PRIVILEGED
Meeting of Working Groups of the US National Academy
of Sciences and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR on
Biological Weapons Control

Moscow and Leningrad, October 6-7, 1989

A meeting of working groups on biological weapons control of
the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (Committee on International
Security and Arms Control working group on BW) and the Academy of
Sciences of the USSR took place on October 6, 1989, at the
Shemyakin Institute in Moscow. On October 7, the American
delegation visited the Institute of Military Medicine in
Leningrad (see appendix A).

The members of the NAS delegation were: Joshua Lederberg,
chairman; Robert Chanock; Thomas Monath; Alexis Shelokov; John
Steinbruner and Lynn Rusten (see attachment #1).

The members of the Soviet Academy delegation were:
Academician Vadim Ivanov, chairman; Corresponding Member Evgeniy
Sverdlov; Academician Sergei Prozorovskiy; Academician Dmitry
Lvov; V. Abarenkov; Col. K. Rayevskiy; and two interpreters (see
attachment #2).

The Agenda included the following items (see attachment #3):
1. Organizational Structures for Internal, Bilateral and

Multilateral Verification.
2. Classification and Characteristics of Pathogenic Agents of

Diseases and Toxins.

3. Facilities to be Verified; Further Definition of Allowed and

Forbidden Activities.

4.  Confidence-Building Measures and Information Exchange.

5S. Site Visit to Institute of Military Medicine in Leningrad.
This agenda derived from an outline presented by the Soviets at
the outset of the meeting. The Soviets proposed that the two
groups produce a joint document to present to their governments
as recommendations from the scientific community. The American

side declined to jointly author a document because it is an
2

explicit groundrule of the National Academy of Sciences committee
not to issue joint documents, conclusions, recommendations or
communiques with its Soviet counterpart committee, nor to
publicly disclose the content of these meetings. It is
understood, however, that each side is free to communicate the
content of the meetings or make recommendations to its own
government. Having reached agreement that there would be no
joint document, the sides agreed the discussion should follow
along the general outline initially presented by the Soviets

since they were substantively prepared on many of those items.

Organizational Structures for Internal, Bilateral and
Multilateral Verification

The primary Soviet presentation on this item was made by
Prozorovskiy. His scheme appeared to flesh out some preliminary
ideas suggested by Abarenkov at the last meeting held in April in
London. Prozorovskiy's scheme proposed to set up committees in
each country which would serve both functions of internal self-
inspection and confidence-building and verification of the other
country's activities.

Prozorovskiy suggested that each country establish a
committee to monitor the implementation of the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC). The committees would be established under the
auspices of the Foreign Affairs Committees of the two parliaments
(U.S. Congress or USSR Congress of People's Deputies.) Members
of the Foreign Affairs Committees would chair the committees.

The committees' membership would include two or three members of
the parliament; representatives of the State organs such as the
Secretaries of State, Defense and Health; representatives from
the Academies of Science, of Medical Science and of Agricultural
Sciences; and ten to twelve independent scientists expert in
epidemiology, virology, bacteriology and molecular biology.
Members of the committees would be approved by the parliament for
a term of 4 to 5 years. Throughout this term members of the

committee would have permanent visas for entry to the other
3

country. The committees would each have a permanent technical
staff of 3-4 people for analysis and preparation of necessary
information and maintenance of permanent direct contacts with the
other country's committee.

Each committee would have the following functions:

1. Monitoring of compliance with the BWC in its own country;

2. Verification and inspection in the other country's
territory;
3. Implementation of the entire complex of measures for mutual

trust, with the widest possible mutual information.

4. Further development and improvement of the system of
verification and confidence-building between the two
countries.

Prozorovskiy said the committees should be as similar as
possible in status, rights, functions and composition. The work
of the committees should be covered by the press and open to the
general publics; the public should be actively involved in
informing the committees of potential cases of prohibited
activities.

