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From Prometheus to Frankenstein -- the humanity of science
Joshua Lederberg
American Psychiatric Association

San Francisco, California
May 12, 1970

My talk today responds to a pervasive attack on science, sometimes based
on misunderstanding, sometimes not. The behavioral sciences, and with them the
mental health professions, are special targets of these attacks. But even if
you had no vested interest to share my concerns, you could not ignore it as
part of the cultural milieu that shapes the psychic reactions of your patients,
and of you and me too.

Speaking to an assembly of psychiatrists is an unaccustomed pleasure
for me, even if not of the magnitude of a simple multiple of what I could reap
in one-to-one relationships. Some of my best friends are psychiatrists, and I
am quite willing to believe that what you have learned from your patients may
have conferred a special share of the wisdom that we so badly need these days,
to learn how scientific knowledge may have both merit and viability. Which is
precisely the theme of my talk this afternoon, wherein I expect to raise questions
that I hope you may be able to help answer better than I.

As this is also a memorial to Adolph Meyer, I may also have a particular
privilege and responsibility to start in a more biographical vein than I might
if I were dealing with my molecular-biological colleagues.

To start with, I must express what you all know, and surely share -- the
events of the last week (though I had experienced them from Israel, which has
its own preoccupations) are so stressful that they can, as well as should, pound
at the style and content of my effort at an academic analysis. I have been

short of time and composure to rearrange my thoughts in an orderly way, nor
indeed to pursue as far as I would have liked the vast literature that bears on
my theme.

The humanity of science may seem a far cry from Cambodia and the breakdown
of democratic decision-making in this country. The nexus is the social revolution
of the current century, the style in which the final dissolution of the feudal
order is to be directed. As the residual grit of hereditary privilege in our society
is pulverised, will it be replaced by a new feudalism masquerading under a progres-
sive label, as happened in every revolution in Europe? Or will we adopt an ever-
more inhumane meritocracy efficiently chasing ultimate disillusionment, as seems
to have been happening here? Or will all other values be erased in favor of an
uncompromising egalitarianism, with noble ends, but lacking the means to sustain
itself against the realities of harsh Nature or brutal men? Or can we find a
pragmatic compromise of these extreme ideologies?

The human meaning of science is at the center of the conflict. Can we
pursue knowledge in such a milieu? Dispassionate search for facts is coming under
attack in principle, allegedly for being a denial of human nature, by the egali-
tarian faction. It is also under severe pressure from the establishment for being
"impractical"; the corporate-military sector will happily support the search for
facts, but only if its particular goals are served. Scientists need great ingenuity
to thread their way through the current system, finding the means to pursue dis-
passionate research with the cooperation of a bureaucracy that wisely defocusses
the Congress' attention from specific projects on behalf of the whole system.

The more talented of us may survive the current system with only a little pros-
titution. A radical alternative is mass rape in the name of social ends even
more narrowly prescribed, directing the scientist what to think about. Chastity

is not one of today's virtues.
That science today is not quite free is beyond argument. The attack
against it has exactly the same complexion as the attack against liberal democracy,
for similar faults, and from similar sources.

The university is a focal point of the conflict; this is where creative
science comes from. Part of the attack on science is merely incidental to the
frontline confrontations on the campus. The radicals point to the university
as a central resource of the power of the establishment. Professors know how power-
less we are, and suggest other reasons for the targeting on academia -- this audience
needs no education on the subject, and I will summarize very briefly. We are vul-
nerable because we stand for careful consideration of opposing, even offensive
views, and therefore foster a level of dissent that every other institution would
find intolerable. We have a paternal, sometimes even patronizing, relationship
to our students that stands in the way of credible discipline (the “silent majority"
is, nevertheless, for the time being less shrill about "getting tough" with
student activism, this having been translated into military homicide). Above all,
however, the campus is the recruiting ground for enlisting idealistic students --
it is where the young are, and any issue will do if it can elicit a sharp con-
frontation with authority, and the police brutality that is the radicals' ideological
secret weapon.

