THE ROCKEFELLER UNIVERSITY

pro bono hwmanis generis
1230 YORK AVENUE - NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10021-6399

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
April 7, 1988

Dr. R. C. Duncan

Director, Defense Research and Engineering DSS
Room 3E1006, Pentagon

Washington, D.C., 20301

Dear Dr. Duncan:
5 questions:

The tough ones are at the intersection of policy, strategy and technology. How to deal better
with that intersection is, I guess, my main response. I won’t tell you how the government
should be reorganized (but see enclosure); but DSB might (eventually) be better reconstituted
as a Science AND Policy Board. Even before that we should have (as DSB once did) more
leavening of the Mil-Ind complex with more academically based and policy oriented folks.

Slightly more narrowly, my main anxiety is our dependence on capital ships that have to be
amortized over a period of 40 years, during which it is certain that they will become ever
more vulnerable, possibly even to 3d world forces. That proposition can be generalized to
other major capital investments, but the Fleet stands out. We had better rethink Trident as
well, with or without START.

As to technologies, the "brilliant, conventionally armed" repertoire of munitions, stipulated in
"DD: Discriminate Deterrence” has to be converted from wish to reality. We have to be
man-saving in our use of technology, make more use of autonomous vehicles in marine and
land regimes as well as air.

Strategic defenses need to be depolarized, and brought back to a realistic framework of
analysis and development. Again, we need a high level political decision before we can do
the right technical job. What I’ve heard so far from Frank Carlucci is encouraging. We can’t
overlook cruise-missiles (eventually long range ones) as a major part of the threat.

DSB shéuld play a substantial role in advising on post-START, and post-post-START
strategic force structures. Bobby Inman’s current panel on START verification is probably
one of the most effective and most important DSB initiatives in recent history.

Some years ago, I had tried to promote: what would we do with onsite inspection if we ever
had it; perhaps we’d be saving a lot of haste and hastle today if we had looked at that more
thoroughly when there was ample time. I suggest we brainstorm what are the future
comparable radical tangents that we can foresee now. DD and Andy Marshall’s group on
Future Strategic Environments have something to say on that.
DSB is still, I believe the most effective body of its kind in the government; yes, it might be
even more so if it worked still more closely with SecDef, and as need arose with the National
Security Adviser.

Yours sincerely,

    

Joshua Lederberg

Ene, CORP tempnn>