-27-

Panofsky said the forthcoming American Physical Society report on
SDI technology would be useful. Keeny said his organization, the
Arms Control Association, was dedicated to public education by means
of educating the media who report on these issues.

Panofsky said it was time to discuss the last agenda item -
chemical and biological weapons - and asked Lederberg to make some
opening remarks. Lederberg said there were changing developments in
the BW and CW fields that made it even more important to raise these
issues. He cited specifically the issues of compliance and new
complications raised by advances in technology - binary technology
for chemical weapons and biotechnology for biological weapons. He
said these weapons would become more significant in a world with
fewer nuclear weapons.

Lederberg said chemical weapons were awesome tactical weapons
which played an important role in WWI. He said biological weapons
had not been tested in that way, but that they made entire
populations vulnerable, much the way nuclear weapons did. Chemical,
unlike biological, weapons do not miltiply and are regulated by the
Geneva protocol, essentially a no-first-use treaty. He noted ongoing
efforts in the Committee on Disarmament to extend restrictions to
chemical weapons, but that there were problems of definition and the
fundamental issue of the dual uses of chemicals. Lederberg said
there were problems of verification, which would affect the entire
Chemical industry, and that there were proposals for on-site
inspections and challenge inspections. He noted that Keeny had been
involved in the prior negotiating history.

Lederberg said the main military threat posed by CW was that of
an adjunct to reduce the tactical efficiency of troops, or to add to
high explosive loads to decrease ability to repair damage, as to
airfields. Lederberg said the U.S. used to neglect Cw defense, but
that the problem was now at least half solved. He said that in view
of deteriorating stockpiles, the U.S. was modernizing with binaries
as a successor. He said one condition of this modernization was not
to have full deployment, but that the ability to have a short lead
time was an advantage. He said the Soviets had invested heavily in
protective personnel systems.

Calogero said there needed to be greater concern about the
proliferation problem, and that the Iraq situation might be a strong
inducement to make progress toward a ban. Lederberg said the West
had embargoed chemicals and equipment to the Middle East, but that
the West Europeans had continued to export chemical intermediaries.
He warned they could end up back on Western soil in the form of
terrorist attacks.

Mason agreed with Lederberg on the assymmetry between NATO and
the WIO in CW delivery systems and stockpiles. He said the only
credible U.S. system was the 155 mm. shell, and eventually, the Big
Eye, while the Soviet Union had several credible systems, and that
-28-

this could lead to chemical weapons use in close battle. Mason said
it was hard to believe the Soviets could gain substantial advantage
in close battles, that the chemical weapons would have to be deployed
in significant amounts and that meant that the level of meaningful
cheating on the tactical level was high. As to interdiction, Mason
said 500 agent tons on 200 targets could interrupt capabilities, and
that this put significant pressure on verification. He said
verification would have to focus not just on stockpiles, but also on
delivery vehicles, which represented a more robust set of
observables.

In answer to a question from Haftendorn, Lederberg explained that
binary technology complicated the verification problem because there
were fewer signatures than for the storage of dangerous unitaries.

He said the compounds produced, and their effects, were identical.

Doty said at the CW Treaty negotiations in Geneva movement toward
agreement had advanced and that 90% of the text was agreed upon. He
said the main problem was posed by the verification of undeclared
stocks and of production facilities. He said the problem was that
serious verification of the entire Soviet Union was unlikely and
unaffordable. He said the administration may try to push this treaty
through as a symbolic step toward the verification of undeclared
stocks. He said that while total control was not possible, there was
an advantage to be gained by a treaty that was not insignificant. He
added that the Reagan-Kohl deal on chemical weapons in Germany might
be the neutron bomb decision revisited.

Keeny asked how serious was the CW threat. Lederberg responded
that its major danger was as a force multiplier and as an added
complication. Calogero added the threat of proliferation as the
greatest danger. Doty said this was under discussion in NATO, and
they were thinking along the lines of the nuclear suppliers group or
something less restrictive. Lederberg said there may be a coupling
of non-proliferation with the U.S. withdrawal of chemical weapons
from Germany.

Flax recalled that in the early 1960's, NATO emphasized chemical
weapons, which at that time were seen as a more acceptable
alternative to nuclear weapons, but that point of view did not last
long. He said that Soviet Military Power says that many Soviet
weapons systems are capable of being equipped to carry chemical
weapons. Flax said, however, that the Soviets were worried about
proliferation, and that this motivated them. He said this was a
difficult problem deserving of international attention. He predicted
it would be hard to write a strict treaty, and that it would require
an SCC-like mechanism.

Steinbruner said that while the Soviets displayed a large
chemical weapons defensive capability, their offensive capability was
not known. Flax agreed, although he said some chemical weapons do
seem to be available for a wide range of Soviet delivery systems.
-29-

Lederberg said the Soviet incentive for a CW ban was the
knowledge that a CW race with the U.S. would not give them any
advantage. He agreed that defining the boundaries of what was
forbidden was difficult, and that the Soviets could feel that if they
changed their mind, it would be easy to get out of it later.
Lederberg said he would be skeptical if a treaty were signed. He
said we should agree to destroy quantities, not percentages, and that
it should be a treaty that declared residuals with some inspections
to verify the declarations.

Schell asked how chemical weapons could be used defensively.
Lederberg said chemical mines could protect a border, for instance,
but that he was not so sure that an arms control regime could be
built on this distinction.

Mason said any agreement would be multilateral, and that this was
important for proliferation. He said we should keep trying for a
negotiated abolition of an entire class of weapons, which he said
would be a magnificent achievement for arms control. Lederberg said
this could not be done because of the dual capability problem--the
class was not that well defined.

Garwin said if there were not training in the use of and defense
against CW, then there could be no use. Mason disagreed, saying
research and training in CW defense was necessary as insurance.
Mason noted this was a sticking point in Geneva.

