. Organic 
chemical factories have proved to be not only arsenals 
in disguise but endowed with the flexibility of their 
parent, the science itself. The factories and plants 
ignore the war significance of the problems put to 
them. They can develop the production of prac- 
tically any chemical which research can produce. The 
will of man can thus silently and swiftly convert the 
dye factory into an arsenal. 
These inherent possibilities of organic chemistry, 
flexibility in research and production, make chemical 
warfare the most important war problem in the future 
reconstruction of the world. 
236 CHAPTER XI 
HUMANE OR INHUMANE? 
A good deal of abuse has been showered on chem- 
ical warfare methods by those who understand very 
little about them. It has been claimed by such that 
gas is particularly atrocious. Feeling on the matter 
has been so strong in certain quarters that the fact 
that all war is particularly vile and atrocious seems to 
have been completely lost sight of. Let us take up 
this matter in a rational way. In the first place, what 
do we mean by the atrocity or inhumanity of a 
weapon ? We can either appeal to the imagination or 
the reason, in the first case, by visualizing the battle- 
fields, or, in the second, by making a cold analysis of 
the casualties caused by gas. 
Nature of Gas Casualties.—Every normal per- 
son who experienced and survived the throes of the 
different stages of the war, and of the different gas 
surprises, mainly German, which were sprung upon 
us, finds it difficult to think out, or express, a cool and 
balanced view on the question of poison gas. But 
such a balanced view is most important for the future. 
It must be remembered that the official protests in 
1915 arose on the grounds, to use Lord Kitchener’s 
words, that “they employed these poisonous methods 
to prevail when their attack, according to the rules of 
war, might have otherwise failed.” Had the rules 
of war permitted their use, we should, no doubt, have 
been protected. But these protests, submerged in 
237 The Riddle of the Rhine 
popular sentiment, became an outcry against the 
atrocity of the new weapon. This, a just criticism at 
the time, became inaccurate when the Allies reacted, 
methods of protection developed, and the specific 
tactical uses of gas were realised. The view of the 
peculiar atrocity of gas has outlived the truth of war 
experience with regard to it. We agree that chemical 
warfare is atrocious. But it is no exception, for thus 
are all the aggressive methods of warfare. Indeed, 
when we attempt to interpret atrocity in terms of 
available casualty statistics, we find that gas is slightly 
less atrocious than the other weapons. We must 
either incline to this view or dispute the figures, which 
are authoritative. Consider the American figures. 
These will be more truly representative than our own, 
because their troops were only exposed during the 
later and more developed phases of the war. On the 
total strength of the A.E.F., the number gassed was 
about six per cent., wounded by rifle and machine-gun 
fire about one per cent., wounded by high explosive 
one and a half per cent., shrapnel wounds three per 
cent., and bayonet wounds less than one half per cent. 
But although enemy gas caused more than 70,000 
casualties, yet of these only one and a half per cent, 
were fatal, while the total number of deaths for all 
types of casualties was thirty per cent. Thus against 
the American army, measured by casualties produced, 
gas was by far the most effective, and yet by far the 
least deadly weapon. What can be more atrocious 
than the actual cone of tens or even hundreds of dead 
and wounded invariably left before an untouched 
machine-gun emplacement in an assault? What is 
more horrible than the captured first line trench after 
its treatment by the preparatory bombardment, or the 
mutilation of men peacefully sleeping in billets behind 
the battle front and thrown, broken and bloody, 
238 Humane or Inhumane? 
through their billet walls under the wheels of passing 
transport, as one has seen them? 
The whole experience of real war is beyond ad- 
jectives. But, leaving impressions, let us turn to 
facts. With regard to the future and from the point 
of view of atrocity, gas has a hopeful outlook as com- 
pared with other weapons. This may seem a curious 
statement to make, but consider the following. We 
cannot envisage advances in the use of explosives in 
shell or bomb to render them more humane. Ex- 
plosives, if their development be pressed, can only 
become more violent, with a wider range of action. 
Chemical warfare may follow the same lines, but it 
has the unique possibility of developing on more 
humane lines. The vesicant action of mustard gas 
produced huge casualties with relatively little per- 
manent harm. Chemicals may be found which tem- 
porarily influence human functions, enabling military 
objectives to be attained with a remarkably small 
amount of pain and death. In a fair review of the 
whole situation, this possibility cannot be overlooked. 
It is more than possible that a League of Nations, 
compelled to employ an element of force in its 
eventual control of peace, may find its most effective 
and human weapon in some chemical development. 
However visionary these views may appear, they are 
not unjustified as scientific possibilities. Analysis of 
war gas casualties reveal two main trends. As the 
struggle became more intense the number of casual- 
ties multiplied. They were considerable during the 
first period of cylinder attack, and the rate remained 
steady until the beginning of the mustard gas period. 
From the summer of 1917 to November, 1918, there 
were more than ten times as many gas casualties as 
for the preceding three years of war. But the per- 
centage mortality, the number of deaths amongst 
239 The Riddle of the Rhine 
:each hundred men attained, decreased considerably. 
As high as twenty-five per cent, during the early 
cylinder attacks, it decreased to two and a half per 
cent, for the huge number of mustard gas cases. Yet 
mustard gas was an exceedingly important military 
factor. It illustrates the possibility of development 
on these lines, but we must by no means disregard the 
atrocity of chemical warfare, and safeguards are 
required for the future. 
We cannot do better than conclude by quoting from 
General Hartley’s report to the British Association. 
He says: 
“The general impression that gas is an inhumane 
weapon is derived partly from the German breach of 
faith in using it contrary to the Hague Convention, 
and partly from the nature and number of casualties 
in the earliest cloud attacks which were made against 
unprotected troops. Under the stress of a long war 
the individual is apt to forget the physical and mental 
sufferings it involves, unless he is daily in contact with 
them, but a dramatic occurrence such as that of the 
first gas attack forces on the imagination the brutal 
significance of war—the struggle for victory by kill- 
ing—and the new weapon is judged as inhumane, like 
gunpowder in the fifteenth century. If we accept war 
as a possibility, the most humane weapon is that which 
leads to a decision with the smallest amount of human 
suffering and death. Judged from this standpoint, 
gas compares favourably with other weapons during 
the period when both sides were fully equipped for 
offence and defence. The death-rate among gas cas- 
ualties was much lower than that among casualties 
from other causes, and not only was the death-rate 
lower, but a much smaller proportion of the injured 
suffered any permanent disability. There is no com- 
240 Humane or Inhumane? 
parison between the permanent damage caused by gas, 
and the suffering caused to those who were maimed 
and blinded by shell and rifle fire. It is now generally 
admitted that in the later stages of the war many 
military objects could be attained with less suffering 
by using gas than by any other means. 
Sargent’s Picture.—“The judgment of future 
generations on the use of gas may well be influenced 
by the pathetic appeal of Sargent’s picture of the first 
‘Mustard Gas’ casualties at Ypres, but it must not be 
forgotten in looking at that picture that 75 per cent, 
of the blinded men he drew were fit for duty within 
three months, and that had their limbs and nerves 
been shattered by the effects of high explosive, their 
fate would have been infinitely worse.” 
Need for Safeguards.—We have continually re- 
ferred to the need for safeguards instead of mere 
reliance on prohibition. Such views and facts as the 
above should be more generally known in order that 
very worthy sentiments may not impel us to adopt an 
unsound solution for future peace. However alarmed 
and revolted we may have been in 1915 and later 
during the war, it is essential to take a balanced view 
in the present critical period of reconstructon. 
241 CHAPTER XII 
CHEMICAL WARFARE AND DISARMAMENT 
Preceding chapters have shown how chemical war- 
fare has now become a normal, technical, and in- 
creasingly important part of the science of war. 
Further, it has opened vast possibilities, the limits of 
which it is very difficult to fix. 
The Treaty of Versailles.—Chemical warfare re- 
ceived definite attention in the formulation of the 
Treaty of Versailles. Lord Moulton, one of the few 
Allied representatives who realised the full impor- 
tance of the matter, has drawn attention to its Treaty 
aspect in a recent speech. He lays emphasis on the 
fact that the full significance of the German dye in- 
dustry was not realised during the war. Referring to 
its chameleon-like nature in peace and war, Lord 
Moulton says: “All this was imperfectly present to 
my mind throughout the war, and I was aware of the 
gravity of the matter, but until I learnt what had 
passed in Germany I could not appreciate it fully. I 
have spoken to you of the extent to which the Ger- 
mans turned their chemical works into general works 
for supplying explosives. I have not touched the 
part in which they played the most deadly game 
against us, and that was where they used their chem- 
ical works to produce those toxic gases.” 
The same statement tells us, “The knowledge that 
I have gleaned as to what was going on in Germany 
during the war makes me feel that all my anticipa- 
242 Chemical Warfare and Disarmament 
tions of the importance of chemical industries in time’ 
of war, all the views that I expressed of that im- 
portance, did not nearly approach what has been 
proved to have gone on in the enemy’s country during 
the war.” He then proceeds to explain how a clause 
was inserted in the treaty—“whereby the Germans 
have to tell us all the secrets of their manufacture of 
explosives, all their methods of making toxic gases— 
in fact, all the military secrets that made them so 
terrible. This clause was a very just one. It is not 
fair that when we have gone through this agonising 
struggle, and when we are still suffering from the 
consequences of all the wealth of knowledge and 
ingenuity which they employed for their infamous 
purposes—it is not fair, I say, to allow them to keep 
these secrets to themselves, and I think you will agree 
with me it was in the highest degree consonant with 
justice that we should make them reveal them all to 
us.” Small wonder that we missed this vital point, 
that we failed to fathom the force behind the German 
chemical war, if such an eminent authority was left 
groping for the truth. There was no time for mature 
reflection with the problems of war supply pressing 
forward in an endless stream. Lord Moulton was 
himself responsible for the brilliant solution of the 
most important, the problem of explosives supply. 
