Reprint from Cincinnati Lancet and Clinic, Nov. io, 1883. 
THE DESPOTISM OF WORDS IN RELATION 
TO SCIENCE. 
BY 
ORPHEUS M.D., 
COLLEGE HILL, O. 
THE CINCINNATI LANCET TRESS TRIM. E DESPOTISM OF WORDS IN RELATION TO SCIENCE. 
O. Everts, M.D., College Hill, O. 
There is a certain degree of natural science 
which proceeds from and attaches to every organ- 
ized being, corresponding in generals and partic- 
ulars to the necessities of such being. 
Language, embracing all possible methods of 
intercommunication of intelligence among ani- 
mals, including man, represents a degree or part 
of such science. 
The languages of man, leading, as he does, by 
reason of the superiority ©f his intellectual capa- 
bilities, the grand procession of living beings 
across the plains of nature, correspond in com- 
plexity to the superiority, hence necessities, of 
such capabilities. 
Word language—speech—is a response to the 
necessities of mankind which require the forma- 
tion of ideas too complex for communication by 
gestures or inarticulate sounds. 
Man is not the only animal gifted with vocal 
organs, or that utters intelligible sounds with a 
definite purpose, to be definitely understood. But 
the spoken language of mankind, at its zero of 
simplicity, is far more complicated than that of 
any other animal at its highest degree of com- 
plexity. 
Words being a response to a necessity for the 
formulation of complex ideas, must correspond in 
complexity to the ideas to be formulated, or fail 
to satisfy the need. 
Mankind, as an individual and a race, having 
been growing in intellectual capabilities through 
a long but continuous process of development, 
his necessities increasing with the increase of his 
capabilities, it follows that there has been a cor- 
responding growth of words. Hence the extent 
and complexity of the vocabularies of superior 
and learned people as contrasted with the simple 
and limited vocabularies of the inferior and 
ignorant. 
Ideas are phenomenal sequences of certain 
activities of force, affecting the motions of matter 
previously specialized by organization as animal 
mechanisms, notably the mechanisms which con- 
stitute a human being. 
Ideas, therefore, which are the result of certain 
activities of force, affecting certain motions of 
matter in the mechanism of any given person, can 
only be communicated, or made intelligible, to 
another person, by an excitation in the mechan- 
ism of such other person of activities and motions 
identical with the activities and motions which 
took place in the mechanism of the first person, 
resulting in the ideas to be communicated. 
Identity of precedent conditions being essential 
to identity of phenomenal sequences, it is 
evident that responsive ideas are, perhaps, never 
identical with original ideas; being only more or 
less accurate reflections or resemblances of the 
original. All individual or racial differences of 
structure, of a quantitative or qualitative char- 
acter; hereditary or acquired habits ; education, 
and the influence of environments, are so many 
difficulties in the way of a community of ideas, of 
languages, or of men. 
Words, like ideas, having been developed by 
growth, men of superior capabilities and*educa- 
tion, by their familiarity with all of the lower 
degrees of development, having themselves 
grown up through them, may comprehend with 
great accuracy the mental phenomena of inferior 
and uneducated men by their expression; but the 
inferior and illiterate, nowever slight the degree 
of their inferiority or lack of education, may fail 
to comprehend the more complex ideas of the 
superior and learned, however expressed, without 
difficult and diligent labor. It is much easier to 
pronounce such ideas absurd, false or dangerous, 
than to ascertain their true value by studying 
and comprehending them. 
The growth of words, as formatives and 
vehicles of ideas, being responsive and essential 
to the growth of ideas—the formation and ex- 
pression of new ideas is attended by more or less 
embarassment, inaccuracy, misconstruction, and 
delay, because of the immediate incapacity of 
old words to communicate new ideas, before un- 
dergoing changes of structure or definition them- 
selves. 
These facts find illustration in the difficulties 
attending the communication of ideas from a 
superior and learned to an inferior and ignorant 
people of a different tongue, by translating the 
words of the one into the words of the other. 
Take, for example, the Anglo-Saxon word “God.” 4 
THE DESPOTISM OF WORDS IN RELATION TO SCIENCE. 
As now understood by the most capable and 
learned English-speaking Christians, the word 
* God” formulates an exceedingly complex idea. 
