26
within the Society that assures that they meet the qualifications that
you have in mind. Those people will get on the advisory committee who
are interested in biological warfare for other reasons and who are
regarded as safe and clearable. That is about the only criterion they
satisfy. If the Service feels that it has achieved a great service fron the
Society in validating the most appropriate experts by the fact of their
membership on this advisory committee, I think they are under a great
delusion, z! nt think they know how a society operates when that is
the case,
Gen, Rothschild:
Of course there is always # an agreement on this if the Society proposes
somebody, Detrick in this case or the Research and Plevelopment demand that
higher
a fixkax agency approve them.
Dr. Lederberg:
Of course. But the Society doesn't propose anybody in a case of this
sort. An officer of the Society does and using the Society to identify
who some prominent microbiologists are, Rather than involve the membership
of the Society in an issue about which they can't know very much why not
just go after these people. You can get the list of officers of the ASM
and if that's the criterion of excellence in microbiology and sometimes

it isnkk and sometimes it isn't, but that information is public too. Nobody

is keeping it a secret from the Army.

Question from the audience:
“Dr. Moukde a -

Q; I wonder if I could ask Professor Lederberg had you thought specifically
what sort of biological catastrophe might result from uncontrolled research
on biological warfare? ~

Dr. Lederberg:
aq

Dr. Lederberg:
I satd-that was an extrapolation from the exapple I gave on dengue.

They are nostly in thet line, namely that agents will be widely disseminated
for offensive purposes on the basis of what will necessarily be a very
inadequate level of testing on security grounds and that even 10 or 100 or
even 1000 people subjected to dengue virus undr one set of conditions
may be a very inappropriate hasis to predict what will happen whenmush
more masSive populations are exposed under differemt conditions. One
thing I should have stressed more clearly because it is in the back of my
mind in all of this is that we don't know when the species is going to be
subjected to another risk of decimation analogous to the black plague,
-analogous to the influenza pandemics and do on, There is not anyone who
hasw#t_2 prophetic foresight to kn@p when by the natural processes of
the evolution of pahtogenic microbes agents of this sort are going to
come along. One reason that I had some sympathy for the cettain activities
in the field of biological warfare is that if public health can't justify
the funds maybe the military security can to go after the methods xke of
detection and kk even the methods of large scale defense against the
threat which in this case will have been from natural rather than artificiaal
DOUALLD
forces. That is also a reason I would like to see that made more public
so that it could be made more ppt for this purpose. It seems to me that
the surest way in which to bring about the development of a deciminating
pandemic is the selection of agents that have a marginal degree of incapacitation

Vals
but are infective and highly durable in the atmosphere in order to meet
the other requirements of military security. Theye there will be an enormous
difference between trying it out and in an experimental basis on the few tens
or a few thousands of individuals and leaving it out in nature sabject to

oR

recombination and mutation on a very, large scale on an offensive basis,

That is The hazard that I am concerned about,
28

Question: Ya. Wioutder 7

I was thinking about Gen. Robhschild's

 

What do we know about urtuck hopper even whan | known lection Roert
spread to a given locality. can we really start a pandemic with a known
agent by spreading it over a known small locality.
Dr. Lederberg:

You've got starting a huge focus is what you're saying.
Questions Da. Meuddor

Yes, And can we reproduce “the {uw Litt \prcun Ue Lok
| ok

That is can we take an agent and tailor a model agent that we can put,one

point source and spread all ofer the world. That is what the pandemic flu
Loos ‘?
warn devo codine it and will we be able to make a new agent

 

Once we put it out in any one place we no longer have it under control.
I don't think We can answer that on any conceivable experminetal basis.
Dr. Rothschild:

I might mention one thing that you probably all familiar with. An

oh, Cowrg

epidemic is ,the result of a very complex set of circumstances that I don't
think any one can plan on reproducing. So none of our military thinking
in this field would ever plan on starting an epidemic. I would venture to
say that the secondary effects, infections, froma primary biological attack
are militarity unimportant. In other words a material put on dust that
is picked up that people inhaled that W mertth ot is transmitted from
person to persn are militarily inimportant. Yousee, in thas case, you
must remember that no military agent including are just used indiscriminately.
We speak about small countries, for example, having the capability.
of using biological agents. Now to launch a sophisticated biological attack
takes one whale of a lot of research and development .