The realisation of the facts in question led to the 
direct admission of their importance in the Treaty. 
Article 172, the one in question, states: “Within a 
period of three months from the coming into force 
of the present Treaty, the German Government will 
disclose . . . the nature and mode of manufacture 
of all explosives, toxic substances or other like chem- 
ical preparations used by them in the war, or pre- 
pared by them for the purpose of being so used.” 
German Information.—This clause should be ful- 
243 The Riddle of the Rhine 
filled in detail. In any given period of the stage of 
intensive chemical warfare and at the end, the Ger- 
mans, in addition to those devices in operation, must 
have had a large number of more telling and more 
novel ones in preparation. It is important to get as 
much information as possible on this development. 
A striking fact emerges. The years 1915, 1916, 
and the early part of 1917 witnessed the actual manu- 
facture of the war chemicals which were used by Ger- 
many on the front. All the research and other work 
which precedes chemical manufacture must have been 
completed much earlier. What surprises, then, had 
the German laboratories in store for us after 1917? 
Have these been revealed under authority of the 
Treaty? 
Probably the most important point in the clause is 
its interpretation with regard to the Haber process. 
Its critical importance in the manufacture of ex- 
plosives is so great that our neglect to use the Treaty 
to remove the monopoly is a direct menace to peace. 
This process undoubtedly saved Germany in 1915 
and is largely responsible for the three years of war 
agony which followed. It can only have missed spe- 
cific reference in the Treaty on account of its claim to 
represent the fertiliser rather than the explosives in- 
dustry. To yield to such views, however ideal the 
motives, is to threaten the greater ideal of world 
peace. 
Limitation of Armament.—This clause, covering 
only war development, cannot be regarded as a seri- 
ous safeguard for the future. It is rather the fruits 
of victory, the logical outcome of Allied success and 
the German breach of faith. But the Treaty of Ver- 
sailles contains an admission of the importance of 
chemical warfare for the future. Article 171 states: 
“The use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases 
244 Chemical Warfare and Disarmament 
and of analogous liquids, materials, or devices being 
prohibited, their manufacture and importation are 
strictly forbidden in Germany. The same applies to 
materials specially intended for the manufacture, 
storage, and the use of the same products or devices.”' 
What kind of guarantee is this? How far is it sup- 
ported by other disarmament? It is very important 
to answer these questions. In a sense the. full execu- 
tion of the other relevant Treaty clauses would pro- 
vide a partial answer. We deal with these in the next 
chapter. 
Report of the Hartley Mission.—Chemical war- 
fare is the point faible in world disarmament. Judg- 
ing from the above clause of the Treaty, it is clear 
that this is not fully recognised. Once again our trust 
is invited in mere prohibition. The lesson of the war 
is not learnt. The chemical menace is not countered. 
Why should this be? There are two main reasons. 
In the first place, very few had any conception of the 
tremendous growth in this branch of warfare, for 
facts had rarely been disclosed, and those with no 
direct contact with chemical warfare were relying on 
impressions. The vivid recollection of the first Ger- 
man cloud attack, and of the introduction of mustard 
gas, have, for most people, obscured the solid facts 
of the case. The great importance of the projector, 
the high percentage of chemical shell used by the 
enemy artillery, and the tremendous undertaking in- 
volved in protecting an army of millions with a 
modern gas mask, have not been grasped. The 
Hartley report clearly revealed the importance of the 
German dye factories for chemical warfare produc- 
tion. But we have a shrewd idea that it left many of 
its official readers much better informed on produc- 
tion than on the use of the materials concerned, that 
is, on the military value of chemical warfare. 
245 The Riddle of the Rhine 
New Conceptions in Chemical Disarmament.— 
The second difficulty preventing a full understanding 
of the case lies in the fact that chemical disarmament 
involves certain conceptions which are remote from 
the normal military outlook. Let us examine the 
matter as simply as possible. 
During the many discussions on disarmament in 
Paris, various principles were suggested as a basis. 
One which received recognition in the Treaty was the 
limitation of the number of projectors or guns, using 
the term “projector” in a general way to cover all 
projectile-throwing weapons. Thus, in the sense im- 
plied, rifles, machine-guns, field and heavy guns are 
projectors. Recent writers have termed gas a pro- 
jectile, one which, on account of its fluid nature, 
ignores the limitations of explosive shell and multiplies 
their radius of action indefinitely. This is true—with 
one most important qualification. Gas has never en- 
tirely depended upon the usual form of projector, the 
gun, and with the limitation of the latter its depend- 
ence will decrease. New forms of chemical weapon 
will evolve. Now it is true that almost every form 
of warfare which one can conceive depends for suc- 
cess on some sort of projector, and it is also true that 
the manufacture of these projectors can be controlled, 
because it is usually so complicated. These remarks 
apply, for example, to the manufacture of a field or 
heavy gun. But there is one serious exception to the 
covering power of this method of limitation. You 
cannot carry on tank warfare without ordinary pro- 
jectors, but you can run a chemical campaign without 
them. 
Facing the difficulties which are before any League 
of Nations or international body planning world dis- 
armament, let us assume armament reduced to a 
police basis. In other words, the use of force is not 
246 Chemical Warfare and Disarmament 
entirely ruled out, but is limited to the minimum re- 
quired for reducing local disorder, maintaining the 
peace, and contributing to any general scheme for 
preventing war. The nations, then, agree to limit 
their personnel and material within certain prescribed 
bounds. The work of the League of Nations, or 
central organisation, does not finish here. We can- 
not assume that permanent purity of national inten- 
tions, in other words, some check or guarantee must 
be instituted. This may take the simple form of sys- 
tematic reporting by nations and their inspection by 
the League. Here we meet with considerable diffi- 
culty. Unless some simple covering principle for 
inspection can be determined upon, we shall end up 
with one-half the world inspecting the administration 
and organisation of the other. The matter becomes 
an absurdity. 
Limitation, Mechanical and Chemical.—Consid- 
ering the present trend of war development, we cart 
divide the factors requiring limitation into three 
classes—the combatants, and weapons of a mechan- 
ical and chemical nature. 
Tank Disarmament.—A little thought will show 
that the limitation of the number of projectile-throw- 
ing weapons covers the first two types, and is a matter 
which is not theoretically beyond the possibility of 
inspection. Periodic inspection could reasonably be 
regarded as a check against very big scale production 
beyond the normal scope of industry, for such weap- 
ons as rifles, machine-guns, field and heavy guns. If 
we consider the most important new mechanical war 
appliance, the tank, we find it no exception to the 
above remarks. Without projectors, that is, machine- 
guns, rifles, etc., it merely becomes a means of convey- 
ing troops and material from one place to another. 
Two possibilities then arise. The number of tanks 
247 The Riddle of the Rhine 
required might be so small that they could be suitably 
armed with light projectors without entering upon 
large-scale production. Secondly, the tank might be- 
come an offensive weapon without projectors, by the 
use of some chemical contrivance. This merely goes 
to prove that steps must be taken to limit the output 
of the tank itself. Are such steps possible? We 
assume that the modern tank is, and will increasingly 
become, a weapon practically as specific as a big gun, 
requiring a number of special parts which normal in- 
dustry does not provide, and that the production con- 
cerned can be controlled by inspection with the same 
order of difficulty as that of the bigger projectors. 
We now come to the third type requiring limitation 
under a disarmament scheme. 
Chemical Limitation.—Can we limit chemical 
armament? Our review of production has shown the 
impossibility of doing so, unless we completely wipe 
out the organic chemical industry which is essential 
for world progress by its contribution of dyes, drugs, 
and other synthetic commodities. The factories of 
the organic chemical industries are more silently con- 
verted into arsenals than any other type. It is true 
that, under normal conditions of warfare, the decisive 
success of a chemical campaign might be restricted by 
the use of other weapons, such as artillery. But, 
under conditions where the latter are seriously lim- 
ited, the chemical weapon becomes, relatively, of 
much greater importance. One of the main trends 
in chemical warfare was the development of devices 
which would give long-range chemical effects without 
a complicated form of projector, or with none at all. 
Having thus shown the independence of the chemical 
weapon, under conditions of limitation of armament, 
we are faced with an important question. What can 
248 Chemical Warfare and Disarmament 
be the guarantees for the limitation of chemical war- 
fare? 
Research.—In the first place, can any research 
results accrue under Treaty or League conditions? 
The chief poison gases used during the war owed 
their discovery, as individuals, to pre-war research 
which was not stimulated by the need for an offensive 
chemical. Phosgene was discovered in 1811 by 
J. Davy, while experimenting on the action of sunlight 
on a mixture of carbon monoxide and chlorine. 
Guthrie, in i860, trying to throw light on some 
theoretical aspects of organic chemistry, examining 
the nature of certain so-called radicles or groups of 
atoms, came across a family of compounds of which 
mustard gas, or B: B dichlordiethylsulphide, was a 
member. This he found to be a dangerous substance, 
but the nearest members of the series were harmless. 
