NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL
2101 Constitution Avenue Washington, D.C. 20418

July 30, 1993

TO: Members of the CISAC BW Working Group
FROM: Jo Husbands

SUBJECT: Beginning to Plan Our Next Steps

Enclosed you will find a number of items intended to get us started thinking about our
activities. First is the draft of a summary of the planning meeting we held in May. This is
not a comprehensive account, but I found as I tried to summarize the decisions we had made
during the meeting that more background seemed needed to explain where these ideas came
from. (If you want to cut to the chase, the summary of our decisions is on page 13). I
would appreciate any comments, additions, or corrections you may have. I do not anticipate
that we would circulate this document, although we might want to send it to the members of
the larger CISAC.

The second item is a short paper by Tom Monath that summarizes the idea for
converting Russian biowarfare research to public health work on dangerous diseases. It
would serve as the basis for the planning meeting we discussed holding in Washington in
early fall to explore the idea further with appropriate U.S. government people, such as D.A.
Henderson and C.J. Peters from CDC.

Third, September and October calendars are included so that we can identify potential
dates for a Working Group meeting, which might take place in conjunction with the planning
meeting on Tom’s idea. Petrov will be coming with the Russian delegation to the main
CISAC meeting from October 25-27, and Josh is expected to meet with him sometime during
that week to talk about our next joint meeting. We will need to have made progress and
thought about our priorities before that happens. Please return the calendars -- marked with
the dates you are NOT available -- by Monday. August 9th

vailable -- , so that we can begin making
contacts for the planning meeting. Our fax number is 202-334-1730.

I look forward to your comments on the draft summary and any other suggestions you
might have. Cheers.
SUMMARY
of a
PLANNING MEETING
CISAC Working Group on Biological Weapons Control
with a delegation from
The Russian Academy of Sciences

May 27-29, 1993

CISAC Working Group: Joshua Lederberg (chair); Robert Chanock; Thomas Monath,
Alexis Shelokov; John Steinbruner; Jo Husbands

Russian Academy Delegation: Academician Rem Petrov, Vice President of the Russian
Academy of Sciences for Life Sciences (chair, Russian counterpart group); Academician
Vadim Ivanov, Shemyakin Institute of Bioorganic Chemistry; Academician Lev Sandakchiev,
Director of Scientific [sic] and Production of Association "Vector," Novosibirsk Region;

Academician Vladimir Bolshakov, Director of Ecology Institute, Sverdlovsk; Yuriy Shiyan,
Presidium, Russian Academy of Science

Guest: John Robbins, Chief, Laboratory of Developmental and Molecular Immunity,
Division of Intramural Research, National Institute of Child Health and Human Development

Agenda:
1. Cooperative research on anthrax pathogenicity and emerging pathogens

2. Update on plans to destroy collections of smallpox strains as a confidence-building
measure

3. Bilateral cooperation on nonproliferation, including
(a) verification and confidence-building measures for the Biological Weapons
Convention,
(b) establishing standards for permissible and impermissible activities under the
Convention,
(c) strategies to promote increased transparency and disclosure, and
(d) cooperation in epidemiological surveillance

4. Conversion of military or military-related facilities to civilian purposes

[NOTE: Since this was a planning session, I have not attempted the traditional CISAC “near
verbatim" record of the discussions. Instead, what follows simply presents highlights, not
necessarily in chronological order, as background for the decisions about possible future
activities. ]
BACKGROUND, GENERAL ISSUES, CLIMATE

Lederberg emphasized several times during the meeting how much times had changed
since the groups last met and the opportunities that this presented for cooperative work.
Rather than struggling to develop a trickle of information between hostile powers, the U.S.
and Russia are now on the same side of many issues. They share a common interest in the
potential threats posed by third parties and the risks of proliferation. The two countries need
to build trust and confidence in one another.

Yet residuals of distrust remain and, as President Yeltsin’s announcement last year
acknowledged, there is a long history that must be clarified. The purpose of this meeting
was not to rake over past history, but to explore what might be done cooperatively between
the two academies to advance a climate of trust and openness. Since the groups had not met
since late 1990, they needed a chance for informal discussions to decide what substantive
contributions they might make toward policies to support the control of biological weapons.