Dr. Lederberg:
lave Deve
Which we will regret- over the next ten years and over the next 20 years
29
given over.
Dr. Rothschild:

Yes, except for details 6f actual munitions and so on. What Xke a
small country could through relatively inefficient ways grow sufficient
material and disseminated through fairly curde techniques practically
modify commercial techniques for putting out various materials now in use,
could launch an attack which could have a fair amount of effectiveness
even though it isn't a very efficient one. So they could do this. But
they certainly would never do this against a large country because there
would be no mission, no purpose, no objective to the accomplishment, They
have got to have one or they are not going to expose themselves to the
possiblity, being found out and destroyed. Dr. Lederberg mentioned Egypt
in this respect. I don't know if I would put it beyond Egypt to Ste" such
an attack against Israel and take the iiitness after it is over. You know
nothing succeeds like success, Once you have wan then WX. people tall
about it. This is a possibility. As far as our own country is concerned

it would be
it is difficult to visualize something like this. For example, she very
simple for a nation to disseminate the stem rust of wheat down in the @uif
of Mexico, We periodically have attacks of stem rust of wheat that start
down in Mexico or in the Gulf area there and then on the winds move north.
Some of them do a great deal of damage. It would not be difficult to initiate
an epidemic of this sort. But with the dangers of being found out add

the dangers of what the results would be when we did find out, no small

country would do this. There must be a realistic military objective to

Owed o pt te malee Ryde okt “ re A,

Dr. Lederberg:
Well, let me pursue just that point because —-—<—-~ %

Dr. Rothschild:

May I go into it further. We wouldn't be starting an epidemic.
. 30

im health
What I would like to ask i$ your secondary effects, your public measures
cn control them even though that alot of people can get sick depending
on the agents you are using. It may be an incapacitating agent where the
damage isn't severe, But your public health measures can normally control
this. As you know a normal epidemic xxxuxnatix as you say starts from a
small focus, spreads out slowly, the flu epidemic of 1918 I think took
two years to get across the country. A military attack is quite different.
Exki If I wanted to attack a particular area I would hit that whole area
with organisms airbound that people would inhale and they would all became
ill, all those who were going to become ill who were going to become infected
and contract the disease, at the same time. Now you can see why this is an
effective military meapon. This means over the area I'm talking about
your doctorshecome ill in the same proportion as other people, your nurses,
your normal public health facilities, your transportation system poeple,
all of them. So it is not like an epidemic thatt slowly develops and people
drop out and somebody elde comes in and takes their job. This area is
pretty well knocked out. You can, for example, hit something like 10, 15 or
20% casulaities, casualties don't mean net deaths, of course, it means

hat of
people who are tin this case ill. So you really knowk’ out an area. So I

d

would like to ask the question, Dr. Lederberg brought tp the pandemic idea,
is there a danger of this sort of thing whith our present pokizx public
health measures in the world, of a pandemic do you think?
Dr. Lederberg:

Of course thereis, There is a danger that this will /alippen tommorrow

CUA AKU AG

with another infbuenza and I-den+t—think public health measures won't be
abd. to do anything about it.
Dr. rothschild:

If it way something like smallpox, we smash it right away because we
SAAT

can't treat smallpox..v4t we can do-is immunize people against it.
31

question= Dr. MoulLer

We howe op asidtec chinbera te
Spreading a pandemic may-have-power now, Spreading slowly night cllons the
ang ky Proborly

otk bus alone Anw tty of, Aprsak In Turkey and maybe Greeee now. Modern

At hid ehalen arpa, Now

Public health measures apparently +

a
the cntxor abe pattern of cholera.
A

   

not change&.