These substances will arise as a result of normal 
chemical research. We admit they may multiply 
much more quickly if work is specially directed to- 
wards their discovery, but it is practically impossible 
to control such work. The research worker’s nearest 
confidante and laboratory companion might be un- 
aware that he was developing some new vitally 
important chemical for warfare. No serious person 
can claim the possibility of a check upon such re- 
search. If, then, the Government of any country 
desires to provide its chemical factories with suitable 
subjects for chemical warfare production, these can 
be produced under any international arrangements, 
however prohibitive. 
Production.—But what of production? Here, again, 
we have an entirely different problem compared with 
that of limiting the output of a gun. Let us assume 
that the production of some vitally important new 
organic compound involves four different steps, and 
249 The Riddle of the Rhine 
that the last step produces the toxic substance. This 
is a fair assumption. Let us further assume the most 
favourable condition for detection, i.e. the final prod- 
uct is a liquid or gas with obviously toxic properties. 
Given a big organic chemical industry, there is no 
possibility of detection by open methods of control. 
With regard to the first three steps, in practically 
every case they will be related to some new or existing 
dye, drug, photographic, or other commercial organic 
product. The products of these first reactions can 
either be stored, ready for the rapid realisation of the 
last reaction, in which case there is no possibility of 
detection, or the reaction can be completed and the 
materials passed without exposure through a standard 
type of plant to an easily concealed container. The 
only type of inspection which could possibly cope with 
such a problem would require to probe deeply into the 
technical and commercial secrets of the factories and 
plants, and could even then be misled owing to the 
constantly developing nature of the compounds pro- 
duced. The inspectors would require to be numerous 
and as closely in touch with the plants and processes 
as the actual factory staffs. 
Consider the Leverkusen works for a moment. 
They cover a very wide range of products, are ad- 
mirably planned on a well thought out and rational 
scheme, and there is a reason for the position of every 
unit. Their methodical arrangement would be of 
more assistance to inspection in this than in any other 
large organic chemical works with which we are ac- 
quainted. Even under such favourable conditions 
satisfactory inspection would be most difficult. Each 
one of the twenty huge blocks contains many units of 
plant, and is devoted to the production of primary 
intermediate or finished materials. For the inspec- 
tion of suspected poison gas production, an examina- 
250 Chemical Warfare and Disarmament 
tion of the first two would be of no assistance, for the 
war and peace materials would be identical. Differ- 
entiation would occur in the dye and finished product 
blocks. Each one of these blocks may be producing 
as many as one hundred different compounds at the 
same time, and each one of these compounds may, 
itself, involve two, three, or four different stages. 
The members of one official mission, when asking to 
be shown the plant for the manufacture of p-amido- 
phenol, an important dye and photographic chemical, 
were taken to a large building filled with assorted 
plant, and were told by the guides, “We have no 
special plant for the product you mention; we make 
it in this building with a great many other products, 
for it is our principle not to have plant which makes 
one product only, but is ready adaptable for making 
a variety.” In many of the processes the materials 
do not appear to the naked eye after their introduc- 
tion into the first plant unit, being fed by gravity or 
pressure from one enclosed apparatus to another. It 
would be absolutely essential for any inspection to 
conduct chemical tests at the different stages. The 
difficulty of inspection is incontestable. It could be 
done with a large staff, but we must remember that 
the Rhine plants are, themselves, but a small corner 
of the whole world of industry requiring inspection. 
Even under the most favourable conditions for detec- 
tion, the chances are exceedingly small. But, in most 
cases, an enemy with a strong organic chemical indus- 
try need not undertake manufacture during peace. 
He could rely on the potentialities of his chemical 
industry, which would enable him to commence pro- 
duction in his existing plant immediately on the out- 
break of war. The question of the use of the chem- 
ical then arises. If of an exceedingly novel and de- 
cisive nature, it could take its share of use in the lim- 
251 The Riddle of the Rhine 
ited number of guns available; on the other hand, it 
might be capable of use in one of the very simple 
weapons already devised for chemicals, or to be de- 
vised in the future. 
Consider the Livens projector, by no means a 
favourable case. The latest German designs have a 
range well over a mile. This range may be increased. 
Yet the Livens projector can be made without serious 
or obvious war modification of plant, in a tube works, 
where the bomb can also be produced. The very 
nature of chemical warfare is such that great accuracy 
is not required, and simplification of production of the 
gas projector follows naturally. We conclude from 
the above that whatever treaty or international ar- 
rangements exist for prohibiting chemical warfare, we 
can find no safeguard in practicable methods of con- 
trol, and must find safety in some other measure. 
Mechanical and Chemical Preparations for War. 
—There is a fundamental difference in preparation 
for the mechanical and chemical methods of war. 
This difference necessitates special consideration for 
the chemical method from the point of view of dis- 
armament. All the modern mechanical types of war 
appliances are characterised by their great structural 
intricacy, witness the Lewis gun with its innumerable 
complicated parts, the heavy and field guns with their 
wonderful mechanism, and the future tank with its 
anti-gas, anti-water, and general anti devices. This 
characteristic of great structural development has cer- 
tain concomitants which are of considerable military 
importance. It imposes certain conditions on produc- 
tion, involving special factories for special parts and 
other factories for the assembly of those parts. It 
implies large scale experimentation for the improve- 
ment of the appliance. All this brings control and 
inspection within the region of the theoretically pos- 
252 Chemical Warfare and Disarmament 
sible, and militates against sudden surprise. The 
structural characteristic also imposes certain impor- 
tant conditions in military training. It takes a definite 
period of time to create a machine-gunner who will 
humour the wonderful mechanism which he serves. 
He must know the different jambs, and simple repairs. 
He must be trained. The same remarks apply to any 
other structurally intricate appliance, such as the tank. 
In other words, this characteristic is a distinct check 
on any nation aiming at a sudden expansion from 
limited to war armament. 
But consider the chemical method. The specific 
property of the chemical which gives it its military 
value is ultimately its influence on the human organ- 
ism, which causes casualties or imposes heavy mili- 
tary handicaps on protected troops. There is, again, 
a question of structure, the chemical structure of the 
substance in question. This, however, does not in- 
volve the same aids to armament limitation as for the 
mechanical type, unless it be in a very restricted sense. 
In research, the discovery of the most effective chem- 
ical the world will ever see can occur by the use of a 
few beakers, pots and pans, and common chemicals, 
directed by a trained mind. Being atomic or molecu- 
lar, the structure imposes no large scale conditions on 
the research. Nor is it fair to say that from the point 
of view of production there is a parallel between the 
complexity of the molecule and the plant required to 
make it. The chemically complicated Blue Cross 
arsenic compounds were produced by Germany in a 
plant which was simplicity itself when compared with 
the marvellous installation developed to produce 
oleum, a concentrated form of the relatively simple 
sulphuric acid, a fundamental substance in explosives 
production. Instead of manipulating a huge lathe, 
or forge, or exceedingly complicated multiple mechan- 
253 The Riddle of the Rhine 
ical device, you manipulate temperatures and pres- 
sures and vary the reaction medium. Naturally, 
chemical engineering is very important, but its magni- 
tude and complexity is in no sense parallel with the 
intricacy of the chemical molecule, whereas a distinct 
parallel exists for the mechanical war appliance. 
More than this, we believe that developments in both 
fields will exaggerate rather than diminish the differ- 
ence. We see thus how, on general grounds, the 
chemical weapon tends to evade any normal condition 
of limitation which might be perfectly adequate for 
the mechanical type. 
Recent Disarmament Proposals.—A superficial 
examination of recent disarmament speeches by prom- 
inent League of Nations advocates leaves one with 
the glow of inspiration produced by homage to a 
great ideal. But later reflection, in the cold light of 
reason, produces a critical, but not cynical, frame of 
mind. Disarmament depends for success on the way 
in which we tackle certain critical cases. The carrying 
out of the more commonly considered forms of dis- 
armament will give immensely added importance to 
other forms of warfare which have already chal- 
lenged supremacy in the keen competitive atmosphere 
of the great world war. The outstanding example is 
the chemical arm, whose peculiar requirements in any 
scheme of disarmament have been but vaguely under- 
stood. 
The great ease and rapidity with which the German 
dye factories mobilised for poison gas production on 
a super-industrial scale has already been demon- 
strated. It took forty years and more to develop 
those factories. Yet forty days saw many of their 
plants producing huge tonnages of poison gas, and as 
many hours were sufficient for others. In some cases, 
indeed, they were already producing eventual muni- 
254 Chemical Warfare and Disarmament 
tions long before the outbreak of war. We must not 
remain insensible to the double-edged nature of this 
industrial weapon. When with one hand Germany 
withdrew life-giving drugs from America, with the 
other she poured upon us an endless stream of deadly 
poison made in the same factories. Even when our 
textile industries were threatened through lack of 
indigo, from the very plants on which we had de- 
pended there issued a steady stream of mustard gas, 
each ounce of which threatened Allied limb and life. 
But how does this touch disarmament? Very 
simply. A few quotations from some recently pub- 
lished disarmament utterances will show that we are 
not pressing the point without need. But let us fol- 
low the matter through in a logical way. 
The Covenant of the League;—Need for Guar- 
antees.—We start from the sure ground of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations. Article 8, 
recognising the reduction of armaments to the lowest 
point consistent with national safety, refers to the 
formulation and revision of plans for such reduction 
and states: “The members of the League undertake 
to interchange full and frank information as to the 
scale of their armaments, their military and naval 
programmes, and the conditions of such of their in- 
dustries as are adaptable to warlike purposes.” Here 
is the frank admission of the importance of such 
industries. But later exponents of the League express 
dissatisfaction with Article 8, claiming the wording to 
be vague. Thus, from Major David Davies, M.P.,1 
“The whole wording of Article 8 is vague. These 
proposals would not eradicate the old atmosphere of 
suspicion which has brought about so many wars. 