Petrov agreed with Lederberg about the scope of the changes, emphasizing how as
scientists, the Russians welcomed the shedding of past rules and practices. There had been
secret laboratories, but Petrov noted that all laboratories were under pressure from the
government and the Communist Party Central Committee. In the past the Soviet Academy
had tried to protect its scientists and the standards of its research, but in fact biological
research had been conducted on high priority military problems in Academy institutes. He
emphasized, however, that all implementation was done outside the Soviet Academy. With
its new charter under the Russian Federation in the last 2 years the now Russian Academy
has begun to define its own priorities. This is a good time for cooperation between the two
academies, and the groups’ work could have an impact on policy.

[NOTE: The Russian government has created a new presidential commission on all

problems related to the CW and BW conventions, headed by General Kuntsevitch.

According to Sandakchiev, Alexei Borisovitch Ignatief is the senior official for BW issues in
the Commission. As yet the group has not issued any reports. There was also a major
international conference in Moscow in May on C&BW issues in which Kuntsevitch was
heavily involved. Shiyan and others reported that there was no mention of BW issues, since
Kuntsevitch preferred to concentrate on CW issues.]

CONVERSION

Petrov expressed concern for the brain drain of Russian scientists, and the need to
find ways to enable scientists to remain at home and to work on peaceful projects. Although
the potential for nuclear scientists to be enticed by third parties has received substantial
attention, the risk applies to BW as well. He divided the problem into three parts:
1. Fundamental, basic research. This type of research in microbiology and
molecular biology is common across international science, and does not require
conversion to other activities. But this research did receive support from the military,
which was interested in its potential applications, and that support has disappeared.
This is not a problem for our groups, but rather of the larger international effort to
support Russian science.

2. Research on dangerous organisms. This group of institutes and researchers
received substantial support from the military. Even if they were not making

weapons directly, it is impossible to draw the line between peaceful and military
purposes in their case. This is the group for which conversion assistance is needed,
so that they will not be susceptible to enticement.

3. Military aspects. These efforts involved the development of delivery systems and
instrumentation for offensive biological weapons. These people and institutes need
not concern our groups, as they can quite readily find other, non-BW related purposes
and work.

Petrov commented that, although #2 was clearly the appropriate target for conversion efforts,
this was not an area where the Russian Academy had experience and he was not sure what
the appropriate mechanisms would be.

Ivanov commented that the Russian government was already working to organize
"federal centers" that would involve institutes that were formerly part of the military-
industrial complex. Of the many candidates, the Kurchatov Institute and the Chemical
Institute in Petersburg had already been chosen. Some of the BW-related institutes were
already discussing potential joint ventures with Western firms and joint work on hepatitis is
under way.

Sandakchiev said that financing from the Ministry of Defense now provided less than
5% of his institute’s budget. The conversion problem really began in 1989, when military
support for research collapsed. There were two main institutes: the Obalynskiy (sp.)
Center, which worked on special infectious diseases and his institute, NPO Vector, which
concentrated on viruses. NPO Vector has a staff of 3,000+ and 120,000 square meters of
facilities. Weapons were not developed at these facilities and there was no production or
stockpiling of strains or agents.

The scientists who work in these facilities are highly qualified, and they have been
exploring joint ventures with Western firms. However, they have no experience with
commercial production and marketing. Moreover, Russian standards of pharmacology are at
a low level. Most of the foreign (French, American, and British) firms that have visited his
institute have suggested that it would be cheaper to build new facilities from scratch than to
try to convert current facilities to Western GMP standards.’

Steinbruner commented that the $800 million in Nunn-Lugar funds for conversion
could in principle be applied to #2 facilities. For that to happen, discussions at various
levels will be’tequired. Extensive disclosure would be needed from the Russians, and
extensive commitments from the U.S. Western governments are recognizing that private
firms need help in absorbing the risks associated with joint projects for conversion; market
forces alone will not be sufficient to the task.