Dr .Rrothschild:

Is there enough effort begng made?

ne Dre Meulker
ees ae OW while one ck Re une Ano be . Sey the Lig” my
we Worl heetth vr hy Rou,

Dr. Lederberg:

Well it plainly isn't enough, it isn't all that is possible to do
from a technical standpoint. If we could develop that technical expertee
to control infectious disease, I might regard it as even worth paying
the cost of a biological warfare program at the same time. It is that
lack of balance that we don't have that kind of world public health at
a time when we are still playing with fire in these other directions.
“this is why I aggue not for stopping this kind of research and development
byt for publicising it. Because I think it will be a the very impact of
the more general realization of exactly what is goinjon, exactly what
techniques are abailable that will provoke more effort in these lines.
Dr. Douderoff: . _.
Ualeaticus ank .

I hear that we are attempting to develop mere etnas agents Led
against animals or humans and plants. This is where there is a real
anger, having arunaway pandemic of some port. I also read in the paper

othinte art. ro & yl

the other day about several Germans who handeled a monkey, and I don't ow

nokwas  touldict A
what happened but if we start a thing like that, If indeed we are
starting developméng by mutation and selection strains of microorganisms
that might give us a runaway like that. I don't know if we are doing this

fi

or not but } fue OP MEO Lu TW. ‘ .l can't see that this as a
32

public health measure when we try to develop a nore fethal agent,
Dr. Lederberg:

I would like to make a remark about it Mike because I do not have
priveleged information in this area, It is my belief kxhak based on
what I've seen and has been published that no very sophisticatelefforts
are now entrained inthe direction but some efforts are. Obviously efforts
to produce more pathogenic agents are in the works and you occasionally
hear reports on the genetics of Pe out of these laboratories and

~ to te pers mel Com akin,

soon. I am personally not deeply alarmed about the level of effort now going
on in this direction. I am concerned what wkx will happen if there is a
100 fofd escalation of effort in biological warfare. And this I'm afraid
is @énevitably in the cards if we keep going as we have been. Each of the
nations that might be involved in it is provoking the other, and it is that
level of activity hhen as I say a 100 fold increase in the effort to
produce more aggressive agents that might produce anyone of a large variety
of calculated effects is when I think we really are in the soup. It is
the anticipation of this vast expansion of this kind of suicidal effort
that I would like us to stop right now. Because I don't think we will be

able to stop it once we are committed that deeply to it.

jon le aon Weve nse we

 

Question! Ap
bo paacheal ee £4
I gather that the BW platform now Csi Yfieck and that art Aa bette
“2 Chia “} * i
‘ eo Low below tharct uty vac hu “ot Aawles dass bacthanr DRL LYLE: Kiree, €

Weer fans
It is cheaper probably too than certaink nuclear weapons. If we can do it phe; cwathin
whetarccthe conttarnts that aud pe pernted Us Lome
Limbleyere hig e Asst oO FUVUuD.

Dr. Rothschild:
It is very difficult to answer you question because it is a very

involved thing. As I say we can™t get enough discussion in our government.
C oe wt he AL

at feast we Could. wh acu Y wo we Ww bones yA PLLC poet,
Now bron telah Dak cuerthing S . Find eck
33

of these areas to arive at a rational decision as to whether we should
use them or not. It is all irrational. Now do yau ask how does this
come about. I think it comes about throughthe propaganda of WW I,
In WW I the Germans launched the first large scale gas attack. They
were not the first ones to use gas, the French were. But they launched
the first large scale gas attack using chlorine ae amis which
they released from cyllinders and they hit an area of 5000 meters wide
and maxke they did a lot of damage to particularly Canadian troops.
And if their Generals had any faith in the new weapons which generals
usually don't they would have had sufficient reserves behind that attack
and they could have gone right through to the Chanel. But they didn't
have any more faith than the allied generals. The reason I say that is
because the allied generals wer etold by intelligence repeatedly that this
attack was going to be launched. But they didn't believe a new weapon
could be used either so they were not prepared to defend themselves,
So here we were hit by a new weapmm type of warfare, and at that time
they had no defense against it except propaganda so they xkatxk started
the propaganda machines going. They talked about this horrible new