The American side expressed general agreement with and
enthusiasm for Prozorovskiy's proposed mechanism for internal
self-inspection by parliamentary oversight and bilateral
confidence-building. Believing it unnecessary and inappropriate
to dwell on the details of how such committees might be
established and operated, the American side said it would think
further about the scheme and discuss it with appropriate
individuals in the U.S. Lederberg noted that the internal changes
taking place in the USSR made more credible these ideas for self-
inspection and cooperative verification.

The American side enumerated existing mechanisms for self-
inspection in the US such as the congressional requirement for an
environmental impact statement on the BW defense program, the
function of oversight committees, budget hearings, reports
demonstrating programmatic compliance with international

treaties, and independent congressional oversight agencies such
4

as the General Accounting Office (GAO), etc. A copy of the final
FIS for the U.S. Biological Defense Research Program, a document
weighing over 2 kg, was left for further perusal by the Soviet
side.

The American side suggested that, as was the case with CW,
it would be particularly important for the US and USSR to
cooperate to cope with the potential for BW proliferation and
that these measures would necessarily be very different from
those designed for the bilateral relationship.

Both Lederberg and Abarenkov touched briefly on the idea
that some measures developed for the Chemical Weapons Treaty
could be looked at to see whether they might be applicable to the
BWC. However, it was also noted that the two cases are not
entirely analogous. Abarenkov said he had some specific
proposals related to the prevention of proliferation of
biological weapons and the capability to produce them;
unfortunately time was short and the discussion never returned to
this topic. Presumably Abarenkov will present his ideas at the
next meeting.

Prozorovskiy suggested that there should be some agreement
on joint measures of protection against BW threats from other
parties. There was also a brief discussion of the degree of
difficultly required to weaponize BW agents. In general, the
Soviets emphasized that weaponization and development of tactics
for use is quite difficult, whereas the Americans tended to
emphasize that even small quantities of agent and relatively
primitive means of dispersal could produce a devastating result.
Rayevskiy and Prozorovskiy asked for specific information on
which countries are alleged to be of concern regarding BW
proliferation. Lederberg declined to respond, saying this was a

topic more appropriate for inter-governmental discussions.

Classification and Characteristics of Pathogenic Agents of

Diseases and Toxins

This item built on the discussion initiated at the London
5

meeting last April. In London, the American side presented a
scheme which would help to define what is a permissible level of
research for defensive purposes under the BWC. The American
scheme suggested that all agents be categorized into one of three
categories (E-extremely dangerous; S-serious; and N-normal) and
that quantitative limits on permitted amounts of agent for
research be associated with each category. At the London meeting
the two sides worked together to assign all known agents to one
of the three categories; in fact, they were able to agree on this
categorization quickly and without contention.

At this meeting, Rayevskiy explained that the Soviets had
reviewed the lists and categorizations with their experts and as
a result proposed some amendments. Specifically, they thought
Yersinia pestis, smallpox virus and pandemic influenza virus
should be added to category E. They thought Pseudomonas mallei,
Pseudomonas psuedomallei, legionella, and the virus causing
hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome, Issyk-Kul fever, and
dengue fever should be added to category S, because they can be
easily isolated from animals and transferred to humans, and are
therefore potentially very dangerous. Rayevskiy also suggested
that the quantitative levels originally suggested in the American
scheme were too high. For instance, with anthrax in category S,
it would be allowable to have as much as 500 agent tons, by his
estimate. He said this quantity was too large.

In response, the American side reviewed the original
rationale for each category. Monath recalled that agents in
category S were to be both very serious and capable of being
effectively weaponized. He said neither dengue or Issyk-Kul
viruses are of great concern with regard to aerosol application
and they were therefore excluded. He recalled that in London the
two sides together had eliminated viruses of even greater concern
on that very same basis. Monath argued that it detracted from
the realistic nature of the list to add Issyk-Kul and dengue.
Chanock recalled that category E was an empty set signifying a

type agent which was as yet unknown: one that would spread
6

efficiently and fatally and could easily be weaponized. He
argued that smallpox did not belong in that category because it
spreads inefficiently and its incubation period is relatively
long.