Robbins noted that another way to think of the problem was to divide between
microbial geneticists, who work on developing and altering strains and fermentation
engineers, who work on large-scale processes. The former group are readily convertible to
other scientific enterprises, while the latter have experience that could be applied to either
pharmaceutical production or industrial uses. One example of potential industrial conversion
would be making glycerol, which is a new industry in the West, and seems a likely candidate
for internal uses. Another is fermentation to make products used for oil production. These
would not necessarily be products for export, but could fulfill the needs of Russian industry.

Sandakchiev suggested that, rather than "converting" these institutes, it would be
better to formulate a joint research program that would continue peaceful work on dangerous
diseases.

Monath commented that much of the work done in the U.S. on rare and exotic
diseases has been done by the military in search of protection for American troops. Such
research has almost no commercial potential, but it addresses important public health
problems in many parts of the world. In the U.S., research is conducted at a small,
underfunded laboratory at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). He suggested that it
would be sensible to think about converting Russian scientists and facilities with experience
in these dangerous agents to public health work. For example, the world needs a variety of
vaccines for diseases such as Lassa fever and various hemorrhagic fevers. An international
research effort could make a real contribution to public health and serve the interests of
conversion at the same time. Private industry will not be interested, so such efforts would
be for governments to support.

 

1 Sandakchiev said that his firm was already producing a variety of commercial and
medical goods _for the Russian market, but these are cheap products that provide very little
profit. The average salary level of his technical staff is the equivalent of $15/month and they
have no access to Western journals.

His institute is cooperating with the Centers for Disease Control and with the World
Health Organization on more scientific research, and have a proposed project with the. -°
Germans to produce vaccine for the Third World that would be financed by the European
Community.
Such an effort should be relatively limited and focused on a few diseases that pose
particular threats. Some of the products could be diagnostic kits for use in monitoring and
the development and testing of vaccines. The effort would require a few tens of millions of
dollars to support cooperative work in Russia, along with the CDC and a few other
laboratories around the world.

In response to a question from Lederberg about potential U.S. support for such a
project with Nunn-Lugar funds, Steinbruner commented that there is a considerable ways to
go before there will be a recognition of international public health activities as an important
option for conversion. Moreover, at the moment, no one in the U.S. government appears to
be taking initiatives for BW aspects of Nunn-Lugar.

The initiative for such a project will almost certainly need to come from outside the
U.S. government, since it cuts across so many jurisdictions. Here the two academies could
play an effective role in developing the idea, in fleshing out its scope and cost. The Russians
will need to develop their own ideas, but they could certainly obtain assistance from the
international community. The idea could be part of a broader effort on international
epidemiological monitoring (see below).

The two groups responded very positively to Monath’s suggestion. Chanock noted
that a special contracting vehicle, called a CRADA, can be used to develop memoranda of
understanding between nonprofit organizations. His institute is currently negotiating such an
arrangement with an institute in Novosibirsk. Although not appropriate for large projects,
mechanisms such as this might permit research partnerships under a broader project
framework. Sandakchiev strongly supported the idea and estimated that Russian scientists
could put initial proposals together within 3 months.

    

a . a U 4 Cal
ifi nts, which version of

research effort focused on specific dangerous agents, which could support the conversion of
some Russian scientists and institutes, should be a priority for our future work, [NOTE: In
private conversation later, the CISAC group discussed convening a small planning session in
the U.S. early in the fall to explore the idea with public health officials and those involved
with Nunn-Lugar projects.]

SMALLPOX

The success of the international campaign to eradicate smallpox means that the virus
no longer occurs naturally. The only known stocks of the etiologic agent, variola virus, are
held by the U.S. and Russia. With sequencing of the smallpox genome complete, the two
countries have agreed, as a confidence-building measure (CBM) under the auspices of the,
WHO, to destroy their collections by December 31, 1993. The groups had discussed the
issue at past meetings, and it will be discussed at a WHO meeting in Glasgow this summer.

