THE 
INTUITIONS OF THE MIND 
INDUCTIVELY INVESTIGATED. 
BY THE 
REY. JAMES M‘COSH, LL.D., 
PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS IN QUEEN’S COLLEGE, BELFAST, 
AUTHOR OF ‘THE METHOD OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT PHYSICAL AND MORAL/ AND 
JOINT AUTHOR OF ‘TYPICAL FORMS AND SPECIAL ENDS IN CREATION.* 
NEW YORK: 
ROBERT CARTER AND BROTHERS, 
530, BROADWAY. 
1860. CONTENTS. 
INTRODUCTION. 
Page 
Aim of the Work and Method of Inquiry 1 
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GENERAL VIEW OP THE NATURE OF THE INTUITIVE 
CONVICTIONS OF THE MIND. 
BOOK I. 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS REGARDING INTUITIONS. 
CHAPTER I. 
NEGATIVE PROPOSITIONS. 
Sect. I. No Innate Mental Images or Representations .... 13 
Sect. II. No Innate, Abstract, or General Notions 16 
Sect. III. No A Priori Forms imposed by the Mind on Objects 19 
Sect. IV. The Intuitions are not immediately before Conscious- 
ness as Laws or Principles 21 
CHAPTER II. 
Sect. I. There are Intuitive Principles operating in the Mind . 23 
Sect. II. The Native Convictions of the Mind are of the Nature 
of Perceptions or Intuitions 29 
Sect. III. Intuitive Convictions rise on the Contemplation of Ob- 
jects presented or represented to the Mind 30 
POSITIVE PROPOSITIONS. IV 
Page 
Sect. IV. The Intuitions of the Mind are primarily directed to 
Individual Objects 31 
Sect. Y. The Individual Intuitive Convictions can be generalized 
into Maxims, and these are entitled to be represented as Phi- 
losophic Principles 33 
CONTENTS. 
BOOK II. 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS AND METHOD OF 
EMPLOYING THEM. 
CHAPTER I. 
MARKS AND PECULIARITIES OF INTUITIONS. 
Sect. I. Tests 37 
Sect. II. Different Aspects of Intuitions, and their Theoretical 
Characters 41 
Sect. III. Certain Misapprehensions in regard to the Character 
of Intuitive Convictions 55 
Sect. IY. Certain Practical Characteristics 59 
CHAPTER II. 
METHOD OP EMPLOYING INTUITIVE PRINCIPLES. 
Sect. I. The Spontaneous and Reflex Use of Intuitive Principles 62 
Sect. II. Sources of Error in Metaphysical Speculation . . , 69 
Sect. III. Conditions of the Legitimacy of the Appeal to Intuitive 
Principles 76 
Sect. IY. Method of Investigating and Interpreting our Intui- 
tions 85 
Sect. Y. What Explanation can be given of the Intuitions of the 
Mind ’ 92 
(SUPPLEMENTARY.) BRIEF CRITICAL REVIEW OF OPI- 
NIONS IN REGARD TO INTUITIVE TRUTHS ..... 98 
CHAPTER III. CONTENTS. 
V 
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PARTICULAR EXAMINATION OF THE INTUITIONS. 
BOOK I. 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
CHAPTEE I. 
BODY AND SPIRIT. 
Page 
Sect. I. The Mind begins its Intelligent Acts with Knowledge. 
The Simple Cognitive Powers 119 
Sect. II. Our Intuitive Cognitions of Body 122 
Sect. III. Some Distinctions to be attended to in regard to our 
Cognition of Body 133 
Sect. IY. The Qualities of Matter known by Intuition .... 145 
Sect. Y. Our Intuitive Cognition of Self or of Spirit 148 
CHAPTEE II. 
ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
Sect. I. (Preliminary.) On the Nature of Abstraction and Gene- 
ralization 157 
Sect. II. On Being 161 
Sect. III. On Substance . . . . v 164 
Sect. IY. On Mode, Quality, Property, Essence 173 
Sect. Y. On Personality 180 
Sect. YI. On Extension 183 
Sect. YII. On Number 184 
Sect. YIII. On Motion 185 
Sect. IX. On Power 187 
Sect. X. (Supplementary.) The Various Kinds of Power known by 
Experience 187 
BOOK II. 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS. 
CHAPTEE I. 
Theib General Nature 196 VI 
CONTENTS. 
Page 
CHAPTER II. 
Time and Space 202 
CHAPTER III. 
The Infinite 214 
CHAPTER IV. 
The Extent, Tests, and Power of our Native Beliefs . 231 
BOOK III. 
CHAPTER I. 
TiiEiit General Nature, and a Classification of them . 236 
CHAPTER II. 
RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED BY THE MIND. 
Sect. I. Relation of Identity 242 
Sect. II. Relation of Whole and Parts . . 247 
Sect. III. Relations of Space 250 
Sect. IV. The Relations of Time 252 
Sect. V. The Relations of Quantity 252 
Sect. VI. The Relations of Resemblance 255 
Sect. VII. Relations of Active Property 257 
Sect. VIII. Relation of Cause and Effect 258 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS. 
BOOK IV. 
MORAL CONVICTIONS. 
CHAPTER I. 
GENERAL VIEW OF THE MOTIVE AND MORAL POWERS. 
Sect. I. The Appetencies, the Will, and the Conscience . . . 279 
Sect. II. {Supplementary.) On the Beautiful 288 
CHAPTER II. 
CONVICTIONS INVOLVED IN THE EXERCISES OP CONSCIENCE. 
Sect. I. Convictions as to the Nature of Moral Good .... 290 
Sect. II. On Sin and Error 297 
Sect. III. Relation of Moral Good and Happiness 302 CONTENTS. 
VII 
Page 
CHAPTER III. 
The Freedom of the "Will 308 
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INTUITIVE PRINCIPLES AND THE VARIOUS SCIENCES. 
BOOK I. 
METAPHYSICS. 
CHAPTER I. 
Metaphysics, Gnosiology, and Ontology 315 
CHAPTER II. 
GNOSIOLOGY. 
Sect. I. On Knowledge 322 
Sect. II. On tlie Origin of our Knowledge and Ideas .... 326 
Sect. III. Limits to our Knowledge, Ideas, and Beliefs .... 334 
Sect. IY. Relation of Intuition and Experience 340 
Sect. Y. On tlie Necessity attached to our Primary Convictions . 345 
Sect. YI. {Supplementary?) On the Distinctions between the Un- 
derstanding and the Reason ; between a priori and a posteriori 
Principles; between Form and Matter; between Subjective and 
Objective; between the Logical and Chronological Order of 
Ideas; between the Cause and Occasion of Innate Ideas . . 351 
CHAPTER III. 
ONTOLOGY. 
Sect. I. On Knowing and Being 358 
Sect. II. On Idealism 362 
Sect. III. On Scepticism 374 
Sect. IV. On the Conditioned and the Unconditioned .... 385 
Sect. V. (Supplementary.) The Antinomies of Kant 388 
Sect. YI. (Supplementary.) Examination of Mr. J. S. Mill’s Me- 
taphysical System 390 VIII 
CONTENTS. 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN THE SCIENCES. 
BOOK II. 
CHAPTER I. 
Page 
Distinction between the Demonstrative or Formal and 
the Material or Inductive Sciences ........ 395 
CHAPTER II. 
THE MENTAL SCIENCES. 
Sect. I. Classification of the Mental Sciences 400 
Sect. II. Logic 402 
Sect. III. Ethics 406 
CHAPTER III. 
Mathematics 409 
CHAPTER IV. 
Intuitive Principles involved in the Physical Sciences 415 
CHAPTER Y. 
APPLICATION TO THEOLOGY. 
Sect. I. Faith and Reason 419 
Sect. II. Natural Theology. The Theistic Argument .... 427 
Sect. III. On the Immortality of the Soul 441 
Sect. IY. Pantheism 446 
Sect. Y. Christian Divinity 461 
Sect. YI. Man as a Religious Being 476 
Sect. YII. Rational Theology 480 
Sect. VIII. Intuitional Theology 482 
ERRATA. 
Page 166, line 5 from foot, for “ Abriei” read “ Ulrici.” 
Page 246, line 7 from head, for “ A is not A ” read “ A is not Not-A.” INTUITIONS OF THE MIND. 
INTRODUCTION. 
AIM OF THE WORE AND METHOD OF INQUIRY. 
According to one class of speculators, the mind derives 
all its knowledge, judgments, maxims, from observation 
and experience. According to another class of thinkers, 
there are ideas, truths, principles, which originate in the 
native power, and are seen in the inward light of the 
mind. These last have been called by a great number 
of names, such as innate ideas, intuitions, necessary 
judgments, fundamental laws of belief, principles of 
common sense, first or primitive truths; and diverse 
have been the accounts given of them, and the uses to 
which they have been turned. This is a controversy 
which has been from the beginning, and which is ever 
being renewed in one form or other. It appears to me 
that this contest is now, and has ever been, characterized 
by an immense complication of confusion; and confusion, 
as Bacon has remarked, is more difficult to rectify than 
open error. I am not, in this treatise, to plunge at once 
into a thicket, in which so many have lost themselves 
as they sought to find or cut a way through it. But 
my aim throughout is to ascertain what are the actual 
laws or principles in the mind denoted by these various 2 
INTRODUCTION. 
phrases, what is their mode of operation, what the rule 
which they follow, and the purpose which they are com- 
petent to serve. 
As the result, it will appear that there are in the 
mind such existences and powers as primary perceptions 
and fundamental laws of belief, but that they are very 
different in their nature from the account which is often 
given of them, and that they are by no means fitted to 
accomplish the ends to which they have been turned in 
metaphysical and theological speculation. I would as 
soon believe that there are no such agents as heat, che- 
mical affinity, and electricity in physical nature, as that 
there are no immediate perceptions and native-born con- 
victions in this mind of ours. I look indeed on the one 
kind of agents, like the other, to be among the deepest 
and most potent at work in this world, mental and ma- 
terial ; and yet the one class, like the other, while ope- 
rating every instant on soul or body, are apt to hide 
themselves from the view. Indeed they discover them- 
selves only by their effects, and their law can be de- 
tected only by a careful observation of its actings; and 
it should be added, that both are capable of evil as well 
as good, and are to be carefully watched and guarded in 
the use which is made of them. 
The prejudice against native and necessary principles 
has arisen to a great extent from the extravagant account 
which has been rendered of them, and from the vain, the 
ambitious, and often pernicious purposes which they have 
been made to serve. It is to be hoped, that by a clear 
determination of their exact nature, and of the rules of 
their operation, and by a judicious exposition of the me- 
thod by which alone they can be discovered, and of the 
restrictions which should be laid on their employment, 
the feeling against them on the part of so many, philo- 
sophers and non-philosophers, may be dispelled; while INTRODUCTION. 
3 
at the same time rash speculators are prevented from em- 
ploying them for the furthering of pretentious ends to 
which they have no legitimate reference. 
In inquiring into the evidence of their existence, into 
the place which they hold in the constitution of the mind, 
the laws by which they are guided, and the way in which 
they manifest themselves, I am to proceed throughout 
in the Method of Induction. I profess to prosecute the 
investigation in the way of the observation of facts—with 
an accompanying analysis and co-ordination, but still of 
facts, which have been carefully observed. It has often 
been shown that the method of induction admits, mutatis 
mutandis, of an application to the study of the human 
mind, as well as to that of the material universe. The 
difference in the application lies mainly in this, that in 
the one case we use self-consciousness, or the internal 
sense, whereas in the other we employ the external sense 
as the organ or instrument. I certainly do not propose 
to find out the intuitions of the mind by the bodily eye, 
aided or unaided by the microscope, nor discover their 
mode of operation by the blowpipe. They are in their 
nature spiritual, and so sense cannot touch them, nor see 
them, nor hear them, nor can the telescope in its widest 
range detect them. Still they are there in our mental 
nature; there is an eye of wider sweep than the telescope, 
and more searching than the microscope, ready to be 
directed towards them. By introspection we may look 
on them in operation; by abstraction or analysis we may 
separate the essential peculiarity from the rough concrete 
presentations; and by generalization, rise to the law which 
they follow. 
But let me not be misunderstood. The method pur- 
sued, as it is not on the one hand to be confounded with 
an ambitious transcendentalism which declines to ask 
help from observation, so it is as little on the other hand 4 
INTRODUCTION. 
to be identified with a miserable sensational empiricism. 
I do not expect to discover what are the native princi- 
ples of the mind by a priori speculation, but neither do 
I profess by observation to lay or construct a foundation 
on which to rear fundamental truth. I am not, there- 
fore, to be lightly charged with a contradiction, as if I 
resorted to experience for a basis or ground of principles 
which I represent as original and independent. I em- 
ploy induction simply as a mean or method of finding 
laws which are prior to induction, otherwise induction 
could not find them. Experience is not supposed by me 
to furnish the ground of necessary truth; all that it can 
do is to supply the facts which enable us to discover the 
truth, and that the truth is necessary. I allude to this 
objection, not with the view of formally meeting it here, 
but in order to show that it has not been overlooked, and 
then adjourn the discussion of it to its appropriate place. 
It will come out, in the course of our survey, that while 
there are regulative principles in the mind, operating al- 
together independently of any reflex notice we may take 
of them, arid not depending for their authority on our 
induction of them, it is at the same time true that they 
can become known to us as general principles only by 
inward observation, and can be legitimately employed in 
philosophic speculation only on the condition of being 
rigidly inducted. By observation we may rise to the 
discovery of mental principles which do not in themselves 
depend on observation, but which have a place in our 
constitution anterior to our observation of them, and are 
there, as observation discovers, native, necessary, and uni- 
versal. 
In some respects, it is an unfortunate time for giving 
forth such a work to the world. Every age, like the seed, 
is at one and the same time the product of combined in- 
fluences in the past, and the germ of life for the future. INTRODUCTION. 
5 
In this present age, two manner of principles, each of the 
character of a different parent, are struggling for the 
mastery; the one earth-born, sensational, empirical, utili- 
tarian, deriving all ideas from the senses, and all know- 
able truth from man's limited experience, and holding 
that man can be swayed by no motives of a higher order 
than the wish to secure pleasure or avoid pain; the other, 
if not heaven-bom, at least cloud-born, being ideal, tran- 
scendental, pantheistic, attributing man's loftiest ideas 
to an inward light, appealing to principles which are dis- 
covered without the trouble of observation, and issuing in 
a belief in the good, instead of a belief in God. Each 
of these views has its keen partisans, either violently at- 
tacking one another, or regarding each other with silent 
contempt, while the great body of reading men are pro- 
fessedly indifferent,—those who claim to be neutral, how- 
ever, being all the while unconsciously in the service 
either of the one or other, commonly of the lower or 
earthly, just as those who profess to belong neither to 
God nor Mammon, do in fact belong to Mammon. 
What then can be expected of the reception of such a 
work in such an age ? A large body, even of the think- 
ing portion of the community, are prejudiced against 
all such discussions, as fruitless of good in every cir- 
cumstance, and in some forms productive of mischief. I 
suspect the great mass of those who call themselves prac- 
tical men, and the majority of those addicted to the study 
of the physical sciences, will be further prepossessed 
against this treatise as defending a doctrine which they 
thought had been long ago and for ever exploded by 
Locke. On the other hand, those most inclined to favour 
such pursuits are, for the most part, committed and 
pledged to extreme views, and can scarcely be expected 
to look with a favourable eye on a work which, pro- 
fessedly built on pure observation, declines to follow any 6 
INTRODUCTION. 
school,—indeed, proclaims that as schools and sects, with 
their separate standpoints and watchwords, have long 
ago ceased in physical science, so it is time they should 
disappear in the field of mental science likewise; that 
those who prosecute the study, calling no man master, 
may look, without prepossession, into the volume spread 
out before them in their own soul, and read it with the 
eye of consciousness. Nearly all confessed metaphysi- 
cians will assert that I am degrading high philosophy in 
making it submit to the method of induction, and that 
the restrictions which I would lay upon speculation must 
deprive it of its most fascinating charms ; while hundreds 
of eager youths, walking hopefully on the high a priori 
road, and expecting that the next turn—which they al- 
ready see not far in front—must open on the great ocean 
of absolute truth, will feel as if they were unmercifully 
stopped and turned back at the very time when the long 
looked-for scene was about to burst gloriously on their 
view. 
But regarded under some other aspects, this is an age 
in which such a work (I would on this account as well as 
many others it were only worthy of its subject) is espe- 
cially needed. Every nation awakened to intelligence 
must have a philosophy of some description. Whatever 
men may profess or affect, they cannot in fact do without 
it; and if any age or nation, arrived at civilization, will 
not form or adopt a high and elevating philosophy, it will 
assuredly fall under the power of a low and a debasing 
one. It oftens happens that a profession of contempt 
for all metaphysics as being futile and unintelligible, is 
often an introduction to a discussion which is metaphy- 
sical without the parties knowing it (as the person in 
the Erench play had spoken prose all his life without 
being aware of it); and of such metaphysics it will com- 
monly be found that they are futile and unintelligible INTRODUCTION. 
7 
enough. Often is Aristotle denounced in language bor- 
rowed from himself, and the Schoolmen are disparaged by 
those who are all the while using distinctions which they 
have cut with sharp chisel in the rock, never to be effaced. 
There are persons speaking with contempt of Plato, Des- 
cartes, Locke, and all the metaphysicians who are taking 
advantage of the great truths which they have discovered. 
I could easily show that in our very sermons from the 
pulpit, and orations in the senate, and pleadings at the 
bar, principles are ever and anon appealed to which have 
come from the heads of our deepest thinkers, in ages long 
gone by, and who may now be forgotten by all but a few 
antiquarians in philosophy. Natural science itself is, in 
the hands of its most advanced votaries, ever touching on 
the borders of metaphysics, and compelling our physicists 
to rest on certain fundamental convictions as to exten- 
sion and force. The truth is, in very proportion as ma- 
terial science advances, do thinking minds feel the need 
of something to go down deeper and mount up higher 
than the senses can do—of some means of settling those 
anxious questions which the mind is ever putting in re- 
gard to the soul, and the relation of the universe to God, 
and of a foundation on which the understanding can 
ultimately and confidently repose. Whatever the super- 
ficial may think, philosophy is an underlying power, of 
vast importance because of mighty influence. It is be- 
cause it is fundamental and radical, that it is unseen by 
the vulgar, who notice only what is above the surface. 
Let us see that the foundation be well laid, that the root 
be properly planted. That foundation must be secure 
which is founded in our mental constitution; that is the 
proper root which is planted by our Maker. 
In. determining the precise nature of the mental intui- 
tions, we may hope to be able to settle what they can do, 
and, as no less important, what they cannot do. Thus do 8 
INTRODUCTION. 
I hope to contribute my little aid in elevating the low, 
and in bringing down the presumptuous tendencies of the 
age; thus would I raise the downward, and at the same 
time lower the proud look; thus would I keep men from 
poring ever on the dust of the earth on the one hand, 
and on the other hand from attempting, Icarus-like, to 
mount in a flight which must issue in a lamentable fall. 
Thus would I seek to raise the view-position of some 
reckoned by themselves and others the wiser and more 
sober, who are digging for ever in the mere clay of ma- 
terial existence, and who, believing in nothing but what 
can be seen and touched, never rise to the contemplation 
of moral and spiritual, of immutable and eternal truth; 
and thus too would I save the more promising of our 
intellectual youths from falling under the power of a 
boasting a priori intuitionalism, which is alluring them 
on by gilded clouds, which will turn out to be damp and 
chill after they have taken infinite pains to climb to 
them and to enter them. 
In Germany, in Britain, in the United States of Ame- 
rica,—alas! France, with its finest minds ground down 
by a military despotism necessitated by an unprincipled 
democracy, has ceased to be a country of independent 
thought, and so cannot be named in such a connection, 
—thought is in a transition, and therefore a very restless 
state. In Germany, the high transcendental, intuitional, 
or dialectic method, has wrought itself out—has cropped 
out to the surface in thinness and brittleness ; and in the 
reaction, eminent professors are lecturing to half-empty 
benches; and books which if published twenty years ago 
would have moved thought to its greatest depths, can now 
find little sale, few readers, and scarcely any believers; 
while in the absence of a judicious philosophy, accepted 
and influential, a plausible materialism, acknowledging 
no existence but matter and force, is making consider- INTRODUCTION. 
9 
able progress on the pretence of furnishing what the old 
metaphysics never yielded, something tangible and there- 
fore solid. In the English-speaking nations there coexists 
with the old experiential spirit engendered by Locke, 
and the sensational spirit imported from France, a deter- 
mined recoil, especially among certain musing and impul- 
sive youths, against Lockism, and sensationalism, and the 
bony and haggard forms of physicism, which have be- 
come denuded of all truth, intellectual, moral, and religi- 
ous, transcending sense and experience; and there is strong 
tendency towards an idealism, which, all decked and ra- 
diant, is seeking to win them to its embrace. It is surely 
possible that there may be some disturbed by the din of 
these controversies, and shunning both extremes, who may 
be prepared to welcome an attempt to discover—not, 
certainly, all truth (which is precluded to the human 
mind), but, by a sure method—that of observation and 
facts—a sure foundation, laid by God himself, and on 
which other truths may be laid, and on which they may 
firmly rest. 
I would not have taken such pains (as I can say con- 
scientiously I have done) with this treatise, had I not 
been persuaded that it embodies important truth. At 
the same time I feel that in discussing so many and such 
abstruse topics, confusion and error may have crept in. 
My conviction indeed is very strong as to the accuracy 
of the general views unfolded in the First and Third of 
the three Parts into which the work is divided. There 
is more room for doubt and hesitation as to the discus- 
sions on the more particular topics in the Second Part. 
In regard to these, I would not only give—what indeed I 
know I cannot withhold—full freedom to others to differ 
from me, but I reserve to myself the right to improve, 
to modify, to correct, if need be, the views here set forth, 
should I receive new light on further reading and reflec- 10 
INTRODUCTION. 
tion. I make this admission and claim this prerogative 
the more readily, as in doing so I may be in the better 
position to maintain that oversights and errors in these 
details will not be found after all to affect the general 
principles expounded in this volume, and their applica- 
tion to every form of speculation, philosophic and reli- 
gious. 
Note.—In thinking out this Work, I have made free 
but not unacknowledged use of the works of the great 
thinkers, both of ancient and modern times, both of the 
Continent and of Britain, who have pondered on these 
topics. Among later metaphysicians I have specially to 
acknowledge my obligations to the erudition, the unsur- 
passed logical power, and the profound observation, of 
the late Sir William Hamilton. I have also derived ad- 
vantage, in the discussion of certain points, from the wri- 
tings of living authors, British and Continental, who will 
be quoted or referred to at the proper places. In ma- 
king this acknowledgment, I do not profess to belong 
to the school of any eminent man of the past or present, 
nor to any school, except the one which will attend to 
nothing but facts. 1 claim to have so far caught the 
spirit of those who have gone before, as to be resolute 
to maintain my independence, and I have not scrupled 
to state wherein I differ from those whose writings have 
yielded me the most valuable thoughts and suggestions. 
I have so constructed the work as to put incidental 
discussions and criticisms in Chapters and Sections, Pre- 
liminary and Supplemental, printed in smaller type. PART FIRST. 
GENERAL VIEW OF THE NATURE OF THE 
INTUITIVE CONVICTIONS OF THE MIND. 13 
BOOK I. 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS REGARDING 
INTUITIONS. 
CHAPTER I. 
NEGATIVE PROPOSITIONS. 
Sect. I. No Innate Mental Images or Represntations. 
The mind of man has the power of imaging or repre- 
senting, in old forms by the memory, or in new forms by 
the imagination, whatever it has at any time known or 
experienced. To this mental property the Aristotelian 
phrase ‘phantasy,’ in use till last century, and revived of 
late by Sir William Hamilton,* might be appropriately ap- 
plied, and then we should have the old term * phantasm ’ 
(not * phantom,’ which might continue to denote the spec- 
tre) ready to designate the mental result, or the idea in 
consciousness. Having seen a given mountain, I can recall 
it at any time. Not only so, but I can put what I have 
experienced in an indefinite number of new shapes and 
colours. Having seen Mont Blanc, I can, when it pleases 
me, bring it up before me in all its bulk, supported by 
its snow-capped buttresses and flanked by its glancing 
glaciers; but I can do more, I can picture a mountain 
covered, not with ice, but with silver, or a mountain 
* See his edition of Reid’s Works, p. 291. 14 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS. 
reaching up to the moon. I can reproduce in like mode 
whatever has been brought under my notice by any of 
the other senses. I can recall and reconstruct the bodily 
sensations,—the sounds, the colours, the tastes,—which I 
have at any time experienced. Milton, when he wrote 
‘ Paradise Lost,’ had lost the power of beholding colours, 
but he had still the capacity of imaging them to him- 
self, or delineating them to others, as he did in his pic- 
ture of the garden of Eden. A late distinguished poet 
never had the sense of smell, except for one brief but 
enjoyable space, when it awoke as he stood in a garden 
with flowers; but he must have been able ever after to 
realize what odours meant. It is to be carefully noted 
that this reproductive power reaches not only over all 
that has been acquired by the bodily senses, but over 
all that has been obtained by consciousness or the in- 
ward sense. I can recall the joys, the hopes, the sorrows, 
the fears, which at some former time may have moved 
my bosom. I can do more : I can picture myself, or picture 
others, in new and unheard-of scenes of gladness or of 
grief. Not only can I represent to myself the counte- 
nance of my friend, I can have an idea of his character 
and dispositions. I can form a mental picture of the out- 
ward scenes in which Shakspeare or Walter Scott place 
their heroes or heroines; but I can also enter into their 
thoughts and feelings. 
But all these ideas, in the sense of phantasms, are re- 
productions of past experience in old forms or new dis- 
positions. He who has had the use of his eyes at any 
time, can ever after understand what is meant by the 
colour of scarlet, but the person born blind has not the 
most distant idea of it in the sense of image, and if 
pressed for an answer to the question what he supposes 
it to be, he can come no nearer the reality than the man 
mentioned by Locke, who likened it to the sound of a NEGATIVE PROPOSITIONS. 
15 
trumpet; or than the blind boy of whom I have heard, 
who when asked whether he would prefer a lilac-coloured 
or a brown-coloured book, offered as a prize, decided for 
the lilac, as he supposed it must resemble the lilac-bush, 
whose odour had been so agreeable to him. Having 
experience of cogitations and sentiments of our own, we 
apprehend and appreciate those of others. Having a 
spiritual nature ourselves, we can form some idea of that 
Great Spirit in whose image we can claim to have been 
fashioned. But there may be attributes possessed by 
God of which we can form as little idea as the deaf man 
can of sounds, or the man without smell can of odours; 
they may be attributes to which we possess nothing like, 
and which we may be incapable of representing even in 
imagination. Niebuhr, the traveller, had often brought 
before him in his old-age the scenes of Eastern lands, 
but it was because he had witnessed them in his youth ; 
and even we who have never been in those countries can 
so far understand the descriptions in his travels, because 
we have had the elements of them in our own experience ; 
but there may be scenes in heaven which it hath not en- 
tered into the heart of man to conceive, inasmuch as no- 
thing similar has passed under his notice in this lower 
world. 
Now the proposition advanced in this Section is that 
the soul is not born unto this world with a stock of such 
phantasms, ready to come out on occasions presented. I 
rather think that this is the sense in which the phrase 
is understood by those who give Locke the credit of 
exploding the doctrine of “innate ideas” for ever. 
Taking * idea ’ in the sense of ‘ image,’ they say, what can 
be so unreasonable as to suppose that the mind comes 
into the world with such impressions ready to start 
forth, like writing with invisible ink, or like sun-pictures 
when exposed to certain chemical agencies. Locke, who 16 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS. 
I suspect took ‘ idea’ very much in the sense of mental 
image, or representation, may very possibly claim to have 
for ever set aside this view. But his credit in this respect 
is not very great after all. "For I rather think no philo- 
sopher of influence ever propounded such a doctrine, for- 
mally or explicitly. It is quite conceivable, indeed, that 
Plato might have consistently held some such doctrine. 
He might have maintained that the soul did come into 
the world with such ideas; but then he would have as- 
cribed them to experience acquired in a previous state of 
existence. But Plato’s doctrine of ideas, while I believe 
it, in many aspects of it, to be as true as it is sublime, 
is apt to run into myths and fancies in the expression, 
so that it is difficult to give a thoroughly consistent ex- 
position of it. By c idea ’ he meant a pattern in or before 
the Divine Mind from all eternity; and he supposes a 
course of philosophic abstraction to be quite as neces- 
sary as reminiscence to call up such ideas into conscious- 
ness. But whether the view which I am opposing has or 
has not been entertained by men of eminence, it is expe- 
dient to notice it, in order at the very commencement to 
remove it out of the way as an encumbrance. 
Sect. II. No Innate Abstract or General Notions. 
This proposition is not the same as that illustrated in 
last Section. A mental picture of a mountain is one 
thing, and a general notion of the class mountain is a 
very different thing. All our cognitions by the senses or 
the consciousness, and all our subsequent images of them 
in memory or imagination, are singular and concrete; that 
is, they are of individual things, and of things with an 
aggregate of qualities. I can see or picture to myself 
an individual man of a certain form or character, but I 
cannot perceive nor adequately represent in the phantasy 
the class man. I can see or imagine a piece of magne- NEGATIVE PROPOSITIONS. 
17 
tized iron, but I cannot see or imagine the polarity of the 
iron apart from the iron. 
Still the mind has the high capacity of forming ab- 
stract and general notions. Out of the concrete it can 
form the abstract notion. I can see or image a lily only 
as with both a shape and colour, but I can in thought 
contemplate its whiteness apart from its form. Having 
seen a number of beasts with four limbs, I can think 
about a class of animals agreeing in this, that they are all 
quadrupeds. It appears then that the mental image and 
the abstract or general notion are not the same. The 
former is an exercise of the reproductive powers, recall- 
ing the old or putting the old in new collocations. The 
other is the result of an exercise of thought, separating 
the part from the whole, or contemplating an indefinite 
number of objects as possessing common qualities. If 
the one may be called the phantasm; the other, in con- 
tradistinction, may be denominated the notion or concept; 
or, to designate it more unequivocally, the logical notion 
or concept. 
But it is quite as true of the abstract and general no- 
tions, as of the mental representations of the individual, 
that they are not in the soul when it comes into the 
world. It has been the avowed doctrine of the great 
body of philosophers, that the mind starts with the sin- 
gular and the concrete. All our abstract notions are the 
result of a process in which we separate in thought the 
part from the whole; say the quality, from the substance 
presenting itself with its qualities,—say transparency, con- 
templated apart from the transparent ice or glass. All 
our general notions are the product of a process in which 
we contemplate objects as possessing common attributes, 
—say philosophers, as men agreeing in this, that they are 
seekers of wisdom. 
It is, as I reckon it, the true merit of Locke that, in 18 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS. 
the second book of his Essay on the Human Under- 
standing, he shows how in the ideas we form of such ob- 
jects as space, time, substance, cause, and infinity, and in 
the general maxims employed in speculation, such as that 
“ it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be 
at the same time,” there is involved a process of the un- 
derstanding founded on a previous experience.* It will 
be acknowledged that the soul is not born into the world 
with such abstract ideas as those of hardness, or organic 
action, or life, nor such general notions as those of mine- 
ral, plant, animal. This is admitted by all. But it is 
equally true that the soul of the infant has not yet in an 
abstract or general form those ideas which certain meta- 
* Wherein lie the defects of Locke will come out as we advance (see 
more especially Part I. Book II. Chap. III., and Part III. Book I. 
Chap. II., sect, ii.); but I think he is invincible when he shows that chil- 
dren do not start with general maxims consciously before them, and that 
savages are not in possession of them. Thus, speaking of the maxim, “It 
is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,” he says, “ A great 
part of illiterate people and savages pass many years of their rational age 
without ever thinking on this and the like general propositions ” (Essay, 
bk. i. ch. xi. s. 12). “ There is no knowledge of these general and self- 
evident maxims in the mind till it comes to the exercise of reason ” (ib., 
s. 14). Speaking of more particular self-evident propositions, which 
are assented to at first hearing, as that one and two are equal to three, 
he says, “ They are known and assented to by those who are utterly ig- 
norant of these more general maxims, and so being earlier in the mind 
than those (as they are called) first principles, cannot owe to them the 
assent wherewith they are received at first hearing ” (s. 20). “ For though 
a child quickly assents to this proposition, that an apple is not fire, 
when lie has got the ideas of these two different things distinctly im- 
printed on his mind, and has learned that the names apple and fire 
stand for them, yet it will be some years after, before the same child 
will assent to this proposition, that it is impossible for the same thing 
to be and not to be” (s. 23). “He that will say children join these 
general abstract speculations with their sucking-bottles and their rat- 
tles, may perhaps with justice be thought to have more passion and 
zeal for his opinion, but less sincerity and truth, than one of that 
age” (s. 25). “Such kind of general propositions are seldom men- 
tioned in the huts of Indians ; much less are they found in the thoughts 
of children, or any impressions of them on the minds of naturals ” 
(s. 27). NEGATIVE PROPOSITIONS. 
19 
physicians describe as innate, as those of the ego and the 
non-ego, extension and potency, mind and matter, cause 
and effect, infinity and moral good. We reach the ab- 
stract idea of hardness by specially fixing the attention 
on one of the qualities of body. In like manner it is ne- 
cessary, in order to attain the idea of space, to separate 
in thought the space from body known as occupying 
space. We get the idea of bodily substance by consider- 
ing the permanent being apart from that which changes 
in the bodies falling under our notice. It is one of 
the aims of this treatise to specify the way in which the 
mind gets these ideas in the concrete and singular. But 
for the present I am seeking to have rubbish removed, 
that there may be free space whereon to lay a foundation. 
And I think it of vast moment to have it admitted that 
every abstract notion implies a process of separation, that 
every general notion implies a process of comparison, 
and that both one and other proceed on a previous know- 
ledge which has come within the range of our conscious- 
ness. 
Sect. III. No a psiosi Forms imposed by the Mind on 
Objects. 
This proposition is laid down in opposition to a view 
which has been extensively and resolutely entertained of 
late years. Traces of it in a looser form may be detected 
at a much earlier date, but it may be regarded as for- 
mally introduced into philosophy by Kant, in his great 
work on the Kritick of Pure Reason. Suppose that the 
eyes, in every exercise of vision, were to start with a lens 
of a particular shape and colour, every object seen would 
take a predetermined form, and appear in a special hue. 
It is thus, according to Kant, that the mind sets out 
with certain forms which it imposes on phenomena,—that 
is, on appearances presenting themselves. In every pri- 20 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS. 
mary cognition the mind imposes two Forms, one of Space 
and another of Time, on the phenomena presented empi- 
rically or a posteriori. Again, in comparing its cogni- 
tions, it sets them in a number of frameworks, called 
Categories, such as that of Quantity, Quality, Relation 
(including Substance and Accident, Causality and Depen- 
dence), and Modality, which have a reality not objectively 
in things but subjectively in the mind. A yet higher for- 
mative power brings these categories into unity in three 
Ideas of Pure Reason, those of Substance, Interdepend- 
ence of Phenomena, and God, in which all objective re- 
ality has disappeared. These forms of the senses, cate- 
gories of the understanding, and ideas of pure reason, 
constitute the a priori as distinguished from the a poste- 
riori elements in the mental exercises. 
It would carry us prematurely into very deep topics, 
with very ramified connections, were I at this early stage 
to criticize this doctrine in all its extent and bearings. 
It must suffice for the present to affirm that so far as it 
declares that the mind in cognition gives to the object 
what is not in the object, it is an unnatural doctrine, and 
is fraught with far-reaching consequences of a perilous 
character. The doctrine which I hope to establish is 
that the intuitive or cognitive powers do not impose 
forms on the objects, but are simply the agents or instru- 
ments by which we are enabled to discover what is in 
the objects. The mind, in looking at a material object, 
does not superinduce extension on it, but it observes that 
it is in space and must be in space. It does not carry 
within it a chain wherewith to connect events by a law 
of causation, but it has a capacity to discover that events 
are so connected and must be so connected. The capa- 
city of cognition in the mind is not that of the bent 
mirror, to reflect the object under modified forms, but of 
the plane mirror, to reflect it as it is in its proper shape NEGATIVE PROPOSITIONS. 
21 
and colour. The truth is perceived by the mind, not 
formed; it is cognized, and not created. There must of 
course be a correspondence between the subject, mind, 
and the object, material or mental, contemplated; but 
it is a correspondence whereby the one knows and the 
other is known. This seems to me to be our natural, 
intuitive, and necessary conviction, and he who departs 
from it is landed in thickening difficulties on every side, 
and in particular cannot possibly defend himself from 
the assaults of scepticism; for if the mind can in respect 
of what it apprehends in the object create so much, why 
not suppose that it creates all ? If it can create the space 
in which the object is perceived, why not suppose that 
it can create the object itself? This was the conclusion 
drawn by Fichte, who, carrying out the principles of Kant 
a step further, made the whole supposed external object 
a mere projection of the mind. There is no satisfactory 
or consistent way of avoiding this consequence but by 
adhering to the natural doctrine, and holding that the 
mind is so constituted as to know the object as it is, un- 
der the aspects in which it is presented to it. 
Sect. IV. The Intuitions are not immediately before 
Consciousness as Laws or Principles. 
I am to labour to show, in coming Sections, that there 
are intuitive principles in the mind regulating cognitions, 
beliefs, and judgments, whether intellectual or moral. My 
present position is, that operating in the mind as native 
laws or rules, they are not, as such, before the conscious- 
ness. 
Every one speaks of there being in the mind capacities, 
powers, or faculties, such as the memory, or the imagina- 
tion, or the reason, yet no one is immediately conscious of 
these mental powers. We are conscious of remembering 
a given event, of imagining a given scene, of discovering 22 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS. 
a given relation, but not of the mental power from which 
the acts proceed. Such considerations show that there 
may be operating in the mind faculties which do not fall 
directly under the internal eye. What is true of the facul- 
ties is true of the intuitive potencies of the mind. In- 
deed the intuitive principles of the mind are very closely 
related to the faculties. I have seldom however seen the 
precise relation between them distinctly pointed out. 
One class of investigators, such as Locke, treat of the 
faculties; another class, such as the German metaphysi- 
cians who have ramified from Kant, of a priori principles 
in the mind; while a third class, such as the Scottish 
school wdiich has sprung from Reid, admit both into their 
system, but without explaining their connection. To me 
it appears that the intuitive or necessary principles of 
the mind are just the fundamental principles or regula- 
tive laws of the faculties. But without dwelling on this 
at present, it is enough to announce that the necessary 
principles, like the faculties of the mind, do not come 
immediately under the cognizance of consciousness. The 
individual actings do indeed fall directly under reflection 
or the internal sense. Thus we are conscious that the 
mind, on discovering a given effect, judges and decides 
that it must have a cause, and looks for a cause ; but 
it has not meanwhile before it the general principle that 
every effect has a cause, or the principle of causation 
expressly formalized. Being convinced that we exist, 
we cannot be made to believe that w7e do not exist; but 
this is not because we have consciously before us the 
principle of contradiction, ‘ that it is impossible for the 
same thing to be and not to be at the same time.’ It will 
be shown forthwith that we arrive reflexly at a know- 
ledge of the intuitive principle, which operates spontane- 
ously, by the observation and generalization of its in- 
dividual acts or energies. My present purpose is gained POSITIVE PROPOSITIONS. 
23 
if it is shown that such metaphysical principles as 
causation and contradiction are not directly before con- 
sciousness as rules, laws, or principles. 
CHAPTER II. 
POSITIVE PROPOSITIONS. 
Sect. I. There are Intuitive Principles operating in 
the Mind. 
I do not propose to bring a full or satisfactory proof of 
this assertion in this short Section; the evidence will be 
found in the Second Part, in which our intuitive con- 
victions are unfolded and discussed in detail. All that I 
profess to do at this stage is, to announce and explain cer- 
tain positions which I hope to establish as we proceed, and 
answer some preliminary objections which are likely to 
occur to the English reader. To illustrate my meaning 
I must refer to certain convictions which I suppose to be 
intuitive, such as those regarding Space and Time, Sub- 
stance, Quality, Cause and Effect, and Moral Good; all 
of these will be treated in detail in subsequent parts of the 
volume. 
(1.) The first position I would lay down is that the 
mind must have something native or innate. The word 
innate is apt to be obnoxious to English ears; it is as- 
sociated with views which Locke is supposed to have 
set aside for ever; and the revival of it will appear to 
some like the raising of a carcase from the grave to which 
it had been happily consigned. I have no partiality for a 24 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS. 
phrase which has been employed to set forth doctrines 
which it will be one object of this Work to undermine. 
To the phrase * innate ideas ’ I take strong objections, 
which will come out as we advance. To the term ‘ innate,’ 
if it were employed to qualify the proper noun, I see no 
objections; but if any are offended with it, the word 
‘ native ’ will serve our purpose as well. All that either 
phrase denotes is, that there is something—at present I 
do not say what—in man’s soul at the time it is born. 
In this respect it is like the bodily substances which 
fall under our notice. These bodies are something and 
have something. This piece of iron which I hold in my 
hand is not a nonentity; it is an existence; it occupies 
space; it resists pressure; it has a colour. The soul of 
man is also an existence; it knows ; it understands ; it 
grieves; it rejoices. The capacity which it has of doing 
so may be described as native and original. 
In this respect it is like the bodily frame when it 
comes forth from the womb. That body is not all which 
it is afterwards to become. Yet it is not, even at this 
early stage, a nonentity; it is not a nothing about to 
grow into something. Already that frame has a struc- 
ture, a form, and most wondrous properties. And just 
as little is the soul, when it awakes to consciousness, a 
nonentity; even at this point, it is an existence, a some- 
thing, and is possessed of something which may be called 
innate or connate. 
Even on the supposition that it is like a surface of wax 
or a sheet of white paper, ready to receive whatever is im- 
pressed or written on it, it must have something inborn. 
If the mind have but a power of impressibility, it has in 
this something innate. The very wax and paper, in the 
inadequate illustration referred to, have capabilities, the 
capacity of taking something on them, and retaining it. 
But such comparisons have all a misleading tendency. POSITIVE PROPOSITIONS. 
25 
Surely the mind has something more than a mere recep- 
tivity ! It is not a mere surface, on which matter may 
reflect itself as on a mirror: our consciousness testifies 
that, in comparison with matter, it is active; that it has 
an original, and an originating potency. 
(2.) A second position may be maintained; that this 
something has rules, laws, or properties. Matter, with all 
its endowments, inorganic and organic, is regulated by 
laws which it is the office of physical and physiological 
science to discover. All the powers or properties of ma- 
terial substance have rules of action ; for example, gravi- 
tation and chemical affinity have regulations which can 
be expressed in quantitative proportions. That mind also 
has properties, is shown by its action; and surely these 
properties do not act capriciously or lawlessly. There are 
rules involved in the very constitution of the active pro- 
perties, and these rules are not beyond the possibility of 
being discovered and expressed. The senses indeed can- 
not detect them, but they may be found out by internal 
observation. Nor does it appear that this law can be 
discovered immediately by consciousness, any more than 
the law of gravitation can be perceived by the eye. But 
the operations of the mental properties are under the eye 
of consciousness just as those of gravitation are under 
the senses; and by careful observation, analysis, and ge- 
neralization, we may from the acts reach the laws of the 
acts. He who has reached the exact expression of our 
mental properties, is in possession of a law which is native 
or innate. 
(3.) As a third position, it is capable of being esta- 
blished that the mind has original perceptions, which ori- 
ginal perceptions may be described as intuitive. Every 
one will acknowledge that the mind has perceptions 
through the senses, and I shall endeavour to show, as we 
advance, that it has perceptions of the understanding 20 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS. 
and of the moral faculty: some of these perceptions are, 
no doubt, secondary and derivative, but the secondary 
imply primary perceptions, and the derivative original 
ones. Thus perception of distance by the eye may be deri- 
vative: but it implies an original perception, by the eye, 
of a surface. It is by a process of reasoning that I know 
that the square of the hypothenuse of a right-angled tri- 
angle is equal to the square of the other two sides: but 
this reasoning proceeds on certain axiomatic truths whose 
certainty is seen at once, as that “if equals be added to 
equals, the wholes are equal.” Let it be observed that 
we are now in a region in which are loftier properties than 
those possessed by inert matter; still these higher have 
rules as well as the lower or material properties. The 
original perceptions by sense, or reason, or moral power, 
have all their laws, which it should be the business of 
psychology or of metaphysics to discover and determine. 
These original perceptions may be represented as intui- 
tions inasmuch as they look immediately on the object 
or truth. The rules or laws which they obey may be de- 
scribed as intuitive principles ; it is the office of mental 
science to discover them by a process of introspection, 
abstraction, and comparison. 
(4.) It is possible to defend a fourth position, that the 
mind can discover necessary and universal truth. Not 
that I propose to substantiate this statement at this stage 
of our inquiries, still I may announce it, and show how 
it is not impossible to establish it. The mind declares 
that these two straight lines before it do not enclose a 
space. It does more: it declares of every other two 
straight lines conceived, that they cannot enclose a 
space. It says of these two straight lines, that if they 
proceed an inch without being nearer each other, that 
they will proceed an ell, a mile, or a myriad of miles, 
without being nearer; nay, it declares of all such parallel POSITIVE PROPOSITIONS. 
27 
lines, that they may be prolonged for ever without meet- 
ing. These are specimens of a large class of truths, 
which the mind perceives to be true, and necessarily 
true. There are logical truths—such as that whatever is 
predicated of a class may be predicated of all the mem- 
bers of the class, and moral truths—such as that sin is 
deserving of reprobation, which are also necessary and 
universal. But if the mind may—as I maintain that it 
can and does—rise to the discovery of such truths, it must 
be by native laws, the expression of which will give us 
metaphysical science, just as the expression of the laws 
which material phenomena obey gives us physical science. 
But it will be said that we discover all this by experi- 
ence. e are not at this stage of inquiry in circum- 
stances to have the relation between intuition and expe- 
rience definitively pointed out. But 
(5.) It may be stated, as a fifth position, that the very 
acquisition of experience implies native laws or principles. 
So far from experience being able to account for innate 
principles, innate principles are required to account for 
the treasures of experience. For how is it that man is 
enabled to gather experience ? How is he different in 
this respect from the stock or the stone, from the vege- 
table or the brute, which can acquire no experience, at 
least no such experience ? Plainly because he is endowed 
with capacities for this end; and these faculties must 
have some law or principle on which they proceed. Ex- 
perience, in the narrow sense, must mean, what we have 
personally noticed. Even in noticing this, there must be 
faculties, with principles involved in them, at work. But 
a personal experience would of itself be valueless to man; 
it would not and could not enable him to rise from the 
known to the unknown, to argue from the past to the 
future. But man can from the known discover the un- 
known, from the past he can anticipate the future ; and 28 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS. 
when he does so, he must proceed on some principle 
which is capable of exposition, and ought to be ex- 
pressed. And if man be capable, as I maintain he is, of 
reaching necessary and universal truth, he must proceed 
on principles which can never be derived from experience. 
Twenty times have we tried, and found that two straight 
lines do not enclose a space: this does not authorize us 
to affirm that they never can enclose a space, otherwise 
we might argue that, because we had seen a judge and 
his wig twenty times together, they must therefore be 
together through all eternity. A hundred times have I 
seen a spark kindle gunpowder : this does not entitle me 
to declare that it will do so the thousandth or the mil- 
lionth time, or wherever the spark and the gunpoAvder 
are found. The gathered knowledge and wisdom of 
man, and his power of prediction, thus imply more than 
experience: they presuppose faculties to enable him to 
gather experience, and in some cases involve necessary 
principles which enable him, and justify him, as he acts 
on his ability, to rise from a limited experience to an 
unlimited and necessary law. 
But it may be urged that Ave reach these results by 
reasoning. I reply that 
(6.) A sixth position may be established, that reasoning 
proceeds on principles Avhicli cannot be proved by reason- 
ing, but must be assumed, and assumed as seen intui- 
tively to be true. In all ratiocination there must be some- 
thing from which Ave argue. That from which Ave argue 
is the premiss,—in the Aristotelian analysis of argument, 
it is the two premisses. But as we go back and back, 
AAre must at length come to something which cannot be 
proven. That which cannot be proven must be assumed, 
but surely not assumed capriciously; if assumed capri- 
ciously, it can yield no proper foundation, and if not 
assumed arbitrarily, it must be according to some rule POSITIVE PROPOSITIONS. 
29 
or principle which should be expounded and stated by 
the metaphysician. How can we reason but from what 
we know ? and in going back we come to truths which 
we know directly, that is, by intuition, and the law of 
this intuition should be evolved. It might further be 
shown that there must be a mental principle involved— 
it is the Dictum in the Aristotelian account of reasoning 
■—in the process by which we connect the conclusion 
with the premisses; for were there no such principle, 
the ratiocination would be arbitrary, and it would be vain 
for any mail to endeavour to convince his neighbour, or 
even to try to keep himself consistent. Such considera- 
tions as these show that at the foundation of argument, 
and at every stage of the superstructure, there are mental 
principles involved which are either intuitive or depend 
on principles which are intuitive. 
Sect. II. The Native Convictions of the Mind are of 
the Nature of Perceptions or Intuitions. 
In some cases there are external objects presented; 
the mind looks upon them, and the conviction at once 
springs up. Thus it is that it knows immediately this 
particular body, this paper or table, as occupying space. 
In other cases it is something within the mind that is 
contemplated; it is self in some particular exercise,—say 
thinking or feeling. In many instances the object pre- 
sented in the mind is the result of a prior mental process. 
Thus, having at a former time seen two straight lines, we 
now, in our thinking moods, image or represent them; 
and the mind, on the contemplation, proclaims at once 
that they cannot enclose a space. Or we have occasion 
to consider some particular voluntary sentiment of a fel- 
low-man,—say his cherishing malice against another man, 
and we proclaim it to be evil, condemnable. In this last 
instance the act contemplated is not, properly speaking, 30 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS. 
under our immediate view, for it is in the breast of a 
neighbour, but it is represented to us in our minds, and 
looking on this representation the mind pronounces a 
decision. In every case these convictions seem to be of 
the nature of perceptions, that is, something is presented 
to us, and the cognition, belief, or judgment is formed. 
It is on this account that I have, in the title of this Trea- 
tise, chosen to call them Intuitions. As we advance, we 
shall find other distinctive characters, the expression of 
which yields other epithets; but the term Intuitions, that 
is, perceptions formed by looking in upon objects, seems 
to bring out the original quality of the native convictions 
of the mind. 
Sect. III. Intuitive Convictions rise on the Contem- 
plation of Objects Presented or Represented to the 
mind. 
Metaphysicians have often given such an account of 
them as to leave the impression that the mind creates 
them independent of objects, or that, at the utmost, expe- 
rience furnishes merely the occasion, on the occurrence 
of which the mind fashions them by its own inherent 
power. I shall have occasion to show that the relation 
between the intuitive powers and objects is of a much 
closer and more dependent character than this account 
would lead us to suppose. In intuition we look into the 
object, we discover something in it, or belonging to it, 
or we discover a relation between it and some other ob- 
ject. Were the object taken away, the perception would 
be meaningless, indeed it would altogether cease. In- 
tuition is a perception of an object, and of something in 
it or pertaining to it. Perception, without something 
looked into, would be as contradictory as vision without 
an object seen, or touch without an object felt. In our 
cognitions we know objects, or qualities of objects, we POSITIVE PROPOSITIONS. 
31 
know self as thinking, or body as extended. In belief 
we entertain a trust regarding certain objects that they 
are so and so,—of time, for example, that it can come to 
no end. In judgment we discover certain relations be- 
tween two or more objects, as that a mode implies a 
substance. Our intuitive convictions are thus not ideas, 
notions, judgments, formed apart from objects, but are 
in fact discoveries of something in objects, or relating to 
them.* 
Sect. IY. The Intuitions of the Mind are primarily 
DIRECTED TO INDIVIDUAL OBJECTS. 
I shall have occasion to show, when I come to distin- 
guish and classify the intuitions, that some are of the 
nature of cognitions and beliefs, while others are of the 
nature of judgments. But whatever be their distinctive 
nature, they always, as intuitions, primarily contemplate 
objects as individuals. If I know, or believe in anything, 
it is an existing thing, that is, as singular. If I form an 
intuitive judgment, that is, make a comparison, it is still 
in regard to two or more objects considered as singulars; 
and so far as we pass beyond this, there is always, as I 
shall endeavour to show, a discursive process involved. 
A very different account is often given, if not formally, 
at least implicitly, of intuition or of intuitive reason. 
Man is represented as gazing immediately on the true, 
the beautiful, the good, meaning in the abstract, or in the 
general. It is admitted that there must be some sort of 
experience, some individual object presented as the occa- 
sion, but the mind, being thus roused into activity, is re- 
presented as contemplating, by direct vision, such things 
as space and time, substance and quality, cause and 
effect, the infinite, and moral good. I hope to be able to 
* Locke laid strong hold of the features specified in this Section and 
the last; see infra, Part I. Book II. Chap. III. 32 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS. 
show that this theory is altogether mistaken. Our ap- 
peal on this subject must be to the consciousness and 
the memory, and these give a very different account of 
the process which passes through the mind when it is 
employed about such objects. Intuitively the mind con- 
templates a particular body as occupying space and be- 
ing in space, and it is by a subsequent intellectual pro- 
cess, in which abstraction acts an important part, that 
the idea of space is formed. Intuitively the mind con- 
templates an event as happening in time, and then by a 
further process arrives at the notion of time. The mind 
has not intuitively an idea of cause or causation in the 
abstract, but discovering a given effect, it looks for a spe- 
cific cause. It does not form some sort of vague notion 
of a general infinite, but fixing its attention on some in- 
dividual thing,—such as space, or time, or God,—it is 
constrained to believe it to be infinite. The child has 
not formed to itself a refined idea of moral good, but 
contemplating a given action it proclaims it to be good 
or evil. The same remark holds good of the intuitive 
judgments of the mind, that is, when it compares two or 
more things, and proclaims them at once to agree or dis- 
agree. I do not, without a process of discursive thought, 
pronounce, or even understand, the general maxim that 
things which are equal to the same things are equal to 
one another, but on discovering that first one bush and 
then another bush are of the same height as my staff, I 
decide that the two bushes are equal to one another. 
It will be shown in next Section that the mind has the 
power of generalizing the individual cognitions or judg- 
ments of the intuitions, and in doing so it may arrive at 
most important truth. It will come out, too, that intui- 
tion may fasten on the general proposition and pronounce 
decisions in which it is involved. But in the formation 
of the general maxim, there is a process of logical thought POSITIVE PROPOSITIONS. 
33 
involved for which the intuition is not responsible. It 
is only in the form of convictions regarding individuals 
presenting themselves that our intuitions manifest them- 
selves in all men—in children and savages for instance. 
The boy decides that the ball which he holds in his hand 
cannot be at the same time in the hand of some other boy 
who may pretend to have it; but he has not meanwhile 
consciously before him the formula that it is impossible 
for the same body to be in two places at the same time. 
The individual conviction is in all men when the objects 
are pressed on their attention, the general maxim is the 
result of thought and especially of abstraction and ge- 
neralization. By drawing this distinction we are able 
to maintain that these .intuitions are native and in all 
minds, and yet save ourselves from the absurdity in 
which so many metaphysicians land themselves when 
they speak of children or infants as employed in contem- 
plating the ego and the non-ego, personality, externality, 
subject, and object. The particular conviction is formed 
by all in a concrete form when the appropriate objects 
present themselves; but the abstract formula is fashioned 
by those addicted to reflection, and is not even under- 
stood except by those whose minds are matured and cul- 
tivated. 
Sect. V. The Individual Intuitive Convictions can be 
Generalized into Maxims, and these are entitled to 
BE REPRESENTED AS PHILOSOPHIC PRINCIPLES. 
The native principles in the soul are analogous to the 
physical laws operating in external nature. Both one 
and other act at all times, on the necessary conditions 
being supplied. Like the physiological processes of re- 
spiration and the circulation of the blood, the intuitions 
do not depend for their operation on any voluntary de- 
termination of the human mind, and they act whether 34 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS. 
we observe them or no; indeed they often act best when 
we are taking no notice of them. We cannot command 
their exercise on the one hand, nor prohibit it on the 
other. A greater or less number of them are working 
in the soul at every waking moment of our existence. 
It is always to be remembered indeed that they are 
mental and not material laws; but, making allowance 
for this, they may be regarded as operating very much 
like the great physical or physiological laws of chemical 
affinity, or of nervous irritability, or of the reflex nervous 
system. As they act in an analogous manner, so they 
may be discovered in much the same way as the laws of 
the material universe, that is, by the method of induc- 
tion. 
The laws of matter are discovered by the observation 
and generalization of their individual operations. With 
the exception of a few metaphysicians of the schools of 
Schelling or Hegel, no one now maintains that these 
laws can be discovered by a priori speculation. Nor can 
they be detected by mere sense,—by eye, or touch, or 
ear; no man ever yet saw, or touched, or heard, a law of 
nature. All that falls under the perception of the senses 
are individual facts, and those generally concrete or com- 
plex ; that is, the object is presented as exhibiting more 
than one quality at the same time, or the effect is the 
result of a variety of causes. In order to reach the law 
by an observation of the facts, there is need first of all of 
a judicious analysis, or, as Bacon calls it, the necessary 
“ rejections and exclusions,” or the separation and set- 
ting aside of the extraneous matter of the mixed pheno- 
menon ; that is, the matter which does not belong to 
the law or agent we are seeking to discover. Having 
made these appropriate rejections, we now generalize the 
facts—that is, find out where they agree—and thus arrive 
at the discovery of the physical law. POSITIVE PROPOSITIONS. 
35 
It is in much the same way, mutatis mutandis, that 
we discover the laws of our original and native convic- 
tions. I boldly affirm that it is as impossible to deter- 
mine them as it is to settle the laws of the external uni- 
verse by a priori cogitation or logical division and dis- 
section. As they cannot be elaborated by speculation on 
the one hand, so neither do they fall under the immediate 
cognizance of consciousness on the other. All that comes 
under the consciousness is individual: it is an object 
now present; it is the mind in some state or mode. But 
our modifications of mind at any given moment are 
always more or less complex; that is, there is more than 
one property in exercise, though of course combined in 
the unity of the mind. But, by a sharp analysis, it is 
always possible to separate the different elements, and 
fix the attention exclusively on that which alone pertains 
to the law or property we are seeking to evolve. Exami- 
ning carefully the nature of the acts which seem to flow 
from the same principle, we generalize them; and, if we 
do so accurately, we obtain the exact nature of the prin- 
ciple, and can embody it in a verbal expression. 
The principle thus discovered and enunciated is pro- 
perly a metaphysical one; it is a truth above sense, a 
truth of mind, a truth of reason. It is different in its 
origin and authority from the general rules reached by 
experience, such as the law of gravitation, or the law of 
chemical affinity, or the law of the distribution of animals 
over the earth’s surface. These latter are the mere ge- 
neralizations of an experience necessarily limited; they 
hold good merely in the measure of our experience, and 
as experience can never reach all possible cases, so the 
rule can never be absolute ; we can never say that there 
may not be exceptions. Laws of the former kind are of 
a higher or deeper nature, they are the generalization of 
convictions carrying necessity with them, and a consequent 36 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS. 
universality in their very nature. They are entitled to 
be regarded as in an especial sense philosophic princi- 
ples, being the ground to which we come when we follow 
any system of truth sufficiently far down, and competent 
to act as a basis on which to erect a superstructure of 
science. They are truths of our original constitution, 
having the sanction of Him who hath given us our con- 
stitution, and graven them there with His own finger. 
It is ever to be borne in mind, however, that the de- 
tection and exact expression of these intuitive principles 
is always a delicate and is often a most difficult opera- 
tion. Did they fall immediately under the eye of con- 
sciousness, the work would be a comparatively easy one; 
we should only have to look within in order to see them. 
But all that consciousness can notice are their indivi- 
dual exercises mixed up one with another and with all 
other actings of the mind. It requires a microscopic 
eye, and much analytic skill, to detect the various fibres 
in the complex structure, and to follow each through its 
various windings and entanglements to its source. 37 
BOOK II. 
CHARACTER OE INTUITIONS, AND METHOD 
OE EMPLOYING THEM. 
CHAPTER I. 
MAKES AND PECULIARITIES OF INTUITION. 
Sect. I. Tests. 
But how are we to distinguish a primitive conviction 
which does not need probation, and which we may not 
even doubt, from propositions which we are not required 
to believe till evidence is produced ? Are we entitled to 
appeal, when we please and as we please, to supposed 
first truths? Have we the privilege, when we wish to 
adhere to a favourite opinion, to declare that we see it 
to be true intuitively, and thus at once get rid of all 
objections, and of the necessity for even instituting an 
examination ? May we, when hard pressed, or defeated 
in argument, resort, as it suits us, to an original prin- 
ciple which we assume without evidence, and declare to 
be beyond the reach of refutation? It is one of the 
aims of this treatise to limit the confidence we put in 
our supposed intuitions, and lay a stringent restraint 
on the appeal to truths which are represented as above 
probation. There can be tests propounded sufficient to 
determine with precision what convictions are, and what 38 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
convictions are not, entitled to be regarded as intuitive, 
and these tests are such that they admit of an easy 
application, requiring only a moderate degree of careful 
consideration of the maxim proffered as claiming our 
assent. 
1. The primary mark of intuitive truth is self-evidence. 
It must be evident, and it must have its evidence in the 
object. The mind, on the bare contemplation of the ob- 
ject, must see it to be so and so, must see it to be so at 
once, without requiring any foreign evidence or mediate 
proof. That the planet Mars is inhabited, or that it is 
not inhabited, is not a first truth, for it is not evident 
on the bare contemplation of the object. That the isle of 
Madagascar is inhabited, even this is not a primary con- 
viction ; we believe it because of secondary testimony. 
Nay, that the three angles of a triangle are together 
equal to two right-angles, is not a primitive judgment, 
for it needs other truths coming between to carry our 
conviction. But that there is an extended object before 
me when I look at a table or a wall, that I who look at 
these objects exist, and that two marbles added to two 
marbles here will be equal to two marbles added to two 
marbles there,—these are truths that are evident on the 
bare contemplation of the objects, and need no foreign 
facts, or considerations derived from any other quarter, 
to establish them. 
But it may be asked, can we certainly know what 
truths are self-evident? Are we not liable to be de- 
ceived, especially by education and prepossessions ? Have 
not some declared propositions to be self-evident, which 
have afterwards been positively disproved ? The reply 
is, that if we devote our minds earnestly to the object, 
we cannot readily go astray. No doubt, it is possible to 
fall into error in the application of this test, as in the 
application of any other; but this can take place only MARKS AND PECULIARITIES. 
39 
by negligence, by refusing to go round the object to 
which the conviction refers, and to look upon it as it is 
in itself, and in all its aspects. In specifying this test 
as the fundamental one, I do not mean that it can be 
applied without much and careful inspection. It is for- 
tunate that we have a secondary test to determine the 
presence of the primary characteristic. 
2. Necessity is a secondary mark of intuitive truth. I 
am not inclined to fix on this as the original or essen- 
tial characteristic. I shrink from maintaining that a pro- 
position is true because we must believe it. A propo- 
sition is true as being true, and certain propositions are 
seen by us to be self-evidently true. I would not ground 
the evidence on the necessity of belief, but I would as- 
cribe the irresistible nature of the conviction to the self- 
evidence. As the necessity flows from the self-evidence, 
so it may become a test of it, and a test not difficult of 
application. 
When an object or truth is self-evident, necessity 
always attaches to our convictions regarding it. And 
according to the nature of the conviction, so is the ne- 
cessity attached. We shall see that some of the convic- 
tions are of the nature of knowledge, others of the na- 
ture of belief, a third class of the nature of judgments, 
in which we compare objects known or believed in. In 
the first our cognition is necessary, in the second our 
belief is necessary, in the third our judgment is neces- 
sary. I know self as an existing thing: this is a neces- 
sary cognition; I must entertain it, and never can be 
driven from it. That space exceeds my wfidest imagina- 
tion of space: this is a necessary belief, I must believe it. 
That every effect has a cause : this is a necessary judg- 
ment ; I must decide in this way. Wherever there is 
such a conviction, it is a sign of an intuitive perception. 
Necessity too may be employed in a negative form, and 40 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
this is often the most decisive form. If I know imme- 
diately that there is an extended object before me in the 
book which I read, I cannot be made to know that there 
is not an extended object before me. If I must believe 
that time had no beginning, I cannot be made to believe 
that it has had a beginning. Necessitated as I am to 
decide that two parallel lines cannot meet, I cannot be 
made to decide that they can meet. Necessity as a test 
may thus assume two forms, and we may take the one 
best suited to our purpose at the time. In the use of a 
very little care and discernment, this test will settle for 
us as to any given truth, whether it is or is not self- 
evident. 
3. Catholicity may be employed as a tertiary test. By 
catholicity is meant that the conviction is entertained 
by all men, or at least by all men possessed of intelli- 
gence, when the objects are presented. I am not in- 
clined to use this as a primary test. For in the first 
place it is not easy to ascertain, or at least to settle abso- 
lutely, what truths may claim this common consent of 
humanity; and even though this were determined, still it 
might be urged in the second place that this does not 
prove that it is necessary or original, but simply that it 
is a native property,—like the appetite for food among 
all men,—and would still leave it possible for opponents 
to maintain that there may be intelligent beings in other 
worlds who accord no such assent, just as we can conceive 
beings in the other parts of the universe who have no 
craving for meat or drink. But while not inclined to 
use catholicity as a primary test, I think it may come in 
at times as an auxiliary one. For what is in all men, 
may most probably come from what is not only native, 
but necessary; and must also in all probability be self- 
evident, or at least follow very directly from what is self- 
evident. Catholicity, when conjoined with necessity, may MARKS AND PECULIARITIES. 
41 
determine very readily and precisely whether a conviction 
is intuitive. 
Important purposes are served by the combination of 
these two tests: that is, necessity and catholicity. By 
the first we have a personal assurance which can never 
be shaken, and of which no one can deprive us. Though 
the whole world were to declare that we do not exist, 
or that a cruel action is good, we would not give up 
our own personal conviction in favour of their declara- 
tion. By the other principle we have confidence in 
addressing our fellow-men, for we know that there are 
grounds of thought common to them and to us, and to 
these we can appeal in reasoning with them. By the 
one I am enabled, yea, compelled, to hold by my per- 
sonality, and maintain my independence; by the other I 
am made to feel that I am one of a large family, every 
member of which has the same principles of belief as I 
myself have. The one gives me the argument from pri- 
vate judgment, the other the argument from common or 
catholic consent. The concurrence of the two should 
suffice to protect me from scepticism of every kind, whe- 
ther it relate to the world within or the world without, 
whether to physical or moral truths. 
These marks are as clear and as easily applied, and 
are quite as decisive for testing reason in its primary 
or intuitive exercise, as the syllogism is in testing reason 
in its secondary or derivative operation; that is, as infer- 
ence or reasoning. 
Sect. II. Different Aspects of Intuitions, and their 
Theoretical Characters. 
Hitherto we have been approaching onr subject by a 
somewhat winding path, catching glimpses of the posi- 
tion of the building, and of some of its principal turrets. 
We may now walk up directly to it, and take a survey 42 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
of its general form, and ascertain the mode of entering 
it, with the view of afterwards exploring its apartments 
one by one. It will be found to present three sides, 
sides of one fabric, but each with its peculiarities. 
The intuitions may be considered first as laws, rules, 
principles regulating the original action and the primi- 
tive perceptions of the mind. Or secondly, they may be 
regarded as individual perceptions, or convictions mani- 
festing themselves in consciousness. Or thirdly, they 
may be contemplated as abstract notions, or general rules 
elaborated out of the individual exercises. We cannot 
have a distinct or adequate view of our intuitions un- 
less we carefully distinguish these the one from the 
other. The whole of the confusion, and the greater part 
of the errors, which have appeared in the discussions 
about innate ideas and a priori principles, have sprung 
from neglecting these distinctions, or from not carrying 
them out consistently. In each of these sides the in- 
tuitions present distinct characters, and many affirma- 
tions may be properly made of the original principles of 
the mind under one of these aspects, which would by no 
means hold good of the others. 
I. They may be contemplated as Laws, Rules, or 
Principles Guiding the Mind. Hence they have been 
called KOLvdl iTpoXrjfieLs, /coival evvoicu, irpwrai evvoicu, forms 
and regulative principles. Under this aspect 
(1.) They are native. Hence they have been called na- 
tural, innate, connate, implanted, constitutional. All these 
phrases point to the circumstance that they are not ac- 
quired by practice, nor the result of experience, but are 
in the mind naturally, as constituents of its very being, 
and involved in its higher exercises. In this respect 
they are analogous to universal gravitation and chemi- 
cal affinity, which are not produced in bodies as they 
operate, but are in the very nature of bodies, and the MARKS AND PECULIARITIES. 
43 
springs of their action. It is thus—that is, by an original 
property of his being—that man is led to look on body 
as occupying space, on any given effect as having a cause, 
and on certain actions as being morally good or evil. 
(2.) They are reyultaive* They rule the mind in its 
original and primitive energies, both of thought and be- 
lief. They lead the mind, for example, on discovering a 
quality, to connect it with substance; on contemplating 
time, to declare that it cannot have had a beginning; and 
on having a vicious action brought before it, to decide 
that it is deserving of punishment. This characteristic 
is brought before us by the phrases so often applied to 
them,—forms, laws, rules, canons, and principles. They 
lead and guide the deeper mental action, just as the 
chemical and vital properties conduct and control the 
composition of bodies and the organization of plants. It 
is to be carefully noticed that, as regulative principles, 
they are not dependent, in themselves or in their ac- 
tion, on our observation of them; indeed they must be 
guiding the mind before we can observe them ; still less 
are they dependent on the will of the possessor, which 
has merely an indirect control over them, and this only 
by bringing before the cognitive or representative powers 
of the mind the objects which evoke them. 
(3.) They are catholic, or common. That is, they are 
* The phrase Regulative has been used by Kant in Kr. d. r. Ver. 
transcen. Doc. der Urtheilskraft, ch. iii., where he speaks of certain 
principles as being constitutive and others regulative. The distinction 
proceeds on certain Kantian views, and cannot be admitted by any 
natural realist. Sir W. Hamilton has adopted the phrase Regulative 
(‘ Metaphysics,’ Lect. 38), and agrees so far with Kant that he reckons 
many of the regulative principles of the mind, such as those about 
space and time and cause, as guaranteeing no objective reality. The 
phrase is a good one, but in adopting it, care must be taken to dissociate 
it from all the peculiarities of the Kantian and Hamiltonian philosophy. 
The regulative..principles guide the mind so as that it discovers what 
is in things, whereas, according to Kant, they guarantee nothing as to 
things. 44 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
in every human mind. Not that they are in all men as 
formalized principles; under this aspect, as we shall see 
forthwith, they come before the minds of comparatively 
few. Some of them are perhaps not even manifested in 
all minds; certainly some of them are not manifested, 
in their higher forms, in the souls of all. In infants some 
of them have not yet made their appearance, and among 
persons low in the scale of intelligence, they do not come 
out in their loftier exercises; just as the plant does not 
come all at once into full flower,—just as the plant, in 
unfavourable circumstances, may never come into seed 
at all. Still the capacity is there, needing only favourable 
circumstances—that is, the appropriate objects pressed on 
the attention—to foster it into developed forms. Under 
this aspect, the epithets common, catholic, have been ap- 
plied to them; they have been represented as the univer- 
sal attributes of humanity, and as belonging to man as 
man. 
But it is to be specially noticed that in this whole ge- 
neral view of them, they are not before consciousness 
as principles. They do indeed come out into conscious- 
ness, not however as laws, but as individual convictions. 
This negative characteristic has been often referred to 
when they have been spoken of as latent, occult, hiding 
themselves, as roots covered up in the substance of the 
soul, as foundations beneath the ground, as faculties re- 
quiring to be developed, and as evoked into exercise only 
on the occasion of experience. 
II. They may be contemplated as Convictions Mani- 
fested in Consciousness. Hence they are called espe- 
cially intuitions, spontaneous or natural convictions, in- 
nate ideas, and primitive beliefs and judgments. It is 
only under this aspect that we can directly apply to them 
the tests of intuition specified in last Section. Under 
what restriction they apply to our intuitions as regulative MARKS AND PECULIARITIES. 
45 
or as generalized principles may be afterwards pointed 
out. We have already in our survey gathered what are 
some of the characteristics of these our conscious convic- 
tions ; still, what we before enounced will require to be 
formally stated in its proper place alongside of some 
other theoretical characteristics, to be now unfolded. 
(1.) They are perceptions. This feature was caught and 
has been expressed by those who speak of them as percep- 
tions, apperceptions, senses, apprehensions, and who re- 
present them as seeing, looking, regarding, contemplating. 
(2.) They look at objects. Hence they have been re- 
presented as comprising knowledge, cognition, and dis- 
cernment. It is of the greater moment to bring out 
this characteristic, from the circumstance that they have 
often been too much dissociated from objects. In read- 
ing some of the exaggerated accounts of them, the im- 
pression is apt to be left that they are formed by the 
native power of the mind, independent of objects altoge- 
ther ; and even in more guarded statements, the presen- 
tation of objects is spoken of as merely the occasion on 
which they spring up.* In opposition to all this, I 
maintain that they are perceptions of objects, of objects 
themselves or something in objects. Sometimes the ob- 
jects are external to the mind, as when I intuitively look 
on body as extended or on space as having no limits. 
In other cases the objects are within the mind, as when 
I look on self, and discover that it has being and per- 
sonality, or on a certain representation in the mind, say 
of a benevolent action, which I discern to be good. Or the 
intuition may manifest itself in the form of judgments 
or comparisons; but even in such, it is a perception of 
objects as having points of relation. It is the very 
nature of the regulative principles of the mind that they 
* This view is examined infra, Part III. Book I. Chap. II. sect, v., 
Supplementary. 46 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
lead us to look at objects, and to discover what is in 
them. 
(3.) They look at objects as singulars. In this re- 
spect they are analogous to the senses and consciousness, 
and have often been characterized as senses and as con- 
sciousnesses. This peculiarity has already been explained 
in a general way. 
(4.) They are immediate. That is, our minds, in in- 
tuition, gaze directly on the object. Hence they have 
been called feelings,—language which may be allowed if 
meant merely to express that they are analogous to feel- 
ing or touch as it feels or handles an object, but which 
is of a most misleading character if intended to signify 
that they are of the nature of emotions. Under this 
aspect they have been called visions, inspirations, revela- 
tions. Hence too the special name Intuitions applied to 
them, to denote that they see the object as it were face 
to face, and with nothing coming between to aid the 
view on the one hand, or obstruct it on the other. This 
character it is which affords what I have described as 
the primary test, that is, self-evidence. 
In the case of many objects, we cannot look on them 
directly. Thus we who live in the nineteenth century 
cannot be spectators of the events which happened in the 
first century. When dwelling in these islands, we cannot 
gaze on the Himalayas or Andes; we can contemplate 
such objects only indirectly, and through something else 
as a medium. But in every intuition we look at once on 
the corresponding object: it is thus we are conscious 
immediately of self in action; thus that we gaze on body 
as occupying space ; thus that we regard space as un- 
bounded; thus that we regard a certain disposition as 
good or as evil. 
But to prevent misapprehension it is necessary here 
to offer an explanation. When I say that the object ]\IARKS AND PECULIARITIES. 
47 
is present, I do not mean by this that the object must 
be a bodily one, or one external to the mind. The ob- 
ject may quite as frequently be a mental as a material 
one. The object may even be represented, in a loose and 
inaccurate sense, as an absent one. Thus I may pro- 
nounce of an event which happened far away, in India, 
that it must have had a cause, and of a deed of self-sacri- 
fice, done a thousand years ago, that it must have been 
good. But then it is not, properly speaking, to the dis- 
tant event that the intuition looks, but to the representa- 
tion of it in the mind. It is only mediately, through the 
representation, that the intuition can refer to the actual 
occurrence, and this on the supposition that the repre- 
sentation is correct; and if the representation be errone- 
ous, or even mutilated, or imperfect, it cannot be legi- 
timately applied to the event. Correctly speaking, the 
object is always present when the intuition gazes on it; 
it is either a bodily object immediately before the mind, 
or it is a presentation or representation within the mind 
itself. 
(5.) There is a conviction of necessity attached to every 
one of them. Hence they have been described as irresis- 
tible, unavoidable, compelling belief, and not admitting of 
doubt or dispute. We have already had this character 
under our notice, and it may yet come before us in its 
applications, and in regard to the supposed diversity in 
the necessity as attached to different convictions, and 
it is not needful to enter more minutely into its nature 
in this general survey. It should be carefully noticed 
that the necessity attaches itself directly only to our in- 
dividual perceptions. The general formula carries with 
it no such conviction till it is shown that it has been 
correctly formed. There may be legitimate doubts and 
disputes as to many proposed philosophic maxims, as to 
whether they are or are not correct. Still, as will be 48 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
shown, the necessity being in the singulars, goes up into 
the universals on the condition of the universal being pro- 
perly formed. 
(6.) They are original and independent. Hence they 
have been called first, primary, or primitive truths, and 
been described as origins, dp%al, or original principles, 
seeds, roots, and starting-points, and characterized as un- 
derived, independent, self-sufficient. The mind sponta- 
neously starts with such, it sets out from them, and in 
doing so, feels that it has need of no probation or foreign 
support of any kind. 
A large body of our convictions, even of the surest, are 
derived; they are dependent on something else. Thus 
we are dependent for our historical information on the 
testimony of our fellow-men; for our belief in the great 
mysteries opened in the Bible, on the testimony of God; 
for our conviction of the propositions in the Sixth Book 
of Euclid, on the prefixed axioms, and on the propositions 
in the other five books, and generally for the last conclu- 
sion of a chain of reasoning, on all the links which have 
preceded. But in intuition, or, as it may be called, intui- 
tive reason, our conviction hangs on nothing else. That 
the whole, orange or earth, is equal to the sum of its 
several parts, is a truth which depends on no other. 
There may be many asseverations to which we do not 
give our assent till evidence of some kind is furnished. 
There may be true propositions from which we withhold 
our concurrence till they are proven. Very possibly there 
may be inhabitants on that other side of the moon 
which no human eye has seen, but I wait for evidence 
before I give a decision one way or another. It seems 
very certain that there have been volcanoes in the moon, 
but men did not give their credence till traces of eruptive 
formations were discovered by the telescope. But there 
are propositions which do not require proof, even as they MARKS AND PECULIARITIES. 
49 
do not admit of proof, and yet our conviction of them, 
to say the least of it, is as strong as of the truths most 
firmly established by probation. There are some ap- 
prehensions, some propositions, in regard to which the 
mind sees that it needs mediate proof in order to con- 
vince it that they imply a reality or a truth; but there 
are others, in regard to which it sees that they have in 
themselves all that is needful to gain our assent. There 
are some truths for which reason demands support before 
it will give its adhesion to them; there are others, in 
regard to which reason says, that they do not require to 
be borne up by any external evidence. It is not because 
of any defect in the veracity of intuitive truths, that 
they do not admit of probation ; it is rather because of 
the fullness and strength of their veracity. It is, in a 
sense, owing to a deficiency in certain truths, or rather, a 
deficiency in our minds with respect to them, that they 
require something to lean on. Thus it is because of some 
defect or perplexity in the truth (to us), that mathemati- 
cians cannot solve, except approximately, the problem of 
three bodies attracting each other. It is because of the 
self-sufficiency of certain truths, such as that the think- 
ing me exists, and that extended bodies exist, and that 
gratitude is a virtue, it is because our minds are so con- 
stituted as to see them at once, that they require no 
proof; we need no other light in which to see them, 
they shine in their own light. 
But let us properly understand and limit this account 
given of them; when they are said to be independent, it 
does not mean that they are independent of objects: we 
have before seen that our intuitions are perceptions of 
or regarding objects. 
(6.) Some of them are catholic,—that is, in all men. 
Hence they have been described as common ideas and 
notions. We have seen that as regulative powers they 50 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
are in all men, without exception. But all of them do 
not, therefore, come forth in actual energies; many of 
them in their developed and manifested form are the re- 
sult of growth, and some of them seem to lie dormant 
in many minds from the want of proper fostering circum- 
stances. Still, there are some of them, such as the intui- 
tion of self and the intuition of body in space, which 
are formed by all men in their individual and concrete 
form. 
III. They may be contemplated as Notions or Prin- 
ciples FORMED BY ABSTRACTION AND GENERALIZATION. 
Under this aspect they are irpwra naturae judicia, 
a 'priori notions, definitions, maxims, and axioms. 
Thus considered they cannot be represented as com- 
mon or universal in the sense of being in all men. If 
we look to the hundreds of millions of human beings on 
the face of the earth, including infants, children, savages 
and the unreflecting masses, there is but a very small 
minority of the family of man who have ever had such 
notions or maxims before them. Every human being, if 
he sees an object before him, will refuse to give his as- 
sent to the assertion that this object does not exist; but 
how few beyond the limited circle of professed metaphy- 
sicians have ever had consciously before them the princi- 
ple that it is impossible for the same thing to be and 
not to be at the same time. Millions of men, women, 
and children are every hour acting on the intuition of 
causation—are taking food, for example, in the belief that 
it will nourish them, though they never have had the 
principle consciously before them, and know not so much 
as that there is a principle of causation. But under this 
view, 
(1.) The General Maxim is Necessary, on the condition 
of the generalization out of the individual convictions being 
properly formed. It is to be constantly kept in mind, that MARKS AND PECULIARITIES. 
51 
the necessity attaches in the first instance to the singular 
conviction looking to its objects. But the necessity being 
in the individuals, may be made to go up into the general, 
provided the general has been legitimately drawn from 
the individuals. With this proviso, a very important 
one however, the maxim is not only true, it is necessarily 
true, it cannot be otherwise. If any one were to lay 
down the principle that “ everything must have a cause,” 
he would not be announcing a necessary truth; for while 
there is a necessary conviction in every exercise of mind 
regarding causation, he has not seized it properly, nor 
expressed it correctly. But if the maxim that “ every- 
thing which begins to be must have a cause” be, as I 
maintain it is, the proper generalization of the peculiarity 
of the individual conviction, it may be regarded as a ne- 
cessary one. In this respect it differs from the general 
laws of nature reached by observation; as for example, 
that hydrogen chemically combines with oxygen in the 
proportion of one to eight. We cannot, from the bare 
contemplation of hydrogen and oxygen, say that they 
must unite in any particular proportion, or that they 
shall unite at all. The law is reached by the pure obser- 
vation of particular cases, and these, however many, are 
still limited in number; for all the particular cases, that 
is, of the mutual action of hydrogen and oxygen in the 
universe, never can fall under our notice. The law may, 
after all, be a mere modification of a higher and wider law; 
there may be exceptions to it in other worlds ; it is in no 
sense absolutely or universally certain. But on the bare 
contemplation of two given straight lines, I perceive, 
without any succession of trials, that they cannot enclose 
a space. I perceive that this would be true of any 
other two straight lines that could fall under my notice, 
and thus I reach the general maxim that no two straight 
lines can enclose a space, a maxim admitting of excep- 52 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
tions at no time and at no place. In regard to the one 
class of general truths, I have formed a law from a neces- 
sarily limited, out of an indefinite number of cases. In 
regard to the other, our generalizations are of convictions 
in our own mind, each of which carries necessity in it. In 
order to the formation of the latter, we have not to go out 
in search of external instances in the mental or material 
world, nor to number and to weigh such; we have all the 
elements in each of our convictions; and if we generalize 
properly, by what in some cases is an easy, but in others 
a somewhat difficult process, we reach general truths, 
which have the same necessity as the individual convic- 
tions. 
(2.) They are Universal, Immutable, Eternal: only 
however on the same condition as they are necessary, that 
is, on the understanding that the general maxim is duly 
fashioned out of the individual convictions. But here it 
will be necessary to distinguish between two applications 
of the word ‘universal’ which have often been confounded. 
Sometimes a principle is called universal because it is in 
all men or avowed by all men. I have in this treatise 
adopted the word ‘catholic,’ or ‘common,’ to express 
this property of intuition. But when we say a truth is 
universal, we may mean that it is universally true, that 
is, admits of no exceptions, and it is in this latter appli- 
cation I use the word ‘ universal.’ Universality in this 
sense follows from necessity; the maxim which is ne- 
cessarily, must be universally, true.* It is only in this 
* That a truth is accepted by common or catholic consent, and that it 
is without exception, are not the same, though they have often been 
confounded under the one epithet ‘universal.’ Sir W. Hamilton says 
(Note A. p. 754, Reid’s Works), “Necessity and universality may be re- 
garded as coincident; for when a belief is necessary, it is, eo ipso, univer- 
sal ; and that a belief is universal is a certain index that it must be ne- 
cessary (see Leibnitz, ‘Nouveaux Essais,’ lib. i. s. 4).” Hamilton means 
by universality, universality of belief; which also Leibnitz means in the 
passage referred to—the language he uses is, “ consentement universel.” MARKS AND PECULIARITIES. 
53 
meaning that the term can be applied to the maxims 
which express in a general form the law of our intuitive 
convictions. Such maxims admit of exceptions at no 
time and in no place. They are true in our own land, 
but they are true also in other lands; true in our world, 
they are true in all other worlds; true in all ages of time, 
they are equally true through all eternity. Hence they 
have been called expressively unchangeable, imperishable, 
and eternal truths. 
(3.) They are fundamental. Hence they have been 
described as radical, as grounds or foundations, and called 
fundamental laws of thought and belief. They are the 
truths we come to, when we analyze a discussion into 
its elements. We may even set out with them in ar- 
gument or in speculation, provided we have adequately 
generalized them. All demonstrated and derived truths 
will be found, if we pursue them sufficiently far down, 
to be resting on such fundamental truths. In controver- 
sies on profound topics, especially in theology and meta- 
physics, those who engage in them feel themselves ever 
coming down to a ground beneath which they cannot 
get. In searching into the structure of argument, we find, 
But it is surely conceivable (I do not say, actual), that a conviction might 
be necessary to one man and not to all men; and there are in fact beliefs 
in man, which are universal, such as that the sun will rise tomorrow, which 
are not necessary. Kant used ‘universal’ in the sense of ‘true without 
exception,’ and very properly remarks, that the necessity and universality 
belong inseparably to each other, but that sometimes the one and some- 
times the other test admits of the easier or more effective application. 
“ Nothwendigkeit und strenge Allgemeinheit sind also sichere Kenn- 
zeichen einer Erkenntniss a priori, und gehoren auch unzertrennlich zu 
einander. "Weil es aber im Gebrauche derselben bisweilen leichter ist, 
die empirische Beschranktheit derselben, als die Zufalligkeit in den Ur- 
theilen, oder es auch mannigmal einleuchtender ist, die unbeschrankte 
Allgemeinheit, die wir einem TJrtheile beilegen, als die Noth wendigkeit 
desselben zu zeigen, so ist rathsam, sich gedachter beider Kriterien, 
deren jedes fur sich unfelilbar ist, abgesondert zu bedienen” (K. d. r. 
V., Einleit. Auf. 2. Werke, bd. ii. p. 697: Eosenkranz). 54 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
as we follow it from conclusion to premiss, hanging on 
a premiss which is self-supporting. The sceptic is ever 
compelling the philosopher to go down to these depths. 
The dogmatist, in building his structure, is entitled to 
start with them as assumptions,—he must be the more 
careful that what he builds on be really the rock. On 
them other truths may rest, but they themselves rest on 
none. There may ever be an appeal to them, but there 
can never be an appeal from them. 
Now in order to avoid confusion, and the error which 
springs from confusion, it is essential that we go round 
these three sides of this shield of truth, that we read 
what is on each, and carefully distinguish the inscriptions. 
If any one having occasion to employ intuition neglect 
to do this, he will ever be liable to affirm of the intuition 
under one aspect, what is true of it only in another, or 
to turn the wrong side towards the weapons of the as- 
sailant while he keeps the wrong side towards himself. 
When we are required to speak of them distinctively, our 
intuitions under the first aspect may be called native 
laws or regulative principles; under the second aspect, 
native, spontaneous, or necessary convictions; under the 
third aspect, universal truths or formalized maxims. 
As Innate or Regulative Principles they are in all men 
at all ages; but it is wrong to represent them as being 
before the consciousness, as being immediately under our 
notice, as capable of being discovered without abstrac- 
tion or generalization, or observation, or trouble of any 
kind. It is wrong to represent them as ideas in the 
Lockian sense of the term, that is, as apprehensions be- 
fore consciousness. 
As Spontaneous Convictions they are immediately 
under the eye of consciousness, but there they are not 
in the form of philosophic principles, nor can we say of MARKS AND PECULIARITIES. 
55 
every one of them they appear in all men, and from 
their earliest infancy. 
As Universal Truths or General Maxims they are in 
an especial sense philosophic principles, but then as such 
they are known only to comparatively few; they can be 
appealed to in argument only on the condition that their 
law has been gathered by induction, and carefully ex- 
pressed, and while there can be no dispute as to the 
spontaneous convictions, there may be disputes as to 
whether they have been properly generalized.* 
At the same time these are after all only the di- 
verse aspects of one great general fact, and they have 
relations all to each, and each to all. There is first a 
mind with its native capacities, each with its rule of ac- 
tion. In due time these come out into action, .some of 
them at an earlier, and some of them at a later date, on 
the appropriate objects being presented, and the actions 
are before consciousness. As being before consciousness 
we can observe them by reflection, and discover the na- 
ture of the law which has all along been in the mind, and 
in its very constitution. 
Sect. III. Certain Misapprehensions in regard to the 
Character op Intuitive Convictions. 
Looking on the above as the properties and marks of 
the intuitive convictions of the mind, we see that a wrong 
account is often given of them. 
1. It is wrong to represent them as unaccountable 
feelings, as blind instincts, as unreasonable impulses. 
They have nothing whatever of the nature of those feel- 
ings or emotions which raise up excitement within us, 
and attach us to certain objects, and draw us away from 
* In writing this Section, I have kept before me throughout Hamil- 
ton’s famous Note A, and have freely borrowed from it. But Hamilton 
has not distinguished between these Three Aspects of Common Sense. 56 
CHARACTER OE INTUITIONS. 
others. Nor should they be put under the same head 
as the instincts which prompt us to crave for food when 
we are hungry, or which lead the dog to follow his mas- 
ter. In such cases the parties obey an impulse, which 
is not accompanied with knowledge or judgment of any 
kind, whereas in the perceptions of intuition there is 
always knowledge involved, and this the most certain of 
all, immediate knowledge, and in many of them there 
is judgment looking directly on the objects compared. 
So far from being unreasonable, they involve a primary 
exercise of reason superior to all secondary or derivative 
processes, which ever depend on the primary, and are 
often inferior in certainty, and can, in no circumstances, 
rise higher than the fountain from which they have 
flowed. 
2. It is wrong to represent man, so far as he yields 
to these convictions, as being under some sort of stern 
and relentless fatality which compels him to go, without 
yielding him light of any kind. No doubt they con- 
strain him to acknowledge the existence of certain ob- 
jects, and the certainty of special truths; but this, not 
by denying him light, but by affording him the fullest 
conceivable light, such light that he cannot possibly 
mistake the object or wander from the path. No doubt 
he cannot have mediate proof, but it is because he has 
what the faculties which judge of proof declare to be 
vastly higher, immediate evidence, or self-evidence. We 
need no secondary proof, for we have primary, to con- 
vince us that two parallel lines can never meet. Our 
intuitions do not compel us against the reason, but they 
convince us in the highest exercise of reason, and they 
lead us not against, but by the assent of our clearest 
and profoundest intelligence. No man is ever, even in 
his most wayward moods, spontaneously tempted to 
complain because bound to yield to these convictions. MARKS AND PECULIARITIES. 
57 
When he reflects on their nature, he should rejoice be- 
cause such is his constitution that he is led to follow and 
obey them. 
3. It is wrong to represent these self-evident truths as 
being truths merely to the individual, or truths merely to 
man, or beings constituted like man. There are some 
who speak and write as if what is truth to one man 
might not be truth to another man ; as if what is truth 
to mankind might not be truth to other intelligent 
beings.* This account might be correct if the convic- 
tions were borne in upon the mind by a blind natural 
impulse. But what we perceive by an original intuition 
* It is not easy to determine tlie precise philosophy of the Sophists, 
if indeed they had a philosophy. The doctrine of Heraclitus was that 
all is and is not; that while it does come into being, it forthwith ceases 
to be. Protagoras, proceeding on this doctrine, declared, <l>r]ai yap irov 
iravrav xprjpdrav perpov avdpanov eivai, rav pev ovrav, as earl, rav 8e prj 
ovrav, as ovk eanv. This Socrates expounds as meaning ola pev enaara 
epol (paiverai, roiavra pev ecrriv epol, oia 8e cro'i (Plato, Thesetetus, 24: 
Bekker). Aristotle represents Protagoras as maintaining that ra So- 
tcovvra TravTa ecrriv aKrjdrj /cat ra cftaivipeva (TVTetapli. lib. iii. c. 5: Bonitz), 
Again, lib. X. C. 6, this /cat yap itceivos e(j)rj iravrav xpppdrav eivai perpov 
avdpa—ov, ovdev erepov \eyav rj to Sokovv incurra rovro /cat eivai irayias. 
It will be observed that in these accounts there is an interpretation 
put on the language of Protagoras. But there can be no doubt that 
Plato, and Aristotle too, laboured each in his own way to show, in op- 
position to these views, that there was a reality and a truth indepen- 
dent of the individual and of appearance. (See infra, Chap. III.) It is 
an instructive circumstance that the Sensationalist School has reached 
in our day the very position of the Sophists, and regard it as impossible 
to reach independent and necessary truth, if indeed any such truth 
exists. We might expect that such men would seek to justify the 
Sophists, and disparage the high arguments of Plato. Cudworth, speak- 
ing of the theoretical universal propositions in geometry and meta- 
physics, has finely remarked that it is true of every one of them when- 
ever “ it is rightly understood by any particular mind, whatsoever and 
wheresoever it be: the truth of it is no private thing, nor relative to 
that particular mind only, but is aikrjdes KadoXueov, ‘ a catholic and uni- 
versal truth,’ as the Stoics speak, throughout the whole world; nay, it 
would not fail to be a truth throughout infinite worlds, if there were so 
many, to all such minds as would rightly understand it” (Immutable 
Morality, bk. iv. c. v.). 5S 
GIIAIIACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
is a reality or is a truth; we know it to be so, we judge 
it to be so. And it is a reality, a truth, whether others 
know and acknowledge it or no. It is a truth, not merely 
to me or you, but to all men; not only to all men, but 
to all intelligences capable of discovering truths of that 
particular nature. That two lines cannot enclose a 
space, is a truth everywhere, in the planet Mars as well 
as in the planet Earth. That ingratitude is morally evil, 
must hold good in all other worlds, as well as in this 
world of ours, where sin so much abounds. Another 
misapprehension, of a different character, must also be 
rectified. 
4. It is wrong to represent all our intuitive convic- 
tions as being formed within us from our birth. The 
account given of them by some would leave the impres- 
sion on the mind that they must all appear in infancy. 
This is commonly the view taken by those who throw 
ridicule upon them. What can be so preposterous, they 
say, as to suppose that babies are meditating on the in- 
finite from the time they escape from the womb, and 
distinguishing between good and evil before they know 
the right hand from the left ? The account which has 
been given, in these chapters, of our original convictions, 
shows how they may not all appear from our earliest 
years. They are formed, we have seen, on the contem- 
plation of objects presenting themselves from without 
or from within. Some of these objects press themselves, 
I believe, on the notice from the very first action of the 
soul, and the intuitions directed to these are exercised 
with the very first exercises of intelligence. From the 
very dawn of existence the infant must envisage self, 
and body acting on self. But there are other convic- 
tions which cannot be formed till a later date, because 
the objects to which they relate cannot be presented till 
the intelligence is advanced. Thus I believe that the MARKS AND PECULIARITIES. 
59 
conviction of moral good and evil arises on the presen- 
tation of voluntary actions done by intelligent beings, 
and the mind must have made progress before it can 
form such a notion, and look into it to see what is in- 
volved in it. The intuition in regard to the infinite is 
called forth only when we contemplate such objects as 
space and time, or God, and the comprehension of these 
implies a considerable maturity of intelligence. We thus 
see that though all our intuitive convictions are native, 
yet some of them are the result of growth. Some of them 
do not appear in infancy ; some of them appear in chil- 
dren, and among persons low in the scale of understand- 
ing, such as savages, only in a very low and rudimen- 
tary form. All of them are capable of growing with the 
growth of our intelligence, and even with the growth of 
our voluntary and emotional nature. Some of them are 
at one and the same time natural, and the issue of a 
long development—like the flower and the fruit, which 
are in the plant from its embryo, but may not be actu- 
ally formed till there has been a stalk and branches, and 
leaves and buds. 
Sect. IY. Certain Practical Characteristics. 
From the theoretical characters there flow some others 
of a more practical nature. 
1. All men who have had their attention addressed 
to the objects, are in fact led by spontaneous conviction, 
and this, whatever be their professed speculative opi- 
nions. This follows from the circumstance that they are 
self-evident, and that men, all men, must give their as- 
sent to them. The regulative principles being essential 
parts of man’s nature, we find all men under the influ- 
ence of them. Being irresistible, no man can deliver him- 
self from them. They are ever operating spontaneously, 
and that whether men do or do not acknowledge them CO 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
reflexly. In this respect the philosopher and the peasant, 
the dogmatist and the sceptic are at one. The metaphy- 
sician who has detected and formalized the principle, is 
not in a better position than the mechanic who acts on 
the principle without knowing that there is a principle. 
The sceptic who denies the principle is notwithstanding 
convinced of the individual truth when it is pressed upon 
his notice, quite as implicitly as the philosopher who is 
strenuously defending it. 
2. These self-evident truths cannot be set aside by 
any other truth, real or pretended. They could be over- 
thrown only by some truth higher in itself, or carrying 
with it greater weight. But there is no such truth, there 
can be no such truth. There are indeed co-ordinate prin- 
ciples,—all self-evident truths are in respect of veracity 
of equal rank,—but not even on the supposition that 
the one contradicted the other, could we set aside either. 
The result in which such a contradiction should land us, 
is not a selection of one or other, but absolute scepti- 
cism, always along with implicit spontaneous faith in both 
principles. I shall have occasion to show that we are 
not landed in any such lamentable issue, and that all 
attempts to prove that intuitive truths contradict each 
other have lamentably failed. 
It follows that when an apparent contradiction arises 
between what seems a self-evident truth and any other 
supposed truth, we are to examine the evidence which 
we have for both. It is thus that the mathematician 
acts when his demonstrations seem to be contradictory. 
He does not allow himself to imagine that truth can be 
inconsistent; he goes over his demonstrations to find out 
what error he has himself committed. If one funda- 
mental principle seems to be inconsistent with another 
fundamental principle, we are to examine whether both 
are certainly fundamental, and can be shown to be so MARKS AND PECULIARITIES. 
61 
by the proper tests, and in particular whether they have 
been properly generalized and expressed. In all such 
cases it will be found either that one at least of the 
principles is not intuitively certain—indeed neither of 
them may be so; or, as is more common, we may not 
have properly stated the primitive principle, and the 
seeming inconsistency lies not in the principles them- 
selves, but in our expression of them. 
Or, again, the apparent contradiction may lie between 
a primitive principle and a derivative one. In such a 
case it is certain that if what seems a primitive principle 
be truly so, and if we have put it in the proper form, it 
can never be displaced or overthrown by any secondary 
one. For if we follow that derivative principle to its 
foundation, we shall find that it cannot be resting on 
any truth more authoritative than the fundamental one 
which it is now being employed to undermine, while in 
the derivation of it, a number of doubtful elements may 
have entered which must render it by more or fewer de- 
grees less certain than the intuitive truth against which 
it is set. In all such cases we must examine the sup- 
posed first principle, to see that it is a first principle, 
and that it is properly inducted, and review the deri- 
vative principle in order to determine the nature of the 
evidence by which it is supported. By such a sifting 
process the seeming contradiction vV:U in all probability 
disappear; but if it still continue, we are of course shut 
up to the alternative of adhering to the fundamental 
truth, and laying aside the derivative one, as being in- 
ferior in authority and certainty. 62 
CHAPTER II. 
METHOD OF EMPLOYING INTUITIVE PRINCIPLES. 
Sect. I. The Spontaneous and Reflex Use of Intuitive 
Principles. 
From the account which has been given of the Intuitions, 
it appears that they may operate—indeed they are ever 
operating—of their own accord, and without our prompt- 
ing them into exercise by any voluntary act; and it ap- 
pears, too, that we may generalize the individual actings, 
discover the rule of their operation, and then proceed to 
use them in deduction and in speculation. The former 
of these may be called the Spontaneous Action, and the 
latter the Reflex Application of the Intuitions. In their 
spontaneous exercise they are regulating principles, regu- 
lating thought and belief, and operating whether we ob- 
serve them or no. But in this operation our convictions 
all relate to singulars, and so cannot be directly used in 
philosophic speculation. In order to their scientific ap- 
plication, there is need of careful reflex observation and 
generalization. In order to their spontaneous perception 
it is not requisite that their nature should be determined, 
they act best when we look simply at the object and take 
no introspection of them. But to a legitimate applica- 
tion of them in philosophy, it is essential that their exact 
nature, and precise law and rule, be carefully determined. 
It is all-important, in treating of our intuitions, to draw 
such a distinction, for much which may be affirmed of 
them under one of these aspects cannot be affirmed of 
them in the other.* 
* “La raison se developpe de deux manieres, spontaneity et re- G3 
METHOD OF APPLICATION. 
1. The spontaneous must always precede the reflex 
form. We have already noticed the circumstance that 
in the ease of some of them the spontaneous perception 
begins with the earliest exercise of the intelligence, while 
in the case of others, though a preparation is made for 
them from the beginning—just as all the organs of the 
animal may be said to be in the embryo—it is long before 
they come out in open manifestation, and in unfavour- 
able circumstances they may never appear in a fully de- 
veloped form, or in vigorous life. But at whatever time 
they appear spontaneously, the generalized expression 
of them must always be later. We cannot generalize 
them till we have observed them, and we cannot ob- 
serve them till they are in exercise. The reflex use of 
them is a scientific process, and cannot begin in the in- 
dividual or in a nation, till the scientific spirit has been 
engendered. Even in their native form, some of them 
appear only in the mature man and in the fully developed 
mind; in their reflex shape they are found only in indi- 
viduals and in ages and countries addicted to reflection 
or inward observation. Indeed, as the discovery, or even 
the comprehension, of the reflex law implies a special 
bending back of the eye, from which most men shrink, 
the process is one which the great mass of mankind 
never engage in, and which the majority of those who 
engage in it never follow, except for the sustaining of 
some favourite dogma, or the repelling of some proffered 
objection. It must be late in the history of inquiry and 
flexion.”—“ La raison debute par une syntbese ricbe et feconde, mais 
obscure: vient apres F analyse qui eclaircit tout en divisant tout, et qui 
aspire eUe-meme a une syntbese superieure, aussi comprehensive que la 
premiere et plus lumineuse. La spontaneite donne la verite; la re- 
flexion produit la science ; l’une fournit une base large et solide aux 
developpements de l’bumanite; l’autre imprime a ces developpements 
leur forme la plus parfaite.”—“ L’erreur vient de la reflexion.” (Cousin, 
Cours de l’Hist. Pbil. lle serie, t. i. vi. vii.) 64 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
speculation before we can expect to have an expression 
of the laws of the intuitions expounded simply for its 
scientific value, or as a body of scientific truth. 
2. The intuition, in its reflex, abstract, or general form, 
is derived from, and is best tested by, the concrete spon- 
taneous conviction. In order to the formation of the 
definition, maxim, or axiom, we must have objects or 
cases before us, and we must be careful to observe them, 
and note what is involved in them. 
It is a matter of fact that geometry arose out of men- 
suration. Men began by measuring fields and heights, 
and thence proceeded to construct a scientific mode of 
accomplishing what had been done by practical rules, 
and I suspect that the enunciation of axioms and some 
of the more elementary demonstrations, came at a later 
date than practical rules, or even than certain of the more 
advanced propositions. We find, in like manner, that a 
systematized and connected Ethics, proceeding from ori- 
ginal principles, and going on to applications, came later 
in the history of moral philosophy than the practical in- 
junctions of parents, or the moral codes of legislators 
and the laws of religion. There was reasoning, and even 
rules of reasoning, before a regular Logic appeared. Me- 
taphysics has arisen out of the contests of opposing sects, 
or has been interposed as a breakwater against a tide of 
scepticism. 
In all times and circumstances, the most effectual 
means of testing logical, ethical, and metaphysical prin- 
ciple, is by the application of it to actual cases, which 
should be as numerous and varied as possible. It is 
when actual examples are before it that the mind is able 
to appreciate the meaning of the general formulae. It is 
only when it has considered them in their application to 
a number of diversified instances that the mind is in 
circumstances to pronounce them to be probably, or METHOD OF APPLICATION. 
Go 
approximately, or altogether correct.* Without such 
observational testiug, definition, division, arrangement, 
and deduction may have rather a tempting and mislead- 
ing influence. A power of dissection and inference can 
do as little in metaphysical as in physical investigation, 
that is, it is of no value at all, or may be positively inju- 
rious unless it proceed on a previous collation of facts. 
Minds of great logical and critical discernment are apt 
to go further wrong than others who are no philosophers 
at all, by seizing on some mutilated or imperfectly ex- 
pressed principle, and carrying it out fearlessly, according 
to the rules of a rigid deduction. Of all men, those who 
live in the region of high abstractions, which they never 
bring down to realities, are most apt to go astray as in 
snow-drift; and when they do wander, they go faster and 
further wrong than other men. 
At the same time, it is to be observed that the ab- 
straction, or generalization, is not got from an outward 
object or event which may fall under ocular inspection 
or instrumental experiment, but from the operations of a 
mental law, which may be altogether missed by those 
who are exclusively engrossed with the object at which 
the mind is looking when the regulative principle is 
working. Of all men, the ardent sense-observer, or the 
* Kant has laid down a very different maxim, declaring that exam- 
ples only injure the understanding in respect of the correctness and 
precision of the apprehension. Speaking of examples : “ Denn was die 
Richtigkeit und Precision der Yerstandeseinsicht betrifft, so thun sie 
derselben vielmehr gemeiniglich einigen Abbruch, weil sie nur selten 
die Bedingung der Regel adaquat erfiillen (als casus in terminis), und 
iiberdies diejenige Anstrengung des Verstandes oftmals schwachen, 
Regeln im Allgemeinen, und unabhangig von den besonderen Umstan- 
den der Erfahrung, nach ihrer Zulanglichkeit, einzusehen, und sie daher 
zuletzt mehr wie Eormeln, als Gfrundsatze, zu gebrauchen angewohnen ” 
(K. d. r. Yern. Trans. Log., p. 119: Rosen.). This shows that Kant 
had no correct idea of the way in which the general rule is reached. 