The mass reaction that is now in motion may be a turning point in the
protest, if it is channeled into politically effective ways of reversing the
President's imperious imperialism. Already, the radicals are reacting in dismay,
throwing up a hundred other issues to fractionate that effort, but their work
may be being done for them. If the President does not respond, nothing less
than democratic culture is at stake.

So, Rome is burning. But fiddling is the only vocation I know.

If I had yours, I might speak more profoundly about the irrational roots
of the attack on Science. For most of my life and career, I have offered an
irrational defense of science, that is, of rational inquiry, on the grounds
that mag is the rational animal; hence the pursuit of knowledge is an absolute
good that may not be tampered with on any account. Man is also many other things
besides rational, and other values may have an equal claim to the absolutely good.
For example, a human life may be accounted as infinitely valuable for its own
sake, or the welfare of the species may be assigned this role. These axioms
correspond roughly, not necessarily logically, to the three main categories of
social organization (merit, equality, caste) alluded to earlier. Merit might
also encompass functions other than rational. They are usually in competition;
when they clash head-on we have trouble.

Many found their consciences seared by Hiroshima. Being just 20, and
more importantky, finding the atomic bomb rather remote from my own field of
science, I could eventually take a more detached view than is currently popular --
that we hardly know how to assess the full impact of the bomb on human values.
The world with it seems frightful -- would it have turned out any better without,
or rather with the latent if unrealized possibility of its development? Having
seen Hitéshima, and with the bomb over our heads, we may forget that nuclear
weapons have been the instrument of a trivial fraction of the killing of the
century -~- so far, Scientists have insisted that the Bomb has made war obsolete,
but this is a metaphor for the total mobilization of a nation's resources in
military conflict, by whatever instrument. Scienstists can well way, "if the
social system just knew how to manage it, atomic energy would be an unmitigated
blessing. What a pity our moral skills have not caught up with our scientific ones!"

On this view, science is often a scapegoat for other wrongs of the social

order, The advocate would say that we must condemn the man who pulls the trigger,
rather than the inventor of gunpowder. Yet ... if there were no guns, life might
be better. The contrafactual universe may be a tolerable escapism, a utopia
where military threats are gone together with war and poverty in the untrammeled
exuberance of human joy and love. The factual one is for most of us quite
intolerable.

There are, however, limits that anyone would have to concede to this
doctrine, of the moral neutrality of the instrument. Our existing milieu may
be faulted, but there are forces that might be introduced by science that would
strain the best ordered society that we could imagine. Thus, I refer in my abstract
to the public hydrogen bomb -- mainly as a metaphor, though one whose physical
realizability by the next century is not excludable, regardless of any policy
that a single nation might enforce. (Nor do I intend to advertise any of my own
speculations about how to build one.)

This metaphor opens the door to an examination of the possible rational
complaints aobut the shadow side of human knowledge, its potential for grave
harm to obher values even in an ideal social milieu. From this, it is a short
step to the actual program of this discourse. Abandoning defensive polemics,
let us look at the world as it is rather than as it ought to be. Let us then
seek a rational evaluation and classification of the kinds of human injury that
might follow from the further introduction of scientific knowledge into the
existential (rather than an ideal) framework. Our conclusions must not be held
as accusatory, for in every case it will be the combination of human frailty
with human knowledge that must be faulted. This approach is an effort at defining
and solving problems, which I therefore label liberal, in distinction to reaction-~
ary defensiveness, on the one side, or radical polarization of ideologies, on the

other.
Biographically, I was led to this by a consideration of the potential
impact of new findings in molecular biology -- the enfymatic synthesis of DNA,
the transfer of genetic information from cell to cell, and so on -- were they
to be applied to human affairs. My overall conclusions have been that the
potential stresses were manageable, or at least reducible to the kinds of
problems we already have from other sources. On optimistic assumptions about
a free society, I could even see important benefits from what has journalistically
been described as "genetic engineering".

However, one eventuality filled me with despair, namely the exploitation
of molecular biology for military purposes, in biological weaponry.

My concern about BW of course included the revulsion shared by most life
scientists about the homicidal use of seience, especially their own science.

