CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT COD/312 27 iugust 1970 Original: ENGLISH UnTTeD STATES This is the first occasion at which I have been invited to attend a meeting of this kind. It is also a twenty-fourth. anniversary of another occasicn when I was a young medical student attending my first scientific conference. This was an international meeting at Cold Spring Harbor, near New York, and it could be truly labelled as the birthdate of a new scientific field, the genetics of bacteria and of. Le} viruses. My first published work was presented at that meeting and it concerned the discovery,. contrary to decades of previous supposition to the contrary, that bacteria were indeed-possessed of a mechanism like sexval reproduction wnich made it possible to crossbreed different bacterial strains. These observations, together with related ones by mary other colleagues have gone into the emergence of the most powerful of new methods and insights in experimental biology, going generally under the name of molecular biology. rom the very beginning it was inescapable to me that these new approaches for the understanding end manipulation of livins organisms had po*sntial implications for human pregress.of very great significance. On the one hand molecular biology could increase man's knowledge about himself and lead to revolutionary changes in medicine in such fields as cancer, aging. congenitel disease, end virus infections. It might also play a vital role in industry and in agriculture. On the other side it might be exploited for military purposes and eventuate in a biological weapons race whose aim could well become the most efficient means for removing men from the planet. 4s a student of evolution, and having studied it in the microcosmos with bacterial O ultures, I knew that man had no guaranteed place on our earth, -He has faced and continues to face natural disasters like the infestations that have wiped out the fmerican chestnut and the Europesn grapevine. To these long-standing threats would now be edded new ones, potentiaily of our ow invention. Gt .70-18912 CCD/312 page 2 These past twenty-five years, in the corso of which the world community has eached a certain degree of familiarity witu the problems of nuclear power, and has undertaken some of the steps needed to contain it as eae servant for rather than ageinst human aims, have seen a sustained, remarkable development of molecular biology. For example, Professor Gobind Khorans recently reported the synthetic assembly of a small gene through chemical operations on DNA components. It will be a step of another order of magnitude to extend this technical capability to the synthesis of small viruses, but this surely will be accomplished within the next decade. This procedure will allow an wnlimited range of experimental variations of the genetic structure of different viruses, a process which has many important potential applications for human health. It also offers us the prospect of engineering the design of viruses to exquisite detail. Accomplishments Vike Khorenata have been possible in a small laboratory on an annual reseateh budget wunich is miniscule compared to weapons hardware. A serious military iuvestment in this srea could be expected to outstrip this already breathtaking pace of advance by many fold. I covld mention many other intriguing scientific advances from my own work and that of others, end fear only that my enthusiasm in discussing these details might outrun your patience in hearing about them. I will be glad to engage later in 4 4 | informal discussions on any aspect of molecular biology thet may be of interest to you. 83 I will just mention the discoveries of three methods of modifying the genetic structure of microbes: (1) cross-breeding them throug’ what is, essentially, sexual reproduction; (2) inserting new genes carried by a virus, a process called "transduction", and (3) direct manipulation of DNA as a chemical substance, and reintroducing this into microbial cells. I deeply appreciate the gravity and importance of the work of this Cormittes. Its principal significance is, of course, for the security of all the people of the vorld; and to that it is only a small addition to mention my own morel pre-occupation with whether my own career will have been labelled a blessing or a curse to the humanity from which I spring. This comment may have more force if I offer it as not only = personal testimony but as typical of the dilemma that faces my entire generation of biological research scientists and our younger students at this very moment. I am therefore many times indebted to you not only for your present labours but elso for ef . + having offersd me the privilege of e more personal participation in a process thet mey a yet result in "civiliazing" this branch oF science. For many years Bil has been given only incidental attention as a subject of diplomatic discussion; for it seemed to have little bearing on the sdjustments of power that were the main work of specialists in foreign affairs. However, By does have something to do with efforts to reduce the barbarity of warfare. 