The same view is evidently taken by many of the formal logicians of 
our day. 66 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
lively picturer of external images, is the most inclined to 
shrink from reflex inspection, and is the worst fitted to 
propound or to judge of abstract mental principles. 
3. The expression of the abstract or general truth is 
more or less easy, and is likely to be more or less correct, 
according to the simplicity of the objects to which the 
spontaneous conviction is directed. It is evident that 
some of the intuitive principles of the mind are more 
difficult to detect and formalize than others. Those 
which are directed to sensible objects, and simple ob- 
jects, will be found out more easily, and at an earlier 
date, than those which look to more complex or spiritual 
objects. Thus the intuitions regarding space—seen by 
the eye, and readily pictured in the imagination—were 
abstracted, and generalized into geometrical definitions 
and axioms, at an early stage of intellectual culture. It 
is a vastly more difficult task to express accurately, and 
in their ultimate form, the intuitive convictions regard- 
ing such objects as substance, and quality, and the laws 
involved in thought and moral perception. Still the war 
of contending sects, and the assaults of the sceptic, and 
the insidious underminings of the sophist, would compel 
men, at an early date, to evolve some sort of logic, and 
we have the nature of genera and species and definition, 
chalked out by Socrates, the principle of contradiction 
employed by Plato, and the formula of reasoning deter- 
mined, at least approximately, by Aristotle, and, in a 
looser form, even in India, more than two thousand years 
ago.* The practical interest collecting round moral ques- 
tions would also lead to an early enunciation of ethical 
principle, which, however, owing to the innumerable re- 
lations involved in the discharge of duty, would not, at 
an early stage, take a thoroughly fundamental or rigidly 
* See Paper on Indian Logie, by Professor Max Muller, in Appen- 
dix to Thompson’s ‘ Outline of the Laws of Thought.’ METHOD OF APPLICATION. 
07 
exact form. The crude nature of the classification em- 
bodied in the cardinal virtues, is a proof of the difficulty 
of expressing the ultimate laws of morality, or the su- 
preme rule of right and wrong. A similar complexity 
presents itself in all inquiries in which substance and 
force enter as elements, and hence, while attempts will 
be made from the commencement of speculation to ex- 
press first principles in regard to such objects, the rule 
announced will in general combine a mixture of intuitive 
and experiential elements, will be able to serve only a 
provisional purpose, will seldom be more than approxi- 
mately correct, and will require to be rectified by much 
subsequent examination and comparison with concrete 
cases. 
4. In their spontaneous action the intuitions never err, 
properly speaking; but there may be manifold errors 
lurking in their reflex form and application. I have used 
the qualified language that properly speaking they do 
not err in their original impulses ; for even here they may 
carry error with them. They look to a representation 
given them, and this representation may be erroneous, 
and this error will appear in the result. The mind intui- 
tively declares that on a real quality presenting itself, it 
must imply a substance; but what is not truly a quality 
may be represented as a quality, and then it is declared 
that this quality implies a substance. Thus Sir Isaac 
Newton and I)r. S. Clarke represented time and space as 
qualities, (which I regard as a mistake,) and then repre- 
sented reason as guaranteeing that these qualities implied 
a substance in which they inhere, which is God. But 
the error in such cases cannot legitimately be charged on 
the intuition, which is exercised simply in regard to the 
presentation or representation made to it. 
But there is room for innumerable errors creeping into 
the abstract or general enunciation and the scientific ap- 68 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
plication of it. For we may have made a most defective, 
or exaggerated, or totally inaccurate abstraction or gene- 
ralization of the formula out of the individual exercises, or 
we may apply it to cases to which it has no legitimate 
reference. From such causes as these have sprung those 
oversights, exaggerations, and not unfrequently flagrant 
and pernicious errors, which have appeared in every form 
of metaphysical speculation. This is a topic which will 
fall to be resumed in next Section. 
5. The tests of intuitive convictions admit of an ap- 
plication to the abstract and general principle, only so 
far as the abstraction and generalization have been pro- 
perly performed. It is only as applied to singulars, that 
our perceptions can be regarded as intuitive. The tests 
of intuitions, viz. self-evidence, necessity, and catholicity, 
apply directly only to individual convictions. To the 
formalized expression of them, the tests apply only me- 
diately, and on the supposition and condition that the 
formulae are the proper expression of the spontaneous 
convictions. 
It is always possible that the abstraction and the 
generalization have not been correctly executed. In 
some cases, this is no more than barely possible. When- 
ever the object is a very simple one, presenting itself very 
much apart from all other circumstances, there is scarcely 
the possibility of error creeping in. Hence the assur- 
ance which the mind feels in regard to mathematical 
axioms, and the propositions founded on them by steps 
every one of which is intuitive. Even in regard to mathe- 
matics there may be doubts and contests, but it is only 
in more recondite topics, such for instance as those into 
which the idea of infinity enters. But in regard to intui- 
tions which refer to objects which are more complicated, 
that is, which are mixed up with divers other matters 
in our comprehension, there may be difficulties in exactly METHOD OF APPLICATION. 
69 
seizing and expressing the principle, and there may there- 
fore be doubts and disputes as to whether any given ac- 
count of them is correct and adequate. It is self-evi- 
dent as to this particular quality, that it implies a sub- 
stance, but there is much obscurity about the general 
relation of substance and quality. The mind at once 
declares of this given effect that it must have a cause, 
but there may be doubts and difficulties as to the proper 
form in which to put the law of causation. Every man 
is convinced that he is the same person today as he was 
yesterday, but how few have had consciously before them 
the general principle of self and of personality ! 
Sect. II. Sources of Error in Metaphysical 
Speculation. 
All proposed metaphysical principles are attempted 
expressions of the intuitions in the form of a general 
law. Now error may at times spring from the assump- 
tion of a principle which has no existence whatever in 
the human mind. I am persuaded however that the 
errors thus originated are comparatively few, and are 
seldom followed by serious consequences. In regard to 
the assumption of totally imaginary principles, I am con- 
vinced that there have been fewer mistakes in metaphy- 
sical than in physical science. As the intuitions of the 
mind are working in every man’s bosom, it will seldom 
happen that the speculator can set out with a principle 
which has no existence whatever; and should he so ven- 
ture, he would certainly meet with little response. It is 
possible also for error to arise from a chain of erroneous 
deduction from principles which are genuine in them- 
selves and soundly interpreted. The mistakes springing 
from this quarter are likewise, I believe, few and trifling, 
the more so that those who draw such inferences are 
generally men of powerful logical mind, and not likely 70 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
to commit errors in reasoning; and if they did, those who 
have ability to follow them would be sure to detect them. 
By far the most copious source of error in philosophic 
speculation is to be found in the imperfect, or exagger- 
ated, or mutilated expression of principles which really 
have a place in our constitution. In such cases the pre- 
sence of the real metal gives currency to the dross which 
is mixed with it. 
In regard to many of our intuitions, the gathering of 
the common quality out of the concrete and individual 
manifestations is about as subtle a work as the human 
understanding can engage in. This arises from the re- 
condite, the complicated, and fugitive nature of the mental 
states, from which they must be drawn. But from the 
very commencement of speculation and the breaking out 
of discussion, attempts have been made to give a body 
and a form to the native convictions. It is seldom that 
the account is altogether illusory; most commonly there 
is a basis of fact to set off the fiction. But the prin- 
ciple is seen and represented only under one aspect, while 
others are left out of sight. It oft.ens happens that he 
whose intuitions are the strongest and the liveliest is of all 
men the least qualified to examine and generalize them, 
and should he be tempted to embody them in proposi- 
tions, they will be sure to take distorted, perhaps errone- 
ous forms. In all departments of speculation, metaphy- 
sical, ethical, and theological, we meet with persons whose 
faith is strong, whose sentiments are fervent, and whose 
very reason is far-seeing, but whose creed—that is, forma- 
lized doctrine—is extravagant, or even perilously wrong. 
In other cases the conviction, genuine in itself, is put 
forth in a mutilated shape by prejudiced men to support 
a favourite doctrine, or by party men to get rid of a for- 
midable objection. 
The human mind is impelled by an intellectual craving, METHOD OF APPLICATION. 
71 
and by the circumstances in which it is placed, to be ever 
generalizing, and this in respect both of material and 
mental phenomena. But its earliest classes and systems, 
even those of them made for scientific purposes, are com- 
monly of a very crude character. Still, even such genera- 
lizations, though at the best mere approximations, at times 
serve valuable ends in the absence of better and until 
better appear. Such laws as these have been laid down, 
“ Nature abhors a vacuum;” “ Some bodies are naturally 
light, and others heavy“ Combustible bodies are che- 
mically composed of a base with phlogiston combined 
with it“ The organs of the flower are transformed 
leaves.” These were the best general statements which 
scientific inquirers could give at the time of their obser- 
vations. They served to express, if not to explain, cer- 
tain phenomena. Nature’s horror of a vacuum showed 
how water rose in a pump. The doctrine of the na- 
tural heaviness and lightness of bodies seemed to explain 
how stones fell to the earth, while smoke rose in the 
atmosphere. The burning of brimstone was thought to 
be satisfactorily accounted for, when it was said that 
brimstone being composed of sulphurous acid and phlo- 
giston, the combustion consisted in giving out phlogiston. 
The undoubted correspondence between the leaf and the 
stamen suggested the idea that the leaf had been trans- 
formed into a stamen. But modern science, advancing 
in the inductive method, has shown that none of these 
were correct expressions of the real laws of nature. It 
cannot be because of its aversion to a vacuum, that 
water rises in a pump, for if the vacuum extends higher 
than a certain number of feet, the water allows it to 
exist in its emptiness. Smoke rises from the earth, not 
because of its natural levity, but because it is buoyed up 
by the atmosphere. It unfortunately happens that lead, 
after it is burned,—that is, after it has given off, accord- 72 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
ing to the phlogiston theory, one of its ingredients,—is 
found to be heavier than before. Stamens and pistils have 
never been leaves, they are merely after the same model. 
These are examples from physical science. Metaphysical 
science, from the subtle and intertwined nature of the phe- 
nomena, can furnish far more numerous instances. In the 
mental sciences the general statements have commonly a 
genuine fact, but mixed with this there is often an alloy. 
The error may not influence the spontaneous action of the 
primitive principle, but it may tell terribly in the reflex 
application. It may not even exercise any prejudicial 
influence in certain departments of investigation, but in 
other walks it may work endless confusion, or land in 
consequences fitted to sap the very foundations of morality 
and religion. Take the distinction drawn, in some form, by 
most civilized languages, between the head and the heart. 
The distinction embodies a great truth, and when used in 
conversation or popular discourse it can conduct to no evil. 
But it cannot be carried out psychologically. For in each 
a number of very distinct faculties are included. Under 
the phrase ‘ heart,5 in particular, are covered powers with 
wide diversities of function, such as the conscience, the 
emotions, and the will. The question agitated in this 
century, whether religion be an affair of the head or the 
heart, has come to be a hopelessly perplexed one, because 
the offices of the powers embraced under each are di- 
verse, and run into each other; and certain of the posi- 
tions taken up are, to say the least of it, perilous : as when 
it is said that religion resides exclusively in the heart, 
and persons understand that it is a matter of mere emo- 
tion, omitting understanding, will, and conscience, which 
have equally a part to play. Of the same description is 
the distinction between the reason and the understand- 
ing. It points to a reality. There is a distinction between 
reason in its primary, and reason in its secondary or METHOD OF APPLICATION. 
73 
logical exercises, and the mind can rise, always however 
by a process in which the logical understanding is em- 
ployed, to the discovery of universal and necessary truth. 
But each of the divisions, the reason and the understand- 
ing, comprises powers which run into each other. This 
distinction is at the best confusing,* and it is often so 
stated as to imply that the reason, without the use of the 
understanding processes of abstraction and generaliza- 
tion, can rise to the contemplation of the true, the beau- 
tiful, and the good. 
It can be shown that some of the ancient philosophers, 
and Kepler in modern times, had glimpses of a law of 
universal gravitation before the days of Newton, but none 
of these had been able to determine its exact nature 
and rule. Suppose that while science was at this stage, 
some person had affirmed that there was a power of at- 
traction among all bodies, varying inversely not according 
to the square of the distance, but according to the distance : 
he would no doubt have had a truth, and a very important 
one ; but the law thus stated, while it explained in a ge- 
neral way a number of the phenomena, would, when de- 
ductions were drawn from it, have issued in ever accumu- 
lating errors, and this not because no such law existed, 
but because its rule had been improperly apprehended and 
enunciated. Almost all metaphysical errors spring from 
this source, from the improper formalization of principles 
which are real laws of our constitution. When presented 
in this mutilated shape, even truth may lead to hideous 
consequences. It will be shown as we advance that there 
is an intuitive law of cause and effect, but this law has 
not always been correctly enunciated. Suppose it be 
put in this form, that “ Everything must have a cause 
it will issue logically and necessarily in the result that the 
* This distinction is examined, Part III. Book I. Chap. II. sect. v.} 
Supplementary. 74 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
Intelligent Cause of this world must Himself have had 
a cause. This consequence can at once be avoided by a 
proper enunciation of the law of causation. 
We may now see how it is that metaphysicians, when 
they go wrong, go further wrong than others. This 
proceeds from the fundamental nature of metaphysical 
principles : every error here, like a mistake in taking- 
down the datum of an arithmetical or mathematical ques- 
tion, must issue in fearfully magnified error in the results 
reached. This weakness in the foundation must make 
the structure insecure to its topmost pinnacle. The 
tainting of the fountain will go with the stream in all its 
length. Suppose that we set out in ethical discussion, 
with the assumption that virtue is just a far-sighted love 
of pleasure; or in theology, with the dogma that justice 
is a modification of benevolence: it will turn out that 
these principles (which I believe to be wrong) will affect 
the whole superstructure of speculation, and lead those 
who adopt them to take very inadequate views of sin on 
the one hand, and the justice of God on the other. It 
should be added, that an error in the starting principle 
comes out in more exaggerated errors in the issue, in 
very proportion to the rigid consecutiveness of the de- 
duction, and the extent to which it is carried. A 
mistake in the first steps of an arithmetical question, 
may be lessened by some counterbalancing blunder in 
the further calculations. It has often happened that 
philosophers have shrunk from following out their prin- 
ciples to their consequences. Locke in particular has 
often been saved from extreme opinions to which his 
theory led, but from which his sagacity and honesty re- 
coiled, by falling into inconsequences and inconsistencies. 
Powerful logical minds, like Spinoza and Hegel, have, on 
the other hand, boldly avowed the most extravagant doc- 
trines, as being the legitimate result of their gratuitous 
assumptions. METHOD OF APPLICATION. 
75 
There is another circumstance to be taken into ac- 
count by those who would unfold the theory of the meta- 
physician’s extravagancies; he is not restrained as the 
physical investigator is by stubborn facts, nor checked 
as the commercial man is by stern realities, which he 
dare not despise. He has only to mount into a region 
of pure (or rather, I should say, cloudy), speculation to 
find himself in circumstances to cleave his way with- 
out meeting with any felt barrier. At the same time 
one might have reasonably expected, that when such 
speculators as Spinoza, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, felt 
themselves rushing headlong against all acknowledged 
truth, they would have suspected that there was some- 
thing wrong in their assumptions, or in their method. 
Whenever the results reached contradict the senses or 
the established doctrines of physical science, whenever 
they lead to the denial of the distinction between good 
and evil, or the personality of the soul, or of the exist- 
ence, the personality, and continual providence of God, 
it is time to review the process by which they have been 
gained, for they are running counter to truths which 
have too deep a foundation to be moved by doubtful 
speculations. The remark of Bacon as to physical, may 
be applied to metaphysical speculation, that doctrine is 
to be tried by fruits. “ Of all signs there is none more 
certain or worthy than that of the fruits produced; for the 
fruits and effects are sureties and vouchers, as it were, 
for philosophy.” “ In the same manner as we are cau- 
tioned by religion to show our faith by our works, we 
may freely apply the principle to philosophy, and judge 
of it by its works, accounting that to be futile which is 
unproductive, and still more, if instead of grapes and 
olives it yield but the thistles and thorns of dispute and 
contention.” 76 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
Sect. III. Conditions of the Legitimacy of the Appeal 
to Intuitive Principles. 
There is scarcely occasion to lay down any rules as 
to the spontaneous use of the regulative principles of 
the mind. It is of their nature to act, and, like the 
physiological processes of seeing and breathing, they act 
all the better when no notice is taken of them. All that 
is necessary to call them forth is to present the appro- 
priate objects ;—in mathematics, for example, to present 
geometrical figures and quantities, and in moral sub- 
jects to present models and ideals of excellence. Thus 
are they evoked in the first instance, and thus are our 
intellectual and moral intuitions refined, elevated, and 
strengthened. Any other rules fitted to promote their 
right action are of a moral, rather than a speculative 
character. If the motive power of the mind be right, 
if the man be impelled by a love of truth, and swayed 
by a spirit of candour, then the regulative principles, if 
occupied about the proper objects, will of themselves 
perform their proper function. There is truth in the 
common observation that a mind sophisticated by logic 
and confused by metaphysics will often fall into errors 
from which others who follow only good sense and good 
feeling are happily delivered. 
But if persons wish at any time to review their opi- 
nions, or answer objections, or convince others by argu- 
ment, they must employ principles of some kind, and 
these, in the last resort, must conduct to first principles. 
I suppose that if man’s moral nature had been pure, he 
would never have fallen into error; there would have 
been no difference among mankind in regard to ques- 
tions of vital moment, and controversy would have been 
unknown. In such a happy condition, I believe that 
first principles would have been contemplated simply as METHOD OF APPLICATION. 
77 
a matter of intellectual curiosity, and as illustrative of 
the Divine wisdom. It is not necessary to prove that 
man is not placed in such a blessed state of things. It 
is scarcely possible to find three men met together whose 
opinions are at one, even on essential points; to err is 
an inherent weakness of humanity, and some have fallen 
into most pernicious mistakes. Every man needs, in 
consequence, to examine the apprehensions he has formed, 
and the convictions which he has been led to entertain; 
he has to defend what he believes to be truth when it 
is assailed, and he has, in a spirit of love, to endeavour 
to convince others of their errors when these relate to 
matters of great moment for this life or the life to come. 
In this world of ours, the review of impressions and 
opinions, and discussion, are matters of absolute neces- 
sity : but this implies the use of proofs, premisses, tests; 
and if we pursue these sufficiently far (as we must at 
times be constrained to do), we go beyond derivative to 
original principles. But are we allowed to call in a 
supposed fundamental principle when it suits us, or use 
it in the form we please, to justify an opinion to which 
we are determined to adhere at all hazards, or to crush 
our opponent ? As there are logical rules to guard against 
abuse in derivative argument, so there may also be logical 
rules laid down to restrain the appeal to assumable pre- 
misses. 
1. Those who appeal to first truths must be prepared 
to show that they are first truths. In most investiga- 
tions it is not necessary ever to be going down to the 
foundation. In ordinary physical inquiry, for example, 
we may assume such laws as gravitation and chemical 
affinity, without being required to prove them once and 
and again. But in certain discussions, theological and 
philosophical, more especially when the controversy is 
with the doubter or the sceptic, it may be needful to rest 78 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
our first stones on the foundation, —in all such cases we 
must be sure that we have gone down to the rock. We 
must hold ourselves ready to prove, not indeed the truth 
of the first principle,—for this is impossible in the nature 
of things,—but that it is a first principle. We are re- 
quired to show that it is self-evident; and if this be de- 
nied, we may show that we are constrained to believe 
it, and cannot be made to judge or decide the contradic- 
tory of it to be true; and we may confirm all this by 
showing that all men adhere to it. We should not stop 
short of this in the argument which we construct for our 
own conviction. An opponent has a right to insist on 
this in arguing with us on questions which go down to 
the bottom; and we have a right, in arguing with one 
who makes any appeal to primary principles, to demand 
of him to prove that what he is calling in be in fact a 
self-evident and necessary conviction. 
2. Those who employ intuitive principles in demon- 
stration, speculation, or discussion of any kind, must see 
that they accurately express them. This is done in the 
science of geometry, which owes much of its certainty, 
and the satisfaction which the mind feels in contempla- 
ting its truths, to the circumstance that it begins with 
announcing, in the rigid form of axioms, or postulates, 
all that it assumes. We should insist that the same 
be done in all other branches which employ first prin- 
ciples. The canon is, not only that they be enunciated, 
but that their precise rule be enunciated. It often hap- 
pens that in the popular expression of material facts, a 
law is put in a form which gives some information, but 
which may not after all be absolutely correct. People 
often say that mountains draw the clouds, and thus foster 
rain, and this gives a sort of statement of certain facts; 
but the true account is that the cold mountain condenses 
the moisture in the current of air sweeping over it. It METHOD OF APPLICATION. 
79 
is quite right to say that the tides are produced by the 
attraction of the moon, and this explains some of the 
facts; but then it cannot show how there is full tide 
not only on the side of the earth next the moon, but on 
the opposite side. In the expression of the phenomena 
of the mind, there are still more frequent instances of 
statements which are only approximately correct. Thus 
substance has been explained as that which subsists of 
itself, or needs nothing else in order to its existence. 
This account contains a truth, but is expressed in too 
unrestricted a form. Spinoza, proceeding on such a de- 
finition, which had been supplied him by the school of 
Descartes, goes on with a bristling array of forms, and 
much w~ord-quibbling, to demonstrate, that there can 
be only one substance, of which all other things are the 
attributes or modes. We are at once saved from this 
pantheistic consequence by putting the proper limitation 
on the definition. It is quite true that in all discussion, 
theological and moral, philosophic principles are often ap- 
pealed to, and may serve a proper purpose, even when 
not very formally or accurately expressed. This they do 
because the truth contained in the principle happens to 
be applicable. But it might have happened to be other- 
wise. “Every event has a cause:” this is a maxim 
which we are applying in our every-day reasonings and 
observations. But has it no limits ? or is causation of 
the same character in regard to every event ? In par- 
ticular, does causation reign in the will, as it reigns in 
the material universe ? or if it does, is causation in the 
will the same in kind as causation in external nature, 
or as causation in the intelligence? He who uses the 
principle of causation indiscriminately, may, before he is 
aware of it, land himself in the conclusion that man is 
as much the slave of circumstances as every spoke in the 
wheel, or as every link in a chain, which a strong force 80 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
is dragging along. We can save ourselves from such 
consequences only by limiting, modifying, or explaining 
the doctrine of causation. We have already seen that 
our intuition regarding causality may be so stated as to 
land us in an infinite series of causes; we now see that 
it may be so enounced as to undermine the great moral 
doctrine of the essential freedom of the will. We see how 
important it must be to have the nature and the precise 
range of the law clearly and definitely settled. 
The two rules now laid down may seem to some to be 
very hard ones; but they are very necessary ones to 
arrest those confused and confusing controversies which 
abound to such an extent in philosophy, in theology, and 
in other departments of investigation as well. It is al- 
ways indeed to be allowed that our inquiries on most 
subjects may be conducted and terminated satisfactorily 
without our being required to go down to metaphysical 
principles. The farmer, the merchant, the politician, 
and even the physical investigator in most of his walks, 
may come to the right conclusion in regard to the topics 
which they wish to settle, without its being necessary for 
them to determine the nature of mathematical axioms 
or the law of cause and effect; on which, notwithstand- 
ing, some of these calculations regarding the seasons or 
the tides or the movements of the heavenly bodies, or the 
probable actings of men, may after all depend—only, 
however, in the sense of a deep foundation which it is 
not necessary for these parties to examine. But if any 
one will enter on speculations involving radical truth, he 
must be prepared to submit to the conditions on which 
they can be properly conducted. No man is bound to 
be a metaphysician unless he chooses, but if he insist on 
becoming one, he must attend to the rules of the office 
which he takes on himself. Every man is not under a 
moral obligation to throw aside other useful pursuits, and METHOD OF APPLICATION. 
81 
devote himself to answering such speculations as those 
of Spinoza, Berkeley, Hume, Fichte, or Hegel; but if he 
ventures into the arena, he must conform to its rules. 
Every friend of religion is not obliged to write a philo- 
sophic defence of it, and some who have ventured upon 
such a work might have been more profitably employed 
in some less ambitious undertaking, as in defending some 
of the outworks of religion, or illustrating its power by 
their lives ; but those who claim to be philosophers must 
comport themselves as philosophers. It is to be regretted 
that multitudes dabble in metaphysics who have no ca- 
pacity for grappling with its subtle truths ; but the only 
effective mode of curbing this incompetency and quack- 
ery, is by insisting on all those who would enter the 
trade undergoing some sort of scientific apprenticeship 
or process of training. Nor are these restrictions the 
less necessary from the circumstance that not a few of 
those who possess the greatest aversion to metaphysics 
are all the while deep in metaphysics without their know- 
ing it, and certainly without their being prepared to avow 
it, and it is necessary to lay an arrest on such by show- 
ing what the science is, and compelling them if they en- 
ter the country to conform to its laws. 
There are persons who are constrained by the circum- 
stances in which they are placed, or by what they believe 
to be the voice of duty, to discuss fundamental questions. 
There have been persons, even in the lowest walks of 
life, troubled, owing to a peculiar intellectual tempera- 
ment (commonly not of a very healthy character), with 
speculative doubts, which are only to be removed by 
speculative arguments; but, if convinced, it must surely 
be by arguments built on a sure foundation. • Some are 
placed in a position in which they are assailed by the in- 
fidel, and feel that they must meet him in the cause of 
truth and religion. Some, as knowing that they possess 82 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
peculiar gifts, feel themselves called on to defend the 
very citadel of morals or of religion, or to rear a fabric 
of truth compacted from the very base. But if these 
men are not to waste their strength in a war of subtle- 
ties, they must be careful how they begin to build, lest 
what they rear turn out to be crazy and unstable, and a 
source of weakness rather than of strength. Paying at- 
tention to certain restrictions and precautions themselves, 
they will be in a position to insist on wild speculators, 
or the sceptics whom they oppose, conforming themselves 
to these canons ot the logic of metaphysical speculation. 
These then I reckon as the conditions of all argument 
which appeals formally to primary truth, to necessary 
conviction, or common sense. Persons not pretending 
to be philosophers, and discussing none of those topics 
which philosophers alone can discuss, may claim the pri- 
vilege, when a sceptical objection comes in their way, or 
an altogether unbelievable dogma is asserted, of reject- 
ing it at once, on the ground of spontaneous conviction, 
and troubling themselves no more about it. They must 
take care, however, in all -such cases, that what they sup- 
pose to be a native conviction be not a mere preposses- 
sion of education, or prejudice of temper, and if there be 
ground for doubt, there is no help for it but in an appeal 
to the tests of intuitions, and the canons of their legitimate 
use. And as to those who profess to proceed philoso- 
phically, it is incumbent on them that they prove that 
what they assume is an original conviction, and that they 
generalize the spontaneous exercises, and express them in 
rigid formulae. But when it is thus conducted, the ar- 
gument from intuition or common sense is not an argu- 
rnentum ad populmn, and least of all an argument ad- 
dressed to vulgar prejudice. It presupposes a rigid sci- 
entific process, and should not be attempted by any ex- 
cept those who possess the requisite retrospective powers METHOD OF APPLICATION. 
83 
of observation, and have disciplined themselves to the 
rules of the logic of first principles. When conformed 
to the right conditions, it is an argument strictly scien- 
tific, eminently satisfactory within its proper domain, and 
is in an especial sense the philosophical argument. 
Such restrictions as these would, I know full well, lay 
an arrest at once on more than one-half of the metaphy- 
sics of this age, and of every age. This would be felt 
to be a discouragement by certain eager youths, full of 
expectations of the results to be reached by philosophic 
speculation, and by certain older, but not wiser men, 
who have mapped out the whole intellectual globe, and 
would feel troubled at the idea of their distribution be- 
ing disturbed: but in the end there would be no loss; 
for the part remaining after the refining process, would 
be of vastly more worth, and would soon be acknow- 
ledged to be so. 
When speculative philosophy is pursued in the usual 
unrestrained manner, the results reached are of the most 
unsatisfactory character, and at times are felt to be so. 
How often do ardent youths rush into the country opened 
to them, as keenly as the adventurers in the sixteenth 
century set out in search of El Dorado, and after spend- 
ing years, and wasting the strength of manhood, they 
come back with a sense of emptiness and a feeling of 
disappointment! Even those who refuse to abandon the 
hope, and who cling most resolutely to the idea that they 
have discovered genuine gold, are now and again all but 
overwhelmed with a feeling of prostration and bitterness, 
and break out, as the Doctor in £ Faust,’— 
“ I feel it, I have heaped upon my brain 
The gathered treasure of man’s thought in vain.” 
In such there is a weariness, an aching, an ennui of the 
head, which is felt to be as deep, if not so keen, as the 
aching, the ennui of the heart ever is; and yet there may 84 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
coexist with this a determination to continue the fruit- 
less pursuit. Others have had a confession wrung from 
them like that of Jacobi: “ In my younger years it stood 
thus with me in regard to philosophy: I seemed to myself 
to be heir to innumerable riches, and only some unim- 
portant lawsuits and some unmeaning formalities seemed 
to hinder me from taking full possession of my inheri- 
tance. The suits, while pending, grew to be important. 
At last it appeared that I had inherited nothing but 
lawsuits, and that the whole bequest was in insolvent 
hands.” 
Happy are those who advance, or who can return, as 
fresh in spirit and as innocent as when they entered. 
Some, feeling as if no certainty could be reached, or as 
if, after unwinding the folds of the mystery, nothing 
wonderful or worthy has been discovered, have come to 
the settled conclusion that it is vain for them ever after 
to expect to find certainty, to reach felt assurance, or even 
to look for anything worth seeing, and so give them- 
selves up to listlessness and apathy. Wandering till they 
have become bewildered, as if in a deep and gloomy fo- 
rest, they sit down with the intention of never rising; 
or, like persons wearied and worn out in snowdrift, they 
lie down to become benumbed, and are ready to perish 
in cold. Still worse consequences have followed. How 
often does the eager youth rush on till he falls into the 
abyss!— 
“ He eagerly pursues, 
Beyond the realms of dreams, that fleeting shade; 
He overleaps the bounds !” 
Entering into the labyrinth, to survey its wonders, he 
is lost in its numberless passages and its endless wind- 
ings, without being ever able to find his way back to 
the open light and air; nay, how often has it happened 
that the builder of such intricacies has himself been METHOD OF APPLICATION. 
85 
imprisoned and entombed within them. Or, rushing 
eagerly to solve the sphinx riddles which Nature is pro- 
pounding, and unable to find the solution, he must pay 
the awful penalty to that terrible Power, which insists on 
a reply, and crushes those who try and do not suc- 
ceed ! Some have entered, with lively anticipations, this 
temple of mystery, only to come out oppressed with 
doubt, or with the language of scorn and scepticism on 
their lips; they have seen all, they say, been in the very 
Holy of Holies, and found it empty, with no God dwell- 
ing between the Cherubim or uttering his voice in the 
Shechinah. 
“ He dropped his plummet down the broad 
Deep universe, and said, ‘Ho God,’ 
Finding no bottom.” 
Sect. IV. Method of Investigating and Interpreting 
our Intuitions. 
Two questions require to be answered in all meta- 
physical investigation. The one is, What is the nature 
of the intuition itself? and the other, What is the nature 
of the object at which it looks, and for which it is the 
guarantee ? These two inquiries are to be prosecuted 
in one and the same way,—that is, in the method of in- 
duction ; not with sense, but consciousness, as our infor- 
mant. There is really no other manner of determining 
the nature of the intuitional power, its law, rule, and 
manner of operation; nor any other mode of ascertain- 
ing what is the kind of object or truth revealed by that 
power. I know of no shorthand or summary way, by 
logic or cogitation, of settling these two essential ques- 
tions in philosophy. It might have been different if 
man had been conscious of the intuition as an intuition. 
In this case it would only have been needful to look 
within by the internal sense in order to find its nature. 86 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
But just as the law of gravitation is not written on the 
face of the sky so that the eye can see it, so neither is 
the law of causation printed on the soul so that con- 
sciousness can read off the inscription. The one law, 
like the other, is to be ascertained by an investigation 
of its individual acts, and this in a state of things in 
which the action of one property is closely interblended 
with that of another property; necessitating not only 
an observation of facts, but a very patient and discerning 
induction, so that we may catch the rule of the distinct 
agencies. 
The task, so far as the second question is concerned, 
might have been easier if all our intuitions had been con- 
structed so as to discover one and the same kind of truth. 
But as each of the senses is organized to discover its own 
kind of material qualities, so each of the internal percep- 
tions reveals its peculiar object or truth, and in its own 
peculiar manner. As inductive inquiry into the nature 
of perception through the eye will not settle for us what 
is the nature of perception through the touch, so neither 
can an investigation of any one intuition settle for us the 
nature of the apprehension which the others, or any of 
the others, are fitted to furnish. The metaphysician, in 
conducting his delicate inquiries, must go over the in- 
tuitions one by one, asking of each what it has to say of 
itself, and what is the vision which it has to disclose; in 
this respect acting like the divine who has the proper 
respect for revelation, and who does not determine be- 
forehand what the inspired record should say, but reve- 
rently asks, What saith the Scripture? A thousand 
errors have arisen in philosophy from omitting to look at 
our intuitions one by one, and from affirming of all what 
may be true only of some. 
It is the special office of the metaphysician to go to 
our intuitions one by one, and ask, What does it say of 87 
METHOD OF APPLICATION. 
itself? what does it profess to look at and discover? This 
latter is the inquiry which we should make when our aim 
is to discover whether the conviction testifies to the exist- 
ence of an object or truth external to, or independent of, 
the mind perceiving it. To give some examples. What, 
we may ask, is the object attested by the mind when it is 
perceiving through the senses? The answer seems to 
be, an object external to self, extended and movable. In 
this exercise, and in every other intelligent exercise, con- 
sciousness testifies to the existence of a self in intelligent 
exercise. There are other operations in which the mind 
is simply imagining: even in such cases it has a know- 
ledge ; but it has no knowledge of, or belief in, an object 
external to the mind. If I am picturing a griffin, I am 
conscious of self thus engaged, but I have no intuitive 
conviction of the existence of a griffin, independent of 
my thinking of it, as I have of the existence of a pen or 
table when I press my hand upon it. In the interpreta- 
tion of the intuition, it is essential to inquire what, if any, 
is the sort of object to the existence of which it testifies. 
These two are different from yet another, and a third in- 
quiry -. Does, or does not, the intuition speak the truth ? 
Is it not possible that it may deceive us ? I am anxious 
to avoid this question for the present, and defer it till we 
have got an answer to the two prior ones,—What is the 
nature of the intuitions ? and what the precise object 
looked at ?—questions which will be settled as we examine 
the intuitions in order. The question as to what saith 
the intuition, is not the same as the question as to whether 
the intuition should be trusted. It is expedient to de- 
termine precisely what the witness says, before we inquire 
whether he does or does not speak the truth; and so we 
adjourn this last question to the close of our survey. 
In questioning the witness, it will be necessary, when 
a testimony is given in favour of a reality independent 88 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
of the contemplative mind, to determine very precisely 
what is the sort of reality. In particular the question 
should be put, Is the attestation in behalf of an inde- 
pendent thing, or merely of the quality of a thing, or of 
the relation between one thing and another, or what else ? 
For example, self-consciousness seems to testify in behalf 
of self as an individual existence, and sense-perception 
seems to assert of bodily objects that they have a sepa- 
rate being; but when the mind contemplates thinking, 
or solidity, or potency, though it undoubtedly affirms of 
them that they are real, it does not look on them as se- 
parate entities, as this paper or as this book is. The 
mind declares that moral excellence is a reality, and not 
a figment; but it does not attribute the same sort of 
reality to it as it does to the man who possesses moral 
excellence. The mind seems to me to declare that there 
is a reality in space and time, but we may land ourselves 
in innumerable difficulties if we make rash assertions as 
to the kind of reality we give them. Unless we draw 
such distinctions, we may altogether misunderstand the 
testimony given, and then be tempted to charge the 
blunders, which our own hastiness has committed, on our 
mental constitution. And yet these are distinctions which 
are altogether lost sight of by those who juggle with the 
phrases ‘objective’ and ‘subjective.’ Even in our most sub- 
jective exercises, as when the mind is thinking of one of 
its own states, there is always an object known, namely, 
self; and when we say that such a thing has an objec- 
tive existence, we may mean a great many different things 
which should be carefully distinguished.* 
The meaning and importance of these cautions may 
best be comprehended by giving examples of the evil 
which has arisen from neglecting them. Kant laboured 
* On Subjective and Objective, see Part III. Book I. Chap. II. 
sect, v., Supplementary. METHOD OE APPLICATION. 
89 
to determine more critically than had been done before, 
the nature of the mind’s convictions regarding space, 
time, and causation, and he stood up resolutely for their 
reality; but then it was a merely subjective reality—a 
reality in the mind. Time and space are represented 
by him as forms under which we cognize all phenomena 
presented to the senses, and cause and effect is a cate- 
gory under which events are arranged by the under- 
standing. Now, in examining this theory, I start with 
inquiring, What do our native convictions say in regard 
to these subjects ? Are they satisfied when it is said 
that time and space and causation have no existence 
out of the mind? They seem to me, on the contrary, 
to declare that time and space have a reality out of the 
mind, and independent of the mind, quite as much as 
the phenomena which we discover in space and time, 
and that cause and effect have an existence quite as much 
as the events which they connect. No doubt I may 
deny the trustworthiness of my intuitive convictions as 
attesting the existence of external being, but immedi- 
ately after, some one, proceeding a step further in the 
same direction, will deny the trustworthiness of all their 
other testimonies, till we are landed in a scepticism 
which sets aside the reality, subjective as well as ob- 
jective. 
This is an illustration of evil arising from a refusal to 
listen to our convictions. Mistakes have also arisen from 
neglecting the distinctions between the kinds of testi- 
mony. M. Cousin finds fault, very properly, with Kant, 
for not allowing an objective existence to substance and 
causation, and other truths attested by reason. But then 
lie does not institute a patient inquiry into the nature of 
the reality which the mind gives to such things as sub- 
stance and cause and moral good; and he argues as if 
these must have the same sort of reality as the individual 90 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
soul has, or as an individual acting causally has, or as 
a good man has; and he has thus been led to argue 
at once, from our idea of objective substance to God as 
absolute substance, from creature effect to God as the 
Supreme Cause, and from the idea of moral good to the 
existence of a good God,—a mode of argument which I 
cannot but regard as inconclusive and highly unsatisfac- 
tory, the more so as it operates, with other considera- 
tions, to lead him to represent God as a cause which 
must create.* 
By steadily adhering to this method of induction, and 
attending to such cautions, we may surely hope to be 
able to ascertain something as to the original principles 
of the mind, and determine likewise what are the truths 
guaranteed by them: and this, I apprehend, is the main 
work which metaphysics should attempt. 
In regard to systems not built upon inductive psycho- 
logical proof, I confess that to me they are all very much 
alike; they differ only in respect of the intellectual tem- 
perament of the individual constructing them, or the 
influences under which he has been nurtured. The man 
of genius, like Schelling, will create an ingenious theory, 
beautiful as the golden locks of the setting sun ; the man 
of vigorous intellect, like Hegel, will erect a fabric which 
looks as coherent as a palace of ice: but until they can 
* See a summary of liis admirable review of Kant, Prem. Ser. tom. v. 
Ie9. viii. In Prem. Ser. tom. ii. Ie9- vii., viii., xiv., xxii., he labours to 
show that the ideas of the true, the beautiful, the good, imply the 
existence of a God who is the true, the beautiful, the good; and in 
Deux. Ser. tom. i. Ie9. iv., v., that the finite implies the infinite, that the 
effect implies a cause, and the cause an effect. In these last lectures 
he had spoken of God as necessarily creating. In Fragments Philoso- 
pliiques, Aver, de la trois. ed., he withdraws the language ‘ necessity of 
creation,’ as not sufficiently reverent towards the Creator; but he ad- 
heres to the meaning, “ Or en Dieu surtout la force est adequate a la 
substance, et la force divine est toujours en acte ; Dieu est done cssen- 
tiellement actif et createur.” METHOD OF APPLICATION. 
91 
be shown to be founded on the inherent principles of 
the mind, or to be built up of materials thence derived, 
I wrap myself up in philosophic doubt, as not being sure 
whether they may disappear while I am gazing on them. 
Nor am I to be seduced into an admiration of such 
imposing systems by the plea often urged in their behalf, 
that they furnish a gymnasium for the exercise of the 
intellect. I acknowledge that one of the very highest ad- 
vantages of study of every description is to be found in 
the vigour imparted to the mind which pursues it. But 
whatever may have been the difficulty in the days of the 
schoolmen, it is not necessary now to resort to fruitless 
a priori speculation, in order to find an arena in which 
to exercise the intellect. Nay, I am convinced that when 
the research conducts to no solid results, it will weary 
the mind without strengthening it; the effort will be like 
that of one who beateth the air, and activity will always 
be followed by exhaustion, by dissatisfaction, and an un- 
willingness to make further exertion. Labour, it is true, 
is its own reward; but if there be no other reward, there 
will be the want of the needful incentive. The vigour im- 
parted is only one of the incidental effects which follow 
when labour is undertaken in the hope of securing substan- 
tial fruits. Nor is it to be forgotten that these speculations, 
though fruitless of good, are not fruitless of evil. In the 
struggles thus engendered there are other powers of the 
mind tried as well as the understanding; there are often 
sad agonizings of the feelings, of the faith, and indeed of 
the whole soul, which feels as if the foundation on which 
it previously stood had been removed and none other 
supplied, and as if it had in consequence to sink for 
ever ; or as if it were doomed to move for ever onward 
without reaching a termination, while all retreat has been 
cut off behind. In these wrestlings I fear that many 
wounds are inflicted, which continue long to rankle and 92 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
often terminate in something worse than the dissolution 
of the bodily organism, for they end in the loss of faith 
and of peace, in cases in which they do not issue in im- 
morality, in scepticism, or in blasphemy. Any sentiment 
of admiration which might be excited by the display of 
mental power and learning on the part of the speculators, 
is counteracted in my mind by more painful associations 
than the Quaker poet connected with the sound of the 
drum. 
“ I hate that drum’s discordant sound, 
Parading round and round and round; 
To me it talks of ravaged plains, 
And burning towns and ruined swains, 
And mangled limbs and dying groans, 
And widows’ tears and orphans’ moans, 
And all that Misery’s hand bestows 
To fill the catalogue of human woes.” 
These exercises, I suspect, resemble not so much those 
of the gymnasium, as of the ancient gladiatorial shows, 
in which no doubt there were many brilliant feats per- 
formed, but in which also members were mutilated, and 
the heart’s-blood of many a brave man shed. I fear that 
in not a few cases generous and courageous youths have 
entered the lists, to lose in the contest all creed, all re- 
ligious, and in some cases, all moral principle, and with 
these all peace and all stability. 
“ I see before me the gladiator lie, 
He leans upon his hand—his manly brow 
Consents to death, but conquers agony ; 
And his drooped head sinks gradually low: 
And through his side the last drops ebbing slow 
From the big gash, fall heavy one by one, 
Like the first of a thunder-shower. And now 
The arena swims around him—he is gone.” 
Sect. Y. What Explanation can be given of the 
Intuitions of the Mind ? 
As we are about forthwith to ask the Intuitions to METHOD OF APPLICATION. 
93 
give an account of themselves, it may be as well to have 
it settled what sort of information we may expect to 
draw from them. 
Our intuitions are at once the clearest and the dark- 
est objects which the mind can contemplate; constituting 
the intellectual sense by which we get all our original 
knowledge, it is found to be a painful and arduous work 
to turn back the eye upon itself. Truths seen by intui- 
tion shine in their own light, like the luminary of day, 
and any attempt to make them clearer is like “ going out 
with a taper to see the sun,” and yet when we would 
look steadily on them our eye is apt to be blenched. In 
another respect too they are like the sun—they shine the 
brightest when we get the first glance at them, and if we 
continue to gaze, they appear dim and dark to our op- 
pressed vision. And yet it is only by reflexly looking on 
them as they shine, that we can expect to be able to de- 
termine their form and dimensions. 
There are senses in which they cannot, there are senses 
in which they can be explained. 
I. 1. They cannot be explained in the sense of being 
rendered intelligible to any one naturally without them. 
He who is born blind cannot be made to see colours by 
help of a microscope or telescope, nor could the most 
vivid description give him any idea of them. In like 
manner, if there were a human being without the intui- 
tions, he could not be made to understand the objects 
which they reveal: he who does not see them when he 
opens his eyes, will never be enabled to behold them by 
any logical process of explanation or definition. If men 
were without the native capacity of perceiving extension, 
or power of discerning moral good, it would be impossi- 
ble by any description or argument to convey the dim- 
mest idea of them. This is one reason why the subject 
of our original perceptions has been felt to be so very 94 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
mysterious. It is seen that human discussion can do 
nothing in clearing them up, and that if it attempt to 
do so, it is only “ darkening counsel by words without 
knowledge.” But all this dazzling of our eye arises not 
from any darkness enveloping them, but from the very 
brightness of the light in which they shine. 
2. They cannot be explained in the sense of being re- 
solved into simpler elements. In physical science we 
can gain important information regarding many objects, 
by resolving them into their constituents ; even there 
however we come to simple substances which cannot be 
decomposed. In mental science we can explain many 
phenomena by explicating the processes involved in the 
formation of them ; thus, in regard to the perception of 
distance by the eye, we can show what are the original 
endowments of the sense of sight, and what are the ac- 
quisitions of experience ; and in regard to reasoning, we 
can point out the relation of premisses and conclusion. 
But in the process of decomposition we must come to 
simple properties which admit of no analysis. The in- 
tuitive principles of the mind are the simple powers to 
which we owe all our original cognitions : he who would 
attempt to cut these atoms will find the edge of his ana- 
lysis bent back and blunted, as the razor is when it is 
applied to the rock. 
d. They cannot be explained in the sense of being re- 
ferred to higher principles from which they derive their 
authority. Some phenomena, both material and mental, 
can be thus shown to hang on higher truths: the move- 
ments of the planets and of the moon up in the sky, are 
dependent on the law of gravitation, and on the colloca- 
tion of the several bodies. We may lawfully and pro- 
fitably seek out for the authority on which certain of our 
apprehensions or cognitions rest: we may trace the steps, 
for example, by which we are led to believe that Julius METHOD OF APPLICATION. 
95 
Caesar lived, or that Jesus Christ died and rose again, or 
those by which we come to be assured that the square of 
the hypothenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the 
square of the other two sides. But in all such regres- 
sions we must at last come back to something original, 
and having its authority in itself. 
For some things we must have a foundation, but we 
do not seek for a foundation for everything. It wTas the 
idea that everything must lean on something else, which 
led the Indians to place the earth on the back of an ele- 
phant, and to make the elephant stand on a tortoise. 
I use this as a mere illustration. It is quite true that 
most truths known to us stand on other truths. But 
we come at last to truths which stand on nothing else. 
The mind does not feel on this account that the truths 
are less stable: it is convinced as to certain truths that 
they need something else to lean on ; but of certain truths 
it sees that they bear up other truths and yet themselves 
need no support beyond or beneath them; and it sees 
that these are the truths which are the firmest and the 
most secure. He who would go beyond them is going 
further back than the beginning; he who would go fur- 
ther down is trying to get beneath the foundation. 
II. But there are senses in which an account or an 
explanation can be given of them. 
1. Negative definitions may be given of them. The 
knowledge which we have of the objects being in its very 
nature the simplest of all knowledge, we cannot make it 
simpler. But if any one mistakes in regard to the 
objects, and says that they possess qualities which we 
know do not belong them, then we can correct him. We 
can by reason of our intimate knowledge of the objects 
make an indefinite number of negative assertions regard- 
ing them. Thus, we can affirm of self perceiving that it 
is different from the body perceived, of extension that it 96 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
is not the same as consciousness or intelligence, of space 
and time that they can have no bounds, of moral excel- 
lence that it is not the same as the pleasurable, and of 
vice that it is not the same as the painful. These nega- 
tive propositions may be made to face error from what- 
ever quarter it makes its hostile assaults. 
2. Their peculiarity may be brought out by abstrac- 
tion. Not that their nature may be explained to one who 
is not already cognizant of them. But the native cogni- 
zance which the mind has of them is concrete, is mixed. 
Several intuitions are mingled in one act, or our intui- 
tive perceptions are bound up with our derivative or ex- 
periential exercises. As long as our reflex knowledge 
is of this character, it is indistinct and confused, and we 
are ever liable to fall into error when we make affirma- 
tions regarding it; for what we assert of the whole, or of 
every one of the parts, may be true only of some or 
of one of the parts. But by analysis we can make the 
given intuitions stand forth separately to the view, just 
as by experiment in physical science we can separate 
the agencies of nature which usually work in combina- 
tion,—separate, for example, in the exhausted receiver of 
an air-pump, the power which draws a body to the earth 
from the resistance given to it in ordinary circumstances 
by the atmosphere. Looking at it thus, we can distin- 
guish and express its peculiarity. Not that this expres- 
sion could convey any meaning to one without the intui- 
tion, but to one with the intuition the meaning flashes 
immediately on the vision. Naturally, there is never a 
knowledge of not-self without a co-existing knowledge 
of self, but by abstraction we can separate the two and 
look at each by itself; and when we describe the not- 
self as extended or in motion, or the self as conscious 
and intelligent, an apprehension at once starts up in the 
mind corresponding to the object. METHOD OP APPLICATION. 
97 
3. The nature of the object intuitively known can be 
specified. Not indeed that it could be apprehended by 
one Avithout the proper perception, but to one with the 
corresponding intuition its nature can be distinctly stated. 
Thus we can, in intelligent language, describe the ex- 
tension of body as its being contained in space and oc- 
cupying space, and virtue as the approvable quality of 
voluntary actions ol intelligent beings, and the mind at 
once understands what is meant to be affirmed of the 
objects. 
4. We may generalize or classify the intuitions of 
the mind.* Fixing by abstraction on certain common 
qualities, we may then, by generalization, place all those 
possessing them into one class. We may fix on the 
more marked and decided points of resemblance, with 
their implied differences, and this will give us the Grand 
Divisions. We may then divide and subdivide, accord- 
ing to other, and minor, but still important points of 
resemblance and difference, in due ordination and subor- 
dination. In this Treatise we classify the intuitions ac- 
cording to what they look at and discover, as 
I. The True. II. The Good. 
I. The True. 
1. Primitive Cognitions. 2. Primitive Beliefs. 3. Primitive Judgments. 
The justification of this arrangement can be found 
only in its embracing all the phenomena, and of this the 
reader must judge as we proceed with the exposition. 
I speak of our intuitions as looking to the true and 
the good, and the true and the good thus perceived have 
a reality, but this is not to be understood as a reality of 
the same sort as is possessed by individual things, which 
* Locke says truly, that if we include all self-evident propositions, 
principles will be almost infinite (Essay, book ii. cb. vii. s. 10). Hence 
the need of generalizing them. as 
CHARACTER OP INTUITIONS. 
may be true or good. They have a reality, not as indi- 
vidual entities, but as common qualities, which should 
be expressed by a common epithet. But the qualities 
always imply individual objects, in which they inhere. 
And wherever the qualities of knowledge and moral 
excellence are to be found in the creature they are but 
emanations from the Creator. The streams, if we follow 
them, will lead us up to the Fountain. It will be seen 
that our intuitive convictions, whether they relate to the 
true or the good, all conduct us to Him who is emphati- 
cally the True and the Good. 
CHAPTER III. 
(SUPPLEMENTARY.) 
BEIEF CEITICAL REVIEW OF OPINIONS IN REGARD 
TO INTUITIVE TRUTHS. 
I. The Pee-Soceatic Schools oe Geeece.—The Greek phi- 
losophers who flourished in the sixth and fifth centuries before 
Christ, if they did not exactly discuss, did, at least, start the ques- 
tion of man’s native power of intuition. The Ionian School, founded 
by Thales, and continued by Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxago- 
ras, and others, dwelling among material elements, found only the 
mutable and the fleeting; till at length it was laid down systema- 
tically by Heraclitus, that all things were in a state of perpetual 
flux, under the power of an ever-kindling and ever-extinguishing 
fire., Eunning to the opposite extreme, the Eleatic School, of 
which Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Zeno were the most illus- 
trious masters, appealed altogether from sense and 
opinion (Sofa) to reason (Aoyos) ; fixed its attention on the abiding 
nature of things beneath all mutation; dived into profound, but 
over-subtle, and often confused and quibbling disquisitions re- 
garding Being; and ended by making all things so fixed that 
change and motion became impossible. It was in the very midst 
of the collision of these sects that Socrates was reared. Pro- 
fessing to have only a practical aim in view, he yet, in putting CRITICAL REVIEW OF OPINIONS. 
99 
down the opposition to that end, indulged in all the subtlety of a 
Greek intellect, and thus stimulated the dialectic spirit of his 
pupil Plato, who sought to harmonize the fleeting and the fixed. 
II. Plato.—It would be altogether a mistake to suppose, as 
some have done, that Plato is for ever inquiring into the origin of 
ideas in the mind, like the metaphysicians who came after Des- 
cartes and Locke. His aim was of a character loftier and wider, 
but more unattainable by the cogitation of one thinker, or indeed 
by cogitation at all. Nor was it his object to discover the abso- 
lute, as if he had been reared in the schools of Schilling or Hegel. 
His grand aim was to discover the real (to ov) and the abiding, 
amidst the illusions of sense and the mutations of things. And in 
following this end he sought prematurely to determine questions 
which can be settled only by a long course of patient induction, 
carried on by a succession of observers of the world without and 
the world within. But in the search he started many deep views 
of God, of man, and of the world, which have been established by 
the Bible, aud by inductive mental and physical science. 1. He 
everywhere proceeds on the doctrine that man is possessed of a 
power of reason (Adyo?, or roCs, or vorjcns) above sense, or faith, 
or understanding (Sidvoia). 2. This reason contemplates ideas 
(iS«u, or €i8rf) suprasensible, immutable, eternal, which ideas are 
realities. 3. He sees that there is need of a process of thought, 
specially of abstraction, in order to the mind rising to these ideas. 
4. The discovery of these ideas should be the especial aim of the 
philosopher, and the gazing on them the highest exercise of wis- 
dom. But Plato moves above our earth like the sun, with so 
dazzling a light that we feel unable, or unwilling, to look too nar- 
rowly into the exact body of truth which sheds such a lustre. 
1. He has given a wrong account of the reality in these eternal 
ideas, making them the only realities; denying reality to the ob- 
jects of sense, except in so far as they partake of them, and seem- 
ing to make them independent even of the Divine Mind. 2. Under 
the one phase, ‘idea,’ he gathers an aggregate of things which 
require to be distinguished,—such as the true, the beautiful, the 
good, unity and being, natural law and moral law, the forms of 
objects, and even the universals fashioned arbitrarily by the mind. 
By heaping together and confounding all these things which 
should be carefully distinguished, he has given a grandeur to his 
views, but at the expense of clearness and accuracy. 3. He does 
not see that ideas exist naturally in the mind merely in the form 
of laws or rules. To account for them he is obliged to suppose 
that the soul pre-existed, and that the calling up of the ideas is a 100 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
sort of reminiscence. 4. He does not see how the mind reaches 
them in their abstract, general, or philosophic form. He did not 
observe that the mind begins with the knowledge of particular 
objects, and must thence rise by induction to generals. He thus 
laid himself open to the assaults, always acute, often just, at 
times captious, of Aristotle, who saw that the general existed in 
the individuals, and that it was from the singulars that man rose 
to the universals (see Metaph. i. 12.) 5. He attaches an ex- 
travagant value to the contemplation of these ideas in their abstract 
and general form. Overlooking the other purposes served by 
ideas, and their indissoluble connection with singulars,—forgetting 
that philosophy consists in viewing law in relation to its objects,— 
he represents the mind as in its highest exercise when it is gazing 
upon them in their essence, formless and colourless: 'H yap dypw/ca- 
ros T6 /cat <\o")(qfL(LTL(TTO<s Kal oocria dvra)s ovcra i/ojyfjs Kvfiepvrjrr) 
p-ovtp 6earfj j/oj ypiyrar 7repl r/v to 777s aXrjOovs yeVos tovtov 
txet rov T07rov (Phaedrus, 58). He thus prepared the way for the 
extravagancies of the Neoplatonist School of Plotinus and Proclus, 
who reckoned the mind as in its loftiest state when under an 
intuition or ecstasy, which looks on the One and the Good, and 
who found, I believe, the gazing idle and unprofitable enough. 
III. Aristotle.—His views, if not so grand as those of Plato, 
are much more sober and definite. He has specified most of the 
separate characteristics of intuition, but I have not been able to 
find how he reconciles his several statements. 1. He has a power, 
or faculty, called NoSs, which he represents as concerned with the 
principles of thought and being: 'O vofs ecru rrepl rds dpyds rtov 
votjtwv Kal tmv ovTwv (Mag. Mor. i. 35). Elsewhere he shows that 
it cannot be <f>p6vr](Ti<;, nor nor €7710-7777*77, but voCs, which has 
to do with the principles of science: Aewrerat vovv elmt twu apyaii/ 
(Eth. Nic. vi. 6 : ed. Michelet). 2. He fixes on self-evidence 
and independence as tests of what he calls first truths and prin- 
ciples. First truths are those whose credit is not through others, 
but of themselves. *E<rn S’ aXrjOrj pikv Kal TTpOrra 7a 77.77 St’ erepwv 
aXXa St avrwv eyoiaa 7771/ ttUttlv ov Set yap ev rats 
apyats e771(7776 to Sta rt, aXA iKaomjv twv apyajj/ avtyjv Kaff 
iavTr/v etrai 7710-7771/ (Top. i. 1: ed. Waitz). 3. He fixes on necessity 
as a test, and represents the truths as eternal. Thus he speaks 
of necessary principles, and of their being inherent in things: 
Et ovv i(TTLV f] a77oSet/c7iK77 €7710-77777.77 e( amy/catW apytoi/ (o yap c77to-7a7ai, 
ov SvvaTov aAAws cyeti/), to, Sc tea#’ avra virapycnna dvayKola 701s 
Trpayfxaa-Lv, k.t.X. (Anal. Post. i. 6). Ta e( avayiaj's ovra a77X079 atSta, 
iravTa 7a S’ atSta ayevrjTa Kal (Eth. Nic. vi. 3). 4. It is a CRITICAL REVIEW OE OPINIONS. 
101 
favourite maxim with him that everything cannot he proven. He 
says that all science is not demonstrative, that the science of 
things immediate is undemonstrable; for as all demonstration is 
from things prior, we must, at last, arrive at things immediate 
which are not demonstrable : 'H/xetsSe cfiap-ev ovre iraaav eirurrrjp.yv 
dirobeiKTiKyv elvai, aXXa ryv twv dfxecrwv avairobeLKrov- kcu tovO oti avay- 
koIov, cftavepov el yap dvdyK'rj p.ev eiricrraaOaL rd irporepa koI i£j wv y airo- 
bei&g, icrrarai Se 7rore Ta d/ierra, ravr dvairobeiKTa dvdiyKy etvai (Anal. 
Post. i. 3) ; see also i. 22, where he says there must be principles 
of demonstration, rwv on 0,vd.yKy apxas etvat. He speaks 
of science and demonstration carrying us to intuition, voOs (i. 23). 
5. He draws the distinction between twro classes of truths. AVe 
believe all things, either through syllogism or from induction, 
diravra yap marevop.ev y Sta, (xvXXoyurfiov y e£ eiraywyrj<i (Anal. 
Prior, ii. 23). To nature, the syllogism is the prior and the 
more known; but to us, that which is through induction is the 
more palpable1: <E>vcm fiev ovv irporepog kuI yvwpip-wrepog o bid rov 
fiecrov <rvXXoyiap.bg, ypuv S’ evapyearepog 6 bid ryg hraywyyg (ib.). 
In explaining this, he says that he calls ‘ things prior and more 
knowable to us’ those which are nearer to sense, and ‘things 
prior and more knowable simply’ those which are more remote; 
but those things which are universal, belong to the most re- 
mote, and those wPich are singular, to the nearest: Aeyw Se 7rpos 
yp.dg pdev irporepa Kal yvwpLpLwrepa rd eyyvrepov ryg alaOyaewg, airXws 
be irporepa Kal yvwpip.wrepa rd iroppwrepov. earl Se iroppwrdrw [lev 
rd KaOoXov pAXiara, eyyvrdrw Se to. Kaff eKaara ’ ’ (Anal. Post. l. 
2). But the question is started, How does the human mind, 
which must begin with the singulars, as better known to it, 
reach the universal ? He seems to say, in the following pas- 
sage, we reach universal truth through induction: MavOdvop.ev 
y eiraywyfj y ean b’ y pdev Ik twv KaOoXov, y 8’ eira- 
ywyrj iic rwv Kara p.epog. dbvvarov be rd KaOoXov Oewpyaai p.y St’ eira- 
ywyyg- eirel Kal ra e$ acfiaipeaewg Xeyofieva ear at St’ eiraywyyg yvwpifia 
iroielv, otl xnrdpyei e/caorw yevet evia, Kal el p.y yoyncrnx eanv, y TOLOvbl 
eKacrrov. Se p.y ag alaOyaiv dbvvarov. rwv yap KaO 
eKaarov y a ter diverts' ov yap eVSeyerat Xafielv avrwv ryv binary p.yv. 
ovre yap Ik rwv KaOoXov dvev eiraywyyg, ovre St’ eiraywyrjs dvev ryg al- 
aOyaewg (ib. i. 18; cf. Eth. bile. vi. 3). All these are important 
principles. But how does he reconcile them P How in particular 
does he reconcile his doctrine, that universals are gained by induc- 
tion, with his statement as to the mind having a vovg which looks 
at principles? There are passages in his Metaphysics which show 
that such questions had been before his mind. The question is 102 
CHARACTER OE INTUITIONS. 
put whether first principles are universal, or are as singulars of 
things; and the further and most important question, whether 
they subsist in capacity or in energy, that is, whether they exist vir- 
tually or in act: IIoTcpov at dp%al xaBdXov dcrlv rj ws to. xa$ c/cacrra 
twv TTpayfxaTwv, kou 8vvdp,ei rj evepyeta (Metaph. ii. 2.10: ed. Bonitz). 
In another passage he seems to answer, that those things which 
are predicated of individuals are first principles rather than the 
genera, but adds that it would not be easy to express how one 
should conceive these first principles: ’Ek pXv ovv tovtwv pdXXov 
(j)ai'v€Ta.L ta e7ri twv drdpwv Karr]yopovp.€va etvaL TU)V yevwv. 
7rdX.LV 84 7ro>s av Set TavTas viroXafidiv ov paStov ewreij/. For 
this statement he gives reasons, which lead him to the conclusion 
that the universals which are predicated of individuals are princi- 
ples in the ratio of their universality, and that the very highest 
generalizations must be emphatically principles : Trp/ p.lv yap dpxqv 
8el /cat Tyjv air Lav etvat 7rapa to. 7rpayp,ara wv d.pyr}, /cat SvvcurOai etvat 
XWpLt,Opievr)V aVTWV TOLOVTOV 84 TL 7rapd TO KaO' CKaLTTOV CLVCLL 8La TL 
dv rt? v7roXdj3oL, 7r\rjv on KaOoXov KarqyopeLTaL /cat Kara 7ravrwv; 
dXXd pLTjv, et 8La tovto, to. pdXXov KaOoXov p.d\\ov OtTeov 
wcttc dpyat ra rrpwT dv dhqaav yevr] (ii. 3. 15). There are points 
of connection not brought out in this statement. But we are 
not rashly to charge Aristotle with an inconsistency. I believe 
that his statement as to first truths and syllogism, and his state- 
ment as to the universality of induction, are both true. But he 
has not drawn the distinction between first principles as forms in 
the mind, and as individual convictions, and as laws got by in- 
duction ; nor has he seen how the self-evidence and necessity, being 
in the singulars, goes up into the universals when (but only when) 
the induction is properly formed. 
IV. Descartes seized on a large body of important truth in 
regard to innate ideas. 1. Tie saw that they were of the nature 
of powers or faculties ready to operate, but needing to be called 
forth. “ Lorsque je dis que quelque idee est nee avec nous, ou 
qu’elle est naturellement empreinte en nos arnes, je n’entends pas 
qu’elle se presente toujours a notre pensee, car ainsi il n’y en 
aurait aucune ; mais j’entends seulement que nous avons en nous- 
memes la faculte de la produire ” (Trois Objec. Bep. Obj. 10). See 
other passages to the same effect, quoted by Mr. AVitch, Trans, of 
Med., etc., pp. 207-208. 2. He had a glimpse, but confused, of 
the test of self-evidence, which he unhappily represents as clear- 
ness. “ Toutes les choses que nous concevons clairement et dis- 
tinctement sont vraies de la faqon dont nous les concevons ” (Med. 
Abrege). He thus explains clearness and distinctness: “J’ap- CRITICAL REVIEW OE OPINIONS. 
103 
pelle claire celle qui est presente et manifeste a un esprit attentif; 
de meme que nous disons voir clairement les objets, lorsqu’etant 
presents a nos yeux ils agissent assez fort sur eux, et qu’ils sont 
disposes a les regarder; et distincte, celle qui est tellement precise 
et differente de toutes les autres, qu’elle ne comprend en soi que 
ce qui paroit nianifestement a celui qui la considere coniine il 
faut” (Prin. Phil. i. 45). 3. He sees that they assume the shape 
of common notions. 4. These are represented as eternal truths 
of intelligence. “ Lorsque nous pensons 'qu’ou ne sauroit laire 
quelque chose de rien, nous ne croyons point que cette proposition 
soit une chose qui existe ou la propriete de quelque chose, mais 
nous la prenons pour une certaine verite eternelle qui a son siege 
en notre pensee, et que l’on nomme une notion commune ou une 
rnaxime ; tout de meme quand on dit qu’il est impossible qu’une 
meme chose soit et ne soit pas en meme temps, que ce qui a ete 
fait ne peut n’etre pas fait, que celui qui pense ne peut manquer 
d’etre ou d’exister pendant qu’il pense, et quantite d’autres sem- 
blables, ce sont seulement des verites, et non pas des choses qui 
soient hors de notre pensee, et il y en a un si grand nombre de telles 
qu’il seroit malaise de les denombrer” (Prin. Phil. i. 49). 5. He 
discovers that they come forth into consciousness; hence he calls 
them innate ideas, and defines idea: “ Cette forme de chacune de 
nos pensees par la perception immediate de laquelle nous avons 
connaissance de ces memes pensees” (Rep. aux Deux Object.). 
But there is confusion throughout, in the view which he takes and 
in his mode of expression. 1. He gives no account of the relation 
between the faculty on the one hand, and the idea or common 
notion on the other. He does not see that abstraction and gene- 
ralization are necessary in order to reach the abstract and general 
idea. 2. The test of self-evidence is not well expressed; in this 
respect he is inferior to Locke. The clearness and distinctness of 
an idea is, to say the least of it, a very ambiguous phrase, for in 
some senses of the word we may have a very clear idea of an ima- 
ginary object, or a distinct idea of a falsehood. 3. That there is 
confusion in his view is evident from the circumstance that he 
often states that these truths are not equally admitted by all, be- 
cause they are opposed to the prejudices of some. He speaks of 
persons “ qui ont imprime de longue main des opinions en leur 
creance, qui etaient contraires a quelques-unes de ces verites ” 
(Prin. i. 50). 4. He expects far too much from a bare contem- 
plation of the principles or causes of things. “ Mais l’ordre que 
j’ai tenu en ceci a ete tel: premierement, j’ai tache de trouver en 
general les principes ou premieres causes de tout ce qui est ou 104 
CHARACTER OE INTUITIONS. 
qui peut etre dans le monde, sans rien considerer pour cet efiet 
que Dieu seul qui l’a cree, ni les tirer d’ailleurs que de certaines 
semences de verites qui sont naturellement en nos ames. Apres 
cela, j’ai examine quels etaient les premiers et les plus ordinaires 
effefcs qu’on pouvait deduire de ces causes; et il me semble que par 
la j’ai trouve des cieux, des astres, une terre, et meme sur la terre 
de 1’eau, de l’air, etc.” (Meth. P. vi.). 
Y. Locke has, in his account of the Human Understanding, both 
a sensational or rather an experiential element, and a rational 
element. Eagerly bent on establishing his favourite position that 
all our ideas are derived from sensation and reflection, he has not 
blended these elements very successfully, nor been at much pains 
to show their consistency. In Prance they took the sensational 
element, and overlooked the other. The Arians and Socinians ot 
Britain seized eagerly on the rational element. In his unmeasured 
condemnation of innate ideas in the Pirst Book of his Essay, he 
seems to deny truths which he openly defends or incidentally 
allows in other parts of the work. 1. He gives a high place to 
reason. Thus, in replying to Stilliugfleet, he says:—“Reason, as 
standing for true and clear principles, and also as standing for 
clear and fair deductions from those principles, I have not wholly 
omitted; as is manifest from what I have said of self-evident pro- 
positions, intuitive knowledge, and demonstration, in other parts 
of my Essay.” Speaking of self-evident propositions :—“ Whe- 
ther they come in view of the mind earlier or later, this is true 
of them, that they are all known by their native evidence, are 
wholly independent, receive no light, nor are capable ol any proof 
one from another ” (see Rogers’s Essays, Locke, p. 47). 2. He 
gives an important place to intuition. 3. He fixes on self-evi- 
dence as the mark of intuition. “ Sometimes the mind perceives 
the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by them- 
selves, without the intervention of any other; and this I think we 
may call intuitive knowledge. Prom this the mind is at no pains 
of proving or examining, but perceives the truth, as the eye doth 
light, only by being directed towards it.” “This kind of know- 
ledge is the clearest and most certain that human frailty is capable 
of. This part of knowledge is irresistible, and, like bright sunshine, 
forces itself immediately to be perceived as soon as ever the mind 
turns its view that way, and leaves no room for hesitation, doubt, 
or examination, but the mind is presently filled with the clear 
light of it.” “ He that demands a greater certainty than this, 
demands he knows not what, and shows only that he has a mind 
to be a sceptic without being able to be so” (Essay, bk. iv. ch. CRITICAL REVIEW OE OPINIONS. 
105 
ii. sect. 1; see also book iv. chap. xvii. sect. 4). Among truths 
known intuitively, “ we have an intuitive knowledge of our own 
existence ” (bk. iv. ch. iii. sect. 21) ; and “ man knowrs by an 
intuitive certainty that bare nothing can no more produce any 
real Being than it can be equal to two right-angles ” (bk. iv. ch. 
x. sect. 3). 4. He is obliged at times to appeal to necessity of 
conception. Thus, in arguing with Stillingfleet:—“ The idea of 
beginning to be, is necessarily connected with the idea of some 
operation ; and the idea of operation with the idea of something 
operating, which we call a cause.” “ The idea of a right-angled 
triangle necessarily carries with it an equality of its angles to two 
right ones; nor can we conceive this relation, this connection of 
these two ideas, to be possibly mutable ” (Essay, bk. iv. ch. iii. 
sect. 29). He speaks of certain and universal knowledge as having 
“necessary connection,” “ necessary co-existence,” “necessary de- 
pendence” (see Webb on the Intellectualism of Locke, P. iii.) 
5. He sees that intuitive general maxims are all derived from 
particulars. This follows from his general maxim that the mind 
begins with particulars. “ The ideas first in the mind, ’tis evident, 
are those of particular things, from which by slow degrees the 
understanding proceeds to some few general ones ” (bk. iv. ch. vii. 
sect. 9). “In particulars our knowledge begins, and so spreads 
itself by degrees to generals” (bk. iv. ch. vii. sect. 11). Follow- 
ing out this view, he speaks of the general propositions being 
“ not innate but collected from a preceding acquaintance and re- 
flection on particular instances. These wdien observing men have 
made them, unobserving men when they are proposed to them 
cannot refuse their assent to” (bk. i. ch. ii. sect. 21). G. He 
saw clearly—what Kant never saw—that the mind rises to uni- 
versal propositions by looking at things, and the nature of things. 
“ Had they examined the ways whereby men come to the know- 
ledge of many universal truths, they would have found them to 
result in the minds of men from the being of things themselves 
when duly considered, and that they were discovered by the appli- 
cation of those faculties which were fitted by nature to receive and 
judge of them when duly employed about them (bk. i. ch. iv. 
sect. 25). 
But, on the other hand, Locke has omitted or controverted cer- 
tain great truths. 1. He imagines that when he has disproved 
innate ideas in the sense of phantasms, and general notions, he has 
therefore disproved them in every sense. 2. He does not see that 
the intuition which he acknowledges, must have a rule, law, or 
principle, which may be described as innate, inasmuch as it is in 106 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
the mind prior to all experience. 3. Misled by his theory of the 
mind looking at ideas and not at things, he represents intui- 
tion as concerned solely with the comparison of ideas. This 
was noticed by the Bishop of , in a letter dated Johns- 
toun, October 2G, 1G97, to Locke’s friend, Mr. Molyneux:—“ To 
me it seems that, according to Mr. Locke, I cannot be said to 
know anything except there be two ideas in my mind, and all 
the knowledge I have must be concerning the relation these two 
ideas have to one another, and that I can be certain of nothing 
else, which in my opinion excludes all certainty of sense and of 
single ideas, all certainty of consciousness, such as willing, con- 
ceiving, believing, knowing, etc., and, as he confesses, all certainty 
of faith, and, lastly, all certainty of remembrance of which I have 
formerly demonstrated as soon as I have forgot or do not actually 
think of the demonstration” (Letters between Locke and Moly- 
neux). Reid refers to Locke’s notion that belief or knowledge 
consists in a perception of the agreement or disagreement of 
ideas, and characterizes it “ as one of the main pillars of modern 
scepticism.” “I say a sensation exists, and I think I under- 
stand clearly what I mean. But you want to make the thing 
clearei’, and for that end tell me that there is an agreement be- 
tween the idea of that sensation and the idea of existence. To 
speak freely, this conveys to me no light, but darkness. I can 
conceive no otherwise of it than as an odd and obscure circumlo- 
cution. I conclude then that the belief which, accompanies sensa- 
tion and memory is a simple act of the mind which cannot be 
defined” (Works, p. 107). 4. He does not see the peculiar nature 
of intuitive maxims. He perceives that they are got by general- 
ization—the great truth overlooked by the special supporters of 
innate ideas; but he fails to observe that they are the general- 
ization of primitive cognitions and truths, which cany with them 
self-evidence and necessity. 
VL Leibnitz had profound but, in some respects, extravagant 
views of necessary truths. 1. He sees that they have a place in 
the mind, as habitudes, dispositions, aptitudes, faculties. “ Les 
connaissances ou les verites, en tant qu’elles sont en nous, quand 
meme on n’y pense point, sont des habitudes ou des dispositions ” 
(Nouv. Essais, Opera, p. 213: ed. Erdmann). At the same place 
he calls them * aptitudes.' “ Lorsqu’on dit que les notions innees 
sont implicitement dans l’esprit, cela doit signifier seulement, 
qu’il a la faculte de les connaitre” (p. 212). 2. “Leibnitz has 
the honour of first explicitly enouncing the criterion of necessity, 
and Kant of first fully applying it to the phenomena. In nothing CRITICAL REVIEW OF OPINIONS. 
107 
has Kant been more successful than in this under consideration.” 
So says Hamilton (Eeid’s Works, p. 323). The remark seems cor- 
rect ; hut it should be added that Aristotle, as has been shown, ex- 
pressly fixed on necessity, while others appealed to it; even Locke 
speaks of knowledge as “ irresistible,” and of “necessary relations.” 
Leibnitz draws more decidedly than had been done before, the 
distinction between necessary and eternal truths and truths of 
experience (p. 209). 3. Because of the natural faculty and “ pre- 
formation,” the ideas tend to come into consciousness in a special 
form. “ II y a toujours une disposition particuliere a Taction, et 
a une action plutot qu’a Tautre ” (p. 223). He illustrates this by 
supposing that in the marble there might be veins which marked 
out a particular figure, say that of Hercules preferably to others. 
“ Mais s’il y avoit des veines dans la pierre, qui marquassent la figure 
d’Hercule preferablement a d’autres figures, cette pierre y seroit 
plus determinee, et Hercule y seroit comme inne en quelque 
(p. 196). 4. He represents the intellect itself as a source 
of ideas. To the maxim “ Niliil est in intellectu quod non fuerit 
in sensu,” he adds, “ nisi ipse intellectus.” The expression is not 
very explicit. He explains it:—“ Or Tame renferme l’etre, la sub- 
stance, Tun, le meme, la cause, la perception, le raisonnement, et 
quantite d’autres notions.” But he is surely wrong in identifying 
these with Locke’s ideas of reflection (p. 223). 5. He sees that 
there is need of more than spontaneity, that there is need of 
some intellectual process, in order to discover the general truth. 
“ Les maximes innees ne paroissent que par l’attention qu’on leur 
donne ” (p. 213). But,—1. He separates necessary truth from 
things, and making them altogether mental, he led the way to 
that subjective tendency which was carried so far by Kant. 2. He 
does not distinguish between the necessary principle as a disposi- 
tion unconsciously in the mind, and a general maxim discovered by 
a process. 3. He does not see that the general maxim is reached 
by generalizing the individual necessary truths. 
VII. Buffier’s principal treatise is on ‘ Premieres Verites.’ 
He saw:—1. That there was in the mind an original law, which 
he characterizes as a 1 disposition.’ 2. He speaks of it as coming 
forth in common and uniform judgments among all men or the 
greater part. 3. He sees that it does not thus come forth till 
mature age, and till men come to the use of reason. These three 
points are all brought out in the following sentence. “ J’entends 
ici par le Sens Commen, la disposition que la nature a mise dans 
tous les hommes, ou manifestement dans la plupart d’entre eux, 
pour leur faire porter, quand ils ont atteint l’usage de la raison, 108 
CHARACTER OI INTUITIONS. 
un jugement commun et uniforme sur des objets differents du sen- 
timent intime de leur propre perception : jugement qui n’est point 
la consequence d’aucun principe anterieur” (p. i. c. v.). 4. He 
specifies several important practical characteristics of first truths. 
“ (1.) Le premier de ces caracteres est qu’elles soient si claires, que 
quand on entreprend de les prouver ou de les attaquer, on ne le 
puisse faire que par des propositions qui manifestement ne sont ni 
plus claires ni plus certaines. (2.) D’etre si universellement re- 
9ues parmi les homines en tout temps, en tous lieux, et par toutes 
sortes d’esprits, que ceux qui les attaquent se trouvent, dans le 
genre humain, etre manifestement moins d’un centre cent, ou 
meme contremille. (3.) D’etre si fortement imprimees dans nous, 
que nous y conformions notre conduite, malgre les raffinements de 
ceux qui imaginent des opinions contraires, et qui eux-memes 
agissent conformement, non a leurs opinions imaginees, mais aux 
premieres verites universellement (p. i. c. vii.). It does 
not appear however that (1) he fixed explicitly on their deeper 
qualities of self-evidence and necessity, nor (2) showed the rela- 
tion between their individual and general form. 
VII. Reid’s great merit lies in establishing certain principles 
of Common Sense, such as those of substance and quality, cause 
and effect, and moral good, as against the scepticism of Hume. 
He does not profess to give an exhaustive account of these prin- 
ciples, nor to enter minutely into their distinctive character and 
mode of operation, but in conducting his proper work, he has 
mentioned nearly all their distinctive qualities. 1. He represents 
them as being in the nature of man: thus he speaks of “ an origi- 
nal principle of our constitution” (p. 121), and calls them “original 
and natural judgments,” as “part of that furniture which Nature 
hath given to the human understanding,” as “ the inspiration of 
the Almighty” and “a part of our constitution ” (p. 209, Works : 
Hamilton’s edition). 2. He represents the mind as having a 
sense or perception of them; and on the one hand avoids the 
error of Locke, who regards intuition as concerned solely with a 
comparison of ideas, and he does not on the other hand fall into 
that of Kant, who looks on them as mere forms in the mind. 3. 
He follows Locke in fixing on self-evidence as a decisive test. 
“ We ascribe to reason two offices, or two degrees. The first is 
to judge of things self-evident; the second, to draw conclusions 
that are not self-evident from those that are. The first of these 
is the province, and the sole province, of common sense, and there- 
fore it coincides with reason in its whole extent, and is only an- 
other name for one branch or one degree of reason ” (p. 425 : see CRITICAL REVIEW OF OPINIONS 
109 
also p. 422). 4. He specifics necessity as a mark. “ By the con- 
stitution of our nature we are under a necessity of assent to 
them” (p. 130). He speaks of a certain truth u being a necessary 
truth, and therefore no object of sense.” “ It is not that things 
which begin to exist commonly have a cause, or even that they al- 
ways in fact have a cause, but that they must have a cause and 
cannot begin to exist without a cause” (p. 455: see also pp. 521, 
456). Yet he has not a steady apprehension of necessity as a 
test, for he says:—“ I resolve for my own part always to pay a great 
regard to the dictates of common sense, and not to depart from 
them without absolute necessity” (p. 113), as if necessity did not 
preclude our departing from them. 5. He characterizes them as 
universal; thus he appeals to the “ universal consent of mankind ; 
not of philosophers only, but of the rude and unlearned vulgar” 
(p. 456). 
His positive errors on this subject are not many, but he has 
not seen the full truth, and he has fallen into several oversights. 
1. By neglecting a rigid use of tests, he has described some truths 
as first principles, into which there enters an experiential element. 
Thus, for example, “ that there is life and intelligence in our fellow- 
men,” “that certain features of the countenance, sounds of the 
voice, and gestures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and dis- 
positions of the mind” (p. 448), and that “there is a certain re- 
gard due to human testimony in matters of fact, and even to hu- 
man authority in matters of opinion” (450) ; and “that in the 
phenomena of Nature, what is to be will probably be like to what 
has been in similar circumstances” (451). A rigid application of 
the tests of self-evidence and necessity, would have shown that 
these were not first principles. 2. He is not careful to distin- 
guish between the Spontaneous and Reflex use of common sense. 
He uses legitimately the argument from common sense against 
Hume, but in philosophy we must use the reflex principle care- 
fully expressed, whereas Reid often appeals in a loose way to the 
spontaneous conviction. And here I may take the opportunity of 
stating my conviction (and this notwithstanding Sir W. Hamilton’s 
defence of it in Note A) that the phrase ‘ common-sense ’ is an 
unfortunate, because a loose and ambiguous one. Common sense 
(besides its use by Aristotle, see Hamilton’s Note A) has two 
meanings in ordinary discourse. It may signify, first, that unac- 
quired, unbought, untaught sagacity, which certain men have by 
nature, and which other men never could acquire, even though 
they were subjected to the process mentioned by Solomon (Prov. 
xxvii. 22), and brayed in a mortar. Or it may signify the commu- 110 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
nis sensus, or the perceptions and judgments which are common 
to all men. It is only in this latter sense that the argument from 
common sense is a philosophic one ; that is, only on the condition 
that the appeal be to convictions which are in all men ; and fur- 
ther, that there has been a systematic exposition of them. Keid 
did make a most legitimate use of the argument from common 
sense, appealing to convictions in all men, and bringing out to view, 
and expressing with greater or less accuracy, the principles in- 
volved in these convictions. But then he has also taken advantage 
of the first meaning of the phrase; he represents the strength of 
these original judgments as good sense (p. 209) : he appeals from 
philosophy to common sense; and in order to counteract the im- 
pression left by the high intellectual abilities of Hume, he showed 
that those who opposed Hume were not such fools after all, but 
had the good sense and shrewdness of mankind on their side 
(see p. 127, etc., with foot-notes of Hamilton). This has led 
many to suppose that the argument of Beid and Beattie is alto- 
gether an address to the vulgar. In this way, what seemed at the 
time a very dexterous use of a two-edged sword, has turned 
against those who employed it, and injustice has been done to the 
Scottish School of philosophers, who do make a proper use of the 
argument from common sense. 3. He does not see how to recon- 
cile the doctrine (of Locke) that all maxims appear in conscious- 
ness as particulars, with his own doctrine of there being principles 
in the constitution of the mind, and there coming forth in general 
propositions. 
IX. Kant has, next to Locke, exercised the greatest influence 
on modem speculation. As a general rule, the one dwells upon 
and magnifies the truths which the other overlooks. Kant is a 
reaction against Locke. He carries out, in his own logical way, 
certain principles which had grown up in the schools of Descartes, 
Leibnitz, and "Wolf. 1. He sees more clearly, and explains more 
fully than ever had been done before, that the a priori principles 
are in the mind in the character of forms, or rules, prior to their 
being called forth or exercised. Thus, speaking of our intuition 
of space, he says it must be ready a priori in the mind, that is, 
before any perception of objects. “Die Form derselben muss 
zu ihnen insgesammt im Gemiithe a priori bereit liegen und 
daher abgesondert von aller Empfindung konnen betrachtet wer- 
den” (Werke, bd. ii. p. 32 : ed. Kosenkranz). The mind has not 
only Intuitions of Space and Time to impose on phenomena or 
presentations, it has Categories of Quantity, Quality, Eolation, 
Modality, to impose on its cognitions; and Ideas of Substance, CRITICAL REVIEW CE OPINIONS. 
Ill 
Totality of Phenomena, and Deity, to impose on the judgments 
reached by the Categories. 2. He maintains that the forms of 
the sensibility, and the categories of the understanding, have all a 
reference to objects of experience, real or possible ; this, in fact, 
is their use; without this they would be meaningless. The ideas 
of pure reason do, however, refer to the comparisons of the under- 
standing, and not to objects, and fruitless speculation arises from 
supposing that they refer to objects; and there may, also, be an 
undue use of the forms of sense and the categories of the under- 
standing, but in themselves they refer to objects of possible ex- 
perience (Kr. d. r. Yern., Trans. Dial.). 3. He proposes in his 
great work, the Kritik of Pure Reason, to give an inventory, in 
systematic order, of the a 'priori principles in the mind. “ Denn 
es ist nichts als das Inventarium aller unserer Besitze durch 
reine Yernunft, systematisch geordnet” (Yorrede zu erst. Auf.). 
He seeks for an organon, which would be a compendium of the 
principles according to which a priori cognitions would be ob- 
tained. “Ein Organon der reinen Yernunft wiirde ein Inbegriff 
derjenigen Principien seyn, nach denen alle reine Erkentnisse a 
priori konnen erworben und wirklich zu Stande gebracht werden” 
(Einleit.). 4. He uses systematically the tests of Necessity and 
Universality, meaning by Universality the Universality of the 
Truth (see supra, p. 43, foot-note). 
But, on the other hand, he has fallen into the grossest mis- 
apprehensions regarding the nature of the a priori principles of 
reason. 1. He maintains that the mind can have no intuition of 
things. All that it can know are mere presentations or pheno- 
mena. It is all true that the Eorms of Sense and the Categories 
relate to objects of possible experience, but then experience does 
not give us a knowledge of things. “ Es sind demnach die Gegen- 
stiinde der Erfahrung niemals an sich selbst.” Speaking even of 
self-consciousness he says, it does not knowr self as it exists: “ Und 
selbst ist die innere und sinnliche Anschauung unseres Gemiiths 
(als Gegenstandes des Bewusstseyns) ... auch nicht das eigentliche 
Selbst, so wie es an sich existirt” (Bd. ii. p. 389). He thus separates 
the intuitions of the mind altogether from things. 2. He makes our 
a priori Intuitions impose on phenomena the forms of Space and 
Time, wrhich have no existence out of the mind. The categories are 
frameworks for binding conceptions into judgments. The ideas 
of pure reason reduce the judgments to unity, but have no re- 
ference to objects ; and if we suppose them to have, we are landed 
in illusion and contradictions. By this system he makes much 
ideal which wre are naturally led to regard as real, and thus pre- 112 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS. 
pared the way for Fichte, who made the whole ideal. 3. His 
Method of discovering the a priori principles of the mind is not 
the Inductive, but the Critical. Season is called to undertake 
the task of self-examination, which may secure its righteous claims, 
not in an arbitrary way, but according to its own eternal and 
unchangeable laws. “ Eine Aufforderung an die Vernunft, das 
beschwerlichste aller ihrer Geschafte, namlich das der Selbst- 
erkenntniss aufs Neue zu ubernehmen und einen Gerichtshof 
einzusetzen, der sie hei ihren gerechten Anspriichen sichere, da- 
gegen aber alle grundloseAnmaassungen nicht durchMachtspriiche 
sondern nach ihren ewigen und unwandelbaren Gesetzen ” (Vor. z. 
erst. Auf.). Season was thus set on criticizing itself according to 
laws of its own, and a succession of speculators set out each with 
what he alleged to be the laws of reason, but no two of them 
agreed as to what the laws of reason were, or what the standard 
by which to test them, and conclusions were reached which were 
evidently most irrational. 
X. Dugald Stewart delighted to look on our intuitions 
under the aspect of “ Fundamental Laws of Human Belief” 
(Elem. vol. ii. ch. i.). 1. He sees that they are of the nature 
of laws in the mind. 2. He sees that they are natural, original, 
and fundamental. 3. He sees that they are involved in the facul- 
ties. Hence he calls them “ elements of reason” (Elem. vol. ii. 
p. 49: Ham. edit.) ; he would identify them with the exercise of 
our reasoning powers, and speaks of them as component elements, 
without which the faculty of reasoning is inconceivable and im- 
possible (p. 39). It may be added that while he never formally 
appeals to necessity, he is obliged to use it incidentally. Thus 
“ every man is impressed with an irresistible conviction that all 
his sensations, thoughts, and volitions belong to one and the same 
being” (Elem. vol. i. p. 47); and “we are impressed with an 
irresistible conviction of our personal identity” (Essays, p. 59). 
Speaking of causes, in the metaphysical meaning of the word, he 
says, the “ word cause expresses something which is supposed to 
he necessarily connected with the change” (Elem. vol. i. p. 97). 
In looking on them as “ fundamental laws,” and in avoiding the 
ambiguity of the phrase “ common sense,” he has gone beyond 
Iteid, but otherwise he has not thrown much light on them. He 
is in great confusion from not discovering how it is that “ the 
•elements of reason” may become general maxims, axioms, or prin- 
ciples. 
XI. Dr. Thomas Brown has demonstrated, with great in- 
genuity, that our belief in the invariableness of cause and effect CRITICAL REVIEW OF OPINIONS. 
113 
cannot be had from experience (Cause and Effect, partiii. sect. 3). 
He has also shown that the belief in our personal identity is in- 
tuitive (Lect. 13). When he comes to our intuitions, he speaks 
of them as “principles of thought;” as “primary universal intui- 
tions of direct beliefas “ being felt intuitively, universally, imme- 
diately, irresistiblyas “ an internal, never-ceasing voice from the 
Creator and Preserver of our being;” as “ omnipotent, like their 
Author;” and “ such that it is impossible for us to doubt them” 
(Lect. 13). These are fine expressions, but his view of them is 
meagre after all, and a retrogression from the Scottish School. 
He makes no inquiry into their nature, laws, or tests. 
XXL M. Cousin has given throughout all his philosophical 
works, clear and beautiful expositions of the elements of reason. 
1. It is a favourite doctrine that reason looks at truths, eternal, 
universal, and absolute; truths, not to the individual or the race, 
but to all intelligences. 2. He uses, most successfully, the tests 
of necessity and universality, in order to distinguish the truths of 
reason from other truths. 3. He has distinguished between the 
spontaneous and reflective form of the truths of reasons (see supra, 
p. 62). 4. He has shown that primitive truths are all at first in- 
dividual. “ C’est un fait qu’il ne faut pas oublier, et qu’on oublie 
beaucoup trop souvent, que nos jugements sont d’abord des juge- 
ments particuliers et determines, et que c’est sous cette forme d’un 
jugementpartieulier et determine que font leur premiere apparition 
toutes les verites universelles et necessaires ” (ser. ii. t. iii. Ie9.19; 
see also ser. i. t. i. progr.; t. ii. progr. Ie9- ii.-iv., xi.). But on the 
other hand, he has given an exaggerated account of the power of 
human reason, and has not seen that induction is necessary in 
order to the discovery of necessary truth in its general form. 1. 
He uses unhappy and unguarded language in speaking of reason. 
His favourite epithet as applied to it is ‘impersonal;’ language 
which has a correct meaning inasmuch as the truth is not to the 
person but to all intelligences, but is often so employed as, with- 
out his intending it, to come very close to those pantheistic 
systems which identify the Divine and human reason (see ser. 
ii. Ie9. v.). 2. His reduction of the ideas of reason to three is 
full of confusion. The first idea is supposed to be unity, sub- 
stance, cause, perfect, infinite, eternal; the second, multiple, qua- 
lity, effect, imperfect, finite, bounded; and the third, the relation 
of the other two. It is to confound the things which manifestly 
differ, to make unity, cause, good, infinite indentical. The business 
of the metaphysician should be to observe each of these carefully, 
and bring out their peculiarities and their differences. 3. He 114 
CHARACTER OP INTUITIONS. 
does not see how it is that the general maxim is formed out of 
the particulars. He says that abstraction, “ saisit immediatement 
ce que le premier objet soumis a son observation renferme de 
general ” (ser. i. t. i. le£. xi.). He does not see that in order 
to the formation of the general law there is need of a process, 
often delicate and laborious, of observation, abstraction, and gene- 
ralization. 
XIII. Sib William Hamilton’s Note A, appended to his 
edition of Eeid’s Works, is the most important contribution made 
in this century to the science of first truths. 1. He has there 
specified nearly every important character of our intuitive con- 
victions, and attached to them an appropriate nomenclature. 2. 
He has shown that the argument from common sense is one 
strictly scientific and eminently philosophic. 3. He has with 
unsurpassed erudition brought testimonies in behalf of the prin- 
ciples of common sense from the writings of the eminent thinkers 
of all ages and countries. But on the other hand:—1. He fails 
to draw the distinction between common sense as an aggregate of 
laws in the mind, as convictions in consciousness, and as gene- 
ralized maxims. Thus the confusion of the spontaneous cognition 
and its generalized form appears in such passages as the follow- 
ing :—“ The primitive cognitions seem to leap ready from the 
womb of reason, like Pallas from the head of Jupiter; some- 
times the mind places them at the commencement of its opera- 
tions in order to have a point of support and a fixed basis 
without which the operations would be impossible; sometimes 
they form in a certain sort the crowning, the consummation 
of all the intellectual operations” (Metaphysics, Lect. 38). 2. 
He does not properly appreciate the circumstance that intuitive 
convictions all look to singulars, and that there is need of induc- 
tion to reach the general truth. He supposes that the general 
truth is revealed at once to consciousness. “ Philosophy is the 
development and application of the constitutive and normal truths 
which consciousness immediately reveals.” “ Philosophy is thus 
wrholly dependent on consciousness” (Reid’s Works, p. 746). It 
is true that philosophy is dependent on consciousness, but it is 
dependent also on abstraction and generalization. He calls ulti- 
mate, primary, and universal principles, facts of consciousness 
(Metaphysics, Lect. 15). 3. His method is not the Inductive, 
but that of Critical Analysis introduced by Kant (Met. Lect. 29). 
4. He fails to observe that the mind in intuition looks at ob- 
jects. He makes the mind’s conviction in regard to such objects 
as space, substance, cause, and infinity, to be impotencies, and CRITICAL REVIEW OF OPINIONS. 
115 
their laws to be laws of thought and not of things (Append, to 
Discussions on Phil.). The error of such views will come out as 
we advance. I have endeavoured to expose it in the appendix 
to ‘Method of Divine Government,’ in an article in the ‘North 
British Review,’ for August, 1857, and an article in the ‘ Dublin 
University Magazine,’ for August, 1859. 
XIV. Dr. Wheweel has done great service at once to the physi- 
cal sciences and to metaphysics, by showing, in his ‘ Philosophy of 
the Inductive Sciences,’—1. That the former proceed upon and im- 
ply principles not got from experience ; that geometry and arith- 
metic depend on first truths regarding space, time, and number ; 
and mechanical science on intuitions regarding force, matter, etc. 
2. He has exhibited these principles in instructive forms, an- 
nouncing them in their deeper and wider character under the 
designation of fundamental ideas, and then presenting them under 
the name of conceptions in the more specific shapes in which they 
become available in the particular sciences : thus, in mechanical 
science the fundamental idea of cause becomes the conception of 
force. But then he has injured his great work:—1. By fol- 
lowing the Kantian doctrine of forms, and supposing that the 
mental ideas “ impose” and “superinduce” on the objects some- 
thing not in the objects, whereas they merely enable us to arrive 
at what is in the objects. 2. He also fails to show that the 
ideas or maxims in the general form in which alone they are 
available in science, are got by induction. 3. The phraseology 
which he employs is unfortunate, it is ‘ fundamental ideas ’ and 
‘ conceptions.’ The word ‘ idea’ has been used in so many different 
senses by different writers, by Plato, Descartes, Locke, Kant, and 
Hegel, that it is perhaps expedient to abandon it altogether in 
strict philosophic writing ; it is certainly not expedient to use it, 
as Whewell does, in a new application. The word ‘ conception ’ 
stands in classical English both for the phantasm, or image, and 
the logical notion—certain later metaphysicians would restrict it 
to the logical notion; and there is no propriety in using it to 
signify an a 'priori law. 4. Pie has damaged the general accep- 
tance of his principles, which seem to me to be as true as they are 
often profound, by making a number of truths a priori which are 
evidently got from experience: thus he makes the law of action 
and reaction, and the laws of motion generally, self-evident and 
necessary. PART SECOND. 
PARTICULAR EXAMINATION OF THE INTUITIONS. 119 
BOOK I. 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
CHAPTER I. 
BODY AND SPIRIT. 
Sect. I. The Mind begins its Intelligent Acts with 
Knowledge. The Simple Cognitive Powers. 
It is a favourite position in the views expounded in this 
treatise, that the mind begins its acts of intelligence with 
knowledge. This is not the common representation. 
According to a very ancient doctrine, the mind has, prior 
to the acquisition of knowledge, a stock of ideas out of 
itself, or in itself, at which it looks, and its primary exer- 
cises consist in contemplating or in forming these ideas. 
This view, with no pretensions to precision in the state- 
ment of it, was a prevalent one in ancient Greece, in the 
scholastic ages, and in the earlier stages of modern phi- 
losophy. It seems to me to be the view which was ha- 
bitually entertained by Descartes and Locke. In later 
times, the mind was supposed to commence with impres- 
sions of some kind. This view may be regarded as in- 
troduced formally into philosophy by Hume, who opens 
his ‘Treatise on Human Nature’ by declaring that all the 
perceptions of the mind are impressions and ideas ; that 
impressions come first, and that ideas are the faint images 
of them. This view has evidently a materialistic ten- 120 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
dency. Literally, an impression can be produced only 
on a material substance, and it is not easy to determine 
precisely wliat is meant by the phrase when it is used 
metaphorically. This impression theory is the one 
adopted by the French Sensational School, and by the 
physiologists of this country. In Germany the influence 
exercised by Kant’s Kritik of Pure Reason has made the 
general account to be that the mind starts with pre- 
sentations, and not with things, with phenomena in the 
sense of appearances, which ‘phenomena’ are but modifi- 
cations of Hume’s ‘impressions,’ and of the ‘ideas’ of the 
ancients. Now it appears to me that all these accounts, 
consciousness being witness, are imperfect, and by their 
defects erroneous. The mind is not conscious of these 
impressions preceding the knowledge which it has im- 
mediately of self, and the objects falling under the notice 
of the senses. Nor can it be legitimately shown how the 
mind can ever rise from ideas, impressions, phenomena, 
to the knowledge of things. The followers of Locke 
have always felt the difficulty of showing how the mind 
from mere ideas could reach external realities. Hume 
designedly represented the original exercises of the mind 
as being mere impressions, in order to undermine the 
very foundations of knowledge. Though Kant acknow- 
ledged a reality beneath the presentations, beyond the 
phenomena, those who followed out his views found the 
reality disappearing more and more, till at length it va- 
nished altogether, leaving only a concatenated series of 
mental forms. 
There is no effectual or consistent way of avoiding 
these consequences but by falling back on the natural 
system, and maintaining that the mind in its intelligent 
acts starts with knowledge. But let not the statement 
be misunderstood. I do not mean that the mind com- 
mences with abstract knowledge, or general knowledge, BODY AND SPIRIT. 
121 
or indeed with systematized knowledge of any descrip- 
tion. It acquires first a knowledge of individual things 
as they are presented to it and to its knowing faculties, 
and it is out of this that all its arranged knowledge is 
formed by a subsequent exercise of the understanding. 
From the concrete the mind fashions the abstract, by 
separating in thought a part from the whole, a quality 
from the object. Starting with the particular, the mind 
reaches the general by observing the points of agree- 
ment. From premisses involving knowledge, it can 
arrive at other propositions also containing knowledge. 
It seems clear to me, that if the mind had not know- 
ledge in the foundation, it never could have knowledge 
in the superstructure reared; but finding knowledge in 
its first intelligent exercises, it can thence, by the pro- 
cesses of abstraction, generalization, and reasoning, reach 
further and higher knowdedge. 
The mind is endowed with at least two simple cog- 
nitive powers,—sense-perception and self-consciousness. 
Both are cognitive in their nature, and look on and re- 
veal to us existing things; the one, material objects pre- 
sented to us through the bodily senses, and the other, 
self in a particular state or exercise. It is altogether 
inadequate language to represent these faculties as giving 
us an idea, or an impression, or an apprehension, or a 
notion, or a conception, or looking on unknown appear- 
ances, they give us knowledge of objects under aspects 
presented to us. No other language is equal to express 
the full mental action of which we are conscious. 
In this Book it is my aim to seek out, to analyze, and 
expose to the view the convictions that are involved in 
the exercise of these two powers. I shall begin with 
our cognitions in their more concrete form, and then 
dwell more specially on the cognitions discovered by ab- 
straction to be involved in these. 122 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
Sect. II. Our Intuitive Cognitions of Body. 
We are following the plainest dictates of conscious- 
ness, we avoid a thousand difficulties, and we get a solid 
ground on which to rest and to build, when we maintain 
that the mind in its first exercises acquires knowledge; 
not indeed scientific or arranged, not of qualities of ob- 
jects and classes of objects, but still knowledge—the 
knowledge of things presenting themselves, and as they 
present themselves; which knowledge, individual and 
concrete, is the foundation of all other knowledge, ab- 
stract, general, and deductive. In particular, the mind is 
so constituted as to attain a knowledge of body, or of 
material objects. 
It is through the bodily organism that the intelligence 
of man attains its knowledge of all material objects be- 
yond. This is true of the infant mind; it is true also of 
the mature mind. We may assert something more than 
this regarding the organism. It is not only the medium 
through which we know all bodily objects beyond itself, 
it is itself an object primarily known; nay, I am inclined 
to think that, along with the objects immediately affect- 
ing it, it is the only object originally known. Intuitively 
man seems to know nothing beyond his own organism, 
and objects immediately affecting it; in all further know- 
ledge there is a process of inference proceeding on a ga- 
thered experience. This theory seems to me to explain 
all the facts, and it delivers us from many perplexities. 
Let us go over the senses one by one, with a view of 
determining what seems to be the original information 
supplied by each. In the sense of smell, the objects 
immediately perceived are the nostrils as affected; it is 
only by experience that we know that there is an object 
beyond, from which the smell proceeds, and it is only 
by science that we know that odorous particles have pro- BODY 
123 
ceeded from that object. In hearing, our primary per- 
ceptions seem to be of the ear as affected; that there 
is a sounding body we learn by further observation, and 
that there are vibrations between it and the ear we are 
told by scientific research. In taste, it is originally the 
palate as affected by what we feel by another sense to be 
a tangible body, which body science tells us must be in 
a liquid state. In touch proper, there is a sensation of a 
particular part of the frame as affected by we know not 
what, but which we may discover by experiential obser- 
vation. It is the same with all the impressions we have 
by the sense of temperature, the sense of titillation, the 
sense of shuddering, the sense of the creeping of the flesh, 
the sense of lightness or of weight, and the like organic 
affections, usually but improperly attributed to touch. In 
regard to all these senses, it seems highly probable that 
our original and primitive perceptions are simply of the 
organism as affected by something unknown, so far as 
intuition is concerned. But there are other two senses 
which furnish, I am inclined to think, a new and further 
kind of information. The sense of touch, when the 
phrase is used in a loose sense, is a complex one, em- 
bracing a considerable number and variety of senses, 
which have not been scientifically classified, and which, 
perhaps, cannot be so till we have a more thorough 
physiology of the nerves. Certain it is that there is a 
locomotive energy and a muscular sense entirely different 
from feeling, or such affections as those of heat and cold. 
The soul of man instinctively wills to move the arm ; an 
action is produced in a motor nerve, which sets in 
motion a muscle, with probably an attached set of bones, 
and the intimation of such a movement having taken place 
is conveyed to the brain by a sensor nerve. As the result 
of this complex physiological process, we come to know 
that there is something beyond our organism; we know 
an object out of our organism hindering the movement 124 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
of the organ and resisting our energy.* It is more dif- 
ficult to determine what is the original perception by 
sight. It must certainly be of a coloured surface affecting 
the felt organism. The boy born blind, when his sight 
was restored by an operation by Cheselden, felt as if 
every object “ touched his eyes, as what he felt did his 
skin.” I think it probable that the coloured‘surface per- 
ceived as affecting the living organism, is seen as in the 
direction of the felt and localized sentient organ, neither 
behind it, nor at the side, but at what distance we know 
not till other senses and a gathered experience come to 
our aid. Such seems to be our original knowledge, re- 
ceived through the various senses as inlets. 
But we are not to understand that the mind receives 
sensations and information only from one sense at a time. 
In order to have a full view of the actual state of things, 
Ave must remember that man, at every instant of his 
waking existence, is getting organic feelings and percep- 
tions from a number of these sources ; say at one and the 
same time from the sense of heat, from the sense of taste in 
* The following is the account given by Muller (trans. by Baly, 
p. 1080):—“ First, the child governs the movements of its limbs, and 
thus perceives that they are instruments subject to the use and govern- 
ment of its internal ‘ self,’ while the resistance which it meets with 
around is not subject to its will, and therefore gives it the idea of an 
absolute exterior. Secondly, the child will perceive a difference in the 
sensations produced according as two parts of its own body touch each 
other, or as one part of its body only meets with resistance from with- 
out. In the first instance, where one arm, for example, touches the 
other, the resistance is offered by a part of the child’s own body, and 
the limb thus giving the resistance becomes the subject of sensation as 
well as the other. The two limbs are in this case external objects of 
perception, and percipient at the same time. In the second instance, 
the resisting body will be represented to the mind as something ex- 
ternal and foreign to the living body, and not subject to the internal 
self. Thus will arise in the mind of the child the idea of a resistance 
which one part of its own body can offer to other parts of its body, 
and at the same time the idea of a resistance offered to its body by an 
absolute exterior. In this way is gained the idea of an external world 
as the cause of sensations.” BODY AND SPIRIT. 
