BW Working Group Meeting
National Academy of Sciences
Washington, D.C.
February 7, 1989

Summary Minutes

A meeting of the NAS Committee on International Security and
Arms Control Working Group on Biological Weapons took place on
February 7, 1989 from 10:00 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. at the National
Academy of Sciences. Present were: Joshua Lederberg, chairman;
Robert Chanock, Thomas Monath, Alexis Shelokov, John
Steinbruner, Wolfgang Panofsky and Lynn Rusten. Robert Mikulak
attended the first hour.

Rusten reported that the Soviets indicated they were
inclined to accept the proposal for a joint meeting in London on
April 1-2, but that their acceptance was not yet definite.
Lederberg reported that Ivanov had indicated general agreement
with the agenda and dates, but had suggested there might be a
change in the Soviet chairmanship from him to Petrov. Firm
information from the Soviets is expected shortly; planning will
proceed with the expectation that the joint meeting will occur
on April 1-2.

Robert Mikulak, a senior scientist in the Bureau of
Multilateral Affairs at the US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, gave a presentation on the current status of BW and CW
issues in the government. Noting that CW proliferation had
become a prominent concern, he said legislation being considered
on the Hill to impose sanctions against CW use and perhaps
against companies that assist CW programs in other countries may
be broadened to include BW. He predicted that the
Administration and Congress would work together to develop
sensible legislation. He said there was interest within the
government in designing a CW non-proliferation regime modeled
after the nuclear non-proliferation treaty regime.

Mikulak said the US government had not been involved in
discussions with the Soviets about BW proliferation as it has

been with the Soviets on CW proliferation.
Mikulak then made some comments on those aspects of the
draft treaty on CW which might have some spillover to the BW
issue. First, he said that toxic chemicals, which are
explicitly prohibited by the Biological Weapons convention, will
also be prohibited under the CW Treaty and therefore some of the
cW verification provisions such as challenge inspections would
be applied to the toxin aspects of the BW field. Second,
Mikulak said there was an explicit understanding with the
Soviets that the next BWC Review Conference, which will probably
take place in September 1991, will evaluate the CW verification
provisions as they apply to the BWC.

Mikulak then made some remarks about the annual data
exchanges in which BWC signatories voluntarily participate. He
said the Soviets want more information on the US BW Defense
Research program, including a complete list of all facilities
involved in the program. The US wants more information on the
Soviet military BW program. He said both countries are involved
in urging some of their own allies to participate in the
voluntary data exchange.

Lederberg asked Mikulak what good ideas had emerged as to
how to deal with the CW proliferation problem. Mikulak
responded that there were no simple solutions; the main ideas
are to employ export controls and political pressure to slow the
proliferation down.

Mikulak said the CW draft treaty had three main categories
of verification. First is inspection at declared military
facilities to verify the declared baseline and to monitor
non-production and destruction of chemical weapons. Second is
random inspection at certain commercial production facilities
where defined key precursors are produced. Third is a regime to
deal with undeclared facilities that did or could produce
chemical weapons or the defined precursors. However, Mikulak
said there was no agreement on whether this regime would rely on -
random spot inspection, a challenge inspection scheme for
individual facilities that cause concern, or some other scheme.

He recalled that the US proposal originally called for anywhere,
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anytime challenge inspections to which military facilities,
government-owned facilities and specifically defined private
facilities could be subject, and that the Soviets had agreed.
In discussion, it was predicted that this provision will
probably not survive in the final version because ultimately the
signatories will insist on a right of refusal. There was a
discussion of incentives and disincentives for misuse of the
challenge inspection provision and what could be done after a
refusal of a challenge inspection. Mikulak said there was also
the problem of detecting undeclared facilities. He noted that
proprietary concerns were prominent for the US chemical
industry, which is concerned mostly about inspections by
representatives of Japanese or Western competitor countries.

Mikulak said the treaty would create a new international
agency for verification of the CW regime which would copy some
of the positive aspects of the IAFA. It's expected to have a
one million dollar annual budget and employ some hundred
inspectors. Who pays has not yet been worked out.

Mikulak left the meeting.