5
Sandakchiev came to the meeting with a paper that argued strongly against
destruction of the collections. He argued that the destruction of the collections was not a
guarantee of complete eradication, and that if a new strain emerged the absence of collections
of old strains would inhibit analysis. He also argued that this would be a loss for potential
research and enhanced understanding; there are 400 strains in the U.S. collection, 109 in the
Russian collection, and only 2 strains were fully sequenced. Finally, he suggested that the
issue had now become as much political as scientific, so that the discussions in scientific
journals and conferences reflected only part of the process pushing for destruction.

Of the CISAC group, only Chanock still supported destruction of the collections. He
noted that destruction set an absolute standard, so that the discovery of existing stocks would
be a clear violation. He also argued that, while one could not anticipate all the research
questions of the future, techniques existed to answer most of the them even without the
stocks. For the others, the end of the Cold War had diminished the symbolic value of
destroying the stocks. Lederberg suggested, however, that it would be important to move to
provide some international management of the collections, even if they remained in Russia
and the U.S. He added that he was struck by how many people appeared to have had second
thoughts about the plan.

Sandakchiev and Petrov said that a Russian commission from the Medical Institute
had not welcomed testimony opposed to destruction, but in the end simply decided that the
issue should be left of the WHO. It is not clear who will make the final decision in Russia,

they said.
fter further di ion, th T i i h,

ing destruction to enable further study of the ie, If the stocks are

     
 

     

Henderson, the mo ropriate Ameri t for this i Tl may_ discuss

the problem further at their next meeting.

THE SVERDLOVSK INCIDENT

Lederberg began the discussion by saying that he regarded the issue of what
happened at Sverdlovsk in 1979 as primarily a domestic political issue for the Russians. He
added, however, that the U.S. and other nations would like to be reassured that Russia is
investigating what happened and takes the problem seriously. Beyond this, what happened is
of interest for public health. Two key questions are: What was the strain (and does it still
exist in a laboratory somewhere)? What was the size of the dose?

Petrov commented that he was not sure he, or others in the group, knew much more

about the incident than those who followed press reports in the West. The answers to-
questions about Sverdlovsk -- and the clandestine BW program -- are held by the military.

6
Thus, to him the crucial question is whether our groups could have any effect on the
military's willingness to reveal information. Would a joint study be feasible?

Bolshakov offered his views as someone working in a research institute in Sverdlovsk
at the time. [NOTE: His presentation did not reflect the statements by Yeltsin nor the
generally accepted view that the accident was caused by a release from a secret military
facility. He did not deny this account, he simply treated the causes as much more an open
question than most people now believe.] Bolshakov said many scientists in Sverdiovsk were
skeptical of the tainted meat story at the time, and offered several other possible
explanations. The one new explanation concemed the ceramics factory where many of the
victims worked. Bolshakov said that the factory made faience using mined locally clay.
After the outbreak some suggested that anthrax-infected animals had been buried years earlier
at the site where the clay was mined and perhaps spores had survived in the soil. He also
stressed the anomalies in the data that are available. For example, there were no cases
among children or adolescents, and no reported cases of wild animals contracting the disease.
Bolshakov concluded by saying that there was little popular interest in Sverdlovsk in an
explanation of the incident, but scientists there found it important and interesting. He
cautioned that any investigation would have to proceed with "baby steps,” noting that
Sverdlovsk was a closed city until 1990.

Shelokov said that the question of the clay had come up during the visit of the group
led by Matt Meselson, in which he took part, but in another context. Some had suggested
that there was radioactivity in the clay, which might have reduced workers’ immunity and
made them more susceptible to the anthrax. The group had not been allowed to visit the
rayon next to the ceramics factory, where they were told there had been many anthrax cases
among domestic animals. He said they had been told of cases among wild animals as well.
He added that it now appeared most of the cases among the ceramics factory workers were
clustered among those who worked in the tile manufacturing section.

Petrov commented that if a mechanism could be found for a joint study, the Russian
Academy Presidium would support the effort. Funds would be needed for the project,
however, and he suggested considering an international effort and a broader focus on anthrax
as a whole. The group then discussed various forms a study of anthrax might take.