Qa wo
weapon and this inhumane, using Howe this 48-a pretty good deal, It
whipped up alot of war spirit. it was very effective. So by the time
we had protective measures, pretty crude but they worked, and by the time
the allies were using very effectively and widely, we had found out that
this propaganda was wonderful to whip up War spirit. So it kept on and
gx we w inculcated certainly a whole generation of people with how bad
chemichg warfare was in spite of the statistics I just gave you. This
has carried over. Now a lot of these same people are still in position
te tf leen ee ment policy and enother thing is that from the military

viewpoint war is pretty conplicated as it is these days. And you just

have one devil of a time training the normal soldier you get in all the
34

aspects of protection and offensive methods he has to use to fight a war.
Therefore the generals also don't want to see a new method intwoduced Geren 4]
because it is going to upset their applecart. They are going to have
to think of something new. There is a different method of using this.

tits |
fo show you how pxegress gots I was chemical officer of the Far East
Command at the time of the Korean War. I kept fighting for a long time
to get permission to use chemical agents in the POW camps in North Korea.
The reason being that the N. Korean thet was captured didn't stop fighting
the war, he kept fighting the war. He had leaders in there, they organized
riats. We had to shoot them constantly, machine guns and rifles, And this
is wonderful propaganda for the enemy. And they kept fighting, of course
the leaders were always in the back where they wern't going to get shot.
Well I finally got permission, of course I had to go throughthe War Dept.
at the time, to use tear gas and vomiting fas in the POW camps. We
stopped those riots quickly and there was no more propaganda. But I was
present at one of the POW camps when a riot started. And I watched them.
NOw these soldiers had had a lot of training tn this. we sent over atet
of special people to train them, So the rioters wert arg ice Jere.
Now with a tear gas grenade which burns from anything from 30 seconds to
2 minutes depending what you are using, what you do is throw it up wind
and let the vapor go down over the people. They didn't do that. They
threw it right at the people. So this half didn't get any because
the windxixdnkkxgekxanyxwas blowing this way. TFhese people could throw
it thixxnxax back and could get out of it. Here is a very simple approach
that requires we thinking. Our police are exactly the same way in this country.

we Gankk buat ab. ..

This was tried in Buffalo I think it was. We had all the riots this last
summer and they were expersive in life and property. In Buffalo somebody

decided theaywere going to try and do something about this and they trained

a number of squads who were ready to go out immediately to use tear gas.
35

So what happened? As soon as they got to a focal point of trouble, they
didn't wait till this grew to a riot, they broke up the crowd immediately
with tear gas. This continued for four nights because they were trying
to get started. But there we relatively little damage done, there a
nobody killed, there is nobody injured. But it was effective. But here
again the police have to thing of new methods and they don't want to.
We have this new. chemical Mace which you have probably heard about which
‘2 this little spray can which the police can use and it will shoot for
15 or 20 feet. If it hits a man near the face it is going to knock him
out pretty well. It oontains some sort of a solvent that seems to expose
nerve ends and just a tiny bit of teargas. It not only gives them the
effect 3 of tear gas but it really knocks them out. He is disoriented
for 10 or 15 minutes. Very effective. You read not too long ago in the
last few weeks about this man who lost his girl and he shot the guy she
was going to marry I think. Took her mnto a second, bui ding of a house
and the police couldn't get at him. They pleaded with him and it didn't
do any good, Finally he whot the girl and I think killed himself. The
girl is very seriously woufded. All they had to do was to take an e
explosive type tear gas bomb which puts out just a pufy of tear gas, not

tle srall apece
too much so that it won't kill anybody, throw that through the window
and that man would have been completely incapacitated just like tat.
He couldn't have done a thing. but you see here again it is different
type of thinking and people don't like a new type of thinking. This
seems to be the main, that holds us down, Then of course you run into
the emotional standpoint regulting from the propaganda and resulting from
peoplesd dislike of war. Of course disliking war is a very logical answer.