This has been escalated beyond rational discussion by the moral faults of the
particular war in which U.S. military power is now deployed. But I had, if that

is possible, an ewen deeper anxiety -- that BW, though developed by military
research as if it were merely another weapon, is in fact a unique one =~ potentially
the functional equivalent of the public hydrogen bomb.

With a wisdom that I wish could again be tapped, Président Nixon assimilated
these and related arguments into his policy decision last November to renounce
biological warfare research and to seek international agreements to control it
everywhere. The Russians may eventually respond in kind -- they have not so far --
and if so may set in motion a vital social defense in time to forfend the universal
germ bomb. This probably would not have been feasible but for the overriding
balance of nuclear terror that regulates the geopolitical system.

Having assimilated this example, and after some general remarks, I will

attempt a provisional taxonomy of the ways in which scientific advance might be
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dangerous; then I will briefly review some selected examples to see how they
fit into the classification.

I will not pursue the important distinction between science and technology,
between abstract knowledge and its practical application, except fo stress the
obvious, that between the two is almost invariably the most practical target for
whatever social control we should exact. It is obviously very difficult, and
the more in a free society, to prevent the discovery of and access to knowledge.
Kaowing what "not to know" would be the most difficult and self-defeating task
of all. Furthermore, our most grievous problems come from incomplete, hence
unbalanced knowledge. Science is an essential precondition of modern technology,
and both partake of the analytical pursuit of solutions to well-defined, albeit
different classes of problems, by generally similar techniques.

Before discussing the fruits of science, bitter and sweet, I should also
point out that the institution of science, i.e., the process of research, is
also under attack. Some think it a wasteful diversion of material resources
better spent on more urgent challenges ~~ but basic science takes less than .2%
of the GNP; or about two weeks worth of its average incremental growth, disregarding
the net return of science to that growth. To put it differently, the whale
scientific enterprise, past, present and future, will have cost no more than the
present month's worth of economic recession.

Less ethereal is that doctrinal complaint that séience is necessarily
coupled to expertise. It generates experts, regarded as a plague in their own
right, and thus establishes an inegalitarian stratification on the basis of
competence: undeniably some people will "know" more than others, and this may be
in conflict with the egalitarian dogma. (Some also entertain a fear I do not

share, that scientific investigation may justify a caste system by demonstrating
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unalterable biological differences among racial groups in their very capacity
to participate in scientific work. This is a different issue, to which I will
return later as an example of stress on vital myths.)

The argument is self-defeating. If each soul is infinitely valuable, so
be it. When the time comes that we have established a reasonable floor of
guaranteed income, I would welcome a return to the labor market that penalized
the scientist relative to other professionals, even more than it does today,
fust because he enjoyed his work so much for its own sake. (I realize this is
a dangerous subject, for its potential analogies with the economics of your own
profession.) Academic science has/vested interest in inequality of income, but
only a minor one, that any good scientist would readily exchange for the success
of his theories and the &fficacy of his advice.

None of the schemes for the classification of "technopathy", the diseases
of knowledge, that I have been able to devise so far is particularly satisfactory.
MOst of the existing literature is too polemical for analytical utility; I may
have overlooked some crucial contributions, and would welcome instruction. For
a start, we postpone fascinating futurisms and ask, who has now been hurt by
science, and in what way.

Man's greatest problems complexly interwoven, are war, poverty, disease,
environmental pollution, overpopulation, and cultural frustration -- the dwarfing
of his soul. Science has made magnificent contributions against disease, and of ..:
course aggravated over-population at least for an interval. It has been applied!
to wipe out poverty (through technical-industrial development) but so unevenly
as to aggravate class and national differences. Mass communication in the form
of commercial television is indicted by some of ygur colleagues as our worst
social evil, spawning all others; it competes with the telephone and the printed

page as paradoxes of enlightenment and frustration. I believe that science has
had an insignificant bearing on the net suffering of war; which is to say that
no benefit has come from its potential promise for mitigating the apical problem
of human survival, nor its psychic and cultural roots. Perhaps war is worse
today than ever, but less on account of the atomic bomb than of the mass media
that entrain a whole population for docile acquiescence in total conflict.
(on the other hand, free communications have displayed the evils of wars so far
away we would otherwise ignore them.) Environmental pollution is not unique to
technological societies -~- witness the bacteriology of the Ganges and the dung-
burning fumes of any Casbah; but here it is surely witness to a disharmony of
knowledge and an irrational allocation of resources.

