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February 27, 1986

Dr. Joshua Lederberg
President

The Rockefeller University
1230 York Avenue

New York, N¥ 10021

Dear Jash:

As always it is beth pleasing and thought provoking ta hear from
Youe :

The passage you noted in my article on decapitation was meant to
convey a Soviet perspective that I would not endorse but nonetheless
would take seriously. I meant to point out there that the perceived
meaning and strategic effect of command system improvements does depend
upon the context of policy in which they are undertaken. In and of
themselves, measures to protect the command system are certainly
desirable, indeed compelling from the U.S. point of view, and do
project the commitment to protected retaliation that is the central
principle ef stable deterrence. When combined with increases in
offensive capacity, however, that can be effectively used for
preemptive attack (i.e. the hard target capabilities of the MX, the
D-3, and the Pershing II) and with doctrinal discussions of the
necessity to prepare for an enduring nuclear war, measures to provide
highly robust and extended command system protection do suggest an
anticipation of war and a method for fighting it that the Soviets are
destined to find particularly dangerous.

Your analogy to SDI and to the general problem of imperfect fixes
does go to the heart of the matter. It is in fact extremely difficult
to make a command system withstand a very deliberate attack primarily
because its central authorities, few in number and normally well
identified, are inherently vulnerable. Soviet officials are quite
sensitive to that fact. Their system appears to be more dependent on
central authority; its internal controls are more rigidly and more
thoroughly imposed; its susceptibility to paralysis if central
authority is removed is commensurately greater. Though the U.S. would
normally be extremely reluctant to count on such a thing, Soviet
officials with knowledge of the actual arrangements probably do fear
it. Knowing therefore that absolute protection is not feasible against
fully dedicated attack and observing the simultaneous programming of
U.S. offensive capability, they appear to be concerned about a U.S.
preemptive strategy that might succeed: a surprise attack on the
Soviet command system that denies Soviet forces the authority to
ho

operate with subsequent and presumably rather extended nop—up
operations against Soviet forces that have been paralyzed by the
collapse of central authority. They might consider Soviet retaliation
under these circumstances to be random and of small scale--something
that a protected (and actively defended) U.S. system misht survive
reasonably well. ‘

Granted, then, for the sake of argument, that the Soviets have
coherent reason to worry, does that not enhance deterrence and is that
not desirable? It certainly would, if the relationship between threat
and deterrence were a monotonically increasing function. Im fact that
relationship almost certainly passes through an optimum and hence one
has to ask where matters stand with respect to the optisum threat
before deciding whether either an increase or a decrease is desirable.
That is not an easy assessment to make, but particularly at the time I
wrote the article I did think the degree of threat was beginning to be
excessive. Preventing war by means of deterrence requires that the
threat to retaliate for any attack he balanced by reassurance that
there is no intention to initiate war.

I will concede that the concerns I expressed were inspired by the
projected surge in U.S. offensive capability and the denigration of
restraining diplomacy rather than by the measures taken to improve
command system protection. As Blair’s work suggests, the current U.S.
system has sertous weaknesses that absolutely need to be strengthened.
The measures taken to increase what is generally called survivability
(iee. the ability to function under attack for several hours up to
several days) clearly will strengthen deterrence rather than weaken it.
The idea of providing a command system that could sustain nuclear war
for 60 days is much more of a question. We have espoused that
objective. I do think we need to think more carefully about it.
Because of the context and the Soviet reaction it could be self-
defeating. :

I am eager to discuss BW issues when there is a chance.
Mercifully they pose no immediate deadlines and hence it is easy to put
them aside for a while. We all know the long-term dangers of that,
however.

Thanks as always for your thoughts.

Very best regards,

John Steinbruner