Lvov argued that it is better to have a pathogen on the list
than to exclude it, and asserted that if one side felt it should
be on the list, the sides would have to search for a reasonable
compromise.

Steinbruner noted that the sides could agree to exercise the
strictest controls on agents other than those in category E for
other reasons, for instance because those agents are known
publicly and feared.

Lederberg said he also agreed in principle with Lvov on
erring on the side of inclusiveness, however one did not want to
unnecessarily restrain legitimate medical research. For
instance, one would not want to restrain research on influenza
strains currently widespread.

Monath said that both the US and USSR are endemic for
plague. Many labs work with it, albeit in small quantities.
There is a need for work in diagnosis, so there is a risk in
limiting the quantities for research. He recalled that the
original scheme called for disclosure of category E agents in any
quantity and a prohibition of amounts greater than 109 infectious
doses. One would have to get special approval to work with
greater quantities. He said this regime was okay for smallpox
and special strains of influenza, but it was not realistic for
plague. Category S has its own requirements which would not
restrict the normal level of research at labs.

Rayevskiy responded that it was that higher quantitative
limit of category S$ that concerned them for certain agents. For
instance, it would permit 500 tons of anthrax, which he said was
too much. He said there should be a differential approach for
each agent taking into account the size of its infectious dose,
virulence and mortality rate.

Lvov suggested establishing a category Very Serious for
7

things like plague, while keeping category E empty.

As a result of this discussion, it was agreed that the issue
should be referred back to a technical working group which would
exchange correspondence before the next meeting. The group will
reconsider both the categorization of agents and the disclosure
and prohibition levels for each category. The American side
pointed out that the scheme was originally put forward precisely
to stimulate this kind of discussion about its implications and
that the author expected from the outset that the scheme would

require modification based on these discussions.

Facilities to be Verified; Further Definition of Allowed and
Forbidden Activities

On this item, Rayevskiy indicated that the Soviets agreed in
principle with the thoughts presented by the American side at the
last meeting on how a facility inspection should be conducted,
what information should be exchanged in advance, etc. He noted
that the remaining open questions revolved around the
acceptability of such inspections and who would conduct them.

Lederberg took the opportunity to express his gratitude that
the Soviet side had been able to arrange a visit for the American
delegation to the Institute of Military Medicine in Leningrad.
At the same time, he expressed disappointment that only Rayevskiy
from the Soviet side would accompany the Americans, noting that
per the discussion about self-inspection, it was as important for
the Soviet scientists to see the institute as it was for the
Americans. Prozorovskiy mentioned that he had been there several
times because his institute collaborates on vaccines with the
Leningrad Institute. Lvov had never been there; he said his
colleagues! efforts at collaboration with the Leningrad Institute
had not been very productive.

Following up on a commitment he had made at the London
meeting, Rayevskiy presented for discussion a proposed list of
allowed and forbidden activities under the BWC. The list of

activities permitted included: studies of dangerous disease
8

pathogens; prevention, diagnostics and treatment of dangerous
diseases; tests of BW reconnaissance and medical means of
protection; studies of the structure and possible effects of
biological weapons; study of the peculiarities of aerosol spread
of weapons in chamber conditions; and the prevention of epidemic
spread against troops and civilian populations. Rayevskiy
suggested that the BWC should explicitly ban: testing and
manufacturing of BW in quantities in excess of that needed for
assessment of methods of defense and evaluation of efficiency;
the testing, manufacturing and development of BW and means of
their delivery; the equipment of arms with BW in a combat ready
stage in storage and in arsenals; and the setting up of special
military units with means of transport and delivery of BW.
Rayevskiy stressed this list was for discussion only.