No less, indeed, than that of an uncreated, self- 
sustaining being—sole Creator and sustainer of 
the Universe ; immanent in all things; the abso- 
lute and infinite of all things—of all abstract 
principles—love, wisdom, truth, beauty, good; 
of all knowledge,—hence omniscient; of all power, 
—hence omnipotent; but when translated into the 
vernacular of a pagan, heathen, or so-called savage 
people, it fails to convey to that people such an 
idea of a supreme being ; or any other idea than 
that which the pagan, heathen, or savage equiv- 
alent word, into which it had to be translated, 
had already commemorated—still a pagan, 
heathen or savage idea of a God, no matter what 
that may have been. Hence it was, in the pro- 
pagandism of Christianity by Emperors and 
Crusader, before education preceded “conver- 
sion,” that pagan, heathen and savage people, in 
adopting the new religion, did not change, 
materially, their old ideas of supernatural beings ; 
nor relinguish altogether the forms and ceremo- 
nies of their old worship, which still embarass 
genuine Christianity, as survivals of ignorance: 
which is superstition. 
WorAs commemorate ideas by rendering them 
not only communicable among contemporaries, 
but transmissible from generation to generation, 
and from one people to another, however re- 
moved by time or space, with approximative 
accuracy. 
Thus, and thus only, do ideas become cumula- 
tive, and contribute to the intellectual growth of 
mankind, as a race, beyond the limitation of 
individual possibilities, fixed by the condition of 
individual existence. 
A general recognition of the wisdom of experi- 
ence (accumulation of ideas) and natural affection 
of children for parents, beget, in mankind, 
respect for the ideas of “the fathers,” amounting 
to veneration for the wisdom of “the ancients.” 
This characteristic of mankind is powerfully 
conservative of ideas—resisting and resenting, as 
it does, all innovation. Thus the wisdom of the 
fathers comes to be, in the course of time, the 
wisdom of the ancients—and the wisdom of the 
ancients comes to be mythical, sacred and divine. 
Words by which such wisdom may have been 
commemorated acquire a rigidity of structure and 
meaning capable of resisting every expansive 
force, save that of growth : a force which no 
despotism of ideas or words is capable of arrest- 
ing, however it may be retarded or embarassed. 
These facts find illustration in the character 
and history of the Mosaic account of crt 
which is an example of commemoration am 
mission by words of ancient ideas respecting 
origin of the earth and its inhabitants. How 
long these ideas were traditional, simply the 
wisdom of the fathers, before they became myth- 
ical and sacred, can not be told. That the com- 
memorative words of the first chapter of Genesis, 
in common with other Scriptures ascribed to the 
same author, have been accepted by the most 
intelligent and learned people of the world, as 
sacred—inspired by the Creator—hence infallible 
—the word of God—for thousands of years—is 
known to us all. That the growth of science 
was, for centuries, and is yet, embarassed by the 
despotism of words thus acquired, and character- 
izing this example, is a matter of fact which 
does not admit of argument. It is by such 
despotizing of words, indeed, by which ideas 
become encrusted, that the living are ruled by 
the dead. 
It is because of the resistance thus offered to 
the growth of ideas, hence to the progress of the 
age, that so large a margin of the present lies 
forever within the shadow of the past. It is true 
that the capable and learned, generally, but re- 
luctantly, have conceded the necessity of a recon- 
struction of the words, or a repudiation of the 
statements, of Moses, respecting the creation of the 
universe ; yet the ideas of the multitude of be- 
lievers in the sanctity of antiquity, and infalli- 
bility of ancient Scripture, calling themselves 
Christians, are held in thrall, and overshadowed 
by the despotism of words in which such ideas 
have been handed down to them. 
But that words are thus despotic, and errors of 
fact, and falsity of belief, are thus perpetuated for 
centuries or ages, can not be, should not be, 
charged to “the fathers” as a fault—nor yet to 
“the ancients.” 
To review, to criticise, to comprehend the past 
by climbing higher and seeing farther than our 
fathers did, is not necessarily to arraign nor to 
condemn our ancestors, not even to treat them 
with disrespect. Our knowledges are but expan- 
sions by growth of what they knew, as we our- 
selves, are inseparable extensions of generations 
which preceded us. The errors of belief, which 
was according to knowledge, of “the fathers”, 
were to them not errors. 
Whatever is on the level of human under- 
standing, without respect to time or persons, is, 
or inevitably appears to be, true. Whatever is 
below that level, which, as individuals or a race, 
we may have outgrown, becomes, by virtue of its 
relation to our perceptions, untrue. Nor is our THE DESPOTISM OF WORDS IN RELATION TO SCIENCE. 