Shelokov mentioned that, although such efforts were beyond the scope of a Western
group such as CISAC, there might be evidence that a Russian internal investigation could
pursue. For example, the Meselson group was told that the organisms isolated from human
cases were deposited at the Habarisk institute [NOTE: Shelokov thought this was not the
main regional institute but a specialized facility for studying newly identified strains}. They
were also told that sera had been taken from hundreds of patients (both victims and those
suspected of having the infection) and these might be at Nikiforov’s old hospital. If any of
these samples survived, there would be potential for both bacteriological and serological
analysis.
Sandakchiev asserted that the Sverdlovsk issue is a political, not a scientific matter,
and that one has to remember the political situation. Yeltsin was the Communist party boss
in Sverdlovsk at the time of the incident. He has repeatedly said that he knew nothing about
what happened, but in the current precarious political climate, an open inquiry is not in his
interests. A few months ago, all data on BW programs was declared closed, so it would take
presidential action to open the files. Furthermore, nothing could be learned without the
cooperation of the military, and they have little incentive to be candid.

Sandakchiev also offered his "personal impression" that the brain drain of scientists
to the West, along with several key defections, had given the U.S. all the essential
information about what happened at Sverdlovsk and in the clandestine Soviet program. He
asserted that the U.S. had known the truth about Sverdlovsk from the beginning, and that
current U.S. government calls for openness were demands for repentance, not information.
[NOTE: Sandakchiev repeated this statement even more strongly during a dinner
conversation with Steinbruner and Shelokov, citing three defectors by name who had
provided essential information.] There is currently little interest in BW nonproliferation
among Russian political leaders and insisting on repentance defeats hopes for cooperation.

Lederberg responded that the new leadership in the Clinton Administration would be
happy to put the past behind us. But they need reassurance that the civilian authorities in
Russia have all the former programs under firm control. As long as the military remains so
secretive about its past activities, doubts will continue. CISAC does not expect answers from
this group, but Russians, perhaps in cooperation with Western groups, need to find some
way to conduct a full internal investigation. Steinbruner agreed that there was no interest in
recrimination, but Yeltsin’s announcement that there had been a clandestine offensive BW
program from 1972-92 cried out for elaboration. The fact that a false account was offered
for one incident compounded the problems, and means that the U.S. government will expect
some explanation. Without that, it will be very hard to move forward to greater cooperation.

Sandakchiev responded that one answer is to foster the kind of military-to-military
contacts that have proved quite effective on nuclear weapons and CW. Shelokov questioned
whether it was realistic to think that the military could sort the issues out alone. Monath
then commented that a Russian military delegation’s visit to Fort Dietrich several years
earlier had led to the exchange of a surprising amount of information. Lederberg noted that
U.S. and Russian possession of nuclear weapons and chemical weapons was not secret, but
BW possession is and this makes a candid dialogue far more difficult.

 
BILATERAL COOPERATION ON NONPROLIFERATION

Background
The two groups had discussed all the items on this agenda topic in the past.

Lederberg noted that there was general agreement that the real problem of potential use of
BW would come from third parties. The basis for establishing a cooperative position
between Russia and the U.S. depends on creating confidence-building measures, setting
standards for verification, and defining what are and are not permitted activities. He
commented that he believed it was not so much how we view one another but what the
obligations would be under international nonproliferation regime, and how we might explore
and test various approaches in a bilateral context.

Since the groups last met the CWC has been completed, which creates a set of
standards and verification procedures. Lederberg commented that he had expected this to be
a model for BW, although the problem of allowed activities is not the same. Production is
more complicated in the BW sphere. There is also the issue of scale, since a small room
would provide space for a production of militarily significant quantities. Concealment and
clandestine activities are much easier, and it is also easier to move between "white" and
"black" activities.

Verification

When one looks hard at the problems of verification, Lederberg commented, one is
tempted to conclude that it is hopeless. Nonetheless, it may be worthwhile to set standards,
although national means may provide more of the actual verification evidence. With that in
mind, Steinbruner and Monath had prepared a paper on a possible classification scheme for
agents. The classifications of particular agents were the result of extensive discussion
between the two groups. The exercise had been motivated in part by the schedule of the 5-
year experts meeting to review the BWC. They had sent the paper to two Soviet participants
in previous meetings (Reyeshevsky and Rokovsky) in hopes that it might eventually result in
a co-authored draft, but communication had broken down in the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and the exercise was not completed. Lederberg suggested that it was now an open
question what the two groups might address in this area.