And I'm all with them, That is why I'm a member of the National Advisory

Board of the United World Rederalists which is trying to stop war “Ett actuate

~luo ps ;
36

Fighting war and trying to eliminate specific weapons of war are two
different things. I don't think you can eliminate specific weapons
of war and make it stick. When a nation gets in a hoée, a bad enough
hole, they are going to use them, hy think it is to their advantage.
I think you can organizationally eliminate war if you can get nations
to agree to it. I think it can be done with ada safety to all nations.
Eliminating weapons of war is different, and this has gone on all through
the history. You know they tried to stop the long bow because it was
inhumane, Up to that time knights with armour were practically safe.
It was only the people on the ground who got killed. And this was a
brutal type of warfare, a longbow would go through a knaght. The same
thing was true a€ when they tried to eliminate the submarine, for example.
And the air craft at the Hagar Peace convention in 1898. They also
tried to eliminate gas then. Well the submarine andxkhe didn't work

Situ
because the French thought that it might be useful to them. The gas
worked witha certian munber of nations, all of which participated
in WW I at the start and they used gas. So it didn't hold. I don't
think you can eliminate weapons of war. I think you can possibly eliminate
war but not the pieces of war. So there is no logic to why were not
using it but we are not.
Question: Liye ite

th a.
You don't think that Codi Coen het “DAY Ledeabery O00 Oxirusseel
Sioa L wed y of, Uirkash “sy Kolorat’s (ox.
pederbras ! CA Creeks of, pubhre vee 4 om Qer wok
Leb

Dr. Rothschild:
Qo laseb OX the same thinking as chemical warfare and there is

no kandemic and you can start with chemical warfare or even epidemic
37

a

a
so I don't think that has had particluar bearing.

uestion: “1.7 : “fo
Q G1 Liles te eat. A uu Ol dome ethay Wor , of getting Ada on aid ue kon-
ye
Is_thore~—any—other-way

ero
whe Kreke lon - mmaketns (Peocedaco than drole {how preipers oa
by Va. Lederberg 5 thak vy coy Gps ‘ Arvoclpaur, wu Une

this Um O& AmMet O LR a Keyra & ANCG Acrents fre AA Guanes}
wwuolotie he Avserxtifre cGy . Phat w wlth, @AQ, wou nee
ott castic lly Bel Cnk this PAohocal 7

Dr. frothschild;

I think that in the state of the world as it is political today
it just isn't possible. Unless you want to do it unilaterally, of course.
I don't think you'll get agreement on this. Inthe area of testing nuclear
weapons underground you remember we have been unable to get any agreement stalk
on it. On the Saviet side they won't take any inspection, and our side
we say there's a faint chance of their getting away with something. The
chances are pretty small. We have methods that would detect perhaps
most of your bursts underground. But we don't have a complete ban

act

on weapons yet. Because there is a faint possibility tath some of these
could go undisclosed. We have a good enough system So it would be
practically impossible to get away with it but nobody will accept it.
So when we talk about the other unless we are willing to do it unilaterally

and I know I personally would not be we are stuck.. Because there are

things of value here in weapons, in munitions, ‘and in agents that you dontt

who ro
just want to turn over to an enemy. Xun might x use them against you.

Dr. Lederberg: . :
How

I think there is alot to be gained by doing this unilaterally. But I

think we lose a great deal by not taking the initiative towards negotaations
This
in this area xmxtHix country is simply not doing that. I would be much
- _- in
more sympathetic to the line you took if we had made proposals grd@ the UN

or otherwise suggested a conference for the control of biological weapons
38
and for mutual disclosure, tried to work out exactly what level of Aquch
disclosure is possible and so on, We have taken absolutely no position
on this point.
Dr. Rothschild:

It is not quite that bad. We have not made approaches on the system
you have taken on complete disclosure, However there have been efforts
made at Geneva to ban the use of biological warfare,

Dr. Lederberg: sduinour wha

I would 1kke to know what, American participation has been in this.
Dr. fothschild:

We had three proposals very definitely to this effect, so have the
Russians, But the trouble is these alot for propaganda purposes. But then
when we get down to saying how will we inspect to see that people are
complying, you can't get agreement. How are you going to know that you
are getting complete disclosure , thaiZis going to bring up the confd¢cre
inspection thing again. So I don't object to the method but I just don't
think that it has a chance of getting anyplace.

Dr. Lederberg:

I'm not informed about any initiatives that this country has taken ,

. Lit ly
in this area, On the contrary a number have been brought up I agree for
propaganda purposes. For exapmle by Hungary in the UN and they have been
left tabled, And there has been no repponse on the part of the US gall te in
Dr. Rothschild:

No, we've made approaches, We have mtways had investigations by the
arms control agency on methods of detection of violations of manufacture

as you
and testing of BW agents and kxscxexk& say nothing has gotten anyplace.