Nations who put their trust in the League are entitled 
1 The Flaw in the Covenant and the Remedy. Major David 
Davies, M.P. 
255 The Riddle of the Rhine 
to an assurance that the League will be able to enforce 
its decisions with promptitude. The proposals con- 
cerning armaments in Article 8 and elsewhere do not 
give this assurance. Something more definite is re- 
quired,” and he proceeds to lay down three aims 
which must be covered by an efficient disarmament 
scheme. 
“ (a) Allow each nation an army sufficient to main- 
tain internal order within its own bound- 
aries, and sufficient also to furnish its quota 
for the League of Nations when required. 
“(b) Ensure that the quota of any nation shall 
not be rendered useless by the employment 
of a new weapon of war by another nation. 
“(c) Provide the League of Nations with an 
adequate force for immediate use. 
“All the above essentials are incorporated in a 
scheme for an International Police Force. This 
scheme, which is given in the merest outline, is based 
on the assumption that our national security must 
always be absolutely safeguarded, and that before we 
decide on any relaxation of our armament policy we 
must be certain that the alternative offers complete 
protection.” Other exponents emphasise this last 
essential. This reference to an International Police 
Force raises an important issue. Such a force must 
draw its personnel from the different nations. With- 
out any doubt, one of the most important contribu- 
tions from the nations is the fostering of organic 
chemical research and technical cadres which can only 
be maintained under true disarmament conditions by 
the redistributed organic chemical industries. 
Viscount Grey—“Germany Must Disarm First.” 
—Viscount Grey, at the public meeting in support of 
the League of Free Nations on October ioth, 1918, 
256 Chemical Warfare and Disarmament 
stated: “Germany must disarm first. She led the 
way up the hill in increasing expenditure on arma- 
ments. She must lead the way down the hill. That 
as a first condition, from our point of view, goes with- 
out saying. There can be no talk of disarmament 
until Germany, as the greater armer, is disarmed.” 
One can only heartily agree with such expressions, 
but the denouement brings a sense of disappointment. 
There is a feeling that those who should be nearest 
are but groping for a solution. The peculiar sig- 
nificance of chemical warfare for the future is freely 
admitted in these utterances. Thus Major David 
Davies states: “If they had kept their intentions 
secret until they could utilise a thoroughly deadly gas 
in the general attack, it was more than possible that 
they would have completely broken the Allied line,” 
and Lord Grey, “You cannot limit the amount of 
merchant ships or commercial aeroplanes, and the 
fewer the armaments, fighting aeroplanes, and ships 
of war, the more potential as weapons of war become 
the things which you use in commerce—ships, aero- 
planes, chemicals of all kinds.” 
Left in this state the case is true but not complete. 
The essential point is that the new and telling types 
of armament will develop from these very peace in- 
dustries. We are not merely concerned with their 
relative magnitude in a state of disarmament, but with 
the critical types which may develop from them. 
So far, so good, but what steps are proposed to 
counter the menace? In reviewing what has been 
suggested by different responsible individuals, we find 
that the methods intended to cover armament limita- 
tion for the newer weapons fall into two classes. 
Suggested Methods.—In the first place, it is sug- 
gested “that war’s newest weapons—poison gas, 
aeroplanes, submarines, heavy artillery, and tanks— 
257 The Riddle of the Rhine 
should be ceded to the League to form the Head- 
quarter’s Force, and that no state should be allowed 
to own them or to make use of any new invention for 
warlike purposes. 
“There should be no delay in handing over the new 
arms before they can claim long traditions. Vested 
interests have not yet been created on a permanent 
footing. Great disturbance would not be caused at 
present by the suggestion of denationalisation.” 
This really claims the advisability of verbal pro- 
hibition, which is absolutely useless, unless supported 
by the second class of safeguard, periodic “inspec- 
tion.” Major Davies suggests “all arsenals and 
munition factories would be open to inspection by the 
General Staff, who would use them, when necessary, 
for arming the quota of a nation other than that in 
whose territory they were situated.” We know of no 
practical method by which inspection could be relied 
upon to give satisfactory warning of the conversion 
of the plants of the I.G. for war purposes. A distinc- 
tion must be made between those weapons whose pro- 
duction can and cannot be practically controlled by 
inspection. In attempting such r. classification, Major 
Davies claims, “It is difficult to prevent the secret 
manufacture of rifles, but it is easy to prevent the 
manufacture of tanks, aeroplanes, gas, or sub- 
marines.” No one having witnessed the large scale 
operations of assembling tanks and heavy guns, and 
aware, at the same time, of the German methods of 
producing mustard gas or Blue Cross compounds, 
could make such an elementary mistake in classifica- 
tion, and any international disarmament arrange- 
ments based on such an error can only produce a false 
security. Gas is the outstanding case of a weapon 
whose manufacture it is difficult to prevent. 
258 Chemical Warfare and Disarmament 
“Vested Interests.”—With regard to the vested 
interests in the new method of warfare, the most 
striking example is again the I.G. We find Luden- 
dorff consulting Krupp and the I.G. representative 
when formulating his plans for a vast munition pro- 
gramme. Few people have realised the existence of 
another Krupp in the I.G. It would, indeed, be a 
revelation to find Germany sharing in these schemes 
of disarmament to the extent of voluntarily abandon- 
ing her dye monopoly. For such a situation is the 
only one consistent with safety. While the sole big 
source of production of these substances exists in Ger- 
many or in any one country for that matter, no 
scheme of disarmament is on sure ground. 
“Handing Over” Inventions.—Certain disarma- 
ment advocates have ingenuous ideas with regard to 
new war inventions, and their “handing over” to the 
League. How can an invention be handed over? If 
every country informed the League of its new scien- 
tific war developments, those countries would still be 
aware of them. It is possible, commercially, to hand 
over any invention by assigning a patent, but this is of 
no use for war purposes. What country would 
regard patent law as a barrier to the use of a valuable 
war invention? Secondly, the cession of an invention 
to the League depends entirely on the goodwill of the 
nation concerned. No country can be sufficiently in- 
spected to root out its new inventions. Suppose a 
gas ten times more useful, from a military point of 
view, than mustard gas were discovered in the labora- 
tories of the I.G. An inspector, or “Secret Service” 
agent, at the next bench in the laboratory might never 
know that the research was not aimed at the discovery 
of a new dye. World equilibrium may at this moment 
be threatened by the discoveries of some absorbed 
259 The Riddle of the Rhine 
scientist working, say, in a greenhouse in St. John’s 
Wood. 
We come back to the same point, that the crux of 
the situation lies in the possession of the means of 
production. There is hope of controlling this for a 
weapon like a tank, but it cannot be controlled for 
chemical warfare. If the League requires these 
weapons it cannot rely on obtaining them from a 
monopoly source so complete as the I.G. Further, 
with or without a League the mere existence of this 
monopoly is a permanent menace to peace. 
Neglect of Chemical Disarmament in the Treaty. 
—Let us face the facts. Our treatment of chemical 
industry during the Treaty negotiations and in the 
Treaty itself persistently ignored its chameleon na- 
ture. We knew that the nitrogen plants at Oppau 
and Merseburg were the most menacing munition 
plants in existence. We knew the grave dangers of 
leaving Germany, a guilty country, in possession of 
the poison gas monopoly. Yet, deaf to such argu- 
ments, the Treaty opportunity was ignored. Even 
now the lesson is only half learnt by those whom it 
vitally concerns. 
Here is a new weapon whose exploitation demands 
research and large scale production. The former 
cannot be checked, and the latter cannot be destroyed 
or suitably controlled to prevent conversion for war 
purposes. Yet three distinct features of this weapon 
make the disarmament need imperative. 
In the first place, everything points to “chemical 
disarmament” as a key measure to control the large 
scale use of all other weapons. The aggressive agent 
in war is the chemical. All weapons, except the 
bayonet, depend upon it. 
In the second place, chemical warfare is itself so 
overwhelmingly important that it is farcical to con- 
260 Chemical Warfare and Disarmament 
template any disarmament scheme which does not, 
first and foremost, tackle this question. 
Thirdly, no nation ever held a more complete 
monopoly for any weapon than did Germany for 
chemical warfare. Yet the levelling up process which 
occurred during the war, tending towards armament 
equilibrium, towards removal of enormous disparity, 
failed to touch the chemical arm. Germany through 
her guilty exercise of the new weapon, has still further 
increased her enormous manufacturing superiority 
for war. 
This age has witnessed the growth of an industry 
critical for war and disarmament. Others will fol- 
low as science progresses. Without them, the possi- 
bility of sudden decisions, and therefore war incentive 
will be removed. Sir Oliver Lodge prophesies the 
war use of the newly controlled atomic energy. The 
fulfilment depends on the growth of another critical 
war industry whose nature it would be difficult to 
foretell. It is these critical industries which rational 
disarmament must harness. At present the chemical 
industry holds the field. 
Surely the first and crying need is to effect a re- 
distribution of these organic chemical forces. This, 
indeed, is the one solid chemical disarmament meas- 
ure which can and must be brought about. 
The certain establishment of these industries in the 
chief countries outside Germany must be fixed far 
beyond the hazard of local politics and the reach of 
organised German attack. True, it is essential that 
no such support should in any way drug the will, 
weaken the initiative and impoverish the service of 
the fostered industries. This must depend upon wise 
organisation and control in the country concerned. 