Steinbruner explained that they had been pursuing ways to clarify the ambiguities in
the BW convention of how to distinguish between defensive and offensive work. They had
developed categories of risk and then classified a long list of agents according to the risks
they posed. The classifications were based on four basic characteristics -- how infective
(i.e., what percentage in contact actually develop an infection; how rapidly does the infection
develop; how virulent is it; and how efficiently does it spread. He commented that at present
there are no known agents with the highest degrees of each of these characteristics -- but that
the 1919 influenza strain was an example of such an agent. Given this potential, it is thus of
particular concern to keep the most dangerous category empty.

The paper envisioned two levels of restriction using this classification scheme -- a

9
threshold of disclosure and a threshold of prohibition -- which would differ according to the
degree of risk in the various categories. The exercise was intended to suggest a common set
of rules that could be agreed on by all laboratories, as well as procedures to encourage
disclosure about the types of agents held by various laboratories without interfering in
research activities. The underlying purpose was to provide the basis for a bilateral system of
disclosure in which the U.S. and Russia would be very forthcoming with each other. This
could be applied internationally and the hope was that illegal activities might be detected
against this broader pattern of openness and disclosure.

Lederberg commented that this exercise was also intended to stave off more
restrictive efforts that might hamper legitimate research unduly. This concern remains
relevant to the two groups’ potential future activities. The improvement in the Federation of
American Scientists’ list, noted by Shelokov, offers the potential that interested groups might
converge on a common list and proposed rules that could be an experts’ input to government.

The discussion focused on issues of feasibility and of how to take account of new
strains. Ivanov commented that additional Russian scientists would have to be identified
who could take part in such an exercise, and Petrov expressed some doubt about whether
theirs was the right group for such an effort. Steinbruner commented that the policy
prescription was to establish an official body, initially bilateral, but eventually perhaps
international, that would be responsible for updating the classifications and for classifying
new agents. These would initially be placed in the most dangerous -- and hence restrictive --
category until a full evaluation was completed. Sandakchiev and Petrov both commented
that such an exercise would be a tangible demonstration of the spirit of openness that the two
sides were trying to establish.

Sandakchiev and Robbins also suggested that joint research and regular contacts
between laboratories should be part of any exercise. Robbins suggested putting a priority on
U.S.-Russian joint work on the agents in the more dangerous categories, since those who are
actually working on projects would be the most likely to know about the state of research on
any given agent. Sandakchiev added that he was a pessimist about the possibilities for
verification, but saw the exercise as worthwhile nonetheless as part of the trust-building
process. Steinbruner and Lederberg repeated that beginning on a bilateral level seemed
most promising, even if moving to an international level later might result in revisions to the
standards and classifications.

 

Lederberg began by noting that this topic has been discussed frequently and that the
two groups should concentrate on what the Academies might have to contribute. Chanock

10
commented that this was an important component of confidence-building, and that regular
surveillance was important to the detection of new diseases.’

The groups then had an extensive discussion of how surveillance is conducted in
Russia and the U.S., and what new measures or assistance might help Russia in creating
better reporting system. Petrov reminded everyone that data on disease and epidemics were
considered classified information under the Soviet system, and some of that culture of
secrecy persist. Sandakchiev commented that a universal system for Russia needed to be
developed, and that perhaps its classifications could be made standard with the U.S, or some
international system.

Robbins commented that a global surveillance system seemed an essential part of a
program to discourage the use of BW, but that to be successful it should: (1) have a high
degree of openness; (2) be independent of governments, so that it was responsible to
scientists and not the political community; (3) have some laboratory capability (to isolate
agents; for serology); and (4) in the long run serve a more general public health objective.
Lederberg noted that, as part of the implementation program for the IOM’s report on
Emerging Infections, CDC is preparing the groundwork for a global surveillance system that
would be managed largely through the WHO. He added, however, that he was not sure the
funds would be there to implement the system.

wo grou id not ision on whether inue di i l
rveil a of their iv iviti

General Proliferation Issues

Lederberg raised the idea that concerns about the misuse of biological research
should be made part of physicians’ ethical education. The grassroots involvement of
physicians, he suggested, could be as important as the Physicians for Social Responsibility’s
activities on nuclear weapons in the 1980s.