125 
the mouth, from the sense of hearing, the sense of sight— 
suppose of a portion of our own body and of the walls of 
the apartment in which we sit, and from the muscular sense 
—say ot the chair on which we sit, or the floor on which 
we stand. Our whole conscious state at any given time 
is thus a very complex, or rather, a concrete one. There 
is in it at all times a sense of the living body as extended, 
and, I may add, as ours. This is a sense which human 
beings, infant and mature, carry with them every instant 
of their waking existence, perhaps in a low state even in 
their times of sleep. “ This consciousness of our own 
corporeal existence is the standard by which we estimate 
in our sense of touch the extension of all resisting bo- 
dies.”* Along with this there will always be in our 
waking moments a sense of something extra-organic but 
affecting the organism, such as the surface before the 
eye, or the object which supports us. But the vividness 
of the impression made, or some decisive act of the will 
in order to accomplish a desired end, will at times centre 
the mind’s regards in a special manner on some one of 
the objects made known by the senses. Thus, a violent 
pain in an organ will absorb the whole attention on it- 
self ; or a vivid colour will draw out the mind towards the 
coloured object. By these concentrations of intelligence 
we obtain a more special acquaintance with the nature of 
the objects presenting themselves. It is thus only that 
the special senses fulfil their full function, and impart 
information abiding with us beyond the moment when 
the action takes place. 
Such seems to be our original stock of knowledge ac- 
quired by sense. It is as yet'within very narrow limits, 
within our frames, and a sphere immediately in contact, f 
* Muller’s Physiology, translated by Baly, p. 1081. 
t “ We perceive and can perceive nothing but what is relative to 
the organ.” (Hamilton, foot-note to Reid, p. 247). 126 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
We reach a wider knowledge by remembering what we 
have thus obtained, by subjecting it to processes of ab- 
straction and generalization, and drawing inferences from 
it. Our information is especially enlarged and consoli- 
dated, by combining the information got from several of 
the senses, which are all intended to assist each other. 
In particular, the two intellectual senses par excellence, 
sight and the muscular sense, are fitted to aid each other 
and all the other senses. By sight we know merely a co- 
loured surface; by the muscular sense we may come to 
know that the object with a superficies has three dimen- 
sions and is impenetrable,—we may know the object to 
be the same by our seeing upon it the hand which feels 
the pressure. By sight we know not how far the co- 
loured surface is from our organism; by inferences founded 
on gathered information from the muscular sense, we 
come to know how far it is from us, whether an inch or 
many feet or yards. By the muscular sense we know 
solid objects only as pressing themselves immediately on 
our organism ; by sight we see objects—which sight does 
not declare to be solid but which a combined experience 
declares must be solid—thousands or millions of miles 
away. By inferences from various senses united, we 
know that this taste is from a certain kind of food, that 
this smell is from a rose or lily, that this sound is from 
a human voice or a musical instrument. Thus our 
knowledge, commencing with the organism and objects 
affecting it, may extend to objects at a great distance, 
and clothe them with qualities which are not perceived 
as immediately belonging to them. We know that this 
blue surface seen indistinctly is a bay of the ocean fifty 
miles off, and that this brilliant spark up in the blue 
concave, is a solid body, radiating light hundreds of mil- 
lions of miles away. 
Let us analyse what is involved in this intuitive know- 
ledge. BODY 
127 
I. We know the object as existing or having be- 
ing. This is a necessary conviction, attached to, or rather, 
composing an essential part of our concrete cognition of 
every material object presented to us, be it our own 
frame, or of things external to our frame; whether this 
hard table or stone, or this yielding water, or even this 
vapoury mist, or this fleeting cloud. We look on each of 
the objects thus presented to us, in our organism or be- 
yond it, as having an existence, a being, a reality. Every 
one understands these phrases ; they cannot be made 
simpler or more intelligible by an explanation. We un- 
derstand them because they express a mental fact which 
every one has experienced. We may talk of what we 
contemplate in sense-perception being nothing but an 
impression, an appearance, an idea, but we can never be 
made to give our assent to any such statements. However 
ingenious the arguments which may be adduced in favour 
of the objects of our sense-perceptions being mere illusions, 
we find that after listening to them, and allowing to them 
all the weight that is possible, we still look upon bodies 
as realities next time they present themselves. The rea- 
son, is we know them to be realities, by a native cogni- 
tion which can never be overcome. 
II. In our primitive cognitions, we know objects as 
having an existence independent of the contemplative 
mind. We know the object as separate from ourselves. 
We do not create it when we perceive it, nor does it 
cease to exist because we have ceased to contemplate it. 
All this is involved in our very cognition of the object, 
and he who would deny this is setting aside our very 
primitive knowledge, and he who would argue against 
this, will never be able to convince us in fact, because he 
is opposing a fundamental conviction which will work 
whenever the object is presented.* 
* Tlie convictions referred to in these paragraphs, set aside at once 128 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
III. We know the object as having an abiding exist- 
ence. This is a truth which requires to be stated with 
not a few explanations and cautions. I can merely give 
a hint of what is meant, and reserve the fuller discussion 
of it till I come to speak of substance, in the next chap- 
ter. I have already affirmed that every material object 
has an existence abiding, in this sense, that our contem- 
plation did not create it, nor will it cease to exist because 
our attention is not directed towards it. But this is not 
all: we apprehend that this thing has an abiding being 
in itself. Our intuition indeed does not say, as to this 
being, how or when it came to be there, nor whether nor 
in what circumstances it may cease; for information on 
such topics we must go to other quarters. But when 
the question is started, we must decide that this thing 
had a being prior to our perceiving it, unless indeed it so 
happened that it was produced by a power capable of 
doing so at the very time our senses alighted on it, and 
that it will continue to exist after we have ceased to re- 
gard it, unless indeed something interpose to destroy it. 
But enough for the present of this somewhat difficult 
discussion. 
IV. In our primitive cognition of body there is in- 
volved a knowledge of outness or externality.* We 
tlie doctrine of Kaut, that the mind in the intuition of sense, takes 
cognizance of phenomena in the sense of appearances. They should 
also modify the doctrine of Hamilton. “ Our knowledge of qualities 
or phenomena is necessarily relative, for these exist only as they exist 
in relation to our faculties.” (Foot-note to Eeid, p. 323.) It is a tru- 
ism that we can know objects merely as our faculties enable us to know 
them; but the question is, What is the nature and extent of the know- 
ledge which our faculties furnish ? I admit that whatever external ob- 
jects we know, we know in a relation to us. But I hold that man and 
his faculties are so constituted as to know things (with being) exer- 
cising qualities, and to know qualities as existing separate from and in- 
dependent of our cognition of them. 
* “ Perception involves in every instance the notion of externality, 
or outness” (D. Stewart, Essays, p. 419). BODY. 
129 
know the object perceived, be it the organism or the 
object affecting the organism, as not in the mind, as out 
of the mind. In regard to some of the objects perceived 
by us we may be in doubt as to whether they are in the 
organism or beyond it, but we are always sure that they 
are extra-mental. This is a conviction from which we 
can never be driven by any power of will or force of cir- 
cumstances. It is at the foundation of the judgments 
to be afterwards specified as to the distinctions between 
the self and the not-self, the ego and the non-ego* 
Y. In all our knowledge through the senses we know 
the object as extended. I am inclined to think that this 
knowledge in the concrete is involved even in such per- 
ceptions as those of smell, taste, hearing, and feeling, and 
the allied affections of temperature and titillation. In all 
these we intuitively know the organism as out of the mind, 
as extended, and as localized. At every waking moment 
we have sensations from more than one sense, and we 
must know the organs affected as out of each other and 
in different places, f It is acknowledged that the primitive 
* The convictions spoken of in these paragraphs set aside all forms 
of idealism in sense-perception. Berkeley says that, so far as matter 
is concerned, “ esse est per dpi." I hold, that according to our intuitive 
conviction, the thing which we perceive must exist before we can per- 
ceive it, and that we perceive it as an extended thing independent 
and out of the contemplative mind. Fichte represents the external 
thing as a creation or projection of the perceiving mind. But the 
mind in knowing the self as perceiving, knows that it is an external 
thing that is perceived, and cannot he made to think otherwise. Pro- 
fessor Ferrier bases his fabric of demonstrated idealism on the propo- 
sition, the object of knowledge “ always is, and must he, the object 
with the addition of oneself,—object plus subject,—thing, or thought, 
mecum” (Inst, of Metaph. prop. ii.). If this proposition professes to 
be a statement of fact, I deny that the fact of consciousness is properly 
stated. If it professes to be a first truth, I deny that it ought to be 
assumed in this particular form. No doubt we always know self at 
the same time that we know an external object by sense-perception, 
but we know the external object as separate from and independent of 
self. We might as well deny that we know the object at all, as deny 
that we know it to have an existence distinct from self 
t Hamilton says, “ An extension is apprehended in the apprehension 130 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
knowledge got in this way is very bare and limited, and 
without those perceived relationships and distinctions 
which become associated with it in our future life. But 
imperfect though it be, it must ever involve the occupa- 
tion of space. The other two senses furnish more express 
information, the eye giving a coloured surface of a de- 
fined form, and the muscular sense extension in three 
dimensions. It should be noticed that in our knowledge 
of extra-organic objects, whether by the eye or the mus- 
cular sense, we know them as situated in a certain place 
in reference to our organism, which we have already so far 
localized and distributed in space, and which henceforth 
we use as a centre for direction and distance. 
VI. We know the objects as affecting us. I have al- 
ready said that we know them as independent of us. 
This is an important truth. But it is equally true and 
equally important that these objects are made known 
to us as somehow having an influence on us. The or- 
ganic object is capable of affecting our minds, and the 
extra-organic object affects the organism which affects the 
mind. Upon this cognition are founded certain judg- 
ments as to the relations of the object known to the 
knowing mind. In particular, 
VII. In certain, if not in all, of our original cognitions 
through the senses we know the objects as exercising 
potency or property. This is denied in theory by many 
who are yet found to admit it inadvertently when they 
tell us that we can know matter only by its properties: 
for what, I ask, are properties but powers to act in a 
certain way? But still it is dogmatically asserted, that 
whatever we may know about material objects, we can 
of the reciprocal externality of all sensations” (Appendix to Reid, 
p. 885). Again, “ In the consciousness of sensations relatively localized 
and reciprocally external, we have a veritable apprehension and conse- 
quently an immediate perception of the affected organism, as extended, 
divided, figured, etc.” (ib. p. 884). BODY 
131 
never know that they have power; we cannot see power, 
they say, nor hear power, nor touch power. In oppo- 
sition to these confident assertions, I lay down the very 
opposite dogma, that we cannot see body, or touch, or 
even hear, or taste, or smell body, except as affecting 
us, that is, having a power in reference to us. When an 
extra-organic body resists our muscular energy,* what is 
it doing but affecting our organism in a certain way ? 
The very coloured surface revealed through sight, is 
known to us as affecting, that is, having an influence 
over, our organism. But there is more than this,—the 
organism is known as having power to affect the cog- 
nitive self. The muscular effort resisted, the visual or- 
gans impressed by the coloured surface, are known as pro- 
ducing an effect on the mind. The organs affected in 
smell, in taste, in temperature, in hearing, in feeling, are 
all known as rousing the mind into cognitive activity. 
It might be further maintained, even in regard to those 
senses which do not immediately reveal anything extra- 
organic, that they seem to point to some unknown cause 
of the affection known; but it is better to postpone the 
discussion of this question till it can be discussed fully. 
But in regard to the two senses which reveal objects be- 
yond the bodily frame, and in regard to all the senses 
so far as they make known our frame to us, there is an 
intuitive conviction of potency wrapped up in all our cog- 
nitions. 
But it will be vehemently urged that it is most pre- 
* Locke says that impenetrability, or, as lie prefers calling it, as 
having less of a negative meaning, solidity, seems the “ idea most inti- 
mately connected with and essential to body, so as nowhere else to be 
found or imagined, but only in matterand he adds, we “ find it in- 
separably inherent in body wherever or however modifiedand in 
explaining this, he says of bodies, that “ they do by an unsurmountable 
force hinder the approach of the parts of our hands that press them ” 
(Essay, ii. iv. 1). 132 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
posterous to assert that we know all this by the senses. 
Upon this I remark that the phrase by the senses is am- 
biguous. If by senses be meant the mere bodily or- 
ganism,—the eye, the ears, the nerves, and the brain,— 
I affirm that we know, and can know, nothing by this 
mere bodily part; that so far from knowing potency or 
extension, we do not know even colour, or taste, or 
smell. But if by the senses be meant the mind exercised 
in sense-perception, summoned into activity by the organ- 
ism, and contemplating cognitively the external world, 
then I maintain that we do know, and this intuitively, 
external objects as influencing us—that is, exercising 
powers in reference to us. I ask those who would 
doubt of this doctrine, of what it is that they suppose 
the mind to be cognizant in sense-perception. If they 
say, a mere sensation or impression in the mind, I reply 
that this is not consistent with the revelation of con- 
sciousness, which announces plainly that what we know 
is something extra-mental. If they say, with Kant, a 
mere phenomenon in the sense of appearance, then I 
reply that this too is inconsistent with consciousness, 
which declares that we know the thing. But if we know 
the thing, we must know something about it. If they 
say they know it as having extension and form, I grasp 
at the admission, and ask them to consider how high 
the knowledge thus allowed, involving at one and the 
same time space, and an object occupying space, and so 
much of space. Surely those who acknowledge this much 
may be prepared to confess further that the mind which 
in perception is capable of knowing an object as occu- 
pying space, is also capable of knowing the same object 
as exercising power in regard to us.* We have only to 
* “ C’est la raison, et la raison seule, qui connait, et connait le monde ; 
et elle ne le connait d’abord qu’a titre de cause ; il n’est d’abord pour 
nous que la cause des pbenomenes sensitifs que nous ne pouvons 
nous rapporter a nous-memes; et nous ne rechercherions pas cette BODY 
133 
examine the state of mind involved in all our cognitions 
of matter, to discover that there is involved in it a know- 
ledge both of extension and of property. 
Such seem to be some of the principal of our cog- 
nitions through the senses; and I have sought to evolve 
them by an analysis proceeding on a careful observation 
of their nature. 
Sect. III. Some Distinctions to be Attended to in 
Regard to our Cognition of Body. 
It is a fundamental position with the author of this 
treatise that we ought to look on all our primitive cog- 
nitions as guaranteeing a reality. In particular we are 
to look on each of our sense-perceptions as pointing to a 
corresponding extra-mental object. But in order to be 
able to maintain this doctrine with even the appearance 
of plausibility, it is necessary to attend to certain dis- 
tinctions. 
cause, par consequent nous ne la trouverions pas, si notre raison n’etait 
pourvue du principe de causalite, si nous pouvions supposer qu’un phe- 
nomene peut commencer a apparaitre sur le theatre de la conscience, 
du temps ou de l’espace, sans qu’il ait une cause. Done le principe de 
causalite, je ne crains pas de le dire, est le pere du monde exterieur, 
loin qu’il soit possible de l’en tirer, et de le faire venir de la sensation.” 
So says M. Cousin in criticizing Locke (Deux. Ser. tom. iii. L9. 19). 
This is not far from the truth. There is reason or intelligence involved 
in our knowledge of the external world, and there is causality in this 
knowledge. The mind knows the external thing as a cause—it must 
know it in other characters as well, in particular it must know it as 
extended—still, it knows it as a cause. But except in the mode of 
development, this doctrine does not differ so much from that of Locke 
as Cousin imagines. Locke derives the materials of all our ideas from 
sensation and experience. He derives our idea of cause from both these 
sources. But then the mind, in the formation of its ideas, proceeds intel- 
ligently, reasonably. There is intelligence, according to Locke, in sen- 
sation, and in comparing certain ideas the mind perceives their agree- 
ment immediately by intuition. Locke’s account of the full pheno- 
menon does not seem to me satisfactory, or very congruously wrought 
out; but it is quite as near the truth as that of Cousin, -who calls sen- 
sation the chronological condition, and reason the logical principle 
(See this distinction examined, infra, Part III. Bk. I. Ch. II. sect. v.). 134 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
I. There is the Distinction between our Original 
and Acquired Perceptions. In standing up for the 
trustworthiness of our perceptions, I always mean our 
original perceptions, proceeding from the primitive prin- 
ciples of the mind, and having the sanction of Him who 
gave us our constitution. The perceptions acquired by 
inference, or other intellectual processes grounded on 
experience, will have a corresponding reality only when 
these processes have been validly conducted. 
I have endeavoured in last Section to give an approxi- 
mately correct account of what seem to be our original 
perceptions through the various senses. But to our 
primitive stock we add others, and in doing so we em- 
ploy rules derived from the generalizations of experience, 
and deductive reasoning in applying them to given cases. 
It has been all but universally acknowledged, since the 
days of Berkeley, that the perception of distance is not 
an original endowment of the sense of sight in human 
beings, but that we come to determine it by a gathered 
observation. As the result of experience, we lay down 
such rules as these: that an object with whose form we 
are familiar,—such as a watch,—if seen with a faint colour 
and outline, and with a smaller disc in comparison with 
other known objects in the field of view, must be more 
distant than when seen with a better defined figure and 
a more vivid colour and a fuller form. We lay it down 
as another rule, that when a number of objects inter- 
vene between us and a scene on which we are looking,— 
say a mountain,—it must be at a considerable distance. 
Such rules formed by us are found approximately cor- 
rect, and useful in ordinary cases, and at every instant at 
which our eyes are open they conduct us to a knowledge 
which carries us far beyond our primitive perceptions. 
But then it is to be noticed that error may creep into 
our acquired perceptions. We may reckon a rule as BODY 
135 
universal which has many exceptions, and may make an 
application of it to a wrong case. It will not be difficult 
to show that all the supposed deception of the senses is 
to be traced to the wrong inferences which we draw in 
our acquired perceptions. 
Almost all forms of idealism—the system which sup- 
poses certain of our supposed cognitions to be creations of 
the mind, and all forms of scepticism—the system which 
would set aside all our cognitions, plead the deceitful- 
ness of the senses. Our senses are not to be trusted in 
some things, says the idealist, and we are to determine 
by reason wrhen they are to be trusted. Our senses de- 
lude us in some things, says the sceptic, and we may 
therefore distrust them in all. It is of vast moment to 
stop these errors at the point at which they flow out, by 
showing that the senses, meaning our original percep- 
tions through the senses, can all be trusted in regard to 
the special testimony which they furnish. 
But how, it is asked, does the stick in the water, felt 
to be straight by the sense of touch, seem crooked to the 
sense of sight ? The answer is, that the knowledge of 
the shape of an object does not primarily fall under 
the sense of sight, and that when we determine whether 
a stick is or is not straight, by the sense of sight, it is by 
a process of inference in which we have laid down the 
rule that objects that give a certain figure before the eye 
are crooked, a rule correct enough for common cases, but 
not applicable to cases in which the rays of light are re- 
fracted in passing from one medium to another. Why 
does a boy seem a man, and a man a giant in a mist, 
whereas if you clear away the mist, both are instantly re- 
duced to their proper dimensions ? An answer can ea- 
sily be given. We have laid down the rule that an object 
seen so dimly must be distant; but an object appearing 
of such dimensions at a distance must be large : and the 13 G 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
phenomenon is felt to be a deception only by those who 
are not accustomed to move in the mist. Why does a 
mountain, viewed across an arm of the sea, seem near, 
while the same mountain, seen at an equal distance be- 
yond an undulated country studded with houses and 
trees, will seem very remote ? The answer is not that 
the eye has deceived us, but that we have made a mis- 
taken application of a rule usually correct, that an object 
must be near when few objects intervene between us and 
it; and it is to be noticed that those who are accus- 
tomed to look across sheets of water, commit no such 
mistakes, for they have acquired other means of measur- 
ing distance. Again, we have found it true in cases so 
many, that we cannot number them, that when we are 
at rest and the image of an object, say a carriage, passes 
across the vision, the object must be in motion. That 
rule is accurate in all cases similar to those from which 
it was derived ; but it fails the landsman when, feeling as 
if he were at rest in the ship, he infers that the shore is 
moving away from the vessel. In all such cases we see 
that it is not the senses, that is, the natural and original 
perceptions of the senses having the authority of God, 
which deceive us, but rules formed by ourselves, and il- 
legitimately applied. It may be observed that the same 
experience which enables us to gather the rules, may 
enable us to ascertain the limits of the rules, and the ex- 
ceptions. It is only the landsman who is deceived into 
the thought that the shore is moving; the seaman has 
modified the rule, or rather, he realizes the idea that he 
himself is moving, and he is not deceived for one instant. 
Supposing this to be the correct account, we may stand 
up for the trustworthiness of all our intuitive perceptions, 
at least when the organism and the mind are in a healthy 
state. Even in cases in which the organism is diseased, 
the error lies commonly, perhaps always, in a wrong in- BODY. 
137 
ference.* When our visual organs are distempered, we 
may seem to see a solid figure before us which touch tells 
us has no reality; but the fact is, all that we intuitively 
see is a coloured surface, whether in or out of the organ- 
ism, whether solid or aerial, we know not intuitively. We 
hear a sound which we interpret as coming from a voice 
where no living being can be, but the interpretation is 
our own : all that our nature declares is, that there is an 
affection of our auditory organs. The visions, the ima- 
ginary sounds, touches, and smells, felt by persons whose 
organs are diseased, or excited by strong mental fancy 
within—just as they would be by an object without, are, 
after all, inferences from what are in themselves mere or- 
ganic affections. In the greater number of such cases, 
there is a means of detecting the error occasioned by dis- 
ease in one of the organs, by other organs not distem- 
pered. At the same time I am not inclined to deny that 
there may be cases in which the brain is so disorgan- 
ized, and the mind so deranged, that the person is given 
up for life to hopeless delusion. We are now within the 
* Aristotle had an apprehension of what I am convinced will turn out 
to be the true account of these seeming errors of the senses. (See his 
Treatise on the Soul, b. iii., c. i., iii., vi.) He says the perception, 
by a sense, of things peculiar to that sense, is true, or invol ves the small- 
est amount of error. But when such objects are perceived in their ac- 
cidents (that is, as to things not falling peculiarly under that sense), 
there is room for falsehood ; when, for instance, something is said to be 
white there is no falsehood, but wThen the object is said to be this or 
that (if the white thing is said to be Cleon), (cf. iii., i. 7), there may be 
falsehood. 'H a’ladrjais twv pev 18lav aXrjBrjs iariv t) oti (Sklyarov eyoixra 
to \fsev8os. devrepov 8e rod o-vpj3efir)Kevai ravra- /cat ivravOa fj8r] ephemeral 
dia-y/sevdeo-Oai• oti pev yap Aevicov, ov \/sevSerai, ei 8e tovto to XevKov 77 aAAo tl 
yfretjdeTai (iii., iii., 12 : ed. Trendelenburg). ’AAV Snnvep to opav tov 181ov 
aXr/des, el 8’ avdpanros to Aevnov rj pi], ovk aXrjdes aiei (ib. vi. 7). Aristotle 
saw that the difficulties might be cleared up, by attending to what each 
sense testifies, and separating the associated imaginations and opi- 
nions or judgments. The full explanation, however, could not be given 
till Berkeley led men to distinguish between the original and acquired 
perceptions of the senses, by showing that the know ledge of distance by 
the eye, is an acquisition. 138 
primitive cognitions. 
range of phenomena which carry us into the deepest 
mysteries of our world, and have a connection with man’s 
liability to disease, and the existence of sin. 
II. There is the Distinction between Sensation 
and Perception. It may be laid down as a general 
fact, that every given state of man’s mind is concrete; 
that is, in the one act there are elements which may be 
separated at other times, or which may be separated by 
analysis. Thus in purely mental action, there may at one 
and the same moment be an exercise of the intelligence, 
of feeling, and of will; in one act we may comprehend 
that our friend is in distress, may feel grieved in conse- 
quence, and resolve to take steps to relieve him. In like 
manner all the mental affections excited by the action of 
the bodily senses are concrete. What is thus mixed up in 
one concrete act, can be separated by analysis, and ought 
for important ends to be so separated : indeed the sepa- 
ration is often made for us naturally, for we have now 
one portion, and now another of the combined state. In 
particular, it is of great moment in philosophy to distin- 
guish between the sensations and perceptions which are 
always mixed up together. 
Perception is the knowledge of the object presenting 
itself to the senses, whether in the organism or beyond 
it. Sensation is the feeling associated,—the feeling of 
the organism. These two always coexist.* There is 
never the knowledge without an organic feeling, never 
a feeling of the organism without a cognitive apprehen- 
sion of it. These sensations differ widely from each 
other, as our consciousness testifies ; some of them being 
pleasant, some painful; others indifferent as to pleasure 
* Reid represents the sensation being “ followed by a perception of 
the objecton which Hamilton remarks, “ that sensation proper pre- 
cedes perception proper is a false assumption ; they are simultaneous 
elements of the same indivisible energy” (Reid’s Works, p. 186: see 
also p. 853). BODY. 
139 
and pain, but still with a feeling. Some we call ex- 
citing, others dull; some we designate as warm, others 
as cold; and for most of them we have no name what- 
ever,—indeed they so run into each other that it would 
be difficult to discriminate them by a specific nomen- 
clature. The perceptions, again, are as numerous and 
varied as the knowledge we have by all the senses. Now 
these two ever mix themselves up with each other. The 
sensation of the odour mingles with the apprehension of 
the nostrils; the flavour of the food is joined with the 
recognition of the palate; the agreeableness or disagree- 
ableness of the sound comes in with the knowledge of 
the ear as affected; and the organ which we know as 
feeling has an associated sensation. There is an organic 
sensation conjoined even with the knowledge we have 
of the extra-organic object affecting our muscular sense 
or our visual organism. This sensation may be little 
noticed because the attention is fixed on the object; 
still it is always there, as we may discover by a careful 
introspection of the combined mental affection. 
But this leads me to notice that in the concrete men- 
tal state sometimes the perception or the knowledge is 
the more prominent, whereas at other times the sensa- 
tion is the predominant. There is a difference indeed 
of the senses in this respect. Thus in the senses of 
taste, smell, touch proper, and the allied senses of tem- 
perature, titillation, shuddering, and flesh-creeping, the 
sensation is the prevailing element. These may be 
regarded as the lower and the more animal senses, in 
which the attention is largely absorbed in self. In hear- 
ing, so far as the original perceptions are concerned, the 
sensation is still the predominant affection; but as we 
come to know the sounding bodies, our attention is often 
directed almost exclusively to the object. Thus as we 
are listening to a person speaking we lose sight of the 140 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
hearing ear, and think only of what is said. Still, when 
the sounds are unpleasant, or when they are peculiarly 
pleasant, as in music, it is the sensation that absorbs the 
attention. In the muscular sense it is the resisting ob- 
ject that is most noticed. In sight the colour is largely 
(but not exclusively, as will be shown forthwith) a sen- 
sational, whereas the spread-out surface is the perceptive 
element. In many of our acts of vision there is a nice 
balancing of the two, the colour and the form being alike 
noticed; in others the colour, by its gorgeousness, ab- 
sorbs the whole mental energy; while in a third class 
the colour-sensation is lost sight of, and we are conscious 
of scarcely anything more than the form. And here I 
am tempted to remark that in the lower forms, both of 
nature and of the fine arts, it is the colour which is the 
more striking characteristic; and children, and persons 
low in the scale of intelligence, feel a peculiar delight in 
such objects. As we rise, in nature to the common her- 
baceous plants, and in art to flower-painting, there is 
often a union of the beauty, both of colour and of form. 
When we mount to the highest plants, as to the trees 
of the forest, and to the animal creation and the human 
form, and in art to historical painting, varied colouring 
disappears, that higher minds may gaze with undivided 
attention on objective forms characterized by high propor- 
tions, or full of life or suggestive of character. 
It should not be omitted that the mind can at any 
time fix its attention more specially on one of these, and 
then the other will very much disappear from the field 
of view. Sometimes this is done for us spontaneously, 
by the vividness of the sensation on the one hand, or by 
the interest which collects around the external object on 
the other. Sometimes the concentration is effected by 
a strong act of will, fixing the mind’s regards on one 
or other in order to gain a special end. Thus we may BODY. 
141 
yield ourselves entirely to a luscious strain of music, or 
we may be absorbed in thought about some object, so as 
scarcely to notice the sounds. Under ear-ache we may 
have the whole energy of the mind concentred on the 
pain, and be able to attend to nothing else; or we may 
be so interested in a discourse or a topic of thought as 
scarcely to feel the torture. 
But while the two ever coexist,—sometimes with the 
one prevailing and sometimes with the other predomi- 
nant, and sometimes with the two nicely balanced, it is 
of importance to distinguish them. Every man of sense 
draws the distinction between the music and the mu- 
sical instrument, between the ear-ache and his ear. The 
metaphysician should also draw the distinction,—indeed 
it is essential that he do so. The two were given for 
different ends. Our perceptions are the main means of 
supplying us with knowledge, whereas our sensations 
are meant to increase our enjoyment, to stimulate to ex- 
ertion, to give warning, or perhaps to inflict penalties. 
We must beware, both philosophically and practically, 
of confounding our sensations and our perceptions, our 
feelings and our cognitions. In the confounding of the 
two we have another circumstance leading men to 
charge their senses with deception. This will appear 
more fully when we come to notice another set of dis- 
tinctions. 
III. There are Distinctions between the Objects 
Known. There is the distinction between the organic 
object and the object beyond the organism. There is 
the more delicate distinction between the objects imme- 
diately known as extra-organic and objects inferred as 
affecting the organism but themselves unknown. Let 
me explain these, distinctions. 
We have seen that in some of the senses the proper 
object of perception is the organism itself. In two others 142 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
it is beyond the organism. Let us consider these two 
classes in order. 
In the first class all that we know immediately is the 
organism as affected. But if affected, it must be affected 
by something. It is in one state this instant, and it 
will be in another state the next. The intuitive con- 
viction of causation—to be afterwards discussed—con- 
strains us to look for an agent to produce the effect. 
And where is this agent to be found? In the organism, 
or beyond the organism? I am certain, in regard to 
some of our organic affections, that intuition says nothing 
on this special point. This is the case with our sense of 
smell, our taste and touch, and sense of temperature,— 
and I think also, though with some hesitation, of the 
sense of hearing. The intuitive conviction of cause and 
effect does indeed intimate that there must be a cause, 
but as to where that cause is to be found we must trust 
to experience, which tells us that the cause is in some 
cases to be found in the organism itself, and in other 
cases in an agent beyond,—such as odorous particles, 
sapid bodies, heat, undulations from a sounding body, 
or a solid object applied to our nerves of touch. In all 
cases the affection of sense and the conviction of cause 
combined are sufficient to prompt us to look round for 
an agent. The senses act as monitors, and most im- 
portant monitors they are, of powers working in our 
bodily frames, and in the physical universe around us. 
I believe that every one of our senses gives us intimation 
of powers,—such as floating particles, light, and heat, 
which are among the most powerful agencies conducting 
the processes of the material world. Still these are un- 
known to our senses, and we become aware of their ex- 
istence merely as causes of known effects. As to what 
odours, sounds, flavours, heat, and, we may add, light 
and colours are, our intuitions are silent, and their na- body. 
143 
ture is to be determined by observation,—indeed can 
be determined only by elaborate scientific research. It 
should be added, that while science has ascertained much 
about them, it has not, in its latest advances, been able 
to settle what is the exact nature of such agents as heat, 
light, and colour. 
Let us turn now to the other class of senses, which 
give us a knowledge of extra-organic objects. By the 
muscular sense we know an object as extended in three 
dimensions, and as resisting our effort. We have thus 
a knowledge of objects extended, and exercising dyna- 
mic energy beyond the little world of self. 
The sense of sight presents peculiar difficulties in this 
connection. It seems to me clearly to look at an extended 
surface, not part of our organism, but affecting it. But 
what are we to make of colour ? It is the greatest diffi- 
culty which the metaphysician meets with in the investi- 
gation of the senses. The mind knows the perceived 
object to be in its nature extended; but do we also 
know it as in its very nature coloured ? If so, is there 
colour in the object as there is extension? The follow- 
ing is the solution which I am inclined to offer of this 
difficult subject. The sense of colour may be regarded 
as intermediate between those senses in which we per- 
ceive an extra-organic object, and those other senses 
which reveal merely the organism as affected, but whether 
by agents within or beyond the organism we know not. 
In the sense of colour, we primarily know only the or- 
ganism as affected, but we are intuitively led, at the 
same time, to look on what thus affects our organism 
as not in the organism, but as in the extended surface 
in which it is seen. But beyond this, that is beyond 
colour being an extra-organic cause of an organic af- 
fection, we know nothing of its nature by intuition. If 
this account be correct, we see that our sense of co- 144 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
lour is different, on the one hand, from our know- 
ledge of our sensations of heat, or smell, or taste, for we 
do not know whether these are within or beyond the 
frame, while we do know that colour is out of ourselves 
in a surface; and different, too, on the other hand, from 
the knowledge of the extended surface and the impene- 
trability which are revealed directly by the sight and 
muscular sense, whereas we do not know what colour is. 
Hence arises, if I do not mistake, that peculiar conviction 
regarding colour which has so puzzled metaphysicians. 
The sense of colour combines, in closest union, the sen- 
sation and the perception, the organic affection and the 
extra-organic. I confess I have always fondly clung to 
the idea that, sooner or later, colour will be found by 
physical investigation to have a reality, I do not say of 
what kind, in every material object.* 
By help of such distinctions as these, we may defend 
the validity of all our native convictions through the 
senses. In doing so, it will be observed that we stand 
up for the trustworthiness of our original, but not ne- 
cessarily of our acquired perceptions; that we stand up 
for a reality corresponding to our perceptions proper, 
but not therefore to our associated sensations; and that 
we stand up for a reality, be it organic, or extra-organic, 
or both, corresponding to each particular sense as for 
itself, but not a reality for any one sense of precisely the 
same kind as the reality for the others. The senses can 
be supposed to deceive us, when the organism and mind 
are in a sound state, only when we overlook one or other 
or all of these distinctions. 
* I have, in ‘Typical Forms and Special Ends,’ by J. M‘Cosh and 
Geo. Dickie (p. 165, 2nd ed.), pointed to a number of phenomena, which 
seem to show that colour is a reality in the object, which reality is made 
known to us by means of the reflection of the beam by the colour. 
When the undivided beam falls on the green leaves of a plant, the green 
beam is reflected aud reaches our eye, and the red is absorbed, not to 
be lost, but to come out in russet bark, or red flower, or berry. BODY. 
145 
Sect. IV. The Qualities of Matter known by Intuition. 
The distinctions unfolded in last Section seem to be 
the all-important ones, in order to enable us to defend 
the trustworthiness of our sense-perceptions. I have not, 
in that Section, made mention of the famous distinction 
between the Primary and Secondary Qualities of Matter, 
because, so far as it is fitted to clear up and establish the 
validity of the senses, it is embraced in those which we 
have drawn, and which are fitted, in my opinion, to bring 
out the whole truth in a fuller and more distinct manner. 
But it will be necessary, for other philosophic ends, to 
draw a distinction between the qualities of matter which 
are primitively known, and others which may become 
known by induction or scientific research. The qualities 
of matter known to intuition may be divided into three 
classes:—those which relate to space; those which one 
body exercises in reference to another; those which body 
exercises in reference to the sensitive and perceiving 
mind. Let it be observed, in regard to all of these, that 
the quality in the body always relates to something else, 
so passive and dependent is body on something out of 
itself. 
I. There are the Qualities of Matter by which it occu- 
pies Space and is contained in Space, that is, Extension. 
We have this knowledge, I believe, through each of our 
senses; for in each of our senses we know the corre- 
sponding organs as extended and out of each other, and 
through two of the senses we know objects beyond our 
bodily frame as extended. Hamilton represents exten- 
sion as a necessary constituent of our notion of Matter, 
and evolves it from “ two catholic conditions of matter; 
(I.) the occupying space, and (II.) the being contained in 
space. Of these, the former affords (A) Trinal Exten- 
sion, explicated again into (i.) Divisibility, (u.) Size, con- 140 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
taining under it Density or Rarity, (hi.) Figure, and (B) 
Ultimate Incompressibility; while the latter gives (A) 
Mobility, and (B) Situation. Neglecting subordination, 
we have thus eight proximate attributes; 1, Extension; 
2, Divisibility; 3, Size; 4, Density or Rarity; 5, Figure; 0, 
Incompressibility absolute; 7, Mobility; 8, Situation.”* 
II. The Qualities which one body exercises in reference 
to another; in other words, the Properties or Forces of 
matter. I have expended much labour in vain if I have 
not shown, in previous Sections, that here we have a 
necessary conviction. In the visual and locomotive 
senses, we know an extra-organic object as affecting us 
and our organism. All this seems to be involved in our 
perception, and to be a native conviction of the mind, to 
which it is ever prompted, and from which it can never 
be delivered. Not only so, we are ever led to look for 
a producing cause, even of our purely organic affections 
in the ear and palate and nostrils. A knowledge of 
power, and a conviction of power being in exercise, is 
thus involved in our very perceptions through the senses. 
Adhering to these views, we must set aside at once 
two opposite doctrines which have had the support each 
of a number of eminent metaphysicians or metaphysical 
speculators. The one is that matter is known as possess- 
ing no other quality than extension. This error origi- 
nated with Descartes,f and has prevailed extensively 
among those metaphysicians who have felt his influence. 
But the view is opposed to that intuition which repre- 
sents all matter as having and exercising energy. On 
the other side, there are speculators who maintain that 
all the phenomena of matter can be explained by suppo- 
* Hamilton’s Reid, Note D, p. 848. 
t “ L’espace ou le lieu interieur et le corps qui est compris en cet 
espace, ne sont differents aussi que par notre pensee. Car, en effet la 
meme etendue en longueur, largeur et profondeur qui constitue l’espace 
constitue le corps” (Des. Med. p. ii. 10). BODY. 
147 
sing it to possess potency. This mistake sprang from 
Leibnitz, who supposed that the universe of matter (and 
of mind) was composed of monads having power, and to 
which the mind imparted the relation of space.* But 
the dynamical theory of body, so far as it denies the ex- 
istence of space, and body as occupying space, is ut- 
terly inconsistent with that fundamental conviction, of 
which the mind can never be shorn, which declares that 
the matter which has force must be extended, and that 
the force exercised is a force in a body in one part of 
space, over another body in a different part of space. 
III. There is the influence, that is, power, which the 
bodily organs have over the mind. I feel that I must 
speak with great caution on this topic. Neither physio- 
logy nor psychology has been able to throw any light on 
the particular way in which body affects mind. The 
theories which have been introduced,—such as that of 
Occasional Causes by the disciples of Descartes, and of 
Pre-established Harmony by Leibnitz, and of impressions 
by modern physiologists,—have only increased, instead of 
removing the difficulties. We cannot say whether the 
organism affects the knowing mind immediately or me- 
diately. We cannot say whether it has power in itself, 
or whether the power may not lie in some other agent 
working in the organ. We cannot say whether the power 
lies exclusively in the organ, or, as is more probable, in 
the organ and mind combined. Scientific research has 
thrown no light on these mysteries, and intuition should 
not pretend to settle these questions. Still intuition 
seems to me to say, that connected with the organism 
* Leibnitz lield that bodies are endowed with some sort of active 
force. “ Les corps sont doues de quelque force active.” This force may 
be called life. “ C’est une realite immaterielle, indivisible et indestructi- 
ble : il en met partout dans le corps croyant qu’il n’y a point de partie 
de la masse ou il n’y ait un corps organise, doue de quelque perception 
ou d’une maniere d’ame (Op. p. 694: ed. Erdmann). That he looked 
upon space as a relation will come out below. 148 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
there is power of some kind to call forth mental ac- 
tion. 
Such seem to be the qualities of matter which we 
know by intuition. But even in regard to these, experi- 
ence is ever adding to our knowledge, which we arrange 
and systematize by induction and science. Whatever 
other qualities of matter—if there be such—may become 
known to us, are discovered by experience. I have put 
the qualification if there be such, because in fact we do 
not know whether all the other qualities of body be not 
modifications of those we have named. We are made 
aware of such agents as heat, light, electricity, magnetism, 
but it is an unsettled question whether they are bodies or 
(as is more probable) affections of body, implying forces 
of a peculiar character. These are questions which can 
be determined only by physical science, proceeding in 
the method of induction. 
Sect. Y. Our Intuitive Cognition op Self or of Spirit. 
It is very probable (tbougb it can never be positively 
proven) that the first knowledge acquired by the mind is 
of our own bodily frame, through the sensitive organism 
—a view which does not imply that, apart altogether 
from such perceptions, the spirit would not have ope- 
rated. But whatever may be the theory formed on this 
speculative subject, it is certain that whenever or how- 
ever the mind is aroused into an act of intelligence, 
there is always involved in the exercise a knowledge of 
self. Coexisting with every intelligent act of mind there 
is always a self-consciousness. But let it be carefully 
observed that this knowledge is not of an abstract being 
or substance, or of an ego, or of an essence, but of the 
concrete self in the particular state in which it may be, 
with the particular thoughts, sensations, or purposes, 
which it may be entertaining at the time. Let us ob- SPIRIT. 
149 
serve, and seek to evolve, what is involved in the cognition 
of self. 
I. We know self as having being, existence. The 
knowledge we have in self-consciousness, which is asso- 
ciated with every intelligent act, is not of an impression, 
as Hume would say, nor of a mere quality or attribute, 
as certain of the Scottish metaphysicians* would affirm, 
nor of a phenomenon, in the sense of appearance, as Kantf 
supposes, but of a thing or reality. In affirming this, we 
are bringing out and expressing what is embraced in our 
primitive cognition. No account which falls short of this 
can be regarded as a full exhibition of the facts falling 
under our eye when we look within. If any man main- 
'* The Scottish School generally maintains that we do not know mind 
and body, but only the qualities of them. Reid indeed says, “ Every 
man is conscious of a thinking principle, or mind, in himself” (Works, 
p. 217). Campbell, in his ‘ Philosophy of Rhetoric,’ speaks of con- 
sciousness being concerned with “the existence of mind itself, and 
its actual feelings, etc.” (b. i. c. v. p. ii.). But this language is not 
free from ambiguity. Reid says that “ sensation suggests to us both 
a faculty and a mind, and not only suggests the notion of them, but 
creates a belief of their existenceand he defends the use of the word 
‘ suggest,’ which I reckon a very unfortunate one in such an applica- 
tion (Works, pp. 110-111). This view is carried out and elaborated by 
D. Stewart: “ It is not matter or body which I perceive by my senses, 
but only extension, figure, colour, and certain other qualities, which 
the constitution of my nature leads me to refer to something which is 
extended, figured, and coloured. The case is precisely similar with 
respect to mind. We are not immediately conscious of its existence, 
but we are conscious of sensation, thought, and volition, operations 
which imply the existence of something which feels, thinks, and wills ” 
(Elem. vol. i. p. 46). See also vol. ii. p. 41, and Phil. p. 58. 
t Kant holds that the inner sense gives no intuition of the soul as 
an object. “ Der innere Sinn, vermittelst dessen das Gremuth sich 
selbst, oder seinen inneren Zustand anseliaut, giebt zwar keine An- 
schauung von der Seele selbst, als einem Object” (Kr. d. r. Y. p. 34). He 
speaks of the subject envisaging itself, not as it is, but as it appears : “Da 
es denn sich selbst anschaut, nicht wie es sich unmittelbar selbst- 
thatig vorstellen wiirde, sondern nach der Art wie es von innem afficirt 
wird, folglich wie es sich erscheint, nicht wie es ist” (Zw. Aufg. p. 718). 
He says that by the inner sense we know the subject self as phenome- 
non, and not as it is in itself: “ Was die innere Anschauung betrifl't, 150 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
tains that all that we can discover is a mere idea, impres- 
sion, phenomenon, or quality of an unknown thing, I ask 
him for his evidence, and he must, in replying, call in the 
internal sense, and I can then show him that this sense, 
or cognitive power (for it is not a sense except in an 
abusive application of the term), declares that we know 
a something, or thing with a positive existence. 
This is a knowledge which cannot be explained, nor 
defined in the sense of being resolved into anything 
simpler or founded on anything deeper. It is a simple 
element implied in every intelligent act, and not derived 
from any other act or exercise. It is a basis on which 
other knowledge may be reared, and not a superstructure 
standing on another foundation. 
As it is a primitive, so it is a necessary conviction. 
We cannot by any other supposed knowledge undermine 
or set aside this fundamental knowledge. We cannot be 
made by any process of speculation or ratiocination to 
believe that we have not being. The process of reason- 
ing which would set aside this cognition can plead no 
principle stronger than the conviction which we have in 
favour of the reality of self. 
In saying that we know self as possessed of being, we 
do not mean to affirm that we know all about self, or 
about our spiritual nature. There are mysteries about 
self, and about everything else we know, sufficient to awe 
every truly wise man into humility. All that is meant 
is, that, whatever may be unknown, we always know 
unser eigenes Subject nur als Erscheinung, nicbt aber nacb dem, vras es 
an sicb selbst ist, erkennen” (ib. p. 850). Mr. Mansel has done great 
service to philosophy by maintaining so clearly and resolutely, in his 
‘Prolegomena Logica,’ and the article on ‘Metaphysics’ in the ‘Ency- 
clopaedia Britannica,’ that we intuitively know self. “I am imme- 
diately conscious of myself seeing and hearing, willing and thinking” 
(Prol. Log. p. 129). Hamilton speaks of our being conscious every 
moment of our existence, and of the ego as a “ self-subsistent entity” 
(Metaph. Lect. 19). SPIRIT. 
151 
being whenever we know any of the objects presented 
to us from within or from without. This subject will be 
resumed in a more special manner in next Chapter. 
II. We know self as not depending for its existence 
on our observation of it. Of course we can know self 
only when we know self; our knowledge of self exists 
not till we have the knowledge, and it exists only so long 
as we have the knowledge. But when we come to know 
self, we know it as already existing, and we do not look 
on its continued existence as depending on our recogni- 
tion of it. 
III. We know self as being in itself an abiding exist- 
ence. Not that we are to stretch this conviction so far 
as to believe in the self-existence of mind, or in its eter- 
nal existence. We believe certainly in the permanence 
of mind independent of our cognition of it, and amidst 
all the shiftings and variations of its states. Yet this 
does not imply that there never was a time when self was 
non-existing. For aught this conviction says, there may 
have been a time when self came into existence—another 
conviction assures us that when it did, it must have had 
a cause. It must be added that this conviction does not 
go the length of assuring us that mind must exist for 
ever, or that it must exist after the dissolution of the 
body. It does indeed seem to say that, if it shall cease 
to exist, it must be in virtue of some cause adequate to 
destroy it; and it helps to produce and strengthen the 
feeling which the dying man cherishes when he looks on 
the soul as likely to abide when the body is dead. But 
as to whether the dissolution of the bodily frame is a 
sufficient cause of the decease of the soul,—as to whether 
it may abide when the bodily frame is disorganized,—this 
is a question to be settled not altogether by intuition, but 
by a number of other considerations, and more particu- 
larly by the conviction that God will call us into judg- 152 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
ment at last, and is most definitely settled, after all, by the 
inspired declarations of the Word of God. But it is 
pleasant to observe that there is an original conviction 
altogether in unison with this derivative belief, a convic- 
tion leading us to look on self as permanent unless there 
be a cause working adequate to its dissolution. 
According to the views presented under these heads, 
the existence of self is a position to be assumed, and not 
to be proven. It does not need proof, and no proof 
should be offered; no mediate evidence could possibly be 
clearer than the truth which it is brought to support. It 
has been keenly disputed how we are to understand the 
“ Cogito, ergo sum,” of Descartes. Are we to regard it 
as a process of reasoning ? If it be so, it is either a pe- 
titio principii, or its conclusiveness may be doubted. If 
the cogito be understood as embracing ego, that is, be 
understood as ego cogito, then the ego is evidently in- 
volved in it, is in fact assumed. If it means anything 
short of this, then it might be difficult to establish the 
accuracy of the inference; "thus, if the cogito does not 
embrace the ego, it is not clear that the conclusion fol- 
lows.* Or are we to regard the statement as a sort of 
primitive judgment, not implying mediate reasoning or a 
middle termpf Taken in this sense, I would reckon 
that the connection between thought and existence is in- 
volved in our knowledge of self as existing, rather than 
that the knowledge of self issues from the perception of 
the connection between thought and personal existence. 
Or are we to look on the expression as simply a mode of 
* Kant lias a powerful criticism of tlie “ Cogito, ergo sum,” considered 
as an argument, in his Paralogismen d. r. Vern. in the Kritik. 
t In answering the objections of Gassendi, Descartes says: “ Cum 
advertimus nos esse res cogitantes, prima qusedam notio est quae et 
nullo syllogismo concluditur; neque etiam quis dicit ‘ Ego cogito, ergo 
sum, sive existo,’ existentiam ex cogitatione per syllogismum deducit, sed 
tanquam rem per se notam simpliei mentis intuitu agnoscit.” See the 
subj ect discussed by Cousin, Prem. Ser. tom. i. let?, vi. SPIRIT. 
153 
stating an assumption ? In this case the word ergo, the 
usual symbol of reasoning, comes in awkwardly; and 
besides, the truth to be assumed is not the complex 
judgment, cogito, ergo sum, but the fact revealed at once 
to consciousness of ego cogitans.* This primitive cog- 
nition may be the ground of a number of judgments, but 
it is to reverse the order of things entirely to make any 
one of these judgments the ground of the cognitions. 
The cognitions which have been unfolded in this Chap- 
ter, form, when memory begins to be exercised, the ground 
of our recognition of our personal identity, and lead us 
to believe in a self which abideth amid all changes of 
thought and mood and feeling. This subject will be 
resumed by us under the head of Primitive Judgments. 
IV. We know self as exercising potency. We have 
seen that we know it as having being; we know it 
further as having active being. We know it as acting, 
we know it as being acted on, we know it as the source 
of action.f Even in sense-perception we know it as 
being acted on from without,—nay, we know it as itself 
acting in producing the result. So far as we know ob- 
jects acting on it, we know it as capable of being in- 
fluenced,—in other words, as having a capacity of a 
particular description. So far as we know it acting in 
producing changes in itself or other things, we know it 
* “ C’est par une meme perception de notre ame qne nous eprouvons 
le sentiment intime et de notre pensee et de notre existence” (Buffier, 
Prem. Ver. p. i. c. i.). 
t Sir W. Hamilton admits all I am pleading for. “ I know myself 
as a force in energy, the not-self as a counter-force in energy” (Note 
D, p. 666, of Ap. to Reid). And again: “We have a perception proper, 
of the secundo-primary quality, of resistance in an extra-organic force 
as an immediate cognition” (p. 883). Is this statement an essential 
part of his doctrine, or an incidental admission P If part of his system, 
it should modify the view he has given elsewhere of our conviction of 
power as being a mere impotency (see Appendix to Discuss.). If it be 
inadvertent, it is a proof that truth will come out of honest men, in 
spite of the errors of their system. 154 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
as a potency, as having power. When we recollect, 
when we fondly dwell on a particular scene, when we fix 
the thoughts on a particular object, we are exercising 
power, and by consciousness we know that we are doing 
so. When in consequence of coming to know of events 
bearing upon us personally,—say of some blessing about 
to descend, or calamity about to befall,—we rejoice or 
grieve, we experience an effect. This conscious potency 
is especially felt in all exercises of the will, whether it be 
directed to the mental action which we wish to stay or 
quicken, or the bodily organism which we purpose to 
move. I demur, indeed, to the view maintained by 
some philosophers of eminence, that our idea of power 
is obtained exclusively from the consciousness of the 
power of will over the muscles. But I am persuaded 
that our most vivid conviction of power is derived from 
the influence of the will both on bodily and mental ac- 
tion,* and that the influence of the will on the organism 
is what enables us to connect mental with bodily action. 
But here it will be necessary to offer an explanation to 
save ourselves from obvious difficulties, which many have 
not seen their way to overcome. We shall find, under 
another head, that while we believe intuitively that every 
effect has a cause, we do not know by intuition what the 
cause is apart from experience; and that while we are 
convinced that the cause produces the effect, it is only 
by experience we know what the effect is. It follows 
that we do not know intuitively what or how many 
* This is substantially the view of Locke, wbo says, “ Bodies by our 
senses do not afford us so clear and distinct an idea of active power as 
we bave from reflection on the operations of our own mind.” In de- 
riving our idea of Power from Sensation and Reflection, he supposes the 
mind to be actively and intelligently exercised. “ Whatever change is 
observed, the mind must collect a power somewhere to make that 
change” (Essay, ii. xxi. 4). But Locke has omitted to inquire what 
it is in the mind which insists that it must collect a cause wherever 
there is a change. SPIRIT. 
155 
powers must concur to produce a given effect. This 
qualification will be found to have a great significance 
imparted to it by the circumstance to be afterwards 
noticed, that in order to most creature effects there is 
need of a concurrence of causes, or of a concause. When 
I will to move my arm, I know that the will is one of the 
elements in producing the effect, but I do not know, till 
physiology tells me, how many others must co-operate. 
It follows that one of the elements of a complex cause 
may act and no effect follow, because one part of the con- 
cause is absent. I may will to take a cheerful view of every- 
thing, and yet not be able owing to the rise of gloomy 
thoughts. I may will to move my arm and yet the arm 
may not move, because paralysis has cut off the concur- 
rence of the organism. This subject will again come 
before us under various aspects. 
Y. We know the knowing mind to be different from 
the material object known, whether this be the organism 
as affected or the object affecting it. Not that we know 
by intuition wherein the difference lies; not that we 
are in a position to say whether they may not, after all, 
have points of resemblance, and a mutual dependence, 
and a reciprocal influence,—on these points our only 
guide is a gathered experience. But in every act in 
which we know a bodily object, we know it to be dif- 
ferent from self, and self to be different from it. This is 
a conviction which we can never lose, and of which no 
sophistry can deprive us. We carry it with us at all 
times, and wherever we go. It makes it impossible for 
any man to confound himself with the universe, or the 
universe with him. Man may mistake one external ob- 
ject for another, but it is not possible that he should 
mistake an external object for himself, or identify himself 
with any other object. This conviction is thus a means, 
as shall be shown later in the treatise, of delivering us 15G 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
from the more common forms of idealism, and from 
every form of pantheism. 
VI. We know self in every one of its states, as these 
pass before self-consciousness. And herein lies an im- 
portant difference between the knowledge we have of 
mind and the greater portion of the knowledge we have 
acquired of the material universe. The knowledge which 
we have of matter by intuition is extremely limited. 
What we thus know, indeed, is supremely valuable, as 
the ground on which we erect all our other information; 
still it is in itself very narrow, being confined to an ac- 
quaintance with our organism as extended and as ex- 
ercising an influence on the mind, and to objects imme- 
diately in contact with it. Most even of the knowledge 
which we have of our organism, and of objects in contact 
with it, is derivative; and there is a process of inference 
in all that we know of objects at a distance,—of sun, 
moon, stars, of hills, rivers, valleys,—and of the persons 
and countenances and conversations of our friends. But 
in regard to our own minds, we know all the individual 
facts directly and intuitively. We gaze at once on the 
mind thinking, imagining, feeling, resolving. In this 
view it may be safely said that we know more of certain 
of the states and of the action of mind than we know of 
the whole material universe, even in this age of advanced 
science. It should be added, in order to save the remark 
from appearing to some incredibly extravagant, that while 
we thus know spontaneously so much about the workings 
of the mind, the majority of men think far more about 
their objective than their subjective knowledge. It 
should be further added, that while we are ever growing, 
more than people who have not thought on the subject 
imagine, in the knowledge of our mental affections, yet 
there are greater difficulties in adding to our original 
stock in the mental than in the material world. ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
157 
It is the office of psychology, as a science, to observe 
wherein the states of mind which fall under conscious- 
ness agree and wherein they differ, and to endeavour to 
arrange and classify them. In conducting this its work, 
all the facts are discovered by consciousness as an intuitive 
faculty. Our sensations, our perceptions, our elaborated 
thoughts, our moral cognitions, our emotions, our wishes, 
our volitions, and all our necessary convictions, are under 
our immediate view. But it is to be carefully observed 
that the classification is a work of discursive, and not of 
intuitive thought. We know our thoughts and feelings, 
but not as thoughts or feelings. As to how we are to 
arrange them, and as to what is the best classification of 
our mental states, this is a question not for intuition, but 
for mental science, looking to the facts which conscious- 
ness makes known. We are conscious, not of faculties, 
but merely of individual energies, which we compare and 
arrange under certain heads as faculties. It is impor- 
tant to state here once more that we are conscious of 
the intuitions of the mind as individual energies, and not 
as abstract forms or general laws. 
CHAPTER II. 
ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
Sect. I, (Preliminary.) On the Nature oe Abstraction 
and Generalization. 
As abstraction and generalization perform so important a part 
in the formation of tbe a priori notions and maxims out of tbe 
concrete and individual convictions, it will be necessary to explain 
the nature of these processes, the more so as a defective account 
has often been given of them. 158 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
It is very generally acknowledged that man’s mind begins with 
the concrete, and thence reaches the abstract, that is, that it first 
knows or contemplates an object with the qualities presenting 
themselves, and that it afterwards learns to consider the object 
apart from any particular quality, or the quality apart from the 
object. The statement now made, does not imply that man’s pri- 
mary knowledge is complex. The complex is not the same as the 
concrete. In complex knowledge man has mingled several cogni- 
tions which are simple; but to man the concrete is the simple. 
His primary knowledge is of objects with certain qualities which 
he may subsequently he able to separate and distinguish. Thus 
by the eye he gets a knowledge of the bodies before him as at one 
and the same time extended and coloured. By the muscular sense, 
or locomotive energy, he knows objects as extended, movable, and 
resisting energy. It is a curious circumstance that when the me- 
mory recalls an object, it always presents it in the concrete, that 
is, with qualities which can be separated. We cannot even ima- 
gine an object except in the concrete ; we cannot picture to our- 
selves an extended surface without giving it colour of some kind, 
and we cannot imagine a colour except on an extended surface. 
With this primary knowledge and these representations in pos- 
session, the mind proceeds to abstract, and is urged to do so by a 
native intellectual impulse. It can separate in thought the quali- 
ties from the object, or one quality from another, say the colour 
from the form. 
Abstraction may be considered in a wider or in a narrower 
sense. It may be regarded, in an extended sense, as that opera- 
tion of mind, in which, to use the language of Whately, “ we draw 
off and contemplate separately any part of an object presented to 
the mind, disregarding the rest” (Logic Anal. Out.). In this 
more general sense the parts may exist separately as well as the 
whole; thus, having seen a judge with his wig, we can not only 
separate in thought the wig from the judge, but the wig can in 
fact be separated from the wearer. In a narrower sense, abstrac- 
tion is that operation of mind in which we contemplate the quality 
of an object separately from the object. “An abstract name,” says 
Mr. Mill (Logic, b. i. c. ii.), “ is a name which stands for an attri- 
bute of a thing.” In this sense the part separated in thought can- 
not be separated from the object in fact. Colour may be thought 
of (not seen or imagined) apart from an extended body, but cannot 
exist apart from a coloured object. 
It is a very common impression that our abstractions are in no 
sense realities. I wish at this early stage of the investigations to ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
159 
be prosecuted in this treatise, to set myself against this view, 
which has sometimes been positively expressed, but is far more fre- 
quently underlying and implied in statements and arguments 
without being formally announced. I lay down a very different 
position, that if the concrete be real, and the abstraction be pro- 
perly made, the abstract thing, that is, the thing contemplated in 
the abstraction, will also be real. I may never have seen a bird 
without wings, but I can consider the wings apart from the bird, 
and I am sure that the wings have as real an existence as the bird 
itself. This will be admitted at once in regard to all such cases 
as this, in which I can in fact separate the pinions from the body of 
the fowl. But I go a step further, and maintain, that even in cases 
in which the part abstracted cannot be separated in reality from 
the whole, still it is to be considered as real. It may not have, or 
be capable of having, an independent reality, but still it has a re- 
ality. I can think of gravitation apart from a given body, or from 
the chemical affinity of that body; and in doing so I do not sup- 
pose that it can exist apart from body ; still the gravitation has an 
existence just as much as the body has, it has not a reality inde- 
pendent of the body, but it has a reality in the body, as a quality 
of it. The same remark might be applied to, and will hold good of, 
any other abstraction. No doubt if the original concrete object be 
imaginary, the abstraction formed from it may be the same ; I can 
separate in thought the beauty of Venus from Venus herself; and 
of course, as Venus is ideal, so also is her beauty. But when the 
object is real, and I abstract or separately contemplate what has 
been known in the real, then, as the concrete object is real, so is 
also the part or quality abstracted real; not that it may be a real- 
ity capable of subsisting in itself, but still a reality in the object 
as a quality of it. 
I reckon it of the utmost moment to make this remark. The 
view here presented saves us on the one hand from an extreme 
Eealism, which would attribute an independent reality to every 
quality abstracted, which would for example represent beauty as a 
separate thing, like a beautiful scene in nature, and on the other 
hand, from what is more important in our present inquiry, from 
regarding it as a nonentity, or at the utmost as a mere form or cre- 
ation of the mind.* We are ever hearing the phrase repeated a 
* “ Concreta vere res sint, abstracta non sunt res sed rerum modi; 
modi autem nibil aliud sunt quam relationes rei ad intellectual seu appa- 
rendi facultates” (Leibnitz de Stilo Pbilos.: Nizolii Op. p. 63). In 
this as in other matters, Leibnitz introduced a subjective tendency,which 
came forth in full manifestation only in a later age. 160 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
“ mere abstraction; ” and the language is applied to such objects as 
space, time, beauty, and even truth and moral good. In opposi- 
tion to such views, I maintain that abstraction is not necessarily 
concerned about fictions or illusions. Abstractions are not, as 
they have often been represented, the attenuated ghosts of de- 
parted quantities ; they may rather be represented as the very 
skeleton of the body, not capable of action alone, but still an im- 
portant existence in the btfdy, acting with its covering of flesh and 
skin. Abstraction is not only a lofty intellectual exercise, it is in 
a sense a cognitive act, and when the concrete object looked at is 
real, it will give us, if properly conducted, a reality in the part se- 
parated. As to whether this part is or is not capable of a sepa- 
rate existence, this depends on the nature of the original concrete 
cognition. 
Generalization is dependent on abstraction, and arises out of it. 
In generalization we contemplate an indefinite number of objects 
as possessing a common attribute or attributes. A general notion 
is a notion of these objects. This expressed in language is a com- 
mon term, which therefore stands for an indefinite number of ob- 
jects, for all that possess the common quality or qualities. 
As abstractions are formed out of concretes, so generalizations 
are formed out of individuals or singulars. It has been very 
generally allowed by philosophers that the mind begins with the 
knowledge of individual objects or scenes presented to it. Among 
these objects it may, by its comparative faculty, discover resem- 
blances. In some cases the comparison is preceded by an ab- 
straction of the qualities in respect of which the objects are alike; 
in other cases it may be perceived at once that there is a resem- 
blance, and the abstraction of the points of resemblance may 
follow. In all cases, both the discovery of resemblance and ab- 
straction are needful to generalization, in which we put in a class, 
and usually call by a common name, the objects thought to re- 
semble each other in certain respects, and so far as they resemble 
each other. 
1 am prepared to lay down in regard to generalization a pro- 
position similar to that which I am inclined to enforce in regard 
to abstraction. When the individuals are real, the generaliza- 
tion has also a reality; that is, there is a reality in the class. 
True, I may constitute a class from imaginary individuals,—say a 
class of griffins, or a class of mermaids, or a class of ghosts. In 
such a case the general is as unreal as the singular. But if my 
generalization is from real objects; if it is a generalization made 
of objects in nature, say of marbles, or reptiles, or cruciferous ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
161 
plants, or even of objects of human workmanship, such as chairs, 
or houses, or churches, then the intellectual product has also a 
reality involved. I do not mean to say that the general exists, or 
can exist, as an individual thing, like the singulars which it em- 
braces,—that the class crocodile has the same sort of existence as 
the individual crocodile,—but I maintain that it has a reality in 
the common attributes possessed by the objects. 
In abstraction, the reality may be simply that of an attribute in 
an individual object. In generalization, it is the possession of a 
common attribute by an indefinite number of objects. The com- 
position of marble is a fact quite as much, though not exactly of 
the same sort, as the limestone itself. The possession of cold 
blood, and of the three heart-compartments, is a reality quite as 
much as the individual crocodile is. The possession of four cross 
petals is a real thing, just as a particular wild mustard-plant is. 
The structure and adaptation to a practical use of chair, house, 
and church, are not fictitious any more than this chair, or this 
house, or this church is. This account preserves us on the one hand 
from an extravagant realism, which would give to the universal 
the same sort of reality as the singular; and on the other, from 
an extreme conceptualism or nominalism, which would place the 
reality solely in the conception of the mind, or in the name. The 
class has a reality, hut it is simply in the possession of common 
qualities by an indefinite number of objects. 
According to this view, abstraction and generalization are pro- 
cesses of a very high order; they are, in fact, essential to philoso- 
phy, quite as much so, indeed, as Plato and the Schoolmen supposed; 
without them we can never reach the truths on which the higher 
forms of wisdom gaze. They always pre-suppose, indeed, that 
something has been given them ; but, acting upon this, they turn 
it to most important purposes, and if they start with realities and 
are properly conducted, they are ever in the region of realities, 
and of realities of the highest kind. We shall see as we advance 
that all philosophic notions and maxims are the results of these 
processes, some of them being abstractions, and others being also 
of the nature of generalizations. 
Sect. II. On Being. 
But what can be said of Being? Verily, little can be 
said of it. The mistake of metaphysicians lies in their 
saying too much; and they have made assertions which 
have, and can have, no meaning, and landed themselves 162 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
in self-created mysteries or in contradictions. So little 
can be affirmed of Being, not because of the complexity 
of the idea, but because of its simplicity; we can find 
nothing simpler into which to resolve it. We have 
come to ultimate truth, and there is really no deeper 
foundation on which to rest it. There is no light behind 
in which to show it in vivid outline. 
In the concrete every one has the cognition of Being, 
just as every man has a skeleton in his frame. But 
the common mind is apt to turn away from the abstract 
idea, as it does from an anatomical preparation; or ra- 
ther, it feels as if such attenuated notions belong to the 
regions of ghosts, where 
“ Entity and quiddity, 
The ghosts of defunct bodies, fly.” 
All that the metaphysician can do is to appeal to the 
perception which all men form, to separate this from the 
others with which it is joined, and make it stand out 
singly and simply, that it may shine and be seen in its 
own light, and with this the mind will be satisfied:— 
“ Who thinks of asking if the sun is light, 
Observing that it lightens ?” 
Those who attempt anything more, and to peer into the 
object, will find that the light darkens as they gaze 
upon it. “ When I burned in desire to question them 
further, they made themselves—air, into which they va- 
nished.” 
I allow that the abstract notion of Being is one which 
the mind is not inclined spontaneously to fashion. As 
to many other abstractions, it is led naturally to form 
them; they are framed for it, or it is compelled by the 
circumstances in which it is placed to frame them. Thus 
I see a man with a black coat one day, and with a grey 
coat the next, and I cannot but separate the colour from ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
163 
the object. But in such high abstractions as Being, that 
which we contemplate is never, in fact, separated from 
any one thing. Still Being is an abstraction which we 
are constrained to make for philosophic purposes, and it 
was, in fact, formed so early as the age of the specu- 
lators of the Eleatic School. It is the one thing to 
be found objectively in all our knowledge. Hence in 
all our abstractions it is that which remains; in the 
ascending process of generalization it is the summum 
genus. This does not prove that Being can exist apart 
from a special mode of existence, or the exercise of some 
quality. Nor does it prove that we can know Being se- 
parate from a concrete existence. I hold the one as well 
as the other of these to be impossible. But in all know- 
ledge we know what we know as having existence, which 
is Being. 
I cannot give my adhesion to the opinion of those who 
speak so strongly of man being incapacitated to know 
Being. I have already intimated my dissent from the 
Kantian doctrine that we do not know things, but ap- 
pearances ; and even from the theory of those Scottish 
metaphysicians who affirm that we do not know things, 
but qualities. What we know is the thing manifesting 
itself to us,—is the thing exercising particular qualities. 
But then it is confidently asserted that we do not know 
the “ thing in itself.” The language, I rather think, is 
unmeaning; but if it has a meaning, it is incorrect. I 
do not believe that there is any such thing in existence 
as Being in itself, or that man can even so much as 
imagine it: and if this be so, it is clear that we cannot 
know it, and desirable that we should not suppose that 
we know it. Of this I am sure, that those Neo-Pla- 
tonists who professed to be able to rise to the discovery 
of Being in itself (which could only be the abstract idea 
of Being), and to be employed in gazing on it, had 164 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
miserably bare and most unprofitable matter of medi- 
tation, whether for intellectual, or moral, or religious 
ends. But if any mean to deny that we can know 
Being as it is, I maintain in opposition to them, and I 
appeal to consciousness to confirm me when I say, that 
we immediately know Being in every act of cognition. 
But then we are told that we cannot know the mystery 
of Being.* I am under a strong impression that specu- 
lators have attached a much greater amount of mystery 
to this simple subject than really belongs to it. Of this 
I am sure, that much of the obscurity which has col- 
lected around it has sprung from the confused discus- 
sions of metaphysicians, who have laboured to explain 
what needs no explanation to our intelligence, or to get 
a basis on which to build what stands securely on its 
own foundation. I do indeed most fully admit that 
there may be much about Being which we do not know; 
much about Being generally, much about every indi- 
vidual Being, unknown to us and unknowable in this 
world. Still I do affirm that we know so much of 
Being, and that any further knowledge conveyed to us 
would not set aside our present knowledge, but would 
simply enlarge it. 
Sect. III. On Substance. 
All that the metaphysician can do in regard to sub- 
* Kant everywhere speaks of our not knowing the “ Ding an sich.” 
See in the Kritik of Pure Reason (Antin. d. r. Y. Abs. vi.). M. Cousin 
allows to Kant that we have not a consciousness of our proper nature, 
otherwise, he says, that the abysses and mysteries of existence would 
all be known; but to save himself from the Kantian consequences, he 
calls in reason to give us a conviction of self and personal identity :— 
“ Nul de nous n’a conscience de sa propre nature, sans quoi les abimes 
de l’existence seraient faciles a sonder, les mysteres de lame nous 
seraient parfaitement connus.” “ L’identite personnelle est une con- 
viction de la raison ” (ser. ii. le<y. xviii.). It were surely both simpler 
and wiser to suppose that there is intelligence in consciousness, and 
that this intelligent consciousness knows self. ANALYSIS OE OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
165 
stance is to show that our cognition of it is original and 
fundamental, and to evolve what is contained in the 
cognition. He should not attempt to prove how it is so 
and so (the Slotc of Aristotle), but he may show that it 
is so and so (the oti of Aristotle). He could not give the 
dimmest idea of it to one who had not already the know- 
ledge, but he may separate it by analysis from the other 
cognitions with which it is combined, and make it stand 
out fully to the view. He may so weigh and measure it 
as to show its extent and boundary, and deliver it from 
those crudities in which speculators have incrusted it. 
The following is the best analysis I am able to furnish. 
I. In all knowledge of substance there is involved 
Being or Existence, not of being in the abstract, but of 
something in being. This we have seen is an essential 
element in our cognition, both of mind and body. The 
mind starts with knowledge, and with the knowledge of 
things as having being. This is the foundation, the ne- 
cessary foundation, of all other exercises. If the mind 
did not begin with knowledge, it could not end with 
knowledge. In particular, if it had not knowledge in the 
concrete, it never could get knowledge in the abstract. 
If there were not a knowledge of things in the premisses 
with which we set out, there never could be such a know- 
ledge in the conclusion. But having knowledge, obtained 
by intuition, to set out with, we find that when we proceed 
legitimately—that is, according to the laws of thought— 
in our discursive exercises, we have always reality in the 
conclusion. 
II. In all knowledge of substance there is involved 
Active Power. We cannot know self, or the mind that, 
knows, except as active, that is, exerting power, or as 
being affected. Nor can we know material objects except 
as exercising or suffering an influence—that is a certain 
kind of power. They become known to us as having a 1G6 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
power either upon ourselves or upon other objects, and 
we express this when we say that we know matter by 
its properties. 
This is a doctrine which has been opposed by a large 
school of metaphysicians that have felt directly or indi- 
rectly the influence of Descartes, who represented exten- 
sion as the essence of matter. This oversight has marred 
their whole speculations, and landed them in innumer- 
able difficulties. For not finding power in our original 
cognitions, they have either with the sceptic Idume denied 
that we have any such cognition, or they have with Kant 
made it a form which the mind imposes on objects. Still 
a large amount of authority can be pleaded in behalf of 
the doctrine, that power is involved in our idea of sub- 
stance. It is the expressed view of Locke. It is main- 
tained by Leibnitz with all the ingenuity of his specula- 
tive genius. Even Kant acknowledges (though from the 
subjective character which he ascribes to our intuitive 
convictions, he can turn it to no profitable account) that 
cause is involved in our idea of substance.* It has been 
incidentally admitted by many who have theoretically de- 
nied it. 
III. There is involved in our knowledge of substance 
a conviction of its having a Permanence.! This proposi- 
tion must be very guardedly stated. By being loosely and 
inaccurately announced, it has led to very erroneous and 
* Locke says that “ powers make a great part of our complex ideas 
of substances” (Essay ii. xxiii. 7-10). Leibnitz says, “Jusqu’ici rien 
n’a mieux marque la substance que la puissance d’agir ” (Op. p. 460). 
The language of Kant is, “ Diese Causalitat fiihrt auf den Bcgriff der 
Handlung, diese auf den Begriff der Kraft und dadurch auf den Begriff 
der Substanz.” “ Wo Handlung mitbin Tbatigkeit und Kraft ist, da 
ist aucb Substanz” (Werke, pp. 172, 173). “Die Substanz in Raume 
kennen wir nur durcb Krafte ” (p. 218). See also Abrici System der 
Logik, Tb. i. 5, where are some profound views of power. 
f Speaking of such qualities as hardness, Reid says :—“ They were 
real qualities before they were perceived by touch, and continue to be 
so when they are not perceived ; for if any man will affirm that dia- ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
167 
dangerous doctrines. But there is a truth here, if we could 
only properly apprehend and express it. A substance is 
not a spectre which appeared when we began to see it, 
and which may cease to exist when we have ceased to 
view it. This conviction is at the basis of the belief in 
the abiding nature of every existing thing, amid all the 
changes which it may undergo. However a piece of mat- 
ter may be beat or cut mechanically, we do not believe it 
to be destroyed. However it may be evaporated or de- 
composed by heat or chemical processes, we are not con- 
vinced that it is annihilated. When the moisture on the 
earth disappears, we do not therefore conclude that it has 
vanished into nothing ; we look for it in a new form, and 
our expectation is gratified when we discover it in the 
vapour of the atmosphere or the cloud. When fuel is 
put on the fire it gradually disappears from the view, but 
we inquire for it elsewhere, and find it in the ashes and 
in the smoke. Our conviction of the abiding nature of 
self is still more deeply rooted and fixed. We believe in 
its continuance amid all the changes of thought and sen- 
sation, mood and feeling, lethargy and activity. 
But while there is all this in our apprehension of sub- 
stance, there is not more than this, and the errors have 
arisen from supposing that there is more. In particular, 
our conviction does not require us to believe either 
in the necessary existence of every substance or in its 
indestructibility. Our intuition does not say whether 
it has or has not been created, whether it does or does 
monds were not hard till they were handled, who would reason with 
him ?” “ Our sensations suggest to us a sentient being or mind to 
which they belong, a sentient being which hath a permanent exist- 
ence, although the sensations are transient and of short durat'on, a 
being which is still the same while its sensations and other opera- 
tions are varied ten thousand ways ” (Reid’s Works, pp. 120, 122). 
The word suggest, taken from Berkeley and from Locke, was appropriate 
enough as used by idealists, but comes awkwardly from Reid. The word 
should have been know. ICS 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
not need the Divine power to maintain and uphold it, 
whether it may or may not be destroyed. It does not 
entitle us to affirm that matter must ever have existed, 
or must, if formed, have been fashioned out of pre-existing 
materials. Nor does it say how long it has existed, or 
how long it will exist. An analogous intuitive convic- 
tion—that of cause—says that if produced, it must have 
been produced by a cause ; that if destroyed, it must be 
by a power independent of itself. Hence we cannot 
assert positively, when we see a substance, say a piece of 
burned coal, disappearing from our view, that it must still 
exist, for in the operation of combustion there may have 
been a power to destroy it; all that we can affirm is, that 
the substance did not vanish of itself. All that our in- 
tuition guarantees is, that in itself substance has perma- 
nence, and that if destroyed, it must be by something ab 
extra. 
By this limitation we are saved at once from certain 
pernicious consequences which were drawn from the doc- 
trine of Descartes. According to him, a substance is that 
which subsists of itself, which has no need of anything 
from without in order to its existence.* Proceeding on 
this definition, Spinoza laboured to show that there was 
and could be only one substance, of which everything is 
an attribute or a mode. The school of Descartes sought 
to save themselves from this pantheistic consequence by 
various devices. It is not to our present purpose to in- 
quire whether these were or were not successful, as in 
accordance with the principles of Descartes. To me it 
appears that we must amend the definition of Descartes, 
* “ Per substantiam nibil aliud intelligere possumus, quam rem quae 
ita existit, ut nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum. Et quidem substan- 
tia quae nulla plane re indigeat, unica tantum potest intellige, nempe 
Deus. Alias vero omnes non nisi ope concursus Dei existere posse 
percipimus” (Prin. Phil., p. i. 51). He speaks of created substances 
“ quod sint res quae solo Dei concursu egent ad existendum ” (ib. 52). ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMTIVE COONITIONS. 
169 
and reject the definition of Spinoza, and then all the con- 
clusions founded on them must fall to the ground. 
“ I understand,” says Spinoza, “ by substance, that 
which is in itself, and conceived by itself; that is to say, 
that of which the concept can be formed without hav- 
ing need of the concept of any other thing.”* There is 
a whole aggregate of things jumbled in this definition. 
That which is in itself is one thing, that which is con- 
ceived by itself is another thing, which is not even neces- 
sarily the same as that which is given as an explanation, 
viz. that of which a concept can be formed without 
having need of the concept of any other thing. I object 
to our conviction in regard to substance being called a 
concept, a phrase denoting an abstract or general notion 
formed by a discursive process of the understanding; the 
conviction is an intuition. The intuition says of every 
substance that it is a thing or reality, but it does not say 
whence the reality proceeded. It says that substance has 
power, but it does not say whence that power. No doubt 
a substance is a thing known (not merely conceived) in 
itself, but the same may be said of space and time, and 
everything apprehended intuitively. Having removed 
this definition out of the way, as not the expression of our 
intuitive knowledge, we leave the whole pantheism of Spi- 
noza without a foundation. I am certain that our native 
conviction as to substance gives no countenance to pan- 
theism of any kind. Our intuition says that substance 
has being, but it does not say whether it is dependent or 
independent being. It says that it has power, but it does 
not say that it is underived, or whence it is derived. It 
says that it has permanence, but does not say that it has 
not been created, and that it cannot be destroyed. 
* “ Per substantiam intelligo id quod in se est et per se concipitur; 
hoc est id cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei a quo 
formari debeat ” (Ethices p. i. def. 3 : ed. Bruder). 170 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
According to the account now given, self or spirit must 
be a substance. We know it as having being, we know 
it as having power and permanence. While it has all 
these, it is to be studiously noticed that we do not know 
it to have all, or indeed any, of these independently. For 
aught our intuition says, it may be dependent for all of 
these on the creative power or concurrent power of God. 
Not only so, it may, for anything our intuition intimates, 
be dependent for some of these on its association with 
the bodily organism in this present state of things. If 
we wish to settle these questions, we must look to other 
circumstances and considerations. 
Many metaphysicians have felt greater difficulty in al- 
lowing that matter is a substance. But explaining sub- 
stance as has been done in this Section, it is entitled to 
be so regarded. It too has being, power, and endurance. 
We can deny this only by refusing to follow our native 
convictions. But in standing up for the substantial na- 
ture of body, it is still more necessary than in the case of 
spirit, to bear in mind the qualifications under which we 
make the statement. We cannot affirm of matter that 
it has derived its characteristics from no source indepen- 
dent of itself. Nor can we declare of it that it can sub- 
sist of itself, and independent of the co-operating power 
of mind, that is, the Divine Mind. We are stretching- 
in tuition altogether beyond its province, if we make it 
pronounce oracular decisions on any such questions. 
But are mind and matter different substances? I 
reply that there are certain positions on this subject 
which can be defended against all opposition. First, in the 
cognition of the knowing mind, which ever co-exists with 
our cognition of matter, we always know the two to be 
different. When we look at these hills we have ever an 
accompanying cognition of self as looking at the hills, 
and we know the hills to be different from self, and self ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
171 
to be different from the hills. Secondly, we know that 
the very things by which substance is characterized—ex- 
istence, potency, and permanence—are not the same in 
the case of mind and body. Thus the being of mind is 
not the same with that of matter, nor are the powers of 
mind the same with those of matter, nor does the per- 
manence of body depend on human beings observing it, 
nor can it be shown that the permanence of mind de- 
pends on the permanence of the bodily frame. With 
these proofs or presumptions in our favour, we may surely 
throw the onus probandi of proving that they are the 
same substance on our opponents. But, thirdly, all at- 
tempts to resolve mind into matter, or matter into mind, 
have utterly failed. If we deny that matter has an exist- 
ence independent of the contemplative mind, we are 
trampling on one of the intuitions of our nature. Those 
who resolve mind into matter always overlook the very 
essential qualities of the knowing, the conscious, the 
thinking, the moral, the responsible soul. We are thus 
entitled, from all we can know of substance, to declare 
them to be different substances. As to whether they 
may not, after all, have some unity in the view of higher 
intelligences, who take a deeper view of substance, this is 
a question which we need not start, for we cannot settle 
it, and the unity is one which we can never discover nor 
comprehend. It is enough for us that they are different 
substances in all the characteristics of substance known 
to us. 
Sir W. Hamilton* remarks that the word ‘ substance’ 
(substantia) may be “ viewed as derived from subsistendo, 
and as meaning ens per se subsistens (ovala, in Greek); 
or it may be viewed as the basis of attributes, in which 
sense it may be regarded as derived from substando, and 
id cpuod substat accidentibus; like the Greek, inroo-racns, 
* Metapli., Lect. 8., where are admirable definitions of terms. 172 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
vTTo/celfjLevov. In either case it will, however, signify the 
same thing, viewed in a different aspect.” With this latter 
statement I cannot concur. In the first of these senses 
there is such a thing as a substance, and its character- 
istics can be specified. But I can see no evidence what- 
ever for the existence of any such thing as a substance 
in the other sense, that is, as a substratum lying in and 
beyond, or standing under, all that comes under our im- 
mediate knowledge.* There is no topic on which there 
has been a greater amount of unintelligible language em- 
ployed than on this. We know, it is said, only qualities, 
* “ If any one will examine himself' concerning his notion of pure 
substance in general, he will find that he has no other idea of it at all, 
hut only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities 
which are capable of producing simple ideas in us; which qualities are 
commonly called accidents” (Locke, Essay ii. xxiii. 23). His view is thus 
fully expounded in his ‘ Letter to Stillingfleet:’—“ Your Lordship well 
expresses it,— We find that we can have no true conception of any modes 
or accidents, hut we must conceive a substratum or subject wherein they 
are; i.e. that they cannot exist or subsist of themselves. Hence the 
mind perceives their necessary connection with inherence or being sup- 
ported ; which being a relative idea, superadded to the red colour in a 
cherry, or to thinking in a man, the mind frames the correlative idea 
of a support. For I never denied that the mind could frame to itself 
ideas of relation, but have showed the quite contrary in my chapters 
about relation. But because a relation cannot be founded on nothing, 
or be the relation of nothing, and the thing here related as a supporter 
or support is not represented to the mind by any clear and distinct 
idea, therefore the obscure, indistinct, vague idea of thing or something 
is all that is left to be the positive idea which has the relation of a sup- 
port or substratum to modes or accidents ; and that general undeter- 
mined idea of something is by the abstraction of the mind derived also 
from the simple ideas of Sensation and Reflection; and thus the mind, 
from the positive simple ideas got by sensation or reflection, comes 
to the general relative idea of substance; which without these posi- 
tive simple ideas it could never have.” I have quoted this passage 
because it lets us see fully what Locke’s precise theory is, and what 
are its defects. The mind gets all its ideas from sensation and reflec- 
tion, but in comparing ideas it discovers necessary relations. Among 
these is substance, of which the idea is very obscure. Still the mind is 
led to suppose that there is such a thing acting as a support or sub- 
stratum. ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
173 
but we are constrained by reason, or by common sense, 
to believe in a something in which they inhere. Or 
qualities, it is said, fall under sense, while substance is 
known by vovs, or reason. Others, proceeding on these 
admissions, maintain that qualities alone being known, 
we may doubt whether there is such a thing as sub- 
stance, and may certainly affirm that we can never know 
it. Now in opposition to all this style of thinking and 
writing, which has prevailed to so great an extent since 
the days of Locke, I maintain that we never know qua- 
lities without also knowing substance. Qualities, as 
qualities distinct from substances, are as much unknown 
to us as substance distinct from qualities. We shall 
show in next Section that we know both in one concrete 
act. We know qualities as qualities of a real thing, hav- 
ing being and power and permanence. 
Sect. TV. On Mode, Quality, Property, Essence. 
Two great truths press themselves on the reflecting 
mind when it contemplates this world of ours. One of 
these, the more obvious, is the mutability of all mundane 
objects. Nothing seems to be enduring, all appears to 
be fluctuating. This has been a favourite view of poets, 
to whom it has furnished a succession of kaleidoscope 
pictures ; moralists and divines have dwelt upon it, in 
order to allure us to seek for something more stable than 
this world can furnish; and even libertines have turned it 
to their own use, and exhorted us to catch the enjoyment 
while it passes, to shoot the bird on the wing: “ Let 
us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.” Philosophies 
have been built on this doctrine of the fluctuation of all 
things. Heraclitus of Ephesus taught that all things 
are in a perpetual flux; that we cannot enter the same 
stream twice; whereon Cratylus rebuked him, and showed 
that we cannot do so once.* But there is another truth 
* Aristotle, Met. iii. v. 6. 174 
PllIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
which has a no less important, indeed a deeper place 
in the nature of things. In the midst of all these 
mutations objects have, after all, a permanence. Ever 
changing, they are yet all the while ever the same. Per- 
sons of deeper thought, or at least more addicted to ab- 
straction, looking beneath the changing surface, dwell on 
this permanence, which they discover to be like the fixed 
mountain—while the changes are merely like the colours 
that pass over its surface ; and some have so magnified 
it as to make it set aside the mutability. The Eleatics 
carried their doctrine so far as to maintain the oneness 
and unchangeableness of all being. The founder of the 
school, Xenophanes, identified this immutable oneness 
with the Divine Being. His disciple, Parmenides, dege- 
nerating in religious faith, though superior to the master 
in logical power, narrowed this unity into metaphysi- 
cal being. Zeno, who followed, showed his subtlety by 
pointing out the difficulties in which they are involved 
who maintain the existence of multiplicity and motion. 
The expansive mind of Plato wrestled with both these 
extremes, and sought by his doctrine of supra-sensible 
ideas, and an exuberance of subtleties, to establish a 
doctrine of being not inconsistent with multiplicity and 
change. In modern times Descartes and Spinoza have 
magnified the importance of Substance quite as much as 
the Eleatics did Being, while the great mass of physicists, 
and all the speculators of the Sensational School never get 
deeper than the fleeting and the phenomenal. 
The wise, and the only proper course, is to assume 
both, to assume both as first truths. No attempt should 
be made to support either by mediate proof; each car- 
ries with it its own evidence. Neither can be set aside 
by any sophistical reasoning founded on the other. It 
is the business of philosophy not to attempt to discard 
either, but rather to give the proper account of each, 
when they will be seen not to be inconsistent. The doc- ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
175 
trine of the permanence of objects is founded on being 
and substance. We must take a view of the other truth 
in this Section. 
Every substance, we have seen, is known as having 
being, power, and endurance. But every terrestrial sub- 
stance is at the same time known as changing. Self 
changes as we look in upon it; the material world 
changes as we look out upon it. No attempt should be 
made to explain how the two can co-exist,"the permanent 
and the changeable. Eor mind and body are known at one 
and the same time as both. The one is quite as much 
known, and therefore quite as conceivable ever after- 
wards, as the other; and there can be no difficulty (what- 
ever metaphysicians may ingeniously urge in opposition) 
in conceiving of their compatibility, since they were ever 
known to exist together. It is one of the permanent 
characters, both of mind and body, that they are ever 
known as changing. Their liability to change is an ele- 
ment in their very nature. Now the appropriate term 
to express the given state of any one substance is Mode ; 
or if we wish a convenient change of phraseology, Modi- 
fication, State, or Condition. 
From this account we see in what sense it is that 
substance implies mode, and mode implies substance. 
Mode implies substance, not only inasmuch as a state 
must be the state of something, but inasmuch as mode 
is the state of a substance liable to change, and so ca- 
pable of manifesting itself in more than one phase. 
Substance implies mode, inasmuch as it must always 
be in a certain state, and is liable to be in different 
states. The maxim is more than a verbal one, more 
than a truism, more than an identical (analytic) judg- 
ment involved in the terms; it is a judgment affirming 
a truth intuitively discovered by the mind when looking 
at the things (a synthetic judgment a priori.) 170 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
Every object is known not only as having being, but 
is known as having a certain being or nature. That 
which is thus manifested to us may be something com- 
mon to this one thing with other things, or it may be 
something peculiar to the thing itself. Every particular 
substance known, is known as at least having being and 
potency and an abiding nature, and is known also as 
possessing peculiar or distinguishing attributes. That 
by which the object is thus known to us as in itself, or 
as acting, may be called a quality of the substance. Sir 
W. Hamilton speaks of the qualities of substance as “ its 
aptitudes and manners of existence and of action.”* 
But let us properly understand the relation of the two, 
substance and quality. The two are ever known in one 
concrete act. Thus when at a given moment we know 
self as rejoicing, we do not know the self as separate, 
or the rejoicing as separate, but we grasp the self and 
the rejoicing at once. But then it is necessary for many 
purposes to distinguish between them, and we do so by 
analysis; indeed, the analysis is in a sense done for us 
naturally. Eor while self is rejoicing to-day, it may be 
grieving to-morrow. To express the distinction it is need- 
ful to have a nomenclature, and so we distinguish be- 
tween the substance and the quality. Not that the sub- 
stance can ever exist without the quality, or the quality 
without the substance. On the contrary, the one im- 
plies the other. The substance must always have at least 
the qualities by which all substance is characterized, and 
it may have many others. The qualities must always be 
qualities of a thing having these characteristics. The 
maxim that the substance implies the quality, is thus a 
proposition of the same character as that the substance 
implies the mode. 
The word c substance’ may be used either as an abstract 
* Metaph., Lect. viii. ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
177 
or a general term. As an abstract term it designates the 
thing as having the characteristics of substance, which 
I believe to be existence, potency, and continuance. As 
a general term it denotes all those things which have 
the characteristics of substance. Quality, too, may be 
employed as an abstract or a general term. As an ab- 
stract term it denotes that in any given substance by 
which it acts or manifests itself. As a general term it 
denotes all the manifestations or actions of a substance. 
Some of these qualities are found in all substance: such 
are the characteristics of substance of which I have so 
often spoken. Others are peculiar to certain substances, 
or manifest themselves in certain substances at certain 
times. Particular qualities are known by us intuitively 
to be in mind or matter. Thus we know consciousness, 
personality, thought, and will, as in mind; while we 
know extension and incompressibility as being in matter; 
these may appropriately be styled Essential Qualities of 
spirit and body. Other qualities are discovered by expe- 
rience. Both mind and body may have qualities which 
can never be known by us. As to the qualities which 
become known to us by experience, and the qualities 
concealed from us, we can never know whether any of 
them are, or are not, essential either to body or mind. 
If this view be correct, we see that a wrong account is 
often given of substance and qualities, and the relation be- 
tween them. Thus it is very common to say that substance 
is a thing behind the qualities or underneath them, act- 
ing as a substratum, basis, ground, or support. All such 
language is in its very nature metaphorical; the analogy 
is of the most distant kind, and may have a misleading 
character. The substance is the very thing itself, consi- 
dered in a certain aspect, and the qualities are its action 
or manifestation. Again, it is frequently said that quali- 
ties are known, whereas substance cannot be known, or 178 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
if known, known only by some deeper or more transcen- 
dental principle of the mind. Now I hold that we never 
know quality except as the quality of a substance, and 
that we know both equally in one undivided act. This a 
somewhat less mystical or mysterious account than that 
commonly given by metaphysicians, but is, as it appears 
to me, in strict accordance with the revelations of consci- 
ousness. 
I have said that the term ‘quality’ expresses all in the 
substance by which it acts or manifests itself. That in 
substance which acts, is power, and in all substance (we 
have seen) is power. The term Property, which signi- 
fies peculiar quality, might, I think, in accordance with 
a usage to which it has of late been approximating more 
and more, be appropriated to express the powers of any 
given substance, as the power of thinking or feeling in 
mind, or of gravity or chemical affinity in body. To vary 
the phraseology, the word Faculty may be employed when 
we speak of mental powers, and Force when we speak 
of material powers. It is the business of science to de- 
termine by observation and generalization, the powers or 
properties of mind and body. 
Another phrase with the ideas involved in it requires 
to be explained here, and that is Essence. It is a very 
mystical word, and a whole aggregate of foolish specula- 
tion has clustered round it. Still it may have a mean- 
ing. As applied logically to classes of objects, it has a sig- 
nification which can be precisely fixed; it denotes the 
common quality or qualities which are found in all the 
members of the class. Thus the possession of four limbs 
is the essence of the class quadruped. It is to be re- 
membered that when the class is one of what some logi- 
cians call Kinds, it is impossible to specify all the com- 
mon qualities which go to constitute it. Thus we cannot 
tell all the attributes which go to make up such natural ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
179 
classes as those of metal, dog, or rose. All that we can do is 
to specify some of the more marked, which are signs of 
others. But for such logical purposes the phrase ‘ com- 
mon attribute ’ or ‘ differentia ’is the better, and is more 
frequently employed. It is in metaphysics that the word 
‘ essence’ is supposed to have a place. Thus the question 
is often put, What is the essence of mind ? or What is the 
essence of body ? or What is the essence of this individual 
mind, or of this piece of clay or chalk? Now we can 
answer such a question as this, only when we are allowed 
to draw distinctions and offer explanations. First, we may 
allowably conceive that every one object, and every class 
of objects, has an aggregate of things which go to con- 
stitute it, and we may with perfect propriety refer to 
such an as possibly or probably existing,* but 
always on the distinct condition forthwith to be specified 
more formally, that we do not speak of the essence as 
something which can be known by us in all its totality. 
Secondly, there are some things which we know to be- 
long to the essence of certain objects; thus we know 
that being, power, and permanence, are essential to all 
substance, and that certain qualities belong to mind, 
and certain qualities, such as extension and incompres- 
sibility, to body. But we must ever guard against the 
idea that there may not be other qualities also essential 
to these objects. For, Thirdly, the essence of a thing, at 
least in its totality, must always be unknown to man. 
How many things are united in body or mind, or in any 
individual mind or material object, this can never be 
ascertained by human observation or ingenuity. In this 
sense it is proper in us to speak of the essence of things 
* Locke, ‘ Letter to Stillingfleet,’ takes Essences “ to be in everything 
that internal constitution, or frame, or modification of the Substance, 
which God, in his wisdom and good pleasure, thinks fit to give to every 
particular creature when he gives it a being; and such essences I grant 
there are in all things that exist.” 180 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
as being unknown to man; meaning thereby, not that 
we cannot know the substance, which I maintain we do 
know, or that we cannot knowT some of the qualities which 
go to make up the essence, but merely that we cannot 
know what precisely constitutes the essence in its entire- 
ness. But, Fourthly, we are not warranted to maintain 
that there must be something lying further in than the 
qualities we know, and that this one thing is entitled to 
be regarded as the essence of the object. We have no 
ground whatever for believing that there must be, or that 
there is, something more internal or central than the sub- 
stance and quality which wre know. True, there are pro- 
bably occult qualities, even in those objects with which 
we are most intimately acquainted, but we are not there- 
fore warranted to conclude that what is concealed must 
differ in nature or in kind from what is revealed, or that 
it is in any way more necessary to the existence or the 
continuance of the object. I have a shrewd suspicion 
that there is a vast amount of unmeaning talk in the 
language which is employed on this special subject by 
metaphysicians, who would see something which the vul- 
gar cannot discern, whereas they should be contented 
with pointing to what all men perceive. It is quite con- 
ceivable, and perfectly possible, that though we should 
know all about any given terrestrial or material object, 
we should after all not fall in with anything more my- 
sterious or deep than those wonders which come every 
day under our notice in the world without, or the world 
within us. 
Sect. V. On Personality. 
Our perception of personality is closely connected with 
our knowledge of being, but there is more in personality 
than in being. We know material objects as having 
existence, but we have a special apprehension in regard ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
181 
to self beyond what we have in regard to material ob- 
jects.* Like every other simple perception, it cannot be 
defined, but it may be brought out to separate view by 
abstraction; and consciousness (with memory) will re- 
cognize it as one of the cognitions which it had seen 
before in company with others. We express this con- 
viction when we say we are persons. The abstract idea 
is one not likely to be spontaneously formed. The 
infant, the child, the savage, are not in the habit of 
making any such analysis of consciousness, nor are the 
great body of mankind at the trouble of asserting their 
own existence. Such a proposition, with its subject and 
predicate, will be formed only after philosophy has taken 
a shape,—probably only after sophistry and scepticism 
have been attacking our original convictions. It is only 
the metaphysician who will ever take the trouble of af- 
firming that he exists, and the wise metaphysician will 
refrain from going further and trying to prove that he 
exists. 
Yet it is a conviction which the mind ever carries with 
it; it is one of the high characteristics of humanity. In- 
animate matter is without it. The brute shows that he is 
tending towards it, yet can have it only in an incipient 
degree. It is the very essence of the man’s individuality, 
* “ This self-personality, like all other simple and immediate presen- 
tations, is indefinable ; but it is so, because it is superior to definition. 
It can be analyzed into no simpler elements, for it is itself the simplest 
of all; it can be made no clearer by description or comparison, for it 
is revealed to us in all the clearness of an original intuition, of which 
description and comparison can furnish only faint and partial resem- 
blances ” (Mansel, ‘Prolegomena Logica,’ p. 129 ; see also Art. Met. in 
Encyc. Brit. p. 618, 619, etc.). It was the greatest of all the oversights 
of Kant that he did not give personality a place among the intuitions 
of the mind, to which it was entitled quite as much as space and time. 
Held in by no primary belief in personality, those who came after, such 
as Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, wandered out into a wide waste of 
Pantheism. Taking with them no belief in the personality of self, they 
never could reach personality in God. 182 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
and is one of the main elements in his sense of inde- 
pendence, in his sense of freedom, in his sense of re- 
sponsibility. As possessing it, man feels that he is inde- 
pendent of physical nature; independent of all creature 
intelligences; independent, in a sense, of God, against 
whom, alas! he may rebel, and to whom he must for 
certain give an account. It is a conviction to be used 
and not abused. It would certainly be abused were it 
to seduce man to isolate himself from the objects around 
him, to try to become independent of the provisions 
made to aid his weakness in physical nature, or to sepa- 
rate himself from his brothers or sisters of humanity; 
and still more were it to tempt him to rebel against 
God. It is properly used when, under the guidance of 
moral law, it is leading him, not to be ever floating on 
with the stream, but at times to be standing up in the 
midst of it and acting as a rampart in its current, or as a 
martyr seeking to stem the tide of corruption, or Pro- 
metheus-like, rising up, not against the true God, but 
against the false gods wdio rule in Olympus. Powrers 
hostile to the progress of humanity have sought to sub- 
due this principle. Absolutism would crush it, and 
make man live for some dominant end, political or ec- 
clesiastical. Pantheism w7ould dissipate it till man be- 
came relaxed and lost all individuality, as he moves 
listlessly in a hot and hazy atmosphere. It is this con- 
viction which makes man feel that he is not a mere 
bubble on the surface of being, blown up in one chance 
agitation, and about to be absorbed in another. It 
keeps man from being lost,—lost in physical nature, lost 
in the crowd of human beings, or lost in the ocean of 
being; he is, after and amidst all, a person. As such 
he has a part to perform, an end to serve, a work to 
do, a destiny to work out, and an account to render. ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
183 
Sect. YI. On Extension. 
The knowledge of extension is involved in every exer- 
cise of sense-perception, even as the knowledge of per- 
sonality is implied in every exercise of self-consciousness. 
We certainly cannot exercise the senses of sight and 
muscular energy,—we cannot, I believe, perceive through 
any of the senses,—without knowing the object, be it the 
organism or something affecting the organism, as pos- 
sessing extension—always along with other qualities. 
This, then, is historically the origin of our idea of exten- 
sion or space,—that is, we have a perception of it in 
every cognition of body. But in this primitive know- 
ledge we do not apprehend it as distinct from body. It 
is an extended and a coloured surface, which we know 
through the eye; it is an extended body capable of 
resisting us, which we know through the muscular sense 
and locomotive energy; it is a set of organs localized 
and out of each other, that we know by the other senses. 
But by an easy intellectual act we can separate the 
extension from the impenetrability and the associated 
sensations. We are greatly aided in our apprehensions 
of empty space by certain exercises of sense-perception. 
Bor we have experience ever presenting itself of two 
bodies seen or felt, with nothing between obvious to the 
senses. True, scientific research shows that the interval 
is not a pure vacuum, that there is air, or ether, between 
the bodies; still it is in our apprehension a void,—that 
is, a space, with no perceived body to fill it. We are 
thus led to an apprehension of space as different from 
body occupying space. We are not to look on the ex- 
tension thus reached as an illusion, a nonentity, or as 
nothing. If we know, as I maintain we do, body in 
space, the space must have an existence (I do not say 
what sort of existence), just as much as the body has. 184 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
But when we separately contemplate the extension, we 
are contemplating a reality just as verily as when we 
perceive the body. It will not do to dismiss space sum- 
marily by describing it as a mere abstraction; in order 
to our apprehension of it there is need of abstraction, 
but it is an abstraction of a real part from a real whole. 
To this cognition of space, and to every apprehension 
of it, there is attached a number of intuitive beliefs. It 
is the business of the metaphysician to unfold these in 
an inductive manner, and point out and determine their 
nature and laws as precisely as possible. This falls to be 
done in another Book of this Treatise, to which therefore 
I adjourn the further discussion of space, as it embraces 
a larger faith than it does of a cognitive element in our 
apprehension of it. 
Sect. VII. On Number. 
We seem to derive our knowledge of number from our 
cognition of being, and especially from our cognition of 
self as a person. We know self as one object; we also 
know other and external objects as singulars. Already 
then have we number in the concrete, involved in this 
our primary knowledge.* Every object known, and espe- 
cially self, is known as o?ie. Every other object known, 
is known as another one. If we know self as one, then 
the external object which is known as different from self, 
is known as a second one. The mind can now think of 
one object, and of one object another object, or of 
two, and of one object -j- another object -f another ob- 
* Aristotle places number among the sensibles perceived by tbe com- 
mon sense (De An. ii. 6; iii. 1). He says each sense perceives unity : 
eicao-TT) yap ev axcr&vrai a'(ar9r)<TiS (iii. 1. 5 : ed. Trend.). Descartes makes 
number perceived by us in all perceptions of body (Prin. p. i. 69). 
Locke says of Unity or One, “ Every object our senses are employed 
about, every idea in our understandings, every thought of our minds, 
brings this idea along with it” (Essay ii. xvi. 1). Buffier says that the 
knowledge that I exist, I am, I think, is in a sense the same as, or at 
least includes this, I am one (Prem. Yer. p. ii. 10). ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
185 
ject, or of three. It can then, by a process of abstrac- 
tion, separate the numbers from the objects, in order to 
their separate consideration. Not that it supposes for 
one instant that numbers can exist apart from objects, 
but it can separately contemplate them. One cannot 
exist apart from one object, or two from two objects, but 
the mind can think about the one or the two apart from 
the peculiarity of the objects. Its judgments and its 
conclusions in all such cases, if conducted according to 
the laws of thought, will apply to objects; that is, all its 
judgments regarding one, two, or a thousand, will apply 
to a corresponding number of objects. Having obtained 
in this way a knowledge of numbers in the concrete, and 
numbers in the abstract, the mind is prepared to discover 
relations among numbers in a manner to be afterwards 
specified in the book on Primitive Judgments. 
But before leaving our present topic, it may be proper 
to state that the mind has no such conviction of the ex- 
istence of numbers separate from the objects numbered, 
as it has of space, distinct from the objects in space, or 
as it has of time, distinct from the events which happen in 
time; nor has it any intuitive belief as to the necessary 
infinity of objects or of numbers. True, it can set no 
limit to the number of objects, but it is not compelled to 
believe that there can be no limits, as it is constrained to 
believe that there can be no bounds to space or to time. 
Sect. YIII. On Motion. 
Our perception of motion is, as it appears to me, intui- 
tive. But it supposes more than sense, or sense-percep- 
tion, in the narrow sense of the term. It is probable 
that we have an apprehension of change of place, from 
the movement of our intuitively localized organs,—say 
from a member of the body being moved by the locomo- 
tive energy, as when I lift my arm; this perception will be 186 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
especially apt to arise when we move the hand along or- 
gans to which a place has been given. Or we may ap- 
prehend an extra-organic body by the touch or muscular 
sense, and by the same sense feel our hand or some other 
extra-organic body passing over it. We may also get the 
perception by the sense of sight. The child touching 
another part of the body by its hand, will see the image 
of its hand moving to perform the act. Besides, the 
“ image of our own body occupies, in nearly all pictures 
on our retina, regularly some determinate space in the 
upper, middle, or lower part of the field of vision;” it re- 
mains constant while the other images are seen moving.* 
There is more here however than immediate cognition. 
There is a brief exercise of memory; we must, at the 
same time that we perceive the body as now in one place, 
remember that it was formerly in another place. There 
is an exercise too of comparison in noticing the relation 
between the object in respect of the place in which it has 
been, and the place in which it now is. And upon our 
discovering change of any kind in the motion, the intui- 
tion of cause comes in to declare that there must have 
been active power at work. This is one of those cases 
which will come before us more and more frequently 
as we advance, in which cognitions, beliefs, and judg- 
ments mingle together ; and yet the act can scarcely be 
described as complex, except in this sense, that on other 
occasions some of the parts can exist separately or in 
other combinations. The circumstance that these other 
elements conjoin in our conviction as to motion, will 
bring the subject before us in other parts of the Treatise. 