5 
ion of the errors of the past, as errors, of 
alue, other than as witnessing our own 
<nment of higher altitudes—and the effect 
which such perceptions may have upon the 
future, which is forever emanating from the 
present. Only the absolute is unrelated. 
Another illustration of the despotism of words 
as affecting the growths of science, is to be found 
in the embarrassment met by students of psy- 
chology—a branch of knowledge now struggling 
to become a science—resulting from the use of 
words despotised by time and veneration for old 
beliefs, in the formation of new ideas. 
Psychology itself is almost a despotic word— 
so nearly so, indeed, that I have need to say, 
now, and here, that I do not mean, by the word 
‘psychology,’ “the science of the human soul”— 
as defined by Webster:—but “the science con- 
veisant with the phenomena of ( ) mind”—as 
defined by Sir William Hamilton, amended by 
leaving out the definite article “the” from before 
‘mind.’ A branch of knowledge which is 
destined to incorporate all other branches, and em- 
brace, within itself, all knowledges. Ilence to 
become the science of sciences. 
The despotism which obstructs the growth of 
psychology attaches, and adheres to all such 
words as by their construction, and long accepted 
definitions, suggest an identity of that which is 
phenominal, hence sequential, with that which is 
antecedent and substantial.—All words, the ten- 
dency of which is to identify or confound thought 
with that which thinks; and such as imply the 
interposition of a hypothetical person, tangible 
or intangible, between the phenomena of mind, 
and the organization, or mechanism, from which 
such phenomena appear, Invariably to proceed. 
Such words, for example as ‘soul,’ ‘spirit,’ ‘ghost,’ 
‘immortal part’ and “the mind”—when used as 
synonyms for an imaginary, impalpable, hypo- 
thetical entity; capable of not only thinking, but 
of taking possession of the real, palpable, human 
body, and controlling its activities and motions 
—entities, or beings of which we have no real 
knowledge—and for which science has no need. 
‘Materialism’—is another word, that in a dif- 
ferent way, exercises despotic power in retarding 
the growth of science ;—especially the science of 
psychology. How many timid students, whose 
draughts of knowledge have not been deep nor 
many, cower, and withdraw from the brilliant 
light o f science into the marginal shadow of 
superstition, at the sound of this terrible word ! 
And yet, in view of all present knowledges, such 
timidity and conduct are both childish and irra- 
tional, Because the man who ascribes the phe- 
nomena ot mind to a soul, gnost, or spirit, in- 
stead of to a man, does not escape from the 
danger of materialism by so doing—inasmuch as 
the phenomenal in nature, under every circum- 
stance, implies material, as unavoidably as form 
implies substance. 
Form without substance, and phenomena with- 
out causes—antecedent conditions of matter and 
force—are alike unthinkable. 
There may be forms of substances too attenuate 
for our sensuous perceptions. But if so, still they 
must be material, although we can have no real 
knowledge of them. To talk about an incor- 
poreal corpus, or immaterial matter, is to talk 
nonsense. Besides it is quite as easy of belief 
and comprehension that a man thinks, as that a 
ghost thinks! It is true, that by reason of dis- 
solution, as a uniform result of natural proceed- 
ures, men cease to think. But as matter, how- 
ever attenuate, in a state of mobility, is pre- 
requisite to the performance of function ; what- 
ever body or mechanism, short of the absolute, may 
be capable of thinking, must be subject to 
changes—to evolution and involution—hence 
without a miraculous interposition, liable to final 
dissolution. 
So that as a matter of fact, the scientist, who 
ascribes to the human body all of the qualities 
and conditions necessarily antecedent to the 
phenomena of mind, sustained by the evidence of 
all known facts, confirmed by the most exacting 
logic, is no more materialistic than the metaphy- 
sician who ascribes similar qualities and condi- 
tions to a hypothetical body, supported by no more 
trustworthy evidence that is derivable from the 
phenomena of dreams —testimony by which it may 
be and is as clearly demonstrated, that all other 
animal bodies, as well as man’s, are but tempo- 
rary tabernacles for the accommodation of spiritu- 
al beings—and that all other objects with which 
the dreamer may have been familiar, or that he 
may have seen in dreams, both animate and in- 
animate, even to the garments which we wear, 
have their ghostly and immortal counterparts. 