Whether our proposals are made in good faith I don't know. I think they

are actually.
39

Dr. Lederberg:

I don't think any of our proposals have been pushed to the point that
bhey have any degree ofqvisibi lity either to the American public or the
Soviets and I think this is a difficult thing.

Dr. Rothschild:

Oh no, the Soviet is not xesxporsikis responding to these either,
question! Plully Wyatt

I would like to get back to the main reason for holding this meeting
and that is to discuss the Advisory state. Committe
Dr. Clark:

q That comes in the second part of the meeting. We have the Chairman
of the Advisory Committee here , we have a member of the Advisory Committee

here.

Question: 4)

é

Souity ty Uprurdoer

to get the distinguished American
What is the purpose of associating this Society with Thigh.

é
How do you get obetilie opinion pushed deeply into the military? And

pressure - Cy tone hee Aerie
how do you, I mean this is a political, type activity puthertebe dew by areme

A :
Q tha ink this ohowt be

this Society has the means and the ability to do this.
Lad

Dr. Lederberg:

I would like to make a partial response to the remark you made because
I think that there is a very important distinction. We are necessarily
extremely sensitive down to hhe last iota on questions of security, disclosure,
and inspection when it comes to nuclear weapons. There is just no doubt
whatsoever chat Haake tctLact Dak on iay is security cra ittet pee
our life does depend on that. The argument that I would like to make is that

we can afford to take a higher level of risk with respect to the same

issues of inspection and certainty of compliance on the other side in
40
biological weaponrythan we can in atomic weaponry. Precisely for the reasnons
that our survival as a nation does not depend on this. fhese are not
valid

dexexxenk weapons sufficiently proved out that they're going to be widely
used anyhow in advance of some largexix scale premonition that they have
in fact been tested. They are not in the same stage of development that
anybody can push a button and go ahead and do anything with them, I'm
trying to say that just nx because we are at a stage long before the large
scale devélopemnt and deployment of these agents we can afford to explore
levels of confidence with one another in the world about biological agents
that we couldfi't tolerate with respect to nuclear ones. And that is why
I think they are very good candidates for efforts at reaching some degree
of mutual agreement at a level of confidenw that wouldn't be sufficient
to apply to nuclear weaponry.
Dr. Rothschild:

I'm not sure I agree with you on the nuclear weapons, Dr. Lederberg.
It depends on the area you are talking about. If you are talking about x
refinements of offensive techniques in muclear weapons, it is hard for
me to see how this is very important. As long as you have the power to
destroy the other nation the refinements to me no longer seem to be very
important. If you had a break through in defensive measures, which we
haven't had, this is a different proposition. But the offensive power is
so great and the ability to stop it at the present time is so limited that
I'm not sure thet you should exclude nuclear weapons from thebs sort of
thing any more than you would biological ones. Wti/ppmnor
Dr/ Lederberg:

Well, I'd be glad to carry it one step further but I guess IJ.guess I
was jumping one step ahead to the region of arms control, And assertions

that we have infact eliminated our stodkpile of nuclear weapons is not

something that we are about do without very intensive inspection of machinery.
, 41

pidrinit
I thank we can afford to enter into a treaty with respect to the disposition
of stockpiles of biological weapns at a level of confidence that falls mf
far short of what we need in the nuclear area, and that is essentially

tne ak

what I was t i t.
Question: Joe Neilands
od moralch
Gen. Rothschild, you mentioned kkak questions about humanity in
chemical and biological warfare but you didn't say much about the legality
although you did say that the US is not party to an agreement 0
New Y5 ck ECO fret thet the US dao Cvrk
prohibiting the use of these agents. Un Gonaye peiiticet of (125 elthgergiacttsheonet
been
although it may not be gatified is it not a fact tht it has been accepted

ie Would you

by the dexcent opinion of manking and most civilized nations.
60 bear
advocate that the US$ appearance before ke the court in session on the

fend tu wae d (3.90%

international war crimes tribunal unl de DA in Vietnam.