* (Muller’s Physiology: trans. by Baly, p. 1083.) Aristotle places 
motion, like number, among tbe common sensibles, Descartes among the 
properties perceived in every perception of body (see places in last 
note), and Locke among the primary qualities of bodies, which are al- 
ways in them (ii. viii. 22). See some profound observations on motion 
in ‘ Logische Untersuchungen v. Trendelenburg,’ b. i. iv. ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
187 
Sect. IX. On Power. 
I have been labouring to show, in the last Chapter and 
in this, that power is involved in our knowledge of sub- 
stance. We can never know either self, or bodies beyond 
self, except as exercising influence or potency. Not that 
we are to suppose that we have thus by intuition an ab- 
stract or a general idea of power: all that we have is a 
knowledge of a given substance acting. This seems the 
only doctrine in accordance with the revelations of con- 
sciousness. It is involved in the common statement that 
we cannot know substance except by its properties; for 
what are properties but powers acting when the needful 
conditions are supplied ? I reckon it as an oversight in a 
great body of metaphysicians that they have been afraid 
to ascribe our apprehension of power to intuition. In 
consequence of this neglect, some never get the idea of 
power, but merely of succession, within the bare limits of 
experience, which can never entitle us to argue that the 
world must have proceeded from Divine Power; others 
have been obliged to find cause, not in any perception of 
the mind as it looks on things, but in some form im- 
posed by the mind on objects; while a considerable 
number hesitate and vacillate in their account, repre- 
senting it now as an original conviction, and now as an 
acquisition of experience. 
Wherever there is power in act, there is an effect. But 
the discovery of the relation between cause and effect 
cannot be discovered, except by an exercise of judgment. 
The discussion of the nature of our conviction of Power 
will be resumed under the head of Primitive Judgments. 
Sect. X. (Supplementary.) The various Kinds oe Power 
known by Experience. 
We are led by the cognitive nature of the mind to look on sub- 
stance as necessarily possessing potency, but it is after all by ex- 188 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
perience that we have to determine the nature of the power exer- 
cised by any particular substance. Experience shows us that all 
potency is not of the same description. The precise nature of the 
power residing in any one substance is to be ascertained by a 
generalization of its individual operations. Though it does not 
fall within our precise province, yet it may help to clear up some 
important metaphysical questions, if we particularize some of the 
kinds of potency made known by experience. 
I. Force or Inanimate Objects.—In order to the exercise 
of this potency there is need of two or more bodies in a particular 
relation to each other. A simple body existing alone in the uni- 
verse, and in a state of isolation, that is, in no relation to any 
•other body, could exercise no active power whatever. Indeed, 
the power of a body seems to be a power to influence some other 
body, or some other substance. It seems also to be a law of the 
action of bodies that when any one body acts on another, that 
other acts on it. In all bodily causation there is thus mutual 
action; and experience seems to show that the action of each of 
the bodies is equal to that of the other. It is the aim of the phy- 
sical sciences to determine the nature and measure of this reci- 
procal operation. 
According to this account there is need, in order to material 
action, of two or more bodies. When these bodies are in such a 
relation as suits their several properties, action takes place, and 
an effect is produced. It follows that cause—meaning by cause 
the invariable and unconditional cause, that which of itself will 
produce the effect, and ever produce the effect—must always be 
more or less complex; it always implies two or more bodies in 
a particular relation to each other. The effect will always be 
found to be of the same complex character, will always be found 
to consist of the bodies which acted as a cause, being in some way 
changed. To illustrate what I mean:— Let us suppose that we 
have two material substances to experiment with, salt and water. 
Place the two out of relation to each other, and no effect will be 
produced. Bring them into contact, and action will commence. 
The salt acts on the water, and the water on the salt. The cause, 
properly speaking, of this action is not the salt alone, or the water 
alone, but the salt and water in a particular relation. This is the 
true cause, productive and necessary; the cause which, wherever 
it exists, will tend to produce the same effect, and in fact produce 
it, except when counteracted by other forces. The effect is also 
dual, and it is to be found in the very substances which acted as 
the cause; it is not to be found in the salt, or in the vrater, or in ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
189 
a third substance, but in the salt and water in a new and different 
state. This is the invariable effect which will be for ever pro- 
duced by the same cause. 
Such seems to be the nature of material causation and effectua- 
tion. In all cases the cause is dual, or plural, as is also the effect; 
and the bodies which acted as the cause are the bodies acted on in 
the effect. I am persuaded that the well-known law of action and 
reaction proceeds on this circumstance, w'hicli is also intimately 
connected with the polar action of substances. In the common 
statements as to cause and effect there is only one of the elements 
of the complex cause or complex effect mentioned, the other being 
omitted because it does not seem needful to express it. Thus we 
speak of the salt as the cause, making the water of a particular 
taste as the effect. But there is an omission in all such state- 
ments, which require to be completed by calling in the missing 
part, when we profess to give a thoroughly accurate and philo- 
sophic account of the process. There are cases in which the com- 
plexity of the cause or of the effect is not so evident as in the 
example I have given. Thus, if a picture were to fall upon a table 
and break it, we would say in loose language that the fall of the 
picture was the cause of the breaking of the table. But when the 
full cause is spread out, it is seen to be the picture falling with a par- 
ticular force, and striking the table in a particular direction, while 
the effect consists not in the breaking of the table merely, but also 
in the picture losing a portion of its momentum. "We have but to 
reflect for a very little to see and be prepared to acknowledge 
that in all gravitating action, in all chemical, in all magnetic and 
electric, there is the co-operation of two or more bodies, and that 
the cause consists of the bodies in one state and the effects of the 
same bodies in a different state.* 
II. Vital Power.-—The attempts which have been made to 
determine wherein life consists cannot be said to have as yet been 
crowned with anything like success. There is every reason to 
think that there is a vital power so far different from the mecha- 
nical or chemical, but science has not yet ascertained its nature 
and its laws. So far as we have glimpses of its mode of opera- 
tion, it seems to involve a complexity of agents. One part of the 
cell acts on another, or one cell acts on another, or it acts on ex- 
ternal matter, and whatever acts is being acted on. 
A curious question is here started, What is the nature of the 
power involved in vegetable and animal reproduction ? This 
* This subject is illustrated, ‘ Method of Divine Government,’ b. ii. c. i. 190 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
is a subject still involved in great mystery, but there are ob- 
vious and well-ascertained facts w hich go to establish a general 
doctrine. 
First, there is a duality in all vital reproduction. In certain 
portions of the vegetable kingdom, the reproductive powers are in 
different organs, in others they are on different plants. In the 
animal creation the reproductive organs are commonly in different 
individuals, which must therefore pair in order to the production 
of young. This is an example in a higher scale, and in a more 
patent form, of that duality in causation which we traced already in 
inanimate creation, and which makes all physical creation so depen- 
dent on arrangements which have been made by the Creator of all 
things. 
Secondly, there is a positive and adequate power in the dual 
parentage to produce the offspring as an effect. No living crea- 
ture can proceed except from a parent of its own kind, no vegeta- 
ble or animal can spring from a vegetable or animal inferior to 
itself in the order of beings. This is one of the best established 
generalizations of natural history, and it has not been shaken by 
any of the attempts which have been made to find exceptions to it, 
certainly not by the analogies which have been urged against it, 
derived from objects totally different. The whole of the true 
analogies of Nature, that is, those derived from objects really cor- 
related, show that every substance or aggregate of substances 
producing an effect, as it must have power to produce the 
effect, so it must have power to produce an effect of that par- 
ticular kind ; indeed we cannot conceive that a cause should pro- 
duce an effect of a higher nature than itself. The parents seem 
to be endowed with a power to produce an offspring “ after their 
kind,” that is, of the same species and no other. There is no power 
on the part of an inferior plant to produce a higher, on the part of 
a vegetable to produce an animal, or on the part of an inferior 
animal to produce a higher. In particular, human beings with in- 
telligences, and such only,—certainly not apes or monkeys,— can 
have an offspring possessed of reasonable and responsible souls. 
This doctrine brings reproduction under laws analogous to those 
laws of causation which reign in other departments of Nature. The 
particular mode of the operation of the power has not been and 
may never be fully determined, but that there is power required, 
special in kind and adequate in amount, seems to be established on 
amply sufficient evidence. This doctrine opens to us a glimpse of 
the deep foundation which the law that the offspring must be 
of the same species as the parent, has in the very constitution ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
191 
of things, and in the nature of the power that operates in the uni- 
verse. 
III. Reciprocal Action oe Mind and Body.—That the two 
have been so constituted as that the bodily organism acts on mind, 
while mind is also capable of operating on the organism, this seems 
to me to be the most satisfactory as it is certainly the simplest ac- 
count which can be given of the connection. But let us properly 
understand what, on such a supposition, is the precise cause. It is 
a complex one in every case ; it is the mind and the body in a parti- 
cular relation to each other. The coexistence of the two is neces- 
sary to any effect being produced, and the effect is the result of 
the two operating and co-operating. Thus in all perception through 
the senses there is a cerebral power and there is mental power, and 
without both there will be no result, no object perceived. There 
seems also to be a duality in the effect: there is certainly a mental 
effect, for the mind now perceives; and the cerebral mass, in the 
very act of producing mental action, may undergo a change; thus 
there seems to be a fatigue and exhaustion produced in the or- 
ganism by the very act of perceiving an immense number of objects 
within a brief time, as when we travel a great distance by railway, 
and this can be accounted for by supposing that the organism is af- 
fected by the action which has taken place. 
There is a similar duality of power in all those cases in which 
the action begins from the mind, as when we will to move the 
arm, and the arm moves. Here the concurrence of two factors 
is necessary in order to the result: there is a volition, and a 
nicely adjusted organism in a healthy state; and if either were 
wanting, the effect would not follow. Possibly, as there is a dua- 
lity in the cause, there may also be a duality in the effect, and the 
next mental state may be so far modified by the joint bodily and 
mental exertion; but I have to add, that it is just as possible 
that we may have here come into the region of pure mental causa- 
tion, in which, as we shall see forthwith, there is no such com- 
plexity. 
In a vast amount of the results of which we are conscious, the 
concurrence and co-operation both of mental and cerebral potency 
are required in order to action. Thus it has been proven that a 
healthy state of the brain is requisite in order to our remember- 
ing or even imagining sensible objects ; for in certain derange- 
ments of the brain the person cannot image an object with a 
figure. In all such cases the main cause is to be found in the 
mind; still the body has a part to play, and if it does not co-ope- 
rate, the effect is not produced. In all those actions in which there 192 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
is the active operation of the bodily organism, in order to a men- 
tal effect, it seems probable that the mental act, or rather the 
joint act, produces also an effect on the bodily organism which has 
been in action. In all mental emotion there seems to be involved 
the active co-operation of a bodily organism, and there is always a 
reaction on the organism, often in wearying and deranging it, at 
least when the feeling, say fear or sorrow, is excited by the con- 
templation of evil. Even in the exercises of the intellect there 
seems to be a concurrence of organic agency necessary, and there 
is always a lassitude following long and continuous intellectual 
efforts. I have sometimes thought that a certain organic state is 
necessary in order to our very volitions; and hence our incapacity 
to form a fixed purpose in certain states of the body, and the 
weariness which follows a long stretch of attention, even when 
this has been accompanied with no bodily exertions. 
I am aware that the account now given of the reciprocal action 
of mind and body, is exposed to a great amount of questioning. 
Thus, it will be asked, How does mind act on body, and body on 
mind ? To this I reply by a counter-question, What is meant by 
‘ How ’ ? If nothing more be meant than simply the occurrence 
of the facts, then I answer that psychological and physiological re- 
search has discovered some of the facts, and may possibly detect 
more, and may very probably never be able to discover the whole. 
If something more than this be intended, then I ask, What is in- 
tended ? If it be expected that we find out some mysterious 
bond between mind and body, I answer that there is no reason to 
think that there is any such bond, and that if there did exist such 
a bond, and we could discover it, it would only increase instead of 
lessening the mystery. The most reasonable and the most simple 
view is that spirit and body have been so constituted, that is, have 
had such a nature imparted to them, that they mutually influence 
each other, and co-operate to produce a joint result. 
IV. Mental Action.—We are not to suppose that purely 
mental is in every respect the same as material action. There is a 
sense in which every given body is inert and passive, it is active 
only so far as it is acted on. In this respect there is a wide dif- 
ference between material and mental power. Material causation 
implies the presence of two or more bodies, whereas mental causa- 
tion requires the presence of only one—the self-acting mind. I 
can think, feel, will, without requiring any external object (always 
perhaps excepting the organism, in the subordinate sense already 
referred to) to co-operate with me. The oldest definition of min'd 
handed down to us, embodies a great truth when it describes it as ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
193 
that which moves itself. Tt can set a train of thought a-going, and 
modify an existing train by a power within itself. This is one of 
the prerogatives of mind, eminently characterizing it, and at once 
distinguishing it from sluggish and passive matter. 
But while there is self-acting power within the mind itself, 
there is a sort of duality or plurality even in mental action. What 
is the cause of any given state, say of the grief I may be feeling at 
this present time F I have just heard of the death of a particular 
individual known to me, and the intelligence apprehended is, no 
doubt, part of the cause; but it is not the whole of it, for the same 
news may have been comprehended by another person without 
producing any such effect. In the unconditional cause there must 
be included not only the immediate intelligence as apprehended 
by me, but the affection which I acquired in former years for the 
individual, and even my original susceptibility of friendship and of 
grief; the concurrence of all these is necessary in order to this 
particular state under which I am now labouring. Even here, too, 
we may discover a kind of duality in the effect, for the result of 
my cherishing grief at this time is to deepen my affection for my 
friend, and even to increase my original capacity for affection and 
sorrow. 
V. Causation in the Wile.—We have seen that mental ac- 
tion differs widely from material. And we are not to suppose that 
every mental action is the same in kind as every other. Every fa- 
culty of the mind indeed has its own rule and mode of operation, 
which it is the office of psychological science to ascertain. In 
particular, causation in the will may differ from causation in other 
mental action. 
I am prepared indeed to maintain that our volitions are not ab- 
solutely beyond the law of causation. If I rightly interpret my 
intuition on the subject of causation, it leads me to look for a 
cause of our very volitions as well as of our intellectual acts. Be- 
sides, as a matter of fact, there have been predictions of voluntary 
acts, say of crimes, as accurate as of physical events, such as births 
or deaths. On such grounds as these I am inclined to say that 
causation must have some sort of place in the will as in all other 
creature-action. But causation in regard to the will may be of a 
totally different character from causation in acts of intelligence 
or feeling. 
While our intuition seems to me to say that causation has a 
place even in voluntary acts, it does not say what is the nature of 
that causation; this is to be determined by an inductive inquiry 
into the operations of our voluntary acts. And here we are 194 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
once met by the fact that man has free will. This fact cannot set 
aside the other fact that our volitions are caused; but as both are 
facts, the one must be so stated as to be seen not to be incon- 
sistent with the other. And when we contemplate our volitions 
by the light of consciousness, we discover at once that causation 
does not operate in the will as it does in the material universe, or 
even in our intellectual and emotional actions. Here, T believe, 
lies the key which is to explain the enigma of the consistency of 
man’s free will and the Divine Sovereignty. We may not be able 
to find the key, but we can tell the place where it lies. 
VI. Divine Causation.—I shrink from entering minutely into 
the consideration of the action of causation within the Divine Mind. 
It is evidently a subject which stretches far beyond human dis- 
cussion or comprehension. But it appears very evident that we are 
led to look on God as a Substance, having power in himself and 
the cause of effects produced. Indeed it is from the effects in the 
universe, and proceeding on an intuitive principle, that we argue 
that there is a cause above the world. The nature of the causa- 
tion is in every case to be determined by an inductive investigation 
of facts, and not by a priori speculation. Such an inquiry will 
soon convince us that causation in the acts of God is not of the 
same kind as causation in the operations of created objects. In 
particular there is no need, as in physical nature, of any co-opera- 
tion in order to the Divine workmanship. “ He spake, and it was 
done: he commanded, and it stood fast.” “ He said, Let there be 
light: and there was light.” Not only so, but in the original opera- 
tion of God in the universe, there must have been the exercise of a 
power, to which we see nothing similar in the actions of any created 
object. Man cannot create anything absolutely new ; he cannot 
create a new power or property : he can merely modify the old 
powers; and even this, so far as the external world is concerned, 
lie can do simply by using the power laid up for him in the 
brain ; and all the changes which take place, fall out according to 
the agencies of Nature. But it is different with God, who must at 
first have created all things out of nothing; that is, there was a 
power to create in him, and this power he chose in his infinite 
wisdom and goodness to exert. 
Metaphysicians have often used very absurd language about 
man’s incapacity so much as to conceive of creation. It is quite 
true that man himself can perform nothing similar to creation, but 
still he can conceive of it. He can suppose that there was a time 
when there was no created object, and he can then conceive a 
world springing into being. He cannot indeed believe that this ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. 
195 
world started into being without a producing cause, but he is not 
compelled to believe that it was effected in the same manner as we 
form a new object, that is, out of pre-existing matter. When I am 
led, as I am led on good evidence, to look on this world as being 
produced by God, I can conceive it caused by an immediate exer- 
cise of his power. I am not necessarily led to believe that it must 
have been formed out of Himself or out of any pre-existing sub- 
stance ; it may have been made not out of Himself, but by Him- 
self, by the power that is in Him. Nor am I led to look upon the 
forces now in the world as existing in some other form in God: to 
suppose this is to forget that the mode of the operation of causa- 
tion varies in the case of every order of beings, and to insist that 
the power exercised by God must be exerted in the same way as 
creature potency. The mode of the operation of causation when 
God creates, is quite as accordant with our intuitive belief as the 
manner in which the forces operate in the mental or material 
world. 
And here I take occasion to remark that the pantheistic doc- 
trine which maintains that the world must have been drawn out 
of the Divine Substance, of which therefore it participates, re- 
ceives no sanction whatever from the primary beliefs of the mind. 
It is simply a rash and unfounded inference from certain ex- 
periential facts which are true of the creature, but may have no 
application to the Creator. Whatever evidence it may profess to 
advance, it cannot plead intuition ; and I may have occasion to show 
elsewhere that there are intuitions directly opposed to it, especi- 
ally that intuition which I have of self as a separate intelligence. 
There is another and a kindred topic which here opens to the 
view, but from the minute discussion of which I draw back. I 
am led to believe that God is a substance, and an unchanging sub- 
stance, unchanging in the character of His voluntary acts. We 
have proot that He is a Being of essential holiness, benevolence, 
and truth, and we further believe that He never will or can do 
an unrighteous act. On what ground do we cling to this belief? 
It seems to be founded on the conviction that there may be, that 
there is, an unchanging substance possessed of moral excellence 
which never can and never will be defiled by sin, and are we 
not thus, and this lawfully and properly, carrying up the law of 
substance and cause to the Divine Being, and making it guarantee 
for us the eternal i-ighteousness of God ? 196 
BOOK II. 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS. 
CHAPTER I. 
THEIK GENERAL NATURE. 
Our primary cognitions and beliefs are very intimately 
connected, and they run almost insensibly into each 
other. Yet they may be distinguished. The word * cog- 
nition,’ when we find it needful to separate it from faith, 
might be confined in strictness to those mental energies 
in which the mind looks on an object now present,—say 
on a body perceived by the senses, or on self in a par- 
ticular state, or on a representation in the mind; and 
then ‘ faith ’ would be applied to all those exercises in 
which we believe—we can only use a synonymous word 
when we describe a simple mode of mind—in the exist- 
ence of an object not now before us, and under imme- 
diate inspection. 
Philosophers have drawn the distinction between Pre- 
sentative and Representative Knowledge. In the former 
the object is present at the time,—we perceive it, we 
feel it, we are conscious of it as now and here and 
under our inspection. In Representative Knowledge 
there is an object now present, representing an absent 
object. Thus I may have an image or conception of 
Venice, with its decaying beauty, and this is now pre- GENERAL NATURE OF PRIMITIVE BELIEFS. 
197 
sent, and under the eye of conseiousness; but it repre- 
sents something absent and distant, of the existence of 
which I am at the same time convinced. When I was ac- 
tually in Venice, and gazed on its churches and palaces 
rising out of the waters, there would be no propriety in 
saying that I believed in the existence of the city,— the 
correct phrase is that I knew it to exist. I know, too, 
that I have at this moment an idea of Venice; but as 
Venice itself is not before me, the proper expression 
of my conviction is that I believe in its existence. I 
maintain that whenever we have passed beyond Pre- 
sentative Knowledge, and are assured of the reality of 
an absent object, there faith—it may be in a very simple 
form, but still real faith'—has entered as an element. 
So far as I am conscious of an imaging of the past, or 
a judging of it, or a reasoning about it, my mental state 
is cognition; but so far as I am convinced of the exist- 
ence of the absent object, my state of mind is belief.* 
* The distinction between Presentative and [Representative Know- 
ledge is drawn by Hamilton in bis edition of Keid, Note B. The view 
given by me in the text seems to be in accordance with such language 
as the following, used by him in Metapb. Lect. 12: “ Properly speak- 
ing, we know only the actual and the present, and all real knowledge 
is an immediate knowledge. What is said to be mediately known is in 
truth not known to be, but only believed to be.” Speaking of memory, 
be says: “ It is not a knowledge of the past at all, but a knowledge of 
the present and a belief of the past.” Consistently or inconsistently, be 
says that “belief always precedes knowledge” (Lect. 3). Speaking of 
the external world, be says : “We believe it to exist, only because we 
are immediately cognizant of it as existing” (Keid, p. 750). With this I 
concur. But I cannot agree with what follows, where be seems to 
found our knowledge on a belief, and represents our knowing that we 
know as founded on a belief prior to or deeper than, knowledge. “ If 
asked indeed, How do we know that we know it P . . . bow do we 
know that this object is not a mere mode of mind illusively presented 
to us as a mode of matter ? then indeed we must reply that we do not (P) 
in propriety know that what we are compelled to perceive as not-self is 
not a perception of self, and that we can only on reflection bebeve such 
to be the case, in reliance on the original necessity of so believing im- 
posed on us by our nature.” 198 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS : 
In such examples the faith is of a low order, and need 
not be distinguished from knowledge, except for the 
purposes of rigid science; but still faith is there, and 
there in its essential character; and he who would know 
what faith is, must view it in these lower forms, “ which 
exist more simple in their elements,” as well as in the 
higher, just as he who would know the nature of the 
plant or animal must study it in the lichen or zoophyte. 
These are the incipient movements of a mental power 
which is capable of rising to the greatest heights of 
earth, and looking up to the heaven above, which can 
call before it all time, and go forth even into the eter- 
nity beyond. Already do we see how it joins on to 
cognition, and mingles with it. Faith, as the telescope, 
shows objects which unaided sense cannot discern, but 
still there is personal knowledge, an eye to guarantee 
the accuracy of the vision. We have immediate know- 
ledge always with us, we have self in a particular state 
or exercise; but rising from this, we believe in an object 
which is absent,—in the loftier energies of faith we be- 
lieve in objects which we have never seen, and which we 
never can see in this world. 
According to this account we are said to know our- 
selves, and the objects presented to the senses and the 
representations (always however as presentations) in the 
mind, but to believe in objects which we have seen in 
time past, but which are not now present, and in objects 
which we have never seen, and very specially in objects 
which we can never fully know, such as an Infinite God. 
The mind seems to begin not with faith, but with cog- 
nition. It sets out with the knowledge of an external 
object presented to it, and with a knowledge of self 
contemplating that object. I cannot, then, agree with 
those who maintain that faith—I mean natural faith— 
must precede knowledge. I hold that knowledge, psy- THEIR GENERAL NATURE. 
199 
chologically considered, appears first, and then faith. But 
around our original cognition there grows and clusters 
a body of primitive beliefs which go out far beyond our 
personal knowledge. Knowledge is, after all, the root; 
but from this stable and more earthly ground there 
spring beliefs which mount in living power and in lovely 
form and colour toward the sky.* 
The two differ psychologically, and there are impor- 
tant philosophic ends to be served by distinguishing be- 
tween them; but after all it is more important to fix our 
attention on their points of agreement and coincidence. 
The belief has a basis of cognition, the cognition has a 
superstructure of beliefs. In a sense we know space, 
for it is present to us; certainly body occupying space 
is ever before the senses, but when we look on space as 
having no bounds, we are beyond the territory of cog- 
nition, we are in the region of faith. The one convic- 
tion, equally with the other, carries within itself its autho- 
rity and validity. No man is entitled to restrict him- 
self to cognitions, and refuse to attend or to yield to 
the beliefs which he is also led to entertain by the very 
constitution of his mind. No man can do so, in fact. 
Every man must act upon his native beliefs as well as 
upon his cognitions. He requires no external conside- 
ration to lead him to trust in the one any more than 
in the other, for each has its sufficiency in itself. He 
* There were profound discussions in the scholastic ages as to the 
separate provinces of faith and knowledge or reason, but it was in 
regard to matters of religion, and specially of revelation, including 
Church authority. Anselm gave the first, or deeper place, to faith, and 
Abelard to knowledge. But there was confusion in the controversy, 
owing to its not being determined psychologically what is the precise 
difference of knowledge and faith, and of reason and faith. In every 
exercise of mind about the great objects and truths of religion, there 
must be both cognitive and faith (psychological) elements embraced, 
and reason always comprises faith when it refers to the existence of 
objects. The relation of faith and reason will fall to bo discussed in the 
last Chapter of this Volume. 200 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS : 
who would weakly give up his native faiths because as- 
saults are made on them, and doggedly resolve to yield 
to nothing but immediate cognitions, will find that the 
sceptic who has driven him from the beliefs will go on 
to attack the cognitions likewise, and that he can de- 
fend the cognitions only on grounds which might have 
enabled him to stand by his credences likewise. On the 
other hand, I grieve over the attempts, for the last age 
or two, of a school of thinkers who labour to prove that 
the understanding or the speculative reason leads to scep- 
ticism and nihilism, and then appeal to faith to save us 
from the abyss before us. I have no toleration for those 
who tell us with a sigh, too often of affectation, that they 
are very sorry that knowledge or reason leads to contra- 
dictions and insoluble doubts, from which they are long- 
ing to be delivered by some mysterious faith. It is time 
to put an end to this worse than civil strife, to this set- 
ting of one part of the soul against another. I do not be- 
lieve that the understanding, or the reason, or any other 
power of the mind, lands us in scepticism. Each cogni- 
tive faculty conducts in its own way to its own truths. 
The intelligence and the faith are not conflicting, but 
conspiring elements. I am sure that the criticism which 
has attacked the knowledge, would, if followed out, be no 
less formidable in its assaults on the belief. In these 
pages I am endeavouring to show how they concur and 
co-operate, being almost always associated in one con- 
crete act, which we analyze merely for scientific ends.* 
* Kant laboured to demonstrate tliat tbe Speculative Keason lands 
us in contradictions, and was not given us in order to reach objective 
truth ; but then he called in a Practical Season, which guaranteed a 
moral law, a God, and immortality. See the ‘ Methodenlehre ’ in the 
‘ Kritik.’ Jacobi admitted, far too readily, to Kant and Fichte, that 
speculation and philosophy led to scepticism, but he fell back on Faith 
(Glaube) or Sentiment (Gefulil), which he represented as a Revelation 
(Offenbarung). See his ‘ David Hume : Ueber den Glauben,’ and * Ja- 
cobi an Fichte,’ He has given views of intuition and of faith as true TIIEIR GENERAL NATURE. 
201 
But while we must yield to our intuitive beliefs as 
well as perceptions, we are not therefore to suppose that 
our faiths are beyond inspection and above examination. 
They are liable to be tried, and should at times be tried, 
by the very same tests as our cognitions. We are not 
to allow ourselves, without examination and without re- 
view, to yield to whatever may suggest itself to our own 
minds, or be recommended to us by others, as a primi- 
tive belief. We must try the spirits, whether they are 
of God. In nothing is man so apt to run into excess and 
extravagance, into folly and error, as yielding to plausible 
beliefs. The tendency of faith is upwards, but it needs 
weights and plummets to hold it down, lest it mount 
into a region of thin air, and there burst and dissolve. 
Fortunately we have a ready means at hand of trying 
our constitutional beliefs, and determining for us when 
as they are beautiful; but he has not unfolded the precise nature of 
faith, nor seen its relation to the understanding. Even Eichte, after 
trying to show that knowledge (Wissen) leads to an absolute idealism, 
in which we know not whether our very thought may not be a dream, 
resorts to Eaith (Glaube), and allows an appeal to the Heart (Herz) 
(Bestimmung des Menschen, Buch iii. Glaube). Sir W. Hamilton main- 
tains that “ all that we know is phenomenal of the unknown ” (Discuss, 
p. 644,2nd ed.), and that “ the knowledge of Nothing is the principle or 
result of all true philosophy” (p. 609), but delights to recognize a faith 
which looks beyond; of which faith, however, he gives no account. 
“We are warned,” he says, “from recognizing the domain of our 
knowledge as necessarily co-extensive with the horizon of our faith.” 
And he adds, “ And by a wonderful revelation, we are thus, in the very 
consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative and 
finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of something uncondi- 
tioned, beyond the sphere of all comprehensive reality” (p. 15). Ever 
since the days of Schleiermacher, there has been a body of theologians 
who in the very same spirit admit that the existence of God cannot be 
established by human intelligence, and who call in a God-consciousness, 
or a faith, to reveal God to us. I admit that intuition and faith have 
their part to act, but so also has the understanding. (See infra, 
Part III. Book II. Chap. V.) For an account of the German systems, 
see Michelet, ‘ EntwickelungsgeschichteChalybaus, Hist. Entwick. 
d. Specul. Philos, von Kant bis Hegel; Willm, Hist. Phil. Allemande, 
and Morell’s limpidly clear ‘ History of Speculative Philosophy.’ 202 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS. 
they should be disallowed, and when they should be al- 
lowed to flow out freely. Are they self-evident? Are 
they necessary, so necessary that we cannot believe the 
opposite ? Are they universal ? These three questions, 
searchingly asked and honestly answered, will settle for 
us whether we ought or whether we ought not to follow 
a belief proffered to our acceptance. We are at liberty 
to employ a belief in argument, appeal, and speculation, 
only under the same conditions as a cognition; that is, 
having shown that it is a constitutional one, we must 
further determine more accurately its nature and law, 
its extent and limits. Thus, and thus only, can we hope 
on the one hand to be kept from mistaking our own 
fancies, misapprehensions, wishes, or prejudices, for pri- 
mitive and heaven-born beliefs, and on the other hand 
be justified in appealing to the faiths which have the 
sanction of our constitution, and the God who gave us 
our constitution, and in using them as a basis on which 
to rear a fabric of philosophical, or ethical, or theological 
truths. 
CHAPTER II. 
TIME AND SPACE. 
Of space in the concrete we have an immediate know- 
ledge ; that is, by the senses, certainly by some of them, 
such as the touch and the sight, most probably by all 
of them, we know bodies, say our own bodily organism 
as extended, that is, as occupying space. By abstraction 
we can fix our attention on the space as distinct from 
associated qualities, and by inward reflection we can 
gather what are the convictions attached. These con- TTME AND SPACE. 
203 
victions pass beyond knowledge proper, and become be- 
liefs, that is, convictions in regard to something which 
we do not immediately know, nay, which we may never 
be able to know. 
With time, also, we have an immediate acquaintance. 
In sense-perception and self-consciousness we know a 
particular object or mental state as now present. Our 
consciousness is continuous ; speedily does immediate 
consciousness slide into memory; the present becomes 
past, and is remembered as past. The child’s organism 
is now in a state of pain; immediately after the pain is 
gone, but the pain of the past is remembered, and re- 
membered as being past. Already, then, there is the 
idea of time always in the concrete. We remember some- 
thing as having been under our consciousness in the past. 
By abstraction we can then think of the time as different 
from the event remembered in time; and by introspec- 
tion we can ascertain the nature of the attached convic- 
tions. Many of these are of the nature of faiths going 
far beyond what is, or ever can be, immediately known. 
Space and time mingle with all our perceptions. Yet 
after all we can say little about them; all that we can 
do as metaphysicians is to analyze and express our ori- 
ginal convictions. It belongs to the mathematician to 
evolve deductively what is involved in certain of them. 
In unfolding the necessary convictions we may make the 
following affirmations. 
I. Time and space have a reality independent of the 
percipient mind, and out of the percipient mind. The 
intelligence does not create them, it discovers them, and 
it discovers them as having an existence independent of 
the mind contemplating them, as having this existence 
whether the mind contemplates them or no, and an ex- 
istence out of and beyond the mind as it thinks of them, 
lie who denies this is in the very act setting aside one 204 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS. 
of the clearest of native principles, and has left himself 
no stand-point from which he can repel any proposal 
suggested to himself or offered by another, to set aside 
any other conviction, or all other convictions. If some one 
affirm that space has no objective existence, he leaves it 
competent for any other coming after him, to maintain 
that the objects perceived in space have no reality. He 
who allows that time may have no reality except in the 
contemplative mind, will find himself greatly troubled to 
answer the sceptic, when he insists that the events in time 
are quite as unreal as the time is in which they are per- 
ceived as having occurred. There is only one sure and 
consistent mode of avoiding these troublesome and dan- 
gerous consequences, and that is by standing up for the 
veracity of all our fundamental perceptions, and, among 
others, of our convictions regarding the reality of space 
and time. 
According to Kant, space and time are the forms given 
by the mind to the phenomena which are presented 
through the senses, and are not to be considered as 
having anything more than a subjective existence. It is 
one of the most fatal heresies—that is, dogmas opposed 
to the revelations of consciousness—ever introduced into 
philosophy, and it lies at the basis of all the aberrations 
in the school of speculation which followed. For those 
who were taught that the mind could create the space 
and time, soon learned to suppose that the mind could 
also create the objects and events cognized as in space 
and time, till the whole external universe became ideal, 
and all reality was supposed to lie in a series of con- 
nected mental forms. He who would arrest the stream, 
must seek to stop it at the place whence it flowed out; 
otherwise all his efforts will be ineffectual.* 
* Dr. Thomas Brown, in an article on Tillers, * Philosophic de 
Kant,’ in No. 2 (1803) of the ‘ Edinburgh Review,’ dwells on this. TIME AND SPACE. 
205 
II. Space and time are continuous, that is, they ex- 
tend out, flow on, without break, separation, or interrup- 
tion. In this respect they are different, from matter or 
body, which may be broken into parts, and the parts 
separated from each other. But there can be no gaps 
in space, no cessation in time. 
This is one of several circumstances which has made 
space and time to be classed together. Yet while they 
may be grouped under one head, they are not identical, 
and they have their points of difference. In particular, 
space has three dimensions,—length, breadth, and depth; 
“ The truth of space and of the world being to our reasoning scepti- 
cism the same, we cannot deny space and admit the reality of sensible 
objects.” D. Stewart, after affirming that the idea of space “is mani- 
festly accompanied with an irresistible conviction that space is neces- 
sarily existent, and that its annihilation is impossible,” adds, “to call 
this proposition in question, is to open a door to universal scepti- 
cism” (Disser. p. 597). In our day we find the greatest opponent of 
the Dialectic of Hegel who has appeared, taking the same view. “ Hier- 
nach sind Haum und Zeit etwas Subjectives und zwar nach Kant 
etwas nur Subjectives. Wenn dies folgt, so verfliichtet sich damit die 
ganze Weltansicht in Erscheinung, und Erscheinung ist vom Scheine 
nicht weit entfernt. Wenn Haum und Zeit nur und ausschliessend 
Subjectives sind, so drangt sich allenthalben diese Zuthat ein. Wie 
die Luftschicht zwischen dem Auge und dem Gegenstande, wirft sie 
auf alles eine fremde Trubung; denn alles erscheint in Ilaum und 
Zeit, die nur aus uns geboren sind. Wir erkennen nun nichts an sich ; 
denn die Verstandesbegrifie haben (nach Kant) nur Anwendung durch 
diese Formen der Anschauung und die Vernunftbegriffe suchen wieder 
nur eine Einheit fur die Yerstandeserkenntniss. Wie wollen wir uns von 
dem Zauberkreise losen, da er vielmehr unser eigenstes Wesen est?” 
(Trendelenburg, ‘ Logische TJntersuchungen,’ b. i. v.). Sir W. Hamilton 
agrees with Kant as to the a priori idea of space, and to avoid the 
difficulties calls in an a posteriori notion —“ We have a twofold cogni- 
tion of space; (a) an a priori or native imagination of it in general, as 
a necessary condition of the possibility of thought; and (b) under that 
an a posteriori or adventitious percept of it, in particular as contingently 
apprehended in this or that complexus of sensations” (Heid’s Works, 
p. 882). “In this I venture a step beyond Heid and Stewart, no less 
than beyond Kant” (p. 126). A simpler and a more natural account of 
the relations between a priori and a posteriori would bring these two 
notions to a unity. 206 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS. 
that is, we may contemplate it as extending along any 
given line, as spreading out in a surface, or as going out 
in all directions. Time again has only succession, or 
priority and posteriority. We often apply to time lan- 
guage derived from space, and we represent time as a 
line, and speak of it as being only in one direction. But 
it is to be remembered that such language is used me- 
taphorically, and has no literal meaning as applied to 
time. Still it points to a truth, and specifies a difference 
between space and time.* But in regard to their ex- 
tension or flow, both are continuous, and spread out or 
run on without a possible division. 
But it will be urged, that the question is often discussed 
as to whether space and time are infinitely divisible, 
and that certain mathematicians maintain that they have 
demonstrated the infinite divisibility of space. In look- 
ing at this question, it is desirable first of all to have it 
settled in what sense extension is capable of division. 
We cannot divide space in the sense in which we divide 
matter. In dividing body we separate one part of it 
from another, so as to leave a space between. We can 
thus divide an apple, and keep one part of it in our 
hand, and put the other in our mouth. But we cannot 
thus separate or isolate space apart from space. In the 
sense of separation, we cannot with propriety speak of the 
infinite divisibility of space, for it is not divisible at all, 
* It lias been, asked why the mind gives three dimensions to space 
and only one to time. Those who regard space and time as the crea- 
tion of the mind, may amuse themselves with answering this question. 
There is profound sense in the following remarks of Sir J. Herschel, 
in his ‘Review of Whewell’ (Essays, p. 202):—“The reason, we con- 
ceive, why we apprehend things without us, is that they are without 
us. We take it for granted that they exist in space, because they do 
so exist, and because such their existence is a matter of direct per- 
ception, which can neither be explained in words nor contravened in 
imagination ; because, in short, space is a reality“ That which has 
parts, proportions, and susceptibilities of exact measurement, must be 
a * thing.’ ” TIME AND SPACE. 
207 
either finitely or infinitely. The same remark holds 
good of time. The mind declares that the separation of 
space from space, or of time from time, is impossible in 
the nature of things.* 
There may however be relations discovered both in 
space and time. We can conceive of less or more of ex- 
tension, and of proportions between the less and the more; 
the one may be twice or ten times as much as the other. 
All this we are allowed, nay necessitated, to think. The 
science which treats of quantity, that is, mathematics, has 
specially to do with their relations. There may be little or 
no impropriety in calling these proportions parts, provided 
we do not misunderstand the language we employ, or 
understand it as implying that between two spaces there 
can be an interval in which there is no space. What is 
meant by the infinite division of space seems to be, that 
fixing our thoughts on any given section or proportion of 
space, say the thousandth part of an inch, we are at liberty 
to conceive of the half of it, and again of the half of the 
quotient, and so on indefinitely as far as may serve our 
purpose or we may choose. Some of these subjects will 
be resumed when we come to consider those primitive 
judgments which relate to quantity. 
But before leaving the subject immediately before us, 
it is of importance to have it noticed that our convictions 
say nothing whatever on (what is a very different matter 
from the divisibility of space, though the two have often 
been confounded) the infinite divisibility of matter. This 
latter is a question which can be settled by nothing but 
experience; experience at this present stage of science 
says nothing whatever on the subject, and I suspect will 
never be able to settle it on one side or other. There 
might be limits to man’s capacity of dividing body which 
* Tlais view is developed with great acuteness in Gillespie’s ‘ Neces- 
sary Existence of Deity ’ (Exam. Antith. Refut. p. iii.). 208 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS. 
would not be limits to other beings, and whether there 
could be any limits to a Being of Infinite Power is a 
question which it transcends our faculties to answer, and 
which therefore we should not attempt to answer. 
But the difficulty has been started, are space and time 
made up of parts ? and if so, are infinite time and space 
made up of parts ? To this I reply, first and decisively, 
that we cannot conceive them as made up of partitions, or 
separable parts, as an apple or an orange is, or as the earth 
is, or the sun is. But then, secondly, we can conceive 
proportion in space and time, and if we take any of these 
proportional sections, and divide it into two, thought will 
compel us to say that the two must make up the whole. 
In this sense the parts make up the whole, that is, the 
subsections make up the section. If the question be ex- 
tended beyond this, and it be asked, Is infinite space 
made up of parts ? I answer, that as we can have no ade- 
quate notion of infinite space, so we cannot be expected 
to answer all the questions which may be put regarding 
it. It is certain that neither infinite space nor finite 
space is made up of separable parts. We can speak in- 
telligibly of proportions in finite space, and determine 
their relations to each other and the whole. I tremble 
to speak of the proportions of infinite space, lest I be 
using language which has or can have no proper mean- 
ing, and the signification attached to which by me or 
others might be altogether inapplicable to such a subject. 
Still there are propositions which we might intelligibly 
use. It is self-evident that any proportion of space must 
be less than infinite space. And if infinite space can be 
conceived as having proportions, and we could conceive 
all these proportions, then these proportions would be 
equal to the whole. But as we cannot adequately con- 
ceive the whole, so neither can we conceive of the propor- 
tions of the whole. We are in a region dark and path- TIME AND SPACE. 
209 
less and directionless, and we may as well draw back at 
once, for nothing is to be gained by advancing.* We 
are on the verge of another subject, to which we must 
turn. 
III. Space and time have andean have no limits. Nor 
is this a mere negative proposition, as some have declared 
it to be; it is a positive affirmation that to whatever point 
we go, in reality or in imagination, there must be a space 
and time beyond. Nor is it, as it has been represented, 
an impotency of mind. It is not a mere incapacity to 
conceive that when we go a certain length back or for- 
ward in time, or out into space, there time and space 
should cease. It is a conviction of a positive kind, that 
beyond these points, or beyond any other space conceiva- 
ble, there must still be time and space. This, as will be 
shown more fully forthwith, is a truth self-evident, neces- 
sary, universal. If we were carried out to the utmost 
point to which the furthest-seeing telescope can reach, or 
beyond this as far as imagination can range, we should 
confidently stretch forth our hand into an outer region, 
believing that there must be space into which it might 
enter, and that if it were hindered, it must be by body 
occupying space. 
There is more than this embraced in our native con- 
viction. We are constrained to believe, as to the space 
and time which we know in part, and which we are con- 
strained to regard as beyond our power of imagination, 
that they are such that no addition could be made to them. 
This is a further and a most important element in our 
conviction. We intuitively know space and time: with 
this we start. Looking to the space and time which we 
* “Non igitnr respondere curabimus iis, qui quserunt an si daretur 
bnea infinita, ejus media pars esset etiam mfinita; vel an numerus in- 
finites sit par anve impar; et talia; quia de iis nulli videntur debere 
cogitare nisi qui mentem suam infinitam esse arbitrantur ” (Descartes, 
Prin. p. i. 26). 210 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS. 
thus know, we are constrained to regard them as ever go- 
ing beyond our image of them. But we do more, we are 
convinced that they are such in their very nature, that 
no further space and time could be added to them. Join 
these elements together, and so far as I can discover by 
reflection on the operations of my own mind, we have 
the conception and belief which the mind of man is able 
to attain as to the infinity of space and time. 
But we are already in the heart of the subject of the in- 
finite, to which a separate Section must be allotted. In 
this Section we have yet to take up certain difficulties 
which press on us when we contemplate space and time. 
We may have occasion to show, at a later part of this work, 
that our very cognitions often land us in mysteries, that 
is, in propositions to which we must assent, but which 
have bearings which we cannot comprehend. To a still 
greater extent is it of the nature of faith ever to be going 
out into darkness. Tor the truths believed in may not 
be fully comprehended in themselves, and their relations 
may be altogether beyond our ken. It should be frankly 
acknowledged that we are landed in mysteries which the 
human intellect cannot explicate, whenever we inquire 
beyond the narrow limits within which our convictions 
restrain us. But it is of all courses the most foolish and 
suicidal to urge the difficulties connected with space and 
time as a reason for setting aside our intuitive convic- 
tions respecting them, say in regard to their reality. 
Doubtless we are landed in some perplexities by allow- 
ing that they are real, but we are landed in more hope- 
less difficulties and in far more serious consequences, when 
we deny their reality; and there is this important differ- 
ence between the cases, that in the one the difficulties 
arise from the nature of the subject, whereas in the other 
they are created by our own unwarranted affirmations 
and speculations. TIME AND SPACE. 
211 
But what are space and time ? is the question that will 
be pressed on us. To this I reply, that it is true of them, 
as of the objects of every other intuitive conviction, that 
we cannot explain them except by referring to our ori- 
ginal perception. All that has been attempted in this 
Section is to bring out clearly what is involved in the 
perception. 
But it will be asked, Are they substances, are they 
modes, or are they relations ? To this I reply, that these 
questions relate not so much to the nature of space or 
time as the classification of them, and that they are 
not to be classified with substances, modes, or rela- 
tions.* We cannot call them substances, for we do not 
know that they have power or action. Nor can we call 
them modes, for we have no intuitive knowledge of any 
substance in which they inhere. And they are certainly 
more than relations of one thing to another, for we know 
no two or more things which by their relation could yield 
space and time. They are not then to be arranged with 
such cognitions as these. They seem indeed to be en- 
titled to be put in a class by themselves, and resemble 
substances, modes, relations, only in that they are exist- 
ences, entities, realities. 
Certain mystical divines and philosophers are accus- 
tomed to speak of space and time as having no reality to 
* Leibnitz held space and time to be relations given to objects by the 
mind. “ Je tenois l’Espace pour quelque de purement relatie, comme 
le Temps; pour un ordre de coexistences, comme le Temps est un 
ordre de successions” (Op. p. 752. See also pp. 756, 769, 461). He 
speaks of space and time as being “ rapports,” and as “ ideal.” Leib- 
nitz thus prepared the way for the more systematic doctrine of Kant. 
Samuel Clarke argues powerfully that space and time are realities, but 
makes them attributes, properties, or modes, of an eternal substance 
(see his Letters to Leibnitz). D. Stewart, with his usual wisdom, says 
that “ space is neither a substance, nor an accident, nor a relationadd- 
ing, “ But it does not follow from this that it is nothing objective ” 
(Dissert, p. 596). 212 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS. 
the Divine mind. It follows, I think, that if they have 
no reality to the God who knows all truth, they can, pro- 
perly speaking, have no reality at all. If our convictions 
testify (as I have endeavoured to show) that they have 
a reality, it follows, I think, that they have a reality to 
the Divine mind. Again, there are some who talk of an 
Eternal Now :— 
“ Nothing is there to come, and nothing past, 
But an Eternal Now does ever last.” 
These verses of Cowley embody, as definitely as can be 
done, a view which has often been floating in the state- 
ments of divines in speaking of God and Eternity and 
Time. But the language has either no meaning, or if it 
has, it lands us in hopeless contradictions. 
It would have been very different if divines had con- 
tented themselves with stating that they do not know 
how space and time stand related to the Divine mind. 
We are here in the midst of a mystery, which we have 
no faculties to clear up. We know that space and time 
exist; we know on sufficient evidence that God exists: 
but we have no means of knowing how space and time 
stand related to God. The view taken by Sir Isaac 
Newton,—“ Deus durat semper et adest ubique, et, ex- 
istendo semper et ubique, durationem et spatium ccnsti- 
tuit,”*—is certainly a grand one, but 1 doubt much 
whether human intelligence can dictatorially affirm that 
it is as true as it is sublime. 
It is by placing the subject beyond the human facul- 
ties that we are able to meet an objection urged with 
great logical power by Kant, and usually thought to be 
insuperable.! If space and time be real and infinite, 
then we have two infinites ; and if God be also infinite, 
our difficulties are increased. For it is absurd, if not 
* Scholium at close of Phil. Nat. Prin. Math, 
t Kr. d. r. Yern., Die transceu. Aesthet, TIME AND SPACE. 
213 
contradictory, to suppose that there can be two infinite 
things—that God can be infinite while space and time 
are also infinites. Now to this I might without the pos- 
sibility of a positive refutation, urge that there may, for 
aught we know, be nothing inconsistent in supposing 
that there are two things, as space and time, the one 
unbounded and the other without beginning or end, and 
that there can even be nothing contradictory in sup- 
posing that space and time on the one hand, and God 
on the other, may have infinite attributes. They could be 
held as contradictory only in the supposition that the ex- 
istence of unbounded space and unending time were, in 
the nature of things, inconsistent with the existence of 
an infinite God; which it may safely be said can never 
be proven. As to how they could subsist together, is a 
question we are not obliged to answer, for we must be- 
lieve many separate truths, each on its evidence, without 
being able to trace a connection, or being able so much 
as to say that there is a how between them. But I plant 
myself on far firmer ground, when I maintain, secondly, 
that while I believe that space and time are infinite, and 
that God is infinite, I am not necessarily obliged to hold 
that the infinity of space and time is independent of the 
infinity of God. Who will venture to affirm that the 
statement we have quoted from the great Newton may 
not be true ? Who will venture to affirm that space and 
time, being dependent on God, may not stand in a rela- 
tion to God, which is altogether indefinable and utterly 
inconceivable by us ? True we are constrained to believe 
that space and time have an existence independent of us, 
but we are not compelled to believe that they have an 
existence independent of everything else, and least of all 
independent of God. In such a subject, where we have 
no light from intuition or from experience to guide us, 
true wisdom shows itself in refusing to assert or dogma- 
o O 214 
THE INFINITE. 
tize, or even to speculate; and when it has observed this 
rule for itself, it is the better able to rebuke doubt and 
scepticism, when they would bring forth their difficulties 
from regions which are beyond the reach of human 
knowledge. 
CHAPTER III. 
THE INFINITE. 
The subject now opening before us is a profound one 
in itself, and has exercised the profoundest minds ever 
since thought began the attempt to solve the problems 
of the universe. All that I profess to do is to endeavour 
to discover by induction what is the mind’s conviction in 
regard to infinity. A priori cogitation is not to be tole- 
rated in its proffered determinations of what our idea of 
Infinity should be or must be. Logical dissection and 
division, instead of aiding, may only lead us into hopeless 
difficulties. Lofty generalizations embracing all other ob- 
jects, may have no application to an object which from 
its very nature must be mi generis. 
This belief, like every other, will be found to grow out 
of a cognition, and to have an apprehension or concep- 
tion as a body round which it gathers. Yet it should be 
admitted as 
Preliminary, that we cannot form an adequate idea 
or conception of an infinite object f It is a favourite po- 
sition of certain British philosophers, that the mind of 
man can form no conception of the infinite, or that the 
* I regard this truth as established by Locke (Essay ii. xvii). Sir W. 
Hamilton has overthrown those gigantic systems which proceed on an 
opposite view (see his "Philosophy of the Unconditioned’). At the THE INFINITE. 
215 
conception is at best negatiye. There is a great truth, 
but we shall show that there is also a fatal oversight, in 
this statement. 
First, it may be admitted that the mind can form no 
apprehension of the infinite, in the sense of image or 
phantasm. In saying so, I do not mean merely that we 
cannot construct a mental picture of the infinite as an at- 
tribute. Of no quality can the mind fashion a picture; 
it cannot have a mental representation of transparency, 
apart from a transparent substance, and just as little can 
it picture to itself infinity apart from an infinite duration, 
or infinite extension, or an infinite God. But it is not 
in this sense simply that the mind cannot apprehend the 
infinite, it cannot have before it an apprehension of an 
infinite object, say of an infinite space, or an infinite 
God. For to image a thing in our mind is to give it an 
extent and a boundary. When we would image unli- 
mited space, we swell out an immense volume, but it has 
after all a boundary, commonly a spherical one. When 
we would picture unlimited time, we let out an immense 
line behind and before, but the rope is after all cut at 
both ends. When we would represent to ourselves al- 
mighty power, we call up some given act of God, say 
creating or annihilating the universe; but after all, the 
work has a measure, and may be finished. In the sense 
of image, then, the mind cannot have any proper appre- 
hension of infinity as an attribute, or of an infinite object. 
But apprehension may be considered as an act of the 
understanding as well as a mere act of the phantasy. 
We can conceive, we can think about much, which we 
cannot image. We can meditate and reason about such 
same time I do not think that either Locke or Hamilton has given a 
full exposition of the mind’s intuitive conviction respecting infinity. 
Mr. Calderwood opposes the views of Hamilton, but is obliged to admit 
that we have not an adequate conception of the infinite (see ‘ Philoso- 
phy of the Infinite’). 216 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS. 
things as law, government, duty, religion, while yet we 
can form no mental picture of them. The grand ques- 
tion in this discussion is, Can we form an intellectual 
notion of an infinite object, say of an infinite God ? And 
I feel constrained to admit and maintain that human in- 
telligence can form no proper or adequate conception of 
an infinite existence. By what process can it be sup- 
posed to construct such a conception ? Certainly not by 
abstraction, for abstraction separates, takes away, dimi- 
nishes. It is just as certain that it cannot compass this 
end by generalization, for generalization merely groups 
objects by attributes known, and unless we have infi- 
nity first in the individual, we cannot have it in the ge- 
neral. IS1 or can we reach it by addition, multiplication, 
composition; these will give the enlarged, but not the 
unlimited: a distance of a quintillion of quintillions of 
years, or ages, has as distinct a boundary as an ell or an 
inch. Nor can the understanding attain it by a pro- 
cess of ratiocination, for unless the infinite were in the 
premiss, no canon of reasoning would justify its having a 
place in the conclusion. If the intelligence does not find 
the infinite in the perception with which it sets out, it 
never could fashion it by cutting or carving, by construc- 
tion or supraposition. 
But it may be said that we have an apprehension, or 
conception, or perception of the infinite by intuition. I 
am about to show that we have a conviction in regard to 
infinity of a very deep and positive character. But I 
am at present arguing that this does not take the shape 
of an adequate mental representation or logical notion. 
What is its nature is to be determined solely by a pro- 
cess of inward observation, and this I am now endea- 
vouring to conduct. 
I. We have an intuitive belief in regard to the infinity 
of certain objects. Let me endeavour to unfold it. I THE INFINITE. 
217 
have allowed that we cannot have an idea of infinite 
space or time, in the sense of imaging, picturing, or re- 
presenting them. Stretch itself as it may, the imaging 
power of the mind can never go beyond an expansion, 
with a boundary, commonly a globe or sphere of which 
self is the centre, and duration stretching along like a 
line, but with a beginning and an end. In respect then 
of the mental picture or representation, the apprehension 
is merely of the very large or the very long, but still of 
the finite, of what might be called the indefinite, but not 
the infinite. But any account of our conviction as to in- 
finity which goes no further, leaves out the main, the 
peculiar element. The sailor is not led by any native 
instinct to believe that the ocean has no bottom, simply 
because in letting down the sounding-line he has not 
reached the ground. When the astronomer has gauged 
space as far as his telescope can penetrate, he finds that 
there are still stars and clusters of stars, but he is not 
necessitated to believe that there must be star after star 
on and for ever. The geologist in going down from 
layer to layer still finds signs of the existence of a pre- 
vious earth, but he is not obliged to conclude that there 
must have been stratum before stratum from all eternity. 
But man is constrained to believe that whatever be the 
point of space or time to which his eye or his thoughts 
may reach, there must be a space and time beyond. 
Whence this belief of the mind on space and time being 
presented to it ? Whence this necessity of thought or 
belief? This is the very phenomenon to be accounted 
for; and yet the British school of metaphysicians can 
scarcely be said to have contemplated it seriously or 
steadfastly with the view of unfolding the depth of mean- 
ing embraced in it.* It implies that to whatever point 
* Locke was prevented by the defects of bis theory and his antipathy 
to innate ideas from developing all that is in our conviction of infi- 218 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS. 
of space or time we might go in our persons or in our 
fancy, there would still be a space and a time beyond. 
I can easily, in imagination, go out as far as the rim of 
the earth, or as the moon, or as the sun, or as the near- 
est star, or as the furthest star seen by the eye, or as the 
remotest star discovered as a speck in a nebulous cloud 
of light by the telescope, but when there, I must be- 
lieve that space still goes on, and that if I were carried 
ten thousand million times further there would still be 
space. I can represent to myself the instant of time 
when man was created, and beyond this the time when 
the lion or the worm, or the palm or the lichen, were 
created, or when the earth or the angels were created; 
but though this period were multiplied by itself millions 
nity. Yet, while lie maintains that our idea of the infinite is negative, he 
admits “ that it has something of positive in all those things we apply 
to it, inasmuch as the mind comprehends so much of the object” 
(Essay ii. xvii. 15). He even admits, though rather incidentally, that 
the mind has a necessary conviction as to the existence of an infinite. 
Thus, speaking of space, he says the mind “ must necessarily conclude 
it, by the very Nature and Idea of each part of it, to be actually in- 
finite” (4). Again, “I think it unavoidable for every considering ra- 
tional creature that will but examine his own, or any other existence* 
to have the notion of an eternal wise Being who had no beginning; and 
such an Idea of infinite duration I am sure I have” (17). It is to be 
regretted that Locke never unfolded all that is contained in these “ ne- 
cessary” and “unavoidable” mental processes. Hamilton represents 
the notion of infinity as an “ impotency” of the mind, an impotency to 
conceive that space and time should have bounds. I am endeavouring 
to show in these paragraphs that there is more than this. Hamilton 
admits that we have a belief in the infinite. “ The sphere of our belief 
is much more extensive than the sphere of our knowledge; and there- 
fore when I deny that the Infinite can by us be known, I am far from 
denying that by us it is, must, and ought to be believed. This I have 
indeed anxiously evinced both by reason and authority” (Metaph. 
vol. ii. App. p. 530). Handing us over in this way to belief, he has no- 
where explained the psychological nature of this belief, or of belief in 
general. Must not a belief in a thing of which we have no conception 
be a belief in zero ? He maintains that our conceptions as to the infi- 
nite land us in contradictions. “ We are altogether unable to conceive 
space as bounded, as finite; that is, as a whole beyond which there THE INFINITE. 
219 
of billions of trillions of times, I not only cannot be- 
lieve that duration did then begin, I am constrained to 
believe that it did not and could not then commence. 
This intuitive belief, accompanied as it is with a strin- 
gent necessity of feeling, is the very peculiarity of the 
mind’s conviction in regard to infinity, as it is one of the 
grandest characteristics of human intelligence. It should 
be added that it is a power which ever impresses man with 
his powerlessness. 
This conviction has the characters and can bear the 
tests of intuition. It is self-evident. Indeed, if it did 
not shine in its own light, it could never be seen in any 
other which we might hold up to it. It can stand the 
test of necessity. It is necessary, we must believe it 
is no further space.” “ On the other hand, we are equally powerless 
to realize in thought the possibility of the opposite contradictory. We 
cannot conceive space infinite, or without bound” (Metaph. Lect. 38). 
I may be permitted to quote the criticism I have offered on this seem- 
ing contradiction in a review of Hamilton in Dub. Univ. Mag., Aug. 
1859. “The seeming contradiction here arises from the double sense 
in which the word ‘ conceive’ is used. In the second of these counter- 
propositions the word is used in the sense of imaging, or representing 
in consciousness, as when the mind’s eye pictures a fish or a mermaid. 
In this signification we cannot have an idea or notion of the infinite. 
But the thinking, judging, believing power of the mind is not the same as 
the imaging power. The mind can think of the class fish, or even of 
the imaginary class mermaid, while it cannot picture the class. Now, 
in the first of the opposed propositions, the word ‘ conceive’ is taken in 
the sense of thinking, deciding, being convinced. We picture space 
as bounded, but we cannot think, judge, or believe it to be bounded. 
When thus explained, all appearance of contradiction disappears; in- 
deed, all the contradictions which the Kantians, Hegelians, and Hamil- 
tonians are so fond of discovering between our intuitive convictions 
will vanish, if we but carefully inquire into the nature of the convic- 
tions. Both propositions, when rightly understood, are true, and there 
is no contradiction. They stand thus:—‘We cannot image space as 
without bounds ; ’ ‘ we cannot think that it has bounds, or believe that 
it has no bounds.’ The former may well be represented as a creature 
impotency; the latter is most assuredly a creature potency, is one of 
the most elevated and elevating convictions of which the mind is pos- 
sessed, and is a conviction of which it can never be shorn.” 220 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS. 
when our intelligence is directed towards it. We can- 
not be made to believe otherwise, or that there is a limit 
to immensity and duration. It is, when properly under- 
stood, universal. The image, it is true, of space or time, 
formed by the boy or savage, may be very contracted. 
The widest space of which he has had any experience 
may be the glorious dome spread over his head in the 
sky, and his imagination may be able to go very little 
beyond the visible heavens or the distant hills which 
bound his view, still he is sure that beyond there must 
be something, an “ outer infinite,” and perhaps he will 
be eager to know what is beyond his horizon. His idea 
of time, as a positive picture, may extend no further than 
the date of the oldest story which his grandfather has 
told him; but he is sure that at that point duration did 
not begin, and he may be interested to know what hap- 
pened before. 
“ Heaven lies about us in our infancy. 
Hence in a season of calm weather, 
Though inland far we be, 
Our souls have sight of that immortal sea 
Which brought us hither, 
Can in a moment travel thither, 
And see the children sport upon the shore, 
And hear the mighty waters rolling evermore.” 
But this is not all that is contained in our conviction. 
We are constrained to believe, in regard to the objects 
which we look upon as infinite, that they are incapable 
of augmentation. Here, as in every apprehension which 
we have of infinity, the imaging power of the mind fails 
and must fail; still we have an image and an intellectual 
conception—say, an image with a notion of extension, or 
duration, or Deity. Or we represent to ourselves the 
Divine Being, with certain attributes,—say, as wise or as 
good,—and our belief as to Him and these attributes THE INFINITE. 
221 
is, that he cannot be wiser or better. This aspect may 
be appropriately designated as the Perfect. This is the 
conviction of the Perfect, of which many profound phi- 
losophers make so much, but not more, as I think, than 
they are entitled to do; though they have not, as it ap- 
pears to me, always given the correct account of the na- 
ture and of the genesis of the notion.* We think of 
God as having all his attributes such that no addition 
could be made to them : and we call such attributes His 
perfections. In regard, indeed, to the moral perfections 
of Deity, it is this expressive word Perfect, rather than 
infinite, which expresses the conviction which we are led 
to entertain in regard, for example, to the wisdom, or 
benevolence, or righteousness of God. 
This, too, seems a native conviction of the mind. It 
needs, indeed, a certain matter provided for it, and to 
which it may adhere. In a positive shape it springs up 
late, and grows slowly in all minds to which it is not ex- 
ternally given by education, out of the Bible or other- 
wise. Still it is there in the mind as a tendency, placing 
* In musing on divine things, the thought occurred to Anselm that 
it might be possible to find a single argument which would of itself 
prove that there is a God, and that he is the Supreme Good. Man, 
he says, is able to form a conception of something than which nothing 
greater can be conceived ; and this conception, he argues, implies the 
existence of a corresponding being (Proslogion). A similar argument 
occurred to Descartes. He found in himself the idea of a Perfect being; 
and he argues that in this idea the existence of the Being is comprised, 
as the equality of the three angles to two right-angles is comprised in 
the idea of a triangle (Meth. p. 4, etc.). Leibnitz acknowledges that the 
argument is valid, provided he is allowed to supply a missing link, and 
to show that it is possible that God should exist (Op. p. 273). It may 
be doubted whether these arguments for the Divine existence, derived 
from the mere idea of the Perfect, are valid, independent of external 
facts. But these eminent men are right in saying that the mind has 
some conception and conviction as to the perfect; and these combine, 
with the observation of traces of design, to enable us to construct an 
argument for the Divine existence. In our day, M. Cousin maintains 
that the mind has the idea of the perfect, which he employs in his 
theistic argument, Ser. ii. t. ii. 9-2-2 
<w <w <v 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS. 
before every man some sort of “Idea” in the Platonic 
sense; a model, or beau ideal, which he is ever prompted 
to strive after, while he is made to feel that he has not 
reached it. It is this impulse, I apprehend, which makes 
even the heathens speak of their gods, or at least their 
supreme God, as ineffably good and immortal;—their 
actual conceptions of his excellence and duration may be 
extremely inadequate, still they will not allow that there 
could be any increase made to his attributes; and, under 
fostering circumstances, the conviction will come out in 
a more decided form. When the object is brought under 
our notice we see that it is perfect, that it must be per- 
fect, and that it cannot be otherwise. The faith is uni- 
versal, but the conception takes the form which may be 
given it by the education or the intellectual strength and 
growth of the individual. 
But it will be urged that these two views or sides of 
infinity are inconsistent. According to the one, infinity 
is something to which something can be ever added; 
whereas, according to the other, it is something to which 
nothing can be added. But in this, as in every other 
case of apparent or alleged contradiction among our ori- 
ginal perceptions, the inconsistency vanishes on a careful 
inspection of the precise nature of the convictions. The 
infinite is something beyond our image or notion ; but it 
is not something beyond the infinite itself. It is some- 
thing which admits of no increase, but that something is 
not the imperfect notion we form, and which we know 
to be imperfect. The two are not contradictory, but the 
one is supplementary to the other. They cannot how- 
ever be represented as the complement the one of the 
other; for while they make up such an apprehension as 
the finite mind of man can form, they do not make up 
the infinite itself, which is confessedly far beyond. The 
first of these views tends to humble us, as showing how THE INFINITE. 
223 
far our creature impotency is below Creator Power. The 
other has rather a tendency to elevate us, by showing a 
perfect exemplar, which is indeed far above us, but to 
which we may ever look up. The Perfect shines above 
us like the sun in the heavens, distant and unapproach- 
able, dazzling and blinding as we would gaze on it, but 
still our eye is ever turned up towards it, and we feel that 
it is a blessed thing that there is such a light, and that 
we are permitted to walk in it and rejoice in it. 
II. We believe in infinite space and time, and in the 
possibility of infinite substance or being. After what 
has been already said of space and time we need not 
dwell on the first of these positions. But in believing in 
the infinity of extension and duration, we believe that 
there may possibly be infinite substance dwelling in 
them. I am not satisfied that our intuitive convictions 
go beyond this, or that they of themselves, apart from 
auxiliary considerations, guarantee the existence of infi- 
nite substance. I am sure they do not give any au- 
thority to the doctrine held by so many of the ancient 
Greek philosophers, that material substance is eternal: 
we can easily believe matter to have been brought into 
existence at some point in time by a power adequate 
to produce it. It does not appear to me that we are 
constrained by our convictions on this special s.ubject, 
taken apart from all other evidence, to believe in the 
existence of an eternal or omnipresent God. Herein 
I have always thought that the argument a priori, or 
intuitive, in behalf of the Divine existence fails. There 
is a link wanting which shows that the proof is not 
apodictic or demonstrative, that it is not founded on 
truths which are self-evident throughout, as is, for ex- 
ample, the proposition that the opposite angles made by 
the intersection of two straight lines are equal. We 
have, and can have, no demonstrative evidence of other 224 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS. 
truths to which the mind cleaves most resolutely,—as, 
for example, that we ever had a sister, or brother, or 
friend, or that we were ever favoured to sit under the 
shelter of a father’s wisdom, or the dews of a mother’s 
tenderness. There is need of other considerations, and 
particularly of an experiential element, in the form of 
certain obvious facts, to prove the existence of a Being 
dwelling in infinite time and space, and possessed of 
infinite power and goodness. I may have occasion to 
show that when the patent facts and the native convic- 
tions are brought together, the certainty is of the very 
highest order short of demonstration, which it falls be- 
neath only so far as not absolutely to preclude the pos- 
sibility of doubt when the fool is determined to say in 
his heart, “ There is no God.” It would be premature 
and out of place to bring forward in array these com- 
bined considerations at this stage of our inquiries, and 
to show how the order and adaptation in nature are 
evidence of a designing and planning mind,—how these 
effects in nature evoke the intuition which demands that 
there be a cause,—how our convictions of moral obli- 
gation imply a law, the embodiment of the nature of 
a lawgiver,—and how all these unite to establish the 
existence of a living Being intelligent and holy. But it 
is to our present purpose to show how these individually, 
and in their union and co-operation, fall in with, and 
exactly suit, our intuition regarding time and space. 
For I, think it may be admitted that there is an 
emptiness, if I may so speak, about pure space and 
time. We know not, in fact, of a space or time without 
a substantial existence in them. I do indeed maintain, 
on the ground of irradicable conviction, that we must 
believe them to be independent of ourselves contem- 
plating them, or of material objects placed in them. 
But the mind has a difficulty in conceiving of them as THE INFINITE. 
225 
altogether separate and independent entities. It is from 
this cause, I am convinced, that so many philosophers 
represent them as mere relations of things rather than 
things, or as forms given to objects by the mind, or as 
mere conditions of existence. These are very incorrect 
representations; still the very fact that they have been 
advanced is an evidence of the difficulty which the mind 
experiences in grasping the realities of empty space and 
time, which do look as if they were voids to be filled up. 
Independent of us, they scarcely look as if they Avere 
independent of a substantial existence. I am not pre- 
pared to affirm with S. Clarke, that they are modes of 
substance, but I have little to say against another state- 
ment of the same author, that “ they are immediate and 
necessary consequences of the existence of God, and that 
without them his Eternity and Ubiquity would be taken 
away;” or the statement of Newton, that “God consti- 
tutes time and space.” The mind feels as if there were 
something a-wanting, till it learns of One to occupy the 
vacuum; but it is met and gratified in every one of its 
intellectual and moral intuitions when it is brought to 
knoAV Him who inhabiteth eternity and immensity, and 
filleth them with living and life-giving fulness. 
III. We look on infinity as an attribute of some ob- 
ject supposed to exist. Infinity is not to be regarded 
as a substance, or a distinct entity ; we do not reckon it 
as an independent something, but we attribute it to 
something which has existence. It is the more neces- 
sary to make this remark from the circumstance that 
metaphysicians are very much tempted to give an inde- 
pendent being to abstractions, and often write about the 
infinite in such a way as to make their readers look 
upon them as separate entities. I stand up for the re- 
ality of infinity, but I claim for it a reality simply as an 
attribute. It is regarded intuitively as an attribute of 226 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS. 
expansion and duration. But the rnind is not satisfied 
that it has got the whole truth till it looks on it as an 
attribute of God, and of his glorious perfections. 
IV. We have a conception of the objects which we 
believe to be infinite. I have admitted that this notion 
is not adequate; in short, it is not a notion of infinity. 
Still the mind has a notion in regard to the infinite. 
On this, as a basis, the belief stands; round this, as a 
body, the belief gathers, as the atmosphere does round 
the earth. First, there must always be a notion of an 
existing thing, say space or time; or, as far more con- 
ceivable, a living and an intelligent God. The mind 
labours to heighten, deepen, widen, this notion on every 
side. Still it is within limits: but it can inquire what 
is beyond. It can do more: it can look out on what is 
beyond. It can do yet more: it knows that there is 
something beyond, and perceives somewhat of it. It 
perceives, for example, that far as it has gone in space, 
there is a space beyond; far as it has gone in time, there 
is a time beyond; much as it has conceived of God, 
there is, after all, more of the Divine perfections. There 
is thus a clear conception of an object; there is thus, 
too, a conception of this same object being beyond, and 
still further. The belief attaches to this conception, and 
declares that this thing conceived, this thing conceived as 
still beyond, is a reality, and that it is such that it can- 
not be increased. My readers must consult their own 
consciousness as to whether the account now given of 
the nature and genesis of our conviction is the correct one. 
This notion, with its adhering belief, is a mental phe- 
nomenon which we have a word to express. We can 
subject, it to logical processes ; it comes in, like all our 
perceptions, in the concrete,—it is something, say space, 
time, or Deity, we apprehend as infinite; but we can ab- 
stract the infinite from the object regarded as infinite, THE INFINITE. 
227 
and form the abstract idea of infinity. We can general- 
ize it, and use it as a predicate; thus we can talk of 
space and time and God as being infinite. We can ut- 
ter judgments regarding it, as that the infinite God is in 
every given place; there is no place of which we may 
not say, “ Surely the Lord is in this place.55 We can even 
reason about it; thus we can infer that this puny effort 
of man, set against the recorded will of God, shall most 
certainly be frustrated by His Infinite power. Keeping 
within the limits prescribed by the nature of the convic- 
tions, man can speak about the infinite and be intelligi- 
ble, he can legitimately employ it in argument, and he 
can muse upon it and find it to be among the most en- 
nobling and precious of themes.* 
* It should be carefully observed that according to this account, in- 
finite is not a separate or an independently existing thing, but the at- 
tribute of a thing,—very possibly an attribute of an attribute of an 
existing thing. It is of something, say of space, or of the attribute of 
something, say of the power of God, that we predicate that they are in- 
finite. This certainly implies that no space can be added to infinite 
space, but does not imply that space, because it is infinite, must contain 
all existence, must comprise, say wisdom and goodness. It implies that 
God cannot be more righteous than he is, but does not involve that his 
righteousness or even that his being must embrace all being. Mr. 
Mansel, in the ‘ Limits of Religious Thought Examined,’ 3rd ed. p. 46, 
quotes the language of Hegel: “ What kind of an Absolute Being is 
that which does not contain in itself all that is actual, even evil in- 
cluded? ” and refers to Sehelling, Schleiermacher, and Parker, as hold- 
ing similar views. I am sure that the mind is not shut up into any 
such doctrine by its native convictions. Against such a view the artil- 
lery of Hamilton and Mansel tells with irresistible power. They have 
shown most conclusively that such a notion involves inextricable confu- 
sion and hopeless contradictions. I freely abandon such a conception 
to them, to tear it to pieces with their remorseless logic. But I decidedly 
demur to the statement of Mr. Mansel, “ that which is conceived as 
absolute and infinite must be conceived as containing within itself the 
sum, not only of all actual, but of all possible modes of being.” I have 
nothing here to say as to the absolute, but I do affirm that we have a 
conception as to the infinite, the perfect—I do not say of the infinite, the 
perfect—which does not imply this consequence, and that we can both 
think and speak of infinity without falling into contradictions. But 
Mr. Mansel says (p. 335) that my view (as partially expounded in Ap- 228 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS. 
And yet it is true all the while that the notion is 
engulfed in mystery; it is but a small lamp of light 
hanging in (to us) circumambient darkness. It is of all 
things the most preposterous in certain speculators to 
set out with the idea of the infinite without a previous 
induction of its nature, and thence proceed, consecutively 
or deductively, to draw out a body of philosophy or the- 
ology. Such men have lost themselves in attempting to 
voyage an “ unreal, vast, unbounded deep of horrible con- 
fusion and yet they would seek to pilot others, only to 
conduct them into darker gloom and more inextricable 
straits, and, in the end, bottomless abysses. The account 
we have given of the conception and belief, shows how 
narrow the limits within which man can make intelligible 
assertions; how strait the road in which he must walk, if 
he would not lose himself in wilderness and bog. He 
who passes these bounds is talking without a meaning ; 
he who would start with the notion of the absolute, and 
thence construct a system embracing God, the world, and 
man, will without fail land himself in helpless and hope- 
pendix to ‘ Method of Divine Government,’ and in an Article on “ In- 
tuitionalism and the Limits to Religious Thought” in the ‘North British 
Review’ for February, 1859), differs from that of Sir W. Hamilton ra- 
ther in language than in substance, and that it is not opposed to any 
principle of the ‘ Philosophy of the Conditioned.’ I rejoice to believe 
this, as I would rather agree with Sir W. Hamilton and Mr. Mansel 
than with any metaphysicians of the past or present age. But whether 
I agree with them or not, I must hold it to be quite possible to muse 
and reason about the attribute ‘infinite,’ as it is in fact conceived and be- 
lieved in by the mind, without falling into the difficulties in which the 
German supporters of the absolute have involved themselves, and that 
we can think of God and write about God as infinite, without being 
compelled by any logical necessity to look upon Him as embracing all 
existence, or to reckon it impossible or inconceivable that He should 
create a world and living agents different from Himself. We cannot 
conceive that God’s power should be increased, but we can conceive it 
exercised in creating beings possessed of power. We cannot conceive 
His goodness to be enlarged, but we can, without a contradiction, con- 
ceive Him creating other beings also good. Nor are we by this con- THE INFINITE. 
229 
less contradictions—the necessary consequent, and the 
appropriate punishment, of his folly and presumption.* 
The nature of man’s conviction in regard to infinity, is 
fitted to impress us, at one and the same time, with the 
strength and the weakness of human intelligence, which 
is powerful in that it can apprehend so much, but fee- 
ble in that it can apprehend no more. The idea enter- 
tained is felt to be inadequate, but this is one of its ex- 
cellencies, that it is felt to be inadequate; for it would 
indeed be lamentably deficient if it did not acknowledge 
of itself that it falls infinitely beneath the magnitude of 
the object. The mind is led by an inward tendency to 
stretch its ideas wider and wider, but is made to know 
at the most extreme point which it has reached that there 
is something further on. It is thus impelled to be ever 
striving after something which it has not yet reached, 
and to look beyond the limits of time into eternity be- 
yond, in which there is the prospect of a noble occupa- 
tion in beholding, through ages which can come to no 
end, and a space which has no bounds, the manifesta- 
tions of a might and an excellence of which we can never 
know all, but of which we may ever know more. It is 
an idea which would ever allure us up towards a God of 
ception shut up to the conclusion that the creature-power or creature- 
excellence might be added to the Divine power and goodness, and thus 
make it greater. To all quibbles proceeding in this line, I say that for 
aught I know it may not be possible they should be added, or that 
if added they should increase the Divine perfections; and no reply 
could be given, drawn either from intuition or experience, the only 
lights to which I can allow an appeal. 
* It is at this point that Sir W. Hamilton has done such unspeakable 
service to Philosophy in his ‘ Philosophy of the Unconditioned,’ and 
Mr. Mansel to Theology, in his ‘Limits of Religious Thought,’ by dis- 
pelling and scattering for ever the Philosophy of the Absolute, and the 
Theology which issued from that dark thunder-cloud, bulking so large 
to the eye, and sending forth terrific lightnings, with bellowing sounds 
and dreadful tempests, which brooded so long over Germany, and has 
been hovering on our shores and those of the United States of America. 230 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS. 
infinite perfection, and yet make us feel more and more 
impressively the higher we ascend, that we are, after all, 
infinitely beneath Him. Man’s capacity to form such an 
idea is a proof that he was formed by an infinite God, 
and in the image of an infinite God; his incapacity in 
spite of all his efforts to form a higher idea, is fitted to 
show us how wide the space and how impassable the 
gulf which separates man as finite from God the infinite. 
They are in error who conclude that they cannot know 
an Infinite God, but they are equally in error who sup- 
pose that they can reach a perfect knowledge of Him. 
There is a sense in which he may be described as the 
unknown God, for no human intellect can come to know 
all the attributes of God, or even know all about any one 
of his perfections; but there is a sense in which he is 
emphatically the known God, inasmuch as he has been 
pleased to manifest and reveal himself, and every human 
being is required to attain a clear and positive, though at 
the same time a necessarily inadequate knowledge of him. 
It is true, on the one hand, that the invisible things of 
God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being 
understood from the things which are made, even his 
eternal power and Godhead; but it is equally true, on 
the other, that we cannot by searching find out God, that 
we cannot find out the Almighty unto perfection. The 
wide finite, with its horizon ever widening as we ascend, 
should call forth our admiration, our adoration, and our 
love; the wider infinite, which is round about, and into 
which we can only gaze as we often gaze into the deep 
sky, should impress us with a feeling of awe in reference 
to Him who fills it all, and a feeling of humility in refer- 
ence to ourselves who can know so little. 
He who dwells in infinity is at once a God who re- 
veals and a God who conceals himself. We can know, 
but we can know only in part. The knowledge which 231 
THE INFINITE. 
we can attain is the clearest, and yet the obscurest of all 
our knowledge. A child, a savage, can acquire a certain 
acquaintance with Him, while neither sage nor angel can 
rise to a full comprehension of Him. God may be truly 
described as the Being of whom we know the most, in- 
asmuch as His works are ever pressing themselves upon 
our attention, and we behold more of His ways than of 
the ways of any other ; and yet He is the Being of whom 
we know the least, inasmuch as we know comparatively 
less of His whole nature than we do of ourselves, or of 
our fellow-men, or of any object falling under our senses. 
They who know the least of Him have in this the most 
valuable of all knowledge; they who know the most, know 
but little after all of His glorious perfections. Let us prize 
what knowledge we have, but feel meanwhile that our 
knowledge is comparative ignorance. They who know 
little of Him may feel as if they knew much; they who 
know much will always feel that they know little. The 
most limited knowledge of Him should be felt to be pre- 
cious, but this mainly as an encouragement to seek know- 
ledge higher and yet higher, without limit and without 
end. They who in earth or heaven know the most, know 
that they know little after all; but they know that they 
may know more and more of Him throughout eternal ages. 
CHAPTER IV. 
THE EXTENT, TESTS, AND POWEE OF OUE NATIVE 
BELIEFS. 
The above are some of the principal—I will not ven- 
ture to say that they are the whole—of our native be- 
liefs. As they grow upon our native convictions, so they 232 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS. 
attach themselves to our primitive judgments, in most of 
which there is more or less of the faith-element, that is, 
belief in the existence of an object not directly known. 
There is belief, for instance, involved in the judgment 
that this effect has a cause, which cause may be un- 
known. There is belief, too, exercised in certain of our 
moral judgments, as when we believe in the integrity of 
a good man, or trust in the Word of God, even when 
His Providence seems in opposition. But these are 
topics which will fall to be discussed specially in subse- 
quent Books. 
It is scarcely necessary to remark that faith is an af- 
fection of mind, not limited to our primary convictions. 
Faith collects round our observational knowledge and 
even around the conclusions reached by inference. We 
believe—the course of Nature being unchanged by its 
Author—that the seed cast into the ground in spring 
will yield a return in autumn, that the sun will rise to- 
morrow as he has done to-day, and that the planet Saturn 
a year hence will be found in the very place calculated for 
us by the astronomer. We exercise faith, every one of us, 
in listening to the testimony of credible witnesses, and 
faith is in one of its liveliest forms when it becomes trust 
in the ability, the excellence, and the love of a fellow-crea- 
ture. Our highest faiths are those in which there is a mix- 
ture of the observational and intuitional elements, the 
observational supplying the object, and the intuitional 
imparting to them a profundity and a power as resting on 
an immovable foundation and going out into the vast 
and unbounded. In particular, when God has been re- 
vealed, faith ever clusters round Him as its appropriate 
object. 
There are canons whereby to try the trustworthiness of 
our belief. First, so far as our intuitive beliefs are con- 
cerned, these are the general tests of intuition. Take our THEIR EXTENT AND TESTS. 
233 
belief in the infinite. We have to ask, Is the truth be- 
lieved in self-evident, or does it lean on something else ? 
Is it necessary ? Can we believe that space and time and 
the Being dwelling in them have limits ? Is it universal, 
that is, do men ever practically believe that they can come 
to the verge of time and space ? Such queries as these 
will settle for us at once what beliefs are original and 
fundamental. We should put these questions to every 
belief that may suggest itself to our own minds. We 
are entitled to put them to every belief which may be 
pressed on us by others. Then, secondly, as to our deri- 
vative or observational beliefs, there are the ordinary rules 
of evidence as enunciated in works of special or applied 
logic, or as stated in books on the particular departments 
of knowledge, or, more frequently, as caught up by com- 
mon experience, and incorporated into the good sense of 
mankind. In no such case are we to believe without 
proof being supplied, and we are entitled and required 
to examine the evidence. Thirdly., as to mixed cases in 
which our faith proceeds partly on intuition, and partly 
on observation ; our business is carefully to separate the 
two, and to judge each by its appropriate tests. In the 
use of such rules as these, while led to yield to the faith 
sanctioned by our rational nature, we shall at the same 
time be saved from those extravagant credences which 
are recommended to us by unauthorized authority, by 
mysticism which has confused itself, by superstition, by 
bigotry, by fanaticism, by pride, or by passion. 
Looked at under one aspect, faith might be considered 
as so far a weakness cleaving to man, for where he has 
faith, other and higher beings may have immediate know- 
ledge. But when contemplated under other aspects, it 
is an element of vast strength. In heaven, much of what 
is faith here, will be brightened into sight, but even in 
heaven faith abideth. Our faiths widen indefinitely the 234 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS 
sphere of our convictions, they surround our solid cogni- 
tions with an atmosphere in which it is bracing and exhi- 
larating to walk, which no doubt has its mists and clouds, 
but has also a kindling and irradiating capacity, and may 
be warmed into the fervour, and reflect the very light 
of heaven in a thousand varied colours. He who would 
tear off from the mind its proper beliefs, would in the very 
act be shearing it of one of its principal glories. 
What a power even in our earthly faiths, as when men 
sow in the assurance that they will reap after a long sea- 
son, and labour in the confidence of a reward at a far 
distance! What an efficacy in the trust which the child 
reposes in the parent, which the scholar puts in his mas- 
ter, which the soldier places in his General, and which 
the lover commits to the person beloved! These are 
among the chief potencies which have been moving man- 
kind to good, or, alas! to evil. By the sharpness of its 
vision it discovers an outlet where sense thought that the 
way was shut in and closed. Difficulties give way as it ad- 
vances, and impossibilities to prudence speedily become 
accomplishments before the might and energy of faith. 
To it we owe the greatest achievements which mankind 
have effected in art, in travel, in conquest; setting out in 
search of the unseen, they have made it seen and pal- 
pable. It was thus that Columbus persevered till the 
long hoped-for country burst on his view; it is always 
thus that men discover new lands and new worlds outside 
those previously known. 
But faith has ever a tendency to go out with strong 
pinions into infinity,which it feels to be its proper element. 
It has a telescopic power, whereby it looks on vast and 
remote objects, and beholds them as near and at hand. 
There is a constancy in its course and a steadiness in its 
progress, because its eye is fixed on a pole-star far above 
our earth. How lofty its mien as it moves on, looking THEIR POWER. 
235 
upward and onward, and not downward and backward, 
with an eye kindled by the brilliancy of the object at 
which it looks! Hence its power, a power drawn from 
the attraction of the world above. No element in all 
nature so potent. The lightning cannot move with the 
same velocity; light does not travel so quick from the 
sun to the earth, as faith does from earth to heaven. It 
heaves up, as by an irresistible hydrostatic pressure, the 
load which would press on the bosom. It glows like the 
heat, it burns like the fire, and obstacles are consumed 
before its devouring progress. Persecution coming like 
the wind to extinguish it, only fans it into a brighter 
flame. 
The proper object of faith is, after all, the Divine Being. 
Time and space and infinity seem empty and dead and 
cold, till faith fills them with the Divine presence, quick- 
ens them with the Divine life, and warms them with the 
Divine love. When thus grounded, how stable ! firmer 
than sense can ever be, for the objects at which it looks 
are more abiding. “ The things which are seen are tem- 
poral, but the things which are unseen are eternal.” 
When thus fixed, the soul is at rest, as secure in Him 
to whom it adheres. When thus directed, all its acts, 
even the meanest, become noble, being sanctified by the 
Divine end which they contemplate. All doubts are now 
decided on the right side by eternity being cast into the 
scale. When thus associated, its might is irresistible. It 
carries with it, and this according to the measure of it, 
the power of God. It is, no doubt, weak in that it leans, 
but it is strong in that it leans on the arm of the Omni- 
potent. It is a creature impotency which makes us lay 
hold of the Creator’s power. 236 
BOOK III. 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS. 
CHAPTER I. 
THEIE GENERAL NATURE, AND A CLASSIFICATION 
OE THEM. 
The mind of man has a set of Simple Cognitive—called 
by Sir William Hamilton Presentative—Powers, such as 
Sense-Perception and Self-Consciousness, by which it 
knows objects before it. Prom these we obtain our Pri- 
mitive Cognitions. It has also a set of Reproductive 
Powers, such as the Memory and the Imagination, by 
wdiich it recalls the past in old forms or in new disposi- 
tions. Out of them arise many of our Paiths, as in the 
existence of objects which fell under our notice in time 
past, and in an infinity surpassing our utmost powers 
of imagination. But the mind has also a Power of Com- 
parison, by which it perceives Relations and forms Judg- 
ments. 
Our Primitive Judgments are formed from our Primi- 
tive Cognitions and Primitive Beliefs. On comparing 
two or more objects known or believed in,* we discover 
* A judgment is usually defined as a comparison of two notions. 
Upon which Mr. J. S. Mill remarks, that “ propositions (except where 
the mind itself is the subject treated of) are not assertions respecting 
our ideas of things, but assertions respecting things themselves,” add- 
ing, “ My belief has not reference to the ideas, it has reference to the GENERAL NATURE OE PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS. 
237 
that they bear a necessary relation to each other. The 
necessity of the relation arises from the nature of the 
things. We discover that objects have a certain rela- 
tion because of the nature of the objects, as these be- 
come known to us, or as we have been led to believe 
them to be; and whenever we are led to discover a ne- 
cessary relation, it is because we have such an acquaint- 
ance as to observe that there is a relation implied in 
their very nature. It should be added, that because of 
our limited and imperfect acquaintance with things, there 
may be many necessary relations which are altogether 
unknown to us, even among objects which are so far 
known. 
In accepting this account, we are saved from the ex- 
travagant positions taken up by many metaphysicians as 
to the a priori judgments of the mind, which they re- 
present as fashioned by a power of reason independent 
of things, whereas they are formed on the contemplation 
of things, and of the nature of things so far as appre- 
hended. Such questions as the following are often put 
by ingenious minds :—How is it that two straight lines 
cannot enclose a space ? How is it that time appears like a 
line stretching behind and before, whereas the analogous 
thing, space, extends in three dimensions ? The proper 
reply is, that all this follows from the very nature of 
space and time. And if the question be put, How do we 
know that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, and 
things” (Logic, i. v. 1). There is force in the criticism, yet it does not 
give the exact truth. In propositions about extra-mental objects, we 
are not comparing the two notions as states of mind; so far as lo- 
gicians have proceeded on this view, they have fallen into confusion 
and error. But still, while it is true that our predications are made, 
not in regard to our notions, but of things, it is in regard to things 
apprehended, or of which we have a notion, as Mr. Mill admits: “ In 
order to believe that gold is yellow, I must indeed have the idea of 
gold and the idea of yellow, and something having reference to those 
ideas must take place in my mind.” 238 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS : 
that time lias length without breadth ? the answer is, that 
all this is involved in our primary knowledge of space and 
time. No other answer can be given ; no other answer 
should be attempted. Our primitive judgments pro- 
ceed on our primitive cognitions and beliefs, which again 
are founded on the nature of things, as we are consti- 
tuted to discover it. 
It will be necessary at this place to examine a very 
common representation that the mind begins with judg- 
ments, rather than the knowledge of individual things, 
and that there is judgment or comparison in all know- 
ledge. According to Locke, knowledge is nothing but 
the perception of the connection and agreement, or dis- 
agreement and repugnancy, of any two ideas. Sir YV. 
Hamilton and Mr. Mansel maintain that in every cog- 
nitive act there is judgment. In opposition to Locke, 
I hold that the mind does not commence with ideas 
and the comparison of ideas, but with the knowledge of 
things, of which it can ever after form ideas, and which 
it is able to compare. I reckon it impossible for the 
mind, from mere ideas not comprising knowledge, or 
from the comparison of such ideas, ever to rise to know- 
ledge, to the knowledge of things. The system of Locke 
is at this point involved in difficulties from which it can- 
not be delivered by those who hold, as he did, that man 
can reach a knowledge of objects. The only consistent 
issue of such a doctrine is an idealism which maintains 
that the mind can never get beyond its own circle or 
globe, and is there engaged for ever in the contemplation 
and comparison of its own ideas, in regard to which it 
never can be certain whether they have any external re- 
ality corresponding to them. If the view of Hamilton 
and Mansel were slightly modified, or were otherwise ex- 
pressed, I am not sure that I should widely dissent from 
it. I acknowledge that every intuitive cognition may THEIR GENERAL NATURE. 
239 
furnish the matter and supply the ground for a judg- 
ment. Thus, out of the knowledge of a stone as before 
me, I can form the judgment “ This stone is now pre- 
sent,” by an analysis of the concrete cognition. The 
knowledge of self as thinking enables me, as I distin- 
guish between the ego and the particular thought, and 
observe the relation of the two, to affirm, “ I think.” 
Nay, I believe that every primary cognition may entitle 
me, by an easy abstraction and comparison, to frame a 
number of primary judgments. Thus, the cognition of 
the stone enables me to say, “ This stone exists;” “ This 
stone is here;” and if the perception be by the eye, 
“ This stone is extended;” and if it be by the muscular 
sense, “ This stone resists pressure ;” while the cognition 
of self as perceiving the stone, enables me to affirm, “ I 
perceive the stone;” I exist;” “ I perceive.” The two, 
indeed—our primary cognitions and beliefs on the one 
hand, and our primary judgments on the other—are in- 
timately connected. Every cognition furnishes the ma- 
terials of a judgment; and a judgment possible, I do not 
say actual, is involved in every cognition. As the rela- 
tion is implied in the nature of the individual objects, 
and the judgment proceeds on the knowledge of the na- 
ture of the objects, so the two, in fact, may be all but 
simultaneous, and it may scarcely be necessary to distin- 
guish them, except for rigidly exact philosophic pur- 
poses.* Still it is the cognition which comes first, and 
* According to Locke, “ Perception is the first operation of all our 
intellectual faculties, and the inlet of all knowledge into our minds” 
(Essay, ii. x. 15). According to the view I take, perception is know- 
ledge. According to Locke, “ Knowledge is nothing but the Percep- 
tion of the Connection and Agreement, or Disagreement and Repug- 
nancy of any of our ideas” (iv. i. 1). Hamilton says,—“ Consciousness 
is primarily a judgment or affirmation of existence. Again, conscious- 
ness is not merely the affirmation of naked existence, but the affirma- 
tion of a certain qualified or determinate existence” (Metaph. Lect. 24. 
See also JNotes to Reid’s Works, pp. 243, 275). Mr. Mansel says,— 240 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS. 
forms the basis on which the judgments are founded ; in 
the case of the primitive judgments, directly founded. It 
should be frankly admitted that what is given in primary 
cognition, is in itself of the vaguest and most valueless 
character till abstraction and comparison are brought to 
bear upon it. Still our cognitions and beliefs furnish the 
materials of all that the discursive understanding weaves 
into such rich and often complicated forms. 
It is to be carefully observed that our primitive cogni- 
tions and beliefs being of realities, all the intellectual pro- 
cesses properly founded on them must relate to realities 
also. If what we proceed on be unreal, that which we reach 
by a logical process may also be unreal. If space and time, 
for example, have, as some suppose, no reality independent 
of the contemplative mind, then all the relations of space 
and time as unfolded in mathematical demonstrations, 
must also be regarded as unreal in the same sense. On 
the other hand, if space and time have (as I maintain) an 
existence irrespective of the mind thinking about them, 
then all the necessary relations drawn from our knowledge 
may also be regarded as having a reality independent of 
the mind reflecting on them. Not that they are to be 
supposed to have an existence as individuals, or indepen- 
dent of the things related : they have precisely such a rea- 
lity as we are intuitively led to believe them to have ; that 
is, they exist as necessary relations of the separate things. 
“ It may be laid down as a general Canon of Psychology, that every act 
of consciousness, intuitive or discursive, is comprised in a conviction 
of the presence of its object, either internally in the mind, or externally 
in space. The result of every such act may thus be generally stated 
in the proposition, ‘This is here.’” To this statement I have scarcely 
any objection to take, the more especially as he goes on to distinguish 
between such a psychological judgment and a logical one. “ The former 
is the judgment of a relation between the conscious subject and the im- 
mediate object of consciousness. The latter is the judgment of a rela- 
tion which two objects of thought bear to each other” (Proleg. Lo- 
gica, ch. ii.). I prefer saying that what he calls a psychological judg- 
ment is a cognition, which may be explicated into a judgment, which 
judgment will be a logical one. THEIR GENERAL NATURE. 
241 
It may be as well to announce here generally, what 
will be shown specially at every stage as we advance, that 
all the primitive judgments of the mind are individual. 
The mind does not in its spontaneous operations declare 
that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to 
be, but upon being satisfied that a certain thing exists, 
it at once sets aside the thought or assertion that it does 
not exist. It does not affirm in a general proposition 
that no two lines can enclose a space; but it says, these 
two lines cannot enclose a space: and it would say the same 
of every other two lines. . It does not metaphysically an- 
nounce that every quality implies a substance, that every 
effect must have a cause, but it declares of this property 
contemplated that it implies a substance, and of this 
given effect that it must have had a cause. It is out of 
these individual judgments that the general maxim is ob- 
tained by a process of generalization. But then it is to 
be observed that it is not a generalization of an outward 
experience,—which must always be limited, and never can 
furnish ground for a necessary and universal proposition, 
but of inward and immediate judgments of the mind, 
which carry in them the conviction of necessity, which 
necessity therefore will attach itself to the general maxim, 
on the condition of our having properly performed the 
process of generalization. 
It is necessary for our purposes to classify the pri- 
mary judgments pronounced by the mind; but this is by 
no means an easy task. An arrangement may however 
serve very important ends, even though it be not 
thoroughly exhaustive, and altogether unobjectionable. 
The following is to be regarded simply as the best which 
I have been able to draw out, and may be accepted as a 
provisional one till a better be furnished.* The mind 
# Locke speaks of relations as being infinite, and mentions only a few. 
He specifies Cause and Effect, Time, Place, Identity and Diversity, Pro- 242 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS. 
seems capable of noticing intuitively at least the following 
relations:— 
Those of (I.) Identity and Difference; (II.) Whole and 
Parts; (III.) Space; (IV.) Time; (V.) Quantity; (VI.) Re- 
semblance ; (VII.) Active Property; (VIII.) Cause and 
Effect. 
CHAPTER II. 
RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED BY THE MIND. 
Sect. I. Relation of Identity. 
We have seen that every object known by us is known 
as having being; I do not say an independent being, but 
a separate and individual being. This being continuing 
in the object constitutes its identity. This identity every 
object has as long as it exists, and this whether the 
identity does or does not become known to us or to any 
other created being. An object has identity not because 
the identity is known to us; but an object having con- 
tinued being, and therefore identity, intelligent beings 
may come to discover it. We are so constituted as to 
be able to know being,—that is, that the object known to 
us possesses being,—and we look on the object as retain- 
ing that being as long as it exists. We are prepared to 
portion, and Moral Relations (Essay, ii. xxviii.). Hume mentions Re- 
semblance, Identity, Space and Time, Quantity, Degree, Contrariety, 
Cause and Effect. Kant’s Categories are :—(I.) Quantity ; containing 
Unity, Plurality, Totality; (II.) Quality; containing Reality, Negation, 
Limitation; (III.) Relation; comprising Inherence and Subsistence, Cau- 
sality and Dependence, Community of Agent and Patient; (IV.) Mo- 
dality ; under which are Possibility and Impossibility, Existence and 
Non-Existence, Necessity and Contingence. Dr. Brown arranges them 
as those of—(I.) Co-existence ; embracing Position, Resemblance or Dif- 
ference, Proportion, Degree, Comprehension ; (II.) Succession; contain- 
ing Causal and Casual Priority. RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED. 
243 
decide then that if we ever fall in with this object again, 
it will have retained its identity. We may fall in with 
the same object again without discovering it to be the 
same, because of a defect of memory, or because the ob- 
ject was disguised in a crowd. But in regard to certain 
objects, we cannot avoid observing the sameness, and 
cannot be deceived in pronouncing them the same. 
So far as self is concerned, we discover the identity 
intuitively as we look on the objects presented in self- 
consciousness and memory. We have an immediate 
knowledge of self in every exercise of consciousness. We 
have a recollection of self in some particular state in 
every exercise of memory. The mind has thus before 
it, at every waking moment, a knowledge of a present 
self; and in every exercise of memory it has a past self; 
and in looking at and comparing the two, it at once 
proclaim sthe identity. It will be observed that here, 
as in every other case, the judgment throws us back on 
cognition and belief; the necessary facts on which the 
mind pronounces the necessary judgment, are furnished 
in the exercise of consciousness and memory. 
In regard to objects external to the mind we have no 
such intuitive means of discovering an identity. Our 
original perceptions do not extend even to the identity 
of our bodily frame. Every particle of matter in the 
body may be changed in seven years, as physiologists 
tell us, in perfect accordance with our intuitive percep- 
tions. We may be without a body in the state between 
death and the resurrection, and may receive an entirely 
new and spiritual body in heaven, and yet retain all the 
while our identity and feeling of identity. And in the 
case of extra-organic objects there is always a possibility 
of doubt as to whether what we perceive now is the 
same object as fell under our notice at some previous 
time. The infant, prompted by his instinct as to the 244 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS. 
continuance of being, and making a wrong application 
of it, will often be inclined to discover identity where 
there is only resemblance, and will be apt, for example, 
to look on every man he meets with as his father. As 
he advances in life he will be led to pay more regard to 
differences. As to when there is a sufficient amount of 
resemblance to denote a sameness, this is to be deter- 
mined solely by the laws of experiential evidence. In 
some cases, as when we recognize our friends and fami- 
liar objects, there is moral certainty; in other cases 
there is probability, less or greater, according to the 
proof which is perceived or can be adduced.* 
The intuitive judgments are always individual, and 
are pronounced on the objects being presented. When 
generalized, they take the form of such metaphysical 
maxims as these :—“ It is impossible for the same thing 
to be and not to be at the same time.” “Everything 
preserves its identity as long as it exists.” “We are 
sure that we are the same beings as we were since con- 
sciousness began, and must continue the same as long 
as consciousness exists.” 
The above are judgments pronounced on individual 
* These views determine tlie light in which we should look on as 
‘ pretty’ a controversy as ever raged in metaphysics or out of it, as to 
whether two things in every respect alike—say two drops of water— 
would or would not be identical. Leibnitz held that each thing differed 
from every other by an internal principle of distinction, and that no 
individuals could be alike in every respect; and that if they were, they 
could have no. principle of individuation (Op. p. 277). Kant criticized 
this view, and urged that even though they wTere in every respect alike, 
they would differ as being in different parts of space (Werke, Bd. ii. 
p. 217). The common representation was that they would differ nu- 
merically. I am not sure that any of these accounts is correct. It is 
quite conceivable that there might be two things in every respect alike, 
except in their individual being. It is not their existence in different 
parts of space which constitutes their diffrence, but as different in 
their being they exist in different parts of space. They have a dis- 
tinct being, not because they are numerically different, but they are nu- 
merically distinct because they have a distinct being. RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED. 
245 
objects contemplated. Under the same head there fall 
to be placed predications which the mind makes at 
once and intuitively in regard to relations which have 
been previously perceived and sanctioned by the mind. 
Suppose that, on the ground of experience, we become 
convinced that no reptile is warm-blooded; the mind, on 
the bare contemplation of the notions, will at once and 
intuitively declare that no warm-blooded animal can be 
a reptile. In all such cases it is presupposed that there 
is a previously discovered relation. It is possible that 
the mind may have been deceived, and that the relation 
does not exist in fact; and in this case the judgment 
pronounced according to the law of identity would also 
be wrong as a matter of fact. Thus if a proposition 
were given that cno mammal is warm-blooded,’ the 
mind would pronounce that no ‘ warm-blooded animal 
can be a mammal.’ The error, however, would lie not 
in the law of thought, but in the original proposition 
furnished. 
This is the proper place to explain the famous dis- 
tinction drawn by Kant between Analytic and Synthetic 
Judgments. Analytic Judgments are those in which 
the predicate is involved in the very notion which con- 
stitutes the subject; as when we say that ‘ an island is 
surrounded with water,’ ‘ a king has authority to rule,’ 
‘ the moral law should be obeyed.’ All such judgments 
are said, in the nomenclature of the Kantian school, to 
be a priori. We have come to entertain certain appre- 
hensions in regard to island, king, and moral law, and 
now we pronounce a set of judgments on the bare con- 
templation of these, and involved in them by the law of 
identity. The judgments involved in the general law 
of identity, the analytic judgments of Kant, are repre- 
sented by Sir W. Hamilton as capable of being resolved 
into three specific laws. “ I. The Law, Principle, or Axiom 240 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS. 
of Identity, which, in regard to the same thing, imme- 
diately or directly enjoins the affirmation of it with it- 
self, and mediately or indirectly prohibits its negation : 
(A is A). 2. The Law, etc., of Contradiction (properly 
Non-Contradiction), which in regard to contradictories 
explicitly enjoining their reciprocal negation, implicitly 
prohibits their reciprocal affirmation: (A is not A). In 
other words, contradictories are thought as existences 
incompatible at the same time, as at once mutually 
exclusive. 3. The Law, etc., of Excluded Middle or 
Third, which declares that whilst contradictories are 
only two, everything, if explicitly thought, must be 
thought as of these, either the one or the other: (A is 
either B or not B). In different terms:—Affirmation 
and Negation of the same thing, in the same respect, 
have no conceivable medium; whilst anything actually 
may, and virtually must, be either affirmed or denied 
of anything. In other words :—Every predicate is true 
or false of every subject; or contradictories are thought 
as impossible, but at the same time one or other as 
necessary.”* These laws have a great importance in 
Formal Logic. Being carried out and applied in special 
forms, they show what may be drawn from any proposi- 
tion or set of propositions given, and they keep thought 
consistent with itself. 
Synthetic (as distinguished from Analytic) Judgments 
are those in which the predicate affirms or denies some- 
thing more than is embraced in the subject: as when 
we say ‘ gold is yellow,’ c body gravitates,’ ‘ sin will be 
punished.’ Some of these judgments are a posteriori; 
that is, we reach them by experience. Others of them 
are said to be a priori; that is, the mind, on the bare 
contemplation of the notions, at once pronounces the 
agreement or disagreement. As examples, there are the 
* Metaph. vol. ii. append, ii. RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED. 
247 
mathematical axioms, such as that two straight lines can- 
not enclose a space; and metaphysical principles, such 
as that every effect must have a cause. In this Section, 
I have given Sir W. Hamilton’s analysis of Identical 
or Analytic Judgments. In the remaining Sections, I 
am to endeavour to unfold the Synthetic Judgments 
a priori. 
Sect. II. Relation of Whole and Parts. 
It is a fundamental principle of this treatise that the 
mind begins with the concrete,—a truth which should 
always go along with the other, which has, however, 
been more frequently noticed, that it begins with the 
individual. Being thus furnished with the concrete in 
its primary knowledge and beliefs,—and we may add, 
imaginations,—the mind can consider a part of the con- 
crete whole separate from the other parts. In doing so, 
it is much aided by the circumstance that the concrete 
whole seldom comes round in all its entireness. The 
child sees a man with a hat to-day and without his hat 
to-morrow, and is thus the better enabled to form a no- 
tion of the hat apart from the man that wore it. 