1 claim, however, that it is one of the main duties 
of any League of Nations or other organisation deal- 
261 The Riddle of the Rhine 
ing with disarmament to proceed two steps beyond 
the paragraph in Article 8 of the Covenant. This 
runs as follows: “The members of the League under- 
take to interchange full and frank information as to 
the scale of their armaments, their military, naval, 
and air programmes, and the conditions of such of 
their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes.” 
Such an exchange of information must be used, first, 
to isolate that industry which is of a vital or key 
nature to the armament of the period, either on 
account of its value as a universal check, or because 
it fosters some particularly deadly new type of 
weapon or aggressive agent. The chemical industry 
at present fulfils both conditions, for without it, all 
weapons except the bayonet become silent, and it in- 
cludes the organic chemical industry which fosters the 
deadly weapon of the period. 
Secondly, rational disarmament must prevent the 
existence of monopoly in this critical industry. It 
may be objected that we are interfering with the play 
of ordinary economic laws. But we must face the 
possibility that the war of the future can never be 
averted without such interference. Indeed, if we 
accept the reports of the American Alien Property 
Custodian, this very monopoly which now threatens 
us was established by methods open to the same objec- 
tions. It is indeed an interesting question whether the 
German dye monopoly resulted from forces which 
directly opposed the play of economic law. Further, 
the question is not so simple as it appears, for, in the 
industries which disarmament most concerns, govern- 
ing technical changes are constantly occurring, and 
the normal home for the production of a whole range 
of chemical products may be shifted by a change of 
process which demands new raw materials or new 
types of energy and power. We must be ready, in 
262 Chemical Warfare and Disarmament 
certain critical cases, to regard disarmament as the 
paramount need. International agreement, through 
the League or otherwise, must find a suitable method 
to control the critical industry and prevent its use 
against world peace. 
To be the ardent possessor of an ideal, to be its 
official guardian, does not allow us to ignore the 
technical aspect of an international and national issue. 
After our gigantic praiseworthy, but wasteful, at- 
tempts at chemical armament, let us at least disarm on 
rational lines. 
263 CONCLUSION 
THE TREATY AND THE FUTURE 
I have endeavoured to present the facts of chem- 
ical warfare as briefly yet as truly as possible, giving 
a glimpse of the war possibilities inherent in this 
branch of applied chemical science. Nor have I 
ignored the hidden forces which inspired, stimulated, 
and supported the huge war chemical experiment. 
The great Rhine factories of the I.G. still cast their 
shadow on the outer world, obscuring the issues of 
reconstruction. This looming menace, its share in the 
past and future of chemical warfare, and the fatal 
growth of the latter present questions demanding an 
imperative answer. It is the weak point of world 
disarmament. 
The Treaty of Versailles answers the riddle in 
principle, but have the actual clauses been unfulfilled? 
Article 168 demands the limitation of munitions 
production to factories or works approved by the 
Allied and Associated Governments. “All other 
establishments for the manufacture of any war ma- 
terial whatever shall be closed down.” 
True, the plants of the I.G., like most other muni- 
tion plants, have a dual function for peace and war. 
But their recent vital use for the latter brings them 
without doubt within the scope of the above clause. 
Are they still equipped for war purposes? Very 
drastic action will have been necessary by the Inter- 
Allied Commission of Control to justify a negative 
answer. Has that action been taken? If not, the 
I.G., a second Krupp, remains in splendid isolation, 
264 The Treaty and the Future 
secure behind our mediaeval but generous conception 
of munitions, for fifty per cent, of the German shell 
fillings, the message of their guns, were eventually 
provided by the I.G. It is true that they were manu- 
factured in synthetic dye and fertiliser plants, but the 
explosives were none the less violent and the poison 
gases none the less poisonous. Do we understand 
that the Allied and Associated Governments volun- 
tarily leave Germany in unquestioned possession of 
this vast source of munitions in the face of the Treaty 
Article 168 ? 
Article 169 wisely requires that any special plant 
intended for the manufacture of military material, 
except such as may be recognised as necessary for 
equipping the authorised strength of the German 
Army, must be “surrendered to be destroyed or 
rendered useless.” The most formidable examples 
of such excess production were, and remain, the nitro- 
gen fixation and the nitric acid plants of the I.G. The 
factories of the latter represent explosives and poison 
gas capacity far in excess of the authorised needs of 
the German Army. Why, then, should they be left 
intact? 
What is the authorised equipment of the German 
Army? In the first place the manufacture and use of 
poison gas is specifically forbidden by the Treaty. 
The plants in question are therefore all in excess of 
authorised production, and should be destroyed or 
rendered useless. At present, to the best of our be- 
lief, they stand ready to produce at short notice at the 
rate of more than 3000 tons of poison gas per month. 
Does this mean that we admit them as authorised 
equipment? If so, we are ourselves contravening 
another clause of the Treaty. 
The Treaty tabulates the authorised equipment in 
stock of shell. Based on the figures, we find that the 
265 The Riddle of the Rhine 
actual war explosives production of the I.G., which, 
we believe, still largely remains available, could meet 
the total stock allowed to Germany by the current 
production of little more than one day! 
Even if the Treaty provided authority, could these 
plants evade their just penalties on the ground of 
commercial world need? 
Consider the question of German poison gas, all 
produced within the I.G., and its use and manufacture 
in Germany forbidden by the Treaty. It was made 
in converted or multiplied dye plants, or in special 
plants of the same type. Germany’s great advantage 
was due, unquestionably, to her pre-war dye monop- 
oly. The 1913 figures for production and home con- 
sumption are given below, under (A) and (B) : 
A 
B 
C 
Country. 
Dye Produc- 
Home Dye 
Dye Produc- 
tion, 1913. 
Consumption. 
tion, 1918. 
Tons 
Tons 
Tons 
Germany 
135.000 
20,000 
135,000 
(probably 
more) 
Switzerland 
3,000 
12,000 
France 
7,500 
9,430 
18,000 
U.K 
4,500 
31,730 
25.000 
U.S.A 
26,020 
27,000 
Other Countries .... 
72,820 
4,000 
Total 
163,000 
221,000 
The completeness of the German monopoly stands 
clearly revealed. If, therefore, any plants capable of 
making dyes were built for poison gas or explosives 
during war, they could find no post-war raison d’etre 
unless the feeble production of other countries had 
even further diminished. 
Do the above figures (C) justify such an assump- 
tion? There is an increase of production outside 
Germany of nearly 60,000 tons per annum. Almost 
all of this, representing development under definitely 
266 The Treaty and the Future 
expressed national policy, must be maintained unless 
we wish to revert to the exceedingly dangerous situa- 
tion of a German dye and poison gas monopoly. 
Much of this 60,000 tons per annum German excess 
could be covered by plants used or built specially for 
poison gas or explosives. 
There is every reason, for world peace, to elimi- 
nate such excess plants. There is no important rea- 
son, for commerce, to maintain them. In addition, 
many of them represent excess capacity which should 
be destroyed because they originated solely for the 
exploitation of a forbidden weapon. Even if a gen- 
erous ruling, superimposed on the Treaty, offered 
these guilty plants a new lease of life because of their 
urgent peace-time use, the claim could not be sup- 
ported before neutral experts. The Treaty provides 
authority for the disarming of certain chemical muni- 
tion plants. Nothing but the most drastic economic 
need can justify departure from this critical disarma- 
ment measure. The need may justify Treaty exemp- 
tion for other types of munition production in which 
the disarmament aspect is not so overwhelmingly im- 
portant. The matter demands examination. We can 
hardly conceive that this has not been done. Are our 
missions equipped to meet the best German commer- 
cial minds on such a matter? In any case, Allied 
Governments have already wisely adopted a dye 
industry policy inconsistent with the special Treaty 
immunity of the excess I.G. munition plants. Our 
figures remove any ground for the economic argu- 
ment. 
The nitrogen fixation plants of the I.G. undoubt- 
edly demand the same critical examination. These 
plants were built almost entirely for war purposes, for 
the production of ammonia to be oxidised to nitric 
acid. Ammonium nitrate also resulted. These sub- 
267 The Riddle of the Rhine 
stances are the mainstay of explosives warfare, and, 
as a matter of fact, their production in these very 
plants was the chief factor which enabled Germany 
to continue the war beyond 1915. 
Under the simple reading of the Treaty clauses, 
the plants should “be destroyed or rendered useless.” 
Here, possibly, strong arguments will be advanced by 
Germany for the retention of the plants for the pur- 
pose of fertilising her own soil. The argument is 
strong, for the impoverishment of German soil has 
been such as to demand theoretically, enormous ton- 
nages of ammonium sulphate. But it is vital, for the 
stability of peace, that this unique capacity for 
producing explosives must not remain the monopoly 
of any one country. It is the expressed intention of 
certain governments outside Germany to foster the 
nitrogen fixation enterprise. If, then, we admit the 
immunity of these German plants from the Treaty, 
for strong agricultural reasons, we must not allow 
Germany to use this privilege as a military advantage. 
In other words, if we yield to such arguments it 
must be on two conditions. In the first place, the 
plants to evade the Treaty clauses must be proved 
necessary for German agriculture. Secondly, the 
products of the untouched plants must be used for this 
purpose and no other. As far as we know, no 
attempt has been made to apply the Treaty to the 
nitrogen fixation plants, and their products, instead 
of being mainly used for agriculture on German soil, 
have served as a deliberate weapon against the grow- 
ing chemical industries of other countries. 