Similarly, Abarenkov stressed the need to define "peaceful
purposes" in the BWC, specifically to define what is allowed for
prophylactic purposes.

In response to these Soviet remarks, the American side
reiterated that the point of the scheme to categorize agents and
put quantitative limits on amounts of agents was precisely to
define permitted levels of R&D. They stressed again the
importance of balancing any restrictions against the level of
interference with necessary research. Lederberg expressed his
view that the BWC permits all research, and that therefore
confidence-building measures are appropriate to allay concerns
about each other's activities. He said ideally all research
should be done in a publicly visible manner.

Abarenkov flagged the problem that many countries do not
have open procedures such as environmental impact statements,
etc. Lederberg agreed and stressed the importance of urging more
BWC signatories to participate in the exchange of data. He said
it would be useful to include in these declarations additional
data on production facilities for pathogens.

Lederberg made a general offer to try to answer any

questions the Soviets might have about the US program. Ivanov
9

then asked about the manufacturing of biologic products by
private firms and by U.S.-owned labs outside of the U.S.

Lederberg said there were hundreds of private firms producing
biologics, and said he would try to answer a more specific
question about that if they had one. He offered to look into the
issue of whether there were U.S. owned labs outside of the U.S.
involved in producing biological material or holding contracts
under the BDRP. It was noted that the EIS mentioned private

contractors and secondary foreign sites.

Confidence-Building Measures and Information Exchange

Prozorovskiy gave an update on Soviet efforts to improve and
open the field of epidemiology in the USSR. He conceded that
there was greater openness about research in the US, but said
that the USSR was making strides toward greater openness. He
said there was now practically no classified epidemiologic
information in the USSR, but what is lacking is the adequacy of
this information. They still have no analogy to the CDC
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. They will, however, soon
be publishing a Bulletin of Epidemiologic Information which
Prozorovskiy said would be beneficial for Soviet medical services
and for the international exchange of information.

Prozorovskiy noted that conversion was taking place in
military research and soon information on scientific research in
the military would also be made public. He said one indicator of
this was that many scientific researchers from military
institutes were now presenting papers at conferences such as the
recently concluded conference on Arboviruses in Moscow. He said
they hoped to have current publications on research done at
Soviet military institutes of potential concern to the U.S.

In the brief time remaining, Ivanov again raised the
difficulty of getting information from private companies and from
firms outside the US but funded by US agencies. He flagged this
as a concern of the Soviet government, and said he would find out

more about these concerns from their officials before the next
10

meeting.

In response, Lederberg reviewed how proprietary concerns
were being dealt with in the CW treaty under negotiation. He
said this would be a concern if there was to be an inspection
regime under the BWC, but that he thought proprietary rights
could be protected by legal means. He also mentioned legislation
currently under consideration in the US Congress which would make
it a criminal offense for anyone in the US to act in violation of
the BWC.

Finally, Rayevskiy asked whether the U.S. Army was now
opposed to contacts and joint collaboration between military
epidemiologists. He asked whom the Soviets should contact to
promote such contacts. Lederberg said he would look into the
matter, noting that one Soviet proposal was currently being

considered, as far as he knew.

General Observations

Due to the visit to the Institute of Military Medicine in
Leningrad, the actual meeting of the delegations in Moscow was
shortened to only one day, which was insufficient time. The
Soviets were well prepared on many items, including on some which
we did not get to due to the lack of time. It was agreed to
exchange working papers before the next meeting to keep the
momentum of discussions going. It is clear that the Soviets have
been asked to provide advice to their government on a short
timetable, presumably in advance of the next BWC Review
Conference. In this regard, it is worth noting that Nikita
Smidovich from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs joined the two
delegations for lunch.

Following the session, the groups took a thorough tour of
the Shemyakin Institute, which is equipped with world class lab
equipment, largely Western made. It made an interesting contrast
to the comparatively primitive labs and equipment at the
Institute of Military Medicine in Leningrad. A report of that

unprecedented site visit follows in Appendix A.

