Dr. Joshua Lederberg

Apt. 115
1230 York Avenue
“ew York, NY 10021-6395

DRrate
January 23, 1987

Memo on meeting with Y. velikoy .( Vie3 Pras. USSR Acad Sa’).
I was called today, Friday, January 23, 1987, to a luncheon
meeting which Ambassador Dubynin had requested of David Rockefeller
in New York. With Mr. Rockefeller and Velikov were also Bill Hy-
land of the Council on Foreign-Relations, J.J. Stremlau re-
cently of “The Rockefeller Foundation and now on Mr. Rockefeller's
; Chris Kerven?)
staff of the Pocantico Institute, another member of DR's staff and
myself. We met at the Sea Grill for little over an hour.
Velikov's principal mission seems to be to lay the ground-
work for the establishment of a new international foundation which
he calls World Laboratory. This would attempt to sponsor a number
of projects that would foster US/Soviet scientific and technical
cooperation stressing those areas that as he said did not necessi-
tate crossing the boundary where there were problems of political
controversy, technology transfer or national security. I did not
get a clear picture oP PO Te naa in mind but one of them had to
do with teaching children with the help of computers, another on
satellite communications on behalf of health services throughout
the world, another the Phobes orbiter and laser surface sampling
experiment that Sagdeev has been already proposing. Velikov posed
the NRDC monitoring initiative at Sermpeladinsh as an example of

what could be accomplished by private initiatives. I taxed him

that as the representative of the world's ESS socialist ‘country
-2-

that he seemed to be eager to privatise ct Petations. His re-
sponse was a chuckle but he said in effect what works works.

He indicated that one area that might be of joint interest,
and that he had discussed with Sam Thier at the Institute of
Medicine would be collaboration on AIDS with some side reference
to vaccines. I told him that one serious obstcle to that was the
propaganda campaign that had been exercised in the Soviet Union,
accusing the United States. of having invented AIDS as a BW agent.
He said that was most unfortunate,that this is what happens some-
times in the popular press. He made the further argument: and—said

"1

if we gave our press more freedom we would have still more trouble

ark ~Sonet sary, |

with an obvious illusion to ecireumstanees in the US press. Ina

/

rather free ranging discussion of topics connected with arms control
I can clearly recall and select just one incident. Velikov had been
at ReyKavik: so I made a point of remarking that I was convinced that
the President stood very strongly behind the proposals that had been

fo ‘
thegé consum-

tabled there, that he was disappointed at the obstles,
mation: but that fuithermore that it was very obvious from the public
press that he had very little support either among US allies or
within his own administration for deep cuts. I said that I felt that
the President nevertheless had a strong personal commitment to those
objectives and had insisted on there being continued study of a
variety of ramifications of the Reykavik proposal. Despite the

fact that betkr elements both in his administration and outside had

been very critical of him,«I indicated that it was important for the
Soviets to understand the very difficult personal political position
the President was in at the present time, that “the immediate circum-
stances he was almost paralyzed? and that I hope that the Russian

side could be patient given that understanding. Velikov said they
understood that very well, that they had not given up hope and that
they would continue to press constructive proposals at whatever

time seemed to be propitious. I indicated that there was one con-
crete step that would have very large symbolic importance as a #xnEEk
earnest of Russian intentions in this areal and—E-said that would be
the removal of decr@ption on their telemetry in missile testing.

ry

His response was, well, do you really think that's very important? I

ar

said he obviously thoroughly grasped what I was driving at, that ,f
symbolic importance was much greater than its technical one (in
terms of the impediment that it offered to verification) but that
one should not sskxmakz underestimate the symbolic importance that
was attached tp this Soviet denial of information pertinent to the
verification of their tests. He replied that this was something
that they had given some thought to; but that he would take the
emphasis in my remarks under further advisement.

The main mission once again was the World Laboratory Foundation.
The other guests seemed to be impressed that “this was a matter worthy
of further discussion although obviously would have to be looked at
very critically in terms of the details of its management and adminis-~
tration. I asked Velikov whether he would be taking any further part

er

in the CISAC committee meetings and he said in Moscow yes but he would
é

oe u
not be able to do so in Washington.

 

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