At the request of Lederberg, Panofsky, chairman of the NAS
Committee on International Security and Arms Control, said a few
words about the committee's upcoming activities. Ina
discussion of CISAC's rules about exchanging papers with the
Soviets, Panofsky said the general rule was to avoid it unless
the paper was of such technical detail that sharing the paper
was essential to ensuring that the content was fully absorbed by
the Soviets. If papers are shared they should clearly be
individually authored papers and not be labeled as committee or
Academy products. Panofsky also stressed the CISAC groundrules
of declining to sign on to joint agreements or communiques.

Turning to the BW working group's preparation, it was agreed
that the next planning meeting would take place on March 3 in
Lederberg's office in New York.

Turning to the agenda for the bilateral meeting, Lederberg
said he owed a paper on the definitional problem posed by

toxins. He said his paper would say that it is the method of
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production, not the material, which defines the toxin. However,
he acknowledged this raised a verification problem because one
could not tell from the substance whether it was produced
naturally or synthetically. He said he would write up his
thoughts in more detail for the March 3 meeting.

Lederberg then opened discussion on the question of
delineating permitted from prohibited research under the BWC,
noting that both Steinbruner and Chanock had prepared papers
related to this question.

Steinbruner said the difficulty he faced in writing his
paper was with the quantitative specification of the thresholds
for disclosure and prohibition. Chanock said that in
Steinbruner's class IV category, flu was the only thing for
which such large quantities of agents are stored. He suggested
as an alternative setting a much lower threshold for that class,
but exempting flu. Lederberg said the response to an outbreak
of virulent flu would be to produce a large quantity of vaccine,
and therefore it is intent, not quantity, that is important.
Steinbruner explained that was the purpose of having a lower
quantitative threshold for disclosure whereby there would be an
obligation to disclose and explain why that quantity of agent
was being produced. Then there would be a higher quantitative
threshold, the exceeding of which would be prohibited except by
some kind of agreement.

Monath remarked that there was a problem with Steinbruner's
creating a new scheme when one already exists based on
biosafety, and furthermore it was confusing because of the
reversal of categories from most dangerous to least. Second,
Monath suggested that the numbers for Steinbruner's class I and
II were probably too low.

Steinbruner explained that his notion was to have a
restrictive threshold for disclosure which would trigger an
obligation to explain what you're doing. It would not be a
threshold over which production would be prohibited; that would
be set at a higher level.

Monath said it was necessary to separate research from

development and production of vaccines. Steinbruner said this
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discussion illustrated the problem that there is always the
excuse with large quantities that you're making a virus. Monath
said this gets into the issue of disclosure.

Chanock said we could adapt the biosafety level system. It
doesn't transfer exactly because it does not take into account
transmissibility.

Monath said one should consider transmissibility,
virulence/lethality and escape into nature, and that many of the
same issues were taken into account by the biosafety level
system. He said most agents fall into Steinbruner's class III
and IV. He agreed the biosafety level system needed
modification for our purposes, and noted that toxins presented a
problem.

Regarding classification problems and the overlapping
jurisdiction of the BWC and the future chemical weapons treaty
regarding toxins, Lederberg posed the question of, “Which toxins
is it legal to own?" For instance, should there be a limited
list of substances, like the CW precursors, which would be
illegal or regulated? Monath gaia the list of agents is
relatively small and it seems they could be agreed upon by both
sides.

Chanock said offensive activities could be distinguished
from defensive activities if the stuff in the pipeline is
coupled to a verifiable peaceful end use. He said only a small
percentage should be allowed to be alive at any one time.

Monath said the issue of quantity should be tied to intent.
A certain amount will always be in storage. If a scale-up
occurs (1000-fold perhaps), the issue is to be able to document
intent to vaccinate or some other peaceful purpose.

Following a break for lunch, Lederberg noted that the
discussion kept coming back to intent. He asked if there were
any objective criteria. He asked if there was any reason not to
disclose vaccines.

Monath said the issue was one of revealing deficiencies in
our BW defense capability. Steinbruner said you could announce

that you've exceeded the threshold without giving the amount.
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Steinbruner said the percentage of live virulent virus in stock
would be a disclosure threshold. Lederberg said a limit at any
time of no more than 10% live virus of what's been accumulated
in vaccine would be reasonable.

Monath suggested splitting it into amounts for research and
amounts for scale-up. Steinbruner explained that his scheme
assumed that amounts below the disclosure threshold are for
research; amounts above that get into scale-up. If you're above
the second threshold, the threshold for prohibition, there
should be a prohibition on producing those quantities except by
mutual agreement.

