Memo

Subject:  Anthrax Epidemic in Sverdlovsk 1979, and Soviet Compliance
          with the BW Disarmament Convention

     The Biological Weapons (BW) Disarmament Convention went into
force in 1972.  Since that time a number of incidents have raised
questions about Soviet compliance.  One of the principal incidents
that has hindered confidence in this respect was an outbreak of
anthrax which occurred in March 1979 in Sverdlovsk, USSR.  According
to emigre reports the outbreak stemmed from an accident in a 
military facility doing illegal work on BW.  By their account an
airborne plume of anthrax spores caused a widespread epidemic of
pulmonary anthrax among military and civilian personnel in
Sverdlovsk.  Until recently, despite numerous demarches by the
United States Government, the Soviets have refused to discuss this
incident in any detail, claiming that it was a public health matter
of purely internal concern and therefore out of the purview of the
obligations for consultation under the BW Convention. The Sverdlovsk
incident, and especially the Soviet refusal to consult about it,
has remained high on the list of alleged treaty violations on the
part of the Soviet Union and has figured in several policy statements
by senior US officials.

     The same subject has been on the agenda of the National
Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms
Control (CISAC) for a number of its recent sessions.  This committee
meets jointly with peers from the Soviet Academy of Sciences.  
During the past 18 months there has been an apparent increase in
flexibility on the Soviet part and they had agreed sometime ago to
convene a meeting in Moscow.  This was held October 8th through
10th 1986; by design experts were available for further discussion.

     The Sverdlovsk epidemic also was briefed by Dr. Antonov at
the BW Convention Review Conference held in Geneva the latter part
of September.  Finally the Soviets invited Dr. Matthew Meselson
of Harvard University, to visit Moscow for three days at the end
of August, and provide him a very detailed briefing on their
version of the 1979 epidemic.  These moves seem to be related to
1) a general amelioration of Soviet policy on the release of 
information about catastrophic events: a policy that was tested
and in due course complied with after the Chernobyl tragedy.
2) the looming review conference on BW and concurrent talks on
CW arms control.

     Attached herewith are some documents pertaining to the 1979
Sverdlovsk event as portrayed by Soviet sources, and my personal
comment on them based on our CISAC visit to Moscow in October.
They now detail that epidemic as intestinal anthrax, attributed
to the distribution of contaminated beef.  Many cattle were fed
a bone meal supplement that had been improperly sterilized and
had been produced from naturally infected carcasses.  Anthrax
is known to be endemic (or rather enzootic) in the northern Soviet
Union and has been a low level but recurrent problem among cattle
and other livestock.  Sporadic cases of cutaneous and intestinal
anthrax have been reported over many years from the Soviet Union.
The 1979 outbreak is by far the largest and most vicious epidemic
so far recorded.  The scope of the epidemic is attributed to the
fact that there was a primary focus of many infected cattle and
the illegal distribution of beef from these carcasses without
proper veterinary supervision.

     My personal conclusion from that evidence, taking account of
other evidence from US sources, is that the present Soviet account
of the epidemic is plausible on its face and internally consistent.
The contrary testimony of the emigres is for the most part hearsay.
While it may be given in good faith it can hardly be said to be
grounded on a professional understanding  of the different forms
of anthrax.  Wild rumors do spread around every epidemic; and this
one conjoined with the widely held belief that the military 
contonment No. 19 is a BW development or production facility.  
Remaining evidence that would link the epidemic to an accident in
the facility is quite thin and subject to arguable interpretations
and may have other explanations.  The current Soviet account is
very likely to be true; and at the very least the evidence that
they have presented gravely impairs the credibility of a portrayal
of the epidemic as directly related to illegal activity in 
Sverdlovsk.

     The latter remains the central question: US concerns that the
USSR continues to do secret military work on BW are not alleviated
in any way by removing the epidemic per se from the list of
allegations.  I believe that it would be in the interest of the
credibility of our arms control initiatives for the US to 
continue to press for satisfaction on the primary issue, but no
longer to insist that the epidemic is important evidence for such
violations.

     It would be possible to pursue the veracity of their account
of the epidemic by raising further questions with their Ministry
of Public Health.  It is unlikely however that any amount of 
evidence they are likely to provide will induce a public reversal
on the part of people here who have taken strong positions.  Hence,
it may or may not be worthwhile to spend much capital in that
pursuit.  This discussion of the epidemic does distract from the
central issue as to the nature of the secret facilities that we
have questioned.

     One other topic of discussion of the CISAC group was a 
proposal to strengthen US-USSR scientific cooperation and exchanges,
in the biomedical areas most germane to BW and the enforcement of
the BW Convention.  I would urge the most sympathetic consideration
be given to these initiatives.  They provide the most likely
avenue for both sides to have an accurate and uninflamed estimate
of the continued work in biomedical research in each country.
I have no doubt that the overwhelming majority of biomedical 
scientists in the USSR, as in the US, abhor the very concept of
biological warfare.  If given any opportunity and encouragement
they would weigh in favor of compliance with, and strengthening
of, the BW Disarmament Convention.