In all abstraction there is judgment or comparison; 
that is, we discover a relation between two objects con- 
templated. We contemplate a concrete whole, and we 
contemplate a part, and observe a relation of the part as 
a part of the whole. It should be admitted that, with- 
out any exercise of comparison, we are capable of imaging 
a part of a whole, in cases where the part can be sepa- 
rated ; thus, having seen a man on horseback, I can 
easily picture to myself the man separately or the horse 
separately, without thinking of any relation between 
them; but in such processes there is no exercise of ab- 
straction. Abstraction is eminently an intellectual ope- 
ration. In it we contemplate a part as part of a whole, 248 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS. 
say a quality as a quality of a substance; for example, 
transparency as a quality of ice, or of some other sub- 
stance. In all such exercises there is involved a Cor- 
relative Power. This power may be called Compre- 
hension, inasmuch as it contemplates the whole in its 
relation to the parts ; or Abstraction, inasmuch as it con- 
templates the part as part of a whole; and the Faculty 
of Analysis and Synthesis, inasmuch as it contemplates 
the two in correlation,—the parts and the whole. There 
is, if I do not mistake, intuition involved in every exer- 
cise of this power. The operations of the intuition are 
always singular, but they may be generalized, and being 
so, they will give us the following as involved in Ab- 
straction. 
1. The Abstract implies the Concrete. This arises 
from the very nature of abstraction. When an object 
is before it in the concrete, the mind can separate a 
quality from the object, and one quality from another. 
It can distinguish, for example, between a man taken as 
a whole, and any one quality of his, such as bodily 
strength; and distinguish between any one quality and 
another, as between his bodily strength and intellectual 
power, between his intellectual faculties and his feelings, 
and between any one feeling, such as joy, and any other 
feeling, such as sorrow. But we are not to suppose 
that, while we can thus distinguish between a whole and 
its parts, between an object and its qualities, between 
one quality and another, therefore the part can exist 
independent of the whole, or the quality of its object. 
Every abstracted quality implies some concrete object 
from which it has been separated in thought. 
2. When the Concrete is Real, the Abstract is also 
Real. In this respect there is a truth in the now ex- 
ploded doctrine of realism. Abstraction, if it proceeds 
on a reality and is properly conducted, ever conducts to 249 
RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED. 
realities. It is thus a most important intellectual exer- 
cise for the discovery of truth, enabling us to discover 
the permanent amidst the fleeting, the real amidst the 
phenomenal. As I look on a piece of magnetized iron, 
I know it to be a real existence, and I think of it as 
having a certain form, and of its attracting certain ob- 
jects, and I must believe that this figure is a reality quite 
as much as the iron which has the form, and that the at- 
tractive power is not a mere fiction, any more than the 
iron of which it is a property. But it is to be carefully 
observed that this abstract thing, while it has an exist- 
ence, has not necessarily an independent existence. We 
have already seen that when it is a quality it must always 
be the quality of a substance. Beauty is certainly re- 
ality, but it has no existence apart from a beautiful person 
or scene, of whom or of which it is an attribute. 
A philosopher, says Kant, was asked, What is the wreight 
of smoke? and he answered,—Substract the weight of 
the ashes from the weight of the fuel burned, and we 
have the weight of smoke. At the basis of this judg- 
ment is the intuitive maxim that the whole is equal to 
the sum of its parts. The individual intuitive judgments 
which the mind pronounces on looking at whole and 
parts may perhaps be all generalized into two principles. 
(1.) The parts make up the whole. (2.) The whole is 
equal to the sum of its parts. From the first of these we 
may derive the rules, that the abstract part is involved in 
the concrete whole, and that the abstract, as part of a real 
concrete thing, is also a real. From the first we have the 
rule that the parts are less than the whole, and from the 
second the maxim that the whole is greater than the 
parts. It is of importance to have such maxims as these 
accurately enunciated in mathematical demonstration and 
logical and metaphysical science. Spontaneously, how- 
ever, the mind does not form any such maxims, which are 250 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS. 
merely the generalized expression of its individual judg- 
ments. 
Still the maxim is underlying many of our thoughts 
in all departments of investigation. Thus, in Natural 
History it urges us to seek for a classification in which 
all the members of any subdivision will make up the 
whole. It impels the chemist to look out for all the ele- 
ments which go to constitute the compound substance. 
In psychology and metaphysics it prompts us to analyze 
a concrete mental state into parts, and insists that in the 
synthesis the parts be equal to the whole. In logic it 
demands, as a rule of division, that the members make up 
the class, and is involved in all those processes in which 
we infer (in subalternation) that what is true of all must 
be true of some; or (in disjunctive division) that what is 
true of one of two alternatives (A and B), and is not true 
of one (A), must be true of the other (B). In most of 
such cases the more prominent elements are got from ex- 
perience ; in some of them, other intuitions act the more 
important part; but in all of them there are intuitions 
of whole and parts underlying the mental processes,— 
unconsciously and covertly, no doubt, but still capable of 
being brought out to view for scientific purposes. 
I have endeavoured to show that the mind in sense- 
perception has a knowledge of objects as occupying space, 
and that round these original cognitions there gather 
certain native beliefs. Upon the contemplation of the 
objects thus apprehended, the mind is led at once and 
necessarily to pronounce certain judgments. They may 
be arranged as follows :— 
1. There are all the mathematical axioms which relate 
to limited extension, such as, “ The shortest distance be- 
tween any two points is a straight line“ Two straight 
Sect. III. Relations of Space. RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED. 
251 
lines cannot enclose a space;” “ Two straight lines which 
when produced the shortest possible distance are not 
nearer each other, will not, if produced ever so far, ap- 
proach nearer each other ;” “ All right-angles are equal 
to one another.” Under the same head are to be placed 
the postulates involved in the definitions and in the pro- 
positions founded on them, such as the following, put in 
the form of maxims:—“ A straight line may be drawn 
from any one point to any other point“A straight line 
may be produced to any length in a straight line;” “There 
may be such a figure as a circle, that is, a plane figure 
such that all straight lines drawn from a certain point 
within the figure are equal to one another;” and that “A 
circle may be described from any centre at any distance 
from that centre.” I shall have occasion, in speaking of 
the application of the principles laid down in this treatise 
to mathematics, to return to axioms, and shall then show 
that the intuitive judgments pronounced by the mind in 
regard to the relations of space are all individual, and 
that the form assumed by them in the axioms of geome- 
try is the result of the generalization, not indeed of an 
outward experience, but of the individual decisions of the 
mind. 
2. There are certain axioms in regard to motion, such 
as that “All motion is in space;” “All motion is from 
one part of space to another;” “All motion is by an ob- 
ject in space;” “A body in passing from one part of 
space to another must pass through the whole interme- 
diate space.” 
3. There are the primitive truths which arise from the 
relation of objects to space, such as “ That body occupies 
space;” “ That body is contained in space;” “ That body 
occupies a certain portion of space;” and thus “That 
body has a defined figure.” But what, it may be asked, 
do our intuitive convictions say as to the relation of mind 252 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS. 
and space? I am inclined to think that our intuition 
declares of spirit, that it must be in space. It is clear, 
too, that so far as mind acts on body, it must act on body 
as in space, say in making that body move in space. But 
beyond this, I am persuaded that wre have no means of 
knowing the relations which mind and space bear to each 
other. As to whether spirit does or does not occupy 
space, this is a subject on which intuition seems to say 
nothing, and I suspect that experience says as little. 
4. There are certain metaphysical judgments as to 
space, such as “ Space is continuous;” “ Space cannot 
be divided in the sense of its parts being separatedand 
all those derived from the infinity of space, such as that 
“ Space has no limits;” “Any line may be infinitely pro- 
longed in space.” 
Sect. IY. The Relations of Time. 
The apprehension of time is given in every exercise of 
memory; we remember the event as having happened in 
time past. Round this primary conviction there collect 
a number of beliefs. When time thus apprehended is 
contemplated by us, we are led, from the very nature of 
the object, to make certain affirmations and denials. It 
declares that “ Time is continuous ;” that “ Time cannot 
be divided into separable partsand that “ Time has 
no limits.” The mind also declares of every event that 
it happens in time. 
Sect. V. The Relations of Quantity. 
These are equivalent to the relations of proportion re- 
ferred to by Locke, and the relations of proportion and 
degree mentioned by Brown; they are the relations of 
less and more. The mind, in discovering them, proceeds 
upon the knowledge previously acquired of objects as 
being singulars, that is, units; it is upon a succession 253 
RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED. 
of units coming before it that the judgment is pro- 
nounced. It also very frequently proceeds on other re- 
lations which have been previously discovered; on per- 
ceiving, for instance, that objects resemble each other 
in respect of space, time, and property, we may notice 
that they have less or more of the common thing in re- 
spect of which they agree. 
It is to this intuition I refer the power which the 
mind has of discovering the relation of simple numbers. 
A very high authority on this subject has given a some- 
what different account. Dr. Whewell refers our concep- 
tion of number to the sense of successiveness, or, as I 
would render it, the faculty which discovers the relations 
of Time. “ The conception of number appears to re- 
quire the exercise of the sense of succession. At first 
sight indeed we seem to apprehend number without 
any act of memory, or any reference to time; for ex- 
ample, we look at a horse, and see that his legs are four, 
and this we seem to do at once without reckoning them. 
But it is not difficult to see that this seeming instanta- 
neousness of the perception of small numbers is an illu- 
sion. This resembles the many other cases in which we 
perform short and easy acts so rapidly and familiarly that 
we are unconscious of them, as in the acts of seeing, and 
articulating our words. And this is the more manifest 
since we begin our acquaintance with number by count- 
ing even the smallest numbers. Children, and very rude 
savages, must use an effort to reckon even their five fin- 
gers, and find a difficulty in going further. And persons 
have been known who were able by habit, or by peculiar 
natural aptitude, to count by dozens as rapidly as com- 
mon persons can by units. We may conclude therefore 
that when we appear to catch a small number by a single 
glance of the eye, we do, in fact, count the units of it in a 
regular though very brief succession. To count requires 254 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS. 
an act of memory; of this we are sensible when we 
count very slowly, as when we reckon the strokes of a 
church clock, for in such a case we may forget in the in- 
tervals of the strokes, and miscount. Now it will not be 
doubted that the nature of the process in counting is the 
same, whether we count fast or slow. There is no defi- 
nite speed of reckoning at which the faculties which it 
requires are changed, and therefore memory, which is re- 
quisite in some cases, must be so in all.” I entirely con- 
cur- with this statement. I am convinced that the per- 
ception of the relations of time, is presupposed in our 
discerning the relations of number. But there may be 
more required. Dr. Whewell appends a foot-note, “If any 
one holds number to be apprehended by a direct act of 
intuition, as space and time are, this view will not disturb 
the other doctrines delivered in the text.”* I believe that 
one, or unity, is involved in our primary cognition of ob- 
jects. Not that I think it necessary to call in a special 
intuition in order to our being able to count or number; 
but I believe that, besides the exercise of memory, and 
the discovery of the relations of the succession in time, 
there must be the general power of discovering the rela- 
tions of quantity: we must be able, not only to go over 
the units, but further, to discover the relations of the 
units and of their combinations. 
To this faculty I refer all those operations in which 
we discover equality, or difference, or proportions of any 
kind, in numbers. The mental capacity is greatly aided, 
and its intuitive perceptions are put in a position to act 
more readily and extensively, through the divisions and 
notations by tens in our modern arithmetic ; every ten, 
every hundred, every thousand, and so on, comes to be 
regarded as a unit, and the judgments in regard to units 
are made to reach numbers indefinitely large. These 
* ‘Philosophy of Inductive Sciences,’ II. ix. 4. RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED. 
255 
numerical judgments admit of an application to exten- 
sion in space. Fixing on a certain length, superficies 
or solid, as a unit, we form judgments which embrace 
lines or surfaces or solids never actually measured. I 
am persuaded that, even in its common and practical 
operations,—as, for example, in the measurement of dis- 
tance by the eye,—the mind fixes on some known and 
familiar length as its standard, and estimates larger space 
by this. Ever since Descartes conceived the method of 
expressing curve lines and surfaces by means of equations, 
mathematics may be said to be concerned with quantity 
as their summum genus. The judgments as intuitive are 
all individual, but they can be generalized, when they will 
assume such forms as the “ Common Notions,” so far as 
they relate to quantity,prefixed by Euclid to his Elements. 
“ Things which are equal to the same are equal to one 
another.” “ If equals be added to equals, the wholes are 
equal.” “ If equals be taken from equals, the remain- 
ders are equal.” “If equals be added to unequals, the 
wholes are unequal.” “ If equals be taken from unequals, 
the remainders are unequal.” “ Things which are double 
the same thing are equal to one another.” “ Things 
which are half the same thing are equal to one another.” 
Sect. VI. The Relations oe Resemblance. 
It has been generally acknowledged that man’s pri- 
mary knowledge is of individual objects : not that he as 
yet knows them to be individual; it is only after he has 
been able to form general notions that he draws the dis- 
tinction, and finds that what he first knew was singular. 
What is meant is, that the boy does not begin with a no- 
tion of man, or woman, or humanity in general, but with 
a knowledge of a particular man, say his father, or a par- 
ticular woman, say his mother; and it is only as other 
men and other women come under his notice, and he 256 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS. 
observes their points of agreement, that he is able to rise 
to the general notion of man, or woman, or humankind. 
In the mental processes involved in generalization, the 
most important part is the observational one. When we 
discover, for example, the resemblances of plants, and 
proceed to group them into species, genera, and orders, 
the operation is one of induction and comparison. There 
is no necessity of thought involved in the law that roses 
have five petals, or that fishes are cold-blooded, or indeed 
in any of the laws of natural history. Still there are 
laws of thought which have a place in the generalizing 
process. 
1. The universal implies the singular. The mind pro- 
nounces this judgment when it looks at the nature of the 
individuals and the generals. The universal is not some- 
thing independent of the singulars, prior to the singu- 
lars, or above the singulars. A general notion is the 
notion of an indefinite number of objects possessing a 
common attribute or attributes. It is clear, therefore, 
that the general proceeds on and presupposes indivi- 
duals. If there were no individuals, there would be no 
general; and if the individuals were to cease, the general 
would likewise cease. If there were no individual roses, 
there would be no such thing as a class of plants called 
roses. 
2. When the singulars are real, the universal is also 
real; always, of course, on the supposition that the ge- 
neralization has been properly made. There exists, we 
shall suppose, in nature, a number of objects possessing 
common attributes, we have observed their points of re- 
semblance, and put them in a class: has, or has not, the 
class an existence P In reply, I say that the genus has an 
existence and a reality as well as the individual objects. 
An indefinite number of animals chew the cud, and are 
called ruminant; the class ruminant has an existence RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED. 
257 
quite as much as the individual animals. But let us ob- 
serve what sort of reality the class has; it is a reality 
merely in the individuals, and in the possession of com- 
mon qualities by these individuals. 
3. M hatever is predicated of a class may be predi- 
cated of all the members of the class; and vice versa, 
whatever is predicated of all the members of a class may 
be predicated of the class. This is a self-evident and ne- 
cessary proposition. It is pronounced by the mind in an 
individual form whenever it contemplates the relation 
of a class and the members of the class; thus, if the ge- 
neral maxim be discovered or allowed, that all reptiles 
are cold-blooded, and the further fact be given or ascer- 
tained that the crocodile is a reptile, the conclusion is 
pronounced that the crocodile is cold-blooded. 
We shall discover, when we come to apply these gene- 
ral principles, that the laws mentioned in this Section 
play an important part in Logic, and have a place in the 
Notion, in the Judgment, and in Reasoning. 
Sect. YII. Relations of Active Property. 
I have been striving to prove that we cannot know 
either self or body acting on self, except as possessing 
property. On looking at the properties of objects, the 
mind at once pronounces certain decisions. These, like 
all our other intuitive judgments, have a reference, in 
the first instance, to the individual case presented, but 
may be made universal by a process of generalization. 
Thus, the mind declares, “ this property implies a sub- 
stance,” “this substance will exercise a property.” The 
abstract truths will seldom be formally enunciated, but, 
as regulative principles, they underlie our common 
thoughts, and we proceed on them, even when entirely 
unaware of their nature or of their existence. Every ac- 
tion or manifestation we intuitively regard as the action 258 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS. 
or exhibition of a something having a substantial being. 
On falling in with a new substance, say an aerolite just 
dropped from the heavens, we know not indeed what its 
properties are, but we are sure that it has properties, and 
we make an attempt to discover them. 
Sect. YIII. Relation of Cause and Effect. 
All our primitive judgments carry us back to primitive 
cognitions and beliefs, that is, they are pronounced by 
the mind as it looks to objects intuitively known or ne- 
cessarily believed in. The judgment which affirms that 
the cause must produce its effect, and that the effect has 
resulted from a cause, proceeds from and is grounded on 
a cognition which has already passed under our notice, 
the intuitive knowledge of substance exercising power. 
It will appear, as we advance, that those who overlook or 
deny the mind’s primary knowledge of power, can give 
no adequate or satisfactory account of the nature or 
meaning of the causal judgment. 
It will be needful to show here, first of all, that the 
judgment is not derived from the generalizations of out- 
ward experience. As we do so, it will be necessary to 
state, though it will not be necessary to dwell on it after 
the enunciations which have been so often repeated, that 
our conviction is not of a general truth, but relates solely 
to individual facts presented to or contemplated by the 
mind. Our original judgment is not that every cause 
has an effect, and that every effect has a cause, proposi- 
tions which will not be admitted and cannot be under- 
stood till the words ‘cause’ and ‘effect,’ terms very abstract 
and general, be explained,—but it is that this thing 
having power, may produce an effect, and that this thing 
apprehended as a new thing or as having been changed 
must have had a cause. 
In proceeding to prove that the mental conviction, thus RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED. 
259 
understood, is not derived from experience, I am dis- 
posed to admit at once that observation might, without 
any original intuition, lead to a loose general belief in 
cause and effect. On seeing two events in frequent 
juxtaposition, we might be disposed when we see the one 
to think of the other by the ordinary law of association, 
and when we see the one to expect the other, as the re- 
sult of a process of generalization. This I freely admit; 
but I maintain, at the same time, that the intuitive con- 
viction is, in fact, one powerful means of making us asso- 
ciate cause and effect so naturally in our minds, and to 
generalize our experience of causation. Any experiential 
conviction would necessarily want certain essential ele- 
ments ever found in our conviction regarding causation. 
First, it would not, as being the result of generaliza- 
tion, operate at so early a period of life as our belief in 
cause and effect evidently does. The causal belief is as 
strong in infancy as in mature life or in old-age, is as 
strong among savages as in civilized countries in which 
scientific observation has made the greatest advances. 
True, savage nations have not a belief in the uniformity 
of nature, which is a result (as shall be shown further on) 
of observation ; they discover events which are thought 
to have no cause in nature, but then they seek for a 
cause beyond nature. Now, if the conviction of causa- 
tion were like the belief in the uniformity of nature, a 
principle derived from induction,—which must necessarily 
be a large induction,—it would be difficult to account for 
its existence and its invariable operation in the earliest 
stages of individual life and of society. I admit that all 
this merely proves that there is a native instinct or in- 
clination prompting us to rise from an effect to a cause, 
and by no means justifies us in standing up for a neces- 
sary conviction. 
Secondly, it would scarcely account for the universality 260 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS. 
of the belief among men brought up in such various 
countries and situations, attached to such different sects 
and creeds, and under the influence of all kinds of whim 
and caprice. This can be most satisfactorily explained 
by supposing that there is a native principle at work, in- 
clining and guiding all men. Such a consideration, I 
allow, does not show that the conviction is a fundamental 
one, nor would I urge it as in itself a positive proof of 
the existence even of a native instinct: still it is a strong 
presumption. Indeed the theory which supposes that 
there is some original impulse or inclination, is the only 
one which can give a full explanation of all the beliefs 
which man cherishes, and the judgments which he ever 
pronounces. 
Thirdly, it would not account for the fundamental and 
necessary character of the judgment. This is the con- 
clusive circumstance, of which the others are to be re- 
garded as merely corroborations. No possible length or 
uniformity could or should give this necessity of convic- 
tion to the judgment. We might have seen A and B, 
this stone and that stone, this star and that star, this 
man and that man together, a thousand, or a million, or 
a billion of times, and without our ever having seen them 
separate, but this would not and ought not to necessitate 
us to believe that they have been for ever together, and 
shall be for ever together, and must be for ever together. 
No doubt, it wrould lead us, when we fell in with the one 
to look for the other, and we would wonder if the one 
presented itself without the other; still, it is possible for 
us to conceive, and, on evidence being produced, to be- 
lieve, that there may be the one without the other. It 
was long supposed that all metals are comparatively 
heavy, but while every one was astonished at the fact, 
no one was prepared to deny it, when it was shown by 
Davy that potassium floated on water. Down to a very RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED. 
261 
recent date civilized men bad never seen a black swan, yet 
no naturalist was ever so presumptuous as to affirm that 
there never could be such an animal; and when black 
swans were discovered in Australia, scientific men, no 
doubt, wondered, but never went so far as to deny the 
fact. A very wide and uniform experience would justify 
a general expectation, but not a necessary conviction; 
and this experience is liable to be disturbed at any time 
by a new occurrence inconsistent with what has been 
previously known to us. But the belief in the connec- 
tion between cause and effect is of a totally different 
character. We can believe that two things which have 
been united since creation began, may never be united 
again while creation lasts; but we never can be made to 
believe, or rather, think, judge, or decide (for this is the 
right expression) that a change can take place without a 
cause. We can believe that night and day might hence- 
forth be disconnected, and that from and after this day 
or some other day there would only be perpetual day or 
perpetual night on the earth; but we could never be 
made to decide that, the causes which produced day and 
night being the same, there ever could be any other 
effect than day or night. We could believe, on suffi- 
cient evidence, that the sun might not rise on our earth 
to-morrow, but we never could be made to judge that, 
the sun and earth and all other things necessary to 
the sun rising on our earth abiding as they are, the lu- 
minary of day should not run his round as usual. We 
see at once that there is a difference between the judg- 
ment of the mind in the twro cases; in the case in which 
we have before us a mere conjunction sanctioned by a 
wide and invariable induction, and that in which we 
have an effect, and connect it with its cause. The one 
belief can be overcome, and should be overcome at any 
time by a new and inconsistent fact coming under our 262 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS. 
observation; whereas, in regard to the other, we are con- 
fident that it never can be modified or set aside, and we 
feel that it ought not to be overborne. 
It is to be carefully noticed that while we have a na- 
tive and necessary conviction, it does not announce what 
effect any given cause must produce, or what is the cause 
of any given effect. On an effect presenting itself to our 
notice, we believe that it must have a cause, but what 
the cause is, is to be determined, after all, by observa- 
tion. On discovering a new substance, say a metal, we 
anticipate that it will act in some particular way on the 
needful conditions being supplied; but how it will act, 
chemically or magnetically, or in reference to any other 
agent, we cannot predict beforehand. It is of the utmost 
moment that we ever take this view of the intuitive prin- 
ciple when we would use it in speculation, and that we 
should distinctly know what it cannot do, as well as what 
it can do. It is meant to be a regulative principle un- 
derlying and guiding our inquiries, but it is not intended 
to supersede experience. On the contrary, it is when an 
effect or a cause is presented, that the intuitive principle 
begins to operate, and constrains us to look for a cause 
or an effect. And as to what the precise cause or effect 
may be, even this is not announced by the conviction, 
but is to be discovered by experience; that is, having 
discovered that, a substance has operated in a certain 
way in time past, we are sure that it will so operate 
again; and having found that a particular effect has pro- 
ceeded from a certain cause, we are sure, on the same 
effect presenting itself, that it must have come from the 
same cause. It thus appears that intuition and experi- 
ence combine, each meanwhile having its own province, 
in all the judgments which we pronounce as to the mode 
of the operation of any given cause, or the cause of any 
given effect. It is our special business, in what remains RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED. 
263 
of this Section, to determine in an inductive manner 
what is involved in our conviction of cause and effect, 
and the relation between them. 
I. Cause implies a Substance with Potency. This 
doctrine was explicitly stated and defended by Leibnitz, 
and has been incidentally admitted by many who have 
not been prepared to adhere to the general view.* We 
never know of a causal influence being exercised, except 
by an object having being and substantial existence. We 
decide, and must decide, that every effect proceeds from 
one or more substances having potency. If a tree is felled 
to the ground, if the salt we saw dry a minute ago is 
now melted, if a limb of man or animal is broken, we 
not only look for a cause, but we look for a cause in 
something that had being and property, say in the wind 
blowing on the tree, or in water mingling with the salt, 
or in a blow being inflicted by a stick, or other hard 
substance, on the limb. When we discover effects pro- 
duced by light, heat, electricity, or similar agents, whose 
precise nature has not been discovered, we regard them 
either as separate substances, or if this seems (as it does) 
highly improbable, we regard them as properties or affec- 
tions of substances. If this world be an effect, we look 
for its cause in a Being possessed of power. 
And this, I may remark in passing, seems to be the 
reason why we do not place Time and Space under the 
law of causation. Causes operate and effects take place 
in time and space, but we are not led to look on dura- 
tion and place producing effects, or being themselves 
affected by any agents. We talk, indeed, of time effect- 
ing mighty changes, say in elevating or abrading the 
earth’s surface, or in revolutionizing society, and chang- 
ing men’s opinions and sentiments; but the language is 
elliptical, and it means, when the steps are fully un- 
* See supra, pp. 147, 166. 264 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS. 
folded, that powers residing in substances produce effects 
when time is allowed them. So far as we know, or can 
know, of time or space, we look on them as unchanged 
and unchangeable, though it would be presumptuous in 
us to affirm that they can in no way be affected or in- 
fluenced by the Divine Power. 
II. Power residing in substance is exercised when the 
needful conditions are supplied. All creature power is 
conditioned and limited: it is a power to produce a cer- 
tain particular effect. Commonly, if not invariably, there 
is need, as has been shown in treating of Power, of the 
concurrence of two or more agencies in order to action, 
and there will be operation only when there is co-opera- 
tion. The very power of God is in a sense qualified, it is 
guided by that which should ever direct it, by His Will, 
which is holy and benevolent. But confining our atten- 
tion to creature power, mental or material, it has always 
a rule, or defined mode of action, and can act only in 
a particular way, and to a certain extent. That which 
is necessary to the exercise of power in a substance may 
be called the conditions, and it is only on the conditions 
being supplied that power is exercised. A magnet has 
a power of attracting iron, but it is only when iron is 
within reach that the property is active. 
There is a sense, and an important sense, in which 
power may be said to be in the substance, to be inhe- 
rent in the substance, to constitute, indeed, an element 
in the nature of the substance. In this sense the power 
of the substance is always the same; that is, the same 
substance will always act in the same way on the condi- 
tions being supplied. Allotropism may seem an exception, 
but it is so only in appearance; for when phosphorus pro- 
duces one effect in one state, and another effect in another 
state, it is because of some change produced by heat, or 
electricity, or some other agent; and that the power RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED. 
265 
continues the same, is evident from the circumstance that 
when the substance is brought back from its allotropic 
state, it exercises the same power as it did at first, a clear 
proof that in the allotropic state it was simply put under 
new conditions. It appears from these statements that 
there may be perfect propriety in speaking of latent power, 
that is, of a power not in action because the conditions 
needful to its operation are not supplied. Nay, it is pos- 
sible, I do not say probable, that there are properties 
both of mind and matter which are usually occult, and 
only appear in action on rare occasions. Nay, some have 
supposed that the soul has capacities which are altogether 
dormant here (like the capacity of the dumb to learn lan- 
guages if only they had hearing), and are to be awakened 
into life only on the conditions needful to their exercise 
being presented in the world to come. 
III. There must be an adequacy or sufficiency of 
power to produce the effect. We not only look for a 
cause, but for a competent cause. Experience, it is true, 
and experience alone, can tell us what is a sufficient 
cause, as it alone can inform us what is the cause. Still 
there seems to be an inherent conviction of the mind 
which leads us, in looking for a cause, to make the cause 
equal to the work which it accomplishes. Powers differ 
in kind, and they differ in degree. There is need, for 
instance, of more than human power to create a sub- 
stance out of nothing. There is need of more than the 
power residing in material substance to produce thought 
and emotion and will. The ant which carries a seed of 
grain, is not competent, like man, to carry a sack of 
corn; and the strength of man is inadequate to raise a 
weight which can be lifted with ease by a steam-engine. 
The lily can reproduce a lily after its kind, but cannot 
produce a pine or an oak. These facts, I am aware, can be 
known only by observation. But underneath all our ex- 266 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS. 
periential knowledge there is a necessary principle which 
constrains us, when we discover an effect, to look not 
only for a cause, but a cause with the kind of power 
which is fitted to produce the kind of effect, and to pro- 
portion the extent of the power to the extent of the effect. 
This original principle is the source of a number of most 
important derivative ones; as, when we have found a 
substance exercising a certain sort of power, we antici- 
pate that it will always exercise the same sort of power, 
and when we have found it exercising a certain amount 
of force, we expect that it will always be fit for the same, 
—of course, always on the necessary conditions being 
furnished. Thus, having found that our minds can fol- 
low a train of reasoning, we are sure that they will al- 
ways be able to do so,—of course, on the supposition that 
the bodily organism needful to mental operation in man 
is not in a state of derangement. The amount of force 
which drives a ball a certain distance to-day, we are sure 
will drive it to the same distance to-morrow. If a de- 
finite weight of oxygen has been ascertained chemically 
to unite with a certain definite weight of hydrogen, we 
are sure it will ever do so; and if we find the very same 
amount of oxygen not drawing to it the same amount of 
hydrogen, we argue that there must have been some 
change in the conditions of the oxygen. It is acknow- 
ledged that in such judgments there is and must be 
an experiential element, which in spontaneous thought 
is ever the more prominent,—it is ever the one about 
which the mind is most anxious, as being the only doubt- 
ful one; still there is also a necessary principle, which 
is overlooked only because it is indisputable and inva- 
riable. Rising from earthly to heavenly things, we look 
on God, who has produced works in which are traces 
of such large power and admirable wisdom, as a Being 
possessed of power and wisdom corresponding to the RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED. 
267 
effects we discover, and as capable, whenever he may see 
fit, of producing works distinguished by the same lofty 
characteristics. 
IV. There is a necessary relation between the cause 
and the effect, arising from the necessity of the cause to 
produce the effect when the conditions are furnished. 
The principles laid down in preceding Sections seem to 
me to establish this truth, and so to clear up the subject 
round which the discussions regarding causation have 
chiefly turned since the days of Hume. Perverting and 
turning to his own purposes the views regarding sensa- 
tion which had been maintained by Locke and other 
metaphysicians, the great sceptic represents the mind as 
starting with impressions; and it seems to me certain 
that, were there nothing beyond this in the original in- 
tuitions of the mind, it would be impossible to show how 
it could ever reach the knowledge of realities. Many of 
the opponents of Hume have not seen, or, at least, have 
not adopted the proper method of meeting him. Kant 
supposes the mind to start with phenomena, and not 
with things; and when he subsequently calls in a cate- 
gory of cause and effect, it is avowed that it cannot ap- 
ply to things, but simply to phenomena. Dr. Thomas 
Brown saw clearly that our belief in cause and effect 
is intuitive, and so far his views are sound, and most 
eloquently and forcibly illustrated; but, supposing the 
mind to start with mere sensations, and not with the 
knowledge of things, and things possessing power, he 
never reached adequate views of the relation between the 
cause and the effect. Differing widely from Hume as to 
the nature of the mental principle which leads us to be- 
lieve in the connection between cause and effect, he re- 
gards the objective connection as merely invariable ante- 
cedence and consequence. In sustaining this tenet he 
wastes an immense amount of ingenuity in showing that 268 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS. 
there is nothing, no link of any kind, between the cause 
and the effect. True I say, and I maintain that, except 
in the way of loose metaphor, no one ever asserted that 
there was. But in all this argument he blinks the main 
question,—and yet it is ever, as appears from chance ex- 
pressions, pressing itself on him,—which is not as to wThat 
is between the cause and effect, but what is there in the 
cause to produce the effect. If he had supposed the mind 
to begin with the cognition of self and of body exercising 
power, he would have found more in the relation than 
the mere invariability of the succession : he would have 
discovered a power in the substance or substances act- 
ing as the cause, and that the invariableness, so far from 
being the primary circumstance, was a necessary conse- 
quence of this. 
The invariability then carries us back to a more im- 
portant circumstance, to the power which is intuitively 
known to be in substance. When the substances have 
the conditions furnished, they act, and effects must 
follow. The acting substances in the relation need- 
ful to their action is thus the true cause, the uncondi- 
tional cause (to use a phrase of Mr. J. S. Mill’s), the in- 
variable cause ever followed by its proper and peculiar 
effects. This view however lends no sanction -whatever 
to the rash statements of M. Cousin, who speaks about 
its being necessary for God to create. True, creation 
must follow if he put forth the volition, but then he has 
a will to exert or withhold the creating act. Creation 
must spring into being if he will it, but to will it is an 
element (always along with power) in that cause of which 
a created object is the effect. The same remark holds 
good, within certain limitations, of the acts of man : when 
he wills it, certain effects follow, as -when he wills to 
lift the arm, the arm must move if the organs be in 
a healthy condition; but in this and all similar cases, RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED. 
269 
while the effect is necessary, it is on the presupposition 
of a cause in which will and free will is an essential 
element. In other cases the effects follow from a power 
in substance, acting, so far as man can knowq without 
any exercise of will. When I hear of the death of a 
friend, and a torrent of grief flows into my bosom, or 
when a spark falls on gunpowder, and an explosion fol- 
lows, there is no exercise of creature will, (though there 
may possibly be a concurrence of the Divine Will neces- 
sary to all creature action); but whether there be or be 
not room for free will in the cause or substances acting, 
there is a necessary connection between these substances 
acting (with or without free will) and their proper effect. 
The mind, in contemplating the relation between cause 
and effect, declares the relation to be necessary, and can- 
not be made to believe otherwise, and decides that it is 
a necessity arising from the power intuitively known as 
in the substance. It is to reverse the proper order of 
things to resolve the necessity into the invariableness: 
the invariableness is the result of a necessity arising from 
the potency of substance. 
V. An effect is known as either a new substance, or 
as a change in a previously existing substance. The 
production of a new substance, or even of a new power, 
property, or capacity in an old substance, is altogether 
beyond human power; it is probably beyond all creature 
power. It seems to be the special prerogative of God to 
create out of nothing. A large induction seems to inform 
us that, in creating substances, he imparted to them all 
their qualities and properties; and man can as little add 
to the powers in the substances, as he can add to the 
substances in the universe. Another kind of effect, and 
the one which alone falls under our common observation, 
consists in a previously existing substance being put in a 
new state: this is the only effect which can be produced 270 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS. 
by any modification of physical action, as by mechanical 
or chemical action; nay, it is the only effect which can 
be produced by mental action or human action of any 
description. Taking advantage of natural powers, we 
may find a body in one condition and put it in another; 
or, accommodating ourselves to mental laws, we may pro- 
duce changes in our own state of mind: but here our 
power terminates. We are informed of all this by an 
enlarged experience rather than by intuition; but our 
primary conviction seems to say, that as every cause is 
found in a substance, so every effect is also in a substance, 
which may, as induction shows, be either a totally new 
substance, or a substance undergoing some modification. 
From this doctrine of causation, there follow several 
corollaries of no little consequence in the settlement of 
speculative questions. 
1. When the effect is real, that is, a real thing or 
substance, the cause must also be real, that is, a real thing 
or substance produced or changed. No doubt, it is quite 
possible for man, endowed as he is with the power of 
imagination as well as cognition, to conjure up a fanciful 
effect, say to fancy that some mysterious power is exer- 
cising a malign influence upon him, and in such a case 
the cause must be as imaginary as the effect (though 
even here the intuitive law of causation will constrain him 
to seek for producing power in some human or angelic 
being, in some star or animal); but if the effect be a 
thing in actual existence, the cause must also be in actual 
existence. Taking this view with us, we see how those 
metaphysicians who suppose that the mind primitively 
knows only phenomena, can never satisfactorily go be- 
yond a phenomenology, or reach a God who has any 
other sort of existence than the phenomena, and the 
mental laws which bind them. But if the world be a 
reality, if mind be a real thing, and body a real thing, and RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED. 
271 
the heavens and earth be real things, and if they be 
effects of power which must of necessity be supra-mun- 
dane, then the constitutional laws of the mind insist that 
the cause must also be real, and is to be found in a Being 
possessed of the adequate and competent powrer. 
2. The mind is not necessitated to seek for an endless 
series of causes. As the doctrine of causation is some- 
times stated, it might appear as if we were required, in 
following the chain of cause and effect, to go back ad in- 
finitum. It is said, in a loose way, that every object 
must have a cause; and then, as this cause must also 
have a cause, it might seem as if we were compelled to 
go on for ever from one link to another. In particular, 
it might appear as if we could never legitimately argue 
from the law of causation in favour of this world being 
caused; for, if the law of cause and effect be universal, 
then we must seek for a cause, not only of the world, but 
of the Being who made the world ; and if it be not uni- 
versal, then it is conceivable that this world may be one 
of the things which are not caused. This is an objection 
urged with great confidence by Kant; and a large school 
of metaphysicians seem to think that it is fatal to any 
argument in favour of the Divine existence derived from 
human intelligence, as in every such argument the law 
of causation must enter as an element. Kant endeavours 
to escape from the dismal consequences in which he felt 
himself being engulfed, by declaring that the law of 
cause and effect, which thus required an infinite regress as, 
was a law of thought and not of things, and by calling 
in a moral argument (which argument has again been 
assailed by the very objections which Kant directed 
against the speculative argument—for if our intelligence 
be a delusion, why may not our moral convictions also 
be so ?); while a large body of thinkers have appealed to 
some sort of mysterious faith which will not submit to 272 
PKIM1T1VE JUDGMENTS. 
be examined or even expressed. But, with all deference 
to these bold asseverations, I maintain that if only this 
Cosmos can be shown to bear marks of being an effect, 
the argument from causation can carry us up to a supra- 
mundane cause, while it does not require us to go back 
to a cause of that cause. All inquiry into causation 
conducts us to substance ; but it does not compel us to 
go on further, or to go on for ever. The law of causality 
does insist that the world, as an effect, must have a cause 
in a Being possessing power; and if, in inquiring into the 
nature of that Being, we find reason to believe that He or 
it must be an effect, it would insist on us going on to look 
out for a further cause. But if, on the other hand, we 
find no signs of that Being who made the world being an 
effect, our intuition regarding causation would be entirely 
satisfied in looking on that Being as uncaused, as self- 
existent, as having power in Himself. It thus appears 
that this difficulty, which has puzzled so many, has arisen 
entirely from a misapprehension and perversion of the 
law of causation, commencing with Hume, and presented 
in a new form by Kant. It is removed at once by an 
inductive investigation of our cognition of power, and of 
our judgment regarding causation.* 
* It is a circumstance worthy of being noted that the powerful mind 
of Kant, in his chase after an Unconditioned, represented by him as 
ideal, finds a progressus or a regressus of some kind or other in time, 
in space, in matter, in cause, in the possible or actual, but admits 
fully and explicitly that in regard to substance the reason has no 
ground to proceed regressively with conditions. In regard to causality 
we have a series of causes which go back unendingly, the unconditioned 
being the absolute totality of the series. But in substance there is no 
such regressus. “Was die Kategorien des realen Yerbaltnisses unter 
den Erscheinungen anlangt, so schickt sich die Kategorie der Substanz 
mit ihren Accidenzen nicht zu einer transscendentalen Idee, d. i. die 
Vernunft hat keinen Grund, in Ansekung ihrer, regressiv auf Bedin- 
gungen zu geken.” (Kr. d. r. Vern., p. 328.) We have only to con- 
nect this doctrine of substance, not necessarily calling, according to the 
principles of reason, for a regressus, with his admission that substance PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS. 
273 
3. By observing and classifying the effects, we may 
obtain a knowledge of the substances from which the 
effects proceed. Powers residing in substances differ in 
kind and in degree in different substances. The power 
of creation differs from the power of simply producing 
changes in what already exists. Power in spiritual beings 
differs from power in inanimate creation. Even when 
the power is the same in kind, it may differ in degree in 
different individuals. Now it is by a careful observation 
and generalization of its actings, and of the effects that 
follow, that we are enabled to gather our chief knowledge 
of substance. In conducting such an investigation in 
a scientific manner, we put in one class, and usually de- 
signate by a common name, the acts which are alike in 
their main features, and argue legitimately that there is 
a faculty in the substance to produce these effects. It is 
thus from a classification of the actings of natural sub- 
stances that we seek to rise to a knowledge of the pro- 
perties general and specific of body. It is thus that we 
observe and generalize the acts of the mind, and so en- 
deavour to ascertain its faculties. It is thus, that from 
a careful generalization of the acts of God, the theo- 
logian attempts to give something like—he should pro- 
fess to do no more-—a systematic account of his Attri- 
butes. All this does not imply, though some are ever 
telling us that it does, that we are dividing the unity of 
the soul, or the unity of God. In proceeding in this 
inductive manner we are taking the only plan available 
to us of becoming acquainted with those powers or attri- 
butes which constitute an essential element in the human 
soul and in the Divine Mind. 
involves power (see supra, p. 166 foot-note) to be able to maintain, and 
this without falling into any contradiction, that the effects seen in 
nature of a power above nature, argue a substance having power, for 
which we are not required to seek for a cause. 274 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS. 
4. By combined intuition and experience we may 
often be enabled to argue that effects of a particular 
description imply causes of a particular kind and degree. 
Intuition insists that not only there be a cause of the 
effect, but that the cause be sufficient. Experience 
then comes in to give us information as to certain effects 
coming from certain causes or substances, and not 
coming from certain others. We do not expect inani- 
mate objects to produce the effects that flow from the 
plant, nor the plant to accomplish what is done by the 
animal, nor body to effect what can be done by mind. 
A very wide induction informs us that order and adapta- 
tion come from a being capable of contemplating means 
and end, and are not to be looked for from material 
forces operating blindly and unintelligently. All this 
may not, it is true, be intuitive or apodictic, but it is 
the result of a large and uniform observation, and it 
connects itself with a primary conviction which demands 
an adequacy in the cause, and is satisfied when it is 
directed to a Supreme Intelligence, the source of all the 
system and utility to be found in the universe. 
5. The intuitive conviction gives no sanction whatever 
to the maxims that like can only act on like, or like only 
proceed from like, or that the effect must resemble the 
cause. All these proceed from narrow views of cause, 
making that universal which holds good only in certain 
cases. Like things do influence each other, but unlike 
things also exercise a mutual affection, as when acid 
acts on an alkali. The offspring of plants and animals 
do resemble their parents; but there are effects which 
are in no way like their cause, as when the sun’s heat 
makes the ice to melt. By laying down such maxims, 
philosophers landed themselves in innumerable diffi- 
culties ; they could not allow that body could influence 
mind, or mind body, or conceive how it was possible for RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED. 
275 
the physical universe to proceed from a spiritual God; 
and they helped, with other Cartesian principles, to shut 
up Spinoza into a pantheism which would admit of only 
one substance. But such maxims have no foundation in 
intuition, and they are contradicted by experience. The 
maxim is not, the cause and effect must be alike, but 
that the cause must be competent to produce the effect. 
6. It is not a sufficiently accurate expression of the 
principle of causation when it is said that like causes in 
like circumstances will produce like effects. When the 
law is announced in this vague form, we lose ourselves 
in determining what amount of resemblance there must 
be in the causes and in the effects, and in estimating 
the relative importance of the causes and of the circum- 
stances. A philosophical account of the cause must 
specify the likeness necessary, and embrace the circum- 
stances. We must therefore bring in substance and the 
power in substance acting according to a rule. Every 
created substance is endowed with power of a certain 
kind and amount, which will act, on the needful condi- 
tions being supplied; and the correct statement is, that 
the same substances, acting in the same relation, will 
always produce the same effects. 
7. Our intuitive conviction is not of the uniformity or 
continuance of the course of nature. This is the vague 
shape in which the principle appears in the works of 
Reid and Stewart. “ God,” says the former, “ hath im- 
planted in human minds an original principle, by which 
we believe and expect the continuance of the course of 
nature, and the continuance of those connections which 
we have observed in time past” (Works, p. 198). “ We 
attend to every conjunction of things which presents 
itself, and expect the continuance of that conjunction.” 
This is far too loose a form in which to present the 
maxim; indeed it is altogether incorrect, and may land 276 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS. 
us, if logically followed out, in very serious consequences. 
Instead of having a belief in the permanence or con- 
tinuance of the course of things, the great body of man- 
kind'— nearly all in the earlier and simpler ages of 
society, and almost all who live beyond the pale of the 
countries in which physical science is cultivated—look 
upon this world as liable to constant interferences on 
the part of supernatural agencies, in cases in which they 
do not regard events as being produced by chance or 
caprice. It is vain, therefore, to speak of the belief in 
the uniformity of nature as a self-evident, a necessary, 
or a universal principle.* 
Besides, if we have an intuitive belief in the perma- 
nence of nature, it will be impossible to prove that nature 
was created, or that there can be any miracles or in- 
terference with the agencies of nature by a supernatural 
power; for no evidence adduced in behalf of creation or 
divine interposition could ever be so strong as the ne- 
cessary belief in direct opposition to it. But the fact is, 
that all such maxims as that the course of things is uni- 
'* Mr. J. S. Mill is successful in showing (Logic, bk. iii. eli. xvi.) that 
man’s belief in the uniformity of nature is the result of experience, that 
it is entertained only by the educated and civilized few, and that even 
among such it has been of slow growth. But Mr. Mill has fallen into 
a glaring ‘ fallacy of confusion ’ in confounding our belief in causation 
with our belief in the uniformity of nature. The distinction was before 
him, at least for an instant, when, speaking of the irregularities of 
nature, he says: “Such phenomena were commonly, in that early 
stage of human knowledge, ascribed to the direct intervention of the 
will of some supernatural being, and therefore still to a cause. This 
shows the strong tendency of the human mind to ascribe every pheno- 
menon to some cause or other.” It is of this tendency that I affirm that 
it is native, and irresistible. He tells us that one “accustomed to 
abstraction and analysis, who will fairly exert his faculties for the 
purpose, will, when his imagination has once learned to entertain the 
notion, find no difficulty in conceiving that in some one, for instance, of 
the many firmaments into which sidereal astronomy now divides the 
universe, events may succeed one another at random, without any fixed 
law; nor can anything in our experience, or in our mental nature, 
constitute a sufficient or indeed any reason for believing that this is RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED. 
277 
form, and that like may be expected in like circumstances, 
are the result, not of any fundamental principle of in- 
telligence, but of experience; and the same experience 
which determines how far they are true must determine 
also how they are to be understood, how they are mo- 
dified, and what are the exceptions to them. Natural 
science proves that while the usual rule is that all plants 
and animals proceed from parents of the same kind, there 
must yet have been a time or times when new species 
appeared on the earth by a supernatural power, or at 
least a power not at work in the present processes of 
nature. The world as a whole bears marks of being an 
effect, and there must have been a time when it was pro- 
duced by a power above itself. In the inspired writings 
we have evidence of works being done by Moses and 
the Prophets, by Jesus and the Apostles, surpassing the 
power of man or of physical nature. All this is incon- 
sistent with a belief in the absolute uniformity of the 
course of nature, but it is quite in harmony with the in- 
tuitive conviction. If the world be an effect, we seek for 
nowhere the case.” I have remarked on this elsewhere (Method of 
Divine Government, p. 528). “This statement about fixed laws is 
ambiguous. If by fixed law he meant simply order and uniformity 
among physical events, the statement is true. But if meant to signify 
an event without a cause, material or mental, the statement is contra- 
dicted by our ‘ mental nature,’ which impels us to seek for a cause of 
every event. He is right in affirming that ‘ experience ’ cannot autho- 
rize such a belief; but it is just as certain that our ‘ mental nature ’ 
constrains us to entertain it: and surely if there be laws in physical 
nature, there may also be trustworthy laws in our mental nature.” 
There is the same confusion of two different things in the following 
passage. “ The uniformity in the succession of events, otherwise called 
the law of causation, must be received not as the law of the universe, 
but of that portion of it only which is within the range of our means 
of sure observation, with a reasonable degree of extension to adjacent 
cases.” I freely admit all this in regard to the order observable every- 
where in our Cosmos; there may or may not be a similar uniformity in 
the regions of space beyond. But our mental nature will not allow us 
to think, judge, or believe (these, and not ‘ conceive,’ which is am- 
biguous, are the proper phrases), that in this our world, or in any other 
world, there can be an event without a cause. 278 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS. 
a cause above the world; if the new species of animated 
beings cannot have been produced by natural agencies, 
we call in a supernatural cause ; if the miracles of Scrip- 
ture cannot be accounted for by human power, we call in 
Divine Power; and we feel, meanwhile, that so far from 
our native convictions being violated, they are gratified 
to the full when they learn of the events, otherwise inex- 
plicable, being referred to causes adequate to produce 
them. It thus appears that those difficulties which have 
been propounded so pompously about the impossibility 
of proving that there can have been a cause above na- 
ture producing the effects in nature, or of establishing 
a miraculous interposition with the course of things, all 
proceed on defective and erroneous views of causation, 
and at once disappear when the nature of our conviction 
is inductively investigated and correctly expressed.* 
* It is not to my present purpose to enter on the subject of miracles, 
but it does fall in with the topics discussed in the text to remark, that 
there is nothing in a miracle opposed to any intuition of the mind,— 
certainly nothing opposed to our intuition as to cause. Hume, the 
sceptic, takes all sorts of objections to miracles, and the evidence by 
which they are supported, but he does not maintain that a miracle is 
impossible. It is “experience,” according to him, “which assures us 
of the laws of nature ” (Essay on Miracles); and I hold that the same 
experience shows us effects in nature which constrain us, according to 
the intuitive law of causation, to argue a Power above nature, which 
Power is an adequate cause of any miracle which may be attested by 
proper evidence. Dr. Thomas Brown has shown very satisfactorily 
that a miracle, with the Divine Power as its cause, is not in- 
consistent with our intuitive belief in causation (Cause and Effect, 
note E). Ever since Eichte published his ‘ Yersuch einer Kritik aller 
Offenbarung,’ there have been persons in Germany who represent it as 
impossible for God to perform a miracle. This may be a necessary 
consequence of those false assumptions regarding our knowing only 
self, which landed Fichte in an incongruous pantheism, in which he at 
one time represents the Ego as the All-including God, as the “moral 
order;” and at another time represents God as the All, and absorbing 
the Ego. But it can plead in its behalf no principle in the constitution 
of man’s mind,—no principle either natural or necessary. The result 
at which we have arrived is, that the question of the occurrence of 
miracles is to be determined by the ordinary laws of evidence. 279 
BOOK IV. 
MORAL CONVICTIONS. 
CHAPTER I. 
GENERAL VIEW OF THE MOTIVE AND MORAL 
POWERS. 
Sect. I. The Appetencies, the Will, and the Con- 
science. 
The relation between the innate principles, or the funda- 
mental laws of the mind, on the one hand, and the facul- 
ties of the mind on the other, has seldom been properly 
understood. The former seem to me to be the rules of 
the operation of the latter. I have in the first three 
Books endeavoured to unfold the main primary principles 
regulating those faculties which have been called the 
Understanding, or the Intellectual or Gnostic or Cogni- 
tive Powers; or, better still, the Cognitive and Contem- 
plative, so as to embrace the Imagination, which can 
scarcely be called a Cognitive but is certainly a Contem- 
plative Power. But in all classifications of the powers 
of the mind which have the least pretensions to com- 
pleteness, there has been a recognition of another class, 
under the name of the Will, or the Peelings, or the 
Erective or Motive Powers; they may perhaps be best 
designated as the Motive and Moral Powers, so as to 
embrace unequivocally the functions of the conscience. 280 
MORAL CONVICTIONS. 
I am in this Chapter to take a glance at this class of 
powers, and afterwards seek to ascertain the fundamental 
principles involved in them. They are at least three in 
number, the Appetencies,—including the Emotions,—the 
Will, and the Conscience. 
I. There are the native Appetencies or the Mind 
leading to Emotions. Man is so constituted that he is 
capable of being swayed in will, and so in action, by cer- 
tain motives, that is, by the contemplation of certain ob- 
jects or ends, while others do not influence him. It 
would serve many important ends to have a classifica- 
tion of these, that is, of the springs of human will and 
action. To endeavour to give a complete and exhaustive 
list of these, that is, of the categories of man’s moral 
nature, would, I am aware, be quite as bold an effort as 
that so often made to determine the categories of the 
understanding. Such a classification would at the best 
be very imperfect in the first instance. But, even though 
only provisionally correct, it might accomplish some use- 
ful purposes. In the absence of any arrangement sanc- 
tioned by metaphysicians generally, it must suffice to 
mention here some of the principal motives which very 
obviously sway the will and impel to action. 
1. Mankind are evidently inclined, involuntarily and 
voluntarily, to exercise every native power,—the senses, 
the memory, the imagination, the power of language, the 
various rational powers, such as abstraction, comparison, 
causality, the emotional, voluntary, and moral capacities. 
A vast portion of human activity proceeds from no higher 
and from no lower source than this. As the lamb frisks, 
and the colt gambols, and as the child is in perpetual 
rotation, so man’s internal powers are for ever impel- 
ling him to exertion, independent altogether of any ex- 
ternal object, or even of any further internal ends to be 
gained. MOTIVE AND MORAL POWERS. 
281 
2. Whatever is contemplated as capable of securing 
pleasure is felt to be desirable, and whatever is appre- 
hended as likely to inflict pain is avoided. This is so 
very obvious a swaying power with human beings that it 
has been noticed, and commonly greatly exaggerated, in 
every account which has been given of man’s active and 
moral nature. The mistake of the vulgar, and especially 
of the sensational systems, is that they have represented 
pleasure and pain as the sole contemplated ends by which 
man is or can be swayed. It is our object in these pa- 
ragraphs to show that man can be influenced by other 
motives better and worse. 
3. There are certain appetencies in man, bodily and 
mental, which crave for gratification, and this indepen- 
dent of the pleasure to be secured by their indulgence. 
Of this description are the appetites of hunger, thirst, and 
sex, and the mental tendencies to seek for knowledge, es- 
teem, society, power, property. These appetencies may 
connect themselves with the other two classes already 
specified, but still they are different. They will tend to 
act as natural inclinations, but still they look towards 
particular external objects. We may come to gratify 
them for the sake of the pleasure, but in the first instance 
we seek the objects for their own sakes, and it is in seek- 
ing the objects we obtain gratification. They operate to 
some extent in the breasts of all, and they come to exer- 
cise a fearfully controlling and grasping power over the 
minds of multitudes. 
4. Man is impelled by an inward principle, more or 
less powerful in the case of different individuals, and 
varying widely in the objects desired, to seek for the 
beautiful in inanimate or in animate objects, in grand or 
lovely scenes in nature, in statues, paintings, buildings, 
fine composition in prose or poetry, and in the counte- 
nances or forms of man or woman. 282 
MORAL CONVICTIONS. 
5. It is not to be omitted that the moral power in 
man is not only (as I hope to show) a knowing and judg- 
ing faculty, it has a prompting energy, and leads us, 
when a corrupt will does not interfere, to such acts as 
the worship of God and beneficence to man, done be- 
cause they are right. 
6. Whatever is felt to be appetible for ourselves we 
may wish that others should enjoy, while we may desire 
that they should be preserved from all that is unappeti- 
ble, such as restraint and pain and sin. Man is so con- 
stituted as to be stirred to desire and prompted to ac- 
tion by the contemplation of other beings to whom he is 
related, such as God when he knows Him, and his fel- 
low-men, more especially certain of his fellow-men, such 
as his countrymen and kindred, and those who have be- 
stowed favours upon him. I must ever set myself against 
the miserably degrading doctrine of those who repre- 
sent man as utterly selfish in his constitution, and capable 
of being swayed by no other considerations than those 
which promise pleasurable gratifications to be realized by 
himself. He may, by a hardening process of sin, make 
himself thus selfish, but in his original nature he is ca- 
pable of being swayed by a great number and variety 
of other motives, and among others by attachments to 
man as man, or to particular men or women, and by sym- 
pathy for persons in trouble. 
In whatever way we may classify them, these, or such 
as these, are the motives by which man is naturally 
swayed. Upon these native and primary principles of 
action, others, acquired and secondary, come to be 
grafted. Thus money, not originally desired for its own 
sake, may come to be coveted as fitted to gratify the love 
of property, the love of power, or the love of pleasure. 
Or a particular fellow-man, at first indifferent, comes to 
be avoided, because he seems inclined to thwart us in MOTIVE AND MORAL POWERS. 
283 
some of our favourite ends, such as the acquisition of 
wealth or of fame. It is a peculiarity of our nature that 
these secondary principles may become primary ones, and 
prompt us to seek, for their own sakes, objects which were 
at first coveted solely because they tended to promote 
further ends. 
The appetencies, native and acquired, stir up Emotion, 
which is called forth by an apprehension of objects as 
fitted to gratify or to disappoint these appetencies. Let us 
call whatever accords with them the Appetible, and what- 
ever runs counter to them the Inappetible; then the law 
is that the appetible, when in prospect, calls forth hope, 
and when realized, joy; whereas the inappetible, when in 
prospect, excites fear, and when realized, sorrow. It is 
always to be taken into account that the emotive suscepti- 
bility is naturally stronger in some minds than in others, 
is stronger at one period of life, or even one day or hour, 
than another; but making due allowance for this vari- 
able element, the intensity of feeling is determined by 
the strength of the motive principle, its native strength 
or its acquired strength, and by the extent of the appe- 
tible or inappetible embraced within the mental appre- 
hension of the object or end fitted to gratify or disap- 
point the appetency. There are thus three elements 
determining the emotion, and these varying in the case 
of different individuals, and of the same individual at 
different times. There is the emotional susceptibility, 
depending largely on the state of the brain or particular 
organs of it. There is the mental appetency, natural or 
acquired. There is the mental apprehension of an object 
or event as tending to content or gratify the appetence. 
By these elements we can explain all the feelings and 
much of the activity of humanity. We have here the key 
to unlock a door through which we may see what rules 
the passions of men and women, often so very capricious, 284 
MORAL CONVICTIONS. 
and apparently contradictory. This deep affection, long 
cherished, or this burst of sudden anger or joy or grief, 
reveals to the observant eye the deep moving principle of 
the inner soul. 
It should be observed that while the mind is impelled 
by such appetencies towards certain objects, it has not 
necessarily before it the general principle by which it is 
actuated, nor indeed a general idea of any description. 
It contemplates an individual object as about to give it 
pleasure, or about to add to its power or fame, and it at 
once longs for it without generalizing its aim. Here, as 
in other cases which have passed under our notice, the 
mind is actuated by principles which are not before the 
consciousness as principles. 
The emotions stirred up by these appetencies are cha- 
racterized by two marked features; one is a drawing to- 
wards the object that is appetible, and a drawing away 
from what is inappetible; and the other is a lively ex- 
citement—whence the name emotions. Thus, in fear we 
have an apprehension of some evil as about to befall us 
or those in whom we feel an interest, and we shrink from 
the object; whereas, in hope, we have an idea of an 
event as about to bring good, and we, as it were, reach 
toward it. While thus longing or shrinking, the mind 
is all the while in a quickened and moved state. 
II. There is the Will. The powers I have been speak- 
ing of rush on to their ends instinctively and blindly. 
The native power goes on to action, the appetite claims 
indulgence, the dominant passion embraces its object, 
each according to its nature. But these activities and 
propensities are often inconsistent the one with the other. 
The intellect would set out on high pursuits, but is op- 
posed by some grovelling appetite, or the man would wish 
to acquire fame, but, in doing so, finds that he cannot 
accumulate property as he might otherwise do. Is man MOTIVE AND MORAL POWERS. 
285 
condemned to be the slave of these appetencies P yielding 
to the one which happens to assail him, or obeying the 
strongest when they are competing or clashing. It is 
probable that this is the condition of the brute creatures, 
and would be the state of man did he not possesss a higher 
power. That power is the Will. 
Properly speaking, the will does not furnish incitements, 
inducement, or motives; these come from the appetencies 
which we have just been considering. It is the province 
of the Will, seated above them, to sanction or restrain 
them when they present themselves, and to decide among 
them when they are competing with each other for the 
mastery. We have seen that the characteristic property 
of emotion is attachment or repugnance, with associated 
excitement. The distinguishing quality of will is choice 
or rejection. Inducements being held out, the mind, in 
the exercise of will, sanctions or refuses; it assumes a 
number of forms, in all of which there is the element of 
choice. If the object is present, we positively choose it 
or adopt it; if the object is absent, we wish for it; if it is 
to be obtained by some exertion on our part, we form a 
resolution to take the steps necessary to procure it. 
III. There is the Conscience. It is the special func- 
tion of this power to say when a particular appetency 
should be allowed and when it should be restrained; in 
doing so, it addresses itself to the will. The conscience 
thus claims to be above, not only our natural appetencies, 
but above the will, which ought to yield as soon as the 
decision of conscience is given; not that it can set itself 
altogether above nature, not that it should set itself above 
nature ; it is its office to sit in judgment on appetencies 
which are natural or may be acquired, and it works 
through free will as an essential element of our nature. 
But, as Bishop Butler has shown, it is of the nature of 
our constitution that it pronounces judgments for the will 286 
MORAL CONVICTIONS. 
and upon the appetencies. Let us endeavour to unfold 
the nature of this moral power. It will be seen that, 
though not identical with, it is so far analogous to the 
intellectual powers. 
1. The conscience is of the nature of a cognitive power. 
It is analogous in this respect to the faculties of sense 
and self-consciousness. Not that it makes known any 
individual object, as the senses do when they show this 
table or that chair, or as self-consciousness does, when 
it discloses self in a particular state, say as musing or as 
hoping : it reveals to us merely certain qualities of objects 
otherwise known, that is, known by perception and self- 
consciousness ; it lets us know, for example, of certain 
voluntary states of ourselves or of others, that they are 
good or that they are evil. Making known no new sub- 
stance or independent existence, it does reveal to us a 
quality of all souls possessed of intelligence and free will; 
it was this property of the conscience that was seized by 
Shaftesbury and by Francis Hutcheson, when they called 
this power the moral sense. The phrase was adopted by 
them, I suspect, to make their system tally with that of 
Locke, who admitted an external and internal sense, to 
which they now added a moral sense. It was, in some 
respects, an unfortunate phrase, as it seemed to degrade 
the moral power in man to the rank of a bodily faculty, 
or to make it dependent on bodily organization. But it is 
fitted to bring out one feature of man’s nature, that by 
which he is able to detect a certain quality in the acts of 
all intelligent beings.* 
2. There are beliefs involved in the exercise of the 
moral power. These beliefs are very closely connected 
* See some valuable remarks in note F, appended to Mansel’s £ Pro- 
legomena Logica.’ “ It appears that a power of discerning right and 
wrong in individual acts must be allowed as the presentative basis, 
without which no system of Moral Philosophy is possible.” See also 
Art. Metaph. in Encyc. Brit. MOTIVE AND MORAL POWERS. 
287 
with the cognitions, from which indeed it is scarcely ne- 
cessary to distinguish them, except for certain purposes 
of philosophic accuracy. The phrase moral cognitions 
might be confined to those mental exercises in which the 
action which we pronounce good or bad is our own, fall- 
ing immediately under consciousness, and we pronounce 
it to be good or bad, whereas our moral beliefs extend 
much further, and refer to acts not immediately under 
the introspective power, as when we believe that benevo- 
lence is good everywhere, and that God is good and has 
been good and shall be good to all eternity. I am in- 
clined to regard our moral cognitions as the basis of our 
moral beliefs. We seem first to have a necessary convic- 
tion in regard to the moral nature of our own actions, 
and thence we arise to convictions which look to moral 
qualities, which, being apprehended by us, we declare 
to be good or evil, wherever they are to be found, and 
whoever may be the possessor. 
3. Judgments are involved in the exercise of this 
moral power. These proceed on our original cognitions 
and beliefs. Discerning in certain agents moral qualities, 
we can discover relations involved in the comparison of 
these qualities one with another, and with other objects 
and qualities. Our moral, like our intellectual cognitions 
and beliefs, furnish matter for innumerable judgments. 
Thus, in looking at the relation in which man stands to 
God, we affirm that we ought to obey the Divine com- 
mands. Or, looking to a certain deed and to the painful 
consequences to which it has led, we say the sin merits 
the suffering. It is the special office of ethical science 
to generalize and express the cognitions, beliefs, and 
judgments of the moral power, and to derive rules from 
them by which to judge of actions. 
4. Our apprehension of moral good and evil is accom- 
panied with appetency and emotion. The conscience, in 288 
MORAL CONVICTIONS. 
fact, partakes of the nature both of a cognitive and a 
motive power; it knows certain qualities in objects, and, 
as it recognizes them, it looks on them as appetible or 
inappetible, and is moved towards them or away from 
them. Hence the conscience is not only a judge, it is a 
spring of action, and prompts us, if we would but obey 
it, to seek certain ends, and carefully to avoid others. 
Sect. II. {Supplementary.) On the Beautiful. 
A reference is here made to this subject mainly with the view 
of showing that, while the appreciation of beauty is a native feel- 
ing, it is not to be regarded as a necessary principle. We are cer- 
tainly led by strong natural inclination to contemplate certain ob- 
jects with special feelings of attachment and admiration. The 
science which seeks to catch and formalize these feelings, and to 
judge by the rules thence drawn of objects in nature and in art, 
has been called Aesthetics, but might perhaps be more appropri- 
ately termed Kalology, or Kallisophy, that is, the science of the 
Fair or Lovely. It may be doubted however whether we have 
any such necessary convictions in regard to beauty as we have in 
regard to certain fundamental intellectual truths and moral quali- 
ties. Our knowledge and belief regarding objects presented to 
sense and consciousness amount to this, that they have an exist- 
ence independent of the mind contemplating them, and that they 
would and must have the same existence to all minds endowed 
with the capacity of becoming acquainted with them. Again, in 
pronouncing certain judgments, the mind declares not only that 
there is a relation, but that the relation is necessary. But, in 
looking on an attractive object, while led to delight in it as lovely, 
we are not constrained to believe that it must be beautiful, inde- 
pendent of our feeling regarding it, and that it must appear beau- 
tiful to all beings. I must believe that the sun exists as an ex- 
tended body, independent of the structure of my eye or mind, and 
that it would be apprehended as an extended body by any inhabi- 
tant of Mars or Jupiter endowed with the capacity to perceive 
the object. I must believe that ingratitude is a sin, not only on 
the earth, but everywhere, in the planet Saturn or the star Sirius, 
in heaven or in hell, and that all beings endowed with moral capa- 
city must see it in the same light; but I am not necessitated to 
believe that the objects which appear beautiful to me, or to all 
men, have a beauty independent of the mind that contemplates MOTIVE AND MORAL POWERS. 
289 
them, and that all other minds, or even that all minds endowed 
with the sense of beauty, must view them in precisely the same 
light. We find, in fact, that the music which is felt by some to 
be so pleasant and exciting, has no charms whatever to others. 
We could easily enough believe, if evidence were furnished to us, 
that the colours which appear so lovely to our eyes, have no attrac- 
tion whatever to the inhabitants of another planet. Not only 
so, we can conceive that the very order and proportions which 
awaken so deep an interest in our minds, might be contemplated 
with no feeling of admiration by beings endowed with a dilferent 
mental constitution. 
At the same time it should be acknowledged that there seem to 
be qualities which must have an excellence altogether independent 
of the mind which views them. It is an opinion which goes as far 
back as the time of Plato, and has ever since been widely enter- 
tained, that beauty of forms consists in some sort of proportion 
or harmony,* which may admit of a mathematical expression; and 
later and more scientific research is altogether in its favour. It 
is now established that complementary colours, that is, colours 
which when combined make up the full beam, are felt to be beau- 
tiful when seen simultaneously ; that is, the mind is made to de- 
light in the unities of nature. At the basis of music there are 
certain fixed ratios: and in poetry of every description there are 
measures and correspondencies. Pythagoras has often been ridi- 
culed for his doctrine of the music of the spheres ; and probably 
his views were sufficiently mystical and fanciful, but the latest 
science shows that there is a harmony in all nature,—in its forms, 
its forces, and its motions. The higher unorganized, and all orga- 
nized objects, take definite forms which are often regulated by 
mathematical laws. The forces of nature can be estimated in 
numbers, and light and heat seem to go in undulations, or at least 
by intervals, while the movements of the great bodies in nature 
are periodical.t Such facts as these seem to show that, at the 
basis of beauty, there may very probably be principles which are 
necessary, eternal, and altogether independent of the individual 
mind, or even of the general mind of humanity. But over them 
all the mind seems to spread a colour and a lustre which we can- 
* See fine Platonic speculations in M‘Vicar, ‘ On the Beautiful, 
the Picturesque, the Sublime,’ and the ‘ Philosophy of the Beautiful 
and in Blackie’s ‘ Beauty, with Plato’s Doctrine of the Beautiful;’ as 
well as in Buskin’s ‘ Modern Painters,’ vol. ii. 
t The harmonies in nature, in respect of Colour, Number, Form, etc., 
are illustrated in ‘ Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation.’ 290 
MORAL CONVICTIONS. 
not regard as necessary, and which may not be universal; or which, 
if universal, can have become so only by the appointment of the one 
God, who Himself delights, and would also lead us to delight in the 
unity and harmony which run through all his works. It is quite 
possible that, so far as there are eternal principles lying at the 
basis of certain forms of beauty, they may only be modifications of 
the eternal principles of truth. 
Other kinds of beauty ally themselves more closely with the 
morally good. There is a beauty in all truly virtuous and benefi- 
cent actions of the creature, and, above all, of the Great Creator. 
Whatever seems to proceed from love or from kindness, such as 
peace and plenty and diffused happiness, is apt to collect a feeling 
of loveliness around it. The question is started, May not the 
principles which underlie these forms of beauty be modifications of 
the eternal principles of right and wrong ? 
In the pages of all writers who have meditated profoundly on 
this subject, will be found such utterances as these:—“ The beau- 
tiful is always true “ The beautiful is ever good.” Alas! the only 
exception to this last maxim is to be found in certain human 
beings, in which guilt has destroyed the holy, but left as yet, and 
for a time, the lovely, which however will in due time lose its 
lustre. But there is truth involved in these maxims, and I have 
sometimes thought that it lies in this, that at the basis of beauty 
there arejeternal principles, modifications of the true and the good, 
over which the mind casts a colour and a clothing. The God who 
made us hath given us a nature which throws a halo and a radiance 
round certain kinds of everlasting verities and moral qualities, with 
the view of rendering them attractive, and gathering our affections 
about them. 
CHAPTER II. 
CONVICTIONS INVOLVED IN THE EXERCISES OF 
CONSCIENCE. 
Sect. I. Convictions as to the Nature oe Moral Good. 
Still deeper interests are involved in our being able to 
show that there is an immutable and eternal morality 
than even in our proving that there is immutable and CONVICTIONS INVOLVED IN CONSCIENCE. 
291 
eternal truth. But after having laboured at such length 
to demonstrate that there are native and necessary prin- 
ciples involved in the intellectual exercises of the mind, it 
will not be needful to take such pains to show that there 
are similar convictions of a moral character. The mind 
is led by its very nature and constitution to perceive that 
there is an indelible distinction between good and evil, 
just as there is an indelible distinction between truth and 
falsehood. It finds that every substance has potency; 
that the species implies the individual; but it also de- 
clares that to give every one his due is good, and must 
be good, and that it is wrong in children to neglect their 
parents, and in God’s creatures to forget their Creator. 
Let me endeavour to bring out and express some of the 
principal moral convictions of the mind. 
I. The moral quality is not given to the action by the 
mind contemplating it. It is not a colour thrown over 
the object by the mental eye which perceives it, but is a 
real quality of the object, is there prior to its being per- 
ceived, and is in the object whether it is perceived or 
not. It is not our perception and approbation that render 
a benevolent action good; but we perceive its excellence 
and approve of it because it is good. It follows that 
II. Moral good is moral good to all intelligences so 
high in the scale of being as to be able to discern it. 
I lay down this position in order to guard against the 
idea that moral excellence is something depending on 
the peculiar constitution of man, and that it is allowable 
to suppose that there may be intelligent beings in other 
worlds to whom virtue does not appear as virtue. Such 
a view seems altogether inconsistent with our intuitive 
convictions, and would effectually undermine the founda- 
tions of morality. It is allowable to suppose that there 
may be beings in other worlds who see no beauty in the 
colours or in the shapes and proportions which we so 292 
MORAL CONVICTIONS. 
much admire; but I cannot admit that there are any in- 
telligent and responsible beings who look on malevolence 
as a virtue or justice as a sin.* 
HI. Moral good lays an obligation on us to attend to 
it. This sense, or rather, conviction of obligation, is one 
of the peculiarities, is indeed the chief peculiarity, of our 
moral perceptions. Herein do our moral convictions, 
whether of the nature of cognitions, beliefs, or judgments, 
differ from the intellectual convictions which have passed 
under our notice in the previous parts of this treatise. 
That a straight line is the shortest between two points, 
this I am constrained to decide when my attention is 
called to the subject, but I know of no duty thence arising, 
no affection which I should thereon cherish, no action 
which I ought to do. But w7hen I am led to believe that 
there is a good God wdio made me and upholds me, the 
mind declares that it is and must be good to love and 
obey that Being, and that there is an obligation lying on 
me to do so. This is expressed by such phrases as 8eov, 
duty, right, ought, obligation, the convictions embodied in 
which cannot be accounted for on any utilitarian hypo- 
thesis. It is shown that a particular action readily within 
our power will tend to promote the happiness of an in- 
dividual or of society. The mind’s apprehension of this 
is one thing, and the conviction that we ought to do it is 
an entirely different thing, and the two should never be 
confounded. 
But the conscience is not only a cognitive, it is a mo- 
tive power. This conviction of obligation distinguishes 
* The systems which represent man’s moral faculty as a mere feeling 
or sentiment, such as the systems of Adam Smith, of Thomas Brown, 
of Sir James Mackintosh, are chargeable with two defects:—First, 
the theory does not come up to the full mental facts, which embrace 
perception, or knowledge, and judgment, as well as emotion ; and, as a 
consequence, secondly, they make it appear as if virtue might arise from 
the peculiar constitution or temperament of the race. CONVICTIONS INVOLVED IN CONSCIENCE. 
293 
it at once from the other motive as it does from the other 
cognitive powers. The inducements addressed to man’s 
sense of duty are altogether different from those addressed 
to the other appetencies of the mind. The love of plea- 
sure, of fame, and of activity, do all hold out allurements 
to man, but none of them carries with it a binding obli- 
gation. When we follow them we have no sense of merit; 
when we decline them we have no sense of guilt. It is 
different when our moral convictions say that a particular 
line of conduct should be pursued. We feel now not 
only that we may do it, but that we should do it, and 
that if we neglect to do it, we are guilty of sin. Hence 
arises the great ethical doctrine, expounded in so mas- 
terly a manner by Bishop Butler, that the conscience is 
supreme; that is, supreme among the other moving 
powers. Just as appetite craves for food, and the love 
of society for social intercourse, so the conscience directs 
to certain conduct, but with this difference, that it de- 
clares itself superior to the others. It carries with it its 
authority, and asserts its claims, and is prepared to de- 
nounce us if we disregard them. 
IV. The conscience points to an authority above itself. 
It is supreme as within the mind, but it is not absolutely 
supreme. It claims to be superior to all other motives, 
such as the love of pleasure, and even to such motives as 
intellectual improvement; but it seems to point to a 
power above the mind altogether. At the same time it 
does not seem to announce what is the nature of the ob- 
ject which it would prompt us to seek after. In this re- 
spect it is like some of our intellectual intuitions, which 
impel us to look round for something which they do not 
themselves reveal. Thus, intuitive causality constrains us 
when we discover an effect to look for a cause, but does 
not specify what the cause is. In like manner our moral 
faculty seems to me to point to some power, principle, 294 
MORAL CONVICTIONS. 
or being, it says not what, above itself. It does not claim 
for itself that it is infallible, that it is sufficient, that it is 
independent. It bows to something which has authority; 
it acknowledges a standard which is and must be right; 
it looks up for sanction and guidance. It says that it 
ought to yield to no earthly power; but it does not 
affirm of itself that it can never mistake, and that there 
is no authority to which it should submit. On the con- 
trary, it often finds itself in difficulty and perplexity, and 
feels that it should look round and up for a light, and it is 
sure that there is such a light. What is thus unknown 
to the intuition itself, but which, notwithstanding, it is 
ever seeking, is revealed by other processes. 
Y. This obligation, when we are led to believe in a 
Supreme Being, takes the form of law ; and we believe 
that we are under law to God. Our moral convictions 
do not, so it seems to me, of themselves compel us to 
believe in the existence of God. I am persuaded, how- 
ever, that like most of our deeper intuitions (as I hope 
subsequently to show) they do point upwards to God. 
And whenever we do, by combined intuition and the ob- 
vious facts of experience, reach God, the God who gave 
us all our endowments, and therefore our moral consti- 
tution, the mind traces up the obligation under which it 
lies to Him. The expression of this inward conviction 
now is not that we are under obligation to an unknown 
power, but under law, and under law to God. It is thus 
indeed we get the peculiar idea of moral government and 
moral law, not from sense, nor from pleasure, nor from 
utility, but from conscience constraining us to feel obli- 
gation, and combined intuition and experience leading us 
to trace up that law to God as the Being who sanctions 
it. Till this object is reached, our moral intuition is felt 
to be vague, indefinite; it is craving for something which 
it feels to be wanting; but when God is found, as lie CONVICTIONS INVOLVED IN CONSCIENCE. 
295 
cannot fail to be found when we are in search of Him, 
then the intuition is satisfied, and ever after connects the 
law with the lawgiver. 
VI. Moral good is perceived as having desert, as ap- 
provable and rewardable. This, too, is a peculiar idea, 
derived from the moral power in man, and cannot have 
been derived from, as it cannot be resolved into, any 
modification of pleasure, or pain, or sensation of any 
kind. We are convinced in regard to every good action 
that it is meritorious; we give to it our approbation, 
and we look for encouragement and reward. This con- 
viction operates with other considerations in leading us 
to look to God as the Governor of this World, and as 
ready to uphold and defend the right. There are times 
when our expectations on this subject are disappointed, 
and when we see deeds of moral heroism only landing 
him who performs them in opprobrium and suffering. 
Still, even in such cases, our instincts keep firm, in spite 
of all appearances to the contrary; and we believe that, 
sooner or later, in this world or the world to come, the 
deeds will meet with their appropriate reward. 
VII. Moral good lies in the region of the will. By 
this I mean that every truly virtuous act must be a 
voluntary one. In saying so, I do not mean to assert 
that every morally good act must be a volition contem- 
plating or performing some outward deed. The will of 
man exists in other forms than in a resolution to act. 
Wherever there is choice, I hold that there is will. 
AVhenever I adopt any particular object presented, or 
prefer any one object to another, there is choice. There 
is also the exercise of choice, and therefore of will, in 
all cases in which we deliberately reject any object or 
proposal made to us. I hold then that there is choice 
—not only in volition, or resolution, or the final determi- 
nation to act,—there is choice in wish or in voluntary 296 
MORAL CONVICTIONS. 
aversion. When we wish that God’s name may be hal- 
lowed, that our friends may prosper and be in health, 
there is will. These wishes and volitions and rejections 
may unite themselves with any one of our feelings, and 
even with our intellectual exercises. Using will in this 
wide sense, I say that it is the region, and the exclusive 
region, of moral good. It is in voluntary acts that the 
conscience discerns a moral quality, and it is upon such 
acts, and no others, that it pronounces its decisions. We 
shall see forthwith that the will, in all its proper acts, 
is free; and it is upon acts which we were free to per- 
form, but from which also we were free to abstain, that 
all the judgments of conscience are declared. 
VIII. Moral Good is a quality of certain actions pro- 
ceeding from Tree Will. I have been urging that moral 
good is not a creation of the mind when contemplating 
actions or affections, but that it has an actual existence. 
But let us understand what is the precise nature of the 
reality. In order to express the reality, some are in the 
habit of saying that morality has an objective and not a 
mere subjective existence. But this language is not 
fitted to bring out the full truth, and may leave an erro- 
neous impression, as if moral excellence had an existence 
as a separate object, like a stone or a mountain. It has 
an existence, but merely as a quality of free acts of in- 
telligent beings. 
IX. The moral quality of action cannot be resolved 
into anything simpler. The mind discerns it at once, as 
the eye sees a surface and the muscular sense feels pres- 
sure. If any man asks us, What is extension ? we bid 
him exercise his bodily senses. If any man asks us, 
What is virtue? I bid him exercise his conscience in 
looking at a good action. No attempt should be made 
to give a positive definition of virtue. Any proffered 
definition will either be erroneous, or it will be a mere CONVICTIONS INVOLVED IN CONSCIENCE. 
297 
identical proposition. If we say that virtue consists in 
happiness, or in utility, or in beneficial tendency, all 
such accounts are utterly wrong, for they leave out the 
main elements, the obligation, the imperativeness of 
moral law, the desert, the approvableness, the reward- 
ableness. If we introduce such phrases as the following, 
and say that virtue is binding, that it is right, good; 
we are, after all, only saying that virtue is virtue. All 
that can be done by moral science on this particular 
point is, to exhibit fully the distinctive features, so that 
the conscience may recognize them, to bring out the law 
or principle, and embody it in suitable expressions. 
Sect. II. On Sin and Error. 
I have been arguing that our intellectual and moral 
intuitions are all necessary and universal. This doctrine 
however must not be so stated as to imply that it is 
impossible for man to fall into error, or for the con- 
science to come to a false decision, or for human beings 
to commit sin. 
That men do, in fact, fall into error is evident from 
this single circumstance, that scarcely two persons can 
be brought to accord in opinion, even on points of im- 
portance. In regard, indeed, to necessary truths, there 
are certain restrictions laid on the mind. No man who 
considers the subject can be made to believe that two 
straight lines will enclose a space. Still, even in regard 
to such truths, the mind has a capacity of ignorance and 
of error; it may refuse to consider them, and, mistaking 
their nature, it may make statements inconsistent with 
them without knowing it. Those who have gone through 
the demonstrations of Euclid are constrained to believe 
the truth of every proposition, but the truths have never 
so much as been presented to the minds of the great 
majority of mankind, and many persons might easily be 298 
MORAL CONVICTIONS. 
persuaded that the angles of certain triangles are equal 
to less or to more than two right-angles. But whatever 
the restrictions laid on our liability to error in necessary 
truth, there seem to be no limits to man’s exposure to 
mistakes in other matters. There is boundless room for 
them in all conclusions which are dependent on expe- 
riential evidence, especially when that evidence is of a 
cumulative character. In all such matters the mind may 
refuse to look at the evidence, or it may take only what 
is favourable to one side, and may arrive at most er- 
roneous and preposterous results. This liability to error 
is apt to appear in all affairs in which we are under the 
influence of pride or party spirit, or a prejudiced and 
biassed disposition; in short, wherever there is moral 
evil swaying the will, and leading it to look on evidence 
in a partial spirit. If I were immediately cognizant of 
the heart of a good man, and could see the springs that 
move him to benevolence and self-sacrifice, I should be 
constrained to approve of him; but I may be prejudiced 
against him, and I shall twist and torture facts till I 
bring myself to believe that he is doing all this from a 
deep designing selfishness. The topie does not come 
within my proper scope, but I cannot keep from giving 
it as my decided conviction, that while ignorance may 
arise from the limited nature of our faculties and from a 
limited means of knowledge, positive error does in every 
case proceed directly or indirectly from a corrupted will, 
leading us to pronounce a hasty judgment without evi- 
dence, or to seek partial evidence on the side to which 
our inclinations lean. A thoroughly pure and candid 
will would, in my opinion, preserve man, even with his 
present limited faculties, not indeed from ignorance on 
many points, but from all possibility of positive mistakes. 
But the question may be asked, How is the existence 
of sin, and of wrong decisions of the conscience, consistent CONVICTIONS INVOLVED IN CONSCIENCE. 
299 
with the necessity which attaches to our moral convic- 
tions ? The difficulty can easily be removed so far as the 
existence of sin is concerned; for sin must ever proceed 
from the region of the will, which is free to do good, 
but also free to do evil. It may be necessary for the 
conscience to decide in a certain manner, but it is not 
necessary that the will should do what the conscience 
commands. And it is to the influence exercised by a dis- 
obedient will upon the conscience that I attribute all the 
errors in its decisions. In whatever way we may recon- 
cile them, these two facts can each be established on 
abundant evidence: the one, that in the primitive exer- 
cises of conscience there is a conviction of necessity; the 
other is, that the conscience is liable to manifold perver- 
sions. Care must be taken not to state the two so as to 
make the one appear to be inconsistent with the other; 
both can be so enunciated as to make all seeming con- 
tradiction vanish. As to the exact nature of the neces- 
sity of conviction, and the ground which it covers, this is 
to be determined, like its existence, by an observation of 
the conviction itself. If we look directly and fairly at 
moral excellence, the mind must declare it to be good. 
But then first the mind may refuse to look at it at all, 
and secondly, it may not regard it in the right light. If 
we look upon the living and the true God in the proper 
aspect, we must acknowledge that we owe Him love and 
obedience; but then we may refuse to look upon Him, 
we may contrive to live without God, and God may not 
be in all our thoughts; or we may fashion to ourselves a 
Deity with a degraded nature, making Him one altoge- 
ther like unto ourselves, and then the proper awe and af- 
fection will no longer rise in our bosoms. 
It is to be taken into account that, while our decisions 
upon the acts presented may be intuitively certain, yet 
that the- acts are not intuitively presented, and may be 300 
MORAL CONVICTIONS. 
very inaccurately presented. The conscience, it is to be 
remembered, is a reflex faculty, judging of objects pre- 
sented to it by the other powers, and the representation 
given it may be incorrect. The liability to deception 
and perversion is increased by the circumstance that the 
states of mind with which our voluntary acts are mixed 
up are of a very complicated character. There is room 
in this way for giving a wrong account of our actual state 
of mind at any given moment. I contribute a sum of 
money to relieve a person in distress; I may do so from 
a variety of motives; but I am naturally led by self-love 
to look on the motive as good, and then I cherish a feel- 
ing of self-approbation, in which I should by no means 
have been justified had I taken a searching view of the 
whole mental state. Again, I find a neighbour doing 
the very same act, and I am led by jealousy to attribute 
selfish motives to him, and I condemn him in a judgment 
in which I may be equally unwarranted. By such se- 
ductions as these the mind may become utterly perverted 
in the representations which it gives, and in the conse- 
quent moral judgments which it pronounces. In the 
case of these perversions of the conscience, as in the case 
of the errors of the understanding (as we have previously 
seen), the evil is to be traced to the will refusing to give 
obedience to its proper law, and conjuring up a series of 
deceptions to excuse and defend itself. The intuition is 
after all there, but it is difficult in a mind perverted by a 
corrupt and prejudiced will to put it in a position to act 
aright. In order to this, it may be needful to have a 
Divine Law revealed, and this applied by a teaching and 
quickening Spirit from above. 
We are already in the heart of the subject of Sin, a 
topic which academic moralists studiously avoid, but 
which must be carefully looked at by those who would 
U'ive a correct account of our moral constitution. In re- 
o «. CONVICTIONS INVOLVED IN CONSCIENCE. 
301 
ferring to it here, I do not profess to be able to give an 
explanation of the origin of sin under the government of 
God, whose power is Almighty, and who shows that he 
hates sin. This seems to be a mystery which human 
reason cannot clear up. The topic certainly does not fall 
within the scope of our present investigation. I have 
here simply to consider sin in its reference to our moral 
convictions. 
I. The conscience declares that sin is a reality. It is 
a reality of the very same description as moral good. It 
is not a separate entity, like a plant or an animal, but it 
is a quality of certain voluntary acts. I lay down this 
position in opposition to those who would represent sin 
as a mere privation or a negation. I never can bring 
myself to believe that deceit and envy and malice and 
ungodliness and lust, are merely the absence of certain 
qualities; they imply the presence of real qualities in the 
will of those who cherish the affections and commit the 
deeds. 
II. Sin is a quality of voluntary acts. It always re- 
sides in some mental affection or act in which there is the 
exercise of free will. The guilt of the sin thus always 
lies with him who commits it. He cannot throw the 
blame on any other, for he has himself given his consent 
to it. Others mav have seduced him into it, and in that 
case the criminality of having tempted him lies with 
them; but then the sin of having yielded to the tempta- 
tion and having done the wicked deed lies with himself, 
he can devolve it on no other. 
III. Our moral convictions declare that sin is of evil 
desert, condemnable, punishable. This conviction is of 
precisely an opposite character to that which we enter- 
tain in regard to good affection and action. We declare 
the sin to have in itself evil desert; we condemn it in 
consequence, and we say of it, that it should be dis- 302 
MORAL CONVICTIONS. 
couraged, nay, punished. The very ideas, so full of 
meaning, involved in these mental convictions, are native, 
original, and necessary. We cannot get them from mere 
sensations of pleasure or pain, or from any intellectual 
operation whatever; and yet we are constrained to take 
this view of sin wherever it is pressed fairly upon our 
notice. It is this conviction that stirs up and keeps alive 
a sense of guilt and apprehension of punishment in the 
breast of every sinner. It is found even among chil- 
dren, and among the rudest and most ignorant savages, 
who are urged thereby to try some means of avoiding or 
averting the wrath of God, and who are prepared in con- 
sequence to listen to the parent, or teacher, or mission- 
ary, when he speaks of the desert of sin, and points to a 
Saviour who suffered in our room and stead, and so made 
reconciliation for transgressors. 
Sect. III. Relation of Moral Good and Happiness. 
These two have a number of points of connection and 
correspondence. Much of moral good consists in the 
voluntary promotion of happiness, and the diminution of 
pain in a world in which there is such a liability to suf- 
fering. A very large number of human virtues, and of 
vices too, take their origin from man’s capacity of plea- 
sure and pain; and in a state of things in which there 
was no possibility of increasing felicity, or removing 
misery, many of this world’s virtues would altogether 
disappear. Still the two, while they have many interest- 
ing points of affinity, are not to be identified. In par- 
ticular, we are not to resolve virtue into a mere tendency 
to promote the pleasure of the individual or happiness of 
the race. There seems to me to be certain great truths 
which the mind perceives at once, in regard to the con- 
nection of the two. 
I. The good is good altogether independent of the CONVICTIONS INVOLVED IN CONSCIENCE. 
303 
pleasure it may bring. There is a good which does not 
immediately contemplate the production of happiness. 
Such, for example, are love to God, the glorifying of 
God, and the hallowing of His name : these have no re- 
spect, in our entertaining and cherishing them, to an aug- 
mentation of the Divine felicity. No doubt such an act 
or spirit may, by reflection of light, tend to brighten our 
own felicity; but this is an indirect effect, which follows 
only where we cherish the temper and perform the cor- 
responding work in the idea that it is right. We do 
deeds of justice to the distant, to the departed, and the 
dead, who never may be conscious of what we have per- 
formed. Even in regard to services done with the view 
of promoting the happiness of the individual, or of the 
community, we are made to feel that, if happiness be 
good, the benevolence which leads us to seek the happi- 
ness of others is still better, is alone morally good. In 
all cases the conscience constrains us to decide that vir- 
tue is good, whether it does or does not contemplate the 
production of pleasure. 
II. Our moral constitution declares that we ought to 
promote the happiness of all who are susceptible of hap- 
piness. The only plausible form of the utilitarian theory 
of morals is that elaborated by Bentham, who says that 
we ought to promote the greatest happiness of the great- 
est number. But why ought we to do so ? Whence get 
we the should, the obligation, the duty ? Why should I 
seek the happiness of any other being than myself ? why 
the happiness of a great number, or of the greatest num- 
ber ? why the happiness even of any one individual be- 
yond the unit of self? If the advocates of the “ greatest 
happiness ” principle will only answer this question tho- 
roughly, they must call in a moral principle, or take re- 
fuge in a system against which our whole nature rebels, 
in a theory which says that we are not required to do 304 
MORAL CONVICTIONS. 
more than look after our own gratifications. The very ad- 
vocates of the greatest happiness theory are thus con- 
strained, if they will only adhere to their view, to call in 
an ethical principle, and this will be found, if they exa- 
mine it, to require more from man than that he should 
further the felicity of others.* But while it covers vastly 
more ground, it certainly includes this, that we are 
bound, as much as in us lies, to promote the welfare of 
* Mr. J. S. Mill gives up Paley as an expounder of utilitarianism 
(Dissertations, vol. ii. p. 460), and allows, as to Bentham, “ that there 
were large deficiencies and hiatuses in his scheme of human nature ” (p. 
462). To whom then are we to look, if we would examine a system 
which assumes such different shapes; which now takes the form of a 
selfish system whose principle is that every man should seek his own 
happiness, now the form of a benevolent system, which says that a man 
should promote the happiness of the greatest number ? In the first of 
these forms it is at once set aside by an appeal to our nature, and to 
feelings which Mr. Mill admits to be in our nature. In the second of 
these forms, that taken by Bentham and Mill, there is a principle of in- 
tuitive morals surreptitiously admitted, that we should look to the hap- 
piness of others as well as our own. Mr. Mill says, “ The matter in de- 
bate is what is right,—not whether what is right ought to be done ” (p. 
460). This is not a full or accurate account of the matter in debate. One 
question in debate is, Can the utilitarian theory account for our con- 
viction as to right and wrong, merit and guilt P I hold that it cannot. 
The higher class of utilitarians seem to trace these convictions to the 
association of ideas proceeding on our feelings of pleasure and pain. 
Thus Mr. Mill says (vol. i. p. 137), “ The idea of the pain of another 
is naturally painful; the idea of the pleasure of another is naturally 
pleasurable. From this fact in our natural constitution, all our affec- 
tions, both of love and aversion, towards human beings, in so far as they 
are different from those we entertain towards mere inanimate objects 
which are pleasant or disagreeable to us, are held by the best teachers 
of the theory of utility to originate. In this, the unselfish part of our 
nature, lies a foundation, even independently of inculcation from with- 
out, for the generation of moral feelings.” Let it be observed that this 
makes the very unselfish part of our nature stand on a selfish basis. 
“The idea of the pleasure of another is naturally pleasurable,” that is, to 
ourselves. I hold that we are led to love oiir fellow-creatures indepen- 
dently of its being pleasant to ourselves ; and that it is when we love 
them that the affection is found to be pleasant, by the appointment of 
the Author of our constitution, who thus prompts us to benevolence, 
and rewards us for cherishing it. The theory does not account for our 
benevolent feelings, and it fails still more when it would account for our CONVICTIONS INVOLVED IN CONSCIENCE. 
305 
all who are capable of having their misery alleviated or 
their felicity enhanced. 
III. Our moral convictions affirm that moral good 
should meet with happiness. They seem to declare that 
this is in itself appropriate and good ; and when we are 
led to believe in the existence of a good God, we are sure 
that He will seek to secure this end. Experience, no 
doubt, shows many things in seeming opposition to this, 
moral convictions. I admit that it might give some explanation of cer- 
tain accompaniments, but it can give no account of the conviction of 
“ ought,” “ obligation,” “ duty,” “ merit,” “ desert,” “ guilt.” A second 
question in debate is, Can the utilitarian show that anything is “ right” ? 
that there is truly anything such that it “ ought to be done ” ? Suppose 
some sensationalist or sceptic were to maintain, as against the utilita- 
rian, that he was not bound to promote this happiness of the greatest 
number, how would the advocate of the greatest happiness principle re- 
ply to him ? Consistently, he could appeal only to these personal feel- 
ings of pleasure and pain; and if he appealed to anything deeper, it 
must be to the very moral principle whose existence he denies. There 
is a third question in debate, which will be more easily determined 
after we have settled the other two. For when it is shown that man 
has convictions as to moral good and evil, and that these require 
him to do certain acts and abstain from others, we may be the better 
prepared to admit, as to certain of these acts, that they do not contem- 
plate the promotion of happiness. Thus, to love God is good, and to re- 
fuse to any one his due affection and gratitude for favours seems to be 
evil, independently of the happiness of the creature or Creator being 
thereby augmented or diminished. A fourth question is, Does utility 
afford a good test and measure of virtue and vice ? It is foreign to the 
scope of this treatise to enter on this question, but I may remark that 
the ultimate appeal to “ ought ” and “ duty ” being taken away, and 
the appeal, in the last resource, being to pleasure and pain, utilitarian- 
ism will not train men to deeds of self-sacrifice, and those who have 
embraced it will ever be tempted to give way on great emergencies, and 
to yield and equivocate when they should at all hazards resist the evil. 
And it has been shown again and again, that it is beyond the capa- 
city of man to foresee the results of acts, or even to discern the ten- 
dency of certain acts done in complicated circumstances. But, omit- 
ting this, it is to my present purpose to call on my readers to notice 
that the theory of an independent morality, and of moral conviction, 
admits and embraces all that is true in utilitarianism. It affirms that 
we ought to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number; and 
in regard to all questions bearing on happiness, the conscience requires 
us to weigh consequences and to look to long issues and results. 306 
MORAL CONVICTIONS. 
shows many crashed with misfortune and wrung with 
agony, who are far more virtuous than those who are in 
the enjoyment of health and prosperity. But our inward 
convictions guide us to the right conclusions in spite of 
these apparently contradictory results of outward obser- 
vation. They lead us to believe that they who are thus 
afflicted are after all suffering no injustice, inasmuch as 
they have sinned against heaven, and to expect that the 
wicked will not be allowed to pass unpunished. And 
since we do not discover a full retribution in this world, 
they lead us to look forward to a day of judgment, in 
which all the inequalities and seeming incongruities of 
this present dispensation will be rectified in appearance 
as well as in reality, and the justice of God’s moral go- 
vernment fully vindicated. 
IV. Our moral convictions declare that sin merits pain 
as a punishment. There is as close a connection between 
sin and pain as there is between virtue and happiness. 
There may indeed be happiness, and there may be suffer- 
ing, where there is neither virtue nor the opposite, as, for 
example, among the brute creation ; but wherever there is 
virtue, we decide that it merits happiness, and wherever 
there is sin, that it deserves suffering, and we are led to 
anticipate that the proper consequences will follow under 
the government of a good and a holy God. But as the 
intellectual intuition of causation, while it constrains us 
to look for a cause, does not make known the precise 
cause, so our moral conviction of merit, while it leads us 
to look for the punishment of sin, does not specify where, 
or when, or how the penalty is to be inflicted : all that it 
intimates is that it should and shall come. This convic 
tion keeps alive in the breasts of the wicked at least an 
occasional fear of punishment, even in the midst of the 
greatest outward prosperity, and points very emphatically, 
if not very distinctly, to a day of judgment and of righ- CONVICTIONS INVOLVED IN CONSCIENCE. 
307 
teous retribution. But as this instinct does not supply 
the object, it is quite possible that a wrong one may 
be presented by the baser fears of the heart, or by a 
degraded superstition, and the final judgment may be 
thought of as a petty assize, and the judge be regarded 
as gratifying a personal revenge, and heaven be contem- 
plated as an elysium of sensual joys, and hell as a place 
of vulgar torture. Still the conviction does demand its 
object, and when the moral sense is refined, it feels that 
the account given in Scripture of a judgment day, and of 
a heaven of light, and a hell of darkness, is in thorough 
correspondence with the intuition which God has planted 
in our mental constitution. 
But in contemplating and in harmonizing such truths 
as these, Natural Ethics finds itself in difficulties : it starts 
questions which it cannot answer; it raises doubts which 
it cannot dispel. We see on the one hand that God will 
be led to punish sin, that he “ will by no means clear 
the guilty.” But we have evidence, on the other hand, 
that he delights supremely in the happiness of his crea- 
tures. How then can God be just and yet the justifier 
of the ungodly ? Intuitive Ethics conducts us to a yawn- 
ing chasm, but shows no bridge across; while we are led 
most anxiously to long for one, and almost to expect that 
one will appear. It leads us to a place where we have 
no light, but where we are led to cry out for a light be- 
cause of the very thickness of the darkness. How grate- 
ful should we be when a light is vouchsafed from heaven 
to show us that the gulf is spanned, and to disclose the 
way by which it may be crossed! 308 
MORAL CONVICTIONS. 
CHAPTER III. 
THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 
We have seen that conscience pronounces its decisions 
on acts of the will. Not only so, its judgments proceed 
on the supposition that the will is in the proper exercise 
of its full functions; in other wrords, that the will is free. 
In every act of will there is an essential freedom, of which 
the mind is conscious. The possession of a free will is 
thus one of the elements which go to constitute man a 
moral and responsible agent. 
The will is free. In saying so, I mean to assert, not mere- 
ly that it is free to act as it pleases,—indeed it may often 
be hindered from action, as when I will to move my arm, 
and it refuses to obey because of paralysis. I claim for 
it an anterior and a higher power, a power in the mind 
to choose, and, when it chooses, a consciousness that it 
might choose otherwise. 
This truth is revealed to us by immediate conscious- 
ness, and is not to be set aside by any other truth what- 
ever. It is a first truth equal to the highest, to no one 
of which w’ill it ever yield. It cannot be set aside by 
any other truth whatever, nor even by any other first 
truth, and certainly by no derived truth. Whatever other 
proposition is true, this is true also, that man’s will is 
free. If there be any other truth apparently inconsistent 
with it, care must be taken so to express it that it may 
not be truly contradictory: 
It is a truth which may be expressed in words. It 
is so expressed when we say the mind has in itself the 
power of choice. But it cannot be drawm from any deeper 
fact, or resolved into any anterior principle. Any at- 
tempts to reduce it to simpler elements, will only perplex 
and confuse the whole subject. Thus, that which is free, THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 
309 
is often supposed to be uncaused ; whereas the uncaused 
for aught I know, might, if there could be such a thing 
in creation, not be free. It is from the exercise of will 
that we get our very idea of freedom. As we survey the 
external world, including even our own bodily frame, we 
find it bound in the chain of physical causation, in which 
every movement of an object is determined from with- 
out. Even our very intellectual and emotive states are 
under laws of association and potencies which control 
them. It is in the sanctuary of the will that freedom alone 
is to be found. 
So much is clear, so very clear that any attempts to 
make it clearer will only darken it. The difficulties which 
encompass this subject do not arise from free will itself, 
but from its connection with other truths. Eirst, there is 
the Divine Foreknowledge and the Divine Sovereignty, 
doctrines which recommend themselves to high reason, 
and which are found in the Word of God. Secondly, 
there is the appearance of causation in the mind, even 
in its voluntary acts. The attempt to reconcile these with 
creature freedom has engaged the subtlest and perplexed 
the clearest minds since men began to ask the how, the 
why, and the wherefore. It is my humble but decided 
opinion that the human understanding cannot thoroughly 
clear up the subject. I certainly do not profess to be able 
to throw light upon it. I must content myself with re- 
marking on some of the more prevalent theories, and ex- 
pounding the view which seems to me to be upon the 
whole the most satisfactory. 
Among the speculative thinkers of the present day 
there are two favourite modes by which they try to ex- 
tricate themselves from the difficulties which beset the 
subject. One was introduced by Kant, who has been 
followed by a long train of theologians and metaphysi- 
cians. According to this view, the mind knows only 310 
MORAL CONVICTIONS. 
phenomena, and not things, and the law of cause and 
effect is a mental framework giving a form to our know- 
ledge of phenomena. It applies therefore to phenomena, 
and not to things, which, for aught we know, or can 
know in this world, may or may not obey the law of 
causation. Kant acknowledges that we are led by the 
speculative principles of the mind to look on even the 
will as under the dominion of cause, but then it is 
quite conceivable that the thing itself may after all be 
free, and we are led to believe it to be free by the Prac- 
tical Reason. Now I have to remark, first of all, on this 
theory, that it must be taken in its entirety. We are not 
at liberty (as some would do) to adopt it so far merely as 
it may suit our purpose, and refuse the very foundation 
on which it is built. We must, in particular, admit as a 
fundamental principle that we can never know things, 
and that causation has no respect whatever to things, but 
is a mere subjective principle of the mind. But I have 
failed in one of the main ends of this treatise if I have 
not succeeded in showing that the mind has knowledge 
of things in its primary exercises, that we know objects 
as having potency, and that the law of cause and effect 
refers to such objects. If we deny this, we are denying 
certain of the intuitions of the mind in certain of their 
clearest enunciations; and if we deny them in one of their 
declarations, why not in others ? and if we deny one set, 
why not every other set ? till at last we know not what 
to believe and wliat to disbelieve. Those who believe 
that the mind can come to the knowledge of things, and 
that they discover power in things, cannot resort to this 
theory. 
A more prevalent doctrine among those who hold firmly 
by the freedom of the will, is that causation does not ex- 
tend to the production of volitions. Thus, M. Cousin 
maintains that we obtain our very idea of causes from THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 
311 
the exercise of will, which may be a cause, but cannot 
be an effect. The difficulties in the way of this theory 
arise, first, from the nature of our intuition in regard to 
cause, and, secondly, from certain facts which seem to 
show that there is causation in the will. The question 
is, first, whether causation reaches over our volitions, as 
it does over our other mental acts. A man does a male- 
volent or a benevolent deed : when this fact is presented, 
the question is, Do we, or do we not, look for a cause in 
the previous character and disposition of the individual, 
combined possibly with the circumstances in which he 
was placed ? Do we not anticipate of the man thoroughly 
just, that he will ever do just acts? We are sure in re- 
gard to the good God that He will, and ever must be, 
good. To confirm all this we have, secondly, facts, sta- 
tistical facts. Knowing that if causes keep the same, the 
same effects will follow, men draw out statistics of vo- 
luntary acts, which turn out to be quite as correct as sta- 
tistics of the weather, or of the mortality of man. The 
number of thefts and murders that will be committed in 
a country next year, and the number of letters which will 
be posted, can be determined as accurately as the num- 
ber of births or deaths. The facts cannot be denied, and 
they proceed on the principles of a sameness of causes 
producing a sameness of effects, which causes embrace 
voluntary acts. 
To avoid these difficulties, I am inclined to admit that 
antecedent circumstances do act causally on the will. But 
at the same time I maintain that cause operates in a very 
different way upon the will from that in which it acts in 
other departments of nature. The mind has and must 
have the power of free choice : so says consciousness. But 
consciousness does not say, and cannot say, what antece- 
dent circumstances of an internal character have swayed 
the will. These causes certainly do not operate as causes 312 
MORAL CONVICTIONS. 
operate in physical nature, or as causes operate in our 
intellectual being. I have shown that cause in the mind 
is not of the same character as cause in physical nature. 
I believe that cause as operating on the will is of a dif- 
ferent character from cause as acting in the intellectual 
or emotive parts of our nature. It is here, I believe,—that 
is, in the peculiar nature of cause as operating on the will, 
•—that the means of clearing up this subject, and effect- 
ing a reconciliation between the seeming incongruities, 
are to be found.* But I do not say that man can find 
them, for I am convinced he cannot penetrate this region 
and determine the nature and mode of operation of the 
power which sways the will. We can point to the place 
where must lie the means of clearing up the mystery, 
but then we cannot reach that place. It is the region 
where operate the agencies which come between God and 
the will of his rational and responsible creatures. Well 
may we pause here, and lay our hands on our mouths, 
as we say in our hearts, “ Once have I spoken, but I will 
not answer; yea, twice, but I will proceed no further.” 