5B stands epart from all other devices in the actual threat that it poses to the health anda life~exoectancy of every human being whether or not he is politically involved in belligerent actions. In a word, the intentional release of an infectious particle, be it 4a virus or ba acteriun, from the confines of the laboratory or cf medical practice must be condemned as an irresponsible threat against the whole human community. Qu te The Black Death, the great bubonic olague that ravaged Europe in the mid-14th century is in fact a well docimented historic example of just this process. The plazue 2 ct first entered Europe in 1346 via the sailors, rats, and fleas on the ships that returned to Genoa after having been expelled from Theodosia in the Crimea where the attacking Tartars hed catapulted some of their corpses into the Genoese fortifications. This plague which reduced the population of Europe by at least one-third, would of course, almost surely have made its way West sooner or later, the nature of the disease being quite beyond the comprehension of the medical science of that ere. Tne Bleck Death in Surope was only one of many visitations of the plague suffered a Qu oO D Oo ct a o = gS 5 ca 3 ad ry F + n oO ry oO i} Q Eg uu f < oO oD oO D 5 n [o) by Kurope during the last 2000 years, W much more disastrous than meny otners. The prosress cr a disease in any given individual is subject to many fectors of whicn only a few are well understcod. + lerge epidemic, involving millions of people spread over time and space, is an immensely more complicated phenomenon about which it is very difficult to make very grave cotentisl hazard with 6, high degree of unpredictability is a pecuilar attribute of biological weaponry at its present stage of develocment. This has 2 great deal to do with the rational dectrine that sc far hes placed a relatively low value on its military utility. present situation tnus mignt orovide the mest fevoursble opportunity for am) By international action to regulate the further development and proliferation of Bh prosnects. Until new no nation appears to nave staked ivs security to amy sisnificant We volt uncil BY has ceen develcoed into 2 relicole ermement Tor use under a range of military doctrine, we must all fear that it could then te toc late to disengage important powers from their commitment to it. Coby 522 Iv I may retvrn to the Black Death, tye cin barriers that may today keep niague from being a great threat in civilized countries are: (1) understanding f£ quarantine, (2) the suppression of rats and fleas by general urban , esnecially antibiotics, to control the 4 j 9° uyedene, and (3) the use of modern there one of these co py yarriers could be breached by further technical develownents if 2 substantial effort were to be applied during the next decade to naling ths placuc bacillus into ea wea o: nealing the plague bacillus into a wea,on. Other infectious agents might be even more adapteble. Some of man's deadliest suonies are viruses which, like yellow fever, are transmitted by mosquitos or other as, These have the advantaze, from a military standpoint, that they mey not a notentially retroactive epidemic in arezs vhere the vector insect does not normally abound. It is already evident that sucl: insect-borne viruses could be a wonited in the : ey first instance by direct aerinl dissemination, with little or no urther spread from the first weve of infected targets. Recent re ports of airborne ob ogeunonic rabies, a terrible disease, which as you know is normelly spread by the bits oP en infected dog or other animal, iliustrate this possibilivy. There is then bbe danger that, if a large nucleus of people is attacked in this wey, further eyoliblon of the virus will occur to give rise to a nev form of the disease that does to person, contrary to the calculations of the attacker. The underwent a similer evolution from the original bionic flea-borne of the far more contagious pneumonic variety. neve learned in recent years that viruses undergo constant evolution in their mutetions within a given strain, but also oy the natural nat eee appear to be only renotely related to n our body cells of which i ich nay be larmless -- though they may eventually eevis tho formation of e tumor, or of brain degeneration, or of other diseases. At isact in the leboretory, however, we can show that such latent viruses can still + cLogeeLeced with other viruses to give rise to many new forms. ity grevest concern is thet similar scientific breakthroughs of e rather predicoeble kind willl be made snd their potentiel military significance exploited, so <5 to result in 2 transformation of current doctrine scout ‘unreliable’ biological wpooons. se ere ell familiar with the process o1 mutual escalation in which the a forss of one side inevitably contribute vo further technical developmen on the other and vice versa. The mere existence of such a contest »roduces a mutual ion of effort; moreover, there is no practicel system of counter-intelligence i protect secret work for an indefinite period of time from becoming xnoim to others. And the potentiel undoubtedly exists for the design and develooment of infective agents egainst which no credible defencs is possible, through the genevic and chemical manipulation of these agents. It is thus clear to me that if vu do something about this possibility, work will go forwerd and my fears will become realities. 