It is time, therefore, that this bugbear, ‘materi- 
alism,’ from w hich the ignorant and superstitious, 
who neither comprehend nor trust the uniform 
procedures and events of nature, shrink and fly 
as from an ogre, be banished from all scientific 
considerations. It is time, also, that intelligent 
men should see, and the timid should be assured, 
that that, to all men, inestimable boon of 
faith—that conservator of life and growth—that 
aspiration of the imperfect toward perfection— 
of the finite toward infinity, which seems to 
characterize all of the movements of nature,which, 6 
culminates m a vision of immortality seen through 
death, in man ; does not depend upon, nor can 
be in any way affected by, man’s knowledge, or 
opinions of himself, or by his speculations con- 
cerning the unknowable. 
But without pressing the discussion further in 
this direction, I will limit it to a few general 
considerations, and some practical suggestions 
respecting the use of a few words in the develop- 
ment of psychology, as already defined—and at 
the risk of some repetition of ideas, will state, 
that if there is anything which science teaches 
more authoratively than another, it is this : 
Mankind does not constitute a kingdom of na- 
ture—not even an entire class of natural objects. 
Man, is therefore not to be considered, scientific- 
ally, as an exceptional being,miraculously created, 
and set apart upon the earth. 
Structurally and phenomenally, man is con- 
tinuous with all other beings—but standing 
in relation to all other beings as an inevitable se- 
quence, or ultimation ; he represents the sum and 
attainment of all organic forms and substances. 
Structure and phenomena uniformly occupying 
the relation toward each other of necessary pre- 
cedent and inevitable sequent, it is rational to 
ascribe the highest phenomena of which we have 
knowledge, to the highest structure of which we 
know anything. The educated man is compelled 
to do so ; and is therefore compelled, in view of 
the fact that the phenomena of human conscious- 
ness, and human thought, are invariably and 
sequentially associated with human structures, 
growing with their growth, disordered by their 
disorders, and disappearing with their dissolu- 
tion, to ascribe consciousness and thought to hu- 
man beings. 
Should we not then say, understandingly, 
•‘man thinks ?” Certainly any other method of 
expression—any use of words, by which a direct 
or indirect ascription of the function of thinking 
to an impalpable, immaterial, hence incogitable, 
mechanism is unscientific and irrational, as well 
as tributary to the survival of ancient errors. 
“I think, therefore, I am. I know that I think, 
therefore I know that I am” is the boast, what- 
ever Descartes may have thought of it, of self- 
conscious man—not of self-conscious-ness. Of a 
sensible sentient being, not of an abstraction, 
nor of an unimaginable hypothesis. 
The use therefore of such words and phrases as 
“the mind,” “the faculties or powers of the 
mind,” manifestation of the mind,” “diseases of 
the mind,” and all other words and phrases of the 
same category, should be so modified as to com- 
memorate scientific ideas, instead of perpetuating 
THE DESPOTISM OF WORDS IN RELATION TO SCIENCE. 
superstition. For example, such won 
phrases as “the imagination,” “the judge 
“the will,” etc., as signifying so many indet 
dent elements, power or personages of mind, 
which, when confederated, constitute “the 
mind” are all obstructive to the growth of psy- 
cology, and conservative of error. We need not 
lose the use of such words as mind,; intellect, 
faculty, power, imagination, judgment, will, 
emotion, feeling, memory, reason, etc., etc., be- 
cause of such necessary modification of their sig- 
nificance and use. They would remain still use- 
ful and indispensible in characterizing various 
phases of mental phenomena, or of such phe- 
nomena in the aggregate. For example, we might 
say with scientific propriety, “phenomena of 
mind,” “disordered imaginations,” “defective 
memory,” “violent emotion,” “lack of will” 
etc., etc., and be understood as ascribing each 
phase of mental phenomena to antecedent con- 
ditions of matter and force, instead of to an hy- 
pothetical medium ; recognizing each by its order 
of evolution, and degree of complexity in rela- 
tion to other phases with which it is continuous ; 
and the development of structures upon which it 
is contingent. Science, which refers all phe- 
nomena to natural causes, and endeavors to ex- 
plain them by ultimate principles, demands this 
modification, of the use of words, as used by psy- 
chologists. Only the ignorant, who in all ages, 
have ascribed the phenomenal in nature to super- 
natural causes, and endeavored to explain it by 
referring special phases of phenomena to specific, 
or individual, supernatural beings, Gods or de- 
mons; faculties or powers—will fail to compre- 
hend the necessity, and continue to use the old 
phrases with their old significance. 