Lynn Rusten
November 7, 1989
Appendix A
PRIVILEGED
Visit of the NAS Working Group on Biological Weapons

Control to the Institute of Military Medicine in Leningrad

On October 7, 1989, the NAS Working Group on Biological Weapons
Control visited the Institute of Military Medicine in Leningrad. The
American group included: Joshua Lederberg, chairman; Robert Chanock;
Thomas Monath; Alexis Shelokov; John Steinbruner; and Lynn Rusten.
They were received by Major General Victor G. Vladimirov, Director of
the Institute; Col. K. Rayevskiy, a member of the counterpart Soviet
Academy group; Col. Sveridov and four other uniformed officers from
the Institute with evident medical expertise; two men in civilian
clothes; two photographers; and one interpreter from the Soviet
Academy of Sciences.

Major General Vladimirov, Director of the Institute, welcomed the
Americans, noting that the changes brought about by glasnost made this
visit possible. He said he would first describe the work of the
Institute and then show the Americans a P-III containment lab.

Vladimirov said they did no classified work at this Institute,
where they work on protection against infectious diseases. There are
four major labs devoted to: 1) research on diagnosis and detection of
infectious disease agents; 2) therapy and prophylactic measures; 3)
disinfection/sanitation; and 4) immunoprophylaxis.

Vladimirov said in the first lab they studied natural foci and
transmission of infectious diseases in the USSR and in areas where
their military forces may be present. He said there were still many
little-studied areas in the USSR where there are, for instance, new
natural foci of tick-borne encephalitis and tularemia. In the Amur
River area they found natural foci of several fevers which could be
dangerous to military personnel.

Vladimirov said analogous work was done in Afghanistan when
Soviet forces were there. He said they discovered agents previously
unknown to be in Afghanistan such as Q fever, Rift Valley fever and ..

typhoid fever. Hepatitis A was an acute problem in Afghanistan. He
ii
said as a result of their work, they have developed about one hundred
diagnostic reagents, including several immunofluorescent products.

Vladimirov said in lab 2 they develop antibiotics and emergency
means of treatment of acute infectious disease. Antibiotics and
chemotherapeutic agents developed here have been tested and approved.
This lab works closely with Academician Prozorovskiy's Institute on
the development of immunomodulators.

Vladimirov said in the third lab they test new disinfectants,
repellents and insecticides. They have large scale equipment for mass
disinfection by means of gas and ethylene oxide. They use large
polyethylene sacks in chambers.

Vladimirov said in the fourth lab they develop modes of
immunization by aerosol and jet injection. Regarding AIDS, Vladimirov
said they were at first concerned that jet injection might be
contraindicated, and they have seen this also noted in the world
medical literature. However, he said they were now optimistic about
the safety of jetgun injection and believe this method does not
transmit HIV.

Lederberg then made some introductory remarks. He said the NAS
working group on BW met regularly with its counterpart Soviet group
from the Soviet Academy of Science and Soviet Academy of Medical
Science. These BW groups are an off-shoot of the parent Committee on
International Security and Arms Control of each Academy. The Soviet
committee was chaired first by Evgeniy Velikhov and now by Roald
Sagdeev.

Lederberg explained that the primary concern of the BW working
groups was to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention regime.
This can be done in part through confidence building measures and
higher security relating to proliferation.

Lederberg said he was pleased with the openness of the Director's
remarks and said he would be pleased to answer any questions about the
American group. He then introduced the Americans.

In response to a question from Lederberg, Vladimirov explained
that while members of his Institute wear the uniforms of the Army,

they work in the Ministry of Defense for all the military services.
iii
They report to the Directorate of Military Medical Services in Moscow.
Theirs is the only military medical research institute of its type and
it serves all the services. Each service has its own clinicians who
provide practical medical services, but they do not conduct scientific
research work.