Lederberg asked what about when there is no vaccine
involved, when its just live virus. Shelokov said all P-IV
activities should be declared. Monath said to use number of
organisms instead of infectious doses, and define how you're
counting organisms. Lederberg said infectious particles is the
criterion. Monath said infectious units.

Lederberg summarized that there had been agreement 1) that
vaccines should be disclosed if more than 100,000 doses, and
less than 10% should be in live virus; 2) that all agents at all
military labs should be disclosed (but the cost is that it lets
the other side know what we're not doing); and 3) that at
civilian labs, all work on a certain set of specified viruses
which would include all P-1V level agents and certain specified
P-III level agents should be disclosed. Monath said the
criteria for P-III level agents in civilian labs to be disclosed
should be that they are transmissible by aerosol and cause
potentially lethal disease. Everything else would be exempt
from disclosure.

It was agreed that Chanock, Monath and Shelokov would
independently draw up a list of the P-III agents which meet
these criteria and then compare their lists. They will consult
the P-III NIH Biosafety pamphlet and eliminate those agents that’ ~
are not potential BW.

Monath asked what about animal and plant pathogens that are
common in one country, but exotic to others. It was agreed to

defer this issue for now.
Lederberg asked what about prohibition? Chanock said
recombinants that are transmitted with high efficiency and
express a potent toxin should be prohibited. He said none exist
yet.

Lederberg said he would write something up on recombinant
research. Chanock might also and if so, they'll compare notes.

Monath then made some remarks on the small pox issue. He
said the Soviets do continue to vaccinate troops against small
pox. Monath made three points: 1) there is confusion about the
value of small pox as a BW agent; 2) it is uncertain whether the
USSR and East bloc countries have ceased all civilian small pox
vaccination and it would be interesting to ask our Soviet
counterparts about this; and 3) there is a question about
whether there's ongoing military research on this in the USSR.
Monath said one idea was to have a joint US-USSR research
project on sequencing the entire variola genome and then have
both sides agree to destroy all existing stocks. Monath said
all NATO countries are vaccinating troops against small pox.

There was then a discussion of how to verify a ban on
vaccination and stockpile disposal. It was agreed that some
random sampling of recruits would be useful for verifying the
ban on vaccination, though the ban could be circumvented without
detection.

Monath said he thought a more significant step would be to
take blood samples from people working in the labs that have the
vaccine in their vaults, particularly in military research
institutes.

Monath said he thought if the Surgeon General and the Soviet
equivalent sent down a rule that vaccination would cease, we
would have means sufficient to know if violations were occurring
on a grand scale. Lederberg asked Monath to look into what
would be adequate verification to allow the US to discontinue
the practice.

Monath reiterated that an exchange of sera from military lab

personnel would be interesting.
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Lederberg said it might be useful to send the Soviets some
advance material on the small pox issue so that they come
prepared to discuss it.

Lederberg said greater openness through exchange of
scientists was still one of the most useful confidence building
measures, and said he wanted our group to promote this. Rusten
mentioned that one potential source of embarrassment could be
that we would promote and facilitate such exchanges only to find
that the State department was denying a lot of the Soviet -
scientists' visas. She explained that there has been great
sensitivity in the US government on this issue on the grounds of
concern about technology transfer. She agreed to report further
on this issue at the next meeting.

On the subject of how to conduct on-site visits, Lederberg
suggested, and Shelokov agreed, that Shelokov use Swiftwater as
a prototype for the pre-visit data exchange that Shelokov
recommended in his working paper so that he will actually bring
to London all the information suggested to be provided in
advance of a visit. Shelokov agreed to work on this providing
he gets appropriate clearance.

Lederberg's only suggestion on Shelokov's paper was that the
educational background of lab personnel also be provided (where
and when degrees were received).

There was a brief discussion of Monath's paper on disclosure
and of the adequacy of the data supplied by the US in the BWC
data exchange. There was general agreement that, on balance, it
would have been desirable had the US submission been more
forthcoming.

Lederberg agreed to think about any further assignments for

the March 3 planning meeting. The meeting adjourned at 4:00

p.m.

Lynn Rusten