* Some of my critics, most respected by me, such as the late Sir W. 
Hamilton, Dr. Fitzgerald, Bishop of Cork, Dr. Ulrici, of Halle, and 
Mr. Mansel, have publicly or privately taken exception to the doctrine 
maintained in the 4 Method of Divine Government’ as to there being 
both freedom and a peculiar sort of causation in the will. I have in 
that work, and now more fully in this, given the view which seems 
sanctioned by our constitution. But I do shrink, on so tangled a sub- 
ject, from controversy, believing that I can throw no new light on it. I 
must ever hold most resolutely to the fundamental doctrine of the 
freedom of the will. But I will listen most willingly to any one who 
can give a better account—that is, more in accordance with our consti- 
tution—of the expectation that the thoroughly good being will conti- 
nue good, and of the possibility of giving statistics in anticipation of 
voluntary actions. PART THIRD. 
INTUITIVE PRINCIPLES AND THE VARIOUS 
SCIENCES. 315 
BOOK I. 
METAPHYSICS. 
CHAPTER I. 
METAPHYSICS, GNOSIOLOGY, AND ONTOLOGY. 
The phrase Metaphysics is believed to have taken its 
rise from the title given to one of the treatises of Ari- 
stotle. There is no reason to think that the name was 
given to the work referred to by the author. It does not 
even appear that it was meant to denote the nature of 
the contents. Andronicus, it is said, inscribed on the 
manuscripts, Td /xeTa rd <frvo-t/cd, to intimate that these 
books were to follow the physical treatises.* In the 
writings of Aristotle this department is called, not Meta- 
physics, but the First Philosophy. 
Metaphysical speculation is usually supposed, and, I be- 
lieve, correctly, to have originated with the Eleatics,- who 
flourished 450 or 500 years before our era. Separating 
from the physiologists, that is, physical speculators, of the 
Ionian School, they directed their attention to the dicta of 
inward reason. Going far below what they represented 
as the illusions of the senses, they sought to penetrate 
* On tlie title, see Bonitz, ‘ Commentarius ’ appended to his edition 
of the Metaphysics. See also M'Mahon’s translation of the Meta- 
physics, p. 1., where Clemens Alexandrinus and Philoponus are quoted 
as giving a different view from the common one. 316 
METAPHYSICS. 
the mystery of being. With them all things were one, 
and this incapable of motion or of change. 
Metaphysics are treated, along with all other topics, 
by Plato, under the somewhat unfortunate name of Dia- 
lectics, which has nearly the same meaning as Speculative 
Philosophy has in modern times, only the former meant 
discussion in conversation, the latter discussion in the 
head or in books. According to Plato, it was the science 
which treated of the one Real Being (to ov) and the Real 
Good. This one Real Being was not with him, as with 
the Eleatics, inconsistent with the existence of the many. 
It embraced the inquiry into the nature of the Good 
and the Beautiful, and expounded the Eternal Ideas 
which had been in or before the Divine Mind from all 
eternity, to the contemplation of which man’s soul could 
rise by cogitation, because it had been formed in the 
Divine image, and in which the sensible universe partici- 
pated, thereby having a stability in the midst of its mu- 
tability.* 
According to Aristotle, the First Philosophy treats of 
entity so far forth as it is entity, and of quiddity or the 
nature of a thing, and of that which is universally in- 
herent, so far as it is in entity. He argues that if 
there were not some substance {ovala) other than those 
that exist in nature, then physics would be the first 
science, but if there be an eternal and unmovable sub- 
stance, then there must be a prior science to treat of it, 
and this is to be honoured as the first and highest philo- 
sophy. But the inquiry into entity is in fact an inquiry 
into causes, or what makes a thing to be what it is; and 
he shows that such an investigation conducts to four 
Causes : (1) the Formal (tr]V ovalav kcu to ti rjv elvcu) ; (2) 
the Material (tt]v vKrjv kcu to ; (3) the Effi- 
* It is scarcely necessary to refer to Arclier Butler’s account of 
Plato, in Hist, of Anc. Phil., as the finest in our language. METAPHYSICS, GNOSIOLOGY, AND ONTOLOGY. 
317 
cient (odev 7] dpxv Tvs Kivrjo-eoos) •, (4) the Final (to ov 
eve/cev /ecu to ayauov). 
From the bent of his genius, Bacon was no way ad- 
dicted to metaphysics, but he allots it a separate and a 
most important place. Fie says that Physics regards 
what is wholly immersed in matter and movable, sup- 
posing only existence and natural necessity, whereas Me- 
taphysics regards what is more abstracted and fixed, 
and supposes also mind and idea. To be more particu- 
lar, he represents physics as inquiring into the efficient 
and material cause, and metaphysics into the formal and 
final, f 
The two largest metaphysical treatises of Descartes 
are entitled ‘ Meditations on the First Philosophy ’ and 
‘ Principles of Philosophy.’ He says that the first part 
of philosophy is “ Metaphysics, in which are contained 
the principles of knowledge, among which are found the 
explication of the principal attributes of God, of the im- 
materiality of the soul, and of all the clear and simple 
notions that are in us.” He represents Philosophy as a 
tree, of which Metaphysics is the root, Physics the trunk, 
and all the other sciences the branches that grow out of 
this trunk. | 
In the Wolfian School which proposed to systematize 
the scattered philosophy of Leibnitz, Metaphysics was 
asked to deal with three grand topics,—God, the World, 
and the Soul,—and should aim to construct a Rational 
Theology, a Rational Physics, and a Rational Psychology. 
Kant takes up this view of Metaphysics, but labours to 
show that the speculative reason cannot construct any 
one of these three sciences. The only available meta- 
physics, according to him, is a Criticism of the Reason, 
unfolding its a priori elements. He arrives at the con- 
* Metaph. i. 3, 1, compared with iii. 1, v. 1, 3. 
f De Augmentis, iii. 4. + Prin. Phil. Epis. Auth. 318 
METAPHYSICS. 
elusion that all the operations of the Speculative Reason 
are mere subjective exercises, which imply no objective 
reality, and admit of no application to things; and he 
saves himself from scepticism by a criticism of the Prac- 
tical Reason, which guarantees the existence of God, 
Freedom, and Immortality.* 
In the schools which ramified from Kant, Metaphysics 
is represented as being a systematic search after the Ab- 
solute,—after Absolute Being, its nature and its method 
of development. 
And what are we to make of Metaphysics in our own 
country ? It is clear that she has lost, and, I suspect, for 
ever, the position once allowed her, when she stood at the 
head of all secular knowledge, and claimed to be equal, or 
all but equal, in rank, to theology itself. “ Time was,” 
says Kant,f “ when she was the queen of all the sciences ; 
and if we take the will for the deed, she certainly de- 
serves, so far as regards the high importance of her ob- 
ject-matter, this title of honour. Now it is the fashion 
to heap contempt and scorn upon her, and the matron 
mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba.” Some seem 
inclined to treat her very much as they treat those de jure 
sovereigns wandering over Europe, whom no country will 
take as de facto sovereigns, that is, they give her all out- 
ward honour, but no authority. Others are prepared to 
set aside her claims very summarily. The multitudes 
who set value on nothing but what can be counted in 
money, never allow themselves to speak of metaphysics 
except with a sneer. The ever-increasing number of 
persons who read but who are indisposed to think, com- 
plain that philosophy is not so interesting as the new 
novel, or the pictorial history, which is quite as exciting 
and quite as untrue as the novel. The physicist who has 
* See Metliodenlelire, in Kr. d. r. Yern. 
f Kritik, translated by Meiklejokn, p. xvii. METAPHYSICS, GNOSIOLOGY, AND ONTOLOGY. 
319 
kept a register of the heat of the atmosphere at nine 
o’clock in the morning for the last five years, and the na- 
turalist who has discovered a plant or insect distinguished 
from all hitherto known species by an additional spot, 
cannot conceal their contempt for a department of in- 
quiry which deals with objects which cannot be seen nor 
handled, weighed nor measured. 
In the face of all this scorn I boldly affirm that Meta- 
physics are not exploded, and that they never will be ex- 
ploded. But if they are to keep or regain a place in this 
country, they must submit to lower their pretensions, and 
secure that the performance be in some measure equal to 
the profession made. In particular, they must confine 
themselves to a field which is open to human investiga- 
tion, and which can be overtaken. Looking to the philo- 
sophies to which I have just been referring, we see that 
some have ascribed to it far too wide a province, allotting 
to it inquiries which in modern times have been happily 
distributed, owing to the advance in the division of la- 
bour, to a great number of sciences. The nature of things 
without and within us, their causes and properties and 
modes of operation, these are to be determined only by 
a great number and variety of inductive sciences, each 
prosecuted in its own way. Others again have allotted 
to it investigations which must ever be futile, either be- 
cause they are meaningless, or because they are beyond 
the human faculties. Thus it is vain for man to seek after 
Being in itself, or the One in itself, because there is no 
such thing anywhere but in the brain of the metaphysi- 
cian, who does not comprehend what sort of realities ab- 
stractions have ; and as to the Absolute, if it has a signi- 
fication at all, it is an object beyond the grasp of man’s rea- 
son. But is there no field of inquiry left open to Metaphy 
sics? I believe that there is, and that in this field those wrho 
are competent for the arduous work of digging in it may 320 
METAPHYSICS. 
find treasures of the highest value. Dugald Stewart has 
noticed “the extraordinary change which has gradually 
and insensibly taken place, since the publication of Locke’s 
Essay, in the meaning of the word Metaphysics, a word 
formerly appropriated to the ontology and pneumatology 
of the schools, but now understood as equally applicable 
to all those inquiries which have for their object to trace 
the various branches of human knowledge to the first 
principles in the constitution of our nature.”* This 
is an approximation to a proper account of the science. 
I am inclined to define Metaphysics as The Science 
which Inquires into the Original or Intuitive Con- 
victions oe the Mind, with a view of Generalizing 
and Expressing them, and also of Determining 
WHAT ARE THE OBJECTS REVEALED BY THEM. Ill prOSC- 
cuting the investigation, it must first be the aim of the 
inquirer to observe the phenomena, primarily and mainly 
by direct consciousness or immediate introspection, but 
secondarily, and often as satisfactorily, by examining the 
expression of the inward convictions in the conversation 
and writings of mankind. As he observes, he must be care- 
ful by analysis to separate the intuitions from the asso- 
ciated mental states, and to distinguish between one kind 
of intuition and another; and he must also endeavour to 
classify them, and to put them in rigidly exact formulae. 
What he thus reaches, if the process has been properly 
conducted, he is entitled to regard as first, or fundamental, 
or philosophic principles. In this investigation he will 
sometimes have to look more to the subjective, and at other 
times more to the objective side; or, in other words, 
sometimes more to the knowing powers, and at other 
times more to the objects known. So far as the science 
looks at the first, it may be called Gnosiology; f so far 
* Dissertation, p. 475. 
t Hamilton speaks of some older treatises, -which afford a name not METAPHYSICS, GNOSIOLOGY, AND ONTOLOGY. 
321 
as it looks to the second, it may be called Ontology; 
which two may be regarded as subordinate departments 
of Metaphysics. This treatise professes to be one on 
Metaphysics throughout. In the Chapters which follow 
this, I am to single out Knowing and Being for more 
special consideration. 
The province thus allotted to Metaphysics is quite a 
defined one. It is not the science of all truth, but it is 
the science of an important department,—it is the science 
of fundamental truth. It should not venture to ascertain 
the nature of all knowledge, Divine and human; it should 
be satisfied if it can find what are the original knowing 
powers of man. It should not pretend to settle the na- 
ture of all being, or the whole nature of any one being; 
but it would try to find what we can know of certain 
kinds of being 'by intuition. It should not presume to 
discover all causes,—which are to be discovered only par- 
tially by all the sciences,—but it should expound the na- 
ture of our original conviction regarding causation. It 
should not start with the Absolute, and thence derive all 
dependent existence; but, as I will show, it is competent 
to prove that our convictions, aided by obvious facts, lead 
us to believe in an Infinite Being. It has a field in which 
it is perfectly competent to discover truth. The body of 
truth thus reached constitutes, in a special sense, philo- 
sophy; and cphilosophical’ is an epithet which may be 
applied to every inquiry which reaches it in the last re- 
sort, or which begins with it and uses it. It is to be 
valued, like all other truth, for its own sake, and because 
truth is the nutriment of the intellect, for which it craves, 
and by which, as it feeds on it, it is strengthened. The 
principles at which it looks are involved, as I am to show 
in next Book, in all the deeper sciences, in all mental 
unsuitable for a nomology of cognitions, viz. Gnosiology, or Gnosto- 
logia (Met. Lect. 7). 322 
METAPHYSICS. 
sciences, in mathematics, and even in certain departments 
of physical science; and it is desirable, not only for the 
sake of metaphysics itself, but for their sakes, to have 
these principles accurately expounded, in order that other 
departments of knowledge may be delivered from discus- 
sions which are to them encumbrances, and have their 
foundations distinctly laid and firmly settled. It is a 
science in which progress may be made from age to age 
by the united action of successive labourers observing, 
distinguishing, arranging, and devising an appropriate 
nomenclature. Like every other science which has to do 
with facts, it must be conducted in the Inductive Me- 
thod,* in which observation is the first process, and the 
last process, and the main process throughout; the pro- 
cess with which we start, and the process by which we 
advance all along, and at the close test all that is done; 
but in which, at the same time, analysis and generaliza- 
tion are employed as instruments, always working, how- 
ever, on facts observed. It is true that metaphysics reach 
truth which is independent of any observation of ours, 
but it is truth which we can discover only by induction. 
CHAPTER II. 
GrNOSIOLOGY. 
Sect. I. On Knowledge. 
What is Science (’Ema-rri^7)? is the question put by 
Socrates in Plato’s subtle dialogue of Thesetetus. But 
* “ If ever our philosophy concerning the human mind is carried so 
far as to deserve the name of science, which ought never to be despaired 
of, it must be by observing facts, reducing them to general rules, and 
drawing just conclusions from them.” (Reid’s Works, p. 122.) GNOSIOLOGY. 
323 
the word ‘ science ’ has two meanings. In one sense it 
can be defined. It is knowledge arranged, correlated, or 
systematized. In this sense we speak of astronomy, ge- 
ology, logic, and other sciences. But the word had, at 
least in Greek, another signification, and meant simply 
knowledge; and we may suppose the question to be put, 
What is Knowledge ? To this the reply must be, that we 
cannot positively define knowledge so as to make it in- 
telligible to one who did not know it otherwise. Still we 
can, by analysis, separate it from other things with which 
it is associated,—such as sensations, emotions, and fan- 
cies,—and make it stand out distinctly to the view of 
those who are already conscious of it. The science which 
thus unfolds the nature of knowledge may be called Gno- 
siology, or Gnosilogy (from yvwo-is and Xoyos). I prefer 
this to Epistemology, which would signify the science of 
arranged knowledge. 
This science should be prosecuted in the same method 
as every other which has to do with facts, that is, in the 
Inductive. Its main office is to inquire into the nature 
of the knowing powers, to determine the mode of the 
operation of each, and the amount, and what is equally 
important, the kind, of knowledge which each is fitted to 
impart. This is what I have been doing all throughout 
this treatise. I am not to recapitulate the processes here. 
Yet it will be necessary to show, in a few sentences, how 
the method followed and the results reached have a bear- 
ing on Gnosiology. Commencing with sense-perception, 
I drew the distinction between our original and acquired 
perceptions, and endeavoured to ascertain what are our 
primary perceptions through the various senses, and also 
pointed out the difference between sensation and percep- 
tion. Proceeding to self-consciousness, I sought to esti- 
mate the primary knowledge which we have of self as 
acting or exercising some property. Coming to the re- 324 
METAPHYSICS. 
productive powers, I showed that here the faith element 
appears, and I pointed out the relation in which faith and 
cognition stand to each other, and unfolded the convic- 
tions which we have in regard to space, time, and the in- 
finite. Looking to the objects thus made known or be- 
lieved in, the mind pronounces a set of judgments, and I 
drew out a classification of these, and sought to unfold 
their nature. But the mind has not only the capacity 
of discovering the true, it has a power of discovering the 
good; and I was at pains to show wherein our moral 
convictions are analogous to our intellectual convictions, 
and wherein they differ from them. 
From this statement it appears that the metaphysician, 
in prosecuting his pursuits, should be able to distinguish 
(1) between our cognitions and certain associated states; 
(2) between one kind of conviction and another; and 
(3) between our original and acquired convictions. Al- 
most all errors, excesses, and defects in philosophy have 
proceeded from overlooking or mistaking these all-essen- 
tial differences. Thus some confound their sensations, or 
their feelings, or their inferences, or even their fancies, 
with their primary knowledge. Some imagine that our 
primitive convictions must all be alike in every respect, 
and that what is affirmed legitimately of one may be af- 
firmed of any other, or of all; that, for example, our pri- 
mitive cognitions and moral convictions, all disclose the 
same sort of reality as is to be found in the perceptions 
of sense. Again, it is by failing to distinguish between 
the convictions guaranteed by our constitution and those 
reached by experience, that persons have been led to sup- 
pose that their senses or faculties deceive them. 
In Plato’s dialogue, Socrates is represented as ex- 
posing all the answers given by Theaetetus, but without 
explicitly furnishing one of his own. He shows first, that 
science is not sense-perception (alaO^aLs). It is true that GNOSIOLOGY. 
325 
all knowledge is not derived from this source; but a cer- 
tain portion is,—though in order to estimate it exactly, 
we must be careful to separate from it associated sensa- 
tions, and stand up only for the positive veracity of con- 
stitutional convictions. He shows, secondly, that science 
is not opinion or judgment (Sofa aXrjdrjs). Yet, by judg- 
ment on materials supplied, we can and do reach truth, 
and have criteria—as will be shown in next paragraph—• 
by which to test it. He then shows that science cannot 
consist in judgment with a rational process (/ierd Xoyov) 
accompanying it. It is admitted that no rational process 
can add to the force of truth, but analysis and explication 
can settle for us wherein lies the force of truth. 
But the question is here started, Can there be a cri- 
terion of truth ? The inquiry has commonly been made 
by those who seek for an absolute law, or for one short 
and easy rule, which may at once determine for us as to 
every given or supposable asseveration, whether it is or 
is not true. Now it may be confidently asserted that 
such a criterion is not discoverable by man, nor can he 
so much as know whether it is possible in the nature 
of things, or available to any other intelligences. But I 
have laboured to show that there are tests of primitive 
truth not very difficult of application; these tests are 
self-evidence and necessity, and, as auxiliary to these, 
catholicity. Again, of that portion of fundamental truth 
which may be ranked under the head of Analytic Judg- 
ments a priori, there are very stringent tests in the Laws 
of Identity, Non-Contradiction, and Excluded Middle. 
Some very definite rules for testing Synthetic Judgments 
a priori may be found in the maxims which have been 
enunciated in treating of the various classes of Primi- 
tive Judgments. As to experiential truth, there are in 
many departments tests quite sufficient for all practical 
purposes, but these are so many that they cannot be 326 
METAPHYSICS. 
numbered. Each advanced science* and art has its own 
rules of evidence, quite competent to determine for it 
what is truth in its own department and within fields 
open to man’s observation. But there can be no rule 
found by the physicist, or devised by the metaphysicist, 
to determine all questions, or questions beyond the 
range of man’s observation,—as, for example, whether 
the Dog-star is or is not inhabited, or as to whether 
there are other substances in the universe besides mind 
and matter. 
Sect. II. On the Origin of our Knowledge and Ideas. 
We must now enter upon the inquiries in which 
Locke and five or six friends who met in’his chamber 
in Oxford found themselves involved, and which issued 
twenty years afterwards in the famous * Essay on the 
Human Understanding.’ Starting with a far different 
topic, they found themselves quickly at a stand, and it 
came into the thoughts of Locke that beforejentering 
“ upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to ex- 
amine our own abilities, and see what objects our un- 
derstandings were or were not fitted to deal with.” It 
follows from the account given in the preceding pages 
that man’s knowledge is derived from Four Sources. 
First, we obtain knowledge from sensation, or rather, 
sense-perception. Such is the knowledge we have of 
body, and of body extended and resisting pressure, and 
of our organism as affcting us, or as being affected with 
smells, tastes, sounds, and colours. 
Secondly, we obtain knowledge from self-conscious- 
ness. Such is the knowledge we have of self, and of its 
* It is scarcely necessary to say, that we have admirable rules and 
tests, in regard to the Inductive Sciences, in Mill’s ‘Logic,’ and in 
regard to the Social Sciences, in Sir Gr. C. Lewis’s ‘ Treatise on the 
Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics.’ GNOSIOLOGY. 
327 
modes, actions, and affections,—say, as thinking, feeling, 
resolving. 
I am convinced that from these two sources we obtain 
not all our knowledge, but all the knowledge we have of 
separately existing objects. We do not know, and we 
cannot, as will be shown forthwith, so much as conceive 
of a distinctly existing thing, excepting in so far as we 
have become acquainted with it by means of sensation 
and reflection, or of materials thus derived. Here Locke 
held by a great truth, though he did not see how to 
limit it on the one hand, nor what truths required to be 
added to it on the other. For man has other sources of 
knowledge. 
‘Thirdly, by a further Cognitive or Faith exercise 
we discover Qualities and Relations in objects which have 
become known by the senses external and internal. Of 
this description are the ideas which the mind forms of 
such objects as space, time, the infinite, the relation 
between cause and effect, and moral good. There is a 
wide difference between this Third Class and the Second, 
though the two have often been confounded. In self- 
consciousness we look simply at what is passing within, 
and as it passes within. But the mind has a capacity 
of discovering further qualities and relations among the 
objects which have been revealed to it by sensation and 
consciousness. This third kind of knowledge seems to 
be what is referred to by those who represent the mind 
or intellect itself as a source of ideas. But this account 
can be admitted only on its being understood that the 
mind notices these qualities and relations as in objects 
which have been made known by sensation and reflection. 
Fourthly, the mind can reach truth necessary and 
universal, that is, universally true. This may be regarded 
as knowledge, and it is knowledge which goes far beyond 
that derived from the other sources. We are sure that 328 
METAPHYSICS. 
these two straight lines which go parallel for the smallest 
possible space, may be extended infinitely, without being 
ever nearer each other. We are certain that gratitude 
and holy love, which are good here, must be good all 
through the wide universe. But this fourth kind of cog- 
nition is not independent of the other three kinds. All 
the necessary truth we can reach bears a reference to 
objects which have become known directly, or by a dis- 
cursive process through perception and consciousness, 
either to these objects, as primarily known, or to the 
qualities and relations in them discovered by a further 
cognitive or faith process. The knowledge attained from 
the first three sources is, as I have repeatedly had occa- 
sion to remark, all concrete and individual. But we 
discern a necessity in certain portions of the individual 
knowledge or convictions, and we can proceed to gene- 
ralize these; and so far as we abstract and generalize 
properly, we are sure that what is true of the singular is 
true also of the universal; that what is true" of these two 
lines is true of every set of lines exactly like them which 
we could contemplate; that what is true of this effect, 
namely, that it must have a cause, is true of every other, 
that is, if we have accurately determined it to be an 
effect. By this process we reach universal truth, of which 
we know that it must hold good in all times and at all 
places. 
Such seem to be the sources of human knowledge. 
We can add to the original stock got from all these quar- 
ters. Thus, we can add to what we have through the 
senses by observing other and new objects. We can 
know more of our minds by carefully noting their ac- 
tions. The mind, too, can rise to clearer and nobler 
views of intellectual and moral qualities by meditating 
on the proper objects and themes. We can widen and 
consolidate our acquaintance with necessary and univer- GNOSIOLOGY. 
329 
sal truth by a careful inspection and generalization of our 
individual convictions. 
The question of the origin of our ideas is substantially 
the same with that of the sources of our knowledge; but 
in discussing this second question, it is of all things es- 
sential to have it fixed what is meant by c idea.’ Plato, 
with whom the term originated as a philosophic one, 
meant those eternal patterns which have been in or be- 
fore the Divine mind from all eternity, which the works 
of nature participate in to some extent, and to the con- 
templation of which the mind of man can rise by abstrac- 
tion and philosophic meditation. Descartes meant by it 
whatever is before the mind in every sort of mental ap- 
prehension. Locke tells us that he denotes by the phrase 
all that the schoolmen designated both by the phantasm 
and the universal notion. Kant applied the phrase to 
the ideas of substance, totality of phenomena, and God, 
reached by the reason as a regulative faculty going out 
beyond the province of experience and objective reality. 
Hegel is for ever dwelling on an absolute idea, which he 
identifies with God, and represents as ever unfolding it- 
self out of nothing into being, subjective and objective. 
Using the phrase in the Platonic sense, it is scarcely re- 
levant to inquire into the origin of our ideas; it is clear 
however that Plato represented our recognition of eter- 
nal ideas as a high intellectual exercise, originating in 
the inborn power of the mind, and awakened by inward 
cogitation and reminiscence. In the Kantian and He- 
gelian systems the idea is supposed to be discerned by 
reason; Kant giving it no existence except in the mind, 
and Hegel giving it an existence both objective and sub- 
jective, but identifying the reason with the idea, and the 
objective wTith the subjective. Using the phrase in the 
Cartesian and Lockian sense, we can inquire into the 
origin of our ideas. 330 
METAPHYSICS. 
In accordance with modern usage in the English 
tongue, it might be as well perhaps to employ the word 
‘idea’ to denote the reproduced image or representation 
in the mind, and the abstract and general notion. Thus 
explained, it would exclude our original cognitions on the 
one hand, and also the regulative principles of the mind 
on the other. An idea, in this sense, would always be 
a reproduction in an old form, or more commonly in a 
new form, of what has first been known. We first 
know objects, external or internal; and then we may 
have them called up in whole or in part, magnified or 
diminished, or mixed and compounded in an infinite va- 
riety of ways; or, by an intellectual process, we may 
contemplate one of their attributes separately, or group 
them into classes. Our ideas, in this sense, are ever 
dependent on our cognitions; we cannot have an idea, 
either as an image or a notion, of which the materials 
have not been furnished by the various cognitive powers, 
primary and secondary. It is always to be remembered 
that by increase and decrease, by intellectual abstraction 
and generalization, our ideas may go far beyond our 
knowledge; still, as our ideas in the last resort depend 
on our knowledge, they must be drawn from the same 
quarters. When the question is put then as to the 
origin of our ideas, we are thrown back on the Four 
Sources from which all our knowledge is derived. So far 
as our ideas of distinctly existing objects are concerned, 
they are all got ultimately from the outward and inward 
senses: to this extent the doctrine of Locke is unassail- 
able. We cannot imagine or think of any other kind of 
existence than matter and mind, with space and time, 
though, for aught we know, there may be other sub- 
stances and beings in the universe with a far different 
nature. But then we are led by our cognitive and faith 
powers, intellectual and moral, to clothe the objects, thus GNOSIOLOGY. 
331 
known, with qualities and relations which cannot be per- 
ceived either by sensation or reflection. It is not by 
one or other of these, or by both combined, that I come 
to believe that space and time are infinite, that this effect 
must proceed from a cause, that this benevolent action is 
good, and that this falsehood is a sin; nor is it by either 
or by both that I can rise to the conviction that the effect 
is for ever tied to its cause, and that lying must be a sin 
in all time and in all eternity. 
The principle “Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius 
fuerit in sensu” has been ascribed to Aristotle, but most 
certainly without foundation, as the great Peripatetic 
everywhere calls in intuition in the last resort, and is ever 
coming to truth which he represents as self-evident and 
necessary. The maxim has been fathered, I do not know 
on what authority, on the Stoics. It is assuredly not the 
principle adopted by Locke, who is so often represented 
as favouring it; for the great English philosopher ever 
traces our ideas, not to one, but to two sources, and de- 
lights to derive many of our ideas from reflection. It 
is however the fundamental principle of that school in 
Prance and in Britain which has been called Sensational. 
There are three very flagrant oversights in the theory of 
those who derive all our ideas from sensation. First, 
there is an omission of all such ideas as we have of spirit 
and of the qualities of spirit, such as rationality, free will, 
personality. Secondly, there is a neglect or a wrong ac- 
count of all the further cognitive exercises of the mind 
by which it conies to apprehend such objects as infi- 
nite time, moral good, merit, and responsibility. Thirdly, 
there is a denial, or at least oversight, of the mind’s deep 
convictions as to necessary and universal truth. Sensa- 
tionalism, followed out logically to its consequences, would 
represent the mind as incapable of conceiving of a spi- 
ritual God, or of being convinced of the indelible dis- 332 
METAPHYSICS. 
tinction between good and evil; and make it illegitimate 
to argue from the effects in the world in favour of the 
existence of a First Cause. 
Locke is ever to be distinguished from those who de- 
rive all our ideas from the senses. He takes great pains 
to show that a vast number of the most important ideas 
which the mind of man can form, are got from reflec- 
tion on the operations of our own minds. His precise 
doctrine is that the materials of the ideas which man can 
entertain, come in by two inlets, sensation and reflec- 
tion ; that they are first perceived by the mind, and then 
retained; and that they are subsequently turned into 
a great variety of new shapes by the faculties of dis- 
cernment, comparison, abstraction, composition, and the 
power of discovering moral relations. The ideas being 
thus obtained, he supposes that the mind can perceive 
agreements and disagreements among them. In parti- 
cular, it is endowed with a power of intuition, by which 
it at once perceives the agreement and disagreement of 
certain ideas, discovers these to be in the very nature of 
ideas, and necessary. Such being the views of Locke, 
they are as different from those of the Sensationalists 
on the one hand, as they are from those of Descartes, 
Leibnitz, and Kant on the other. Indeed the most 
careless reader cannot go through the ‘Essay on the 
Human Understanding ’ without discovering that, if 
Locke has a strong sensational, he has also a rational 
side. He will allow no ideas to be in the mind except 
those which can be shown to spring from one or other 
of the inlets, and yet he resolutely maintains that, with 
these ideas before it, the mind may perceive truth at 
once; he thinks that morality is capable of demonstra- 
tion, and in religion he is decidedly rationalistic. So far, 
it appears to me, we can easily ascertain the views of 
Locke. It is more difficult to determine how far he sup- GNOSIOLOGY. 
333 
posed the mind to be capable of modifying or adding 
to the materials derived from the outward and inward 
senses. It is quite clear that he represents the mind as 
having the power to perceive and compound and divide 
these ideas, and discover resemblances and other rela- 
tions ; but there are passages in which, consistently or 
inconsistently, he speaks of the mind having something 
more suggested to it, or superinducing something higher.* 
Confining our attention to the points which are clear, 
I think we may discover—not certainly such grave errors 
as in the doctrines of the sensationalists, but still—several 
oversights. First, he overlooks the cognitions and be- 
liefs involved in the exercises with which the mind starts. 
This has arisen, to a great extent, from his attaching 
himself to the theory that the mind begins not with 
knowledge, but with ideas, which are first perceived by 
the mind, and then compared, upon which comparison it 
is that the mind reaches knowledge. He has never set 
himself to inquire what is involved in the sensation and 
reflection which give us* our ideas. He takes no notice 
of intuition enabling us to look directly at the very thing, 
and of our intuition of extension, and of a cognitive self- 
consciousness, and of the beliefs gathering round space 
and time and the infinite. Secondly, he has not given 
a distinct place and a sufficient prominence to the ideas 
got from the mind observing certain qualities and rela- 
tions in objects made known by sensation and reflection. 
The defects of his system, in not giving an adequate ac- 
count of our idea of moral good, which he gets from our 
* Locke speaks of certain ideas being ‘ suggested ’ to tbe mind by tbe 
senses (a phraseology adopted by Reid and Stewart), ‘ Essay,’ ii. yii. 9 ; 
and of ‘ relation ’ as “ not contained in tbe real existence of things, but 
extraneous and superinduced,” ii. xxy. 8. (See Webb on ‘ Intellectual- 
ism of Locke,’ y.) He maintains that morality is capable of demonstra- 
tion, iii. ii. 16, etc. Eor other passages illustrative of Locke’s precise 
views supra, pp. 18, 31,104-106, 133, 154, 166,172 (especially), 218,239. 334 
METAPHYSICS. 
sensations of pleasure and pain, with a law of God su- 
perinduced, without so much as his trying to prove 
how we are bound, on his system, to obey that law, was 
perceived at an early date by British writers, who ad- 
hered to him as closely as possible; and Shaftesbury 
and Hutcheson called in a Moral Sense (as an addition 
to Locke’s outward and inward sense); while Bishop 
Butler called in conscience, which he characterized as a 
“ principle of reflection.” Thirdly, he has not inquired 
what are the laws involved in the Intuition to which he 
appeals in the fourth book of his Essay as giving us the 
most certain of all our knowledge. Plad he developed 
the nature of intuition, and the principles involved, with 
the same care as he has expounded the experiential ele- 
ment, his system would have been at once and effectually 
saved from the fearful results in which it issued in France, 
where his name was used to support doctrines which he 
would have repudiated with deep indignation. He is 
right in saying that the mind has not consciously before 
it in spontaneous action such speculative principles as 
that “ Whatever is is,” or moral maxims in a formalized 
shape; but he has failed to perceive that such principles 
as these are the rules of our intuitions, and that they can 
be discovered by a reflex process of generalization. It 
is but justice to Locke to say that he acknowledges ne- 
cessary truth, but it does not form a part of his general 
theory: his professed followers have abandoned it; and 
sceptics have shown that he cannot reach it in consistency 
with his system. 
Sect. III. Limits to our Knowledge, Ideas, and 
Beliefs. 
It is instructive to find that not a few of the most pro- 
found philosophers with which our world has been ho- 
noured, have been prone to dwell on the limits to man’s GNOSIOLOGY. 
335 
capacity. The truth is, it is always the smallest minds 
which are most apt to be swollen with the wind engen- 
dered by their own vanity. The intellects which have 
gone out with greatest power to the furthest limits, are 
those which feel most keenly the barriers by which hu- 
man thought is bounded. The minds which have set 
out on the widest excursions, and which have taken the 
boldest flights, are those that know best that there is a 
wider region lying beyond, which is altogether inaccessible 
to man. It was the peculiarly wise man of the Hebrews 
who said, “No man can find out the work that God 
maketli from the beginning to the end/’ The Greek 
sage by emphasis declared that, if he excelled others, it 
was only in this, that lie knew nothing. It was the 
avowed object of the sagacious Locke to teach man the 
length of his tether, which, we may remark, those feel 
most who attempt to get away from it. Reid laboured 
to restrain the pride of philosophy, and to bring men 
back to a common sense, in respect of which the peasant 
and philosopher are alike. It was the design of Kant’s 
great work to show how little speculative reason can ac- 
complish. In our own day we have had Sir W. Hamilton 
showing, with unsurpassed logical power, within what 
narrow bounds the thought of man is restrained. 
We have already in our survey gathered the materials 
for enabling us to settle the general question, in which 
however are several special questions which should be 
carefully separated. 
1. What are the limits to man’s power of acquiring 
knowledge? The answer is, that he cannot know, at 
least in this world, any substance or separate existence 
other than those revealed by sense and consciousness. 
There may be, very probably there are, in the universe, 
other substances besides matter and spirit, other exist- 
ences which are not substances, as well as space and time, 336 
METAPHYSICS. 
but these must ever remain unknown to us in this world. 
Again, he can never know any qualities or relations 
among the objects thus revealed to the outward and in- 
ward sense, except in so far as we have special faculties 
of knowledge; and the number and the nature of these 
are to be ascertained by a process of induction, and by 
no other process either easier or more difficult. This is 
what has been attempted in this treatise, it may be sup- 
posed with only partial success in the execution, but, it is 
confidently believed, in the right method. A more diffi- 
cult process need not be resorted to, and would conduct 
us only into ever-thickening intricacies; and an easier 
method is not available in the investigation of the facts 
of nature, in this, nor, indeed, in any other department. 
After unfolding what seems to be in our primitive cogni- 
tions, I gave some account of the primitive faiths which 
gather round them, and classified the relations which the 
mind can discover, and unfolded the moral convictions 
which we are led to form. Such are the limits to man’s 
original capacity, of which there are decisive tests in self- 
evidence, necessity, and catholicity. 
Within these limits man has a wide field in which to 
expatiate; a field, indeed, which he can never thoroughly 
explore, but in which he may discover more and more. 
What he may discover, and what he may never be able 
to discover, are to be determined by the separate sciences, 
each in its own department. Thus, what he can find out 
of mind, of its various powers and original convictions, 
is to be determined by the various branches of mental 
science. What he can ascertain by the senses, aided by 
instruments, must be settled by the physical sciences. 
2. The limits to man’s capacity of knowledge being as- 
certained, it is easy to determine the limits to his power 
of forming ideas. The materials must all be got from 
the four sources of knowledge which have been pointed GNOSIOLOGY. 
337 
out. There are two classes of powers employed in en- 
larging and modifying these. The one is the imagination, 
which can decrease, as when on seeing a man it can form 
the idea of a dwarf; and increase, as when it can form 
the idea of a giant; or divide, as when it sees a man it 
can form an image of his head; or compound, as when it 
puts a hundred hands on man, and forms the idea of a 
Briareus. The mind can further discover a number of 
relations among the objects primitively known. These I 
have endeavoured to classify. In particular, the mind 
can out of the concrete form innumerable abstracts, and 
from the singulars construct an indefinite number of uni- 
versals. It should be observed that man’s power of ima- 
gination and correlation extends over his moral convic- 
tions as well as his intellectual cognitions. Thus, he can 
clothe the hero of a romance in various kinds of moral 
excellence of which we have discovered the rudiments in 
ourselves or others, and perceive relations among the mo- 
ral properties which have fallen under his notice. These 
are the limits to man’s capacity of forming ideas, deter- 
mined first by his powers of cognition and secondly by 
his powers of belief and correlation. 
3. Our beliefs, it is evident, may go beyond our cog- 
nitions. Nay, there is a sense in which they go beyond 
our very phantasms or notions. Still there are stringent 
limits set to them in our very nature and constitution. 
Thus, we can never believe anything in opposition to self- 
evident and necessary truths. In regard to at least some 
of these truths, we cannot so much as imagine them 
to be false. Thus, we cannot conceive that we ourselves 
while we exist should at the same time not exist. There 
are beliefs which are in our very mental make and frame, 
and which are altogether beyond our voluntary power. 
If we except these, however, our power of possible belief 
is wide as our capacity of forming ideas. If it is asked 338 
METAPHYSICS. 
what we should believe within these limits ? the answer 
is, only what has evidence to plead in its behalf, , what 
has self-evidence or mediate evidence. Metaphysics, with 
its tests, can determine what truths are to be received 
on their own authority; as to the kind and amount of 
evidence required in derivative truth, this can be settled 
only by the canons of the special departments of investi- 
gation, historical or physical. 
But do our beliefs ever go beyond our ideas ? This 
is a very curious question, and different persons will be 
disposed to give different answers to it. It is quite clear 
that we can, and do, believe in much of which we can 
form no adequate conception in the sense of mental 
image; thus, we believe in the existence of an infinite 
God, who is not picturable in the imagination. But the 
more difficult question is, Can or should we believe in 
aught of which we have no apprehension of any kind ? 
I am inclined to think that there is always a conception 
of some sort at the basis of every belief; and that when 
there is no positive conception, then faith ought to cease, 
and must cease. But this doctrine is liable to misappre- 
hension unless certain very important modifications and 
explanations be conjoined. 
It seems clear to me that every belief must be a belief in 
something of which we have some sort of conception. A 
belief in nothing would not deserve to be called a belief, 
and a belief in something of which we have no apprehen- 
sion would be equivalent to a belief in nothing. But it 
will be urged that every man must believe in certain 
great truths regarding eternity, of which he has no con- 
ception, and that the Christian in particular has such a 
truth in which he firmly believes, in the doctrine of the 
Trinity. Still, I maintain that even in such a case there 
is an apprehension or conception. Thus, in regard to in- 
finity, we apprehend space or time, or God, who inhabits GNOSIOLOGY. 
339 
all space and time, stretching away further and further; 
but far as we go, we apprehend and believe that there is 
and must be a space, a time, a living Being beyond. Or 
we apprehend a spiritual God, with attributes, say of 
power and love ; and we strive to conceive of Him, and of 
these perfections; and we believe of Him and His power 
and goodness that they transcend all our feeble attempts 
at comprehension. In every supposable case of belief 
we have an apprehension of some kind. A traveller tells 
us that he saw in Africa some strange monster which he 
cannot describe so as to enable us to comprehend it; we 
understand this man’s language, and if we have reason 
to look upon him as trustworthy, we believe his state- 
ment ; but still our belief goes upon our apprehension. 
An inspired writer tells us something about there being 
three persons in one God; and, having evidence of his 
inspiration, we believe him: but even here there is an 
apprehension; there is a conception of the God of truth 
as revealing the truth. There is more : this revelation is 
contained in words of which we form some sort of appre- 
hension. Thus, we are told that Jesus Christ is God; 
that he became man; and yet we discover that he is 
somehow or other different from God the Father. Thus 
in all our beliefs there seems to be a conception of some- 
thing, and of something real and existing; but still it 
may be of something conceived by us as having qualities 
which pass beyond our comprehension, or qualities of 
which we have no comprehension. 
Some of these conceptions, with their attached beliefs, 
are those which raise up within us the feeling of the 
sublime, and are, of all others, the most fitted to elevate 
the soul of man. Need I add that it is possible for us 
to believe in truths which we cannot reconcile with other 
truths of sense or understanding. It is wrong in ns, 
indeed, to believe in a proposition unsupported by evi- 340 
METAPHYSICS. 
dence; but when it is thus sustained, and when especially 
it is seen to have the sanction of God, then the mind as- 
serts its prerogative of belief, even when the truth tran- 
scends all sense, all personal, all human experience, nay, 
even when it is encompassed with darkness and difficul- 
ties on every side. Eaith feels that it is in its highest 
exercise, when founding on the authority of God, it be- 
lieves not indeed in contradictions (which it can never do), 
but in truths which it cannot reconcile with the appear- 
ances of things, or with other truths which the reason 
sanctions. 
Sect. IV. Relation of Intuition and Experience. 
We must now dive into the subject whose depths the 
great Teutonic metaphysician sought to sound ; not that 
Kant spoke much of it in the intercourse with his friends, 
but he was for ever pondering on it as he sat in his ba- 
chelor domicile, as he paced forward and backward in his 
favourite wralk in the suburbs of Konigsberg, as he lec- 
tured to his class, or elaborated his published writings. 
The general question embraces several special ones, which 
must be carefully distinguished. In seeking to settle 
these, we must always have it fixed in our minds in what 
sense we employ the word ‘ experiencefor the phrase 
may be understood in narrower or in wider significations. 
It may be confined to the outward fact known or appre- 
hended, or it may also embrace the inward consciousness. 
It may mean mere personal experience, or it may contain 
the whole gathered experience of mankind. It has been 
employed to stand for the experience of sense, and it has 
been so enlarged as to comprise all that we can know or 
feel by any or all of our cognitive powers, such as con- 
sciousness and conscience. In this Section I use it to 
express all that comes into consciousness ; for, properly 
speaking, there is no experience till the fact is appre- GNOSIOLOGY. 
341 
hended within. Taken in this sense, it would be nearer 
the truth, that is, would embrace a larger portion of 
truth, were we to say that our knowledge and ideas are 
drawn from the experience of consciousness, rather than 
from the experience of sense. We cannot reproduce 
things in idea, we cannot generalize any conglomerate of 
facts till they have been in consciousness, into which 
however they must have come by a cognitive power, 
which is therefore the true source of knowledge. When 
I limit the phrase ‘ experience5 to a particular class of ap- 
prehended facts, I will give notice by an epithet or ex- 
planatory clause. If it be needful to fix steadily in how 
wide a sense we use £ experience,’ it is still more essential 
to determine under what particular aspect we view intui- 
tion, when we would consider its relations to experience. 
We have seen, in an earlier part of this Treatise (Part I. 
Bk. II. Ch. I. s. ii.), that Intuition may be contemplated 
under three general aspects,—as a body of regulative 
principles, as spontaneous convictions, and as generalized 
maxims. Under each of these, Experience stands in a 
different relation to Intuition. 
I. Let us consider the relation of Experience to Intui- 
tion, considered as a body of Regulative Principles. In 
this sense intuition, being native and original, is prior to 
experience of every kind, personal or general. So far 
from depending on what we have passed through, our in- 
tuitions are a powerful means of prompting to the ac- 
quisition of experience; for, being in the mind as natural 
inclinations and aptitudes, they are ever instigating to 
action. All of them seek for objects, and are gratified 
when the proper objects are presented. Just as the eye 
was given us to see, and light is felt to be pleasant to 
the eyes, so the cognitive powers were given us in order 
to lead us to the acquisition of knowledge, and they are 
pleased when knowledge is furnished. Our belief as to 342 
METAPHYSICS. 
the boundlessness of space is ever alluring us to explore 
it in earth and sea, and in the deep expanse of heaven; 
and our belief in time without beginning and without 
end, is ever tempting us to go back through all the years 
which human history opens to us, and, beyond these, 
through all the ages which geology discloses, and to look 
forward, as far as human foresight and Bible prophecy 
may enable us, into the dim events of the future. Thus 
too our minds delight to discover substances acting ac- 
cording to their properties, and plants and animals 
developing according to the life that is in them, to find 
species and genera in the whole organic kingdoms, to 
trace mathematical relations corresponding to our higher 
intellectual cravings among all the objects presenting 
themselves on the earth and in the starry heavens, and to 
rise from near effects to remote causes in space and time. 
Nor is it to be omitted that our moral convictions prompt 
us to look for, and when we have found him, to look up 
to a Moral Governor of the universe, and to anticipate of 
him that he will be ready to support the innocent sufferer, 
and to punish the wicked. It should be added, that in 
experience we are ever finding a gratifying exemplifica- 
tion of our native tendencies, and a satisfying corrobo- 
ration of our intuitive expectations. We expect a cause 
to turn up for this mysterious occurrence; we are disap- 
pointed at first, but in due time it appears. We antici- 
pate that this secret deed of villany will be detected and 
exposed; and so we are amazed for a season when we hear 
of the perpetrator flattered by the world, and seemingly 
favoured in the providence of God; but our moral convic- 
tions are vindicated when the wicked man is at last caught 
in the net which had all along been weaving for him, and 
all his ill-gotten spoils are made to add to the weight of 
his ignominy, and to embitter his disgrace. 
II. Let us consider the relation of Experience to our GNOSIOLOGY. 
343 
Intuitive Convictions as these are manifested in Conscious- 
ness. We have now a more complicated series of cir- 
cumstances to look at and to weigh. Under this head 
we cannot speak of intuition and experience as being op- 
posed ; every conviction, be it of sense or consciousness, 
of the understanding or of conscience, is an experience. 
It is in itself an experience, and it is an experience which 
can be generalized. 
So far, all is clear enough. The difficulty and the con- 
fusion arise when we contemplate the relation of experi- 
ence to the forthcoming of the regulative principle into 
action, and into consciousness. There is a sense in which 
experience is required in order to such manifestation. 
Thus, in some cases the mental intuition is called forth 
by an external stimulus ; it is thus that our knowledge 
of body is evoked by an action of the bodily senses. It 
is to be observed however, in regard to all such cases, 
that it is scarcely correct to represent the intuition as de- 
pending on experience; it depends, no doubt, on an out- 
ward stimulus as an essential part of the concause, but 
the action can scarcely be called experience, for there is 
nothing in consciousness till the intuition is in energy. 
The proper statement is that there must be the concur- 
rence of an outward action, in order to the rise of the in- 
ward conviction. Again, it is a fact that all our intui- 
tions relate, directly or indirectly, to objects which have 
become known by sensation and reflection, in the sense 
explained in the two preceding Sections. But in esti- 
mating this circumstance, it is to be remembered that 
sensation and reflection are themselves intuitions, and 
comprise very deep convictions. Once more, there are 
cases in which the intuition is called into exercise by 
the representations or apprehensions that have risen up 
in the mind. This is the case with all our primitive be- 
liefs, judgments, and moral convictions: they all depend 344 
METAPHYSICS. 
on previous cognitions, and our judgments may further 
depend on beliefs. Thus it is when we contemplate an 
object as extended, and an event as happening in time, 
that our intuitive convictions as to space and time spring 
up; it is when we consider two straight lines, that we 
proclaim that they cannot enclose a space. Thus it is 
when we look to objects grouped into classes, that we 
declare that whatever is predicated of the class may be 
predicated of all the members of the class. Thus it 
is when we look to certain voluntary acts of intelligent 
beings, that we regard them as good or evil, rewardable 
or punishable. In regard then to all intellectual beliefs 
and judgments, and to all moral cognitions, beliefs, and 
judgments, there must always be an experience on which 
they proceed. But, in making this statement, let it be ob- 
served first, that the experience may not be one of sense. 
Thus, our moral convictions proceed, not on an outward 
sensation, but on a voluntary action being presented to 
the moral power. It is to be further taken into account 
that the beliefs and judgments may often proceed on an * 
experience which is itself intuitive. I proceed upon an 
intuitive conviction regarding time when I declare it to 
be infinite, and on an intuitive knowledge of extension, 
when I affirm that the shortest distance between two points 
is a straight line. It thus appears, in regard to our spon- 
taneous convictions, that there is no proper opposition be- 
tween experience and intuition ; that we must beware of 
making sweeping declarations in the idea that they will 
apply to all instances ; that in most cases there is a com- 
plex co-operation of the two ; and that we must consider 
each class of cases separately, in order to determine what 
is the precise nature of the relation. 
III. Let us consider the relation of Experience to 
ouLGeneralized Intuitions. To reach these, experience is 
always necessary, is indeed an indispensable condition. GNOSIOLOGY. 
345 
The maxim is just the generalization of the experiences. 
But let us keep a steady apprehension of the distinction 
between the generalizations fashioned from two different 
sorts of experience. One kind of general maxim is ob- 
tained from facts external and internal which may have 
fallen under our notice, no matter how, through our own 
experience or the experience or authority of others. Thus, 
we have discovered that the positive poles of magnets re- 
pel each other; that dicotyledonous plants are exogenous ; 
and that ideas which have at any time co-existed tend to 
recall each other. But the mind can reach a higher order 
of maxims; I may give as examples, that two parallel 
lines cannot meet; that every quality implies a substance, 
and that sin is of evil desert. This second class of axioms 
implies a generalization equally with the other, but it is 
from a very different sort of singulars. Of the first class 
of maxims we may be able to say that they seem to be 
true within the cosmos open to our observation; but whe- 
ther they hold good in all parts of the universe, we cannot 
dogmatically affirm. Thus, there may be metals in other 
worlds which follow very different magnetic laws, and 
there may be intelligent beings in them whose ideas fol- 
low a different order of association from those with which 
we are acquainted on earth; but it is as certain in those 
other worlds as in this, that the whole is equal to the sum 
of its parts, and that ungodliness is a sin. 
Sect. Y. On the Necessity Attached to our Primary 
Convictions. 
We have seen throughout the whole of this Treatise 
that a conviction of necessity attaches to all our original 
cognitions, beliefs, and judgments, both intellectual and 
moral. But we may find ourselves in hopeless perplexi- 
ties, or even in a network of contradictions, unless we 
determine precisely to what it is that the necessity acl- 346 
METAPHYSICS. 
lieres. The proper account is, that the necessity covers 
the ground which the conviction occupies,—neither less 
nor more. We may err, either by contracting it within 
a narrower, or stretching it over a wider surface. It fol- 
lows that if we would determine how far the necessity 
extends, we must carefully and exactly ascertain what is 
the nature of the native conviction, and what are the ob- 
jects at which it looks. 
Beginning with our Cognitions, the conviction is that 
the object exists at the time we perceive it, and has the 
qualities we discover in it. This implies, according to 
the law of identity (in the form of non-contradiction), that 
it is not possible that it should not be existing, and not 
in possession of these qualities at the time it falls under 
our notice. But it does not imply that the object has a 
necessary or an eternal existence. It does not imply that 
the object must have existed in all other, or in any other, 
circumstances. For aught our conviction says, the ob- 
ject in other positions, or with a different set of pre- 
existing causes, might not have existed at all, or might 
have had a different set of qualities. But while the ne- 
cessity does not reach further, it always extends as far as 
the perception : thus it demands that body be regarded 
by us as extended and as resisting pressure, that self be 
looked on as capable of such qualities as thought and feel- 
ing, and that the properties of body and mind are not 
produced by our contemplation of them. 
Coming now to our original Beliefs and Judgments, it 
has been shown, as to the Beliefs, that while they pro- 
ceed on our Cognitions, they go beyond them, go beyond 
the now and the present,—declaring, for instance, of 
time and space, that they must transcend our widest phan- 
tasms or conceptions of them, and that they are such that 
no space or time could be added to them. And as far as 
the conviction goes, so far does the necessity extend. GNOSIOLOGY. 
347 
The necessity attached to our Judgments is in like man- 
ner exactly coincident with them. These imply objects 
on which they are pronounced. At the same time the 
judgment, with its adhering necessity, has a regard not 
to the objects directly, but to the relation of the objects. 
These objects may be real or they may be imaginary. 
I may pronounce Chimborazo to be higher than Mont 
Blanc, but I may also affirm of a mountain 100,000 
feet high that it is higher than one 50,000 feet high. 
As to whether the objects are or are not real, this is a 
question to be settled by our cognitions and beliefs, ori- 
ginal and acquired, and by inferences from them. But 
it is to be carefully observed, that even when the object 
is imaginary, the judgment proceeds on a cognition of 
the elements of the objects. Thus, having known Avhat 
is the size of a man, we affirm of a giant, who is greater 
than a common man, that he is greater than a dwarf, 
who is smaller than ordinary humanity. Still, the neces- 
sity in the judgment does not of itself imply the existence 
of the objects, still less any necessary existence; all that 
it proclaims is, that the objects might exist out of mate- 
rials which have fallen under our notice, and that the 
objects, being so and so, must have such a relation. In 
a sense, then, our judgments are hypothetical; the ob- 
jects being so, must have a particular connection. There 
may be, or there may never have been, two exactly pa- 
rallel lines: what our intuitive judgment declares is, 
that if there be such, they can never meet. A similar 
remark may be made of every other class of primitive 
judgments. There may or there may not be a sea in the 
moon; but if there be, its waters must be extended, and 
can resist pressure. There may or there may not be in- 
habitants in the planet Jupiter; but if there be, they must 
have been created by a power competent to the opera- 
tion. It is on this account, I suppose, that such truths 348 
METAPHYSICS. 
have been called abstract or hypothetical, inasmuch as 
they deal with abstract relations, not implying the exist- 
ence of the things. But it is to be borne in mind, that 
when the objects exist, the judgments, with their accom- 
panying necessity, apply to them. 
It holds good also of our Moral Perceptions, that the 
necessity is as wide as our conviction, but no wider. It 
implies that the good or evil is a real quality of certain 
voluntary acts of ours, and this whether we view it or not, 
and independent of the view we take of it. It involves that 
certain actions are good or evil, whenever or wherever they 
are performed, in this land or other lands, in this world or 
other worlds. Rising beyond cognitions and beliefs, the 
mind can pronounce moral judgments on certain acts ap- 
prehended by it. These judgments do not imply the ex- 
istence of the objects; but the decision will apply to the 
realities, if there be such. Thus, there may or may not 
be ungodliness or ingratitude in the planet Saturn; but 
if there be such a thing, we declare that it must be evil 
and condemnable. It is to be noted that our moral con- 
victions do not imply that we shall certainly practise the 
good, or that all must be morally good which men declare 
to be so. 
As soon as our original cognition or belief assures us 
of the existence of an object with certain qualities, or as 
a judgment affirms a necessary relation, the law of iden- 
tity comes into operation, and insists on our keeping truth 
consistent with itself; and in particular, the law of non- 
contradiction restricts us from thinking or believing the 
opposite of the truth apprehended. When we know that 
self exists, we cannot be made to think that self does not 
exist. Constrained to look on time as without limits, we 
at once deny that it can have limits. Deciding that every 
effect has a cause, we cannot be made to believe that it 
has not had a cause. We have a conviction that murder GNOSIOLOGY. 
349 
is a crime, and cannot be made to decide that it is not. 
We have this necessity in two forms as a test of funda- 
mental truth ; in its original or positive, and also in a ne- 
gative form, founded on the law of non-contradiction. In 
no case can the conviction be wrought in us that what we 
intuitively know or believe to exist does not exist, or that 
the contradictory of a primitive judgment can possibly 
be true. 
A different impression might be left by an account 
often given. A distinction has been drawn between self- 
evident truths which relate to matters of fact, such as that 
body exists and that self exists, and necessary truths, such 
as that a quality implies a substance, and that the whole is 
equal to the sum of its parts. Of the latter it is supposed 
that we cannot conceive or think the opposite, whereas it 
is supposed that we can of the former. But there is con- 
fusion in this representation. Thus, it is said that we can 
easily conceive that the self of which we are conscious 
might never have existed. The statement is correct, but 
it does not go to establish the general doctrine. Tor our 
intuition is not that self must have existed in all possible 
circumstances, but it is that it exists with certain qualities 
at the time we contemplate it. We may think a great 
many things about it, but the exact opposite we cannot 
be made to think or believe; in this respect our cogni- 
tions are on the same footing as our judgments, and all 
our intuitions are alike. 
And this leads me to specify with precision what it 
is that we cannot do in regard to necessary truth. A 
common account is that we cannot conceive the contra- 
dictory of such a truth. But the word ‘conceive’ is am- 
biguous, and in itself means nothing more than £ ap- 
prehend,’ or even than ‘ imagine ■’ and it is not mere ap- 
prehension or imagination that we use as a test. The 
exact account is that we cannot realize in consciousness 350 
METAPHYSICS. 
the exact opposite of the intuitive conviction, whatever 
that be; that whatever we know intuitively as existing, 
we cannot be made not to know as existing; whatever we 
intuitively believe, we cannot be made not to believe; and 
when we discover an agreement, we cannot be made to 
judge that there is notan agreement.* The test of neces- 
sity thus employed admits of an application at once easy 
and certain. 
It should be noticed that the conviction of necessity 
follows conviction wherever it is found. In what is tech- 
nically called demonstrative or apodictic reasoning, all 
the new steps are seen to be true intuitively, and the 
necessity goes through the whole process step by step. 
Thus the necessity adheres not only to the axioms of Eu- 
clid, but goes on to the last proposition of the last book. 
It is the same in all other sciences which are demonstra- 
tive, as Ethics and Logic are to a limited extent; the ne- 
cessity adheres to whatever is drawn from first truths by 
intuitive principles. It is needful to add, that in mixed 
processes, in which there is both intuition and experience 
in the results reached, the necessity sticks merely to the in- 
tuitive part, and does not guarantee the whole. I suppose 
there is no doubt of the accuracy of the mathematical 
demonstrations employed by Eourier in his disquisitions 
about heat, but there are disputes as to some of the as- 
sumptions on which his calculations proceed. We have 
here a source of errors. In processes into which intuition 
enters, but is only one of the elements, persons allot to 
the whole a certainty which can be claimed only in behalf 
of one of the parts. 
* There are acute and profound remarks on the various kinds of ne- 
cessity of thought in Mansel’s Proleg. Log. GNOSIOLOGY. 
351 
Sect. VI. (Supplementary.) On the Distinctions between 
the Understanding and the Season ; between a priori 
AND A POSTERIORI PRINCIPLES ; BETWEEN FORM AND MAT- 
TER ; between Subjective and Objective ; between 
the Logical and Chronological Order op Ideas; be- 
tween the Cause and Occasion of Innate Ideas. 
We are now in circumstances to examine certain distinctions 
which have been drawn by the supporters of innate ideas, or in- 
tuitive reason, mainly in order to reconcile their views with the 
claims of experience. 
I. Thebe is the Distinction between the Understanding 
and the Season.—Milton draws the distinction between reason 
£ intuitive’ and ‘ discursive.’ Beattie and Seid represent Season 
as having two degrees: in the former, reason sees the truth at once; 
in the other, it reaches it by a process. There is evidently ground 
for these distinctions. But the distinction I am now to examine 
was first drawn in a formal manner by Kant, and has since assumed 
divers shapes in Germany and in this country. According to Kant, 
the mind has three general intellectual powers, the Sense, the Un- 
derstanding (Verstand), and the Season (Vernunfl) ; the Sense 
giving us presentations, or phenomena; the Understanding bind- 
ing these by categories; and the Season bringing the judgments of 
the Understanding to unity by three Ideas—of Substance, Totality 
of Phenomena, and Deity—which are especially the Ideas of Season. 
The distinction was introduced among the English-speaking nations 
by Coleridge, who however modified it. “ Season,” says he, “ is 
the power of universal and necessary convictions, the source and 
substance of truths above sense, and having their evidence in 
themselves. Its presence is always marked by the necessity of the 
positions affirmed” (Aids to Seflection, i. 168). It has become an 
accepted distinction among a certain class of metaphysicians and 
divines all over Europe and the English-speaking people of the 
great American continent. These parties commonly illustrate 
their views in some such way as the following. The mind, they 
say, must have some power by which it gazes immediately on the 
true and the good. But sense, which looks only to the phenome- 
nal and fluctuating, cannot enable us to do so. As little can the 
logical understanding, whose province it is to generalize the phe- 
nomena of sense, mount into so high a sphere. IUe must there- 
fore bring in a transcendental power—call it Season, or Intellectual 
Intuition, or Faith, or Feeling—to account for the mind’s capacity 352 
METAPHYSICS. 
of discovering the universal and the necessary, and of gazing at 
once on eternal Truth and Goodness, on the Infinite and the Ab- 
solute. 
Now there is great and important truth aimed at and meant to 
be set forth in this language. The speculators of France, who de- 
rive all our notions from sense, and those of Britain, who draw 
all our maxims from experience, are overlooking the most won- 
drous properties of the soul, which has principles at once deeper 
and higher than sense, and the faculty which compounds and com- 
pares the material supplied by sense. And if by Reason is meant 
the aggregate of Regulative Principles, I have no objections to 
the phrase, and to certain important applications of it, but then we 
must keep carefully in view the mode in which these principles 
operate. 
~We may mark the following errors, or oversights, in the school 
referred to. (1.) Intuitive Reason is not, properly speaking, op- 
posed to Sense, but is involved in certain exercises of sense. There 
is knowledge, and this intuitive, in all sense-perception. It may 
be proper indeed to draw the distinction between the two elements 
which are indissolubly wrapt up in the one concrete act. Kant 
endeavoured to do so, but gave a perversely erroneous account 
when he represented intuition as giving to objects the forms of 
space and time; whereas intuition simply enables us to discover 
that bodies are in space, and events in time. There is certainly a 
high intuitional capacity involved in every exercise of mind which 
takes in extension or regards objects as exercising property. And 
then it is altogether wrong to represent sense as the one original 
source of experiential knowledge, which is derived from conscious- 
ness as well as from perception through the senses. (2.) It is 
wrong to represent Intuitive Reason as opposed to the Under- 
standing. There is intuitive reason involved in certain exercises 
of the understanding, as when we infer that what is true of a given 
class must be true of each of the members of the class. Nor is it 
to be forgotten that the understanding can abstract and generalize 
upon a great deal more than the objects of sense; it can do so 
upon the materials supplied by consciousness, and by all the fur- 
ther convictions of the mind, such as the conscience. (3.) It is 
wrong to represent the mind as gazing immediately and intuitively 
on the true or the good, upon the necessary or the universal. It 
can indeed rise to the conception of these, but, in order to its 
doing so, it has to engage in abstraction and generalization, which 
makes the truth gained no longer a truth of pure reason, but of 
reason and understanding combined. It is not consistent with the GNOSIOLOGY. 
353 
natural history of the mind to represent it as at once rising to the 
contemplation of some ideal of the fair and good, which it is able 
to look at when the spirit is not agitated by passion or bedimmed 
by earthliness. We are undoubtedly led by native taste to admire 
the beautiful, but it is when embodied in a lovely object. We are 
constrained, in spite of a rebellious will, to approve of the good, 
but it is when a good action, or rather, a good being performing a 
good action, is presented to the mind. The general ideas of the 
true, the fair, and the good, do not spring up intuitively in the 
mind, but are fashioned out of intuitive elements by those addicted 
to reflection. (4.) It is preposterously wrong to suppose that the 
mind can employ intuitive convictions in philosophic or religious 
speculations without any associated exercise of the logical under- 
standing. Not being immediately conscious of the Eegulative Prin- 
ciples of the mind, we cannot employ them in discussion till we 
have first inquired into their nature by induction, and embodied 
their rule in a clear definition or a precise axiom. 
II. Distinction between ‘ a Priori ’ and 1 a Posteriori ’ 
Principles.—Prior to the time of David Hume, the phrase a priori 
was applied to the procedure from principle to consequent, and from 
cause to effect, using the word cause in a wider and looser sense 
than in these times ; wrhile the word a posteriori was employed to 
characterize the procedure from consequent to antecedent, or from 
effect to cause.* Since the publication of Hume’s philosophic works, 
and more especially since the ‘ Kritik of Pure Eeason’ came to have 
such extensive influence, a priori denotes whatever is supposed to be 
in the mind prior to experience; and a posteriori whatever has been 
acquired by experience. The distinction thus indicated and desig- 
nated may be admitted without allowing that it probes the subject to 
its depths, and certainly without admitting all the views usually asso- 
ciated with it. Even in regard to knowledge acquired by experience, 
I maintain that, prior to its acquisition, the mind has the power of 
acquiring it. The bodily frame has certainly the organs of sense 
prior to seeing, hearing, tasting, touching, or smelling. The mind 
has certainly the capacity of perception before it actually observes 
any external object, and the power of comparison before it can no- 
tice relations. And, in acknowledging the distinction, we must 
ever protest against the idea that any universal or necessary truth 
can be discerned by the mind without a process of a posteriori in- 
* Cudwortli’s language is, “ The abstract universal rationes, ‘reasons,’ 
are that higher station of the mind, from whence, looking down upon 
individual things, it hath a commanding view of them, and, as it were, 
a priori comprehends or knows them ” (Immut. Mor. i. iii. 2). 354 
METAPHYSICS. 
duction and arrangement. So far as the phrase is applied to ge- 
neral maxims, it should he on the understanding that they have 
been drawn by a logical process out of the individual a priori con- 
victions. 
Closely allied to the question of a priori truth is the question, 
Can there be an a priori science ? This is a topic which will come 
more fully before us in certain of the Chapters of the next Book. 
There is a sense in which certain sciences are a priori, that is, the 
principles of them are in the constitution of the mind, and are 
ready to manifest themselves in individual acts. In another sense 
there can be no a priori science, for science employs general prin- 
ciples, and there are no such principles known a priori. But there 
are sciences, the ground-principles of which are not the generaliza- 
tions of a gathered experience, but of the necessary decisions of the 
mind, and these sciences may be called a priori with perfect pro- 
priety, provided always that it be understood, that wdiiie the gene- 
ral law is in the mind prior to its manifestation, it is discovered by 
us only through the generalization of its individual exercises. 
III. Distinction between Form and Matter.—This phrase- 
ology was introduced by Aristotle, who represented everything as 
having in itself both matter (vXrj) and form (ct8os). It had a new 
signification given to it by Kant, who supposes that the mind sup- 
plies from its own furniture a form to impose on the matter pre- 
sented from without. The form thus corresponds to the a priori ele- 
ment, and the matter to the a posteriori. But the view7 thus given 
of the relation in which the knowing mind stands to the known 
object is altogether a mistaken one. It supposes that the mind in 
cognition adds an element from its own resources, whereas it is 
simply so constituted as to know wdiat is in the object. This doc- 
trine needs only to be carried out consequentially to sap the foun- 
dations of all knowledge,—for if the mind may contribute from its 
own stores one element, why not another ? why not all the ele- 
ments ? In fact, Kant did, by this distinction, open the way to all 
those later speculations w7hich represent the whole universe of be- 
ing as an ideal construction. There can, I think, be no impropriety 
in speaking of the original principles of the mind as forms or rules, 
but they are forms merely as are the rules of grammar, which do 
not add anything to correct speaking and writing, but are merely 
the expression of the laws which they follow. As to the word 
£ matter,’ it has either no meaning in such an application, or a mean- 
ing of a misleading character. 
1Y. Distinction between Subjective and Objective.—The 
vrord ‘ subject ’ has a diversity of meaning in the English language. GN'OSIOLOGY. 
355 
Tn logic it denotes the term of which predication is made; in common 
discourse, it means the topic about which affirmations are made; 
and in metaphysics, the mind contemplating an object. The term 
‘ object ’ too is not without its ambiguity. Sometimes it stands for 
a thing contemplated by the mind, and sometimes for a thing con- 
sidered in itself, and often it denotes the aim or end which the mind 
has in any of its pursuits. I am afraid it will be impossible, in 
common discourse, to deprive the phrases of any one of these vari- 
ous significations. The adjectives ‘ subjective ’ and ‘ objective ’ 
have not had such a variety of meaning, and the nouns ‘ subject ’ 
and £ object,’ when used together, in philosophic discussion, should 
be limited so as to be exactly coincident with them. They should, 
in my opinion, never be used except as correlative phrases ; the 
terms * subject ’ and £ subjective ’ being employed to designate, not 
the mind in itself, but the mind as contemplating a thing; and 
the terms £ object ’ and £ objective ’ to denote, not a thing in itself, 
but a thing as contemplated by the mind. It is clear that if the 
phrases were employed in this sense when used at the same time, 
we should be saved an immense amount of word-warfare, in which 
subject and object, subjective and objective act so prominent a part. 
We should be prevented from speaking, as is so often done, of the 
mind as subject or subjective, except when it is looking at some- 
thing, or of the thing as an object or objective, except when it is 
contemplated by a thinking mind. We would also know at once 
what is meant when it is said that the subject implies the object, 
and the object the subject. It does not mean that the existence 
of mind implies an'external thing to contemplate it, or that a thing, 
as such, implies a mind to consider it; it signifies simply that the 
one implies the other, as the husband implies the wife and the wife 
a husband, from which we cannot argue that every man must have 
a wife and every woman a husband, but merely that when the man 
is a husband, he must have a wife, and when the woman is a wife, 
she must have a husband. The subjective implies the objective 
merely in the sense that when the mind is contemplating a thing, 
it must be contemplating it, and that when a thing is contemplated, 
it must be contemplated by a contemplative mind. 
With a large school of metaphysicians and divines the words 
subjective and objective are used in a Kantian sense, and are made, 
without the persons employing them being aware of it, to bring in 
the whole peculiarities of the critical philosophy. In the philosophy 
which has germinated from Kant, the subject mind is supposed to 
have a formative power, and the object thing is supposed to be a 
thing, or phenomenon, plus a shape or a colour given it bjr the 356 
METAPHYSICS. 
mind. Proceeding on this view, the phrase ‘ subjective’ comes to 
express that which is contributed by the mind in cognition. Thus 
by a juggling use of these phrases, persons are being involved, 
without their having the least suspicion of it, in a philosophy 
which makes it impossible for us ever to know things except un- 
der aspects twisted and distorted no man can tell how far from 
the reality. We can be saved from this only by using them as 
correlatives, and insisting when we do so that the subjective mind 
is so constituted as to know the object as it is under the aspects 
presented. 
Y. Logucal and Chronological Order oe Ideas.—Sir W. 
Hamilton quotes a saying of Patricius, “ Cognitio omnis a mente 
primam originem, a sensibus exordium habet primum.” The dis- 
tinction is deep in Kant, and has been fully and skilfully elabo- 
rated by M. Cousin. It is said that there are ever two factors in 
the formation of our a priori ideas, reason and experience; and 
that logically reason is first, whereas chronologically experience 
comes first. The distinction is not clearly nor happily drawn by 
such phraseology. Por it is difficult to understand what is meant 
by ‘ origin’ as distinguished from ‘ beginning;’ and what is meant by 
£ logical ’ in such an application; it cannot mean, according to the 
rules of formal logic, it must mean, according to reason; and then 
comes in the important fact that reason and experience are not, 
properly speaking, opposed. The distinction, however, points to 
a truth, inasmuch as our intuitions, as mental faculties, laws, or 
tendencies, are in the mind prior to the exercise of them. There 
is a difficulty, however, in apprehending wrhat is meant by the 
logical or reason element being first, but not chronologically. The 
intuition as a law is in the mind prior, chronologically, to the ex- 
perience of it. The individual exhibition of the conviction and the 
experience of it come chronologically together. It is true, how- 
ever, in the fullest sense, that an experience is necessary in order 
to our being able to present the necessary conviction in the form 
of an abstract definition or general maxim. This distinction con- 
nects itself with another, which I am now to examine. 
YI. Distinction between Keason as the Cause, and Sense 
and Experience as the Occasion.*—It is allowed that, apart 
* Cudworth refers to ideas of a high kind, which he admits are “most 
commonly excited and awakened occasionally from the appulse of out- 
ward objects knocking at the doors of the senses,” and complains of 
men not distinguishing “betwixt the outward occasion, or invitation, of 
these cogitations, and the immediate active or productive cause of 
them ” (Immut. Mor. iv. ii. 2). GNOSIOLOGY. 
357 
from sense and experience, the mind cannot have any ideas; still, 
it is not experience which produces our necessary ideas, it is merely 
the occasion of them, the true cause being the reason. Thus, with- 
out an exercise of sense, there could be no idea of space in the 
mind; but then the operation is merely the occasion on which the 
idea of space is produced by an inherent mental energy. Aloof 
from a special event, there could be no idea of time; but then it is 
affirmed that upon an event becoming apprehended, the idea of 
time, already potentially in the mind, is ready to spring up. With- 
out the observation of contiguous concurrences, there could be no 
idea of cause; but on such being presented, the mind is found to 
be already in possession of an idea of cause by which to bind 
them in a necessary connection. Till some human action is pre- 
sented, there could be no idea of moral good; but on a benevolent 
action being apprehended, the idea of moral good is ready to 
spring up. 
There is important truth which this account is intended to ex- 
press, but it es n ot bring it out accurately. It is not so easy 
to settle precisely the difference between cause and occasion: the 
occasion is, in fact, one of the elements of unconditional cause, 
or rather, concause, which produces the effect. In regard to the 
original faculty or law of the mind, it is undoubtedly the main 
element of the complex cause which issues in a spontaneous in- 
tuitive conviction. But there is need of a concurrence of circum- 
stances in order to this faculty operating. But instead of con- 
fusedly binding all these up in the one expression £ occasion,’ it is 
better to spread them out individually, when it will be found that 
each acts in its own way. Thus we should show that an action of 
the organism is needful to call our intuition of sense-perception 
into exercise. We should show, too, that an apprehension of an 
object or objects is needed, in order to call into action our in- 
tuitions as to the infinity of time, and eternal relations, and moral 
good ; and then we may see that this apprehension may not have 
been got from sense, and that in our primary cognition of the 
object there may have been intuition,—thus, it is because we in- 
tuitively know every object as having being, that we declare its 
identity of being at different times. Again, in respect to the ge- 
neralized maxim, or notion, the account is fitted to leave a very 
erroneous impression, for it makes it appear as if it were upon the 
occasion of the presentation of a material object, that there springs 
up the abstract idea of space, and of an event becoming known, 
that there arises the idea of time, or of a succession of events being 
apprehended, that the mind forms an idea of cause. It is all true 358 
METAPHYSICS. 
that there must be experience in .order to the construction of the 
abstract or general notion, but the notion is formed, after all, by 
the ordinary process of abstraction and generalization. 
CHAPTER III. 
ONTOLOGY. 
Sect. I. On Knowing and Being. 
These are topics which the subtle Greek mind delight- 
ed to discuss from the time that reflective thought was 
first awakened within it,—that is, from at least five hun- 
dred years before the Christian era. I confess I should 
like to have been present when they were handled on that 
morning when Socrates, as yet little more than a boy, 
met the aged Parmenides, so venerable with his noble 
aspect and hoary locks, and Zeno, tall and elegant, and 
in the vigour of his strength, in the house of Pythodorus, 
in the Cerameicus, beyond the walls at Athens.* At the 
same time I fear that, after all, I could have got little 
more than a glimpse of the meaning of the interlocutors. 
It is clear that even Socrates himself is not sure whether 
he is listening to solid argument, or losing himself among 
verbal disquisitions and dialectic sophistries. And who 
will venture to make intelligible to a modern mind—even 
to a Teutonic mind—the arguments by which Parme- 
nides and Zeno prove that Being is One, and the impos- 
sibility of Non-Being; or translate with a meaning, into 
any other tongue, the subtleties of those Dialogues, such 
as Parmenides and the Sophist, in which Plato makes 
his speakers discourse of the One and of the Existing P 
The grand error of all these disputations arises from 
* See the opening of the Parmenides of Plato. ONTOLOGY. 
359 
those who conduct them imagining that truth lies at the 
bottom of the well, whereas it is at the surface; and in 
going past the pure waters at the top, they have only 
gone down into mud and mire. We are knowing, and 
knowing being, at every waking hour of our existence, 
and all that the philosopher can do is to observe them, 
to separate each from the other, and from all with which 
it is associated, and to give it a right expression. But 
the ancient Greeks, followed by modern metaphysicians, 
imagined that they could do more, and so have done in- 
finitely less. They have tried to get a more solid founda- 
tion for what rests on itself, and so have made that in- 
secure which is felt to be stable. They have laboured to 
make that clearer which is already clear, and have thus 
darkened the subject by assertions which have no mean- 
ing. They have explained what might be used to ex- 
plain other truths, but which itself neither requires nor 
admits of explanation, and so have only landed and lost 
themselves in distinctions which proceed on no differences 
in the nature of things, and in mysteries of their own 
creation. 
Knowing, in the concrete, is a perpetual mental exer- 
cise, ever under the eye of consciousness; and we can 
by an intellectual act separate it from its object, and 
contemplate it in the abstract. In all acts of knowledge 
we know Being in the concrete; that is, we know things 
as existing, and we can separate in thought the thing 
from our knowledge of it, and the thing as existing from 
all else which we may know about the thing. The sci- 
ence which treats of Being, or Existence, is Ontology. 
In a loose sense, every real science,—that is, every science 
which treats of existing objects,—might be called an on- 
tological science. But every one sees that it would be 
preposterous to represent astronomy and geology and 
agriculture as departments of ontology, for these sciences 3G0 
METAPHYSICS. 
treat not so much of the mere being of objects gene- 
rally, as of certain qualities and laws of special classes 
of objects. We must therefore confine the science within 
more stringent limits. If we define Ontology as the 
science of what we know of things intuitively, we are 
giving it a precise field, which can be taken in from the 
waste, and cultivated. Gnosiology and Ontology may be 
treated to a great extent together in a Metaphysics which 
unfolds, as has been attempted in this treatise, the ori- 
ginal convictions of the mind. Still they can be distin- 
guished, and the distinction between them should be 
steadily kept in view. The one seeks to find what are our 
original powers, the other to determine what we know of 
things by these powers. 
In order to reach this second end, we must go over, one 
by one, the various classes of objects known by our in- 
tuitive powers; but this not, as in Gnosiology, to deter- 
mine what the power is, but what is the object which it 
looks at. I have been seeking to accomplish the one as 
well as the other of these all throughout this treatise. 
By simple cognitive, or presentative powers (as Hamilton 
calls them), we know objects in the singular and in the 
concrete : by consciousness we know self as having being, 
and capable of thought and feeling; by perception we 
know body as extended and resisting pressure; and by 
both we know self and not-self as having an existence 
independent of the contemplative mind. By the repro- 
ductive powers we are led to believe in the past event 
recalled by memory as real, that is, as having occurred 
in time past; and round space, known in the concrete in 
perception, and time, known with the event in reminis- 
cence, there gather a number of beliefs which can be as- 
certained and expressed. Among the objects thus known 
or believed in,—and it should be added, imagined out of 
the materials supplied by the cognitive and reproduc- ONTOLOGY. 
361 
tive powers,—the mind can discern necessary relations, 
that is, arising from the very nature of the objects. The 
mind, too, is led to know and believe in a moral excel- 
lence in the voluntary acts of intelligent beings, and to 
discover the bearings and relations of moral good and 
evil. 
Such a survey as this enables us to determine what are 
the kinds of reality which the mind is able to discover. 
In sense-perception and consciousness it is a real thing, 
known as having certain qualities. In our beliefs, too, 
we look to a real thing having attributes. We believe, 
we must believe, space and time to have an existence, not 
as mere forms of thought, but altogether independent of 
the contemplative mind. Our judgments may or may 
not look to a reality, for we may discover relations among 
imaginary as well as among actual objects. But when 
the objects are real the relations discovered are also real, 
—not indeed independent realities, but real relations in 
the actual objects. The reality discovered by the moral 
power lies in a quality of certain voluntary acts performed 
by persons possessed of conscience and free will. We 
thus see how such an inspection settles for us not only 
that there is a reality, but what is the sort of reality; 
whether a present or an absent reality, whether an inde- 
pendent reality or a reality in objects. Thus we maintain 
that abstract and general notions have a reality when the 
objects from which they are drawn are real; but we are 
not to understand, as Plato’s language would lead us to 
believe, that they have a reality independent in some in- 
telligible world. The relations of quantity treated of in 
mathematics have a reality, but it is only in space and 
time, and in bodies as occupying space and existing in 
time. Cause and effect have a reality independent of the 
mind which observes them; but this is, after all, in the 
substances which act and are acted on. Moral good and 3G.2 
METAPHYSICS. 
sin are certainly both real, but their actuality is in the 
dispositions of responsible beings. 
But it will be urged that all this proceeds on the idea 
that our original convictions can be trusted. I might 
maintain, in reply, that whether our convictions can be 
confided in or not, it is at least a matter of speculative 
interest to determine what our convictions say. But I 
do hold that our original convictions must be held as a 
sufficient guarantee of the truths for which they vouch. 
The objections which may be advanced against this view 
will be answered in the Sections that follow, on Idealism 
and Scepticism. It will be seen that, so far as they have 
any plausibility, they are all removed when we take along 
with us accurate conceptions of what it is that our ori- 
ginal convictions depone to. 
Sect. II. On Idealism. 
Two questions here press themselves on us, and seem 
to raise up clouds in which dimly-seen objects look like 
spectres. 
I. Does the subject never add to the object something 
not in the object? Does the eye, in looking at a scene, 
never impart a colour to it, a glow or a gloom ? The 
mirth is not in the merry peal, nor the melancholy in the 
funereal toll of the bell, nor is the music in the flute or 
organ, but in the soul which rings and breathes and beats 
in harmony with the external movements. The view dif- 
fers according to the point from which men take it, ac- 
cording to men’s natural or acquired temperaments, tastes, 
and characters, and according to the circumstances in 
which they are placed. How different the estimate which 
is formed of a neighbour’s character, according as he who 
judges is swayed by kindness or malignity, by charity or 
suspicion! The scene varies according to the humour 
in which we happen to be, quite as much as it changes ONTOLOGY. 
363 
according to the light or atmosphere in which we survey 
it. Hope gladdens everything as if it were seen under 
an Italian sky, whereas disappointment wraps it in mist 
and cloud. Joy steeps all the landscape in its own rich 
colours, whereas sorrow wraps it as in the sable dress of 
mourning. Do not such facts, known to all observers of 
human nature, and dwelt on by poets as being largely 
their stock-in-trade, prove that in all our ideas, views, no- 
tions, opinions, there is a subjective element no less po- 
tent than the objective ? And if there be, what limits are 
we to set it ? Is our metaphysical philosophy agreed 
\v ith itself on this subject ? Or, with all its refinements, 
can it draw a decided line which will for ever separate the 
one from the other ? 
1. All knowledge through the senses is accompanied 
with an organic feeling, that is, a sensation. Our im- 
mediate acquaintance with the external world is always 
through the organism, and is therefore associated and 
combined with organic affections pleasing or displeasing. 
Certain sounds are felt to be harsh or grating, others are 
relished as being sweet or melodious or harmonious. Some 
colours, in themselves or in their associations, are felt to be 
glaring or discordant, while others are enjoyed as being 
agreeable or exciting. In short, every sense-perception is 
accompanied with a sensation, the perception being the 
knowledge, and the sensation the organic affection felt by 
the conscious mind as present in the organism. He who 
is no philosopher, finds little difficulty in distinguishing 
the two in practice; and it ought not to be difficult for the 
man who is a philosopher to distinguish the two in theory. 
Every man can distinguish the sugar in itself from the 
sweet flavour which we have in our mouth when we taste it, 
or the tooth and gum from the toothache which is wrench- 
ing them; and the metaphysician is only giving a philo- 
sophic expression to a natural difference when he distin- 
guishes between sensation and perception. 364 
METAPHYSICS. 
2. Certain mental representations are accompanied with 
emotion. Thus the apprehension of evil as about to come 
on us or those whom we love, raises up fear ; the contem- 
plation of good, on the other hand, as likely to accrue to 
us or those in whom we feel an interest, excites hope. 
This is only one example of the kind of emotions which 
attach themselves to all mental pictures of objects, as hav- 
ing brought, or as now bringing, or as likely to bring 
pleasure or pain, or any other sort of good or evil, and 
which steep the objects in their own waters, and impart 
to them their peculiar hue. Hence the gloom cast over 
scenes fair enough in themselves—as by a dark shadow 
the effect of the interposition of a gloomy self obstructing 
the light; hence the splendour poured over perhaps the 
very same scenes at other times—as by light streaming 
through our feelings, as through stained glass or irradi- 
ated clouds. Hence the pleasure we feel in certain con- 
templations, and the pain called forth by others. Hence 
the fear that depresses, that arrests all energy, and at last 
sinks its victim; hence the hope which buoys up, which 
cheers and leads to deeds of daring and of heroism. But 
while the two are blended in one mental affection in the 
mind, it is not difficult, after all, to distinguish between the 
object known, and the accompanying emotion; between 
the trumpet sounding, and the martial spirit excited by 
it; between the canvas and oil of Titian, and the feeling 
which his ascending Mary raises within us, glowing and 
attractive as the splendours of the dying day; between 
our friend as he is in himself, and the deep and tender 
regard which we must entertain towards him. 
3. Certain ideas are associated with other ideas which 
raise emotions. It does not concern us at present to ex- 
plain the nature of the laws which govern the succession 
of our ideas. It is certain that ideas which have at any 
time been together in our mind, either simultaneously ONTOLOGY. 
365 
or successively, in a concrete or complex state, will tend 
to produce the one the other or the others; and an idea 
which has no emotion attached, may come notwithstand- 
ing to raise up feeling through the idea with which it is 
associated, and which never can come without sentiment. 
Thermopylae, Bannockburn, and Waterloo, look uninter- 
esting enough places to the eye, and to those who may 
be ignorant of the scenes transacted there, but the spots 
and the very names stir up feeling like a war-trumpet in 
the breasts of all who know that freedom was there de- 
livered from menacing tyranny. Thus it is that the buds 
and blossoms of spring, and the prattle of boys and girls, 
call forth a hope as fresh and lively as they themselves 
are. Thus it is that the leaves of autumn—gorgeous 
though they be in colouring, and the graveyard where our 
forefathers sleep—clothed though it be all over with green 
grass, incline to musing and to sadness. But neither is 
it very difficult to distinguish between an apprehension 
or representation and its associated feeling, to separate 
between the primrose and the buoyant emotion which 
bursts forth on the contemplation of it, between the grave 
of a sister and the sorrowful tenderness which it evokes. 
4. The mind of the mature man cannot look on any 
one object without viewing it in a number of relations. 
A house presented to an infant may be nothing but a 
coloured surface with a certain outline; to the mature man 
it is known as a house possibly, with a loved dweller with- 
in. An apple falling to the ground is known intuitively 
simply as an object in motion; but by the educated man 
it is known as a vegetable fruit falling to the ground in 
obedience to what seems a universal law of matter. l)oes 
not the mind, in such cases, add to the object relations 
imposed by itself? To this I answer, that all that the 
mind does, is to add to its original a further knowledge 
of relations discovered in the objects themselves. The 3CG 
METAPHYSICS. 
object before us is not merely a coloured shape, it is a 
house, and as a house we are entitled to regard it. The 
apple falling to the ground is in fact a fruit obeying a 
power of gravitation. The letters of a book are to the 
infant mere black strokes; to the child learning to read 
they are figures, signs of sound; to the grown man or 
woman they are signs of thoughts or feelings, addressed 
by a writer to a reader : but the truth is, the letters are 
real things under all these aspects, real strokes, real signs 
of sound and sense. So far as we proceed accurately, 
' according to the laws of thought using experience, and 
are employed in discovering the actual relations of things, 
the conceptions reached imply a reality quite as much as 
the intuitions with which the mind starts. 
I am not prepared to say that these are all, but they 
are the more important of the natural influences which 
operate to colour or enlarge our knowledge. The Author 
of our nature certainly means us to add to our knowledge 
by observation, and to graft the acquired on the original 
stock ; and he has superinduced these attached sensations, 
and made the very laws of our nature to call in associated 
thoughts and feelings in order to intensify and elevate 
our enjoyment, and in some cases to be a prognostic of 
evil, which should ever be associated with offence and dis- 
gust. So far as music gives us more pleasure than wire 
vibrations;—so far as a Swiss valley, guarded by Mont 
Blanc, or Mont Cervin, or the Jungfrau, is finer than an 
accumulation of grass, trees, stones, and snow;—so far 
as the spot where a great and a good man was born, is 
more stimulating than would be the uninteresting hut, 
which is all the bodily sense perceives,—we owe it to the 
beneficence of God, who has made us sensitive as well 
as cognitive beings. So far as we are led to shrink from 
baser scenes, it is by a provision which is intended to 
keep us back from what might issue in pain or in sin. It ONTOLOGY. 
367 
should be added that while this is no doubt the original 
intent of these peculiarities of our constitution, they may, 
in the voluntary and sinful abuse of them, become a se- 
duction to evil, and a scourge to inflict the keenest misery. 
They may lead man, through a misgoverned imagina- 
tion, to paint in glowing colours a fictitious object, and 
then pursue it, when he 
“ Sees full before liim, gliding without tread, 
An image with a glory round its head; 
This shade he worships for its golden hues, 
And makes (not knowing) that which he pursues.” 
Thus it is that the mind irradiates with a romantic tinge 
objects unworthy in themselves, and then goes on to love 
them and delight in them. Man may thus come, too, to 
be haunted by spectres of his own creation, to be mocked 
by his own shadow seen across some of the deeper gorges 
of the earth, and striding opposite as he himself moves. 
Thus it is that there are to us, for our gratification, glow- 
ing colours, burnishing what are in themselves only mists 
and damps, and spanning the heavens above us with a 
bow of hope, assuring us that these waters which threaten 
will not overwhelm us; thus it is, too, that there are 
hideous mock suns personating the very brightest light 
which God has planted in these heavens. Still the man 
of good sense and of simple honesty will find no difficulty 
in distinguishing practically between things which I have 
been seeking to separate theoretically in this Section. 
II. But is not an imperfect knowledge an erroneous, 
a delusive knowledge? A rock seen in outline between 
us and the sky, seems like a man’s face; as we approach 
it, the features, chin, nose, and brow vanish, and we dis- 
cover it to be an unshapely mass. To the common ap- 
prehension the sky looks concave, with a sprinkling of 
stars sparkling at night like diamonds on its surface, and 
it is only further consideration which bring* us to regard 368 
METAPHYSICS. 
it as a vast expanse, in which great luminaries are mov- 
ing. The boy feels as if he might mount to the moon, 
and bring it down; and as if he could hold the sun in 
his hands like an orange, provided it did not burn him. 
In such instances our further experience on earth sets 
aside our first beliefs ; and is it not possible that many 
of the favourite opinions entertained by all men on earth 
may be set aside by the wider and ever widening expe- 
rience of heaven ? Is it not conceivable that the very 
strongest and most universal convictions of humankind 
may seem altogether erroneous to beings in a different 
constitution of things, and with other principles of know- 
ledge and belief? 
1. I answer that many of the inferences we draw from 
our original and acquired knowledge, and the applications 
we make of it, are erroneous. It is ascertained, for in- 
stance, that absolute size, distance, and direction, are not 
original endowments of the sense of sight; all that we 
intuitively perceive by the eye is a coloured surface. It 
follows that when we are judging of the magnitude or 
locality of objects, we are drawing inferences from our 
original perceptions. We found these conclusions on 
rules which are correct enough for ordinary cases, or 
cases similar to those from which they were derived, but 
which may be altogether wrong or deceptive when ap- 
plied to other or peculiar cases. We are not warranted 
to allege that our intuitive perceptions through the senses 
deceive us : we have been led astray by rules laid down 
by ourselves; and further knoAvledge enables us to cor- 
rect them, or rather, to show under what restrictions they 
hold good. But the increase of knowledge does not set 
aside the primary knowledge ; on the contrary, it might 
be shown that it proceeds on the original stock. 
I am inclined to think that all the errors into which 
we fall are of a similar character. We draw rash in- ONTOLOGY. 
369 
ferences from our real knowledge, original or acquired, and 
then charge our errors on our constitutions. Still more 
frequently we illegitimately extend rules correct enough 
in themselves to cases to which they do not apply. In 
some of these instances the generalizations we form, or 
the conclusions we draw, may serve some good end, even 
though they "cannot "be regarded as positively true. Thus 
we suppose the sky to be a concave sphere; thus, too, 
scientific men of the most rigidly positive class are obliged, 
when referring to the last resources of decomposition, to 
call in indivisible particles, molecules, monads, or atoms. 
But these are mere suppositions to aid our conceptive 
power, and enable us to think or talk intelligibly of ob- 
jects of which we have no intuitive, and, in the latter 
case, no certain knowledge whatsoever. These convictions 
cannot be described as primary or fundamental, and we 
can easily deliver ourselves from both the one and the 
other. In such cases, increase of knowledge constrains us 
to modify or correct some of the conclusions illegitimately 
drawn from data which are sound. 
2. I answer, that further knowledge is ever adding 
to our original or acquired stock, but does not set it 
aside. Were we to look upon our knowledge as being 
absolute and perfect, we should, in the very act, be falling 
into error; we should be drawing a conclusion unwar- 
ranted by facts. I am convinced that much of the sup- 
posed illusion into which we fall arises from this cause. 
We suppose that we know all about an object, whereas 
we may know it, after all, only under one aspect, or in the 
exercise of but a very few of its many and varied pro- 
perties; but, imagining we know its whole nature, we 
set about constructing theories regarding it, and pointing 
out its relation to all other objects. I acknowledge that 
such speculations may be set aside by further knowledge, 
even as they would be seen all along to be erroneous by 370 
METAPHYSICS. 
persons of higher intelligence. Those who imagine that 
they have cleared up all the mysteries of the Divine na- 
ture and decrees, of the soul of man and the nature of 
spirit or of body, may be astonished and humbled to find, 
when they reach the land of brighter light, how crude 
their theories have been. But their mistakes have arisen, 
not from their constitutions or their experience deceiv- 
ing them, but from the unwarrantable additions made by 
their own ingenuity. But so far as our knowledge pro- 
ceeds from intuition, and is guaranteed by our nature and 
constitution, it will be found that further knowledge, na- 
tural or supernatural, imparted in this life or the life to 
come, serves only to enlarge our original stock, and make 
it more solid and congruous. The new aspects now pre- 
sented will not be inconsistent with the old, but will 
rather enable us to make a more extended use of them. 
Here we see as in a glass darkly ; still, what we see is a 
correct representation, so far as it goes; and what we are 
to discover in a clearer light, may often be the full linea- 
ments and features of what we saw here so very obscurely. 
All existing objects may be represented as polygons,— 
some perhaps with a hundred sides, some with a thousand, 
and the Supreme Being with an infinite number; and of 
these man may see only a few, perhaps half-a-dozen or a 
dozen; still, what he sees is real. The knowledge may not 
be sufficient to enable him to construct the mathematics 
of the figure, or to discover all the relations of side to 
side and side to centre ; still, what he sees are real sides 
of the very thing ; and if we could see other sides, or all 
the sides, it wrnuld not even modify this first knowledge, 
it would simply enlarge it. 
Conceive a savage, just taught to read simple words of 
one or two syllables, poring over the pages of a full Bible, 
which a missionary has presented to him. A few chap- 
ters in Genesis or John is all he has read or can yet read. ONTOLOGY. 
371 
What he has thus learned is truth, and if he keep to 
what he has read and understood, he has committed no 
error. But mingled with this there may be supposi- 
tions, guesses, conclusions, expectations, as to the general 
contents of the book, and associated with the whole, su- 
perinduced feelings of wonder or awe, and these, were 
he to open them up, wTould in all probability appear 
sufficiently ludicrous to one who has perused the whole 
volume. It appears to me that the wisest man in this 
world stands in relation to the whole body of truth in 
very much the same relation as the savage does to the 
truth in the Bible. Let this wise man, if he would de- 
serve the name, keep to what he does know, and he is on 
safe ground ; but if he begins to speculate beyond, his 
conjectures will in all probability appear most" preposte- 
rous to higher intelligences, and his most confident as- 
sertions may turn out to be contradictions. Still, when 
he keeps within the precincts of knowledge given in in- 
tuition or acquired by experience, what is revealed to him 
is as certain as it is valuable, valuable in itself, and va- 
luable as the foundation on which further acquisitions 
may be built, without limits and. without end. I do 
believe that in the region, wherever it be, to which man is 
carried after death, new objects will be disclosed to him 
which he could not so much as conceive on earth; and 
the very objects which he knew before, divine or created, 
will be seen clothed with new qualities, as different from 
any which have come under his notice when on earth, as 
colours are to the man born blind but whose eyes are 
opened, or as musical sounds are to the man whose ears 
have been unstopped, and that these newT kinds of know- 
ledge will open new sources of enjoyment, ever-during 
and ever-increasing, but all this without any of our ge- 
nuine earthly knowledge or experience being nullified or 
cancelled. 372 
METAPHYSICS. 
We are now in circumstances to judge of idealism. 
But let us first speak of the ideal spirit. It is truly an 
elevated and an elevating one, if at all restrained within 
proper limits. There are elements in human nature fitted 
and intended to produce and foster it. It is meant that 
sensations should warm our knowledge into a glow, that 
feelings should buoy up our intellectual notions into a 
higher region than they themselves can reach, and 
that our colder apprehensions should be linked to others 
which are more fervent. The glory thus cast around ob- 
jects, commonplace enough it may be in themselves, ren- 
ders them more lovable and beloved. The melody which 
the ear gives to the sound, increases our interest in the 
thought or sentiment uttered, and turns, if I may so 
speak, prose into poetry. The ideal spirit may be an in- 
centive to glorious enterprise; it steeps the country be- 
fore us—mountain, vale, sea, and island—in sunlight, 
and thus allures us to explore it, It is especially eleva- 
ting when it takes a moral direction, when it places be- 
fore us a high model to which we ever look, and to whicK 
we would become assimilated, and sets us forth amidst 
sacrifices made, to accomplish some high end reaching 
forth far in time or into eternity. Still, it is of the utmost 
moment that the person steadily draw the distinction 
between our knowledge of the object and the light in 
which we view it. Without this, the unrestrained spirit 
will be apt to break forth into extravagance, which will 
end in a collapse and a reaction ; foolish hopes will be ex- 
cited which can never be gratified, and when this comes 
to be realized, the issue is the blackest disappointment, 
not unfrequently ennui, apathy, and chagrin,—at times, 
sourness, bitterness, or despair. 
While we can with truth say so much of the ideal 
spirit, I can bestow no such commendation on idealism 
as a philosophic system, that is, the system which would ONTOLOGY. 
373 
raise our associated sentiments to the rank of cognitions. 
I allow that it is vastly superior to sensationalism, which 
acknowledges only the visible and the tangible; but, in 
making this allowance, it is proper to add that, on the 
principle that extremes meet, it sometimes happens that 
there are persons atone and the same time sensational- 
ists and idealists, believing only in the physical, and yet 
not believing the physical to be real.* But, speaking of 
idealism in itself, it is an unphilosophic system, and, in 
the end, has a dangerous tendency. Its radical vice lies in 
maintaining that certain things, which we intuitively know 
or believe to be real, are not real. I say, certain things ; 
for were it to deny that all things are real, it would be 
scepticism. Idealism draws back from such an issue with 
shuddering. But, affirming the reality of certain objects, 
with palpable inconsistency it will not admit the existence 
of other objects equally guaranteed by our constitution. 
This inconsistency will pursue the system remorselessly 
as an avenger. Idealism commonly begins by declaring 
that external objects have no such reality as we suppose 
them to have, and then it is driven or led in the next age 
or in the pages of the next speculator to avow that they 
have no reality at all. At this stage it will still make 
lofty pretensions to a realism founded, not on the exter- 
nal phenomenon, but on the internal idea. But the logi- 
cal necessity speedily chases the system from this refuge, 
and constrains the succeeding speculator to admit that 
self is not as it seems, or that it exists only as it is felt, or 
when it is felt; and the terrible consequence cannot be 
avoided, that we cannot know whether there be objects 
before us or no, or whether there be an eye or a mind to 
perceive them. There is no way of avoiding this black 
and blank scepticism but by standing up for the trust- 
worthiness of all our original intuitions, and formally 
* See a review of Mr. Mill, infra, Sect. YI. 374 
METAPHYSICS. 
maintaining that there is a reality wherever our intuitions 
declare that there is. 
The idealist has indeed a truth, which he weaves into 
the body of his system, but that truth is misapprehended 
and perverted. There are impressions and inferences 
ever mingling, naturally or inadvertently, lawfully or un- 
lawfully, with our knowledge; and he confounds these, 
when it is his business, as a professed philosopher, to dis- 
tinguish them in theory, as men of common sense ever 
distinguish them in practice. Iiis system is not clearness, 
but confusion. He has dived below the surface, but has 
not, after all, gone down to the bottom so as to see all, 
and his view of the deep is more obscure than if he had 
remained above. Amazed or enraptured with the dis- 
covery of certain facts immediately below that which is 
patent to the vulgar eye, he looks on them as the main 
or sole facts, and henceforth overlooks all the superficial 
ones, forgetting that it is true in philosophy, as in geo- 
that the rock strata which jut out into the most 
prominent peaks are those which, if we follow them, dive 
down the deepest. He has sought to attain a higher 
position, but has stopped halfway, and his views, after 
all, are not so clear as those obtained further down, and 
they are certainly much more confusing than those which 
he might have had, had he reached the clear height above 
all dimming influence; they are at best like those which 
the traveller gets on cloudy days when he has climbed a 
certain elevation up the Alps, and, in the midway mists, 
catches occasional glimpses of the green valleys below him, 
and of the imposing mountain-tops and sky yet far above 
him. 
Sect. III. On Scepticism. 
Scepticism may assume a variety of forms, which how- 
ever differ only in some being more thorough-going than ONTOLOGY. 
375 
others, some denying the veracity of certain of onr cogni- 
tions, others denying the trustworthiness of all. Like most 
kinds of folly, it commonly does not reach its last stage 
at once, but advances step by step. Some philosopher of 
eminence sets aside one of our intuitions, and then an 
advancing thinker, impelled by logical consistency, or by 
the sharpness of his mind, or by levity, or wantonness, 
or by the love of paradox or of notoriety, shows how 
on the same ground we may deny them all. It was thus 
that Berkeley, in denying the substantial existence of 
body, prepared the way for Hume, who denied the sub- 
stantial existence of spirit; and thus that Kant, in af- 
firming that space and time had no existence out of the 
mind, opened a path for Fichte when he declared that the 
external object in space might also be the creation of 
the mind; and for Schelling and Hegel when they made 
mind and matter, creator and creature, all and alike 
ideal.* I have already discussed scepticism disguised as 
idealism; I am now to offer a few remarks on an avowed 
scepticism. 
Let us understand precisely how far a sceptic may go. 
In doing so it is essential to remember the distinction 
between the spontaneous and reflex use of our intuitions. 
Under the first of these aspects they not only claim au- 
thority, they secure concurrence and obedience. Every 
man knows that he has a bodily frame, and believes that 
it exists in space, and that if he would go in the nearest 
way to a given point, he must walk in a straight line. 
Doubt and denial are possible only in regard to the re- 
flex statement of intuitive principles. Every man is in 
* It is thus that the speculations of Professor Ferrier as to our cog- 
nition of the external world being the cognition of the object plus self, 
is holding out a great temptation to some vain and conceited youth to 
go a little further in the same direction, and maintain that all truth, all 
reasoning, that our very belief in God, are mixed up with some subjec- 
tive element, are, in short, object or truth mecum. 376 
METAPHYSICS. 
fact convinced that he has a solid bodily frame, and that 
the nearest way to a particular place is a straight line; 
but it is possible for him, if he chooses, to deny the pro- 
positions in which these truths are conveyed; it is quite 
competent for him speculatively to assert that he has not 
a body, and that the shortest road to a given point is a 
crooked line. 
And this leads me to point out in what respects scep- 
ticism may be allowable, and wherein it may even be be- 
neficial. The dogmatist often lays down and employs for 
purposes lawful and unlawful, principles represented as 
indisputable, which have not the sanction of our constitu- 
tion, or which may be expressed in a form only partially 
or approximately correct. Great interests may often be 
involved in having these principles doubted or disputed. 
Without this we may find, before we are aware of it, 
great moral or religious truths assaulted or undermined; 
or we may set up for defence of the citadel of truth a 
crazy and insecure turret, which is a positive weakness, 
and which, as it falls, may give an easier inlet to the 
enemy. This then is the special mission of the sceptic: 
it is to lay a restraint on the dogmatist; at times, if need 
be, to assail or to lash him. It would be wrong to affirm 
that the scepticism of Hume has not cleared the philo- 
sophic atmosphere of many weakening and deleterious 
influences which had been gathering for centuries. The 
great sin of scepticism lies in this, that it attacks indis- 
criminately the good and the evil, and would destroy 
both as by a consuming fire. But surely there may be 
a means of securing all the .good ends which scepticism 
has produced, without the accompanying destruction of 
the good. Socrates seems to me to have succeeded in 
this, when he attacked the pretentious systems of his 
age, at the same time that he held resolutely by every 
great moral and spiritual truth. Let it be admitted that ONTOLOGY. 
377 
our spontaneous convictions guarantee a truth, but let it 
be avowed at the same time that any given philosophic 
expression of them is fallible, and may be doubted, 
disputed, and denied. Let it be understood, as to every 
philosophic principle proffered, that we are entitled, nay, 
in duty bound, to examine it before we assent to it, and 
that the burden of establishing that it is a thorough trans- 
cript of the law in the mind lies on him who employs 
it. By this simple rule, rigidly enforced and scrupulously 
followed, we might have all the benefits which have arisen 
from the siftings of scepticism, without its fearful throes, 
and its destructions—terrible as those of a battle-field— 
of noble credences and inspiring hopes. 
But what are we to do with the sceptic, that is, with 
one who speculatively denies intuitive truth ? 