These examples suggest one framework of technopathy, according to the

group whose welfare motivates a particular technological development.

1) This may be entirely neutral in motive (pure science), and its effects are
then diffused and emerge throughout the whole structure, or may have important

ideological impacts, as in the classical confrontations of science and religion.

2) It is often at the service of special class interests, and then may
enhance the power of corporate industry, or of a government or government in
general vis-a-vis the individual through economic controls or police surveillance,
or generally of the already rich over the poor. Or a local technological
fluctuation might upset an established balance of power. I struggle for any
recent example -- Nazi Germany came close, and would have been on the mark had
it made a serious effort at nuclear weaponry, or been a year ahead with its own
“secret weapons”. American power partakes of this, but with many other inputs
that make our technological development more predictable.

The scientific input is an example of the corruption of power. When a

society is sufficiently corrupt, its establishment (if it rationally pursues
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its own interests) will promote special branches of applied technology. It

may even be wise enough to promote basic research as well, both for the general
upgrading of basic knowledge, and even more importantly as a training ground

for its technical specialists. Then, all scientific work makes some contribution
to the established order -- except for the organized skepticism that accompanies
dispassionate research.

Indeed, this is the characterization of contemporary America, by the
doctrinaire Left, which has generated so much tension among the intelligentsia.
The preeminent class interest is the military-industrial complex.

Can this be brought under effective political control so that we pursue
not absolute but realistic military security, without destroying the cultural
integrity that underlies any real security? I still believe it can, and at least
would rather try than resort to a radical cure whose cost in blood might outweigh
even that of the disease, and whose eventual outcome is likely to be as para-
dozical as the principal revolutions of Europe. Some liberal scientists have
already given up, and argue for the abandonment of science. But there is just
a short gap between that and the full abrogation of the social contract, the
most effective form of which, I say in all sincerity, may be emigration, to any

land whose culture gives better latitude for creative effort.
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3) A great deal of technology is intended for widespread welfare,
whether directly through basic health research, or indirectly through
iddustrial or agricultural efficiency. Most of our environmental degra-
dation has come from a mixture of exploitation and ignorance, both of
which are countered by further scientific study as well as organized

political reaction.

The preponderance of technopathic effects arises from the sub-
optimization, the solution of the wrong problem, so that ignored side
effects outweigh the benefits. The basic principles of environmental
rights have become well established in this country, only recently. Much
degradation is simple theivery, stealing a common good for private
benefit, and "there ought to be a law." With the established momentum of
political action, I believe there will be many laws, and I do not see
environmental problems as a major, long range impediment to the general
welfare. However, a significant fraction - - ferhaps 10 or 20% of the
national product may have to be converted, or the bookkeeping properly
rearranged to account for natural resources as capital assets, to reshape
an industrial society. As the real cost of this emerges, we can foresee
conflicts of priorities -- whether every item of environmental conservation
takes higher priority than schools, urban redevelopment, and so on. The
best answer, in my view, ig sustained economic growth of a new kind, namely
a high technology, low-polluting category whose gains can then be reinvested

in social welfare. This in turn requires a heavy investment in academic
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research, ideally funded by a reconversion of military expenditures.

The assessment of technological benefits is itself a new art, being

actively pushed through the efforts of men like Congressman Daddario.

Some of us are still battling the abuses of the industrial revolution,
when modernization eroded human values through wage slavery and the assembly
line. Today, personal services are the major (and ever-increasing) fraction
of the national product; still the diffichlt problem of the post-industrial
society are the disposition of leisure, and the establishment of satisfying
rplke for talents outside the confines of high-technological efficiency.

We do not know whether a culture can survive such affluence -- the underlying
anxiety of the opponents of work-relieving welfare schemes. The combination
of obtuse government and id#é hands is unbearable. The trashed windows on

the campuses are a consequence of the mismanagement of science, and scientists

may be faulted for their impotence more than their malevolence.