Vladimirov said his institute is also concerned with military
occupational safety problems other than infectious diseases. He said
he was a radiologist by training.

Vladimirov said that students from the Medical Military Academy
normally go into the services as practical physicians. Those who show
promise return to the Medical Academy for graduate work and some of
those then come to this Institute as researchers.

Chanock asked if adenovirus infection was a problem in military
recruits. Col. Sveridov responded that this was not a main problem
for them. The civilian institutes are researching it, and they do not
yet have an approved vaccine for it.

Chanock asked about a paper from their Institute on aerobiology
which appeared a few years ago. It concerned the immunization of
rabbits with a vaccinia virus delivered by aerosol to the lungs.
Chanock said he was interested in this because a new approach to
immunization involves vaccinia with a foreign gene inserted in it
which stimulates antibody response. So far, it does not have
sufficient immunogenicity.

One of the uniformed officers responded that one of his
researchers conducted that study. He said they used a Soviet vaccinia
virus and it was not a recombinant. The purpose was to show the
effectiveness of aerosol vaccine. He said by using aerosolization,
one can get the same effect with a dose smaller by two orders of
magnitude than what would otherwise be needed. He said this work was
done in a chamber which the Americans would see. It was done only
with rabbits.

Lederberg asked if they did any aerosol vaccination to people. A
uniformed officer said there had been some studies on humans on a
small scale to check the immune response and side effects. They tried

it with a flu vaccine, and to a limited extent, vaccinia virus.
iv
Chanock expressed his interest in studying the effects on humans at a
very early age. The American delegation requested more information
concerning the response of human subjects to vaccinia virus delivered
directly into the lungs by aerosol. However, Rayevskiy indicated that
such information would not be made available until a satisfactory
collaboration agreement had been established with USAMRIID. One
Soviet noted that the main problem was not to exceed the immunizing
dose. The particle size and dose are critical. He said they have not
published their work with humans, but they found no toxicity or
adverse effects on humans from aerosolization.

Lederberg turned the discussion back to broader issues. He said
in the US some of the most pioneering research is being done in the
military labs. He asked the Soviets whether they regarded as part of
their mission defense against BW attack, as it is the mission of the
US military medical labs? He asked whether tularemia was a research
interest as a zoonosis or as a hostile BW agent? He asked whether if
not here, then were there other institutes concerned about defense
against BW attack?

Vladimirov responded that all the agents mentioned are zoonotic
and therefore they were concerned with defense against naturally
occurring zoonotic disease; however, should one of these agents be
used in biological warfare, the measures they are developing would of
course be applicable. He said in Afghanistan they encountered agents
not endemic in the USSR, and some could be used as BW agents.
Vladimirov said that therefore, willingly or not, they are facing this
problem. He said their work would therefore "kill two rabbits with
one bullet."

Steinbruner asked whether they were sure those agents were
endemic in Afghanistan and not introduced? Vladimirov responded yes
because the infections had been recognized in the population in the
decade preceding the Soviet intervention.

Monath asked about the Rift Valley fever virus isolation in
Afghanistan which someone from the Institute reported at the recent
Arbovirus Symposium in Moscow (see attachment #4). He asked whether

they were able to study its natural transmission cycle?
Vv

Rayevskiy responded that they did not because the virus was
isolated from a patient's blood collected in 1987 and preserved frozen
in liquid nitrogen. The virus isolation was accomplished later --
after the Soviets left Afghanistan. Rayevskiy said in 1988, "thank
god," the decision was made for them to leave Afghanistan, so there
was no opportunity to study the transmission cycle. He said there was
no one left at that site to conduct the studies. [Their claim to have
identified Rift Valley Fever was hotly contested by both American and
Soviet delegates at the Arbovirus Symposium. ]

Monath asked whether they had a multi-specialty field team to
respond to questions such as those raised by this isolation?
Vladimirov said no but they pull together such a team when the need
arises and the opportunity exists.