That such a transition from the habitual to the 
needful will be slow, and is difficult, may be 
known from the fact that modern writers of abil- 
ity and reputation, claiming to be authorities on 
psychological subjects, who may, and possibly 
do, recognize the true relation of psychological 
phenomena to antecedent physical conditions, 
still adhere to the linguistic formulas of meta- 
physical and scholastic assumption ; seemingly 
unmindful of the consequent confuson of ideas, 
and doubts of comprehension, which must embar- 
rass a thoughtful student of their texts, unless 
already qualified by education to infer correct 
meanings from words and phrases which were 
constructed and have been used, time out of 
mind, to commemorate very different ideas. 
For example, the distinguished author of a re- 
cently published treatise on insanity, of whose 
scientific attainment it would be presumptious to THE DESPOTISM OF WORDS IN RELATION TO SCIENCE. 
7 
respectfully, strikes out boldly with the 
ns: 
.ne brain is the chief organ from which the 
“force called the mind is evolved. * * * * 
“It is with the mind developed by the brain that 
“we have to concern ourselves. * * * * 
“By mind, therefore, I understand a force pro- 
duced by nervous action, and in man especially 
“by the action of the brain. * * * * It is 
“contended that the brain is only the tool or 
“organ of which the mind makes use in man to 
“manifest itself. According to this view there is 
“in every human being a mind not dependent 
“upon the nervous system for its existence. On 
“the other hand it is asserted that the mind is 
“directly the result of nervous action, and espe- 
cially of the brain, and if there were no nerve 
“substance there would be no mind. This view 
“is that held by the majority of scientific writers 
“of the present day, etc., etc.” 
From all of which (sample quotations) it would 
not be difficult for one familiar with modern 
science to classify the author as one who accepts 
the physiological view of the genesis of mind, 
and the relation of the phenomenal in nature to 
the material. The inexperienced student cannot 
fail to be confused, however, by other statements, 
the words and phrases of which either obscure 
the ideas or pervert the meaning of the author. 
For example, he says: “The several categories 
of facts which go to establish the connection be- 
tween the mind and the brain * * * are, in 
general character, similar to those which exist 
between any other viscus and the product of its 
action.” 
What does he mean by product? A phenom- 
enon? Or a substance? How is the student, 
who should be taught that all psychical phenom- 
ena are but the manifestations of the activities of 
force affecting motions of matter, specialized as 
nerve, to escape the conclusion that the author 
means by ‘product’ something other than a mani- 
festation ; something substantial, indeed ; corre- 
sponding to bile, urine, saliva, or the waste pro- 
ducts of muscular motion it may be? Perhaps 
he will find light upon the subject further on. 
Yes. Here is an explicit statement: 
“The mind, like some other forces, is com- 
pound—that is, made up of several sub-forces. 
These are, perception, intellect, emotions, and 
will.” Now we understand the author. The 
brain produces a compound force, made up of 
four simple forces. One of which is perception, 
one intellect (remember that), one emotions (we 
are not told how many), and one will. The ques- 
tion which is naturally suggested to the student 
of psychology by reading so far must be—what 
is force ? single or compound. When, on reflec- 
tion, he determines that he has no knowledge of 
force other than by phenomenal manifestations, 
sequential to the motions of matter effected by 
force, he is pleased with the author’s more lucid 
statement, that “All of the manifestations {mark 
the word) of which the brian is capable, are 
embraced in one or more of these parts.” Mean- 
ing to teach, after all, that mind is phenomenal, 
not material—a manifestation—not an object—not 
even a force—and that perception, intellect, emo- 
tions and will, are but characteristic phases, or 
appearances of the manifestations of force and 
matter in activity and motion, and not inde- 
pendent mechanisms or forces capable of per- 
forming functions. 
The next assertion, however, is calculated to 
excite fresh doubts as to the author’s teaching. 
