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WATC!

gw VOLUME 3, NUMBER 1
JANUARY - FEBRUARY 1992

U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs

 

 

 

This year marks the twentieth anniversary of the
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which outlawed
one of the world’s most potentially destructive weapons
ofwar. As insurance against the risk that nations will
once again produce or use such weapons, the interna-
tional community is slowly moving to strengthen that
treaty. If these efforts fail, the world may face new
horrors that could jeopardize not just our national secu-
rity, but the planet itself.

The BWC bans the development or production of
agents and toxins, as well as the means to deliver them
"for hostile purposes or in armed conflict." Yet the line
between civilian and military purposes (like the line
between research and development) is not always
clear. The treaty also permits activities that are justi-
fiable for "prophylactic, protective or other peaceful
purposes” but is silent on the types or quantities of
agents or toxins that are appropriate for such uses.

Asa result, there is a risk that "defensive" research
can disguise an offensive military program. Iraq, for
example, recently claimed it was engaged in "defensive"
BW research (Iraq signed the BWC in 1972 but never
ratified it) and Japan -- well before the BWC came into
force -- termed its secret wartime BW program the
"Epidemic Prevention and Water Supply Unit."

The problems of verifying the intent of medical
research performed under military auspices, and the
difficulty of detecting the development or use of biologi-
cal weapons, have led to disputes between parties to the
BWC. The United States claimed in 1981 that an un-
usual outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk in 1979 was a
Soviet violation of the BWC. The Soviets denied the
claim and attributed the outbreak to natural causes;
only recently have senior Russian officials challenged

 

the once-official story. The U.S. has also accused the
Soviet Union of using mycotoxins ("Yellow Rain") in
Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan.

Some experts have suggested that short-notice,
on-site inspections of declared facilities -- like those
envisioned for the CW Convention -- may help to resolve
these types of disputes. But inspections can only go so
far in verifying compliance with disarmament agree-
ments -- a point well recognized in early U.S. efforts to
halt nuclear proliferation. As stated in the Acheson/
Lilienthal Report of 1946: "So long as intrinsically
dangerous activities may be carried on by nations, rival-
ries are inevitable and fears are engendered that place
So great a pressure upon a system of international en-
forcement by police methods that no degree of ingenuity
or technical competence could possibly hope to cope with
them.” This conclusion is especially relevant to verify-
ing the BWC, given the availability of the commodities
and expertise needed to produce such weapons.

The Final Declaration of last year’s BWC Review
Conference offers a way out of this dilemma by encour-
aging an effort "to elaborate an international program-
me of vaccine development for the prevention of diseases
involving scientific and technical personnel from devel-
oping countries which are States Parties to the Conven-
tion. The Conference recognizes that such a program-
me might not only enhance peaceful international
cooperation in biotechnology but also will contribute to
improving health care in developing countries and pro-
vide transparency in accordance with the Convention."

Although this proposal raises some dilemmas of its
own, it may help finesse a key verification problem of
the BWC. We will be monitoring relevant develop-
ments in future issues of Proliferation Watch.

To contact the committee, write to: Chairman John Glenn, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, SD-840, Washington,

DC 20510-6260 or call (202) 224-4761 or 224-9682 (FAX).

 

PRODUCTION STAFF

 

 

COMMITTEE MEMBERS

DEMOCRATS REPUBLICANS Staff Director Leonard Weiss
John Glenn, Ohio William V. Roth, Delaware Editor Randy Rydell
Sam Nunn, Georgia Ted Stevens, Alaska
Carl Levin, Michigan William S. Cohen, Maine Contributors Chris Kline
Jim Sasser, Tennessee Warren B. Rudman, New Hampshire Eileen Choffnes
David Pryor, Arkansas John Seymour, California Ann Schnittker
Herbert Kohl, Wisconsin
Joseph Lieberman, Connecticut Layout ‘~~  Rucardo Ferreira
Daniel K. Akaka, Hawaii