Dr. Rothschild:

In answering your first question, our delegates did sign the Geneva
gas protocol in 1925, it was not ratified so we're not signatory to it.
When it comes to the degcent opinion of manking it depends on what it is
based upon. Whether it is based on knowledge i feelings. And my feelings
and knowledge lead me to believe that there is much more defense for the
use of chemical warfare if you have to fight a Wor than there is argument
against it. I suppose when you tall about decent feelings it reminds
me of a sign I saw on a window over on Sutter street the other day. It
says 1 love humanity, it is people I hate. I don't know how much respect
I have for the general opinion of people unless they ar’informed people.
So when you talk about defending the US for using C S gas in Vietnam I
don't think a defense is necessary, I think that tk took humanitarian
measures there which are much to our crédit. It was our handling of the

situation that was wrong. When this was First yseds it happened to be

by the soubh Vietnamese even though we supplied in the beginning of 1965,
fi
42
veyy stupidly, instead of the US saying we are going to use these things so
that we can avoid shooting when women and chitdrentave out in fromt of
the Viet Cong as hostages, and this will allow us to break up the attack
without shooting them, they kept quiet about the thing until} it leaked
out ak through the reporters with an outcry all over the world. Then our
adminsitration was forced actually forced by the outcry into making a defense.
The defrigse is very weak, They didn't have any position prepared and the
defense they gave was about the weakest that you could possibly imagine.
I heard Dean Rusk give it and I read some of the others. But the outcry
dieR, down imnediately. Around this country the editorial content of the
papers was very favorable which it hadn't been before because there was an
explanation. This was done with good cause, it was done for humanitarian
reason, So I don't think we need any defmnse further of using CS. I

think it is a perfectly proper use. I think we could go further and use

other agents also that would be to ourcredit.
‘Ds, ihruard
Question: “Yor Neland,

many
How saHXa nation that sighed the 1925 protocol?

Dr. Rothschild:
Oh, there are a fair number. It is possibly up, I'm just guessing now
because I haven't looked recently. Say on the order of 50 or 60, But of c
Course don't forget that both Ethiopia and Italy sighed the protocol but
Italy still used gas against Ethiopia in the Abssynian campaign in 1936.
Dr. Lederberg: +
F 6 Qu
| q \ toy - 6.
Well let's not make that a Scpehaas of Cum ecdn p? LM,
Dr. Rothschild:
Chaain Sew mataine Wer bernt thar Acgnd
preset . a :
hese agreements mean well and I think our position is a samdd one.
Quite sound.
Mark Achtman:

orke® A-tak

Loe _ .S
I'd like to bring up a couple of examples from Abwnao Ago aah

Qre uty ‘eb AT Of
many dangers involved in biological warfare and chemical warfare as well.
43

AVL tha
You've been talking about a chemical called fice which a—coupte. of people
in this area have had quite intimate contact with having been sprayed
with it in Oakland. One thing that became very obvious was that nobody
really knew what the chemical was doing to the people. Nobody really

. . “Tladeoth. we ;

knew what the lasting effects of this were. \ yeehe were being used
as test cases are quite unsure khat permanent effects it will have on them.
But the police were very happy to have axxingis this incapacitating agent

Ww x
which they were quite happy to ase On & 2rowk xt wasn't really

all that dangerous but was lan prving . The other illustration is that

ale ele, clarke g
you seem uncertain what, the possibilitigs 6éf a pandemic mena mean
‘ athe

once you have had a huge \ycus of biological pathogens. This uncertainty
or any lack of knowledge about something as complicated as this must negate
any thought of using biological war because we just Una don't know what

can happen, The danger is much too great and the advantage is toolittle

to justify it.

Dr. Rothschild:

Well, you always have to remember you are comparing something against
something else. When you talk about the use of Hace for expmple I know that
if a policeman lays an 18 inch billy across a man's head it is going to do
damage.

Mark AakOman

To one man, That same paiikewna policeman can nowspray...
Dr. Rothschild:

The mace chemical affects no one but the man that is hit and he even
has to be hit somewhere near the face before it is goin to affect him, It
isn't going to affect anyone else in the area.

