OFFICE MEMORANDUM « STANFORD UNIVERSITY ¢ OFFICE MEMORANDUM ¢ STANFORD UNIVERSITY # OFFICE MEMORANDUM

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DaTE: December 1, 1977

To , To the File

From , voshua Lederberg
Professor of Genetics

Sussect: R= V. Jones - Chemical Warfare in World War IL

Jones did not have any particular information on the intelligence that
led to the Merck Report. He did mention having seen an Ultra message, quoting
Hitler as having warned the Japanese ambassador not to consider the use of
chemical weapons because the British had superior capabilities. This dispatch
apparently has not been published as yet, and Jones had not thought it
important enough to mention in his forthcoming book.

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He also recalled that after the V-bombing of London that Churchill was
so exercised that he seriously contemplated the use of chemical weapons in
retaliation. Sir Marshal Portal persuaded him that this was unnecessary
and not useful.

rew mm thiwie

Jones’ own organization apparently gave little or no attention to CW
intelligence in the belief that there was an MI-6 section working with the
Porton labs on this subject. This was probably false and as a result the
matter had very little attention.

My own hypothesis: the very thinness of analytical coverage that may
have resulted from this discrepancy may also be a cause of the mis-intelligence
that resulted in the Merck Report and the mounting of the US — CW program.

“SOI30E0

I asked him whether he though the raid on the Norwegian heavy water plant
might not have been a tip-off to the Germans about the feasibility of a
nuclear weapons program -~ it had exactly that effect when lL read the newspapers
myself. He implied that little thought was given to that contingency; crippling
German access to heavy water was operationally of greater consequence. By
then they probably did have some intelligence on Allied efforts in that area --
of which I am rather skeptical. He was not aware of any indication one way or
the other that the raids received any such interpretation in Germany. It
might be well to reexamine Heisenberg's memoirs on this subject.

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When I asked him what was the greatest failure of the scientific intelli-
gence during WW II, he thought it was having neglected to push Charles Frank
at the ALSOS mission just after the war. In consequence, the German nuclear
energy data, such as they were, managed to get straight to the United States
without being intercepted and copied in London. He believes that had further
consequences for the organization of nuclear energy work both in Britain and
in the United States, subsequently. "Going along with the Americans" was the
prevailing fallacy.

vise 102/77
Memo to the File -2- December 1, 1977

Jones was quite vehement about the Coventry myth. He was not aware
of any Ultra message on the subject before the raid. He was sure Churchill
could not have received any such message, since he went to London that night
typically "looking for trouble" and he would have gone through Coventry him-
self instead if he has prior knowledge! He gave several examples of Churchill's
insistence at being at the front edge of risk during Wartime when he had such
responsibilities for the lives of others. He repeated the anecdote: George VI
persuading Churchill not to take part in V-E Day, “if Winston could do it, so

could he, George!"

He stressed very strongly the importance that higher leaders sample the
primary data as "the sharp edge”, e.g., the utter unreliability of quantitative
trajectory data in mine sweeping operations: only port vs starboard was useful
and this was not known until one of his operation scientists actually went to
sea. He quoted Newton about putting able mathematicians on a ship rather than
having able seamen bring the data to land.

He also stressed the importance of having "serving officers" work together
with the scientists. He almost didn't know what I meant when I asked him what
the analog of the serving officer was at the Level of nuclear strategy.

Despite the Coventry myth, he suggested that the situation in Crete
might have borne out the basic pattern: General Freyburg was constrained from
redisposing his forces ewen with three weeks advanced notice of the invasion.
However, even with that notice, it was evident that there was very little
that could be done in the circumstances.

He was quite critical of "Intrepid:" Jones never heard of him in. London;
he certainly had nothing to do with Bohr's escape; possibly he did have important
exploits as liaison in the United States, he could not say.

He was not connected to political intelligence and therefore was not
able to say very much about the disruption of information about the German
underground, although he was in general agreement about the folly of the policy
of unconditional surrender. He suggested that Philby should be taken at
his word, especially in describing the earlier part of his career. He feels
that he brake down later and the latter part of his book is much less reliable.

He agreed that it was more difficult to anticipate the development of
Soviet technology because of the wider cultural gap between say himself and
German scientific opposite numbers during WW II.

Katy just called: ‘Crick worked for Jones after the War, and was much

interested in biological analogues of coding, e.g., the information content
of a sperm head.

JL:ek