THE ROCKEFELLER UNIVERSITY

1230 YORK AVENUE * NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10021-6399

oe Mos L486,

I realize how busy you have been during these past few weeks
in the mobilization of medical response to the Chernobyl tragedy.
I presume you are also preoccupied with the planning for the followup
studies needed te assure the best medical support for the more chronic
conseguences, and to extract the best scientific information from the
incident. May I also express what so many of cur colleagues share in
sumpathy fer tne pecplie who sre suffering from the accicent, many sf
them plainiy in consequence of their heroic efforts te contain it.

 

Dear Dr. Bochkav:

For the above reasons, I have waited briefly before writing
to you about plans for the discussions on BW at the occasion of the
CISAC meeting in Moscow this fall. We are all very pleased that this
initiative can go forward, and I hepe you will be personally involved.

The NAS office in Washington has cabled to Dr. Saqdeev asking
whether the meeting of medical specialists can pe held immediately
before the CISAC, namely on 27-28 September (Saturday-Sunday), which
we would prefer to 25-26. The later date would give me a better
opportunity to stay over for the full CISAC; and it would make it
possible for Paul Marks and Alex Rich to be part of our group.

Do you have any idea as yet who will represent your side? it
would obviously be advantageous to begin some correspondence to tru to
erganize our program in advance of the meeting. Also, if there are
specialized skills or kinds ef information that should be more fully
emphasized in the composition of the group, I would be happy to have
your suggestions.

My criteria have included a) people especially interested in
the containment of BW proliferation: b) people experienced in
infectious disease from either an experimental or a public health
standpoint: cc) pecple who have some knowledge af the past history of
US BW programs, prior to the disarmament convention, and perhaps of

contemporary research related to BW, but legaliy permitted under

the treaty: d) people conversant with biotechnology research and its
peaceful applications Cthese are clouded by the threat of diversion to
military purposes]; e) people who have some credibility with our own
policy-makers. BW has not been a high-priority target of scientific
or policy concern during the last decade; so in a short time I have not
necessarily been able to identify all of the most appropriate
candidates, but will be working further on this during the next few
months.

If our discussions can result in a level of candor and mutuel
confidence so that we understand our respective positions, comparable ta
what has been achieved in large measure for strategic weapons, I
believe that will be a positive step with important ramifications far
the integrity of medical research, and for the hopes of peace

[ptien Taclactong