Monath asked how they protect the lab workers who work on the
putative Rift Valley Fever agent? Rayevskiy responded that they work
in a glove box in a room at the P-II or P-IIl level. This work would
be done in lab 4, their only P-III facility. The other labs are P-IlI.
There is ultraviolet radiation in the boxes. They observe a high
degree of personal protection. Rayevskiy said they have very rigid
national regulations. They have had no intra-laboratory infection
with Rift Valley fever virus. They check their employees by means of
serum surveillance, depending on the frequency of exposure, to see if
people are abiding by the rules. He said most of the time the agents
are in the frozen collection; lab workers do not have daily exposure
to dangerous pathogens. Severe punishment is enforced for violating

safety regulations. A safety committee must approve an individual's

competence to work with dangerous pathogens. They must past a test
every two years. Sometimes there are unannounced "spot checks,"
especially if there is concern or suspicion about violations. Lab

supervisors monitor safety compliance daily. Rayevskiy said the

"Greens" were very active in the USSR, meaning citizens concerned

about environmental issues. He said they were now facing

environmental impact problems like the US has faced for many years.
Monath said he was pleased to hear that their controls for safety

and environmental protection were so strict. He mentioned the concern
vi

with Rift Valley fever virus -- a lab worker could pass it to a farm
animal, so one must be concerned with inadvertent escape from the lab
of agents that cause disease in livestock. He asked whether their
authorities restricted contact between workers and farm animals when
working on Rift.

Rayevskiy reminded Monath that the Rift Valley isolation was very
unexpected and that the virus is not enzootic in the USSR. He said
the two lab workers working on Rift were city-dwellers. Rayevskiy
said they were considering sequencing the genome to verify the
isolation. That would have to be done at the Ivanovskiy Institute
because the military institute does not have the resources.

Lederberg said some of the confidence building measures the two
Academy groups have discussed included exchanges of information and
possible quantitative limits on the scale of production of biologics.
He asked whether Vladimirov would be able to say what was the level of
production of biologics in his institute? Lederberg said his
colleagues were prepared to answer any questions they might have about
NIH, Fort Detrick, etc. Vladimirov responded that they make no
vaccines and have no manufacturing here, no fermentation. Their work
is purely in test tubes, petri dishes, etc. They produce nothing in
large quantities. Rayevskiy added that they use low pathogenic or
vaccine strains of agents for diagnostics. [In the labs we were shown
a tissue cell culture system of 1.5 Liter capacity (manufactured by
the Oncology Research Institute in Kiev). This is used to produce
cells for small scale virus research. ]

Lederberg said this was useful to the discussion of the working
group on quantitative limits. It means that a limit of one liter of
agent would not be too restrictive. Rayevskiy agreed and said that
was why he could not fathom the large amount of anthrax being
discussed in the previous day's meeting in Moscow.

Lederberg asked how they disinfected large equipment. Vladimirov
said they did it in special aerosol chambers. For instance, if an
ambulance transported an infected person, they would put the entire
ambulance in a polyethylene bag and zap it with ethylene oxide.

Vladimirov suggested the Americans tour the lab. The group was
vii
taken inside several buildings on the campus. One was lab #4 where
the Americans were shown the P-III containment lab. They also saw
parts of lab #1 and lab #2.

Following the lab tour, the two groups shared a meal together
where they informally discussed a wide range of subjects including the
prospects for Gorbachev and perestroika, the expanding US-USSR
military exchanges, and the situation regarding defense spending and
new definitions of national security on both sides.

What we were told had been planned as a two hour visit lasted for
four hours. While the meeting started out very formally, the
atmosphere grew more open and relaxed as the two sides talked before
the lab tour.

Vladimirov confirmed that this was the first time ever that
foreigners had visited his institute.

A Soviet Academy staff member later told the Americans that
approval for the visit came only at the last minute and that it went

all the way up to General Moiseyev, Chief of the General Staff.

Lynn Rusten
November 7, 1989