1. There are some things which we ought not to do 
with him. We should not waste our precious feeling 
in professing to sympathize with him, as if he were 
practically troubled with doubts as to the existence of 
himself, or his friends, or his enemies, or his food, or his 
money, or his earthly interests ; for in respect of all these 
he is quite as firm a believer as the man who comes 
to convince him with an apparatus of argument. Nor 
need we be at the trouble of appointing a guard to 
watch him lest he run against a carriage, or step into a 
river, or fall over a precipice. For whatever he may pro- 
fess to us or to himself, he believes in the existence of 
the carriage, the river, and the precipice, and has a salu- 
tary awe of their perilous power. Nor would there be 
any propriety in declaring him mad, and sending him to 
Bedlam, for he only pretends to have lost his senses, or 
rather, never to have had them, and in his simulation has 
over-acted his part, and gone beyond the madman, who 
never sets himself against intuitive truth.* 
* M. Morel was asked to examine a prisoner who pretended to be 378 
METAPHYSICS. 
2. There are some things which we cannot do with 
the sceptic, and therefore should not attempt to do. We 
cannot answer him by argument, that is, mediate proof; 
for this, if followed sufficiently far back, will conduct us 
to a principle which cannot be proven, and which there- 
fore the sceptic will deny. It can scarcely be regarded 
as a complete refutation to demonstrate that his sceptical 
denials are inconsistent with certain affirmations made 
by him; for he may admit the inconsistencies, and then 
found his argument against the possibility of discovering 
truth on the circumstance that he and every other must 
inevitably fall into contradictions. It is not even a con- 
futation when it is shown that his scepticism is suicidal, 
or violates the law of contradiction, for he may find no 
position so suited to him as that which maintains that all 
knowledge is contradictory. 
Still there are some things which we can do for or with 
the sceptic. 
I. We may make use of any admissions avowed by him 
or incidentally made, in order to shut him up into truths 
which he denies. Sometimes we may be able to show 
that the truth which he allows implies the truth which 
he disallows. In other cases we can ask him on what 
principle or ground he assents to certain truths ; and when 
we have his answer, we may be able to show how, on the 
same grounds, he must admit other propositions. Thus 
we ask the Berkeleian on what ground he admits the ex- 
istence of the subject mind; and, whatever it be, we may 
show that the same ground supports the doctrine of the 
deranged, and asked him how old he was; to wliicli the prisoner re- 
plied, “ 245 francs, 35 centimes, 124 carriages,” etc. To the same ques- 
tion, more distinctly asked, he replied, “5 metres, 75 centimetres.” 
When asked how long he had been deranged, he answered, “ Cats, 
always cats.” M. Morel at once proclaimed his madness to be simu- 
lated, and states,—“ In their extreme aberrations, in their most furious 
delirium, madmen do not confound what it is impossible for the most ex- 
travagant logic to confound.” (See ‘Physiological Journal,’ Oct. 1857.) ONTOLOGY. 
379 
existence of the object matter. Thus too we may ask 
how it is that Kant admits the existence of a thing behind 
the phenomenon, and by help of this process prove that 
the phenomenon is the thing. If Fichte admit an ego, 
or a self, or a belief, it is competent to proceed there- 
on to show that we are thereby constrained to believe in 
the existence of objects out of self and independent of 
our belief.* This argumentum ad hominem is perfectly 
allowable. We can say to him, If you admit this, you 
must also admit that. If he is so guarded and stinted in 
his admissions as to say that he allows this merely prac- 
tically and not theoretically or absolutely, we are entitled 
to demand of him that he believe that practically. Thus, 
if he admit practically that he has at any time had (what 
Ilume allows at the outset) an impression, or idea, we may 
show him that he should also admit practically that he 
has an abiding and an identical self, and that he contem- 
plates objects out of him, and independent of him, and, 
as more important, that he should admit practically that 
he is a responsible being, and must give account of him- 
self. Should he try to save himself, by declaring that he 
believes the first, or second, or third of those truths, 
only because obliged to do so, we may show that there 
is a similar necessity requiring him to believe the rest. 
This is a telling argument, which has been used with 
great skill and power by many of the opponents of scep- 
ticism in all ages. It is emphatically an argumentum ad 
hominem, for it is one which may be used not merely 
against a particular individual, but with men as men, 
with every man. No man but admits something, and 
* It is thus that when Professor Ferrier declares that we know the 
object mecum, we can show that on the same ground, whatever it be, 
he should admit an object independent of the me. He says (Scottish 
Philosophy, pp. 19, 20) that “ no man in his senses could require a proof 
that it [that is, real existence] is.” I am glad of this appeal. A man’s 
senses tell us that the stone before us has an existence independent of 
the contemplative mind. 380 
METAPHYSICS. 
that something may be employed to make him admit 
something else. It can be shown that he who doubts 
believes, that he who denies affirms, and that he who 
doubts or denies that he doubts or denies, is in the very 
act making an affirmation. Such a process goes at least 
to shut the mouth of the sceptic, for if he open his mouth, 
it is to let out a weapon which you can turn against him. 
His only refuge is in a thorough-going scepticism, which 
affirms that man’s supposed knowledge is contradictory, 
and that all argument is delusive. You can at least in- 
sist on this scepticism that it remain silent, and not ad- 
vance arguments which are inconsistent with that judg- 
ment or belief to which it would appeal. 
II. We can carefully explain the nature of a primitive 
conviction. The method referred to under last head is 
one which we may quite legitimately employ in dealing 
with the sophist or the caviller, we may always kill him 
with his own weapons. But we have a more satisfactory 
mode of dealing with the truth-seeking and the truth- 
loving. We can ask them to examine the nature of the 
convictions to which we invite them to yield. 
1. It can be shown that the mind declares of itself 
that its primitive perceptions contain knowledge. I do 
not urge this as a mediate proof, or a new and indepen- 
dent proof, it is simply the statement of a fact, that the 
mind, in contemplating its original convictions, affirms 
that there is knowledge in them. As to some of its 
states, it finds that they contain sensations, sentiments, 
imaginations, but in every one of them, at the same time, 
a cognition of self, and in certain of them a cognition of 
an object or truth external to self and independent of 
it. It is to these that we ask consent without the aid of 
further evidence. 
2. It may be shown that the intuitive principles of the 
mind are native, catholic, necessary. It is not truth merely ONTOLOGY. 
381 
to the individual man, but to all men ; not merely to all 
men, but to all intelligent beings. It is certain not only 
to me but to all beings throughout the universe who have 
capacity to understand it, that if two straight lines pro- 
ceed an inch without coming nearer, they will proceed a 
million of miles without coming nearer, and not only is 
the wilful infliction of pain a sin on earth, it is a sin in 
every other part of the universe. 
3. The mind declares of certain truths that they need 
no other truth to support them. There are cases in which 
it feels that it needs evidence in order to gain its assent. 
It does not allow that there was such a man as David, 
king of Israel, or Philip, king of Macedon, till proof is 
brought forward. It may remain in doubt as to what 
truth there is in the poetical accounts of the siege of 
Troy, because no valid evidence is produced. But it 
draws a distinction between these cases and others in 
which it needs no evidence. When it is asserted that 
the moon is inhabited, the mind asks proof, but it asks 
none when it is aflirmed that I am the same person yes- 
terday as I was to-day. It is conceivable that the first 
of these assertions might be substantiated by evidence 
which would command our assent, but it would not, after 
all, be a more rational assent than that which we give at 
once to the other. 
4. The mind knows self-evident truth to be the most 
certain of all truths. What is it that the sceptic de- 
mands ? It is all-important to put this question, and to 
fix him down to a specific answer. Does he demand 
proof or argument ? Then it implies that he would be 
satisfied with argument. But it can be shown him that 
in argument there is a first principle involved, the depen- 
dence of conclusion on premisses, and in the last resort 
we come to a premiss not admitting of probation. But 
surely he who admits argument must admit all that is in 382 
METAPHYSICS. 
argument; but as to the premiss with which we set out, 
it is not less evident, it is more evident than the conclu- 
sion. It is so far a weakness in a proposition, or rather, 
of our mind in reference to it, that we do not see it to 
be true or false immediately. The mind declares that the 
most certain of all truths are those which are seen to be 
true at once and in themselves. 
.III. It can be shown that there is a congruity and 
consistency among the original and derivative convictions 
of the mind. This is not urged as if it were an inde- 
pendent and unassailable demonstration. It is conceiv- 
able that the power from which human power derives its 
power might have made all men liable to a deception, 
incapable of being ever detected, in consequence of its 
being carefully provided that no inconsistencies should 
creep in. This is certainly possible, though it is by no 
means probable, according at least to our laws of judg- 
ment. For, if this power be a Being possessed of good- 
ness and truth, it is not conceivable that he should form 
any creature liable to be deceived: and, if it be a capri- 
cious or malignant power, it is by no means probable 
that all the deceptions would turn out to be congruous: 
here or there would come out an original conviction in 
manifest contradiction to another original conviction, or a 
derivative principle openly inconsistent with both. The 
consistency of the parts is thus a sort of corroboration of 
the truth of each part and of the whole. To give only 
two examples. It is by intuition I have endeavoured to 
show that the intellect, on discovering an effect, looks for 
cause, and it always finds, in fact, that for every effect 
there is a cause; and as it finds this again and again, in 
an extended and invariable experience, it has in this, not 
a primary proof, but a secondary confirmation of its in- 
tuition. Again, we expect that sin will not go unpunished; 
from time to time we find it punished in this life, and are ONTOLOGY. 
383 
thus strengthened in our convictions that it will all be 
punished at last. All the intuitions have such corrobo- 
rations in the daily experience of every man, and these 
are felt to give a satisfaction to the mind.* 
IV. When we reach the great truth, that there is a 
righteous God, we can plead the Divine veracity in favour 
of the trustworthiness of the intuitive convictions planted 
by Him in our constitution. Not that even this consi- 
deration can be adduced as a primary or an absolute 
proof; for it is only on the supposition that a God exists 
that it can be legitimately employed, and our conviction 
of the Divine existence presupposes a confidence in the 
veracity of our intuitions and arguments founded on them. 
But this truth, being once admitted, becomes henceforth 
the keystone which keeps all the separate and indepen- 
dent parts of our constitution in one compact and stable 
whole, wdiich can never be broken down, but will be felt 
to be the stronger the greater the weight that is laid 
upon it. 
V. No truths, recognized by the mind as such, can be 
shown to be contradictory. In this line of thought a 
sound metaphysics may accomplish some good ends. Seep- 
* Speaking of primary convictions of the mind, Hamilton says: “ They 
are many, they are in authority co-ordinate, and their testimony is clear 
and precise. It is therefore competent for ns to view them in correla- 
tion ; to compare their declarations; and to consider whether they con- 
tradict, and, by contradicting, invalidate each other. This mutual con- 
tradiction is possible in two ways. 1st, It may be that the primary data 
themselves are directly or immediately contradictory of each other. 2nd, 
It may be that they are mediately or indirectly contradictory, inasmuch 
as the consequences to which they necessarily lead, and for the truth and 
falsehood of which they are therefore responsible, are mutually repug- 
nant. By evincing either of these, the veracity of consciousness will be 
disproved; for, in either case, consciousness is shown to be inconsistent 
wi th itself, and consequently inconsistent with the unity of truth. But 
by no other process of demonstration, is this possible.” He adds, “Ho at- 
tempt to show that the data of consciousness are (either in themselves 
or in their necessary consequences) mutually contradictory has yet suc- 
ceeded ” (Beid’s Works, pp. 745, 746). 384 
METAPHYSICS. 
tics have laboured—and others not sceptics have done 
their best to aid them—to prove that certain proposi- 
tions approved of by the mind are contradictory. But 
in this attempt they have failed, as can be shown, I be- 
lieve, of every case in which they have tried.* It can be 
proved, in regard to the opposed propositions, that, in 
some cases, they have no meaning; that, in other cases, 
the mind pronounces in favour of neither the one nor the 
other; that, in several cases, the propositions seem to be 
contradictory only because improperly stated, and when 
they are properly enunciated, the difficulty disappears; 
and that, in the remaining cases, there is merely a diffi- 
culty in proposing a positive reconciliation of the propo- 
sitions, but no real inconsistency. 
There is little risk of scepticism producing any injuri- 
ous influence in the common business of life. The reason 
is, that circumstances ever pressing on the attention con- 
strain men to proceed on their spontaneous principles, 
which are sound, even when the speculative principles are 
altogether infidel. He who is hungry will partake of food, 
he who sees an offensive weapon about to strike him will 
avoid it, even though he be not prepared to avow, as a 
philosopher, that there are any such gross things as bread 
or iron in the universe, or though he may doubt, as a 
metaphysician, whether food be fitted to nourish, or a 
sword to kill him. It is not in such urgent matters of 
animal comfort and temporal interest that scepticism is 
wont to manifest itself, but in far different subjects, and 
especially in leading persons to doubt of the great truths 
of morality and religion, the practical action in which is. 
more under the control of the will. Even here there will 
be times when the spontaneous belief or impulse will 
overmaster the speculative unbelief, as when moral indig- 
nation, implying a belief in the reality of sin, is excited 
* See an examination of Kant’s attempt, infra, Sect. V. ONTOLOGY. 
385 
by a mean or dishonest action, or when disease has seized 
us, and death seems in hard pursuit, and threatens to 
hurry us to the judgment-seat. Such circumstances as 
these will call forth the action of conscience, in spite of 
all efforts to repress it. But when there is nothing of 
this description to arouse the native feeling, unbelief may 
succeed in keeping us very much out of the way of all 
that would call the internal sentiment into activity, and 
for days, or weeks, or months together it may seldom 
arise to utter a protest or create a disturbance of any de- 
scription ; and, even when the deeper moral or religious 
powers come forth to assert their authority, there may 
be a vigorous, and, so far, a successful warfare waged 
with them; that is, they may be so far repressed as not 
to command the will, or lead to any practical operation. 
Hence the evil of scepticism, in chilling the ardour of 
youth, and confirming the hardness of age, in repressing 
every noble aspiration and every high effort, while it 
leaves the soul the servant or slave of the lower, the sen- 
sual, the ambitious, the proud, or the selfish impulses of 
the heart. 
Sect. IV. On the Conditioned and the Unconditioned. 
Leibnitz complained of the Electress of Brandenburg 
that she asked the why of the why. There are some truths 
in regard to which we are not warranted to ask the why. 
They shine in their own light; and we feel that we need 
no light, and we ask no light, wdierewith to see them, 
and any light we might seek to aid us would be felt only 
as an encumbrance. In all such cases the mind asks no 
why, and is amazed when the why is asked; and feels 
that it can give no answer, and ought not to attempt an 
answer. Other truths can be known only mediately, or 
by means of some other truth coming between as evi- 
dence. I need no mediate proof to convince me that I 38G 
METAPHYSICS. 
exist, or that I hold an object in ray hand which I call a 
pen; but I need evidence to convince me that there are 
inhabitants in India, or that there is a cycle of spots pre- 
sented in the sun’s rotation. In regard to this class of 
truths I am entitled—nay, required—to ask the why. Not 
only so; if the truth urged as evidence is not self-evident, 
I may ask the ivhy of the why, and the why of that why, 
on and on, till we come to a self-evident truth, when the 
why becomes unintelligible. Now we may say of the 
one class of truths that they depend (to us) on no con- 
dition, and call them Unconditioned; whereas we must 
call the other Conditioned, for we require another truth 
as a condition of our assenting to them. 
But this is not precisely what is meant, or all that is 
meant, by conditioned and unconditioned in philosophic 
nomenclature. We find that not only does one truth de- 
pend on another as evidence to our minds, but one thing 
as an existence depends on another. Everything falling 
under our notice on earth is dependent on some other 
thing as its cause. All physical events proceed from a 
concurrence of previous circumstances. All animated 
beings come from a parentage. But is everything that 
exists thus a dependent link in a chain which hangs on 
nothing? There are intellectual instincts which recoil 
from such a thought. There are intuitions which, pro- 
ceeding on facts ever pressing themselves on the atten- 
tion, lead to a very different result. By our intuitive 
conviction in regard to substance we are introduced to 
that which has power of itself. True, we discover that 
all mundane substances, spiritual and material, have in 
fact been originated, and have proceeded from something 
anterior to them. But then our intuition presses us on, 
and we seek for a cause of that cause which is farthest 
removed from our view. Pursuing various lines, external 
and internal, we arrive at a substance which has no mark ONTOLOGY. 
387 
of being an effect; to a substance who is the cause, and, 
as such, the intelligent cause, of all the order and adapta- 
tion of one thing to another in the universe; who is the 
founder of the moral power within us, and the sanctioner 
of the moral law to which it looks, and who seems to be 
that Infinite Existence to which our faith in infinity is 
ever pointing; and now the mind in all its intuitions is 
satisfied. The intuitive belief as to power in substance 
is satisfied; the intuitive belief in the adequacy of the 
cause to produce its effects is satisfied; the native moral 
conviction is satisfied; and the belief in infinity is satis- 
fied. True, every step in this process is not intuitive or 
demonstrative; there may be more than one experiential 
link in the chain; but the intuitive convictions enter 
very largely, and when experience has furnished its quota, 
they are gratified, and feel as if they had nothing to de- 
mand beyond this One Substance possessed of all power 
and of all perfection. 
If we would avoid the utmost possible confusion of 
thought, we must distinguish between these two kinds of 
conditioned and unconditioned; the one referring to hu- 
man knowledge, and the discussion of it falling properly 
under Gnosiology; the other to existence, and so falling 
under Ontology. The conditional, in respect of know- 
ledge, does, if we pursue the conditioned sufficiently far, 
conduct at last to primary truths, which are to us uncon- 
ditioned. These are the first truths which we have been 
seeking to seize and express in this treatise. We cannot 
be made to think or believe that these primary truths 
should not be positive truths, and regarded as truths by 
all other beings capable of comprehending them as well 
as ourselves. But it is to be carefully remarked, and 
ever allowed, that some of those truths which are ori- 
ginal and independent to us, may be seen by higher in- 
telligences to be dependent on, or to be necessarily inter- 388 
METAPHYSICS. 
linked with, other truths. We may by patient induction 
ascertain what are to us unconditioned truths; but it 
would be presumptuous in us to pretend to determine 
what truths are so in themselves, and are seen to be such 
by the omniscient God. Again, as to conditioned and 
unconditioned existence, it is quite clear that nothing falls 
under our notice in this world which is absolutely uncon- 
ditioned. But the intuitive convictions of the mind, pro- 
ceeding on a few obvious facts, lead us by an easy pro- 
cess to an unconditioned Being,—that is, whose existence 
depends on no other. 
But the question is started, Can we conceive of the 
Unconditioned? Of truth unconditioned to us we can 
conceive : it is the generalization of those truths on which 
we are ever falling back in the last resort. But can we 
conceive of unconditioned existence ? I find no difficulty 
in doing so. My intellectual and moral convictions are 
not satisfied till I do so. But is not our conception, after 
all, merely negative ? I admit that my conception of un- 
conditioned is negative, is a conception merely of the 
removing of a restriction; and I am not aware that we 
have any intuitive conviction as to unconditioned such 
as we have in regard to infinite. But pursuing every one 
of our native convictions, cognitive, fiducial, moral, they 
conduct us to a positive conception of a Being from 
whom all conditions are removed, and whose existence 
and perfections are themselves underived, while they are 
the source of all power and excellence in the creature. 
Sect. Y. [Supplementary.) The Antinomies of Kant. 
Kant tries to show that the speculative reason conducts to pro- 
positions which are contradictory of each other (Kritik d. r. Vern. 
p. 338). It follows that it cannot be trusted in any of its enun- 
ciations. Kant extricates himself from the practical difficulties in 
which he was thereby involved by declaring that the speculative 
reason was not given to lead us to positive objective truth, and by ONTOLOGY. 
389 
appealing from it to the practical reason. It is however always 
competent to the sceptic to maintain that, if the speculative reason 
deceive us, so also may the practical reason. The doctrine which 
I hold is, that the reason does not lead directly nor consequentially 
to any such contradictions. In regard to some of the counter-pro- 
positions, Eeason seems to me to say nothing on the one side or the 
other. In regard to others, there seem to be intuitive convictions 
but the contradiction arises from an erroneous exposition or ex- 
pression of them. It is of course easy, on such abstruse subjects, 
to construct a series of propositions which may seem to be contra- 
dictory, or in reality be contradictory, if they have a meaning at 
all. But these propositions will be found not to be the expression 
of the actual decisions of the mind. Let us examine the contra- 
dictions which are supposed to be sanctioned by reason. I am to 
content myself with looking at the propositions themselves, with- 
out entering on the elaborate demonstrations of them by Kant, 
These demonstrations proceed on the peculiar Kantian principles 
in regard to phenomena, space, time, and the nature of the relations 
which the mind can discover, and these I have been seeking to 
undermine all throughout this treatise. It will be enough here to 
show that Eeason sanctions no contradictions on the topics to which 
Kant refers. 
FIRST ANTINOMY. 
The world has a beginning in 
time, and is limited in regard to 
space. 
The world has no beginning in 
time, and no limits in space, but 
is in regard to both infinite. 
JNow upon this I have to remark, first, that, as to the ‘ world,’ 
we have, so far as I can discover, no intuition whatever. We have 
merely an intuition as to certain things in the world, or, it may be, 
out of the world. Our reason does declare that space and time are 
infinite, but it does not declare whether the world is or is not infi- 
nite in extent and duration. We shall find under another anti- 
nomy what is our conviction as to God. Eeason does not declare 
that space or time, or the God who inhabits them, must be finite. 
Every composite substance con- 
sists of simple parts, and all that 
exists must either be simple or 
composed of simple parts. 
SECOND ANTINOMY. 
JNTo composite thing can consist 
of simple parts, and there cannot 
exist in the world any simple sub- 
stance. 
Our reason says nothing as to whether things are or are not 
made up of simple substances. Experience cannot settle the ques- 390 
METAPHYSICS. 
tion started by Kant in one way or other. We find certain things 
composite : these we know are made up of parts; but we cannot 
say how far the decomposition may extend, or what is the nature 
of the furthest elements reached. 
THIRD ANTINOMY. 
Causality, according to the laws 
of nature, is not the only causa- 
lity operating to originate the phe- 
nomena of the world ; to account 
for the phenomena we must have 
a causality of freedom. 
There is no such thing as free- 
dom, but everything in the world 
happens according to the laws of 
nature. 
Here I think reason does sanction two sets of facts. One is the 
existence of freedom ; the other is the universal prevalence of some 
sort of causation, which may differ however in every different kind 
of object. These may be so stated as to be contradictory. But 
our convictions in themselves involve no contradiction : it is im- 
possible to show that they do by the law of contradiction, which is 
that A is not Not-A. “ There is some sort of causation even in vo- 
luntary acts and “ the will is freeno one can show that these 
two propositions are contradictory. 
FOURTH ANTINOMY. 
There exists in the world, or in 
connection with it, as a part or as 
the cause of it, an absolutely ne- * 
cessary being. 
An absolutely necessary being 
does not exist, either in the world 
or out of it, as the cause of the 
world. 
Our reason seems to say that time and space must have ever 
existed, and must exist. When a God is found, by an easy process 
the mind is led by intuition to trace up these effects in nature to 
Him as the underived substance. No contradictory proposition 
can be established either by reason or experience. 
A little patient investigation of our actual intuitions will show 
that all these contradictions, of which the Kantians and Hegelians 
make so much, are not in our constitutions, but in the ingenious 
structures fashioned by metaphysicians to support their theories. 
Sect. YI. (Supplementary.) Examination of Mr. J. S. 
Mill’s Metaphysical System. 
By far the ablest opponent of intuitive truth in this country in 
our day is Mr. John Stuart Mill. It will be necessary to examine 
his own metaphysical system. I speak thus because he has in fact ONTOLOGY. 
391 
a metaphysics underlying his whole logical disquisitions. He says, 
indeed, in the introduction to his Logic, that “ with the original 
data or ultimate premisses of our knowledge, with their number or 
nature, the mode in which they are obtained, or the tests by which 
they may be distinguished, logic in a direct way has, in the sense 
in which I conceive the same, nothing to do.” Yet Mr. Mill is 
ever and anon diving down into these very topics, and uttering 
very decided opinions as to our knowledge of mind and body, as 
to the foundation of reasoning and demonstrative evidence, and as 
to our belief in causation. This I exceedingly regret; the more so 
that his logic in topics remote from first principles is distinguished 
for masterly exposition, for great clearness, and practical utility.* 
If it be answered that a thorough logic cannot be constructed 
without building on the foundations which metaphysics supply, 
then I have to regret that Mr. Mill’s metaphysics should be so 
defective. His philosophy might seem to be that of Locke, but 
in fact it omits many truths to which Locke gave prominence, as, 
for example, the high function of intuition. Mr. Mill’s metaphy- 
sical system is that of the age and circle in which he was trained; 
it is derived in part from Dr. Brown, and his own father, Mr. 
J ames Mill, and to a greater extent from M. Comte. 
The only satisfactory metaphysical admission of Mr. Mill is, 
“ Whatever is known to us by consciousness is known beyond the 
possibility of question” (4th edit. Logic, Introd. p. 6). What 
does this admission amount to ? Eirst, as to self, or mind, he says, 
“ But what this being is, although it is myself, I have no know- 
ledge, other than the series of its states of consciousness.” As to 
body, he says the reasonable opinion is that it is the “ hidden ex- 
ternal cause to which we refer our sensations” (Logic, i. iii. 8). 
Sensation is our only primary mental operation in regard to an 
external world, and perception is discarded “ as an obscure word” 
(compare Dissertations, vol. i. p. 94). “ There is not the slightest 
reason for believing that what we call the sensible qualities of the 
object are a type of anything inherent in itself, or bear any affinity 
to its own nature.” “ Why should matter resemble our sensa- 
tions ?” (Logic, i. iii. 7). Speaking of bodies, and our feelings or 
* Mr. Kidd, in his very able work on the ‘ Primary Principles of 
Reasoning,’ cbap. iii., has examined Mr. Mill’s Attributive theory of 
reasoning, and has shown that when he puts the major premiss in the 
form of “Attribute A is a mark of Attribute B,” it means that “the 
class of things that possess A also possess B,” and that we have thus 
the Dictum which he so much disparages brought in surreptitiously. 392 
METAPHYSICS. 
states of consciousness, lie says, “ The bodies, or external objects 
which excite certain of these feelings, together with the powers 
or properties whereby they excite them ; these being included 
rather in compliance with common opinion, and because their ex- 
istence is taken for granted in the common language, from which 
I cannot deviate, than because the recognition of such powers or 
properties as real existences appears to be warranted by a sound 
philosophy.” It is curious to see how extremes meet. Mr. Mill 
seems in every way the opponent of the Kantian school. Yet he 
quotes with approbation and evident delight the words of Sir W. 
Hamilton, “ All that we know is therefore phenomenal,—pheno- 
menal of the unknown” (i. iii., 5). 
I have to ask my readers to compare this philosophic system 
with the account I have submitted in this treatise, and judge for 
themselves in the light of consciousness. He admits that whatever 
is known by consciousness is beyond possibility of question; but 
I hold that by consciousness we know much more than he admits. 
He allows that we know Feelings—the favourite but most inade- 
quate language of the French Sensationalists, and of Brown. I 
maintain that our consciousness is of Self as Feeling, and not of 
Feelings separate from Self. If he ask me to define Self, which 
I maintain that we thus know, I ask him to define Feeling, which 
he acknowledges that we thus know. It will then be seen that 
neither can be defined, because both are original perceptions of 
consciousness. He admits as indisputable only what we are 
conscious of. I maintain that we must admit all we intuitively 
know, and that we know body immediately. Mr. Mill, following 
Brown, maintains that we know body by inference, as the cause 
of what we feel. Brown can get the inference; for he holds reso- 
lutely by the doctrine that we intuitively believe that every effect 
has a cause; and discovering phenomena in us which have no cause 
in us, he seeks for a cause without us. This process would, I think, 
leave the external world an unknown thing, and could never give 
us a knowledge of extension (which not being in the effect we 
could not place in the cause;) still we might thus argue that an 
external world existed. But how can Mr. Mill, who denies intui- 
tive causation, get the external world at all ? Where, indeed, is he 
to get even his causation as an experiential law ? For in a mind 
shut up darkly from all direct knowledge of anything beyond, the 
most common phenomena must be sensations and feelings of which 
we can never discover a cause, or know that they have a cause. I 
agree with an able critic (‘ National Beview,’ Oct. 1859), that the 
logical result of such a system is painfully blank. Kant saved 393 
ONTOLOGY. 
himself from the consequences of his speculative system by calling 
in the Practical Reason, and Hamilton accomplished the same end 
by calling in Paith. I think that these great men were entitled 
to appeal to oar moral convictions and to our necessary faiths. 
These I hold to be beyond dispute, no less than our consciousness 
or our feelings. But Mr. Mill makes no such appeal to save him 
from the void; and he avoids expressing any opinion as to the 
great fundamental religious truths which men have in all ages in- 
tertwined with their ethical principles, and from which they have 
derived their brightest hopes and deepest assurances. He is silent 
on these subjects, as if on the one hand unwilling to deny them, 
and as if he felt on the other hand that by his miserably defective 
philosophic principles he had left himself no ground on which to 
build them. 
Mr. Mill’s derivative logic is admirable; but it is difficult to 
find to what the final appeal is to be. “ There is no appeal from 
the human faculties generally; but there is an appeal from one 
faculty to another, from the judging faculty to those which take 
cognizance of fact, the faculties of sense and consciousness” (iii. 
xxi. 1). This would seem to make sense and consciousness the 
final appeal. But all that sense gives, according to him, is an un- 
known cause of feelings, and all that consciousness gives is a series 
of feelings. He says, very properly, that we should make “ the 
opinion agree with the factbut he seems to leave us no means 
of getting at any other facts than floating feelings. 
I have already noticed his defective account of our moral percep- 
tion (see sioprci, p. 304), and of our belief in causation (p. 276), and 
I may yet have occasion to refer to his theory of mathematical 
axioms. It now only remains at this place to show that he has 
given an utterly erroneous account of the tests or criteria of pri- 
mitive or fundamental truth. He is obliged, as for himself, to ad- 
mit some sort of test: we must admit, he says, “ all that is known 
by consciousnessand he says there is “ no appeal from the hu- 
man faculties generally.” I do regret that he has never patiently 
set himself to inquire what is the knowledge given by “ conscious- 
ness,” and in the testimonies of the “ faculties generally.” This 
would have led him to truths which he ignores, or contemptuously 
sets aside. He examines the views of the defenders of necessary 
truth on the supposition that the test of such truth is that “ the 
negation of it is not only false but inconceivable ” (Logic, ii. v. 
6). He then uses the word “ inconceivable ” in all its ambiguity 
of meaning. By “ conceivable ” he often means that which we can 
apprehend, or of which we may have an idea, in the sense of an image, 394 
METAPHYSICS. 
“ When we have often seen or thought of two things together, and 
have never in any one instance either seen or thought of them 
separately, there is, by the primary law of association, an increas- 
ing difficulty, which may in the end become insuperable, of conceiv- 
ing the two things apart.” He then proceeds to show that what 
is inconceivable by one man is conceivable by another; that what 
is inconceivable in one age may become conceivable the next. 
“ There was a time when men of the most cultivated intellects, and 
the most emancipated from the dominion of early prejudice, would 
not credit the existence of antipodes ” (iii. v. 6). I acknowledge 
that the tests of intuition have often been loosely stated, and that 
they have also been illegitimately applied ; just as the laws of de- 
rivative logic have been. But they have seldom or never been put 
in the ambiguous form in which Mr. Mill understands them, and 
it is only in such a form that they could ever be supposed to cover 
such beliefs as the rejection of the rotundity of the earth. The 
tests of intuition can be clearly enunciated, and can be so used as 
to settle for us what is intuitive truth. It is not the power of 
conception that should be used as a test, but it is self-evidence 
with necessity,—the necessity of cognition, if the intuition be a 
cognition ; the necessity of belief, if it be a belief; the necessity of 
judgment, if it be a judgment. There was a time when even edu- 
cated men felt a difficulty in conceiving the antipodes, because it 
seemed contrary, not to intuition, but to their limited experience ; 
but surely no one knowing anything of philosophy, or of what he 
was speaking, would have maintained, at any time, that it was self- 
evident that the earth could not be round, and that it was impos- 
sible, in any circumstances, to believe the opposite. The tests of 
intuition, clearly announced and rigidly applied, give their sanc- 
tion only to such truths as all men have spontaneously assented to 
in all ages. 395 
BOOK II. 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
THE VARIOUS SCIENCES. 
CHAPTER I. 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE DEMONSTRATIVE OR 
FORMAL AND THE MATERIAL OR INDUCTIVE SCI- 
ENCES. 
The distinction between them is so obvious that it has 
been very generally acknowledged. Every one sees the 
difference between such sciences as mathematics and the 
Aristotelian logic on the one hand, and zoology and 
botany on the other. Different accounts however have 
been given of the grounds of the distinction. Here, as 
in so many of the other topics which have fallen under 
our notice, there has been much confusion, issuing in 
partial truth and positive error. Thus, it is often said 
that the one class has to do exclusively with abstract 
truth, and the other with facts which it seeks to classify 
and arrange. But there are generalizations, and there- 
fore abstractions, in all science ; and if there be any truth 
in the account given in this treatise, even the sciences 
which proceed on intuition have to commence with facts 
which they generalize. Again, the one class is said to be 
concerned with a priori and the other with a posteriori 
truth. But then truth can be available in such sciences 396 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
only in a general form, and in order to reach the general 
truth there must be a process of induction. Still there 
is truth in both these statements. All that is necessary 
is to explicate it clearly, and make it stand out separate 
from associated errors. 
One class of sciences have evidently to do throughout 
with facts which they seek to correlate by observing the 
relations among them, say of form, of property, or of 
cause and effect. When these facts are external, the 
sciences are material, such as physiology and chemistry 
and geology. If the facts be internal, then we have the 
science of psychology, with its several subdivisions. In 
these sciences the inquirer always starts with individual 
facts, but he aims to discover resemblances or other rela- 
tions, to abstract the points of correlation, and at last to 
arrive at general laws or causes ever rising in generality. 
The other class of sciences, if there be any accuracy 
in the fundamental principles of this work, must also, 
begin with facts, but they are facts of a different order. 
The investigator seizes on the original convictions of the 
mind on the given set of objects, discovers their rule, or 
the principle involved in them, by a process of abstraction 
and generalization, and then constructs his science by 
combining them, and carrying them out deductively. 1 
am to show, in the Chapters which follow, that this is 
what is done in the science of mathematics, and to some 
extent also in logic and ethics. 
The distinction between the two is thus sufficiently 
marked. Both must start with facts, but the one starts 
with the individual convictions, which are native, original, 
and necessary—or, to speak more accurately, with the facts 
and truths thus revealed,—and formalizing the princi- 
ples involved in them, it adopts these as its fundamental 
maxims, and is now ready to begin its proper work of 
combining its truths and deducing consequences. The DEMONSTRATIVE AND INDUCTIVE SCIENCES. 
397 
sciences which use only such principles are very properly 
called apodictic, or demonstrative. They may also be 
called, in an especial sense, abstract sciences, inasmuch 
as they deal with principles in an abstract form. Logic 
is frequently called formal, because it proceeds on such 
rules; and the appellation might be applied to other sci- 
ences, such as ethics, and even mathematics. But it is 
not to be forgotten, that, after all, these sciences do start 
from facts, though from facts of a particular kind, and if 
there be any dispute as to their fundamental principles, 
the appeal must be to these facts, that is, to the original 
convictions of the mind. These facts have all a convic- 
tion of necessity in them, and on the condition that they 
be properly generalized, the necessity goes up with each 
case into the general axiom, and all the truths may be 
represented as Necessary Truths. The maxims with 
which these sciences start are all generalizations of our 
primitive cognitions, beliefs, or judgments, and these with 
the furthest deductions reached have all a reference to 
objects, and these are the particular kind of objects con- 
templated in the original conviction. The propositions 
of geometry have a reference to space. The maxims of 
ethics have a reference to voluntary actions. Logical for- 
mulae have a reference to the notions of the mind and 
the objects apprehended in these notions. We may at 
any time apply the abstract deductions of any of these 
sciences to cases which fulfil the conditions. They are 
all true, necessarily true, of their corresponding objects. 
Thus all the conclusions of mathematics in regard to the 
ellipse must hold good of the planets, so far as they move 
in an elliptic orbit. The special rules of the syllogism 
must hold good of our reasoning about every sort of 
things. It is to be remembered, however, that most of 
the axioms of the sciences are generalizations, not so much 
of our primitive cognitions or beliefs, as of our primitive 398 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
judgments, and these, while they have a reference to ob- 
jects, may have a reference to such merely potentially. 
There may be no such thing as a perfectly elliptic curve 
in the planetary movements ; still, even in such cases, the 
abstract truth has a respect to a possible ellipse mathe- 
matically correct. 
And here the question is started, How can demonstra- 
tion be carried so far in certain departments, while in 
others it can proceed only a very little way? To this it must 
be answered, first, in a general way, that demonstration, 
as proceeding on intuition, is possible only in those de- 
partments in which we have intuition, and in these only 
so far as the special intuition will carry us. In mathe- 
matics we have the necessary relations of space, time, 
number, and quantity to proceed on. The simplicity of 
the objects allows of great accuracy of expression, which 
again admits, and all but necessitates, great clearness of 
notion and comprehension, and thus error is rendered 
all but impossible, except from the grossest carelessness. 
An encouragement is given to the prosecution of mathe- 
matical deduction, by the circumstance that the truths 
reached admit of an application to so many departments 
of nature which in respect of form, time, and quantity 
are constructed on rigidly mathematical principles. In 
formal logic too, and in ethics, the laws of thought and 
of our moral convictions being detected and rigidly ex- 
pressed, may be carried out to a considerable length by 
rigid deduction. In mechanics and dynamics the intui- 
tion of mind regarding force may admit of a very limited 
union of demonstration with experiment. But in cases 
in which the intuition is of a very bare character, the 
number of relations which can be discovered is necessarily 
very limited. Thus the relation of identity can afford 
little matter for demonstration. Again, when the intui- 
tion mixes itself closely with other mental acts, it is diffi- DEMONSTRATIVE AND INDUCTIVE SCIENCES. 
399 
cult to reach its precise rule, or get a rule sufficiently 
clear and definite for demonstration. Thus, our intuition 
as to cause, the causes being so often dual or plural, does 
not admit of so satisfactory deduction as our mathema- 
tical intuitions. Yet further, demonstration, however far 
it might be carried in an abstract form, admits of few 
applications to nature when the circumstances become 
very complicated. Mathematics can determine very de- 
finitely what will be the path of a body when it is at- 
tracted by only one other, but it can settle the problem 
of three bodies only approximately. Formal Logic is 
greatly hampered by the complexity of thought and the 
variety of the objects of thought, and a demonstrative 
ethics becomes valueless in the complicated affairs of hu- 
man life. By far the greater number of the phenomena 
of nature within and without us, are so involved and in- 
tricate that the abstract truths of intuition and demon- 
stration admit of no application to them. 
In the other class of sciences the inquirer begins with 
facts, these not being the necessary convictions of the 
mind. He has first and mainly to observe them care- 
fully, and, if need be, to work experiments so as to elicit 
them fully, and discover the special action of each agent 
working in the complex operation ; and he aims by the 
“ necessary exclusions,” and by co-ordination, to reach 
a general law or a general cause. This law, however, 
has in it no necessity, and no absolute universality, or 
universality beyond the knowable cosmos. Having- 
reached the law, the science is satisfied in regard to that 
department of facts. At the same time it may employ 
the law as a means to further ends; say, by deduction to 
ascertain unknown facts, or to reach some further law. 
These deduced particulars, or laws, can of course have 
only the certainty of the law from which they are drawn, 
and this only on the condition that the derivation is pro- 400 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
perly made. The truths in these departments of know- 
ledge are all Experiential or Contingent. 
It should be noticed that some sciences are of a mixed 
character, partaking of the nature of both classes. Of 
this description are mechanics, astronomy, and optics, in 
each of which there is a union of the generalization of 
outward facts with the generalization of the intuitive 
convictions of the mind regarding space, number, and 
force. In ethics too there is an observation of the cha- 
racters and circumstances of men, combined with original 
moral principle. Logic, taken in a large sense, may be 
considered as not only the science of the generalized ope- 
rations of thought, but of the laws of thought as applied, 
say, to necessary truth in demonstration, and to contin- 
gent truth in induction. 
Nor should it be omitted that in most sciences there 
are metaphysical principles involved, though these are 
seldom noticed by physical inquirers. In the Chapters 
which immediately follow, I am to refer first to the sci- 
ences in which intuition and demonstration are the all- 
important instruments, and then to those departments of 
knowledge in which intuition enters, often tacit and un- 
seen, as an element. 
CHAPTER II. 
THE MENTAL SCIENCES. 
Sect. I. Classification of the Mental Sciences. 
Already five mental sciences have emerged, and these 
will come each to be subdivided into special departments 
as the study makes progress. 
There is Psychology, which inquires into the operations 401 
THE MENTAL SCIENCES. 
of the mind of man with the view of discovering its laws 
and its faculties. The founder of this science is un- 
doubtedly Aristotle in ancient times. Locke may be de- 
scribed as its second founder in modern times. It is a 
science throughout of facts and the co-ordination of facts. 
As a whole, it has made a gradual progress since its origin 
in Greece, and its second rise in the seventeenth century. 
There is Logic. There were helps and preparations 
towards its construction in the discussions of earlier spe- 
culators, but Aristotle may be regarded as the founder 
of this science also. In modern times it has had a spe- 
cial province allotted to it by Kant, who defined it as the 
science of the laws of the understanding and of the 
reason. Those who do not acknowledge the distinction, 
as drawn by Kant, between the understanding and the 
reason, but who adopt Kant’s general view of Logic, de- 
scribe it as the Science of the Laws of Thought. It should 
seek first to seize the laws of thought as in the mind of 
man, but its main office is to analyze and formalize and 
apply them. 
There is the science of Ethics. The founder of it is 
undoubtedly Socrates. It is the science of the laws of 
the Morally Good. It should endeavour to seize the laws 
of man’s moral nature, especially of the conscience, and 
thence proceed, as its more particular work, to analyze 
them into forms or rules, and apply them to the peculia- 
rities of human character and the specialties of human 
life. 
There should be a science whose object-matter is the 
laws of the feelings. Already have we a science for 
an important part of this general subject, the science of 
which would determine the laws of the beau- 
tiful. But we should have a science seeking to discover 
the laws of the feelings generally, and to trace them in 
their influence, as directed to various classes of objects 402 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
within and without us. Plato is entitled to be regarded 
as the founder of this science, from his frequent and 
often profound inquiries into the nature of the to koXov, 
or ‘the fair.’ I am inclined to call this scarcely formed 
science Kalology, or Kallisophy. 
There is the science of Metaphysics. In some of its 
inquiries it appeared earlier than any of the others, going 
back to the age of the Eleatics. Yet it will be one of 
the latest to come to any degree of perfection, owing to 
the subtle and deeply seated nature of the objects at 
which it looks. It has generally had far too wide and 
ambitious a province allotted to it. I have sought in 
this treatise to confine it to a special field, and defined it as 
the science of the intuitive convictions of the mind, and 
made the science of knowledge and the science of being 
as two compartments of it. Its office is by induction to 
determine what are the laws of the intuitions, and to re- 
duce them to general expressions. It cannot attain any- 
thing like a scientific form, till psychology has made 
some progress, and taught us to distinguish between in- 
tuition and associated and allied states of mind. 
Sect. II. Logic. 
I am disposed to define Logic as the Science of the 
Laws of Discursive Thought. It presupposes that cer- 
tain materials are supplied to the mind, say, by sense and 
self-consciousness, and by the reproductive powers bring- 
ing them before the mind even when the objects are not 
present. Thought works on these materials discursively, 
that is, from something given it draws or derives some- 
thing else. In doing so it follows certain laws. It is the 
office of Logic to seize these laws, and to derive rules 
from them which may guide and guard thought in its va- 
rious applications. 
Logic is described by those who take much the same Til 15 MENTAL SCIENCES. 
403 
view of it as I do, as an a priori science. But this ac- 
count cannot be allowed to pass without an explanation. 
It may be called an a priori science, inasmuch as it deals 
with laws which are in the mental constitution prior to 
all experience. But in another sense it is not an a priori 
science, nor can there be an a priori science, for there is 
no department in which general laws can be discovered 
independent of experience. While the laws of thought 
are a priori, we cannot discover them a priori. It is quite 
conceivable, indeed, that man might have been so framed 
that he could discover the laws of thought by immediate 
consciousness or intuition. His mental constitution might 
have been such as to enable him at once to enunciate 
the laws of contradiction and excluded middle, and the 
Dictum de omni et nullo. But it is very evident that man 
has not been so constituted by his Maker. The only 
method available to us of discovering the laws of thought, 
is to observe their spontaneous operations, separate by 
analysis the invariable from the accidental, and by a 
process of induction collect the law from its individual 
acts. 
Logic thus throws us back on Psychology, and on an 
inductive psychology, not indeed to justify the laws, but 
to discover them. Not that psychology and logic are iden- 
tical, or that they should be mixed up with one another. 
Psychology, in treating of the operations of the mind gene- 
rally, will fall in with thought, and will seek by classifi- 
cation to discover the faculties of thought, and these are 
specially the comparative or correlative powers. It will 
seek even to discover in a general way the laws involved 
in thought. But when it has gone so far in this direc- 
tion, it will stop. It does not make a very minute analysis 
of these laws, it does not seek to present them in all pos-- 
sible forms, it does not make an application of them to 
discursive investigation. It leaves this to logic as its spe- 404 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
cial province. Nor should logic enter generally into the 
nature of the human mind, its faculties and laws. It 
should confine itself to one single department. Nor does 
it in this department seek to investigate faculties and 
their mode of operation. It looks at the human mind 
merely with the view of discovering the laws involved in 
the discursive exercises, and when it has detected them, it 
puts them in convenient formulae, and applies them to 
all various discursive investigations. If psychology were 
in a more perfect state, it would save logic from nearly 
all psychological inquiry by handing over to it certain 
truths which it might at once adopt, and use for its own 
special purposes. 
Logic has points of relation to metaphysics. Certain 
of the fundamental principles of logic are intuitive. 
These must fall under the province of metaphysics, which 
should generalize them out of their individual operations 
and express them, and show what is their precise nature 
in the human constitution, and their objective validity, 
and the relation in which they stand to the other intui- 
tive principles, and to the experiential exercises of the 
mind. But having finished this work, it hands over 
these principles to logic, to make a more specific use of 
them by presenting them in divers formulae, and followT- 
ing them out in discursive investigation. On the other 
hand, logic does not consider these intuitive principles 
as intuitive. If they are admitted, it does not care 
whether they are intuitive or experiential; it does not 
trouble itself to inquire about their origin, foundation, 
or guarantee, or their relation to other exercises of the 
mind. But while logic is not to be confounded with 
psychology or with metaphysics, yet in all disputes as 
to its fundamental principles, it is necessarily thrown 
back on both. In particular the disputes as to the na- 
ture of the abstract and general notion, and all the dis- THE MENTAL SCIENCES. 
405 
cussions in the present day as to whether the predicate 
ought or ought not to be qualified, as to whether the 
dictum is or is not the ultimate expression of the uni- 
versal law of reasoning, are to be settled by psycholo- 
gical and metaphysical investigation. 
From a very old date, Logic is represented as having 
to do with the Notion, with Judgment, and Reasoning. 
Its special province is to discover the laws of thought 
involved in each of these, to formalize and apply them. 
The investigations pursued in this treatise have brought 
out a number of truths capable of furnishing principles 
in each of these departments. But it would carry us 
into another science altogether, were I to proceed in this 
treatise to specify the logical applications of metaphy- 
sical truth. 
In addition to the Universal Logic discovering and 
applying the laws of thought, whatever be the objects, 
there may also be a Particular Logic unfolding the laws 
of discursive thought as addressed to particular classes 
of objects. Under this head such subjects as demonstra- 
tive and probable evidence, induction, and analogy would 
be discussed. In this eminently practical department, 
metaphysics should be able to show, in every branch of 
inquiry, what principles are intuitive,—by the tests which 
I have so often specified,—and, by consequence, what 
must be made to rest on experience.* 
* I am aware that there are some who deny that there can be such 
a department of logic. Logic, they say, has to do with thought, and 
not with objects, and can take no cognizance of the difference of ob- 
jects. I admit that logic has to do with the laws of thought, and not 
with the nature of objects. But then thought has always a reference, 
avowed or tacit, to objects. There is a subtle error lying here in the 
account given of universal logic by Kant, who says that it makes ab- 
straction of all content of the cognition (Kritik, Trans. Logik). It is 
all true that logic looks to the thought, but it is also true that thought 
has a content. The difference between universal and particular logic 
lies in this, that the former looks to thought, whatever be the content, 406 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
Sect. III. Ethics. 
Ethics is in every respect an analogous science to Lo- 
gic. The difference lies in the difference of the matters 
with which they deal, the one aiming to find the laws of 
discursive truth, the other the nature of moral good; the 
one seeking to attain its end by generalizing the opera- 
tions of thought, the other by generalizing the exercises 
of the motive and moral powers of man. Ethics, like 
Logics, is in a sense an a priori science; it finds and it 
employs principles which are valid independent of our 
experience. In another sense, it is a posteriori, inas- 
much as these principles and their laws can be discovered 
by us only through observation of their individual mani- 
festations ; and thus far it is dependent on an inductive 
psychology. We must begin with inquiring, Quid est? 
and then we find that the thing reached relates to the 
Quid oportet ? It is the special office of ethics to ascer- 
tain what is involved in the oportet, and apply its for- 
mulae to the conduct of responsible beings. 
It has to look to three special classes of objects, in 
order to discover the laws which it employs. It has to 
look to the motives addressed to the mind, with the view 
of gaining its consent, and, it may be, of inducing it to 
form a determination to act. It has to look to the will 
or the mind deciding upon the motives addressed to it. 
Further, and specially, it has to look to the conscience 
and the latter to thought, directed to special classes of content. This 
leads me to point out another error which has crept into the Kantian 
Logic from the Kantian Metaphysics. It is that the laws of thought 
are mere forms in the mind. True, they are rules in the mind, but 
they are rules which refer to objects, and they do not give the objects 
anything that is not in them. True, all discursive thought implies ma- 
terials supplied to it. If fable or error be given it, what it reaches may 
also be fabulous or erroneous. But on the other hand, if it start with 
fact or with truth, and proceed according to logical laws, all that it 
reaches will also be real and true. THE MENTAL SCIENCES. 
407 
intimating to the will when it should yield to motives 
addressed to it, and when it should resist. The mind 
discerns moral good as a quality of certain voluntary acts, 
and it pronounces a number of decisions in regard to 
moral good in itself, and these can be abstracted into 
definitions or generalized into laws which are the funda- 
mental principles of the science. The mind too has a set 
of primitive judgments, which it forms in regard to the 
connection of moral good and happiness, and these can 
also be made to assume a general form. The general 
principles thus obtained can be put, by analysis, into an 
immense number of specific forms, to suit special purposes- 
scientific or practical. They can be put in the form of 
ethical principles, to meet prevalent errors, such as those 
of the utilitarian or of the sensationalist. Or, again, they 
can take the form of general or specific precepts, such as, 
“ Thou shalt love the Lord with all thy heart“ Thou 
shalt not covet anything that is thy neighbour’s.” In 
regard to the will, our intuitive convictions declare that 
in all moral action the deed must be voluntary, and the 
will must be free. 
But a science of ethics fitted to serve any useful pur- 
pose cannot be constructed from the mere native convic- 
tions of the mind. We do obtain a few most important 
general principles from this source exclusively, and these 
underlie the whole science, and bear up every part of it. 
But, in order to serve the ends intended by it, ethics must 
settle what are the duties of different classes of persons, 
according to the relation in which they stand to each 
other, such as rulers and subjects, parents and children, 
masters and servants; and what the path which indivi- 
duals should follow in certain circumstances, it may be, 
very difficult and perplexing. In consequence of the af- 
fairs of human life being very complicated, demonstration 
can be carried but a very little way in ethics. In order 408 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
to be able to enunciate general principles for our guid- 
ance, or to promulgate useful precepts, the ethical inquirer 
must condescend to come down from his a priori heights 
to the level in which mankind live and walk and work. 
Even in the most practical departments of ethical science, 
the grand fundamental laws of our moral constitution 
must ever be the guiding principles, but we have to con- 
sider their application to an almost infinite variety of 
earthly positions and human character. 
In these investigations metaphysics, were it diligently 
to cultivate its own field, and confine itself to it, should 
be able greatly to serve the science of ethics. It should 
be in a position to show what is the nature of our intui- 
tions, how these intuitions differ from one another, where- 
in our intellectual differ from our moral intuitions, and 
what sort of objective reality each class of our intuitions 
guarantees, and it should show how we may draw the 
general law out of the individual convictions. But meta- 
physics and ethics are not, after all, the same science, nor 
should ethics be regarded as a branch of metaphysics, 
nor should metaphysics profess to be able to construct 
an ethical science. Some of the fundamental principles 
of ethics are certainly metaphysical, but ethics consists 
mainly in the construction of a science on these principles 
as a basis. 
Of all the sciences, ethics is that which comes into 
closest relationship with Christianity and the Word of 
God. The reason is obvious. It deals with the law 
and the very character of God; it deals with man as 
under law, and with man as having broken the law. It 
thus prepares us, if it faithfully fulfil its functions, to be- 
lieve in a religion which shows us how the sinner can be 
reconciled to God. When the great doctrine of the Atone- 
ment is embraced, a new and most important element is 
introduced into ethics. It should no longer be a science MATHEMATICS. 
409 
constructed, on the one hand for pure beings, nor on the 
other for persons who must ever be kept at a distance 
from God. This new reconciling and gracious element 
turns a pagan into a Christian ethics ; it turns a cold and 
legal, into a warm and evangelical obedience. 
CHAPTER III. 
MATHEMATICS. 
It has been shown by Kant that the axioms of geometry 
are synthetic and not analytic judgments.* Thus, in 
the axiom, “ Two straight lines cannot enclose a space,” 
the predication that “ they cannot enclose a space,” is not 
contained in the bare notion of “ two straight lines.” Start- 
ing with axioms which involve more than analytic judg- 
ments, we are reaching throughout the demonstration 
more than identical truth. The propositions in the books 
of Euclid are all evolved out of the definitions and axioms, 
but are not identical with them, or with one another. 
The question is keenly agitated as to axioms, whether 
they are or are not the result of the generalizations of 
experience. It will be found here, as in so many other 
questions which have passed under our notice, that there 
is truth on both sides, error on both sides, and confusion 
in the whole controversy, which is to be cleared up by an 
exact expression of the mental operation involved in pass- 
ing the judgment. A mathematic axiom, being a ge- 
neral maxim, is the result of a process of generalization. If 
we look to what has passed within our minds, we shall 
* Kritik d. r.Vern., p. 143. Mr. Mansel (Proleg. Log., p. 93) main- 
tains that such axioms as that “Things which are equal to the same are 
equal to each other ” are analytic. But does not this confound equality 
'vith identity ? 410 
. METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
find that it has been by the contemplation of individual 
instances that the mind has attained to the comprehension 
and the conviction of the general proposition, that “ If 
equals be added, the sums are equal.” The boy under- 
stands this best when he is in circumstances to use his 
marbles, or his apples. The youth who is finding his way 
through Euclid does not feel that the axiom adds in the 
least to the cogency of the reasoning; on the contrary, it 
is rather the case before him that enables him to compre- 
hend the axiom and to acknowledge its truth. 
But it does not follow that the axiom is a mere gene- 
ralization of an ordinary or an outward experience. It is 
not by trying two straight rods teu, twenty, or a thousand 
times that we arrive at the general proposition that two 
straight lines cannot enclose a space, and thence conclude 
as to two given lines presented to us that it is impossible 
they should enclose a space. It is certainly not by placing 
two rods parallel to each other, and lengthening them 
more and more, and then measuring their distance to see 
if they are approaching that we reach the axiom that two 
parallel lines will never meet, and thence be convinced as 
to any given set of like lines that they will never come 
nearer each other. Place before us two new substances, 
and we cannot tell beforehand whether they will or will 
not chemically combine; but on the bare contempla- 
tion of two straight lines, we declare they cannot con- 
tain a space; and of two parallel lines, that they can 
never meet.* 
* Mr. Mill maintains (Logic, ii. v. 4, 5) that the proposition, “ Two 
straight lines cannot enclose a space,” is a generalization from observa- 
tion, “ an induction from the evidence of the senses.” That observation 
is needed I have shown in this treatise ; but there is intuition in the 
observation. That there is generalization in the general maxim I have 
also shown ; but it is not a generalization of outward instances. Ob- 
servation can of itself tell us that these two lines before us do not en- 
close a space, and that any other couplets of lines examined by us MATHEMATICS. 
411 
Iii mathematical truth the mind, upon the objects be- 
ing presented to its contemplation, at once and intuitively 
pronounces the judgment. It conceives two straight 
lines, and decides that they cannot be made to enclose a 
space. What is true of this case is seen to be true of 
this other case, and of every other, and of all cases. There 
is thus generalization in the formation of the axiom, but 
it is a generalization of the individual intuitive judge- 
ments of the mind. Hence arises the distinction between 
the axioms of mathematics and the general laws reached 
by observation. If we have properly generalized the in- 
dividual conviction, the necessity that is in the individual 
twenty, or a hundred, or a thousand, do not enclose a space; but expe- 
rience can say no more without passing beyond its province. An intel- 
lectual generalization of such experience might allow us to affirm that 
very probably no two lines enclose a space on the earth, but could never 
entitle us to maintain that two lines could not enclose a space in the 
constellation Orion. Mr. Mill, in order to account for the necessity 
which attaches to such convictions, refers to the circumstance that geo- 
metrical forms admit of being distinctly painted in the imagination, so 
that we have “ mental pictures of all possible combinations of lines and 
angles.” We might ask him-what he makes of algebraic and analytic 
demonstrations of every kind, where there is no such power of imagina- 
tion and yet the same necessity. But without dwelling on this, I would 
have it remarked that in the very theory which he devises to show that 
the whole is a process of experience, he is appealing to what no expe- 
rience can ever compass, “to all possible combinations of lines and 
angles.” Intuitive thought, proceeding on intuitive perceptions of 
space, may tell us the “possible combinations ” of geometrical figures, 
but this cannot be done by observation, by sense, or imagination. Sup- 
posing, he says, that two straight lines after diverging could again con- 
verge, “ we can transport ourselves thither in imagination, and can 
frame a mental image of the appearance which one or both of the lines 
must present at that point, which we may rely on as being precisely si- 
milar to the reality.” Most freely do I admit all this. We may ‘ rely ’ 
on it, but surely it is not experience but thought which tells us what 
must be at that point, and that it is a ‘ reality.’ The very line of remark 
which he is pursuing might have shown him that the discovery of ne- 
cessary spatial and quantitative relations is a judgment in which the mind 
looks upon objects intuitively known, and now presented, or more fre- 
quently represented to the mind. 412 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
goes up into the general, which embraces all the indivi- 
duals, and the axiom is necessarily true, and true to all 
beings. But we can never be sure that there may not 
somewhere be an exception to experiential laws. We are 
sure that two straight lines cannot enclose a space in any 
planet, or star, or world, that ever existed or shall exist. 
But it is quite possible that there may be horned animals 
which are not ruminant, or white crows in some of the 
planets; and that there may come a time when the law 
of gravitation shall no longer operate. 
In the case of our intuitive convictions regarding space, 
number, and quantity, the simplicity of the objects makes 
it easy for us to seize the principle, and to put it in proper 
formulae, which can scarcely fail to be accurately made, 
Hence these convictions came to be expressed in ge- 
neral forms, in what were then called Common Notions, 
at a very early age of the history of intellectual cul- 
ture. The disputes among mathematicians in regard 
to axioms, relate not to their certainty and universality, 
but to the forms in which they ought to be put, and as 
to whether what some regard as first truths may not be 
demonstrated from prior truths. Such, for instance, is 
the dispute as to how the axioms and demonstrations as 
to parallel lines should be best constructed. But in re- 
gard to our convictions of extension, number, and quan- 
tity, it is not difficult to gather the' regulating principle 
out of the individual judgment, and the expression is 
commonly accurate. It is different with other of our 
original convictions, such as those which relate to cause 
and effect; the greater complexity of the objects renders 
it more difficult to seize on the principle involved, and 
there is greater room for dispute as to any given formula 
whether it is an exact expression of the facts. 
Another interesting and still disputed topic in the 
metaphysics of mathematics, relates to the nature and MATHEMATICS. 
413 
value of Definitions. Mathematical definitions seem to me 
to be formalized primitive cognitions or beliefs regarding 
space, number, and quantity. In their formation there is 
a process of abstraction involved. A point is defined “ po- 
sition, without magnitude there is no such point, there 
can be no such point. “ A line is length without breadth 
there was never such a line drawn by pen or diamond 
point. But the mind in its analysis is sharper than steel 
or diamond. It can contemplate position without taking 
extension into view. It can reason about the length of a 
line without regarding the breadth. In all these defini- 
tions there is abstraction, but I must ever protest against 
the notion that an abstraction is necessarily something 
unreal. If the concrete be real, the part of it separated 
by abstraction must likewise be real. The position of 
the point is a reality, and so also is the length of a line; 
they are not independent realities, and capable of exist- 
ing alone and apart, but still they are realities, and when 
the mind contemplates them separately, it contemplates 
realities. So far as it reasons about them accurately, ac- 
cording to the laws of thought, the conclusions arrived at 
will also relate to realities, not independent realities, but 
realities of the same nature as those with which we started 
in our original definitions. Thus whatever conclusions 
are arrived at in regard to lines, or circles, or ellipses, will 
apply to all objects, so far as we consider them as hav- 
ing length, or a circular or elliptic form. We find, in fact, 
that the conclusions reached in mathematics do hold true 
of all bodies in earth or sky, so far as we find them oc- 
cupying space, or having numerical relations. 
If this view be correct, we see how inadequate is the 
representation of those who, like D. Stewart and Mr. 
J. S. Mill, represent mathematical definitions as merely 
hypothetical, and represent the whole consistency and 
necessity as being between a supposition and the conse- 414 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
quences drawn from it.* This is to overlook the con- 
crete cognitions or beliefs from which the definition is 
derived. It is likewise to overlook the fact that these 
refer to objects, and the further fact that the abstractions 
from the concretes also imply a reality. This theory 
also fails to account for the circumstance that the con- 
clusions reached in mathematics admit of an application 
to the settlement of so many questions in astronomy, 
and in other departments of natural philosophy. Thus, 
what is demonstrated of the conic sections by Apollonius, 
is found true in the orbits of the planets and comets, as 
revealed by modern discovery. All this can at once be 
explained if we suppose that the mind starts with cogni- 
tions and beliefs, that it abstracts from these, and dis- 
covers relations among the things thus abstracted : the 
reality that was in the original conviction, goes on to the 
furthest conclusion. 
I am inclined to look on the primitive cognitions as 
constituting, properly speaking, the foundation of mathe- 
matics. The mind, looking at the things under the clear 
and distinct aspects in which they are set before it by 
abstraction, discovers relations between them, and can 
draw deductions from the combination. In this process 
the mind proceeds spontaneously, without thinking of 
the general principle involved in the reasoning. It finds 
that A is equal to B, and B to C, and it at once con- 
ludes that A is equal to C. It does not feel that in order 
to reach this conclusion it needs any generalized maxim, 
such as that “ Things which are equal to the same things 
are equal to one another.” The reasoning appears clear 
anterior to the general principle being announced; and 
when the principle is announced, it does not seem to 
add to the force of the ratiocination. It does not, in fact, 
add to the cogency of the argument; it is merely the 
* Stewart’s Elem. yoI. ii. p. 53. Mill’s Logic, ii. v. 1. 415 
THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES. 
expression of the general principle on which it proceeds. 
Still, it serves many important scientific purposes, as 
Locke and Stewart admit, to have this general principle 
expressed in the form of an axiom.* It allows the re- 
flective mind to dwell on the general principle underly- 
ing the spontaneous conviction ; by its clearness it en- 
ables us to test the ratiocination; and it shows what those 
must be prepared to disprove who would dispute or deny 
the conclusion. If this view be correct, the abstracted 
cognitions or beliefs in the definitions constitute the 
proper foundation of mathematical demonstration, while 
the axioms being the generalizations of our primitive judg- 
ments pronounced on looking at the things defined, are 
the links which bind together the parts of the super- 
structure added, f 
CHAPTER IV. 
INTUITIVE PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN THE PHYSICAL 
SCIENCES. 
These sciences must ever be conducted in the method 
of induction, with sense and artificial instruments as the 
agents of observation. But almost all these sciences do 
at times go down to first principles, and the inquirer is 
obliged, in the last resort, to appeal to what the mind 
* Locke’s Essay, iv. vii. 11. Stewart’s Elements, vol. ii. p. 25. 
f There is truth, then, in a statement of D. Stewart: “The doc- 
trine which I have been attempting to establish, so far from degrading 
axioms from that rank which Dr. Reid would assign them, tends to 
identify them still more than he has done, with the exercise of our 
reasoning powers; inasmuch as instead of comparing them with the 
data, on the accuracy of which that of our conclusion necessarily de- 
pends, it considers them as the vincula which give coherence to all the 
particular links of the chain; or (to vary the metaphor) as component 
elements, without which the faculty of reasoning is inconceivable and 
impossible” (Elements, vol. ii. p. 38). 416 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
sees to be true. At the same time, it is not the special 
business of these sciences to inquire into the nature or 
guarantee of ultimate truths ; this it leaves very properly 
to metaphysicians, who should be prepared to announce 
laws of intuition, which the physicist might profitably em- 
ploy to suit his purposes. They might be more profit- 
ably employed in such a work, which lies exclusively 
within their own province, than in pursuing speculative 
ends which can never be attained by human reason. 
In all the sciences which meet in their researches with 
regular forms, and correlated numbers, and constant or 
periodical motion,—such as mechanical science, statics 
and dynamics, and certain departments of astronomy, 
optics, and thermotics,—mathematics have an important 
part to act, and they come in with all their intuitive 
axioms and demonstrations. On these I need not dwell 
further. I leave them, to refer to those sciences in which 
intuition enters otherwise than in a mathematical form. 
Most, if not all, of our intuitive convictions enter, in 
a tacit way, into physical investigation. Thus, the con- 
viction as to the identity of being leads us to chase the 
substance through the various forms it may assume, and 
constrains even those who are most opposed to hypotheses, 
to speak of ultimate molecules or atoms, which change 
not with changing circumstances. The intuition of whole 
and parts prompts us to seek for the missing part after 
we have found certain parts which have been separated 
by analysis, and it constrains us to look on the abstract 
as implying the concrete. Our intuitions as to space 
make the physicist certain, when he sees body now in 
one place and again in another, that it must have passed 
through the whole intermediate space; and it should 
prevent him from ever giving in to the theory which re- 
presents matter as consisting merely of points of force; 
these points cannot, properly speaking, be unextended, THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES. 
417 
and there must always be space between. Our convic- 
tion as to time assures us that there can be no break 
in it, and that when we fall in with the same object at 
two different times, it must have existed the whole inter* 
vening time. Our intuitions as to quantity, or to num- 
ber and proportion, enter more or less formally into all 
natural investigation. Our intuition as to generalization 
insists that, in division, the subclasses should make up 
the class. Our conviction as to substance and property 
prompts us, when we discover a new object, to look out 
for the exercise of its properties; and leads the physicist, 
when he meets with such agencies as electricity and gal- 
vanism, to declare that they must either be separate sub- 
stances (which is very improbable), or properties or states 
of substances. Finally, the fundamental law of causality 
directs us to seek for a cause to every effect. The phy- 
sical investigator, engrossed with external facts, and 
seeking to clear them up, will seldom so much as observe 
these fundamental principles, which are unconsciously 
guiding him; and only on rare occasions will he find 
it necessary to make a formal appeal to them. Still, 
there will be times when those most prejudiced against 
metaphysics will be tempted or compelled to fall back on 
them, when going down to the depths of a deep subject, 
or when hard pressed by an opponent. It often happens 
that, when they do so, their expression of the principle is 
sufficiently awkward and blundering; and I think they 
have reason to complain of the metaphysician that he has 
been wasting his ingenuity in unprofitable and unattain- 
able pursuits, and has done so little to aid physical inves- 
tigation in a matter in which he might have lent it effec- 
tual aid. 
It has been shown by Dr. Whewell, in his great work 
on the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, that each 
kind of science has its special fundamental idea at its 418 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
basis, and he classifies the sciences according to the 
ideas which regulate them. The phrase “ideas” does not 
seem a good one to express the intuitive convictions of 
the mind, either in their spontaneous exercises or formal 
enunciation, and I think he is altogether wrong in sup- 
posing that these ideas “ superinduce ” on the facts some- 
thing not in the facts. But he has in that work deve- 
loped great truths, which physical investigators were al- 
most universally overlooking. I do not mean to follow 
him in his elaborate exposition of the ideas and concep- 
tions involved in the various sciences; I must content 
myself with showing how certain intuitive principles en- 
ter into special sciences. 
There is a class of sciences which proceed on our in- 
tuition as to the resemblances among objects and classes. 
These have been called the classificatory sciences by Whe- 
well; they embrace zoology and botany, and mineralogy 
so far as it is not a branch of chemistry, and geology so 
far as it deals with organisms. In all these the mind 
is guided and guarded by our convictions regarding 
individuals, classes, genera, and species. Another class 
of sciences have underlying them our conviction as to 
substance and property ; of this description is chemistry, 
and the sciences which treat of electricity and magnetism 
and the cognate agencies. A number of sciences pro- 
ceed on the conviction as to causation; such are all de- 
partments of natural philosophy, as it seeks to determine 
the laws which regulate force; and such too is geology, 
so far as it strives to find the circumstances and agencies 
which have brought the earth’s surface to its present 
state. In physiology too there is an inquiry after the 
properties, be they mechanical or chemical or vital, which 
have brought the organism into the state in which we 
find it. 
The metaphysician should in no case pretend to be THEOLOGY. 
419 
able to construct any department of natural science; but, 
keeping within his own province, it is competent for him 
to furnish an expression of the fundamental principles of 
cognition, belief, and thought, and the physicist might 
then be able to use them under the forms which are best 
suited to his special purposes. 
CHAPTER V. 
APPLICATION TO THEOLOGY. 
Sect. I. Faith and Reason. 
The word Faith is used in various senses, some of them 
sufficiently wide and loose, and others extremely narrow 
and stringent. But there is a common mental property 
to which the phrase points in all its shades of meaning. 
This quality cannot be positively defined; but we may 
bring out in clear relief its peculiarity as known to 
consciousness, and show what it is not by distinguish- 
ing it from other exercises of mind. It is that operation 
of soul in which we are convinced of the existence of 
what is not before us, of what is not under sense or any 
other directly cognitive power. It is a native energy of 
the mind, quite as much as knowledge is, or conception 
is, or imagination is, or feeling is. Every human being 
entertains, and must entertain, faith of some kind. He 
who would insist on always having immediate knowledge, 
must needs go out of the world, for he is unfit for this 
world, and yet he believes in no other. 
It is in consequence of possessing the general capacity 
that man is enabled to entertain specific forms of faith. 
By a native principle he is led to believe in that of which 
he can have no adequate conception,—in the infinity of 420 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
space and time; and, on evidence of His existence being 
presented, in the infinity of God. This enables him to 
rise to a faith in all those great religious verities which 
God has been pleased to reveal. 
There is faith, always along with other exercises, in- 
volved in nearly every act of human intelligence. There 
is faith, I acknowledge of a simple kind, even in the very 
acts of memory, for in every exercise of memory we be- 
lieve in that which is not before us. In many, indeed in 
most of our judgments, there is faith implied, as when 
on seeing an effect we look for an unseen cause. There 
may be faith wrapped up even in the very operations of in- 
ference, as when from data before us we infer something 
not before us ; as when we see the tide ebbing now, and 
argue that it will be flowing so many hours after; or, 
as when Columbus reasoned himself into the belief that 
there was a world lying far to the west of the lands 
known to civilized men. 
Not in any way psychologically different from these 
exercises of faith is that which leads us to believe in the 
testimony of others, a kind of belief to which the word 
Faith has often been specially appropriated. I am not 
inclined, with some, to look on this faith in testimony as 
originating in any intuitive or necessary conviction. I 
think it indeed very likely that there is a native tendency 
in children to give credit to the narratives told them by 
those whom they love or esteem; but this is not of the 
nature of a fundamental or irresistible conviction. Our 
common and settled belief in testimony is the result of 
observation, induction, and reasoning. We have found 
by experience that we can trust our fellow-men, at least 
some of our fellow-men. In all this there is inference 
proceeding on an induction, the issue being not a faith in 
all men, or in all statements, but a belief in certain men 
and in certain narratives. THEOLOGY. 
421 
When we rise from faith in man to faith—I mean na- 
tural faith—in God, there are the same elements with 
certain new ones. The new ones arise from the convic- 
tions regarding morality and infinity which attach them- 
selves to the good, the omnipresent, and eternal God. We 
believe that this omniscient God must know the truth; 
that this infinitely righteous God is incapable of false- 
hood. At the same time this faith is not without reason, 
for what are our intuitions about infinity and goodness 
but primary exercises of reason ? This faith is not even 
without reasoning, for I am inclined to think that there 
is a single link of ratiocination in that mental exercise 
by which we rise from the works of God to God the 
worker, and there is certainly deduction implied in the 
process by which we reach the conclusion that the decla- 
ration of this God of truth must be true. 
The word Reason has been employed in as great a 
diversity of significations as the term Faith. Sometimes 
it stands for the faculty which reasons or draws inferences. 
With other writers, reason, as distinguished from the 
understanding, denotes the power which sees necessary 
truth at once, without an intermediate process. With 
certain English writers it stands for that aggregate of 
qualities (unspecified) which distinguishes man from 
brutes. Very often it is a general name for intelligence, 
or for the cognitive powers of man. When persons com- 
pare or contrast the exercises of reason with those of faith, 
they should be careful to understand for themselves, and 
to signify to others, the senses in which they employ the 
phrase. In the remarks which I have to offer, I use it as 
embracing every form of human intelligence, and I at- 
tach particular epithets to it when I refer to certain more 
special exercises. 
It is wrong-to represent faith as in itself opposed to 
reason in any of its forms. Faith may go far beyond 422 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
intelligence, but it is not in itself repugnant to it. There 
is belief involved in all kinds of intelligence except the 
primary ones, those in which we look on the object as 
now present; and in all the higher exercises of reason 
there is a large faith-element which could be taken out of 
reason only with the certain penalty that reason would 
be stripped of all its soaring capacities. What could cog- 
nition say of duration, expansion, substance, causation, 
beauty, moral good, infinity, God, if faith were denied its 
proper scope, and forbidden to take excursions in its na- 
tive element? 
But if reason is not independent of faith, so neither is 
faith to proceed without reason. In particular, it would 
be far wrong to insist on any one believing in the exist- 
ence of any object, or in any truth, without a warrant. 
True, the mind is led to believe in much intuitively, but 
it is because the objects or verities are self-evident, and 
reflexly can stand the tests of intuition. And in all cases 
in which we have not this self-evidence, it is entitled to 
demand mediate evidence, and should not concede cre- 
dence till this is furnished. It is not indeed justified in 
insisting that all darkness be dispelled, but it is aban- 
doning its prerogative when it declines to demand that 
light be afforded; either direct light, which is the most 
satisfactory, or reflected light, where direct light is una- 
vailable, as it is in by far the greater number of instances. 
An allowable faith has thus ever the sanction of reason, 
and in some cases it is the issue of a consequential rea- 
soning. Faith is thus liable to be tested, even as reason 
is; nor are we at liberty to lay reason aside on the pre- 
tence of following a faith which will not allow itself to be 
examined. Where the truth is alleged to be intuitive, it 
must submit to be tried by the marks of original convic- 
tions. Where it professes to be the conclusion of reason- 
ing, the process may be subjected to the crucible of the THEOLOGY. 
423 
logic of inference. Where it claims to be the result of a 
gathered experience, it must be prepared to stand an exa- 
mination by the canons of induction. 
It is not good either for reason or faith that it should 
“be alone/' The former is in itself hard, bony, angular; 
and, unmarried to the other, is apt to become opiniona- 
tive, obstinate, and dogmatic; the latter, without her 
partner to lean on, would be facile, weak, and impulsive. 
The one is a help-meet provided for the other, and let 
there be no divorce of the firmer from the more flexible, 
or the more devout and affectionate from the more con- 
siderate and resolute. 
When faith has evidence, intuitive or derivative, in its 
favour, by all means let us follow it, and this however 
far on it may lead us, however high it may lift us. As 
a general practical rule, we are to yield to what has fair 
prima facie evidence in its behalf, without waiting till 
every objection is removed. Those who act thus will find 
as they advance that difficulties are removed, and fur- 
ther light furnished. This is easily explained. It arises 
from the knowledge of the subject and of its relations 
which is being acquired, and from the suggestions flow- 
ing in upon a mind whose intellectual senses are open to 
receive knowledge. Thus children, confiding in the in- 
formation conveyed by parents whose veracity they have 
reason to trust, and pupils believing, on the testimony of 
a judicious master, in the utility of branches of know- 
ledge which are at present felt to be irksome, will find as 
they make progress that confirmations ever come in to 
strengthen their primary trust. In like manner those 
who follow such light as they have in religious matters, 
will find further light as they grow in an acquaintance, 
speculative and practical, with the truths to which they 
are thus brought into closer propinquity. Those who 
allow the star set up in the sky to guide them, will fall 424 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
in with more formal testimonies to direct them as they 
go on, and will at last reach the very spot where truth 
—it may be in humble guise—is waiting to gratify their 
vision and to receive their homage. On the other hand, 
those who refuse or decline to act on the evidence sup- 
plied, may find themselves landed in hopeless darkness. 
The rationale of this can also be given. They have re- 
fused to follow light, and in the very act they have given 
offence to the conscience, which will fill the soul with re- 
proaches whenever the attention is forced upon the ob- 
ject, from which, therefore, the mind will ever be tempted 
to turn away as from a personal enemy, whose presence 
reminds us of ill usage in the past, and possible mis- 
chief for the future. Hence, I suspect, the unwilling- 
ness of many to consider even the claims of religion, 
whose initiatory evidence they have refused to look at, and 
the further evidence of which is therefore denied them. 
They have turned away from the object, and to look 
upon it produces only irritation, and so they cannot see 
it, as they might have done, under its pleasant and its 
profitable aspects, and at length it is associated in their 
minds with humiliation and bitterness. There is but 
one way of delivering themselves from this unbelief and 
its ever widening shadows, and this too many of them are 
unwilling to submit to; they must come, like the Apostle 
Thomas, to the very place of intercourse which they ori- 
ginally avoided, and there a gracious invitation will be 
given them to search the object round and round, and 
in every part, till, as they find unmistakable marks, 
every doubt vanishes, and they exclaim, “ My Lord and 
my God.” We see the difference between the two classes. 
The one class, under the influence of pride, have turned 
their backs on the light, and they have the shadow caused 
by their obstruction of it before them, and they go out 
into the darkness and are lost. Whereas the other and THEOLOGY. 
425 
wiser class keep the light before them, and they leave 
their shadow behind them, and they go on towards the 
light, and as they approach nearer, the shadow lessens, 
till as they stand immediately under it, and look up to 
it, all blackness and darkness are dispelled. 
But on the other hand, we should not place ourselves 
for one hour under the guidance of a faith which has no 
evidence to furnish. There cannot be a more perilous 
advice than that which has been given by certain parties 
to the doubting and inquiring, when they exhort them 
to force themselves to believe, when as yet they feel that 
they have no convincing evidence, or to profess a creed 
in order to get one as they fall in with evidence in ad- 
vancing. It will be seen at once wherein this case dif- 
fers from the other previously put. In the one we walk 
with reason from the beginning, though we do not just 
know whither it may lead us; in the other we are with- 
out reason from the beginning, and cannot expect reason 
to aid us in our difficulties. In the one we set out with 
light, and wait for more; in the other we set out with- 
out light, and necessarily at random, and if we fall in 
with light, it must be by the purest accident. There 
cannot, as it appears to me, be a more likely means of 
leading faith into temptation, than by counselling her 
to yield to the first party who pays address to her; for 
speedily finding herself deceived, she may refuse to put 
confidence in any other; or, being seduced or debauched, 
she loses all purity of discernment, and runs from one 
lover to another, and the issue is commonly either a scoff- 
ing infidelity or a restless flitting from creed to creed, 
and from one observance to another, and not unfre- 
quently a ridiculous combination of the two, and the soul 
is taking refuge in, and seeking repose under the nearest 
and most imposing superstition, in order to avoid a blank 
and horrid scepticism. 426 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
There is indeed a sense in which there may be said to 
be an opposition between faith and reason; but it is as 
there may be an inconsistency between one dictate of 
reason and another. There occur times and circum- 
stances, in the life of every one, when reasons are ad- 
dressed to the intelligence in favour of inconsistent 
courses, and when the reasonable man decides, it is in 
favour of the one for which the reasons are the strongest. 
So there may also be times when man is required to be- 
lieve, in opposition to many appeals to the sense, and 
even to the understanding. But in all such cases reason 
in a higher sense comes to the aid of faith, and an- 
nounces that we ought to believe in spite of the appear- 
ances of mere sense, and of a quibbling intellect. 
It is further to be taken into account that there are 
truths to be believed which are not and cannot be 
reached by any native shrewdness of intelligence, or by 
the consecutive deductions of reasoning. Of this de- 
scription are some of our convictions as to infinity. Of 
a similar character are many of the doctrines which 
God has revealed in His Word. In regard to some of 
these, not only is a deductive reasoning incapable of de- 
monstrating them, reason in its highest degree is inca- 
pable of fully comprehending them. When it labours to 
do so, it is encompassed in darkness, and finds itself 
utterly at a loss as it would seek to reconcile them with 
other truths sanctioned by reason or experience. But 
still, even here, faith is not without reason; for in regard 
to certain of these truths, the intuitive reason which 
commands us to believe in them is above all derivative 
reason ; and in regard to truths revealed to us superna- 
turally by God, reason calls on us implicitly to submit 
to them as to an intelligence which cannot err. Reason 
always demands that we should have evidence, imme- 
diate or mediate, in order to believe; but it does not in- THEOLOGY. 
427 
sist that the truth be completely within the comprehen- 
sion of the reason, or unclouded by mystery of any de- 
scription. Faith has ever the support of reason; yet 
it goes far beyond reason, and embraces much which is 
far beyond the conceptions of the intellect in its widest 
grasp and excursions. It is because man has a natural 
capacity of faith in the unseen and unknown, that he is 
able to cherish a faith in the supernatural truths of God’s 
Word. It is because he has the natural gift of faith, 
that he is capable of rising to the supernatural grace. 
Sect. II. Natural Theology. The Theistic Argument. 
The idea of God, the belief in God, may be justly 
represented as native to man. We are led to it by the 
circumstances in which we are placed calling into energy 
mental principles which are natural to all. Man does not 
require to go in search of it: it comes to him. He has 
only to be waiting for it and disposed to receive it, and 
it will be pressed on him from every quarter; it springs 
up spontaneously, as the plant or animal does from its 
germ ; it will well up from the depths of his heart; or it 
will shine on him from the works of nature, as light does 
from the sun. 
But, while the conviction is natural, this does not prove 
that it is simple, original, unresolvable, unaccountable. 
The knowledge of distance by the eye is undoubtedly 
natural to man; there is a provision made in the orga- 
nism for its attainment, and all who have an eye acquire 
it; yet it is not original, but the result of a variety of 
processes, physiological and psychological, which can be 
pointed out. Our conviction as to God seems to me to 
be of a like nature; it is not a single instinct incapable 
of analysis, but is the proper issue of a number of simple 
principles, all tending to one point. Such being its na- 
ture, the process admits of explicit statement and satis- 
factory defence. 428 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
Among metaphysicians of the present day it is a very 
common opinion that our belief in God is intuitive. In 
particular this is the view set forth by a school in Ger- 
many and in this country, which allows to Kant that the 
speculative reason can find or devise no valid argument 
in favour of the Divine existence. Left without mediate 
proof, they have called in a special cognition, intuition, or 
feeling, under the name of * God-consciousness ’ or £ Di- 
vine Faith.’ If there be any validity in the conditions 
laid down in this treatise, as to the logic of intuition, 
those who advocate this view may be called on to show 
that such an intuition exists; that it is original—that is, 
incapable of being resolved into anything else; and fun- 
damental—that is, leaning on nothing else. It may be 
further demanded that they explain the precise law, that 
is rule of the intuition’s operation. Is it of the nature of 
an intellectual cognition, or is it a mere feeling, or is it 
a faith ? What, in particular, is the precise object which 
it perceives and which it reveals, and how much is re- 
vealed regarding that object ? Is God revealed as a be- 
ing, or a person, or a substance? Is he revealed as a 
power or a cause ? or is he revealed simply as a life ? Is 
he revealed as a living God ? or as an infinite God ? or 
as a holy, that is, sin-hating God ? It behoves those who 
invoke a separate intuition to reply to such questions as 
these, in a way that is at least approximately correct; 
and, in giving the answers, it will be needful to reconcile 
the replies with the known facts of history, and, in parti- 
cular, with the degraded views which have been enter- 
tained, in most countries, of the Divine Being. If it be a 
partial or mutilated God that is revealed,—say, a bare ab- 
straction without qualities, or a brute force, or a vague 
life or activity,—we are left, after all, to depend on other 
processes when we would clothe him with perfections. 
If, on- the other hand, it be a full-orbed light, shining in THEOLOGY. 
429 
all the glory of wisdom and excellence and infinity that 
is hung out in the firmament before the mental eye, the 
question will have to be answered, Howt have the great 
body of mankind come to see Him in such distorted 
shapes and in such dark or hideous colours ? 
I am not convinced that we are obliged to call in a 
separate intuition to discover and guarantee the Divine 
existence. I agree, writh the majority of philosophers and 
divines in all ages, that the common intelligence, com- 
bined with our moral perceptions and an obvious expe- 
rience, lead to a belief in God and his chief attributes. 
But in the process there may be, and there commonly 
is, a variety of elements conspiring.* In particular, there 
are both experiential and a priori elements. 
I. There are facts involved. These become known to 
man in the ordinary exercise of his faculties of knowledge. 
In observing them, he discovers phenomena which bear 
all the marks of being effects. Everywhere are there 
traces of plan and purpose ; heterogeneous elements and 
diverse agencies conspire to the accomplishment of one 
end. They are made, for example, in the organs of 
plants and of animals, to take typical forms, which it is 
interesting to the eye, or rather, the intellect, to contem- 
plate, and which look as if they were built up by a skil- 
ful and tasteful architect. Then every member of the 
animal body has a purpose to serve, and is so constructed 
as to promote, not merely the being, but the well-being 
of the whole. Even in the soul itself there are traces of 
structure and design. Man’s faculties are suited to one 
another, and to the state of things in which he is placed; 
the eye seems given him to see, and the memory to re- 
* The whole theistic argument is expounded with admirable judg- 
ment in Buchanan’s ‘ Faith in God, etc.’ There is vigorous thinking 
in Dove’s * Logic of the Christian Faith.’ It is not necessary to do more 
than refer to the Burnett Prize Essays, by Thompson, Tulloch, Orr, etc. 430 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
member, and the laws of the association of his ideas are 
suited to his position, and his disposition to generalize 
and his capacity of grouping enable him to arrange into 
classes, in due subordination, the infinite details of na- 
ture. If once it be admitted that these are effects, it will 
not be difficult to prove that they do not proceed from 
the ordinary powers working in the cosmos. No doubt 
there are natural agencies operating in the production of 
every natural phenomenon which may be pressed into 
the theistic argument; but the agencies are acting only 
as they operate in the works of human skill, which are 
most unequivocally evidential of design. In the con- 
struction and movements of a chronometer there is no- 
thing, after all, but natural bodies, and the action of 
mechanical forces, but there is room for the discovery of 
high purpose in the collocation and concurrence of the 
various parts to serve an evident end. It is in the same 
way that we are led to see traces of design in the works 
of nature; we see physical agents made to combine and 
work to accomplish what is obviously an intended effect. 
Just as in the construction of a timepiece we discern 
traces of an effect not produced by the mere mechanical 
laws of the parts, so in the construction of the eye we 
find marks of plan and adaptation which do not proceed 
from the potency of the coats and humours and muscles 
and nerves, but which must come from a power above 
them, and using natural agencies merely as a means to 
accomplish its end. 
Facts illustrative of order and adaptation furnish the 
stock of the common treatises of Natural Theology. Most 
important ends are served by having them advanced in 
great number and variety. For not only do they give 
a religious direction to physical science, not only do they 
help the devotion of those who are already believers, 
not only do they confirm the conviction already pro- THEOLOGY. 
431 
duced,—they tend to produce the conviction. I am 
aware that there are intuitions involved in the process, 
and in particular the intuition of causation. But the in- 
tuitions are called forth by facts. It is the trace of ef- 
fects which evokes the intuition of causality. A son of 
the desert being asked how he came to believe that a 
God existed, replied, that he knew it as he knew from 
traces on the sand that a beast or a man had passed. 
By all means then let works unfolding marks of design 
in the universe be multiplied, and let each take up its 
own department and yield its peculiar contribution. Nor 
let it be urged that one case is as good as a thousand 
or a million. There are, I admit, single cases which 
are decisive,—such, for example, is the construction of 
the eye,—but in all these the adaptations are numerous, 
and they should be carefully unfolded. It is by the 
number and diversity of instances that the possibility of 
doubt is precluded. The single trace of a foot in the 
desert might scarcely have seemed conclusive to the sa- 
vage; the presence of many would have settled the ques- 
tion beyond all dispute. It is the multiplicity and variety 
of traces that show so clearly and satisfactorily that na- 
ture is the effect of construction. It is a happily ordered 
circumstance that every man has evidence, and evidence 
in proportion to the extent of his knowledge. The com- 
mon man, the peasant, the artisan, is furnished with 
abundance of traces in the portions of nature which 
fall under his immediate inspection,—in the revolving 
seasons, in the grass and grain, in the instincts and 
organs of animals, in his own bodily frame, in the pro- 
vision made for his wants, and the events of an over- 
ruling Providence, now encouraging and now punishing 
him. The man of science, according as he widens his 
sphere, finds further evidences; and in proportion as he 
penetrates deeper, he falls in with more recondite proofs. 432 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
I cannot then agree with those metaphysicians who look 
on the presentation of instances, or at least the multipli- 
cation of them, as useless, and who would have writers 
on Natural Theology to be threading their way for ever 
among the intricacies of abstract discussion. The fact is, 
in order to a spontaneous conviction, we do not require to 
have the mental principle enunciated. The unsophisti- 
cated mind will have the belief produced more readily 
and effectually by reading such a work as that of Paley, 
than by the subtlest exposition of the metaphysics of the 
argument. 
Still, there is a metaphysical principle involved, and 
this should be brought out in every professedly scien- 
tific statement of the complete argument. The belief 
will spring up of its own accord when the facts are pre- 
sented, and this whether the mental law is or is not 
formalized and expressed; but those who would review 
the conviction must have the mental principle as well as 
the facts unfolded, and it is the office of metaphysics to 
furnish it to natural theology. 
II. The principle of causation is involved. The object 
being offered, the intuition is ready to act. The object 
presented is an effect, and the intuition demands a cause. 
It may be admitted that there is a possibility of doubt 
as to whether the phenomenon is an effect. It is conceiv- 
able that the stones, lime, wood, and slates might, without 
any power beyond themselves, have met to form the house 
in which I dwell; and it is equally conceivable that the 
flesh, bones, skin, ligaments of the human frame, might 
also have congregated into my bodily frame without any 
higher power contriving their harmony. This link of 
the argument is not intuitive. The evidence is just so 
much short of demonstration as to allow the possibility 
of doubt. But it is a probability, a moral certainty of 
the highest order. It is quite as certain that the eye is THEOLOGY. 
433 
a construction, as that a watch is so, or a house is so, or 
a steam-engine is so. This being admitted, the pheno- 
menon comes under the mental law, and we are neces- 
sitated to believe, that this, being an effect, must have a 
cause. 
It may be demanded of those who profess to expound 
the whole argument, and who appeal to the principle of 
causation, that they should specify the nature of the prin- 
ciple and show wherein lies its validity. If they derive 
it from an extended experience, it will always be compe- 
tent for the sceptic to urge that the widest experience of 
human science and of history cannot justify the univer- 
sality of the law. True, in this world every effect seems 
to have a cause, but our experience in the cosmos does 
not entitle us to go beyond it, as we must do, when we 
seek a cause of the cosmos. Hence the importance, if 
we would bind firmly the ligaments of the theistic argu- 
ment together, of showing that the principle of causa- 
tion is a primary one, prior to experience and above it. 
It may be further required of those who appeal to the 
principle, that they unfold its precise nature. In doing 
so they will find that every joint of the reasoning is firm, 
and capable of repelling all the weapons which have been 
directed against it. 
It is an essential part of the internal law that it re- 
quires the cause to be adequate to produce the effect; it 
must be a power to produce the effect, the given effect.* 
Here again an experiential element must, I should sup- 
pose, enter. Experience must tell us what the precise 
effect is. Experience, too, must tell us that there is no 
power in the common agencies of nature, without an ar- 
rangement made for them, to run into these typical forms 
and beneficent collocations. The intuition, meanwhile, 
* I have endeavoured to establish the positions here used, P. II. 
B. III. C. II. s. 8. 434 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
insists not only on a cause, but a competent cause for 
this effect, and for every separate effect, and for the whole 
effect in its beautiful co-ordination and harmonious .ad- 
justment. Our idea of the cause thus grows and accu- 
mulates with our idea of the extent of the effect, till at 
last it is felt to be far beyond human comprehension. 
It is an essential element of the law of causation that 
if the effect be a real thing, the cause must also be real 
quite as much so as the effect. Hence the importance 
of adhering to the doctrine of natural realism as opposed 
to idealism. For when the effect is supposed to be in 
part or altogether a creation of the contemplative mind, 
the cause is apt to be regarded in the same ideal light. 
It is of the nature of the law of causation that it looks 
for the cause in a substance, in an existing thing having 
power and capable of action. The intuition does not say 
what the nature of the substance must be: it says, how- 
ever, that it must be a substance with a power commen- 
surate with the effect. And what is the effect P It is an 
harmonious adjustment, a union of agency, a combina- 
tion of effort far beyond our power of comprehension, and 
the cause, whatever it be, must reside in an existence com- 
petent for all this. So far the mental principle, proceed- 
ing on very obvious facts, can carry us. Perhaps it can 
conduct us no further without the aid of other intuitions 
employing other facts. But in guiding us so far it has 
fulfilled its function and discharged an important office in 
God’s service. 
It will be observed that the principle of causation, while 
it constrains us to seek for a power in a substance, does 
not, when properly interpreted, necessitate us to look for 
an infinite series of causes. The intuition is satisfied 
when it reaches a Being with power adequate to the whole 
effect; and if, on the contemplation of the nature of that 
Being, we find no marks of His being an effect, the intui- THEOLOGY. 
435 
tion makes no call on us to go further. It feels restless 
indeed till it attains this point. As long as it is mount- 
ing the chain, it is compelled to go on ; it feels that it can- 
not stop, and yet is confidently looking for a termination ; 
but when it reaches the All-Powerful Being, it stays in 
comfort, as feeling that it has reached an immovable rest- 
ing-place. 
III. Other intuitions take hold of other facts, and 
confirm the argument, and clothe the Divine Being with 
a variety of perfections. The argument is a cumulative 
one. It gets materials from a great number and diver- 
sity of quarters, indeed from every quarter. It is the 
business of natural theology as a science to spread out 
these, and of metaphysics to give an exact expression to 
the intuitive elements. 
(1.) There is the conviction which we have of self as a 
being, intelligent, thinking, loving, willing. It is the know- 
ledge which we have of ourselves as spiritual beings which 
suggests the idea of God who is a spirit. Those who, 
like Hobbes, or like the French Sensationalists, make sen- 
sation the only inlet of knowledge and ideas, can never 
consistently reach a spiritual God. The possession of a 
soul by us justifies us in regarding God as a being with 
intelligence and personality. We are constrained to look 
for an adequate cause of the marks of design in the uni- 
verse, and we cannot rest till we call in a Designing Mind. 
Besides, this self is an important part of the effect, and 
we look for intelligence as alone capable of producing in- 
telligence. Our idea of the Great Original Cause of all 
things is thus at one and the same time enlarged and 
rendered more definite. 
(2.) I have shown that man has a very peculiar class 
of intuitive convictions bearing on the subject of mpral 
good. In particular, every one has a conscience, which 
declares that there is an indelible distinction between 436 
• METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
good and evil. Surely the God who implanted that con- 
science must himself love the good which it would lead 
us to love, and hate the evil which it would impel us to 
hate. This moral power in man manifests itself in lead- 
ing us to cherish a conviction of obligation to a law above 
itself, independent of itself and of the mind which looks 
to it, and having authority or right to enjoin and forbid. 
I shall not go the length of positively affirming that this 
binding law of itself implies a lawgiver, but I do main- 
tain-that the mind feels something wanting till it hears ot 
a Moral Governor who is ever ruling, and is ready to re- 
ward and punish. 
(3.) The mind has a strong conviction that there is an 
infinite existence. Space and time are conceived by them- 
selves as unbounded, and wherever they are, there may be 
substance dwelling in them. But infinite extension and 
duration, and our belief regarding them, are felt to be 
void and empty till we are able to place in them infinite 
substance with infinite attributes ; but when it has done 
so, the mind feels that it has found the wanting truth, and 
is satisfied supremely and to the full. 
Thus it is that I would build up the cumulative idea. 
But I would have it remarked that what I have sought 
to construct so systematically, is spontaneously reared 
in a much more irregular or piecemeal manner; that 
which I have placed first coming last; or, in too many 
cases, very important elements, such as the recognition of 
the high spirituality and holiness, or even the unity of 
the Divine plan and personality, being altogether omitted, 
so as to exhibit a partial, or broken, or distorted image; 
or the whole may happily be reared at once by the strong 
intuitive energy, evoked and trained by a Christian edu- 
cation. 
Several advantages arise from giving this account of 
the genesis of the conviction. The argument thus built 43 7 
THEOLOGY. 
postulates no new or peculiar intuitions other than those 
which guide us in all thought of a lofty or a profound 
character. Our appeal is to the universal principles of 
humanity, on which all men act in other matters, and 
which they are not at liberty summarily to discard when 
it would constrain them to believe in a Great and Good 
Being, the Author of their own being and of the universe. 
It embraces the same mixture of elements, experiential 
and intuitive, as is found in the arguments which carry 
conviction in the more important transactions of life. It 
carries with it the sanction of our constitution, and yet 
allows observation to contribute out of its ever-accumu- 
lating stores. When ingenious men make the inference 
demonstrative, it holds out incitements to other ingenious 
men to detect weaknesses and breaks in the links of the 
chain. When there is a loose appeal to consciousness 
or faith, there is always a possibility of persons urging in 
reply, ‘ You may have such a sentiment, and I allow you 
freely to indulge it, but do not impose it on me •’ or more 
frequently this vague feeling may be satisfied with a God 
as vague and empty as itself. If the account given above 
be correct, then the grounds of our belief can be spread 
out, and the argument defended, the experiential ele- 
ments by the logic of induction, and the mental elements 
by the logic of intuition; and the whole pressed home, 
in an appeal which no one is at liberty to decline to look 
at or to accept. 
The account given shows how the argument may be 
resisted. The conviction springs up naturally, but not 
necessarily. Men may overcome it, being led into a la- 
byrinth of sophistry from which they discover no outlet, 
or, more frequently, being hardened by an encouraged 
pride, or sensualized by a course of vice. An atheist is 
a phenomenon which rarely presents itself; and when it 
does, it is to be viewed with a feeling of humiliation and 438 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
compassion. It may be allowed, I think, that there have 
been persons who have strived hard to persuade them- 
selves that there is no God, and have so far succeeded 
that they are troubled with the conviction only at some 
of the more lucid or awful moments of their lives. 
We see how man is responsible for his belief in God. 
Were the argument altogether apodictic, there would be 
no possibility of doubt, and therefore no room for the 
consent or dissent of the will. But the argument being- 
moral, and not demonstrative, there is room for the exer- 
cise of an evil heart in rejecting it, and therefore of a 
candid spirit in falling in cheerfully with it. 
The account given shows not only how we can build 
up on defensible grounds the argument for the Divine 
existence, but also how we can construct a defence of His 
more peculiar perfections, such as His goodness, justice, 
and infinity. Those who describe the whole process as one 
of feeling, are apt to take a very light and loose view of 
the Divine Being; they talk of Him as mere power, or 
mere activity, or mere life. But when we give a wiser 
and juster view of the conviction, we see that the same 
considerations which lead us to believe in his existence 
also constrain us to believe in his unbending righteous- 
ness and his spotless holiness. 
Following out the theory, we can account for the low, 
the unworthy, the perverted representations taken and 
given of the Divine character. When the higher intui- 
tions of the mind are not called into exercise by proper 
training and the appropriate objects, they lie, to a great 
extent, dormant, and so God, or the gods, come to be 
largely stripped of spiritual or moral qualities. As men’s 
minds became barbarized and narrowed, their attention 
was confined to a very limited class of objects as being 
the proper effects of the Divine power. God came to 
be contemplated not as the author of creation, or as the THEOLOGT. 
439 
actor in it throughout, but as an agent merely in certain 
portions of it, which were contemplated with peculiar 
wonder or fear; and as these portions were viewed as 
inconsistent with each other, there arose gods many and 
lords many. The doctrine of the unity of God, and of 
the spirituality of God, being lost sight of, the gods came 
to be multiplied indefinitely, according as it suited the 
impulses, the fears, the superstitions of the votaries, or 
the interests of the priests and their temple. The dis- 
tinction between God and His works being lost sight of, 
distorted traditions, and baseless fables and myths, the 
natural expression of human wants and wishes, clustered 
in ever-increasing intensity round the gods, and their 
places of worship, and certain awful spots in nature, or 
mysterious agents operating in it; and these were handed 
down from mother to son, ever growing in waywardness 
and strength. In the history of religion we have two 
classes of phenomena to be accounted for by those who 
would give an explanation of the nature and genesis of 
the religious conviction. We have an all but universal 
belief in a God, or in gods, with nearly as universal a 
degradation of the character of Deity. The double phe- 
nomenon can be explained only by supposing that there 
are native religious tendencies in the mind, ever working 
but ever liable to be abused and perverted, and requiring 
to be called forth into healthy exercise by the presenta- 
tion of suitable objects, and indeed to be guided and di- 
rected by a standard revelation. 
We see how the conviction is to be called out, strength- 
ened and refined. It is by the presentation of objects 
fitted to awaken the intuitions into energy and to keep 
them in proper exercise. The idea of a moral and spiri- 
tual God is to be aroused and kept alive by the atten- 
tion being directed to moral and spiritual truths. This 
is what is done, in the best of all modes—in the concrete 440 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
mode, in the Word of God—which ought therefore to be 
thrown open to children at an early age. This is what 
is done in a religious training, conducted according to 
the Word of God. A God who is at once Light and 
Love is set before us, and he is represented as revealed 
to fallen man in the ftjce of his Son; holy precepts are 
enjoined by Him as the guardian of duty; and thus is 
generation after generation reared, the child being trained 
by the parent, and the child becoming the parent in order 
to train the child. Natural Theology is also fitted to con- 
firm and widen this conception among the comparatively 
few who may be expected to study it. According as men 
are taught to look on their own nature as spiritual, so will 
they be disposed to look on God as a Spirit; and accord- 
ing as they are educated to look on the conscience as an 
undefeasible property of humanity, so will they be led to 
look on God as essentially holy. Still it is only, I believe, 
by an abiding written revelation that the truth can be 
made patent to the great mass of mankind, or saved 
from perversion by the fancies, the foolish speculations, 
and the infidelity of the educated. Only thus can we 
get light admitted into the dwelling of the poor man, and 
into the heart of the busy man of the world, and only 
thus get it handed down from age to age. I am aware 
that even though the Bible were withdrawn, the religious 
conceptions would go down, in lands which had once 
enjoyed its light, to the next age in comparative purity. 
But as generations succeeded which had not been trained 
in its lessons, I am convinced that the great mass of the 
people would speedily lapse into some degraded worship, 
probably of the Mormon type, and that the philosophers, 
pursuing their own favourite ideas, would exercise little 
influence, certainly little influence for good, and care little 
to put forth what little they have over an unthinking mul- 
titude, who would appreciate their distant and refined THEOLOGY. 
441 
speculations only by evincing at times their shrewd sense 
of their practical absurdity. It is by a permanent Lumi- 
nary being kept up in the sky that we expect light to be 
so diffused over our world that all men may behold it, 
and walk in it, and see objects in it. 
Sect. III. On the Immortality of the Soul. 
The doctrine of the soul’s immortality cannot be esta- 
blished by rigid demonstration any more than that of 
the Divine existence. But in the one as in the other 
there are necessary principles involved, which look to 
obvious facts, and issue in a conviction which may be de- 
scribed as natural. The expounded argument is the ex- 
pression of processes which are spontaneous. It draws 
materials from a variety of quarters and admits of accu- 
mulation. No one of the elements is in itself conclusive, 
but in the whole there is a high probability quite entitled 
to demand belief and practical action. There are three 
intuitive elements involved. 
I. There is the intuition of self as a being, a substance, 
a spiritual substance. Every one is immediately conscious 
of a self different from the material objects which press 
themselves on his notice, and of the action of mental at- 
tributes in no way resembling the properties of matter, 
of lofty thoughts and far-ranging imaginations and high 
moral sentiments, of lively and fervent emotions and of 
a power of choice and fixed resolution. The circumstance 
that the bodily organism is dissolved at death is no proof 
that these qualities or the existence in which they inhere 
shall perish. We see the body die, but we never see the 
spirit die. We know that the soul has existed ; we have 
no evidence that it ceases to exist. The burden of proof 
may legitimately be laid on those who maintain that it 
does. The soul exists as a substance, and will continue 
to exist unless destroyed by a power from without capable 442 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
of producing this special effect. I doubt whether the 
argument can be stretched further. It is possible to con- 
ceive that the dissolution of the body may be an adequate 
cause of the destruction of the soul, and the idea could 
not be repelled by any positive demonstration. It could 
only be urged in reply that there is no necessary connec- 
tion between the breaking-up of the bodily organism and 
the death of the soul, and that the soul is convinced that 
it may look on in the midst of the struggles of the ma- 
terial dissolution and survive when they are ended. 