Indeed, the figures at our disposal would indicate 
that even if the full demands of German agriculture 
were met, the plants built and projected leave a big 
margin which can only find outlet by export or mili- 
tary use. According to the Frankfurter Zeitung of 
268 The Treaty and the Future 
November 23rd, 1919, the total consumption of 
nitrogenous material by Germany was, in 1913, as 
follows: 
Source and Nature 
Tons 
Tons 
Calculated as 
Chili Saltpetre 
Nitrogen 
116,000 
Ammonium Sulphate 
92,000 
Norwegian Nitrate 
35,ooo 
4,500 
Calcium Cyanamide 
6,000 
Haber Ammonium Sulphate 
(by Fixation) 
4,000 
Total 
The same journal, October 18, 1919, states the 
capacity of the finished Haber plants to be equivalent 
to 300,000 tons of nitrogen per annum, and the total 
consumption of the old German Empire was thus less 
than the amount available from one source alone, i.e. 
nitrogen fixation by the Haber process. But other 
pre-war German sources of nitrogen, expanded by the 
war, will easily contribute their pre-war quota. We 
can therefore very safely assume German capacity 
of above 400,000 tons of nitrogen per annum, 
approximately twice the pre-war consumption. It is 
exceedingly unlikely that Germany will actually con- 
sume such a quantity. In any case, a large excess is 
now deliberately used to recapture world chemical 
markets, and this, as explained above, should be dealt 
with under the Treaty even if special immunity be 
afforded the capacity required for home purposes. 
We are indeed entitled to ask, what is being done on 
this vital matter? 
Article 170 prohibits the importation of munitions 
of every kind into Germany. Considered from the 
point of view of chemical munitions, this clause shows 
a complete failure to understand the situation. Far 
from importing, possession of the I.G. leaves 
Germany the greatest potential exporter of chemical 
269 The Riddle of the Rhine 
munitions in the whole world. Further, it is not im- 
probable that countries outside Germany may en- 
courage her in munitions production for export. 
Lord Moulton stated in a speech at Manchester in 
December, 1914: “Supposing our War Minister had 
been in the last few years buying in the cheapest 
market for the sake of cheapness, and that he had 
had the munitions of war manufactured by Krupp’s 
of Essen. Gentlemen, I think he would have been 
lynched about three months ago.” 
We have fallen far from the inspired resolution of 
those days! Knowing the true war significance of the 
I.G. as a second Krupp, if we fail to establish our own 
organic chemical industries, that warning may become 
a prophecy. 
Article 171 forbids the manufacture of asphyxiat- 
ing gases and analogous materials in Germany. 
Lias this clause any value unsupported by 
definite measures of control? With such an enor- 
mous capacity of rapidly convertible production, need 
Germany consider the production of these chemicals 
during peace? Once engaged in war, what is the 
value of the prohibition? True, failure would imply 
penalties for the specific breach of the Treaty. But a 
similar breach of International Convention is already 
involved, and admitted in the first phrase of Article 
171: “The use of poison gases being prohibited, etc.” 
It is difficult to see, therefore, unless penalties 
be actually incurred for the existing breach, why 
Article 171 would be a serious deterrent for the 
future. 
A trenchant comparison is afforded by the motive 
for this Treaty Article, and the actual operation of 
other Articles which should support it. 
The Treaty makers thought it necessary to give 
direct reference to chemical warfare. They issued 
270 The Treaty and the Future 
a special edict against its use. This alone should 
have guided those responsible for the execution of 
the Disarmament Clauses of the Treaty, measures 
of general application to the means of production 
of the different types of weapon. Have the special 
plants erected for poison gas received drastic action 
under the Treaty? It is to be feared that they and 
other war chemical plants of the I.G. have received 
undeserved immunity. 
Where lies our help apart from the Treaty? 
World peace depends upon disarmament. True 
peace must come from a radical change in the 
outlook and sentiment of individuals. The forces 
working through these channels are the real peace- 
makers. But a League of Nations can forward 
the cause by wise measures of disarmament, and 
this implies limiting war producing capacity. The 
weak point in such a scheme is the organic chemical 
industry. There must be a redistribution of capacity, 
for while Germany retains a vast world monopoly 
of potential organic chemical munitions, which fed 
the armaments of the past with explosives and 
poison gas, and to which the weapons of the future 
are looking for inspiration and sustenance, disarma- 
ment will be a hollow farce. 
The League of Nations may succeed in rooting 
out the means of production of certain munitions. 
But organic chemical factories must survive for the 
sake of their material contribution to the welfare 
of humanity. They cannot be inspected and con- 
trolled, as we have shown, and there is only one 
sound solution. The obstacle to peace must be re- 
moved by decentralising the organic chemical fac- 
tories. We cannot leave this monopoly in the hands 
of any country. It now lies a weapon ready to the 
hands of those who created and wielded it with such 
271 The Riddle of the Rhine 
success. Redistributed, this dangerous productive 
grouping will create a source of stability and strength 
to a League of Nations, and will invite a national 
sense of security, so essential to peace and disarma- 
ment under the present regime. This has only one 
meaning, the establishment of dye industries in Allied 
countries. This may clash with certain political 
schools of thought developed before the war without 
a due realisation of the organic way in which produc- 
tion links up with national defence. But let there 
be no misunderstanding. The refusal to support this 
critical industry is a definite sacrifice of vital national 
issues. Political principles responsible for such op- 
position no longer merit the name; they have become 
a fetish. 
Our armies repelled the German chemical attack. 
They stood and fell unprotected before the early 
German clouds and unprotected again before the 
vile contact of mustard gas. The awful price they 
paid for our safety demands that we do more than 
rest contented with the sacrifice. It is an imperative 
and patriotic duty to the fallen, to the future of the 
race, and to the Empire, that, faced once again with 
modern war, we should be able to say, “every pos- 
sible precaution was taken.” But the chief precau- 
tion will have been neglected unless organic chemical 
industries are fostered on Imperial soil. 
But what of chemical warfare itself? It is a 
growth, malignant or otherwise, according to our 
creeds, which will continue until very definite steps 
be taken to suppress it, with all war. Therefore, 
urgent guarantees for national safety are absolutely 
essential until the web of peace is strongly organised, 
which cannot be until the immediate menace of the 
monopoly in production is removed. But even then, 
until the general peace is fairly implanted, we must 
272 The Treaty and the Future 
be ready for any surprise from an unscrupulous 
enemy. Research and training in chemical protec- 
tion must be continued, and this can only be ensured 
by keeping abreast with offensive chemical warfare. 
“The Struggle for the Initiative” has at least estab- 
lished this. 
Each nation and any League of Nations must 
seriously face the question of the establishment of 
elaborate and complex chemical warfare organisa- 
tions. It seems to me that the logical course of 
thought and action is as follows. If guarantees are 
forthcoming, internationally, removing this grave 
German chemical warfare threat through her manu- 
facturing monopoly, then the need for a definite 
chemical striking force and organisation will be 
greatly reduced. National safety is itself a corollary 
of world disarmament. But if satisfactory guaran- 
tees were forthcoming it would be consistent with 
national safety to limit the chemical warfare equip- 
ment of each nation to what would actually represent 
a scientific military brain. So long as national min- 
istries for war or defence exist, they must possess 
even under the most stringent disarmament condi- 
tions, fully accredited within their regular staffs, an 
individual or individuals with scientific and military 
training, who represent knowledge, vision, and the 
power to expand in chemical warfare. What would 
be said of a great nation not equipped to think for 
the future on naval or artillery questions? Techni- 
cal naval and military minds have evolved for these 
purposes. We are not slow to judge and act on the 
value of a new ship, tank, or machine-gun. The 
chemical arm is even more specialised and demands 
the same combination of scientific and military think- 
ing and training. Whatever international disarma- 
ment decisions may be forthcoming, unless they seri- 
273 The Riddle of the Rhine 
ously dismember the Defence Ministries, we should 
ensure that the pre-war position is corrected and that 
our staff conception and organisation covers the 
chemical weapon. 
One alone of the Allied and Associated Powers 
was able to see the chemical menace with clear and 
unprejudiced vision. This was America, for she not 
only entered the war less hampered by traditions 
than the rest, but at a period when the chemical war 
was in full blast. More than a quarter of all her 
casualties were due to “gas,” and no other arm pro- 
duced as many in her ranks. As a result, we see 
America establishing an independent peace Chemical 
Warfare Service, as sister service to the Infantry 
and Artillery. This can only be interpreted as a 
frank realisation of the place of chemical warfare 
and of the need for serious international guarantees 
in the present situation. 
Let us take a balanced view of the facts, realise 
the unique significance of chemical warfare and 
chemical industry, for war and disarmament, and 
act accordingly. 
274 INDEX 
A. charcoal, 129. 
Aircraft, gas and, 181, 185, 229, 
230, 231 
Aisne, German attacks on, 77,141. 
Akticn Gesellschaft fur Anilin 
Fabrikation, 151. 
Alert Gas Zone, 228. 
Alien Property Custodian, report 
of, 19,152,187,189,190,191, 
194, 262 
Allied Gas Statistics, 82. 
Missions, 86, 87. 
Reaction, 48. 
American activities, 64, 173, 174. 
chemical warfare develop- 
ment, 105, 173, 174, 178, 
273, 274. 
chemical warfare service, 49, 
178,179, 274. 
Amidol, 203. 
Ammonia, synthetic, see Nitrogen 
Fixation. 
Anjes the tics, 201, 220. 
local, 199, 202, 220. 