Another radical view is offered by the counter-cultural anti-tech-
nologists, like Ellul and Roszack. They invest the argument, and regard
capitalism as a derivative evil of scientistic technocracy, the preeminence
of an objective world view. Their suggestion that rational decision dominates
government is ludicrous to anyone who has ever tried to get any policy through
the bureaucracy. Roszack's semantics are to label as technocratic every
evil of the social order -- including, for example, the substitution of

Playboy for affection. If we could find a common language, we might find
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quite a core of agreement, but his remarks have almost nothing to do with the
realities of science.

4) For logical completeness, a fourth category of abuse should be mentioned-
the wilful development of techniques having no positive benefit to the
sponsor, but destructive of others. This is psychoipathology in the tradition
of the mad scientist -- and you are better equipped than I am to recite
examples, if there are any, or to dissect this component from more complex
behavior. In my experience, science has some workers who correspond in part
to the public image of aloof disinterest, but many more who are quite decent
human beings. If there is anything odd about the seicntific community

I know (the natural scientists) it may be its relative poverty of really

evil men. It is, itthink, difficult to work within the rigors of the
scientific method, and still manipulate people (or serve them) to an

excess of evil or good.

This classification, based on welfare, implies some linear scale of
value and therefore leaves out some of the most perplexing side-effects of
scientific knowledge: the confrontation of orthogonal values. Ignorance
and powerlessness are often the insulators that allow mutally incompatible
myths to be sustained. The 1ffeboat problem is one of the typical dilemmas:
if the many can be saved by the sacrifice of the one, "WHO SHALL DECIDE".

Our social system is ill-equipped to make such decisions and many of us
resent the necessity of sharpening our moral faculties in areas that had been

left to God. In the conduct of war, the nation-state has overridden every
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other institution, and our statesmen do indeed play God, and must every

day. However, the same Church that has dug in hard, and demanded many personal
sacrifices in the name of the inviolability of the fetus, offers no resistance
whatever to selective service that obliges a man to kill and risk being killed

for a community value that he and many others may profoundly question.

My ostensible purpose in this remark is to wipe away the illusion that man
can escape playing God. But science may be faulted for creating or ex-
posing direct responsibilities for the management of life. The social
order must set humane bounds to "lifeboat" decisions, to protect both the

agent and the acted upon.

The most urgent stress is in the style of dying, which is increasingly
a matter of active decision -- "when to pull the plug" as you well know.
Further adgances in biomedical engineering will broaden the scope of that
capability -- we may soon be at the point where nopne may die without an
explicit decision that the value of prolonging life is outweighed by its
costs -- and these costs will also burgeon for that same technology. If,
then we are to have the benefits of life-saving, we must also develop the
social framework -- part of the new social contract -- in which such decisions

are made with general public acceptance and understanding.

Conceptually similar issues will arise with such technologies as
weather modification, hurrican deflection and earthquake-prevention (by

preemptive shocks!), and already in compulsory vaccination programs.
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The general area of genetic engineering is bedevilled by another
problem -- the newborn cannot be consulted about his own quality, But
then the style of infant nutrition and the education of the young is
aleo left to a tentative combination of parental freedom and community bounds.
I suggest that the same approach be adopted for choices about the quality
of offspring. The technology for this is gradually emerging (for example
through the prenatal diagnosis and rejection of severely defective fetuses)
and it is unlikely that any evils will get out of social control before they
can be managed in a free society. A totalitarian one will, of course, sink

into even deepdertrouble with such technologies.

I also suggest that knowledgeable scientists act more responsibly
about announcing the imminence of such advances. The public, unless correctly
informed, may well mistake some advance in principle with its technological
fulfillment, although 30 years may be necessary to fill the gap. So: &@ do

think it is time to think, not panic, about such problems.

Some technologies are potential instruments for frightful moral abuses.
I could start with Promethean fire, and conclude with a Frankensteinian
monster, Boris Karloff version, with brain-lodged electrodes. But in all
seriousness I would point to the handgun as the biomedieal instrument

that most urgently needs social control in contemporary society.

We have not learned how to manage that, and until we can the outlook

for the continued abuse of science in an imperfect society is indeed gloomy.