And here it is worthy of being noticed that we have 
no experience of any one thing being absolutely annihi- 
lated. Man knows no such thing even among material 
objects. He casts wood into the fire, and the existing 
combination of its elements is destroyed, but the elements 
themselves are not lost; one part has gone down into the 
ashes, another has gone up into the air, and not one 
particle has perished. What is true of material particles 
is no less true of physical forces. Man cannot create a 
physical force, and as little can he destroy it; if it be in a 
statical state, he may bring it forth into a dynamical one ; 
if it be in activity, he may contrive to counteract it; but 
he cannot create it on the one hand, not put it out of ex- 
istence on the other. The force which came from the sun 
to the plants in the form of heat in the geological age of 
the coal-formation is not lost; it was received by the ve- 
getable organisms, it was laid up in the strata of the earth, 
and is ready to burst forth, on the needful conditions be- 
ing supplied, in fire and flame, and be a source of mecha- 
nical force in steam. And if no material particle is ever 
lost, and no physical force lost, is it consistent with the 
analogy of nature to suppose that mental force is lost P 
If mind is extinguished on the dissolution of the body, it 
is the only force known to us as being absolutely anni- 
hilated, and yet it looks and feels as if it were the most 
imperishable of them alb THEOLOGY. 
443 
II. There is the conviction of moral obligation and re- 
sponsibility pointing to a judgment day and a state of 
righteous retribution. The argument built on this ground 
is felt by many strong minds to be the strongest of all. 
Kant, so severe in his criticism of the psychological ar- 
gument, yields to the moral one. Chalmers fondly dwells 
on it as the one which actually carries weight with man- 
kind. It proceeds on the existence of a moral faculty; 
but its validity does not depend on any peculiar view 
which may be taken by us of the moral powers in man. 
It is enough that man be acknowledged to be under mo- 
ral obligation—under moral law : that law is imperative— 
it commands and it forbids: it is a supreme law—claim- 
ing authority over all faculties and affections, over in 
particular all voluntary desires and acts. This law in 
the heart points to a lawgiver who hath planted it in our 
constitution, and who sanctions and upholds it. Upon 
our recognizing God as lawgiver, the conscience an- 
nounces that we are accountable to him; “ so then every 
one of us shall give account of himself to God.” But if 
we are to give account to God, there must be a day of 
reckoning to arrive—in this life, or, if not in this life, in 
the life to come. He who hath appointed the law must 
needs be judge; He who has appointed it so authorita- 
tively, and proclaimed it so publicly, must needs inquire 
whether it has or has not been obeyed. But this judicial 
work is not fully discharged in this present state of things, 
and therefore we look for another. There are times when 
God seems to set up a throne of judgment on the earth, 
and call men before it. There are ever and anon instruc- 
tive examples of studiously concealed wickedness being 
brought to light and exposed ; of the arm of violence be- 
ing arrested, when the blow was about to descend; and 
of the deceitful man being caught in the net which he 
laid for others. These cases however are not uniform, or 
without palpable exceptions; they are corroborations of 444 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
our moral decisions, but they do not come fully up to 
the demands of our constitution, which is thereby only 
strengthened in the conviction and expectation that what 
is only partial here will, at last, be universal. 
Our moral nature, giving these general intimations as 
to the world at large, seems to carry a more special mes- 
sage to every man,—that he must submit to the judge. 
Ihis is a feeling which may lie very much dormant in 
many states of the existence of man; as when he is en- 
grossed with business, or absorbed in schemes of earthly 
ambition; but it seizes many a quiet moment to insi- 
nuate the truth committed to it; it awakes with terrible 
power in the state of relaxation which succeeds the 
fever heat of the evil propensities ; it issues its lightning 
flashes in the dark hour of disappointment; it raises its 
sharp voice in the stillness of the sick chamber; and gives 
forth foreboding utterances, which few dare despise when 
they realize the thought that the time of their departure 
is at hand. I am not seeking to disturb men by dreams 
in the night, which have no corresponding realities in the 
day; I am not raising up ghosts in the darkness to 
frighten men, as if they were children, into a salutary 
fear; I am asking them to read what is graven, as by a 
chisel on a rock, on the constitution and heart of all men. 
The conscience in this life is the anticipation of the arch - 
angel’s trumpet summoning all men to the judgment, and 
in the other world may become the worm that never dies, 
and the fire that is not quenched. 
III. There is the intuition of personality guaranteeing 
that the self that lives and sins and the self to be judged 
is the same being. I am not advancing this as a primary 
proof that this self must abide after death; I urge it 
simply to prove that, if the soul outlives the body, it must 
carry with it its essential personality. The soul which lives 
after death is the same as lived before. 
I have previously noticed the circumstance that there THEOLOGY. 
445 
is nothing lost in this world. In particular, the soul 
carries with it the conviction that it should abide. This 
feeling being perverted has led to a doctrine which has 
been widely entertained in various ages and nations, that 
the spirit passes from body to body. But in this doctrine 
of transmigration there is a serious mistake, arising from 
materialistic ideas, that is, from attaching to the soul ideas 
which have a meaning only when applied to bodily force. 
It is easy to conceive of physical force migrating from body 
to body, losing meanwhile none of its essential qualities. 
But in supposing that mind thus travels we are obliged 
to strip it of one of its essential attributes : we suppose 
that it has a different consciousness in its different habi- 
tations, and thus deprive it of an abiding personality. It 
is curious to notice that a similar error has made its ap- 
pearance of late among a class of thinkers who profess to 
be looking into great depths, but in so doing have over- 
looked a truth near at-hand. According to the panthe- 
istic doctrine of these times, the soul at the separation 
from the body goes out as it were into a great ocean of 
spiritual existence. This doctrine is also materialistic. 
We can conceive of air thus rushing into air, and of a 
bucketful of water losing itself in a river ; and why P be- 
cause neither air nor water ever had a separate and con- 
scious personality. The soul as long as it exists must 
retain its personality as an essential property, and must 
carry it along with it wherever it goes. The moral con- 
viction clusters round this personal self. The being who 
is judged, and saved or condemned, is the same who 
sinned and continued in his sin, or who believed and was 
justified when on earth. 
Upon these arguments others grow which have more or 
less of force. There is, for example, the shrinking from 
annihilation, the longing for immortality,—a feeling which 
seems to guarantee the veracity of the expectation che- 446 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
rished. Then there are affections, pure and holy, spring- 
ing up on earth but not allowed to be gratified on earth, 
but we may hope to have satisfied to the full in heaven. 
There are attachments and profitable friendships firmly 
clenched only to be violently snapped asunder by the 
stroke of death, but which we expect to have renewed in 
a place where there are no breaches. Do not those swell- 
ing feelings which agitate the bosoms of friends when one 
of them is summoned away seem to show that these di- 
vided waters are yet to meet ? Then we see from time 
to time intellectual powers cultivated to the utmost, but 
blasted in the flower when they seemed to promise a large 
fruit. May we not believe that in a universe in which 
nothing is made in vain, and nothing of God’s workman- 
ship lost, these powers have been nurtured to serve some 
great and good end in a future state of existence? These 
facts combined seem to show that there are means insti- 
tuted in this world which have their full consummation 
in the world to come. 
Sect. IV. Pantheism. 
Pantheism has some qualities to recommend it to our 
favourable regard, especially when it is viewed at a dis- 
tance. To be able to reduce the multiplicity in the uni- 
verse to unity may seem to be about the highest achieve- 
ment of human ingenuity, and the end to which every 
separate science points. To represent every existing 
thing as a modification of the one God seems to account 
on the one hand for the variety which we find in nature, 
and on the other hand for the wonderful mutual connec- 
tion and dependence of all the parts. The system fosters 
the admiration which the enlightened mind feels in the 
contemplation of the beauties of nature and art, and thus 
falls in readily with those aesthetic feelings which become 
stronger in every nation as it advances in refinement and THEOLOGY. 
447 
civilization. It allows too of the outpouring of some of 
the devout sentiments of our nature. It leads us to con- 
nect God with his works, and makes us feel as if our ad- 
miration of beauty were an act of devotion paid to God, 
of whom this beauty, whether it proceed from the forces 
of nature or the ingenuity of man, is an exhibition. If it 
does not compel us to fall on our knees in prayer, it at least 
encourages praise, for what is all this admiration, whether 
merely heaving in the breast or expressed in glowing lan- 
guage, of the loveliness and grace of the objects around 
and above us, and of the order and harmony of the powers 
in nature, but just a hymn of praise to Him who lives and 
acts in them and indeed constitutes them? Pantheism 
calls forth and fosters these feelings because of the truth 
which it has retained,—truth often left out or rejected in 
certain mechanical systems of nature, in which, to use the 
strong language of Thomas Carlyle, God is represented as 
“ sitting as it were apart, and guiding it, and seeing it 
go.” As embracing these truths it can use, though often 
in a hypocritical sense, the profoundest phraseology of the 
Bible, and speak of God as incarnate in his works and 
especially in man. 
But it must be added, that there are other considerations 
wdiich recommend pantheism to not a few. Under some of 
its forms it fosters the deepest pride; as, for instance, in 
the system of Spinoza, where man is represented as a mode 
of Deity, and in that of Hegel, where human intelligence 
is represented as identical with the Divine. Under every 
form it delivers mankind from a sense of personal respon- 
sibility to God, who may call his intelligent creatures to ac- 
count ; and from all sense of guilt and fear of punishment 
in a future life. Being a modification of Deity, we are not 
called to cherish any deep sense of dependence on Him, 
and we have no motive to pray to Him; more especially 
as His whole procedure is an eternal flow in a predetei- 448 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
mined channel beyond the control of our prayers. No 
doubt we are liable, even according to this system, to be, 
not exactly punished, but exposed to suffering if we pur- 
sue certain courses; but all this does not imply that we 
have given offence to a living being, that we have raised 
up by our conduct a holy indignation in the breast of any 
one, or that we shall have to appear at last at a throne of 
judgment. What we have to bear (this is the sort of spirit 
which Carlyle has caught from feeding on the German 
pantheists), let us bear in a spirit of manly pride, as know- 
ing that we cannot by any entreaties influence a power 
whose movements are fixed from eternity. And as to the 
world to come, doubtless there is such a world, but there 
God is as unpersonal as He is here, and we become like 
Him by casting off our supposed personality, and, like 
the burst bubble, become swallowed up and lost in the 
awful ocean of Being, out of which we were blown to 
float for one brief hour as a spectacle on the surface. 
These are the considerations which have recommended 
it to some of the best and some of the worst principles 
of our nature. It is needful to examine it, and yet it is 
difficult to do so, for, Proteus-like, it takes a new shape 
as we seize it, cloud-like it eludes us as we would grasp 
it. Pew of those attached to it have ever attempted to give 
it a defined shape, and most of those who have attacked 
it have had no fixed or conceded points from which to 
assail it, and the weapons that they shoot neither wound 
nor slay. “ They fight in vain ; the shadows which they 
destroy spring up again in a moment, like the heroes in 
Valhalla, again to be able to amuse themselves in blood- 
less conflicts.” 
There have been very exaggerated statements made as 
to the extent of the prevalence of pantheism, and this 
both by its foes and its friends. Some, in a sensitive 
apprehension of it, have discovered it in systems which 449 
THEOLOGY. 
have not avowed it, and in which there is an open ac- 
knowledgment of the existence of a personal God. The 
historians of philosophy of the school of Hegel discover 
pantheism, even in the Hegelian form, in almost every 
system of philosophy, Asiatic or Grecian. I grant that in 
the great majority of the popular superstitions and pagan 
philosophies there has been no sharp line of demarcation 
drawn between God and his works, and in most of them 
there is supposed to be some matter coeval with God, 
and independent of him. This arises certainly not from 
an elevating, but from a degrading tendency in the 
human mind, which has a difficulty in conceiving of a 
spiritual God, the creator of all things. Acknowledging 
that this confounding of God arid his works is nearly 
universal in all systems of religion or philosophy not 
derived directly or indirectly from revelation, I am per- 
suaded that comparatively few have allowed themselves 
to sink so far in the bogs of metaphysics as not to look 
on God as a person, or to believe that God is in no way 
distinct from his works. The number of avowed pan- 
theists must ever be very few, fewer than belong to Budd- 
hism, Brahminism, Mahometanism, or even Mormonism, 
and they are to be found exclusively in the narrow circle 
of the refined and the idle. The creed is of far too subtle 
and cobweb a texture to stand the rude jerks and the 
storms of common life. 
It has assumed an immense number of shapes, if shape 
it can be said to have, whose very nature is to be shape- 
less. The following seem to be the more decided. 
1. There is Material Pantheism. According to this, 
it is the mere matter of the universe, with its forces, its 
life, its thought, as the result of organism, which consti- 
tutes the One All, that may be called God. This is the 
lowest sort of pantheism, indeed it scarcely deserves the 
name, for it has no proper unity amidst the diversity. Yet 450 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
I suspect it is, after all, the most prevalent among those 
who are inclined to pantheism in this country or in France, 
and in the extreme left of the school of Hegel,—and this 
has as many supporters in Germany as the higher forms 
have. It has something to recommend it to vulgar minds, 
which dislike a Jiving God, and yet are not prepared to 
give up all belief in Deity. It admits nothing but what 
can be made patent to sense, and yet it has a way of 
deceiving itself, by speaking of the aggregate of material 
existences as if they were one existence, capable of some- 
thing like order and intelligence. 
2. There is Organic or Vital Pantheism. The diffi- 
culty which we have in defining life, or in apprehending 
it, holds out a temptation to many to explain all things 
by it, which, in fact, is to explain the ignotumper ignotius. 
All nature, they say, is full of life; and this statement is 
doubtless true, if by life is meant simply activity. The 
old Cartesian doctrine, according to which matter is mere 
extension, and is in itself utterly sluggish and inert, can- 
not stand in the midst of the discoveries of modern science, 
which show us the chemical, electric, and calorific forces 
all characterized by incessant activity. But while matter 
is active in a sense, this does not show that any one par- 
ticle of it, or that the material world as a whole, has life, 
meaning organic life. The mystical view that nature is 
a plant, an animal, or an organism, appeared in various 
forms of Platonism; the equally unintelligible idea that 
all nature has life, comes out in the writings of certain 
physical speculators of the school of Schelling, and has 
passed over into the poetry and the poetical prose of this 
country, and in all cases tends to substitute some sort of 
impersonal power for a personal God. 
3. There is the One Substance Pantheism. Persons 
begin first by declaring that the material universe is the 
body, and God the soul. This is an error, for God acts 451 
THEOLOGY. 
independent of the universe, which is his creation. It is 
not, however, pantheism; for persons may hold this view, 
and yet maintain that the two are distinct. It however 
prepares the way for pantheism, which maintains that 
there'is a spiritual power acting in the material form, 
the two being all the while one substance. We owe the 
introduction of this system, as a system, to Spinoza, who 
tried to found on certain views of Descartes as to the 
nature of substance. According to this shy, thought- 
bewildered man, there is but one substance, which sub- 
stance has attributes which the mind can conceive as its 
essence and modes, being the affections of the substance. 
This substance is infinite, a part of it is substance finite, 
and man is such a part of the Divine Substance. This 
system has been set forth in his Ethics in a terrible array 
of confused and confusing definitions, axioms, and de- 
monstrations, in which things that should be distin- 
guished are confounded, and propositions that should 
be proven are unconsciously assumed. Perhaps no one, 
except Spinoza, ever held his precise doctrine; but it 
was eagerly grasped at by those who, towards the end of 
last century, were seeking to introduce pantheism in a 
more shadowy form. It might be shown, in opposition 
to it, that whatever considerations are urged to prove 
that there is one substance, may be employed to prove 
that there must be two. 
4. There is Ideal Pantheism. It is the issue reached 
in the course of ages by a process of philosophical specu- 
lation, starting with improper assumptions, and con- 
ducted in a wrong method by persons of consecutive and 
systematic minds, who will follow out their favourite 
notions, however preposterous the conclusions to which 
they lead. Kant began with making time and space 
subjective forms, and Fichte wrent on to make matter and 
God himself a subjective creation of the mind. Schelling 452 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
sought to enlarge the system by making mind and matter, 
God and the universe, at one and the same time ideal 
and real,—ideal on the one side, and real on the other; 
and Hegel came forward with an artificial dialectic, to 
show how nothing could become something, and how God 
becomes conscious in humanity. These systems differ 
widely ; indeed some of them are absolutely inconsistent 
with the others. In particular, an ideal pantheism is 
incompatible with a materialistic, organic, or substantial 
pantheism. Yet among those who are inclined to these 
views there is a constant propensity, when attacked, to 
flee from the one to the other. When we prove that there 
is a material world, they assert that this external world 
intellectualized is God; and again, when we prove that 
there are laws, typical forms, ideas, above the mechanism 
of nature, they solemnly announce that these objectified 
constitute the universe. But we cannot allow the system 
thus to transmigrate from body to body; I insist on its 
abiding in some one of its shapes while we subject it to 
examination. In the course of our extensive survey we 
have attained principles quite sufficient to exorcize it, 
whatever be the form which it assumes. It will be in- 
structive to find that the intuitions of the mind, while 
they conduct, with the aid of obvious facts, to a belief in the 
Divine existence, are utterly inconsistent with pantheism. 
1. Pantheism is inconsistent with the intuitive know- 
ledge which we have both of mind and matter. The 
universe cannot all be matter, for we are conscious of 
ourselves possessing thought and intelligence, and of 
planning, designing, and executing in the exercise of 
free will. It cannot be a mere organism, for we see 
material objects which are beneath the organic state, and 
we are conscious of souls which are above it. It cannot 
be one substance, for we are as sure that there are two 
substances as that there is one. It cannot be all idea, or THEOLOGY. 
453 
mere idea, for we are cognizant of the object as well as 
of the thought; and ordinary experience, with the laws 
of thought building on it, carries us from object to object, 
from quality to substance, and from effect to cause, the 
one being real as much as the other. 
2. Pantheism is inconsistent with the consciousness of 
self, with the belief in our personality. It may seem a 
doctrine at once simple and sublime to represent the uni- 
verse as (,Ev kclL Trap, but it is inconsistent with one of the 
earliest and most irradicable of our primary convictions. 
If it can be shown that there are two or more persons, it 
follows that all is not one, that all is not God. Accord- 
ing to every scheme of pantheism, I, as a part of the 
universe, am part of God, part of the whole which con- 
stitutes God. In all consciousness of self we know our- 
selves as persons; in all knowledge of other objects we 
know them as different from ourselves, and ourselves as 
different from them. Every man is convinced of this; 
no man can be made to think otherwise. If there be a 
God, then, as all Ilis works proclaim, He must be dif- 
ferent from at least one part of His works, He must be 
different from me. In the construction of his artificial 
system of a priori forms, Kant most unfortunately omitted 
the knowledge of a personal self, and thus speculation, 
in the hands of his successors, was allowed to flow out 
into a dreary waste of pantheism. When we restore the 
conviction of the separate existence of self, and the belief 
in our continued personality to its proper place, we are 
rearing an effective barrier in the way of the possible in- 
troduction of any system in which man can be identified, 
with God or with anything else. 
3. Pantheism is inconsistent with man’s possession of 
a will, and a free will. It is the circumstance that man 
is possessed of a distinct will which suggests the idea 
that God is not a mere law or principle, but a person 454 
METAPIIYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
with a power of voluntary determination. It is in con- 
sequence of his possessing an inherent and positive free- 
dom that man is led to look upon God as also free, and 
this in a higher and more absolute sense, inasmuch as 
there can be nothing to lay restraint upon His liberty. 
May we not go a step further, and maintain that the pos- 
session of voluntary power and freedom on the part of man, 
is not only fitted to suggest, but is a proof, that the God 
from whom they proceeded has a will, and that this will is 
free ? It is not easy to determine, as to certain forms of 
pantheism, whether they attribute free will to God, or in 
what sense they affirm or deny it. The doctrine of Hegel, 
that God awoke to consciousness, and acquired a will in 
the consciousness and will of man, seems to me to be ut- 
terly inconsistent with the essential principles of reason, 
which requires that the cause be adequate to produce the 
effect. But what adequacy can there be in a power with- 
out will to produce will ? All forms of pantheism which 
do not ascribe a separate will to God are liable to the 
objection that they suppose God to produce in man a 
free will not possessed by Himself from eternity. If the 
other alternative be taken, and will be ascribed to Deity, 
then have we two wills in the universe, the will of God 
and the will of man, and it follows that all is not one in 
any intelligible sense, for we have now two distinct wills, 
which may run counter to each other. Whatever be the 
philosophic system adopted, we have, as matter of fact, 
the hundred of millions of distinct wills possessed by 
human beings. These separate wills show by one pro- 
cess that God must have a distinct will, and by another 
process that there must be more than one will in the 
universe, and both conclusions are inconsistent with a 
system which says all is one. 
4. Our sense of accountability to God as Judge is in- 
consistent with pantheism. There is in man, wre have THEOLOGY. 
455 
seen, a native principle, which leads him to distinguish 
between good and evil, which indicates not unobscurely 
that the evil will be punished, and points to One ready to 
inflict the penalty. Natural religion, it is true, can say 
little as to the time and manner of the judgment, but it 
does announce that the sustainer of the moral law must, 
among other offices, exercise that of Judge. But the 
feeling with which we look at the judgment plainly inti- 
mates that we must submit to the trial in our individual 
capacity. It is utterly inconsistent with the sentiment to 
suppose that, prior to the final judgment, man is to be 
absorbed into Deity. God, as Judge, must be distinct 
from the persons judged, and we who are judged must 
be the same as those who committed the deeds. In 
particular, they who sinned, and they only, are liable to 
punishment. We have only to follow out the doctrine of 
personal responsibility to find it setting aside every form 
of pantheism. 
Having thus inquired into the truth of pantheism, we 
are now at liberty to look at its consequences.* And 
this, it may be remarked, seems to me to be the proper 
order in which to proceed in all investigation. The ar- 
gument from consequences may very properly make us 
suspicious of a doctrine, but cannot absolutely disprove 
it. It may be one of the very objects of those who pro- 
pound an erroneous dogma, to deliver us from the fear 
of God and the obligations of morality, and they are to 
be met by proving, not that their opinions are injurious, 
but that they are unsound. But when we have first 
shown that a doctrine is untrue, we may then point out 
the evil consequences which flow from it. It will be 
found, in fact, that the true always leads to beneficent, 
and the false to pernicious results. This does not seem 
* There are fine remarks on the Pantheistic spirit in the First Essay 
of Bayne’s ‘ Christian Life.’ 450 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
to arise, as some have supposed, from the true and the 
good, from the false and the wicked, being identical, but 
rather from the pre-ordained connection instituted be- 
tween them by Him who hath marked His approbation 
of the true and the good by making them yield happy 
fruits, and hath branded the false with His disapproba- 
tion by causing it to be followed by a train of disastrous 
consequences. 
In weighing the results to which the system leads, I 
would not wish to be indiscriminate in the censure be- 
stowed ; I by no means charge it with leading to every 
sort of evil. As containing some important elements of 
truth, it may, under some aspects, have rather an elevat- 
ing tendency, more especially when compared with those 
systems in which God is separated altogether from the 
universe, and made an idle spectator of its mechanism, 
or those other and superstitious systems in which he is 
pictured as guilty of favouritism and caprice. But in 
comparing it with an enlightened theism, in comparing 
it with revelation, which it would set aside, it is charge- 
able with certain very grave consequences. 
It is supposed to be one of the special advantages of 
the system that, teaching us to discover God in all his 
works, it leads us to cherish a perpetual affection towards 
Him. But in this representation there is as grievous a 
misunderstanding of the character of man as there is of 
the character of God. It proceeds on a mistaken view 
of emotion, and of the objects which call it forth. The 
sentiment raised by inanimate beauty is a mere aesthetic 
feeling, and has nothing in it of love, in the adequate 
sense of the term. The feeling with which we contem- 
plate a lovely natural scene, such as Loch Lomond or the 
Trossaclis, or a great monument, such as that of Rauch 
at Berlin, or that of Canova at Vienna, or of Thorwaldsen 
at Lucerne, is not that required of us when we contem- THEOLOGY. 
457 
plate the Divine Being. Then it may be doubted whe- 
ther any abstract truth or general principle is fitted to 
kindle emotion. Analysis and classification are intended 
to deepen and amplify our intellectual conceptions, but 
are by no means fitted to rouse feeling. It is not by 
dwelling on the grand ideas of the lovely and the good 
that sentiment is evoked, but by the contemplation of 
a lovely object or a good individual. These ideas may 
serve to widen our views and raise our minds above a 
weak superstition, but they are not fitted nor intended, 
by Him who hath given us the capacity to form them, to 
create and cherish affection in our bosoms. It is when 
a lovely object, a fine statue or painting, is presented, that 
feelings of admiration are called forth; and in like man- 
ner, it is when a person supposed to be possessed of good 
or amiable qualities is brought under our notice that w~e 
are led to love him. It follows that in very proportion 
as we take away the individuality of God, we make it 
more and more difficult for man to love him; and if we 
strip Him of personality altogether, we make it impossible 
for the human heart to cherish any affection towards 
Him. Hence we find that the pantheist, when he would 
create a passing feeling of gratitude or affection towards 
the God of his system, is obliged to personify him. Were 
he to look upon God as a mere principle of law or order, 
as a procession of processes, he would find his heart con- 
tinuing cold and blank as he contemplated Him, and so 
he uses a species of deception, or yields to a delusion, 
and represents Him as having consciousness and life, 
nay, as the only consciousness and the absolute life. In 
this way he may succeed in exciting a sort of mystic feel- 
ing, radiant as the evening sky; but as the body of the 
luminary, which alone can keep up the glow, is gone, it 
soon sinks into darkness. Even when the feeling is warm- 
est, there is an idea ever pressing itself on the mind, that 458 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
the whole representation is fictitious, and hence the glow 
produced has as little of permanence, and exercises as 
little control over the practice, as that called forth by a 
theatrical showr or the scenes of a novel. 
Failing as it does in this its supposed advantage, the 
system is chargeable with stripping religion of all those 
severe truths and elevating sentiments which practically 
influence the minds of men for good. The feeling of 
personality having been destroyed so far as it is possible 
for an artificial system to destroy it, he who has imbibed 
the spirit of pantheism will not be distinguished by much 
determination, activity, or practical philanthropy. The 
energetic and devoted character of Fichte may seem to 
be an example to the contrary; but, as Archdeacon Hare 
remarks, “ To form a correct judgment concerning the 
tendency of any doctrine, we should rather look at the 
fruit it bears in the disciples than in the teacher. For 
he only made it, they are made by it.” We see the 
true influence of pantheism in the indolent and dreamy 
character of the Brahmins and Buddhists of the East. 
It is scarcely conceivable that there should arise among 
pantheists a great reformer, an energetic philanthropist, 
a self-devoted martyr. Along with personality there 
must depart all feelings of responsibility, all sense of 
obligation, all consciousness of guilt, all apprehension of 
a judgment-day ; and when these are gone, there can re- 
main no very acute perception of the distinction between 
right and wrong, between good and evil. This feeling 
is promoted by the representations given of the eternal 
ideas, processes, and laws, which are supposed to move 
on in one everlasting stream, raising up, bearing along 
with them, and turning to their own use, every event, the 
important and the unimportant, the evil and the good. 
Viewed in this light, evil comes to be esteemed the lesser 
good, or rather, as merely the lesser good for the pre- THEOLOGY. 
459 
sent; for in the end it may come to be the greater, 
or the very greatest good. It is a necessary tenet of 
this system that the evil equally with the good is a 
part of God,—some one speaks of the “ good as God’s 
right hand, and the evil as the left.” It is vain to 
suppose that under such a system God can seriously 
purpose to punish the sin, or that he can so much as 
condemn it. Those who are thoroughly imbued with 
the spirit of the system, will be led first of all to excuse 
evil in themselves, and then they will be led to palliate 
it in others. One of the issues will be very perverted 
views of contemporaneous society and of past history. 
The responsibility of the individual will be lost sight of 
in the contemplation of the vast processes and sweeping 
cycles which move like gigantic wheels, apparently as 
well without as with individual effort; and crime, espe- 
cially brilliant and successful crime, will be spoken of 
with little or no condemnation, because regarded as a 
step necessary to great and good results. Nor is it to 
be forgotten that pantheism, in nearly all its forms (if 
not in all), rejects the doctrine of the immortality of the 
soul, at least of a personal immortality. Our personality 
in this life is an illusion, or rather, a delusion, and at 
death the deception ceases, and the reality commences 
in the soul being swallowed up in the all-absorbing One, 
and lost in its individuality, as the river is when it flows 
into the ocean. It should be the grand aim and the 
holy office of religion to raise the downward tendencies 
and to lay a restraint on the evil propensities of huma- 
nity ; and this it can do only by the holy truths which 
it proclaims, and the self-sacrificing sentiments which it 
calls forth. But so far from providing or fostering these, 
pantheism seems rather to remove them out of the way, 
or destroy their force; and instead of stemming the 
stream of evil, it rather sails along with it, and helps to 
swell its waters. 4G0 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
Such, if I do not mistake, is the influence of pan- 
theism on the individuals who are under its sway. 
Equally pernicious would be its influence upon any coun- 
try in which it might prevail to any great extent. It is 
foolish indeed to expect or to fear that the majority of 
any people will ever attach themselves to so mystical, 
and yet, withal, so artificial a system. The great body 
of mankind must—happily or unhappily—be far too 
much engrossed with realities, will be far too eagerly 
bent on seeking calculable gains, and exposed to far too 
many real sorrows, to allow of their wandering into this 
land of dreams and shadows. But if ever pantheism 
should come to be favourably received or extensively 
adopted among those addicted to reflection, or possessed 
of abundant leisure, in any modern nation, the effect on 
the character of the people would be most pernicious. 
It would necessitate an immediate revival of the old 
distinction, done away with by Christianity, of an eso- 
teric doctrine for the thinking few, and an exoteric doc- 
trine for the unthinking many. The inner doctrine of 
the select class would be an airy pantheism scarcely 
differing from a blank atheism, and the outer doctrine 
of the multitude would be a hero-worship, a nature- 
worship, or an idol-worship; in short, some description 
of creature-worship, with all its degrading tendencies. 
All this would take place without any attempt on the 
part of the learned to restrain the evil; nay, the learned 
would join in the evil and encourage it; and this wor- 
ship would be defended by them as a homage paid to 
the part of the One All as representative of the whole. 
They would acknowledge that the mass of the people 
are incapable of seeing any such meaning; but then, it 
is by this very circumstance that they themselves are 
separated from the vulgar, who must necessarily be 
doomed to act without knowing the significance of their 461 
THEOLOGY. 
acts. “ Posterity,” says Jacobi, “will not wonder, if 
in the desert of unbelief, men raise serpents and pray 
to golden calves once more, and if in this serpent and 
calf service philosophers tend the altars.” In such a 
state of things it is evident we should have the idle 
and the educated classes proud, haughty, self-righteous, 
mostly pleasure-loving and dissolute, and the great 
body of the people abandoned—without any serious 
attempt being made to elevate them—to the grossest 
darkness and the most grovelling superstition, relieved 
only by a love of imposing spectacles which impress the 
senses or excite the imagination; while now and then, 
and here and there, we should have some earnest or 
malicious sceptic attacking the hypocrisy of the one 
class and the ignorance of the other, and troubling 
both, without being able to improve either by supply- 
ing anything more solid or satisfying. So far as I can 
see, the more advanced nations of modern Europe are 
to be saved from such an issue only by the active and 
earnest propagation of Scriptural light. 
Sect. V. Christian Divinity. 
It lias been found in all ages, that there are intimate 
points of affinity between Metaphysics, that is, our gene- 
ralized intuitions, and Theology, that is, the systematized 
expression of the concrete and scattered truths of reve- 
lation. In the first speculations of mankind theology 
and philosophy are indissolubly intertwined in what has 
been called Theosophy. At a very early age of the 
Church of Christ, the Eastern theosophies and certain 
forms of Platonism became associated with Bible doc- 
trine. This arose partly from the circumstance that a 
number of eminent Christian Fathers had, prior to their 
conversion to Christianity, been attached to philosophy, 
Asiatic or Grecian; and partly, I am convinced, by the 462 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
fact that there had been wrought, even into the pagan 
philosophic systems, a large body of truth, either spring- 
ing from the native convictions systematized by the 
inherent sagacity of the mind, or derived from a tradi- 
tion which had kept afloat a remnant of primitive truth. 
Platonism, in particular, had many interesting points of 
correspondence with Christianity. The lofty genius of 
Plato, nurtured in Eastern as well as Western learning, 
and drinking deeply of the moral spirit of Socrates, had 
succeeded in seizing on some of those great natural 
truths which come closest to Inspired Revelation. In 
the scholastic ages the logical forms of Aristotle were 
employed to mould into a certain shape every known 
truth of religion (as well as of secular knowledge), and 
may be traced at this day in not a few distinctions 
and technical phrases of theology. In modern times 
famous divines and schools of divinity have delighted to 
couch their expositions of doctrine, and their defences 
of Christianity, in accordance with the favourite prin- 
ciples and often in the very nomenclature of particular 
philosophers of eminence. The influence of Descartes 
is visible in the rigid, dogmatic, and deductive method 
of not a few theological treatises of the second half of 
the seventeenth century. Even the philosophy of Locke, 
though possessing little affinity to the profounder truths 
of Christianity or sympathy with them, may be detected 
as regulating the defences of religion, and the manner in 
which it was recommended during last century,—as when 
it is shown us that experience, external or internal, is in 
favour of Christianity, and that piety promotes the hap- 
piness of the possessor. The speech of those who talk 
much of a moral sense “ bewrayeth ” them, and shows 
that they have taken their views directly or indirectly 
from Shaftesbury or Hutcheson. In the United States 
of America the metaphysics of Jonathan Edwards were THEOLOGY. 
463 
incorporated for two or three ages with New England 
theology. The formidable nomenclature and the brist- 
ling distinctions of Kant, as also the subtle and glowing 
intuitionalism of Schleiermacher (the two being often 
mixed incongruously together) may be traced in almost 
every theological work published in Germany for the 
last half-century, and come out in the writings of not a 
few British and American divines who have felt the im- 
pulse of the great Teutonic invasion of thought. The 
airy spirit of Coleridge has been caught by a consider- 
able body of English divines of high literary reputation. 
It may be doubted whether religion has not, on the 
whole, been injured to a greater extent than it has been 
benefited by its close association with philosophy. The 
gnosticism of the East introduced the earliest formida- 
ble heresies into the Christian Church, and drew many 
away from the simplicity of the truth into mystic specu- 
lations. In the writings of Origen, and others of a kin- 
dred spirit, the statements of the Word were thought to 
be of little value in their literal interpretation, and are 
sublimated into gorgeous theories, constructed in a region 
of gilded clouds. No doubt many of those who thus in- 
troduced the gentile philosophy into the religion of Jesus, 
imagined that they might thereby benefit Christianity, 
but in fact they corrupted it,—quite as much as those who 
with like intentions introduced pagan rites into Christian 
worship, and pagan statues into Christian temples. In 
the medieval ages the scholastic bandages, when they 
did not positively strangle the vital truths, did yet set them 
in so rigid a shape as to injure the life, and made them re- 
pulsive to many souls which might have been attracted by 
the same truths presented in a so much more rounded and 
flexible and altogether natural form in the pages of the 
living Word. The professed demonstrations and deduc- 
tions, conducted in the mathematical mode of Descartes 4G4 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
and Samuel Clarke, were guilty of many a paralogism, 
and this often tempted shrewd men to doubt of the whole 
system which had been supported by such brittle but- 
tresses. The philosophies of Locke and of Hutcheson 
could not appreciate one-half of the great soul of Chris- 
tianity; the sanctifying truths of revelation assumed a 
clipped, a bare, and a dry appearance in the pages of those 
whose appeal was to sense, and in whose view happiness 
is the greatest good. Edwards had undoubtedly a spirit 
of angelic brightness and depth of penetration, yet it 
may be doubted whether certain profound and mysterious 
doctrines of Christianity are most expediently defended 
by being identified with his speculations as to necessity 
and original sin. The theologies which have ramified 
from the' trunk of Kant, or sprouted from the germ of 
Schleiermacher have laboured to move Christianity from 
the old foundation of faith in the testimony of God, on 
to a new ground in the Practical Reason, or a God-con- 
sciousness ; and the issue is that those who have felt their 
influence have been seeking to construct each one a reli- 
gion for himself, retaining only so much of revealed truth 
as may please his heart and fancy or suit his purpose. 
The school of Coleridge has experienced how difficult it 
is to serve two such masters as religion and literature, 
and in its airy excursions has had a tendency to fly off 
from some of those truths—such as the Inspiration of 
Scripture and the Atonement of Christ—to which unso- 
phisticated minds have ever clung most resolutely as feel- 
ing that their soul’s peace is involved in them. 
Can no method be devised of making philosophy and 
theology co-operate without their being confounded ? In 
particular, is there no way by which religion may call in 
philosophy to her aid in fighting her battles against error, 
and yet prevent the powerful and ambitious ally from set- 
tling in her country and lording it over it? The following THEOLOGY. 
465 
rules might at once guide and guard religio-philosophic 
speculation. 
I. Metaphysics have important negative purposes to 
serve in theology. 
1. Sound metaphysics may be employed to meet un- 
sound metaphysics. When Scriptural truths are assailed 
on professedly philosophic grounds, by philosophy may 
these foundations be examined. Thus some object to the 
Scriptures that they represent God as cherishing moral 
indignation against sin; their views may be counteracted 
by showing that, if we are entitled to argue from our 
mental nature that God is a good God, we are authorized 
on the same ground to look upon him as hating iniquity. 
If it be maintained that the Scripture doctrines are not 
to be believed because they land us in speculative diffi- 
culties, and cannot be fully comprehended, philosophy is 
at hand to show that the truths which are most fully be- 
lieved by us, such as those relating to being, cause, in- 
finity, to the growth of the plant and of the animal, and 
even to such agents as heat, light, and electricity, all go 
out into mystery.* 
But in performing this office of expulsion, philosophy 
should not be allowed to take the place which had been 
usurped by the power which it has driven out. What I 
mean may be illustrated thus. Certain doctrines regarding 
necessity and free will have found their way into theology, 
and wrought not a little mischief. Some have given such 
an account of man’s freedom as to make him indepen- 
dent of God, and to set aside the Scripture doctrine of 
his being enslaved by the influence of sin. At the oppo- 
site extreme some have gone so far as to deny to man 
all proper freedom of will, and some have identified their 
doctrine of an iron necessity with the Bible doctrine of 
the Divine Sovereignty. Both of these extreme errors may 
* See ‘ Glauben unci Wissen,’ yon Dr. H. Ulrici. 466 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
be removed, as I think, by a judicious exposition of the 
true facts of human nature, by proving on the one hand 
that there is a causation mi generis in the human will, and 
by showing on the other hand that consciousness tes- 
tifies to an essential freedom in every genuine exercise of 
the voluntary power in man. But when this end has been 
accomplished, let metaphysics henceforth retire into its 
own territory, and let not the peculiar views which we 
may entertain in regard to the will, or the precise psycho- 
logical nature of freedom, be allowed to rule in Divinity 
proper, and to overawe the honest interpretation of Scrip- 
ture, according to exegetical principles. 
2. Metaphysics may be pre-eminently useful in keeping 
metaphysics in their own place. For it is the tendency 
of metaphysics to be ever pressing beyond their own do- 
main, and encroaching on their neighbour’s territory,— 
sometimes avowedly and as claiming a right, more fre- 
quently in a covert manner, denying that they are meta- 
physics, to which they may even profess an antipathy;— 
but under whatever pretext they come, if they propose to 
settle in theology, they must be driven out as intruders. 
Metaphysics have a very important province—not all truths, 
but first truths—and to that province they must be con- 
fined. No one will now tolerate for a moment any claims 
which they may put forth to construct a natural philoso- 
phy, a botany, or a chemistry. A primary philosophy may 
do some little in the way of setting fast the foundations 
of these sciences, but they must be built up by materials 
got from other quarters. And just as little is it capable 
of rearing a theology, and determining every question 
which may be started as to God and man and nature, 
and their reticulated mutual relations. History, the his- 
tory of all ages and countries, gives a testimony as de- 
cided as it is uniform, that human reason is incapable of 
forming a religion which can stand the tests of reason THEOLOGY. 
467 
and meet the felt wants of man. He who would con- 
struct a physical science must go to the volume of nature ; 
he who would construct a theology must go to the volume 
of revelation. It is no disparagement to metaphysical 
science that it cannot do what it is the province of other 
sciences to accomplish. It is no disparagement to geo- 
metry that it cannot draw out a system of anatomy, nor 
in any way to the discredit of chemistry that it cannot 
build up a science of geology. Nor is it any degrada- 
tion to speculative philosophy that it cannot rear a sci- 
ence of Divinity. Each science, like a planet, has its own 
orbit, and when it keeps to this it has good purposes to 
serve ; but if it passes beyond, it will fail to accomplish its 
proper ends, and may come into destructive collision with 
other powers. “ We do not enlarge the sciences,” says 
Kant, “but disfigure them, when we suffer their bounda- 
ries to run into one another.” He who would seek for a 
quickening religion among the maxims of philosophy, is, 
as Bacon says, seeking the living among the dead, and 
must ever come back with an aching heart and a feeling 
of disappointment. A wise metaphysics, which knowTs its 
own place, which is the place of principles, will find it to 
be for its interest—indeed absolutely essential to the pre- 
servation of its influence, and the protection of its own 
territory, in the present day, when it has so many enemies 
—to rebuke every attempt which may be made by its less 
prudent but more ardent supporters to make it intrude 
into the province of other sciences. 
II. Metaphysics, without entering Theology, may lend 
it some aid. 
1. It may show that the difficulties and mysteries 
which meet us in theology are the same as those which 
come up in metaphysics, being those which arise from 
the limitation of our faculties, and the imperfection of 
our knowledge. “ No difficulty,” says Sir W. Hamilton, 468 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
“emerges in theology, which has not previously emerged in 
philosophy.” The difficulties of Revealed Religion chiefly 
congregate round the doctrines of the Trinity, of the De- 
crees of God, and Original Sin. The difficulties of the 
first arise simply from the mystery which attaches to this, 
but also to every other doctrine regarding the Divine Na- 
ture; we can understand so much, but learn of vastly more, 
beyond our comprehension. Those who wrould doubt of 
the triune nature of God because they cannot fully com- 
pass it, will find themselves landed in precisely the same 
difficulties when they would fathom the infinity, or in- 
deed any of the perfections of God. The difficulties which 
may spring from the doctrine of the Divine Sovereignty 
are no other than the old ones which philosophers have 
met with from the beginning, as they sought to reconcile 
freedom with causation. The doctrine of Original Sin 
does raise up difficulties, and may seem to bear hard 
against the character of the Creator; but an analogous 
insoluble problem presents itself in Natural Religion. 
How has sin been permitted under the government of 
a God at once Omnipotent and Good? Nay, it is the 
very same difficulty which presses on us when we ask 
the question, How does it happen that all human beings, 
left though they be to the freedom of their own will, 
do in fact begin to sin as they begin to act for them- 
selves? He who would answer this question and not 
avoid it, must come to an original sin, encompassed with 
all the difficulties of the Bible doctrine; but if he dis- 
card Christianity, he has no relief from the evil, he has 
no light to set over against the darkness. Metaphysics 
are competent to demonstrate that no man can deliver 
himself from these difficulties by fleeing from Christianity 
to what may be represented as a Rational Theism. 
2. Metaphysics may furnish not a few evidences in 
favour of Christianity. Thus it supplies the main ele- THEOLOGY. 
469 
ments in the proof of those great doctrines which the 
Word of God presupposes, such as the existence of the 
infinity and unity of God, and the immortality of the 
soul, and a judgment-day,—truths very much lost sight 
of in heathenism, and the prominence given to which 
in the Jewish Scriptures is a proof of their being di- 
vinely inspired. All works of Natural Theology pro- 
perly constructed have a tendency to strengthen the 
foundations of Christianity. In particular, the inductive 
investigation of the moral faculty in man may yield a 
number of evidences in favour of the Divine origin of 
our religion. The conscience declares that there is an 
indelible distinction between good and evil, and conducts 
by an easy process to the conviction, that God approves 
the good and hates the evil. The moral power points to 
a law, holy, just, and good, a law which all men have 
broken, and which no nation shut out from supernatural 
light, and no pagan philosophy, has ever exhibited in its 
purity. When that law shines forth in the Word, and 
when, in particular, it is manifested in the character of 
the God-Man, the conclusion is forced on us that those 
who make it thus shine upon us in its brightness, must 
have had an express vision from heaven. The consci- 
ence, rightly interpreted, declares that all men have 
sinned, and so given offence to God. The same moral 
power indicates, not obscurely, that sin deserves to be 
punished, and points to God as ready to inflict the pe- 
nalty. Great service, as it appears to me, is rendered to 
Christianity, when it is shown, by means of an inquiry 
into the nature of conscience, that these are truths of 
natural religion. For being once established on an in- 
dependent basis, they prepare us to welcome the grand 
doctrine of Revealed Religion, that the Word has be- 
come flesh, and tabernacled on the earth, suffering in 
the sinner’s room and stead, and thus opening a way by 470 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
which sinful man may be restored to the favour and 
image of a sin-hating God. Verily those rationalists or 
intuitionalists who would set aside or explain away the 
doctrine of the sinner being reconciled by the blood of 
Jesus, are overlooking what is about the deepest and 
strongest conviction of moral reason or intuition in the 
breast of man. In these, and in a variety of other ways, 
illustrated by such writers as Pascal, Butler, and Chal- 
mers,* a sound philosophy may show us light shining 
through chinks upon us in the darkness, to allure us to 
look out for the great luminary which God has made to 
shine upon our world. 
3. Metaphysics can give a philosophic method and 
manner to the treatment of theological topics. It may 
do so without intruding beyond its province, or intro- 
ducing any of its peculiarities. It may appear in its mode 
and in the results, without troubling us with all the 
processes. How often does it happen, in theological dis- 
cussions, that there are laboured attempts to prove what 
need not and cannot be proven, while other propositions, 
which ought to be demonstrated, are left unsupported! 
How often are derivative propositions left without a sup- 
port, while primary principles are made to lean on se- 
condary ones ! A mind trained to philosophy will avoid 
these errors; as knowing what propositions require not 
probation, and how to make such shine in their own light, 
and generally, how to build up an argument of original 
and derived truth consecutively from the foundation. 
But are metaphysics to be absolutely precluded from 
entering the domain of divinity proper ? If a pliiloso- 
* Tiie intimations of conscience were long neglected in tlie philo- 
sophies and speculative theologies of Germany, which in this respect 
were behind those of Britain. A better tone was commenced by J nlius 
Muller, in his great work on ‘ Sinand of late we have, in ‘Die Christ- 
liche Dogmatik vom Standpunkte des Gewissens, von Dr. Sckenkel,’ an 
admirable account of the relation of the conscience to God. THEOLOGY. 
471 
phic thought occur to a youth in the freshness of his 
observation, or to an old man in the ripeness of his wis- 
dom, is he not to be allowed to bring it into the temple, 
and lay it on the altar, because these are too sacred ? In 
reply, I observe that, 
III. Metaphysics are to be allowed to enter theology 
only under certain conditions. 
1. The metaphysical principle advanced must be shown 
to be sanctioned by the very constitution of the mind, 
and by Him who has granted it to us. It is thus only 
that we can lay an arrest on fancy, conceit, and preju- 
dice, and prevent persons, when pushed hard for a de- 
fence, from taking refuge in a principle which they de- 
clare to be above argument. There are truths above pro- 
bation, but there are no truths above examination, and 
the truths above proof are those which bear inspection 
the best. If persons appeal to first principles, avowedly 
or unavowedly, the burden lies on them of showing that 
the principles they employ are first truths. Those who 
adopt this rule for themselves are entitled to insist that 
those who oppose them, or oppose religion, should sub- 
mit to the same restrictions. It may certainly be de- 
manded of those who set themselves against Christianity, 
or any of its peculiar doctrines, on professedly philoso- 
phic grounds, that they show that their objections are 
founded on principles which are fundamental, and not 
drawn from the prejudices of the heart or the pet opi- 
nions of some small knot of thinkers. 
2. The precise nature of the fundamental principle 
employed must be specified, so far at least as it is 
brought to bear on the topic discussed. Tor it is quite 
possible that the principle, though in itself a legitimate 
one, may be illegitimately employed, and how can this be 
ascertained except by a precise enunciation of its rule ? 
Thus, I believe that there is a principle of causation ope- 472 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
rating in all creature-action, even, I believe, in acts of 
the will; but then it would be wrong to infer from this 
that the mode of causal action is the same in our volun- 
tary as in physical, or even as in our intellectual nature. 
Yet, again and again have writers maintained that man 
must be a machine, because the principle of causation is 
universally operative, even in the will, as is shown by 
predictions founded on statistics which can be given 
forth as to crimes and other voluntary acts. The fallacy 
at once appears when we properly interpret the principle 
of causation, which announces indeed that every event 
has a cause, but leaves the nature of that cause to be 
determined by experience, which shows that causation 
in the will is entirely different from causation in other 
action. Some go to the other extreme, and insist that 
the possession of freedom by man is inconsistent with 
the universal reign of causation. This misapprehension 
may be removed by a correct exposition of the intuitive 
principle of freedom, which affirms indeed of every action 
of the will that it is free, but says nothing, and can say 
nothing, as to whether it is or is not caused. These are 
illustrations of the way in which a philosophic principle, 
sound in itself, may issue in illegitimate consequences 
because its rule has not been ascertained. 
I have so far limited the rule as to say that the intui- 
tive principle employed must be precisely enunciated, so 
far at least as it is brought to bear on the topic we are 
discussing. This is all that can be legitimately insisted 
on. Every time that we argue that an effect has a cause, 
or that a quality implies a substance, we may not be 
bound rigidly to announce the formula. But in all per- 
plexing questions and doubtful references, the law must 
be given in express terms, for it is quite possible that it 
may not admit of a legitimate application to the case 
before us. Fortunately the questions in which such THEOLOGY. 
473 
rigid accuracy requires to be insisted on are compara- 
tively few. Unfortunately for the theologian it so hap- 
pens that among these are the very questions which fall 
to be discussed in deeper divinity. The rule is that the 
principle must be correctly expressed so far as it relates 
to the topic to which it is applied, and if it is possible 
that an expression in part may be an inaccurate one, 
there is no help for it, the law must be fully and rigidly 
unfolded. 
But it will be urged that such a caution must often 
necessitate the inappropriate discussion of a metaphysi- 
cal question in the midst of a theological exposition. I 
admit that this shows that the introduction of metaphy- 
sics into theology has its difficulties and inconveniences. 
Nothing can be more unsatisfactory than the practice by 
many theologians of laying hold, without examination, of 
a supposed philosophic principle which serves their end, 
using it to help their immediate purpose, and then pass- 
ing on to another topic, which is treated in the same 
manner. All ingenuous minds feel this method to be 
most confusing and \mcomfortable; even the professed 
metaphysician will often be stirred up to oppose it, as 
the metaphysics may not be his own. If metaphysics 
are to venture into the theological field, let them come 
in openly and not furtively, and let them conform to the 
rules of the logic of intuition. And if the investigations 
thus necessitated cannot come in gracefully in the heart 
of a Scriptural exposition, let them be handed over to an 
appendix, or appear in a separate treatise, the merits of 
which will be more readily ascertained from the circum- 
stance that the philosophical stands out separate from the 
religious element. This leads to another rule. 
3. There must be a careful separation of the Scriptural 
truth from the supposed metaphysical principle employed 
to illustrate or defend it. The great body of practical 474 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
thinkers, especially in England, have ever entertained, and 
this not without grounds to go on, a suspicion of meta- 
physical theology. In the exposition of the doctrines of 
the Bible, not only in sermons, but in practical divinity, 
the introduction of metaphysical discussions may be de- 
clined with great wisdom, except when the metaphysical 
objections of opponents necessitate it. The great body, 
even of thinking men, will be vastly more pleased, and 
in a still higher degree more profited, by clear statement 
and spontaneous reasoning, than by abstruse discussions. 
A calm reverence for Scripture, a careful collation of pas- 
sages, an enlarged acquaintance with the whole volume, 
sound sense, clear statement, direct argument, in which 
there is but a link or two between the first premiss and 
the final conclusion, a knowledge of human character in its 
practical operations, and,above all, genuine faith, an attach- 
ment to the truth, and a love to God and man, will do vastly 
more than metaphysical subtlety or lengthened deduction, 
in explaining, enforcing, and defending Divine truth. 
But are metaphysics therefore to be absolutely banished 
from theology ? I lay down no such stringent rule ; the 
very objections of the heretic and the rationalist, and the 
cavils of the infidel and the scoffer, compel divines, whe- 
ther they will or no, to enter the regions of metaphysics. 
The God who gives to all men their gifts, is to be praised 
because he has raised up from time to time persons of great 
intellectual stature, who have defended the grand essen- 
tial doctrines of Christianity in learned and elaborate phi- 
losophical treatises. Philosophy should acknowledge that 
some of the works of which she has most cause to be 
proud were constructed with the avowed design of de- 
fending the foundations or strengthening the fortresses of 
religion. 
But in professedly theological works there should be 
a studious distinction drawn between the philosophy and THEOLOGY. 
475 
the religion. This is needful, in order that we may satis- 
factorily examine both, and be able on the one hand to 
determine whether the author has laid hold of a correct 
metaphysical principle, and been legitimately applying it; 
and, on the other hand, to view the religious doctrine 
apart from the philosophic speculation. The caution now 
enforced will not forbid philosophy from attempting to 
aid religion, to furnish to it evidences, to confirm its doc- 
trines, and systematize its scattered truths; but it will 
secure that the two be not confounded ; in particular, that 
philosophy do not represent itself as religion but as me- 
taphysics ; that it do not claim for its speculations the 
authority of the Bible or of God, or advance them as an 
essential part of religion, or place them on the same level 
as the truths of the Divine Word; and, above all, that it 
do not make religion lean upon them, so that if they 
should break down religion would be supposed to have 
suffered a defeat. 
The rule laid down demands that the two be seen to 
be different. Not that it should insist that they be dis- 
cussed in separate treatises, or each in separate chapters 
of one treatise; this might look too like that formal ac- 
curacy of demeanour and character which often conceals 
the worst inaccuracies. But it rigidly exacts that the two 
be distinguished in the mind of the writer, and that the 
discussion be conducted so that the difference cannot be 
lost sight of by the most careless reader; so that the 
philosophy may be recognized simply as philosophy, and 
the religion be seen to be independent of the philosophy; 
and so that, should the philosophy be set aside by new 
systems, the religion may remain entire and uninjured. 
Bishop Butler, I may remark, has set a noble example 
in this respect both in his ‘ Analogy 5 and in his ‘ Ser- 
mons •/ his philosophy, whether employed in illustration 
or defence, is always so brought forward that it can never 476 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
be confounded with the religious truth, which it is meant 
to aid, and never to injure. As neighbours, the two may 
have much pleasant and profitable communion, and many 
interchanges of good offices; but still, they should keep 
their separate domiciles; without this there will sooner 
or later be misunderstandings, jarring, and disputes, and 
in the end suspicions and cruel separations. 
These restrictions, I am aware, lay the axe to the root 
of many a tree which those who planted it will be un- 
willing to see cut down ; but they are necessary to the 
clearing of a dreadfully intertangled forest, and to allow 
the trees which are entitled to remain to have free breath- 
ing-space, and thus attain their full growth, and stand out 
in their proper form. 
Sect. VI. Man as a Religious Being. 
There is a sense in which man is certainly not a reli- 
gions being. He is inclined to avoid God, and to live 
unmindful of Him; and when constrained to look at His 
purity, his eyes are so dazzled that he pays Him a blinded 
and superstitious prostration. When left to himself, he 
has ever been degrading the Divine nature and character, 
and whether blessed or not with a supernatural revelation, 
he has ever been breaking the commandments of God. 
But there is a sense in which man is a religious being. 
All nations have had a religion of some kind, and the 
number of professed atheists is so small that some have 
doubted whether there has ever been such a monster as 
a sincere atheist. The Psalmist' seems to give the true 
account when he describes the fool as saying in his heart 
there is no God. There are intuitions, processes of 
thought, natural observations, and deep feelings, which 
all tend, even when restrained and degraded, towards a 
conviction of the existence of a Supernatural Being, to a 
faith in Him or a fear of Him, to adoration, and a sense THEOLOGY. 
477 
of responsibility. Every deeper intuition of the soul 
goes out towards God. Created being, as we follow it 
down, is felt to be fixed and permanent only in uncreated 
being. The objects around us are felt to be so fleeting 
that our conviction of reality is satisfied only when we 
reach self-existent substance. Our conviction of sub- 
stance is not content till it comes to One who has all 
power in himself. Infinite time and space are felt, after 
all, to be only infinite emptiness till we fill them up with 
a living and loving Being. All the beautiful relationships 
in nature, all the order in respect of form, time, and 
quantity, all the adaptations of means to end, seem but 
the scattered rays from an original and central wisdom. 
The impulse which prompts us to search after causes will 
not cease its cravings till it carries us up to a first cause 
in a self-acting substance. Earthly beauty is so evanes- 
cent that we rejoice to learn that there is a Divine beauty 
of which the other is but a flickering reflection. Our 
moral convictions especially mount towards God as their 
proper sphere, their source, and their home. Our sense 
of obligation connects us by stronger than physical bonds 
with Him who is the author of our moral nature, the 
sanctioner of the moral law, and who is at last to be our 
judge. I do not go so far as to say that any one of these 
does of itself prove the Divine existence. I do not even 
affirm that all of them together would enable us to con- 
struct a logical argument in behalf of the being of God. 
These intuitions are expected to look to certain very ob- 
vious facts pressing themselves on the attention of all; 
but I maintain that, being thus stimulated and supported, 
they do lead to certain deep feelings and impressions in 
the minds of all, and to a most reasonable belief in God. 
Every one of them, like the plant, is sending down roots 
towards this ground, is shooting out points towards this 
light. We feel that this world has no stability till we 478 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
make it rest on God. In particular, we feel as to our- 
selves that we are in a state of dependence; as having 
derived our being from another; as needing a supply for 
our ever-craving wants; as having our destiny swayed 
by events arranged without consulting us; as being ever 
under an eye that inspects us ; and as having at last to 
appear at a judgment-seat; and we cannot be satisfied 
till we learn that we hang on a Great Central Power and 
Light, round which we should revolve, as the earth does 
round the sun. 
These convictions, and the feelings growing on them, 
are deep down in the bosoms of all; and like waters 
which have descended from the heavens and penetrated 
into the hills, they will ever tend to burst out, and if re- 
strained in their legitimate channels, they will find vent in 
others. Ever craving for something, they will be in pain 
and uneasiness till the appropriate object is presented. 
Their cry indeed will often be like the infant’s cry in the 
night, a cry in the darkness for something unknown. 
And as the appetite of hunger in its eagerness may lead 
us to grasp at a sad mixture of food and earth, nay, of 
food and poison when it is presented, so our natural 
religious faith may often be taken in with a sad medley 
of truth and error, of earnest godliness, and debasing su- 
perstition. Still, while they eagerly devour such, they will 
not be satisfied therewith, but, feeling restless and trou- 
bled, they will still crave for something, they know not 
what, and look for a remedy to their experienced ills. 
It follows from this account that these instincts and 
feelings may be perverted and abused. Man is allured, 
not compelled, to be religious. True piety is always a 
holy act, to which there is the consent of the will. Man, 
if he is bent upon it, may become unbelieving or su- 
perstitious. As having committed sin, he will ever be 
prompted, like Cain, to go out from the presence of the THEOLOGY. 
479 
Lord, and to strain after a forgetfulness of Him. Or, as 
oppressed with a secret consciousness of sin, and as un- 
able to look on the holiness of God, he will ever be 
tempted to form a god to his own taste, and who may 
not dazzle and blind him by the brightness of his purity. 
The majority of mankind flit between these two states ; 
between a stubborn forgetfulness of God and desire to 
be independent of Him, and a superstitious prostration 
before a god, or more frequently gods, fashioned by them 
according to the crude cravings and cherished wishes of 
their hearts. 
But in this state of half-conscious sin there is a power- 
ful intuition awakened, and though to a large extent 
blind, and to some extent incapable of hearing, it will at 
times cry terribly for its object. There will rise up a 
conscience of guilt and an apprehension of an unknown 
danger, like the sullen roar of ocean waves evidently at 
hand, but not seen in a murky and stormy night; and 
this will be followed by an anxious though possibly very 
ignorant and perplexed looking round for a way of 
escape. While men are engrossed with the cares and 
climbings and fears and gratifications of this world, 
these apprehensions may to a large extent be suppressed; 
still they are there deep down in the heart, and at times 
they will breathe out in yearnings after some help, to 
come we know not whence, or burst forth in dreadful 
cries and alarms ; or if these natural outlets be closed 
by a cherished unbelief, it will only be to make the re- 
strained feelings spread like a disease and burn like an 
internal fire. It is this sentiment which keeps alive a 
sense of sin and a fear of God and of a judgment-day 
among all nations, and which so far prepares the heathen 
to listen to the tidings of a provided Saviour. But this 
instinct may likewise be misled, because of its blindness, 
and may be directed to objects which seem fitted to 480 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
gratify it, but which in the end disappoint it. It may 
tempt the man who is moved by it to picture God as a 
vindictive being, or it may prompt to acts of laceration, 
supposed to be fitted to appease the anger of God. Still, 
the anxious spirit, even after the most horrid and excru- 
ciating acts have been performed, will not be satisfied, 
for it will still be in doubt whether, after all, that terrible 
God be pacified. These sentiments and cravings will 
always feel that there is nothing to meet them in a de- 
istic or rationalistic creed, and that there is nothing to 
give them peace in pagan ritual and sacrifices. I believe 
they can be met, and gratified, and brought to compo- 
sure only by the view, presented in the Word, of God 
reconciling man to Himself by the blood of His Son. 
Sect. YII. Rational Theology. 
Attempts have often been made, by persons professing 
a great respect for Christianity, to construct a religious 
creed by human reason ; sometimes using ‘ reason ’ in the 
larger and looser sense, to stand for all the intellectual 
powers, together with the moral faculty, and sometimes 
confining it to the mere logical understanding. It is not 
proposed to discard the Bible, but to found the doctrines 
believed in on a rational basis ; and most commonly all 
tenets are rejected, or at least omitted, which cannot be 
thus supported. In this country this theology usually 
borrowed largely from Locke, and appealed much to ex- 
perience and man’s desire to secure happiness. In Ger- 
many it proceeded on the fundamental principles of the 
critical philosophy of Kant, and especially on certain a 
priori notions of the sufficiency of virtue. Its oversights 
are many and glaring. 
1. While professing to appeal to human nature, it has 
commonly overlooked some of the very deepest intuitions 
and the most characteristic feelings of the soul, such as THEOLOGY. 
481 
the sense of sin and the terror of a sin-hating and sin- 
punishing God. These have been studiously omitted, 
because they are palpably and uncompromisingly opposed 
to the self-righteous, self-sufficient spirit which the builders 
of the system wish to be allowed to cherish. 
2. There have been not a few gaps and flaws in the 
structures reared. These have proceeded from the deter- 
mined purpose of the builders to erect a system of theo- 
logy without accepting aid from Divine authority. They 
have been triumphantly pointed out with a sneer by the 
sceptic, who showrs that objections can be taken to many 
of the pretended demonstrations of religious truths, as, for 
example, to the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, 
and all that depends on that doctrine in regard to the 
world to come. By all means let the analogies and illus- 
trations which may be drawn from nature in favour of 
such doctrines be urged, but the truths rest, after all, 
most securely on the authority of God. The rational the- 
ology, which would move them from this foundation, is in 
every respect most irrational. 
3. It errs most' egregiously in casting aside the truths 
of the Word, which are most suited to the deeper wants of 
man, such as those which tell us of reconciliation through 
the Son of God, of the work of converting grace, and of 
restoration to communion wTith God. These doctrines 
cannot be discovered by human reason in its highest or 
deepest researches, yet they are the truths which when 
revealed commend themselves most forcibly to the heart 
of man. 
4. It has been powerless in calling forth deep feeling, 
in rousing the soul to enthusiasm and devotedness, or in 
urging it on to deeds of heroism and self-sacrifice. The 
heart of man, especially at those times when it is awed 
by a sense of the Divine majesty and purity, or struck 
with a sense of its own sinfulness, or elevated by aspira- 482 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
tions after a holier state, has ever turned away from it 
with abhorrence and scorn. 
Sect. VIII. Intuitional Theology. 
The icy and rigid rationalism of last age has dissolved 
in the heat of a warmer season, and of late we have had 
a time of wading deep in melted matter; and now we 
are in an atmosphere of sultriness and dimness, of hazi- 
ness and dreaminess. It is universally acknowledged 
that the logical processes of definition and reasoning can 
do little in religion; and those who, in days bygone, 
would have appealed to such forms, are in these times 
betaking themselves to something livelier,—to Feeling, 
Belief, Inspiration,—or, in one word, to Intuition, which 
looks at the truth or object at once, and through no in- 
terfering process or dimming medium. In last age, cer- 
tain of our “ excelsior” youths were like to be starved in 
cold; in this age, they are in greater danger of having 
the seeds of a wasting disease fostered by lukewarm damps 
and gilded vapours. 
The clearest views they show are those which we ob- 
tain by gazing immediately on the object. Have not, 
they ask, the seers and sages of our world, poetic and 
philosophic, seen further than other men by direct, and 
not by reflected or introspective vision ? Does not our 
own consciousness witness that we get the furthest-reach- 
ing glimpses when we are wholly engrossed in looking 
out at things, without being at the trouble to analyze 
our thoughts ? There are moments when all thinkers, or 
certain thinkers, have seen further than in their usual 
moods; and this by overlooking all interposing objects, 
and gazing full on the truth. Some seem to have expe- 
rienced ecstatic states, in which, being lifted above them- 
selves and the earth, and carried—whether in the bodv 
V 
or out of the body they know not—into the third heavens, THEOLOGY. 
483 
they behold things which it is not possible for man to 
utter. An entranced minute of such bursting revelation 
is worth, they say, hours or years of your logically con- 
catenated thought. The soul is then carried as to a 
great height, above the clouds that rise from the damps 
of earth, like unto Mount Teneriffe, from which ardent 
gazers thought they saw land lying to the far west ages 
before the practical Columbus actually set foot on Ame- 
rica. As there are sounds, such as the sighings of the 
stream, heard in the stillness of evening, which are not 
audible in the bustle of the day, so there are voices heard 
in certain quieter moods of the mind which cannot be 
discerned when the soul is being agitated by discussion 
and ratiocination. As there are states of our atmosphere 
in which remote objects seem near, as there are days in 
which we can look far down into the ocean and behold 
its treasures, as the night shows us heavenly lights which 
are invisible in the glare of common day, so there are 
day moods and night moods in which we look into great 
depths, and see the dim as distinct, and behold truths 
glittering like gems, and brilliant as constellations. At 
these times it looks as if a veil or cloud were removed, 
and we see, as it were by polarized light, the inward 
constitution of things which usually expose but their 
tame outside; and we gaze on naked truth without the 
robe which it commonly wears, but which conceals what 
is infinitely more lovely than itself. Our eye can then 
look on pure light without being blinded by it; and we 
stand face to face with truth and beauty and goodness, 
and, in a sense, with God Himself. 
This is a view very often presented in the present day; 
and it should be admitted at once that it is by spon- 
taneous, and not by reflective thought, that the mind at- 
tains its clearest and most penetrating visions of things. 
Our mental powers operate spontaneously, and act most 434 
METAPHYSICA.L PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
faithfully when we are taking no notice of tlietn, but are 
influenced by a simple desire to discover the truth ; when 
the mind is in its best exercises, the interposition of me- 
taphysical introspection and syllogistic formulae would 
tend only to dim the clearness of the view. It may be 
allowed farther, that there are times in every man’s 
thinking when great truths come suddenly upon him ; 
times when he feels as if he were emerging at once from 
a tunnel into the light of day. These are states to be 
cherished, and not curbed. But it is of vast moment that 
we understand their precise nature, and the value to be 
attached to them, and the restrictions to be laid upon the 
confidence we put in them. 
I. In these visions, clear or profound, there are com- 
monly other processes besides simple intuition. Almost 
always there is involved in them the gathered wisdom 
of long and varied and ripened experience; very often 
there are analyses more or less refined, generalizations of 
a narrower or wider scope ; and not unfrequently ratioci- 
nations, passing so rapidly, that the processes are not 
only not analyzed, they are not even observed. AVhen 
Archimedes broke out into such ecstasy on discovering 
a law of hydrostatics; when the thought flashed on the 
mind of Newton that the power which draws an apple to 
the ground is that which holds the moon in her sphere; 
when Franklin identified the sparks produced by rubbing 
certain substances on the earth with the lightning of 
heaven; when it occurred to Watt that the steam which 
moved the lid of a kettle might be turned to a great 
mechanical purpose; when the Abbe Haiiy, in gathering 
up the fragments of a crystal which had accidentally 
fallen from his hands, surmised that all crystals were de- 
rived from a few primitive forms; when Oken, on looking 
at the bleached skull of a deer in the Hartz Forest, ex- 
claimed, “ This is a vertebrate column!” every one ac- THEOLOGY. 
485 
knowledges that there was vastly more than intuitional 
power involved: there were presupposed large original 
talents of a peculiar kind in each case, habits of scientific 
research, and long courses of systematic training and ob- 
servation ; while at the instant there were the highest 
powers of comparison and computation in exercise. It 
will be readily allowed that there was a similar combi- 
nation of native gift, of accumulated experience, and con- 
nected ratiocination, implied in the discoveries made by 
Adam Smith and others in political and social science. 
But I go a step further, and maintain that the grand 
views of moral and religious truth which burst on the 
vision of our greatest philosophers were the result of rays 
coming from a thousand scattered points. When Socrates 
unfolded to an age and nation deprived of the light of 
revelation such elevated doctrines regarding a superin- 
tending Providence, and the intimate relation between 
virtue and happiness; when Plato showed that man par- 
ticipated in the Divine intelligence, and that the forms 
of nature partook of the ideas or patterns which had been 
in or before the Divine Mind from all eternity; when 
Leibnitz developed his grand theory of a pre-established 
harmony running through the mental and material uni- 
verse,—there were in active exercise profound reflection, 
long observation of human nature and of the ways of 
God, searching analyses, and a cultivated moral vision. 
I am sure that there is a similar union involved in those 
far-reaching glimpses which more obscure men have had, 
at their better moments, of great moral or spiritual veri- 
ties regarding the nature of man, and the character and 
dealings of God. 
The leap of waters at the cataract of Niagara is on the 
instant, yet it is not, after all, a simple process: antece- 
dent to it there have been rains falling from heaven, and 
these gathered into a river, and acquiring momentum as 486 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
they move on, and a precipitous cliff formed for their de- 
scent ; and in the fall, water, rock, and atmosphere mingle 
their separate influences. The flash of lightning across 
the sky is instantaneous, yet it is the produce of long 
meteorological operations, in which probably air, mois- 
ture, sunlight, electricity, and an attracting object, have 
each had its part; and it is only on the whole gathering 
to an overflow that the convulsive effect is produced. 
There must have been a similar collection of strength, 
and combination of scattered influences, in those sudden 
leaps which certain minds have taken; as when Augus- 
tine abandoned paganism, and Luther left ritualism; and 
there are the same in those movements of the spirit of 
man in which it penetrates to immense distances without 
our being able to follow it through all the intermediate 
space, and illumines as it passes the densest masses of 
darkness. It is the business of physical science to ex- 
plain the one set of processes, and it shows that they are 
the result of a conspiracy of agencies. It is the office of 
psychological science to explain the other set of opera- 
tions, and it can show that there is involved in them a 
variety of original and acquired endowments. A number 
of different rays have met in the production of this pure 
white light. The views are so wide-ranging, because all 
the inlets of the mind are open to receive impressions. 
II. In all these higher visions there is apt to be a mix- 
ture of error. The glittering lustre in which the objects 
are seen is apt to dazzle the eye, and prevent it from 
taking too narrow an inspection. The rapidity of the 
mental process is favourable to the concealment of hasti- 
ness of inference, to which we are led by the influence 
of inferior motives, acting like concealed iron upon the 
ship’s compass. With the desire to discover the truth 
there may be united the personal vanity or the idiosyn- 
crasies of the individual, or the prejudices of the pledged THEOLOGY. 
487 
partisan, or the proud and self-righteous temper, or a 
spirit of contradiction. How often does it happen, in 
such cases, that the conceits of the fancy or the wishes 
of the heart are attributed to the reason, that high feeling 
is mistaken for high wisdom, that what is dark is sup- 
posed to be deep, that what is lovely is supposed to be 
holy! In the region to which they have betaken them- 
selves, objects seem gigantic because perceived in the 
mist, as they look through the openings in which persons 
mistake gilded clouds for sunlit islands, or for moun- 
tains based on the earth and piercing the sky. 
Besides the error which may be in the original vision, 
there are apt to be additional mistakes when the indi- 
vidual would unfold it and put it into language. As 
Aurora Leigh says :—• 
“ It may be, perhaps, 
Such have not settled long and deep enough 
In trance, to attain to clairvoyance ; and still 
The memory mixes with the vision, spoils 
And works it turbid.” 
The intuitionalist often has a genuine feeling; and when 
he confines himself to a simple description, his statement, 
if not altogether free from error, may be a correct tran- 
script of what has passed in his own mind, and may have 
as vivifying an influence upon others as it has had upon 
himself. The glow which radiates from such men as Cole- 
ridge, when tracing the correspondences between subject 
and object, or Wordsworth, as he sketches the feelings 
awakened by the forms and aspects of nature, or Ruskin, 
as we gaze with him on the higher works of art, steeps all 
attendant minds in its own splendours,—as the gorgeous 
evening sun burnishes all objects, clouds as well as land- 
scapes, in its own rich hues. The intuitionalist ever suc- 
ceeds best in poetry, or in prose which is of the character 
of poetry, and might, if the father of it chose, be wedded 488 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
to immortal verse. But when he attempts, as he often 
does, a systematic exposition, scientific, or logical, or phi- 
losophical, or theological, of his sentiments, there may 
now, with the errors of the original writing, be mingled 
the mistakes that arise from an unfaithful transcription. 
Every one knows that to feel and to analyze the feeling 
are two very different exercises; and it often happens that 
those who feel the most intensely, and even those who 
think the most profoundly, are the least capacitated for 
unfolding the process to others. In attempting to do so, 
they often mix it up with other elements, and the product 
is a conglomerate, in which truth and error are banded 
together without the possibility of separating them. In 
unwinding the threads, they have tangled them; and 
they become the more hopelessly entangled the greater 
the strength which they exert in unravelling them. The 
pool may, or quite as possibly may not, have been ori- 
ginally pure; it has certainly been rendered altogether 
turbid by the mud stirred up in the attempt to explore 
it. As the author of ‘Hours with the Mystics’ says, 
“ This intuitional metal, in its native state, is mere fluent, 
formless quicksilver; to make it definite and serviceable, 
you must fix it by an alloy: but then, alas ! it is 
Reason no longer; and, so far from being universal truth, 
receives a countless variety of shapes, according to the 
temperament, culture, or philosophic party of the indi- 
vidual thinker.” 
These visions, raptures, and ecstasies are most apt to 
appear in philosophy and theology ; and it is there they 
work most mischief. The intuitionalist is ever placing 
things in their wrong category, dividing the things which 
should be joined, or mixing the things which should be 
separated. His analogies overlook differences ; his dis- 
tinctions set aside resemblances. His limitations are like 
the mad attempts of Xerxes to chain the ocean. His THEOLOGY. 
489 
definitions are like the boundings of a cloud—while he is 
pointing to them they are changed ; indeed his whole 
method is like a project to make roads and run fences in 
cloudland. In metaphysics, he represents as essences 
what are in fact nothing but attenuated ghosts, created 
by his own oppressed vision as it looks into darkness. 
The Neo-Platonists pretended to see the One and the 
Good by ecstasy ; what they saw was merely an abstract 
quality separated from the concrete object. They tried 
to raise up emotion by the contemplation of the skeleton 
attribute, but in this they did and could not succeed; for 
it is not by abstraction that feeling is excited, but by the 
presentation of an individual and living reality. The at- 
tempt in the present age, by certain metaphysical specu- 
lators, to call forth feeling by the presentation of the 
True, the Beautiful, the Good, must terminate in a simi- 
lar failure. It is not by the contemplation of truth, but 
of the God of truth; not by the contemplation of loveli- 
ness, but of the God of loveliness; not by the contem- 
plation of the good, but of the good God, that feelings 
of adoration and love are called forth and gratified. 
There are still greater perils attending the indulgence 
of these inspirations in matters of religion. The intui- 
tionalist is tempted to ascribe to some higher influence 
the idea which arises simply from the law of association 
or organic impulse; to attribute to intuition what is mere 
floating sentiment; to pure reason what is the product 
of habit or of passion; nay, to God Himself what springs 
from the fallible human heart. The height to which the 
soul is carried in these elevations is apt to have a dizzying 
influence; and not a few have fallen when they seemed 
to themselves to be standing most secure. Some, pre- 
tending to a heavenly mission, have yielded at once to the 
temptation which the true Messenger withstood ; and, 
without a promise of one to bear them up in their pre- 4yO 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
sumption, have cast themselves down from the pinnacle 
to which they were elevated, and been lost amidst the 
laughter of men. Some have claimed for their own con- 
ceits the inspiration of Heaven ; and have come to deify 
their own imaginations, and to sanctify their schemes of 
ambition, by representing them as formed under the 
sanction of God. 
III. The error is to be detected by a careful reflex ex- 
amination of the spontaneous process of intuition, or, 
what is more frequent, of the intuition with certain con- 
joined elements. That error may creep into these visions 
and raptures, is evident from the circumstance, that 
scarcely any two inspirationalists agree even when pre- 
tending to have revelations on the same point; and when 
they do concur, it is evidently because of the dominant 
authority of some great master. How, then, are we to 
decide among the claims of the rival sages, or seers, or 
doctors, or schools ? Plainly by inquiring which of them, 
if any, are in fact under the influence of a native intui- 
tion ; and this is to be done by an inductive inquiry into 
the nature of our intuitions, and by trying the proposed 
dogma or feeling by the tests, thus discovered, of intuition. 
In no other department of human investigation, except 
speculative philosophy and theology, will an indiscriminate 
appeal to intuition or feeling be allowed in the present 
day. Mathematics admit of no such loose methods of 
procedure. The fundamental principles of that science 
are, no doubt, founded on intuition; but then it is on 
intuitions carefully enunciated and formalized, and the 
whole superstructure is banded by rigid logical deduction. 
Physical science will not tolerate any such anticipations, 
except at times in the way of suggesting hypotheses, to 
be immediately tried by a rigid induction of facts, and 
accepted or rejected only as they can stand the test. In 
political science there is a necessity for the weighing of THEOLOGY. 
491 
conflicting principles, and room for clearness of head and 
far-seeing sagacity; but in these operations mere intuition 
has a small share, and is not allowed to pass till it is 
carefully sifted. It is surely high time that intuition were 
prevented from careering without restraint in the fields of 
philosophy and theology, and that rules were laid down, 
not for absolutely restraining it, but for confining it within 
its legitimate province. 
The sole corrective of the evil, the only means of se- 
parating the error from the truth, is to be found in a cool 
reflex examination of the spontaneous process. This is 
needed, even when the idea is one which has occurred to 
our own minds; to protect them from the self-deception 
to which all are liable, to provide them with a safety-lamp 
when they would enter dark subterranean passages ; or 
with a chart when they would venture on a sea of specu- 
lation ; or with a compass to tell the direction when they 
would go out beyond the measured and fenced ground of 
thought into a waste, above which clouds for ever hover, 
and where are precipices over which multitudes are for 
ever falling. Needed to guard us even in our personal 
musings, it will surely be acknowledged that it is still 
more necessary when others demand our assent to their 
proffered vision, lest what we pick up be 
“ Like cast-off nosegays picked up on tlie road, 
The worse for being warm.” 
Not that this review of the spontaneous thought should 
set out with the fixed purpose of rejecting all that has 
been suggested; on the contrary, it should retain and 
carefully cherish all that may be good, and cast away 
only what cannot stand a sifting inspection. But the test- 
ing, in order to accomplish these ends, must proceed on 
certain principles. So far as the spontaneous exercise 
professes to be guided by an induction of facts, it must 
be tried by the canons of the logic of induction. So far 492 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
as it involves ratiocination, the approved rules of reason- 
ing must determine its validity. So far as it claims to 
be intuitional, metaphysical science is entitled to demand 
that the principle involved be shown to be in the very 
constitution of the mind, self-evident, necessary, univer- 
sal ; and further, that its determinate rule be specified 
and formalized, so that we may see whether it covers the 
case in hand. 
In moral subjects, first thoughts are often the best, be- 
cause formed prior to the calculations of selfishness. 
They may not, however, always be the best; for they 
may proceed from passion, which in fallen man is as 
spontaneous and quite as quick as any moral impulse. As 
a general rule, neither the first nor the seco?id thoughts 
are the best; but the last thoughts of a studious course 
of reflection, in which both first and second thoughts are 
reviewed, that which is good in each being preserved, and 
that which is evil rejected. The same remark holds good 
of the exercises of the intellect. The first views of the 
truth are frequently the freshest and the justest. It has 
been remarked, that the first view of the new-born infant 
discloses a resemblance to father or mother which the 
subsequent growth of the child effaces ; and there is often 
a similar power of penetration in the first glance of the 
intellectual eye, directed towards a truth presented for the 
first time : the prominent features are then caught on the 
instant, and correspondences are detected which disappear 
on a more familiar acquaintance, being lost sight of among 
other qualities. But while these original glimpses are 
often very precious, and are to be carefully noted and 
registered, it is equally true that first impressions often 
contain large mixture of error. At these times of intense 
rapture and ardent longing, the mind seizes eagerly on 
what presents itself, and is incapable of drawing distinc- 
tions, and may utterly neglect other aspects, which are THEOLOGY. 
493 
only to be detected by longer and more familiar acquaint- 
ance. Hence the need of cool reflection to come after, 
and retain only what can be justified by the rules of logic. 
As the first looks of the infant reveal features which are 
subsequently lost sight of, so the last look of the dying 
will call up once more likenesses which had escaped our 
notice in the interval. Let there be a similar holding of all 
the true analogies—caught in the first look—in those last 
looks, which, after many a survey, we cherish and retain 
for ever of the objects which excite our interests and claim 
our regards. 
IV. In order to give the intuitions in the disordered 
soul of man a religious direction, there is need of a very 
special Object to evoke, to harmonize, and centre them. 
Had man’s nature been limpidly pure, I suppose he 
would have risen at once and spontaneously to the con- 
templation of God, and that his soul would have reposed 
with satisfaction on Him. But man ever feels, when he 
would thus mount, that there is a downward drag, when 
he would draw nigh to God that there is a repulsion, and 
he knows not what to do in order to reconciliation, and he 
either betakes himself to various sorts of supposed paci- 
fications, but is left in painful uncertainty as to whether 
they can accomplish his ends, or he allows himself to 
sink into a godless indifference. In order to the resto- 
ration of peace, and to his heart being drawn forth to- 
wards God, there is need of some Reconciler being dis- 
closed to the view; and this is what is so aptly provided 
in the Eternal Logos becoming flesh and working out a 
salvation. But in order that this Object be recognized, 
he must come before us with the authority of God; and 
in order to our being able to look to him, he must be 
set before us in such a way that we can readily and 
clearly see Him. It is thus that Jesus Christ comes be- 
fore us, attested by prophecy and by miracle, thus that he 494 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
is presented to us in the Word as in a glass. We have 
now the Object fitted to call forth the deeper moral in- 
tuitions into play, and to gratify them each and all to the 
full. We can now look to God, revealed in the face of 
his Son, without being scared or prostrated ; and as we 
gaze, the pent-up and imprisoned religious affections are 
set free. The sense of sin, which before so bound the 
heart in icy hardness, is melted as by genial heat, and 
repentance bursts forth in copious streams to relieve the 
soul. Faith feels that it can repose on a pacified God, 
and love clasps and embraces Him who is now seen to 
be chiefest among ten thousand, and altogether lovely. 
Need I add, that in order that the Object presented 
accomplish those ends he must be a real object. Were 
he a mere picture, or a fable, or a myth, the soul would 
be driven back by the idea ever pressed on it, that this 
is, after all, an illusion. The understanding would rebel 
against the imposture which had been tried upon it; and 
the faith would veer round by a polar reaction to a har- 
dened scepticism; and the intuitions would refuse to 
appear on the idle summons given them; and the soul 
would in sulkiness, as it were, retreat into a dim cavern 
where it has only a flickering light, but from which it is 
morbidly indisposed to pass into the sunshine without. 
It is, as I reckon it, a happy result of the development 
of principles in this treatise, that it shows how we must 
still go to the Word of God for our religion. All at- 
tempts hitherto made to construct a religion indepen- 
dent of Scripture have turned out acknowledged failures : 
the systems reared cannot stand a sifting examination by 
reason, and have been utterly powerless on human cha- 
racter. There was an expectation, long cherished by 
many, that something better than the old Christianity of 
the Bible, literally interpreted, might come out of the 
great German philosophic systems of Kant and Fichte, THEOLOGY. 
495 
Sclielling, Hegel, and Schleiermaclier ; but these hopes 
have been doomed to acknowledged disappointment. The 
idea was fondly cherished by some that certain men of 
literary genins, who had caught more or less of the spirit 
of the German Metaphysics, such as Coleridge, and 
Goethe, and Carlyle, must have something new and pro- 
found to satisfy the soul in its deeper cravings, could 
they only be induced to utter it. Coleridge has played 
out his tune, sweet and irregular as the harp of iEolus, 
and all men perceive that he never had anything to meet 
the deeper wants of humanity, except what he got from 
the songs of Zion. It has long been clear, in regard to 
Goethe, and is now being seen in regard to Carlyle, that 
neither of them ever had anything positive to furnish in 
religion, and that all they had to utter was blankly ne- 
gative, and I rather think that the last hope of drawing 
anything soul-satisfying from these quarters has vanished 
from the minds of those who have been most impressed 
by their genius. I freely acknowledge, as to some of the 
eminent men I have referred to, that they have given 
profound expositions of some of the deeper principles 
and feelings of the soul, and have thus furnished a con- 
tribution to philosophy and incidentally benefited the- 
ology. In particular, it may be admitted of a school of 
intuitionalist divines who have felt the influence of the 
Teutonic speculations, that they have called attention to 
foundations and impulses in our nature, which a narrow' 
artificial theology—made up of coagulated abstracts of the 
supposed Christian system—had overlooked; but which, 
as these men have shown, had not been lost sight of in 
actual and living Christianity. The school has erred not. 
in the positive views which the members of it have un- 
folded, but in wdiat they have omitted and scornfully 
denied. In particular, they have lost sight of one of the 
deepest and most ineradicable of all our intuitions; they 496 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
have taken no notice of that sense of sin and apprehen- 
sion of God and of a judgment-day which make men feel 
dissatisfied with every form of natural religion, and bring 
them in helplessness to the Crucified Saviour and the 
written Word.* Intuitionalism has had its trial in the 
age now passing away as rationalism had in the previous 
one, and both have been found utterly insufficient. Ra- 
tionalism reared a structure with regular walls and well- 
fitted gates, but the soul has ever felt it to be desolate 
as a prison. Intuitionalism has raised up a showy sum- 
mer palace, but it is utterly and manifestly unfitted to 
withstand the winds and colds of winter. 
There are some who imagine that we may now discard 
the Bible, and yet retain all the light and assurance and 
comfort which it has diffused. There were persons in 
the last century who thought they could dispense with 
the Scriptures, and yet retain among the people their 
high morality. The generation which had been piously 
educated did in many cases keep up to the high standard 
of morality; but the generation which succeeded, edu- 
cated in mere morality, thought they had outgrown the 
rigid morality of their fathers, as these fathers had out- 
lived the rigid orthodoxy of their fathers; and the race 
which was reared to be moral, turned out fearfully im- 
moral. Men had cut down the tree on which the flowers 
grew, expecting they would still flourish, and were as- 
tonished when they faded. In the day which has now 
reached its noon, the corresponding class of thinkers are 
under a deep impression that there is need of feeling in 
order to incite to a living morality, and so must have 
* In particular, Mr. Maurice, drawing from the schools in Germany 
which flourished prior to the later inquiries into Sin and Conscience, 
has, while developing some of the airier of our mental aspirations, over- 
looked the deeper convictions of the moral power, and thus been led to 
discard the Scripture doctrine of Atonement. There are important re- 
marks in Kigg’s ‘ Anglican Theology.’ THEOLOGY. 
497 
sentiment, by all means and above all things a warm 
and glowing sentiment. But still they would rise above 
the inspired Word, and leave it behind, foolishly imagin- 
ing that they may have a continuance of the diffused 
fervour, without the body from which the heat radiates. 
The issue of such an experiment is certain, and is already 
beginning to show itself. The race reared under such 
influences will go a step further in the direction in which 
they have been led, and will have no difficulty in dis- 
carding the feelings which are left without a basis, till we 
have a generation without creed, and without any sem- 
blance of piety, real or pretended. The evening sky, im- 
mediately after the sun has sunk, may be as lovely and 
gorgeous as when he was above the horizon; but it is 
only the child who will cherish the imagination, that 
after the illuminating body has gone the glow will not 
soon fade into gloom. 
V. A theology which looks merely to that portion of 
Divine truth which is addressed to our intuitions must 
be very vague, loose, and unsatisfactory. If compelled 
to decide between a rationalistic and intuitional religion, 
I would infinitely prefer the latter, just as I would choose 
an idealistic view of nature rather than a materialistic or 
sensational or mechanical. But I am not bound to make 
a selection. It is all true that a logical divinity has ever 
been felt to be harsh and crabbed, and that there has 
been nothing in it to gain our deeper convictions or win 
our regards. But it is as true that intuitional theology 
gives mere cloudland, in which all is vapoury and hazy 
at the best, and in which we are at last apt to be drenched 
in rain and tempest. If the one looks so unattractive, as 
dyked so rigidly into rectilinear and rectangular figures, 
disregardful of all natural height and hollow, the other 
is a territory in an unmeasured and unenclosed waste. 
In religion, in all its beneficent forms, especially in re- 498 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 
ligion as set forth in the Bible, all the deeper principles 
and higher facnlties of the soul are addressed, and, being 
combined, they keep each other in their proper position, 
while each fulfils its function the better by having the 
co-operation of the others. True religion certainly calls 
forth the intuitional power in its highest intensity, but it 
gives exercise to other powers of the soul. If there be 
need of an immediate reason to gaze on higher truth, and 
appreciate it, there is also a use for the logical under- 
standing in examining and weighing the evidence, in dis- 
tinguishing one truth from another, and in keeping truth 
consistent with itself; and there is a place for the affec- 
tions as they collect an interest around it. Nor is it to 
be forgotten that the will, or the choosing and resolving 
faculty, has a very special work to do in following out the 
obligations lying on us in the discharge of duties, which 
are an essential part of religion, and react upon our whole 
intellectual and moral nature; “ by works faith is made 
perfect.” It is all true that a performance of duty with- 
out respect to God and godliness, will become empty for- 
malism or self-righteous phariseeism, but it is just as 
certain that a mere gazing intuitionalism will end in idle 
musing, wasting itself and so dying out. 
It was never meant that any one of the members of 
our psychical frame should act apart from the others in 
religious exercises, just as it is not intended that one 
limb of the body should act without the others, or that 
the eye should act without the ear, or the taste without 
the touch. In a sound piety the various powers act in 
combination, like the various elements—heat, colour, and 
chemical—of the sunbeam, and they are to be separated 
only for scientific ends by a scientific process. True, 
there may, even in natural operations, be a preponder- 
ance of one of the elements above the others, for the ac- 
complishment of special ends; still, they are never alto- THEOLOGY. 
499 
gether separated; and if studiously kept apart, or if cer- 
tain of them be allowed to gather to excess, their action 
may become deleterious, or they may burst out in a de- 
structive discharge. In particular, the contemplative ele- 
ment, if unduly fostered (like a plant in a stove), and dis- 
severed from rigid thought and a resolute will, must issue 
in a mystic creed and a life of day-dreams. Revelation 
calls forth all the powers of the soul. The light of the 
Word, like the light of the sun, is one, but it has, after 
all, a number of elements, such as narrative, example, de- 
scription, type, argument, appeal, exhortation, warning, 
precept, promise, presentations, and representations, in 
prose and poetry, each fitted to evoke a corresponding 
power in our souls, and to draw it forth in a proper di- 
rection, and give it the proper hue; and piety is in the 
healthiest and loveliest state when every essential prin- 
ciple of our constitution is exercised in due measure and 
proper proportion. 
VI. In a living piety the intuitions have a very impor- 
tant place, being always associated with other mental 
exercises. All the deeper convictions of our nature rest 
on the objects which are presented in a living religion; 
indeed they can be satisfied with nothing else. The self- 
existent being, the self-subsistent substance, the inherent 
power, the loveliness, the love, the righteousness, the 
truthfulness of God, these, not in their abstract forms 
(which are far too like skeletons to delight the eye), but 
as embodied in full form in a Living Being, are objects 
on which the soul would gaze with rapture in its pure 
and unclouded moments ; it would turn towards them as 
towards an attractive light; it reposes upon them as upon 
a mountain whose foundations can never be moved ; and 
it expands towards them as towards the expanse of 
heaven, with its still stars away in the depths. We have 
never reached the proper objects of religion, nor even the 500 
intuitional theology. 
region in which they dwell, if intuition has not been bear- 
ing up the soul. In our highest exercises of rapt devo- 
tion, other operations, though still present in their results, 
may disappear in their processes, to allow the soul to 
gaze without distraction, immediately, and, as it were, 
face to face, on God who is a Spirit, on God who is 
Light, on God who is Love. 501 
INDEX. 
Abelard, 199. 
Abstraction and Abstract Notion, 
16-19, 50-55, 68, 96, 103, 
114, 157-161, 247-250, 413. 
401, 446. 
Analysis, 248. 
Analytic Judgments, 245-247, 
325, 409. 
Anselm, 199, 221. 
Antinomies of Kant, 388-390. 
Appetencies, 279-284, 287, 406. 
A priori, 19-21, 34-35, 111, 115, 
317, 353-354, 395, 403, 406, 
428-429, 453. 
Aristotle, 13, 57, 66, 100-102, 
137, 184, 186, 316-317, 331, 
354, 401, 462. 
Atonement, 307, 408, 464, 466, 
480, 481, 493, 496. 
Axioms, Mathematical, 50, 64, 
68, 247, 249, 250-251, 255, 
409-415. 
Bacon, 1, 75, 317, 467. 
Beattie, 110, 351. 
Beauty, 288-290, 456, 477. 
Being, 121, 149, 161-164, 165, 
477. 
Berkeley, 81, 129, 167, 375. 
Body, 126-133, 170, 441-442, 
452. 
Brown, Thomas, 112-113, 204, 
242, 252, 278, 292. 
Buffier, 107-108, 153, 184. 
Butler, 285, 293, 470, 475. 
Calderwood, 215. 
Campbell, 149. 
Carlyle, 447, 448, 495. 
Categories of Kant, 20, 110—1L2, 
242. 
Catholicity as a Test of Truth, 
40, 41, 43, 49, 52-53, 107, 
109, 220, 380. 
Cause and Causation, 20, 23, 73, 
79, 89-90, 109, 112, 113, 
187-195, 258-278, 310-311, 
316-317, 342, 353, 356-357, 
390, 392, 417-418, 433-435, 
471-472, 477. 
Chalmers, 443, 470. 
Classification, 418 (see Generali- 
zation). 
Clarke, Samuel, 67, 211, 225,464. 
Coleridge, 351-353, 463-464, 
487, 495. 
Colour, 124, 140, 143, 144. 
Common Sense, 55, 109-110, 
112, 114. 
Conscience, 285-288, 301-302, 
385, 406-407, 435, 436, 443- 
444, 470, 496. 
Consciousness, 21-23, 42, 44-50, 
85-86, 88, 114, 121, 148- 
157, 340-341, 360, 392-393, 
452-453. 
Contradiction, Principle of, 66, 
246, 325, 346, 348-350. 
Contradictions, supposed, in Hu- 
man Reason, 60-61, 200, 212- 
213, 218-219, 222-223, 227, 
271-273, 382-384, 388-390. 
Cousin, 62-63, 89-90, 113-114, 
132-133, 164, 221, 268, 310- 
311. 
Criterion of Truth, 325-326. 
Cud worth, 57, 353, 356. 
Definitions, 50, 66, 93-97, 412- 
415. 
Demonstration, 350, 395-400, 
438. 502 
INDEX. 
Descartes, 7, 79, 99, 102-104, 
115, 119, 146, 152, 166, 168, 
174, 184, 186, 209, 221, 317, 
329, 450, 451, 462. 
Design in Nature, 429-432, 435, 
477. 
Edwards, Jonathan, 462-463, 
464. 
Eleatic School, 98,163,174, 315- 
316, 358, 402. 
Emotions, 283-284, 364-365, 
456-457, 498. 
Essence, 178-180. 
Ethics, 64, 66-67, 70, 74, 279- 
307, 350, 400, 406-409. 
Excluded Middle, Law of, 246, 
325. 
Experience, 4, 27-28, 104, 232, 
258-262, 274, 305-306, 325- 
326, 340-345, 353-354, 356- 
358, 396-400, 410-412, 429- 
433, 437, 477. 
Externality, 128. 
Eaculties of the Mind, 21-23, 72- 
73, 236, 279-288, 351, 360. 
Faith, 196-202, 286-287, 327, 
337-340, 341-342, 346, 348- 
350, 361-362, 393, 419-427, 
428. 
Ferrier, Professor, 129,375, 379. 
Fichte, 21, 75, 81, 112, 129, 
181, 201, 278, 375, 379, 451, 
458, 494. 
Forms given by the Mind, 19-21, 
110-112, 354, 453. 
Fundamental Principles, 38, 53, 
112, 115. 
Generalization and General No- 
tion, 16-19, 32-36, 50-55, 
62-71, 97, 103,114,157-161, 
255-257, 258-259, 409-412. 
Gillespie, 207. 
Gnosticism, 463. 
Gnosiology, 320-362, 387 (see 
Knowledge). 
Goethe, 495. 
Hamilton, Sir William, 10, 13, 
43, 52-53, 55, 106-107, 109, 
114-115, 125, 127-128, 129- 
130, 138,145-146, 153, 171— 
173,197, 201, 205, 214, 217- 
219, 227-229, 238-240, 245- 
247, 312, 320-321, 356, 360, 
383, 467. 
Hegel, 75, 81, 115, 181, 227, 
329, 375, 447, 449, 450, 452, 
495. 
Heraclitus, 57, 98, 173. 
Herschel, Sir J., 206. 
Hobbes, 435. 
Hume, 81, 108-110, 119, 149, 
166, 242, 272, 278, 353, 375, 
376. 
Idea, 1, 13, 15, 99, 115, 119, 
329-340, 418. . 
Idealism, 5, 9, 129, 135, 363— 
375, 451-452. 
Identity, 242-247, 325, 416. 
Immortality of tbe Soul, 441-446. 
Individuals, 29-36, 45-46, 68, 
105, 110, 113, 114, 240-241, 
244, 248. 
Induction, 3-4, 101-102, 112, 
114, 322-324, 423, 491. 
Infinite, 32, 59, 113, 114, 208- 
210, 214-231, 436, 477. 
Innate Ideas, 1, 15, 23-29, 42, 
54, 103, 329-337. 
Intuition, 29-36, 42,44-50, 85- 
87, 104, 340-345, 351-353, 
437, 439, 482-500. 
Intuitional Theology, 470, 482- 
500. 
Ionian School, 98. 
Jacobi, 84, 200-201, 461. 
Judgments, Primitive, 236-242, 
287, 346-350. 
Kalologv, 401-402. 
Kant, 19-21, 22, 43, 52-53, 65, 
88-90, 105, 106-107, 108, 
110-112, 115, 127, 128, 149, 
152, 164, 166, 181, 204-205, 
212, 242, 244, 245, 271-273, 
309-310, 317, 329, 351, 353, INDEX 
503 
354-356, 375, 379, 388-390, 
401, 405-406, 409, 443, 451, 
453, 463, 464, 467, 480, 494. 
Kidd, Mr., 391. 
Knowledge, 38, 106, 119-122, 
126-133, 148-157, 196-200, 
322-336, 346, 358-362, 362- 
374, 387. 
Leibnitz, 52, 106, 107, 147, 159, 
166, 211, 221, 244, 385, 485. 
Locke, 7, 9, 14, 15, 17, 18, 22, 
23, 31, 97, 99, 107, 115, 120- 
121, 131, 132-133, 154, 167, 
172-173, 179, 184, 186, 214, 
217-218, 238-240, 241, 252, 
329-335, 401, 415, 462, 464, 
480. 
Logic, 64, 66, 82, 250, 257, 351, 
390-393, 400, 401, 402-405, 
422-423, 437, 497-498. 
Mackintosh, Sir James, 292. 
Mathematics, 64, 68, 74, 255, 
396-398, 409-415. 
Mansel, Mr., 149-150, 181, 227- 
229, 238-240, 286, 409. 
Maurice, Mr., 496. 
Maxims, 18, 32-36, 50-55, 64- 
66, 106, 114, 344-345, 409- 
415. 
Metaphysics, 6-7, 64-97, 315— 
394, 402, 404, 408, 416, 461- 
476. 
Mill, Mr. J. S., 158, 236-237, 
268, 276-277, 304-305, 326, 
373, 390-394, 410-411, 413. 
Miracles, 276-278, 493. 
Mode, 173-175. 
Moral Good, 23, 32, 58, 59, 66- 
67,88,290-297,302-307,342, 
348, 357, 361, 393,407, 435- 
438, 439, 443-444, 458-459, 
477. 
Motion, 185-186, 251. 
Necessary Truth, 4, 26, 39-40,47, 
50-53, 56, 59, 100, 105, 107, 
109, 111, 112, 113, 219-220, 
260-262, 267-268, 298-299, 
327-328, 345-350, 353, 380, 
390, 394, 397. 
Neo-Platonists, 100, 163, 489. 
Newton, Sir Isaac, 67, 212. 213, 
225. 
Notion (see Abstraction and Gene- 
ralization). 
Number, 115,184-185, 253-254. 
Obligation, Moral, 292-295, 404- 
305, 443-444, 454-455, 459, 
476-480. 
Ontology, 315-316, 321, 358- 
388. 
Original Principles, 48, 58, 63. 
Original Sense-perceptions, 122- 
126, 134-138. 
Pantheism, 166-169, 275, 446- 
461. 
Pain, 306-307. 
Perfect, 220-221. 
Permanence of Substance, 128, 
151, 166-169, 442-445. 
Personality and Personal Identity, 
112, 113, 180-182, 444-445, 
448, 453, 457. 
Phantasm and Phantasy, 13, 105, 
115, 215. 
Phenomenal Theory of Knowledge, 
19-20, 127-128, 163, 204, 
270. 
Philosophy, 6-7, 33-36, 82, 316- 
319, 464-476. 
Plato, 7, 16, 57, 66, 99-100, 115, 
174, 289, 310, 324-325, 329, 
358, 361, 450, 460-461, 485. 
Physical Sciences, 250, 415-419. 
Power, 130-133, 146-148, 153— 
155, 165-166, 178, 187-195, 
257-258, 263—265 (see Cause'). 
Pronerties, 178, 257-258, 417- 
418. 
Psychology, 400-404. 
Quality, 20, 23, 113, 145-148, 
176-178. 
Quantity, 20, 66, 252-255, 417. 
nationalism, 468, 470, 480-482. 504 
INDEX 
Reason, 20, 56, 72, 73, 104,108, 
110-112, 113, 199, 351, 353, 
419-427,498. 
Reasoning, 28-29, 66, 405, 492. 
Reflex use of Intuition, 62-69, 
109, 113, 490-492. 
Regulative Principles, 25, 33, 34, 
42-43, 54, 59, 341-342. 
Reid, 22,108-110,138,149, 166, 
167, 275, 322, 351. 
Relations, 250-278, 365-366. 
Resemblance, 255-257 (see Gene- 
ralization). 
Responsibility (see Obligation). 
Revelation, 439, 440, 461-476, 
482-498. 
Scepticism, 135-137, 374-385. 
Schelling, 75, 181, 375, 451-452, 
495. 
Schenkel, 470. 
Scldeiermacher, 201, 227, 463, 
464, 495. 
Schoolmen, 7, 462-463. 
Self, Knowledge of, 58, 148-157, 
243, 435, 441-442, 452-453. 
Self-Evidence, 38, 56, 59—60, 
100, 102, 103, 104, 108, 219, 
381. 
Sensation, 138-141, 324-325, 
363. 
Sensationalism, 5, 9, 57, 120, 
331-332, 435. 
Senses, 86-87, 122-144, 353, 
357. 
Sense-Perception, 86-87, 121, 
134-145, 324, 325, 326, 353, 
363. 
Shaftesbury, 286, 462. 
Sin, 297-302, 360-361, 470, 
478-482, 496. 
Singulars (see Individuals). 
Socrates, 57, 66, 324-325, 358, 
401, 462, 485. 
Sophists, 57, 66. 
Space, 20, 23, 32, 67, 88-89,114, 
115, 202-214, 215-223, 250- 
252, 262, 357, 360-361, 389, 
416. 
Spinoza, 74, 79, 81, 168-169, 
174, 447, 451. 
Spirit, 148-157, 170-171, 251- 
252, 435, 441-446, 452-453. 
Spontaneous Convictions, 44-50, 
54, 56, 59, 62-69, 82, 109, 
113, 114, 342-344, 357,490. 
Stewart, D.; 112, 128, 149, 205- 
211, 275, 320, 413, 415. 
Subjective andObjectrve, 3 54-3 5 6. 
Substance, 20, 23, 66-67, 89-90, 
110, 113, 164-180, 263, 268, 
416-418, 450-451, 477. 
Synthesis, 248. 
Synthetic Judgments, 245-247, 
1 325, 409. 
Superstition, 438, 457, 461, 478- 
480. 
Testimony, 420. 
Tests of Intuition, 37-41, 68, 
109, 113, 231-233, 325, 326, 
393, 394, 422, 492. 
Theistic Argument, 271—2 73,388, 
427-441. 
Theology, 70, 74, 383, 461-476, 
482-498. 
Time, 20, 23, 32, 67, 88, 89, 114, 
115, 200-214, 222-225, 252, 
263, 357, 360, 361, 389, 417. 
Trendelenburg, 186,-205. 
Ulrici, 166, 465. 
Unconditioned, 272, 385-388. 
Understanding, 72-73, 351-353. 
Uniformity of Nature, 259, 275- 
278. 
Unity, 113. 
Universal Truth, 26-27, 52-53, 
50-55. 57,111,113,291,321- 
328, 353, 380-381. 
Utilitarianism, 303-305. 
Whately, 158. 
Whewell, Dr., 115, 253-254,417- 
418. 
Whole and Parts, 247, 416. 
Will, 284-285, 295-296, 308- 
312, 390, 406, 453-454, 465, 
471-472.