It is this : “Either one of these parts (percep- 
tion, intellect, emotions, will) may be exercised 
independently of the other, though they are very 
intimately connected and in all continuous mental 
passages are brought more or less into relation 
and consecutive action.” An assertion which 
again confuses the student, inasmuch as, while he 
can think, clearly, of the continuity, or interrupt- 
ed relations, of phenomena, or manifestations of 
activity, predicable of matter and force, he can 
not conceive of anything being ‘excercbed’—in 
the sense of being brought into action—that has 
not both the mechanism of matter and the poten- 
tiality of force. The confusion, thus begun, is 
only increased by the succeeding statement,which 
is by way of explanation, and reads as follows : 
“By perception is to be understood that part of 
the mind whose office it is to place the individual 
in relation with external objects.” 
Does not this assertion, because of the despot- 
ism of words used, distinctly formulate and con- 
vey the idea that the mind is a hypothetical en- 
tity interposed between the man, ‘the individual,’ 
and external objects?—a sort of medium occupy- 
ing an intermediate and official relation to the 
body, yet not of it. But such being the charac- 
ter of “perception,” what constitutes “intellect?” 
According to the language of the author, “in- 
tellect is a perception resolved into an idea,” and 
“to the formation of an idea” the author says 
(whatever he may mean by the saying), “several 
important faculties and modes of expression of the 
intellect contribute.” Which is equivalent to say- 
ing, the intellect contributes by the kind offices 
of its own faculties to its own genesis and exist- 
ence. Of “the emotions” he says : “An idea, 
in its turn, excites another part of the brain to 8 
THE DESPOTISM OF WORDS TN RELATION TO SCIENCE. 
action, and an emotion is produced.” And “the 
will,” he says, “is that mental force by which 
the emotions, the thoughts, and the actions are 
controlled.” 
Has not the brain, by the activities of which 
the whole mind is produced, something to do 
with the character of emotion, or of thought? 
Does the will, which we have been told is a force 
evolved from the brain—a product of brain ac- 
tion, turn about and control the brain in the pro- 
duction of the emotions? 
That the author regards “the will,” or is will- 
ing that his students should so regard it, as a 
hypothetical mechanism capable of performing 
function, in the same sense that he represents the 
brain as a functionating organ, is manifest from 
the fact that he represents it as producing some- 
thing, saying : “The production of the force (the 
will) is called a volition.” Also the fact that he 
represents “the will” as subject to disease. A 
most formidable disease, if names signify any- 
thing—no less a disease than that of “aboulo- 
mania” or “paralysis of the will.” 
But as these quotations and comments have 
been made with a purpose of illustration only, and 
not as an analysis or review of the book alluded 
to, of the general merits of which no opinion is 
expressed, I will close by saying that one meets 
with too many such examples of confusion of ex- 
pressions resulting from the careless use of words 
in many modern books and essays which are de- 
signed to teach psychology ; or to illustrate some 
special phases of psychical phenomena—exam- 
ples that can only be accounted for by the sup- 
position that they are the productions of authors, 
who in their mercenary, or ambitious haste to 
occupy this particular field of science with their 
literature, have, by too hastily rambling over the 
field, made themselves familiar with its .ni 
only. Authors, who, notwithstanding a’* 
tious display of bibliography, liberal quot2<- 
from, and reference to, a multitude of authori- 
ties, exhibit, in their own work, an unbecoming 
lack of solid information; or an indisposition (I 
will not say inability) to reduce information to 
knowledges and knowledges to science (in ac- 
cordance with the more distinctive definitions of 
these terms) by integrations and inductions. Au- 
thors who manifest a greater desire to appear 
learned than to be so in reality—to be read and 
admired, perhaps envied, by the half-educated 
many, than to be appoved and applauded by the 
more cultivated few. 
Therefore, it is, that the apparently increasing 
rapidity of human progress, the continuously in- 
creasing scope of human observation, widening 
ever, as the intellectual horizon of the race ex- 
pands; the constant integration of new and far- 
reaching perceptions into new and more compre- 
hensive ideas—in short, the never ceasing transi- 
tion from old to new, as the present is forever 
being pushed forward by and out of the past, de- 
mand that the vocabularies of science be ex- 
purgated ; and if not enlarged by new words, 
that old words be so modified as to adapt them 
to new uses. There is no other method by which 
the growth of science can be more pratically 
aided ; or by which students, especially students 
of psychology, can be more certainly protected 
from the dangerous imposition of pseudo scientific 
authors, who are often the most popular book- 
makers of the day, but who escape from detection 
and condemation behind the confusion of their 
expressions and the despotism of words which 
they use without discrimination. 
Cincinnati Sanitarium, Oct. 25, 1883.