NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL
2101 Constitution Avenue Washington, D.C. 20418

February 12, 1990

TO: Yuri Shiyan
FROM: Lynn Rusten A
SUBJECT: Next BW Meeting

I spoke with Dr. Lederberg this morning about our plans for the next BW
working groups’ meeting in the US. As you know, we are working to arrange a
site visit to the Swiftwater facility of the Salk Institute where vaccines are
produced for the US BW defense research program. We hope to invite the Soviet
delegation for a meeting probably in late June or July, but are not yet able
to suggest specific dates. We hope to make a concrete proposal sometime in
April.

Regarding the agenda, we expect to continue discussions on many of the
items discussed at our last meeting in Moscow. In fact, we are still waiting
for: 1) Dr. Abarenkov’s thoughts on BW-related export controls; and 2)
additional thoughts your side has on the problem of how to categorize and
where to set quantitative limits on potential BW agents to specifiy allowed or
forbidden levels of research and development. As you recall, your side
promised to send these items to us by FAX. We do appreciate your sending us
Dr. ,Prozorovskiy’s remarks on mutual information and Dr. Rayevskiy’s comments
on Dr. Shelokov'’s paper about inspections.

In addition to continuing our discussion of these items, we would like
to further discuss the issue of civilian scientific surveillance of the
military medical programs in each country. We would also like to discuss in
greater depth the problem of whether it is possible to design export controls
which would help inhibit proliferation of BW agents and associated technology
without unduly impeding legitimate scientific and even commercial activities.

These are just some very preliminary thoughts on the agenda. We welcome
your suggestions also. We hope to be in touch after a month or so to invite
you for specific dates and elaborate our ideas for the agenda. In the
meantime, I would appreciate it if you could tell me the FAX number for Dr.
Ivanov's institute. If Dr. Ivanov is eager to pursue these matters, I am sure
Dr. Lederberg would be pleased to hear from him directly.
Senator Herb Kohl
August 10, 1989
-2?-

realistic cases that could be envisaged, including
individual homicide, terrorism, and military acts
in violation of the BWC. Terrorist acts could
after all be directed at individuals or small
numbers of individuals, not necessarily acts of
"mass destruction". There are many other loose
ends in the Convention but I urge you not to try
to address them in legislation: they are already
troublesome in international discussion, like the
definition of "toxins". These are better coordinated
with chemical weapons and their control.

As to the seizure and destruction of dangerous
material, that ought to be embraced under existing
law as (a) material evidence (b) environmental
safety and (c) interstate transport and export of
dangerous material.

Yours sincerely,

shua Lederberg