Lederberg said a few words about biological weapons, which he
said posed a serious threat to all people, not just the combatants.
He said as an overhanging anxiety it also contaminates other efforts
at world order.

Lederberg said the BW convention, signed in 1972, was a useful
partial step towards controlling biological and toxin weapons,
notwithstanding its well-understood limitations with respect to a)
verification/campliance, b) enforcement, and c) its inability to deal
with weapons-related R & D (as opposed to production and
deployment). He said intrinsic to its utility was an expectation
that it would foster a climate of mutually advantageous, cooperative
verification and enforcement, meeting the deeper interests of all
sides.

Lederberg said the convention has undoubtedly been helpful in
forestalling a major technology race in BW, compared e.g. to recent
history in cruise missiles. However, the limitations of the
convention perhaps now contribute to other elements of international
competition. He said the result today is a high degree of
ummitigated suspicion about actions and intentions of 'the other ©
sides,' with grave consequences for 1) the credibility of arms
control agreements generally--especially those not manifestly
verifiable by the grossest of national means; and 2) the potentiality
for fueling a major technology race between the superpowers, within
the letter if not the spirit of the 1972 BW convention. Lederberg
-30—

said that since agents could be manufactured in plants primarily
designed for medical or industrial purposes, and since we have the
prospect of still newer and more effective weapons-agents from
biotechnology, anxieties about a threatening "breakout! in violation
of the 1972 convention further poison international harmony.

Lederberg said that international security was more likely to be
threatened by the proliferation of BW capability to less responsible
powers; the nuclear superpowers have a marginal need, at most, for BW
atop their nuclear retaliatory capability. He said the possibility
of regulating that proliferation is gravely impaired by the current
lack of cooperation in the enforcement of the BW convention. The
irresponsibility just mentioned is aggravated by the likelihood that
biological weapons will spread infection from the targets under
attack, with potentially unlimited collateral damage, even
retroaction.

Lederberg said it would not be easy to design formal procedures
for a more cooperative approach: the minimm that should be sought
promptly is to enhance forums for candid discussion where questions
can be raised and pressed on matters that elicit anxieties about
compliance with the purposes of the BW convention. The still
unanswered questions about the "Sverdlovsk case" are an example. The
"answers" offered in print about the "foodborne epidemic of
intestinal anthrax" at Sverdlovsk were so lacking in detail, they did
not meet the minimm standards of a scientific or public health
report.

Lederberg said in the long run, mutual confidence about the
intentions and capabilities of BW-related research can be built up by
more extensive international cooperation in the study of infectious
disease. All responsible states will also have to be proactive in
their reassurances to other states about their posture on BW and
compliance with the spirit of the BW disarmament convention. The
fabric of international control of BW development is tenuous indeed.

Lederberg concluded by noting that within the framework of the
bilateral U.S.-USSR Academies of Science - CISAC discussions, we were
organizing a subgroup of specialists to address the above challenges,
with particular emphasis on proliferation.

Lederberg said the Soviets saw the value of BW vis-a-vis China,
and that this could complicate BW arms control prospects.

Schell asked about terrorism and whether the technology needed to
safely use BW against an aggressor was fairly sophisticated.
Lederberg responded that if one side had a modern hospital, then it
had that capability.
-31-

Zuckerman said he thought the U.K. and the U.S. conducted BW
research in WII, but that the Soviets did not. Flax said there was
an ambiguity in the treaty because it allowed research on defensive
measures, and that it was hard to make the distinction between
research for offense and research for defense.

In answer to a question about how one calculates the effects of a
BW attack, Lederberg said this was hard, and was one reason why
biological weapons have not been used.

Panofsky adjourned the discussion for the day. The final session
resumed at 9:00 a.m. on Monday, June 30. Panofsky first reviewed the
substantive discussion of the previous day.

Panofsky summarized Zuckerman's presentation on the balance of
forces in Europe, which questioned the relevance of the question of
the balance of forces given the unpredictability of the outcome of
conflict. Panofsky reviewed the following points made by Zuckerman:
that the introduction of nuclear weapons into Europe occurred before
NATO was formed; that they had no military utility in terms of actual
use; and that the INF deployments reflected a political, rather than
military, rationale. Panofsky review Doty's main points and those
that emerged from the discussion on the same agenda item: that there
was a great difficulty in predicting the outcome of conflict; that
the Kaufmann estimate of 25% chance of holding back a WIO incursion
for one month might be enough for deterrence; that the introduction
of new technologies into Europe represented a mixed blessing; that
NATO may be overly reliant on high technology and may be fueling a
race in this area; that the new technology appears to threaten
preemption; that surveillance from a large distance was vulnerable to
countermeasures; that rapid pace of modernization may be artificially
shortening the life spans of weapons and therefore unnecessarily
costly; that the SDI program did not address the defense of Europe
against ATEM and that Europeans did not see a way to afford ATEM.

On the INF discussions, Panofsky reviewed the paradox that
emerged regarding linkage to strategic arms control, particularly in
regard to the British position. He said the discussion revealed that
there had been some disengagement of nuclear forces in Europe,
despite some recent reversals. Finally, Panofsky said there was a
concensus that deliberate nuclear confrontation in Europe was
unlikely, and that inadvertent nuclear war was the main danger,
emphasizing the need for greater study of crisis management.

Summarizing the deep cuts discussion, Panofsky said there was
note of the common goal of 50% reductions, but that the two
superpowers never appeared serious about this goal at the same time.
Panofsky reviewed the discussion of the rationale for deep cuts, ©
which included: a moral imperative to go down instead of up; positive
impact on the political environment; non-proliferation treaty
commitment to do so; and decreased inclination to use nuclear weapons