Anti-Gas Committee, British, 95. 
Department, British, 98,127. 
Armenti&res, bombardment of, 77. 
Arras, Battle of, 63. 
, British 1917 offensive, 61. 
Arsenic Compounds, 26, 28, 69, 
136, 137, 139, 160, 163. See 
also Blue Cross. 
Artillery Gas experts, 91. 
Asphyxiating Compounds, 25. 
Aspirin, 199, 208. 
Austria-Hungary, gas battalion of, 
47- 
Azo Dyes, 160. 
Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik, 
88,151, 207, 212. 
Bleaching Powder, 169, 221, 222. 
Blue Cross, 29, 69, 74-77, 89, 126, 
131, 132, 136, 137, 160, 229, 
253, 258. 
Bn. Stuff, 42. 
Box Respirator, British, 68, 98, 
101, 125, 126, 176. 
Bribery and Corruption, 190. 
British Association, General Hart- 
ley’s report, 64, 123, 240. 
Central Laboratory, 93, 115. 
Dyes Limited, 168, 169. 
Brominated methyl-ethylketone, 
42. 
Bromine, American Industry, 157, 
190, 191. 
French, 157, 171, 196. 
Monopoly, German, 157. 
Bromoacetone, 26, 41. 
B. Stuff, 41. 
Buntkreuz, 139. 
Cacodyl oxide, 35. 
Cambrai sector, attack on, 70, 79. 
Camouflage chemicals, 141, 217, 
218. 
Canadians, gas attack on, 39. 
Captured Documents, 52, 53, 74, 
82, 128, I33, 221, 222, 228. 
275 Index 
Carnoy, attack at, 61. 
Cartridge Mask, German, 124,128. 
Castner Kellner, 169. 
Casualties, gas, 56, 93, 174, 182, 
237-241, 274. 
Chaulny, 209. 
Chemical Advisory Committee, 96. 
' Exchange Association, 194, 
196. 
' Initiative, see Initiative, 
struggle for. 
■ Policy, German, 186-188, 
200, 205. 
Warfare Department, Brit- 
ish, 96-98. 
Designs Committee, 99. 
Medical Committee, 97. 
Organisations, 85, 215, 
217 228, 239, 
264. 
, English, 92, 94, 
103, 105, 165. 
, French, 94, 99, 
100, 105. 
, German, 85, 89, 
102, 103, 149. 
, Italian, 101. 
Policy, 88, 249, 250. 
Production, see Produc- 
tion. 
Research, see Research. 
Service, American, see 
American Chemical 
Warfare Service. 
Chemische Fabrik Griesheim Elek- 
tron, 151, 152. 
Fabriken vorm. Weilcr-ter- 
Meer, 151. 
Chloral Hydrate, 196, 202. 
Chlorine, 23, 25, 35, 36, 155, 156, 
169, 171, 217. 
Chlormethylchloroformate, 64, 69. 
Chloroform, 220. 
Chlorpicrin, 25,158,169. 
Cloud Gas attacks, 23, 46, 52, 56, 
57, 65, 215. 
Coloured Cross, 139. 
Colour Users Association, 169. 
Commerical Advisory Commitee, 
British, 96. 
Critical Industries, 261-263, 272. 
Range, 226, 229. 
Defence, national, see Dye Indus- 
try and National Defence. 
Dianisidine, double salts of, 41. 
Dichlor-diethyl-sulphide, see Mus- 
tard Gas. 
Dichlor-methylether, 163. 
Diethylamine, 201. 
Diphenylchlorarsine, see Arsenic 
compounds. 
Diphenylcyanarsine, see Arsenic 
compounds. 
Diphosgene, 25, 29, 157, 163. 
Directeur du Materiel Chimique 
de Guerre, 100. 
Director of Gas Services, 94, 98. 
Disarmament, 20, 24, 142, 145, 
150, 172, 177, 242, 245, 246, 
252, 254-262, 267, 271-274. 
See also Limitation of Arma- 
ments. 
Drugs, 199-201. 
Dumps, enemy, 79, 141. 
Dye Agency, German information 
system, 192, 193, 195, 197. 
Industry and National De- 
fence, 163, 171, 172, 198, 
203, 204, 272. 
Industry, British, 146, 168, 
203, 204. 
, German, 146, 147, 153, 
186, 242, 254. 
Monopoly, German, see Mo- 
nopoly, German Dye. 
276 Index 
Dye supplies to America, 197. 
Dyes, use in Gas Shell, 72. 
Edgewood Arsenal, 105, 106, 175- 
178. 
Entressin experimental grounds, 
no. 
Espionage, 192, 193. 
Ether, 220. 
Ethyldichlorarsine, 163. 
Ethylenemonochlorhydrin, 164, 
202. 
/3-Eucaine, 202. 
Exhaustion of Stocks, forced, 80. 
Explosives, English Production, 
168. 
German Production, 149,150, 
151- 
Farben fabriken vorm. Fr. Bayer 
and Co., 90, 151,194, 208. 
Farbwerke vorm. Meister Lucius 
and Bruning, 87,151. 
Field Organisation, British, 90. 
German, 90. 
Tests, 86, no. 
Flame Projector, see Flammen- 
werfer. 
Flammenwerfer, 43, 61, 72, 73. 
Flexibility of Supply, German, 65, 
138. 
French College of Warfare, 185. 
Full Line Forcing, 190. 
Future of Chemical Warfare, 144, 
183. 
Gas and Aircraft, see Aircraft. 
Casualties, see Casualties, 
gas. 
Discipline, 62, 81-82, 132, 
J33>140. 
Experts on Artillery staffs, 
see Artillery Gas Experts. 
Gas Mask, see Mask, gas, and 
Helmet, gas. 
Personnel, 89. 
Regiment, 90, 91. 
School, German, 86, 90, 91. 
Shell, see Shell, gas. 
Specific uses of, 39. 
Gaswerfer, 1918, 71. 
Gelbolin, 221. 
German Dye Industry, see Dye 
Industry, German. 
Patent Policy, see Patent 
Policy, German. 
Press, 33, 54. 
Production, see Production, 
German. 
Givenchy, attack near, 51, 70. 
Green Cross, 29, 69, 77,135,136, 
158. 
Haber Process, see Nitrogen, Fixa- 
tion. 
Hague Convention, 32, 33, 240. 
Hanlon Field, experimental sta- 
tion, 175, 218. 
Hartley Mission, 87,148,149,172, 
207, 245. 
Heeres-Gasschule, see Gas School, 
German. 
Helmet, Gas, 121, 122, 124. See 
also Mask. 
Hexamine, 122. 
Hill 60, attack on, 40. 
Hindenburg Programme, 66, 89, 
149. 
Hochst, 87,151,152,156,157,158, 
161. 
Hohenzollern Redoubt, storming 
of, si. 
Iiooge, attack on 2nd Army, 44. 
Hydrocyanic acid, see Prussic acid. 
I.G., see Intersessen Germein- 
schaft. 
277 Index 
Immune Functions, 217, 218, 232. 
Imperial College of Science, 97. 
Indigo, 28, 155,158, 159,165, 168, 
202, 255. 
Initiative, Struggle for, in, 121, 
134, 273. 
Interessen Gemeinschaft, 18, 32, 
86, 89,109,148,149-151. i54, 
163, 186, 187, 192, 198, 200, 
202, 205, 214, 258-260, 264- 
267, 270. 
Inter-Allied Chemical Supply 
Committee, 107. 
Commission of Control, 85, 
264. 
Liaison, 106. 
Munitions Council, 107. 
Intensive Chemical Warfare, 66. 
International Police Force, 256. 
Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, 35, 85, 
89. 
Kalle and Co., 151. 
Kemmel, attack on, 77, 224, 229. 
K. Stuff, 41. 
Kommandeur der Gastruppen, 91. 
Krupp’s Works, 206. 
La Bassde Canal, 76. 
Lachrymators, 26, 42, 118, 124, 
156, 170, 217, 218. 
League of Nations, 21, 127, 239, 
246, 247, 255, 256, 258, 260, 
261, 262, 263, 271-273. 
Lens, attack at, 71, 76. 
Le Rutoire Farm, 43. 
Leopold Cassella, G.m.b.H., 151. 
Leverkusen, 86, 90, 149, 151, 156- 
158, 159, 161, 208, 250. 
Levinstein Limited, 168, 169. 
Lewis Gun, 252. 
Limitation of Armament, 114, 244- 
248, 254, 264, 265, 267. See 
also Disarmament. 
Livens Projector, 29, 60, 61, 65, 
90, 101, 133, 17s, 216, 227, 
228, 245, 252. 
Longworth Bill, 178. 
Loos, Battle of, 43, 50,118,170. 
Ludwigshafen, 88, 151, 156, 159, 
160, 161. 
M2, French Mask, 135. 
March, 1918, German Offensive, 
17, 69, 76, 219, 224. 
Marne, Battle of, 94, 143, 205. 
Mask, first improvised gas, 121. 
See also Helmet, gas. 
German cartridge, see Car- 
tridge Mask, German. 
M2 French, see M2, French 
Mask. 
resistance of, to breathing, 
130, 131, 140. 
Metol, 203. 
Minist&re de l’Artillerie et des 
Munitions, 100. 
Monchy, attach at, 55. 
Monopoly, Germany Dye, 18, 38, 
148, 188, 198, 214, 266. 
Montauban attack, 55. 
Munitions Inventions Depart- 
ment, 97. 