Petrov responded that Dr. Chasov (sp.) is no longer the chairman of the Russian PSR
counterpart since he has become minister of health. He believes the new chair is the dean of
the medical institutes. The movement is much less active now, presumably reflecting the end
of the Cold War. He liked the idea of a physicians movement against BW, and the groups

ill di i r when there i re i ion Russi i R
groups. [NOTE: Husbands checked with PSR headquarters, and currently BW is not a
major focus for its programs, although several of its Board members are interested and may
do things as individuals with the blessing of the organization. ]

 

2 AIDS was first noticed by researchers who spotted an unusual pattern in the
Morbidity, Mortality Weekly Report produced by the CDC.

11
Lederberg suggested that sharing of intelligence data on third parties could be very

important, but added that he was not sure what the two groups could do to promote this.
Petrov strongly endorsed the idea, and suggested that it be raised at the main meeting of

AC with i i n in r, I Petrov_will
issue with the head of the Russian surveillance service (Valenkov?).
NEXT MEETING

The groups agreed that the scheduled meeting of CISAC with its Russian counterpart
group in late October was too soon for the two sides to meet again. However, Petrov and
perhaps Ivanov will be coming with the delegation and they could use the opportunity to
meet with Lederberg and others from the Working Group to update each other on their
progress and to plan for the next meeting.

The groups agreed that early in 1994 was a reasonable target for the next meeting,

which would probably be held in Moscow. Ivanov suggested that, if the meeting were held
in Russia, it might be possible to have some members of the Russian military participate.

12
SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

1. Conversion. The two groups agreed that developing the idea of an international public
health research effort focused on specific dangerous agents, which could support the
conversion of some Russian scientists and institutes, should be a priority for our future work.
{[NOTE: In private conversation later, the CISAC group discussed convening a small
planning session in the U.S. early in the fall to explore the idea with public health officials
and those involved with Nunn-Lugar projects.]

2. Smallpox. The two groups agreed to support postponing the destruction to enable further
study of the issue. If the stocks are retained, the groups support proposals for international
management. Lederberg agreed to contact D.A. Henderson, the most appropriate American
target for this idea. The two groups may discuss the problem further at their next meeting.

3. The Sverdlovsk Incident. The groups agreed to continue exploring a modest joint
research effort on some aspect of anthrax. Some portion of the effort would be devoted to
Sverdlovsk, but only as an epidemiological problem. The U.S. group will explore potential
funding sources and both sides will look for scientists who might be candidates to participate
in the study.

4. Bilateral Cooperation on Nonproliferation.

a. The groups agreed to continue discussing the ideas represented by the Steinbruner-
Monath paper on classifying agents, possibly adding the classification scheme
prepared for FAS by Barbara Rosenberg as a "straw person” for examining
alternatives.

b. The two groups did not come to any decision on whether to continue discussing
global surveillance as part of their cooperative activities.

c. The groups will discuss the idea of a grassroots movement by physicians against
BW further when there is more information about the Russian and American PSR
groups. [NOTE: Husbands checked with PSR headquarters, and currently BW is
not a major focus for its programs, although several of its Board members are
interested and may undertake activities with the blessing of the organization. ]

d. Petrov endorsed the idea of sharing intelligence data on third parties, suggested
that it be raised at the main meeting of CISAC with its Russian counterparts in
October. In the meantime, Petrov will raise the issue with the head of the Russian
surveillance service (Valenkov?). [NOTE: This idea needs follow up and discussion
within the CISAC Working Group to decide if we want to proceed.]

NOTE: The groups agreed that Petrov will consult with Lederberg during the main CISAC
meeting in late October about progress on the decisions made at the planning meeting and
about plans for a next meeting, which is likely to be in Moscow in early 1994.

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