5 oO 5 a oO ow a go fe, bh He n = m 3 5 he py oO 5 Qs oO Ki + Dp to ct Permit me, now, to ask a rhetorical questio will, in effect, protect "you", es representatives of the global community, from the - vences to which my own peers and myself have dedicated sa subversion of the scientific ad their careers. iowish I could be sure that such a remark vould always be received with an understanding of the ironic soirit with which it is uttered. I do not heve to tell ) 1 f you of the worldwide attack on science, the flicht from reason that has tempte on ep} O many young people and makes so many dilemmas for those of us in university life. onal revolt has probably had its worst impact in countries whicn neve @ 5 @ BH 3 ct be @ Oo £ cy rod o St Oo c iS am o s o ny already achieved a degree of affluence, but it is eroding the moral i in those countries whose economic future most Cepends on their development of a high level of technical and scientific skill. ‘het the youth see as the perversion of lmovledge is, I believe, an important aspect of their repudiation of us. Among the undergraduates at my oun university, there is no prospect more disheartening then the idea that even health research is subject to exploitatior in the most inhumene sted thet the control of biological warfars be given 2 svecial vlace in internationecl and national initiatives for reasons 1 nave mentioned. ( savowed offensive biologicel warfere development has made it possibie for ne eddress these issues in terms fully consistent with the wolicy of the government of my own country. As you know, soon after President Nixon's announcement it became epparent that em of toxins had been Lert by biologists, are chemical substances, usually (but not always) proteins of moaesv 7 7 + 7 > < + 4-4 3 4 % i att Tatr a2s moleculer size which are by-products of bacterial growth and which me; play a lesser oe . . . . wnt at fa te gd ta or greater role in the disease manifestations of a bacterial infection. Cee CCD/312 page 6 For present purposes we mignt think of a toxin as a chemical substance which would be unknown tc science exceot for its association with microbiel growsh and one which has an extreordinarily high lethality per unit weight. Meny toxins er? nerve poisons, resembling the nerve gnses in their effect on the body, but far more potent. , s a For example, the lethal dose of botulinus toxin is about one millionth or a gram. uo ¢ This means that one could eesily carry in a despatch case a quantity of toxin sufficient to wine out the human population, although the image would imply that the human herd uonld Tine up for the slaughter. The very high potency of such toxins is certainly a fecsor in their military potenbiel but may even be owbweighed by other considerations, like the vossibility of specific immunization of an aggressor force or population. Even after agreoment to eliminate biological weapons, we Willi still remain very vulnerable to a form of biologies? varfare which is beyond the reach of any covenant s the warfere practised upon us by nature, tne unren Litting fs that we cen make. This J barrage of infection by old and by new agents that still constitute a very large part of the perils to normal and healthy life. L +. tle have all had vexing, perhaps even tragic, personal experiences with virus infections. You will all recall the global epidemic of influenza that was first identified in Hong Kong about three years ago. This vas not 2 particularly severe form of the virus and its eventual mortality was probably only in the tens of thousands. It is wrong, however, to believe that there is any assurence that. the next epidemic of this kind wilt be es mid; end we have still developed only the most feeble and precarious protection against this threat whose impact is shared by all the nations, but against which very little common defence hes been erected. You will also recall having read from time to time about small outbresks of mysterious new diseases like "Lassa fever" and the "HMerbug virus". These were both extremely dangerous threats; and while much credit must be given to the diligence of the medical people whe dealt with the outbrecks, a large elenent of pure luck was involved in localizing these incidents. “We must expect that there are muny additional viruses already indigenous to primete and human populations in primitive ereas and to which the inhabitants of advanced countries sre extremely vulnerable, Yellow fever is a historicelly imoortant Cisease which now belongs in the same category. It is now maintained on earth meinly throush an enimal reservoir c . infection, in the monkeys in tropical jungies. Urben populetions are nov protected H Fr oO md a! Do 4 kt o y a) @o a Oo 5 a a 0 re) 3 re} ret oe co 5 oO cl oO ¢ o Oo fe [ue na o c C a \- o