Preliminary conclusions from the meeting of CISAC in London,
April 1-3, 1989. From JL notes, transcribed 4/6/89

The greatest progress was made on agenda Item 1 - delineation of permitted from
unpermitted research under the BWC. This clarification is intended to deal with the
ambiguity in the BWC about what constitutes amounts and categories of material that have no
peaceful use. The general principles in John Steinbruner’s paper of the classification of
agents as E(extreme), S(serious) and N(not controlled) was accepted; and in a special working
group there was prompt and unanimous agreement about the list of agents and the categories
to which they should be assigned.

Further discussion is needed on some definitional details as to the units of measure; how
different related agents are lumped or split apart; what about commercial proprietary interests;
are we talking about national inventories or a single laboratory and so forth. The precise
mechanism of dealing with new agents provisionally until such time as they can be classified
and agreed upon is also for further discussion.

In addition, in connection with this and the next topic the other side brought up what
should be the overall verification regime? Under what circumstances are inspections to be
made? We had given no consideration to this, as most of our thought had been directed
towards voluntary visits; but we agreed to have some proposals ready for our next meeting in
October. Plainly we would be following the lines being set under the CW negotiations.

In connection with the overlapping status of toxins I presented the thought that we should
do some preparatory work as to the implications of summarily adding all of BW to the control
provisions agreed to under CW. How deal with much smaller scale, dual use, undeclared
sites? This will probably not be attended to in any other place. (It is not our intention to
complicate the ongoing discussions on CW by bringing this up as a formal issue.)

There seemed to be general understanding about the double track concept: that a few
reciprocal progressive unilateral steps be taken on a voluntary basis towards ever more
disclosure. [N.B. the trial inspections being planned for CW]. This would allow the exercise
of the principles of observation and verification before they become formalized into treaty
obligations. Eventually these would evolve into the multilateral and formal agreement that
would involve mandatory compliance.

On Item 2 - (Shelikov’s) what can be learned from an on-site visit?: we were somewhat
hampered by the fact that Alex had not yet been given clearance to hand over any documents
comprising substantial disclosures about Swiftwater [that this is an unclassified facility
notwithstanding}; and he had more or less inadvertently promised not to hand over the
working paper although its content is innocuous. We therefore discussed this in rather general
terms with a promise that Shelikov would be providing a more detailed version in the very
near future (that is to say that as soon as he can get clearance). There was again a very
prompt consensus about the general principles of the kinds of information that should be’
disclosed.

Item: Under the definition of toxins we very quickly found that there was no interest on
the other side in trying to clarify the status of chemically synthesized material. Sverdlov was
even somewhat vague as to the fact that synthetic polypeptides were covered under the
convention and had to be reminded of that by Aburenkov. They thought any effort, including
my own, to draw sharp dividing lines was futile so that the matter was better left to be dealt
with under chemical disarmament. We both agreed that it was very important to be
absolutely sure that toxins would be covered by both the BW and CW and that there would
be then no hiatus in their prohibition. I promised to check on the status of the CW
negotiations in this regard.

Item: With respect to smallpox - we were surprised to find that both Lvov and
Prozorovsky were skeptical that smallpox can be guaranteed to have been eradicated,
especially as there remain pockets of isolated indigenous people. However, the Soviet
Ministry of Health had decided promptly in 1979 to forego vaccination of the USSR civilian
population: which is not what Lvov would have advised. The army continues to vaccinate its
troops justifying this on the same contingency and the fact that troops in their barracks anf
general hygienic conditions are especially liable to the rapid spread of smallpox should it
reemerge. Raiyevsky said this should not be coupled in any way with BW since the main
threat of smallpox would be to civilian populations and these are not being vaccinated. Their
conclusions on this matter seem quite firm. We agreed that smallpox was not a very rational
choice for BW.

They were on the other hand very interested in proposals to continue with the molecular
genetic study of variola and to the idea of enabling the destruction of variola stocks once
there had been clones of the relevant segments. I stood out on our side, and Ivanov on the
other, opposing the destruction of the virus until there were proven means available for
reconstructing its genetic identity. (Channock would like to see the early destruction. I’m
concerned about making a rule that would be in any case very difficult to verify. The
incentive to conceal stocks will disappear when the genomes are properly cloned and
eventually sequenced.)

Item - On further measures on epidemiological information -- this was mainly a
presentation by Prozorovsky on the status of the development of their epidemiological
surveillance. They are trying very hard to develop a system that would match what already
goes on in the United States and we propose various methods of cooperation towards that end,
including the collaboration of the editor of the Weekly Mortality Morbidity Report and visit to
state health laboratories.

In all our discussions we agreed that we would develop prototypes to cover just human
disease and that threat to animals and plants would simply be identified as necessary targets
for other work by experts more concerned with those issues.

We had throughout the meeting very extensive discussion of pandemic viral threats and
the kind of world organization needed to try to cope with them. WHO should expand its
activities as an information center and perhaps might also do some careful monitoring about
where stocks of sensitive infectious material might be sent both from a BW disarmament and
a public health safety perspective.
Item - On proliferation - we are still very puzzled as to what steps can be taken in that
direction. We agreed that the prompt example of the superpowers in dealing with CW and in
BW openness was a very important example and a necessary step to the development of
monitoring an sanctions for the use of BW in third states. They thoroughly shared our
concern about this direction.

Item - We discussed the exchange programs -- the steps that the NAS is taking to
advertise postdoctoral opportunities. We also pointed to WHO as providing a possible
medium for facilitating visas.

With respect to smallpox the persistence of variola in corpses for up to 100 years was
cited and the textbooks do refer to 20 year survival of infective crusts.

I promised to get from John Sninsky a list of primers that could be used for viral
diagnosis using PCR. {I’ve written him. JL}

There was an agreement that aerosol research was particularly sensitive and that there
should be a mutual commitment that all research on aerosol dispersal of infectious agents be
openly disclosed. Raiyevsky wanted to be much more categorical than the rest of us in
defining what was and what was not allowed but I think we straightened that out. He had the
technologies which are forbidden under the BWC in mind rather than research.

To the list of prospective BW agents Prozorovsky suggested we add Legionella. Lvov
that we add IssyKol fever; and we had all neglected to put down variola.

For future activity the workshop has suggested that there be a repository of viruses from
patients with disease and also with inapparent infection to study the molecular genetics and
evolution of virulence. (This is a revolution in epidemiological thinking). There should also
be a bilateral research program along the lines of US and Japan.

Lvov has isolated avian influenza strains that do show high mortality and if these had
been adapted to humans and been of a different serological type there might have been a very
serious pandemic threat.

The USDA does make it difficult to import influenza strains that might attack birds.

There was a considerable discussion about listing and disclosing vaccine stockpiles. I
questioned whether there was much to be added by the listing of amounts but we will have to
discuss this further among our side.

Prozorovsky made a very good point that in our presentation we indicate a broader
perspective about the problems that we are trying to address. I talked at some length about
the role of self-inspection and that disclosure was as much for the benefit of informing
scientists within the country to enable them to surveil their own country’s programs, was for
mutual disclosure.

We have to look into the legal framework of continued research on variola. There are
some meetings coming up celebrating the 10th anniversary of the certified disappearance of
smallpox. Tom Monath will talk to Don Henderson about that.

The difficulty of proliferation control is that vaccine development provides a perfect
cover: all the technologies are dual use and it will be very difficult to regulate what
production facilities a country is going to have.

There was some argument, but the scientists were the ones to be pessimistic that terrorists
had sufficient technology to do very great harm.

There will be more detailed notes but perhaps not for another month from Lynn.