Mustard Gas, 27-29, 28, 67,68, 74, 
75. 77. 78, 81, 89, 119, 136, 
137, 141, 158, 170, 216, 217, 
221, 224, 230, 236, 240, 
255, 258, 272. 
, Allied Production, 80, 
81, 104, 164, *65, 
168, 171. 
casualties, 68, 224. 
defensive use of, 229. 
first use of, 66, 67, 
215- 
German production, 
158, 202. 
278 Index 
Mustard Gas, protection against, 
137, 221, 222. 
Surprise, 66, 67, 69. 
National Health Insurance Com- 
mission, 164, 201. 
Neglect of Chemical Industry, 
171, 187. 
New War Chemicals, see War 
Chemicals. 
Nieuport, 66, 67, 217. 
Nitric Acid, 171. 
Nitrogen Fixation, 88, 171, 186, 
205, 208, 211-213, 244, 260, 
265, 267, 268, 269. 
No-Man’s Land, future, 227, 229. 
Non-persistent substances, 28, 29. 
Novocain, 201. 
Obstacle, new type of, 223, 229. 
Organic Chemical Industry, 145, 
235, 236, 250, 251, 271. 
Oxalic Acid, 190. 
Particulate Clouds, 140, 232. 
Patent Policy, German, 191. 
Penetrants, 29. 
Persistent lethal substance, 225- 
227, 229,231. 
substances, 28, 29. 
Phenol, German cornering of, 194. 
Phenylcarbylamine chloride, 158. 
Phosgene, 25, 29, 64, 69, 124, 141, 
156, 167, 217, 230, 249. 
, “ delayed action,” 45, 53. 
, French development of, 170. 
, German cloud, 44-46. 
Phosphorus, 175, 181. 
Photographic chemicals, 189, 203. 
Physiological classification, 25. 
Poison gas, 25, 150, 151. 
Porton, experimental station, 97, 
110. 
Portuguese front, attack on, 77. 
Potassium permanganate, 126, 221. 
Price cutting policy, German, 189, 
213. 
Production, 83,149,162, 163, 249, 
250. 
, critical importance of, 143, 
144, 171, 260. 
statistics, 82, 83, 88. 
Projector, German development 
of, 70, 71. 
Livens, see Livens Projector. 
short range, 182. 
Propaganda by German dye 
agents, 191. 
, German use of, 113. 
Protection, 38, 90, 92, 95, 99, 100, 
109, 113, 114, 121, 124, 
125, 127, 128, 176, 216, 
217, 220, 221. 
collective, 231, 233. 
future developments, 231. 
Individual, 231, 232. 
of animals, 92. 
Prussic acid, 26, 118. 
Puteaux, American laboratory, 
175, 218. 
Rechicourt, attack on French, 70. 
Red Cross appeal to end war, 1x9. 
Research, 35, 85, 108, 176, 184, 
249- 
Respirator, Box, see Box Respira- 
tor. 
drums, 87. 
XTX, 135. 
Rhineland occupation, Allied, 206. 
Royal Society, 50, 94-97. 
Rubber, German shortage of, 132. 
Russia, gas attacks against, 47, 
123, 124. 
St. Mihiel Battle, 182. 
Salicylic acid, 189, 194,199. 
279 Index 
Salvarsan, 199. 
Scientific Advisory Committee, 
49, 95, 96. 
Semi-Circular Canals, 215. 
Sensitisers, photographic, 203. 
Service Chimique de Guerre, 
105. 
Shell, Gas, 30, 40, 41, 64,136,183, 
216. 
Falkenhayn’s orders, 43. 
percentage of, 77, 79, 
80, 141, 245. 
Smoke, future importance of, 180, 
181, 216. 
use with lethal gases, 140, 
180. 
Somme offensive, 52, 55, 61, 64, 
143. 
Speculative element, 215, 220. 
Special Brigade R.E., 52, 174. 
Companies, 50, 93. 
Sternutatory compounds, 26, 28, 
4i. 
Stokes Mortar, 29, 52,175. 
Stovaine, 220. 
Strategy, chemical, see Tactics and 
Strategy. 
Sulphur Black, 155. 
Sulphuric acid, 171, 253. 
Supply Department, British, 101, 
105. 
Organisations, 102. 
Surprise, critical factor of, 31, 32, 
S3, hi, 113,114,144. 
Tactics and Strategy, 215, 216, 
225. 
Tactical classification, 25, 28. 
Tanks, 143,217,227,233, 234, 247, 
248. 
Technik im Weltkriege, Die, 36,3 7, 
40, 41, 47, 5i, 57, 69, 74, 80, 
125, 128, 129, 135, 136, 141. 
Thermite shell, 175. 
Thiodiglycol, 159. 
Toxic compounds, 26. 
Treaty Stocks, 150. 
Trench Warfare Department, Brit- 
ish, 95, 96. 
Research Department, 
96. 
Supply Department, 96, 
105, 170. 
Tri-chlor-methyl-chloro-formate, 
64, iS7- 
T. Stuff, 41. 
Verdun, gas attack at, 69. 
Versailles, Treaty of, 34, 150, 210, 
242-244, 264-267, 270, 271. 
Vesicant Compounds, 27,137, 217, 
239- 
Vested Interests, 258, 259. 
Vincennite, 118. 
War chemicals, new, 217, 225. 
Physiological classifica- 
tion, see Physiologi- 
cal classification. 
Tactical classification, 
see Tactical Classifi- 
cation. 
Warsaw, cloud attacks, 123. 
White Cross shell- 225. 
Xylyl bromide, 41, 156. 
Xylylene dibromide, 41. 
Yellow Cross, see Mustard Gas. 
Yperite, 80,166. 
Ypres, first German gas attack 
23,31,32,38- 
first Mustard gas, 66, 217. 
Yser, raid by Germans. 117. 
280 NAME INDEX 
Albert, Dr., 194-196,197,198. 
Bacon, Colonel R. F., 218. 
Baeyer, Professor, 27. 
Baker, Professor H. B., 95. 
Barley, Major, D.S.O., 46. 
Beilby, Sir George, 96. 
Bemstorff, von, 194. 
Bethmann-Hollweg, Dr. von, in, 
197. 
Boy-Ed, Captain, 197. 
Bueb, Dr., 212. 
Cadman, Sir John, 96. 
Chevalier, Medecin aide-major, 27. 
Crossley, Professor A. W., 95, 97. 
Curmer, General, 99. 
Davies, Major David, M.P., 172, 
255, 257, 258. 
Davy, J., 249. 
Dawson, Sergeant-Major, 51. 
Debeney, General, 185. 
Duisberg, Herr, 147, 208. 
Ehrlich, Dr. Paul, 199. 
Falkenhayn, General, 94,147,148. 
Foch, Marshal, 175. 
Foulkes, Brig.-General C. H., 92. 
French, Field-Marshal Sir J., 31, 
43, 48. 
Fries, Brig.-General A. A., 114, 
i7S, 177, 179, 180, 183. 
Fuller, Colonel J. F. C., 227, 233. 
Garvan, Francis P., 189, 195, 197, 
199. 
Geyer, Captain, 136-140. 
Green, Prof. A. G., 168. 
Grey, Viscount, 256, 257. 
Guthrie, 249. 
Haber, Professor, 35, 49, l>$, 90. 
Haig, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas, 
54- 
Haldane, Dr., 12T. 
Harrison, Lieut.-Colonel E. F., 98, 
126. 
Hartley, Brig.-General H., 63, 76, 
98, 123, 240. 
Horrocks, Sir William, 95. 
Hossenfelder, Consul-General, 197: 
Jackson, Colonel L., 94, 95. 
Joyce, Colonel, 212. 
Kirschbaum, Prof. F. P., 135. 
Kitchener, Lord, 33, 94, 95, 121, 
237- 
Kling, M., 100. 
Krupp, von Bohlen, Herr, 147, 259. 
Lambert, Major, 126. 
Lebeau, Professor P., 101. 
Levinstein, Dr. H., 168. 
Livens, Major, 60. 
Lodge, Sir Oliver, 94. 
Ludendorff, General, 70, 82,90,91, 
114, 147, 149, 259. 
281 Name Index 
Meyer, Victor, 27. 
Macpherson, Captain, 121. 
McConnel, Lieut., 208. 
Moulton of Bank, Rt. Hon. Lord, 
S, 169, 242, 243, 270. 
Moureu, M. Charles, 100. 
Norris, Colonel, 206, 208, 209. 
Ozil, General, 100, 105. 
Palmer, Mitchell, 19, 189. 
Paterno, Senator, 101. 
Penna, Colonel, 101. 
Pick, Dr. H., 125, 129, 130,131. 
Pollard, Professor A. F., 112. 
Pope, Sir William, 165,191, 202. 
Ramsay, Sir William, 94. 
Rayleigh, Lord, 94. 
Runciman, W., 1461. 
Sachur, Professor, 35. 
Schmaus, Lieut. Dr., 75. 
Schwarte, see Technik im Welt- 
kriege (Subject Index). 
Schweitzer, Dr. Hugo, 194, 195, 
211. 
Sering, Dr. Max, 211. 
Stieglitz, Professor Julius, 191, 
198, 200. 
Thomas, Albert, 100. 
Thorpe, Prof. J. F., 96, 99. 
Thuillier, Major-General H. F., 
94, 98, 105. 
Villavecchia, Prof., 101. 
Vincent, Monsieur, 100. 
Watson, Colonel, 93. 
Weiss, M., 100. 
Wells, H. G., 112. 
Wing, Major-General, 43. 
282