Mark: (a & Ue ~P wrree. Worn ww Qouns Ars Wuts

Teel, -
And now he has Struck five people in that one easy stroke.
44

Dr. Rothschild;

Possibly, but the fact still remains, as I say you are comparing one
weaponagainst another, whether it is in the hands of the police or in
the hands of the service, An epidemic is very unlikely to be started and
I ask the question here speaking generally of any pandemic in the world
these days. I wasn't only speaking of one from a BW. It seems to me
that the public health measures would tend to stop it. Of course when
you go from epidemic to pandemic it depends on what volume you are talkigg
about and we do have the cholera which is spreading. I have a feeling,
and I'm not sure,that a sufficient world effort would stop the cholerae pu! nu
from spreading. But we don't get the effort through various things. We
don't get it through the desire of the world to do enough, or the countries
to do enough. Now these countries are all of the backward countries
again. And they don't put up the effort in these things and they don't get
it from the world and the UN as a tool doesn't have that much effort at
its disposal. I don't think that there is any reason that a pandemic can't
be stopped in the world. But Dr. Lederberg would hnow alot more about
this than I do.
Dr. Lederberg:

Gud
No, I don't know anything about it, but I don't think that anybody

Lot, Un eee baradaae

else does either and I feel we are soing-to-geba kukixpaxaner
&

WKHHKMUKK with respect to our security against Worth urine Qusinat ‘
Question:
. * oun

I've seen a Viet Cong publication and on how the-uses of gas

are used in Southeast Asia and I spoke to (Dr. Rothschild: You mean
a i w Asmat bons,

South Vietnam.) yeas Yawygoar hail Med 7, between what we say we are
doing and what they say we are doing. But they mums Uunge Glee

smgm somehow poifson accidentally getting into food in concentration camps,
45
somehow the proper concentration of rethat Rel back lett, uae

and people were dying from too high a concentrationbeing sprayed on the

people wd\takt a bey Der Gas rt Gngrnticd Ce aL AC) Lethnrok here
Crk amatthin ae pert poor eh Candny

Dr. Lederberg:
JThak Warts wow Tehran. :

No that wasn't entirely facetious if I can anticipate your remarks,
That is clumsiness an dealing with very potent agents and it souldn't

Trak huis
be condoned. “can occur in the service, it can occur in the police

oust tele
department and it oughtn't to be condoned withoutthe, skilled use of any
of these agents, It has nothing to do with Ale philoacfilsel castes
abo Qhitther Wate te ss Ward ok ath,
Dr. Rothschild:
I think I can go a little bit further in answering this. Yes, their
approach has been very advantageous to us. The agents that we have used
as I say have been 24D, @,4, ST and colaodbc acid, The toxicity to humans
is exceedingly low. The NLF and the Viet Cong put out ets propaganda
for the propaganda value and it has proven to be of great value to us,
Because once we have used this material on an area the Viet Cong will
never enter that area again and they won't eat eny of the food that is
in that area. The food that is lying out there, the drying fish and
CAR CWiw
so on, iS perfectly edible. They won't touch $t, I've seen pictures
for exapple, air photos, of the river leading up to I think it was Saigon,
oD
a beautiful curving river, there is fire coming on our planes from this
area on one side. They wenwarned as they always are by leaflets before
we launch any attack whether it is with CS or anything else, with anticrop
tL urovt&
agents, they were warned to stop the fire jm the area er be attacked. And
they didn't. The area was laid waste with the anticrop agents. They won't
go back in those areas which is very advantageous to us, They won't eat
Steud
the food that they have setred there which is foolish. It is very difficult

to substantiate their claim of forcing starvation on them because here in

this picture on the other side of the river you see all these beautiful

 

 
46
fields still in bloom and on both sides of this particular fiéld that they
are having the trouble with the fields were still growhng therr crops.
I don't think there is any tryth to the propaganda at all. This is nothing
but that propaganda. Incidentally on CS every time we hit an area, I gave
you one example in operation Light Wing one of the large operations we
ee wee htroee tine of
have there, in this village there is fire coming on our A plan€s,
We drop leaflets saying that you stop the fire or we are going to attack,
_Well the fire didn't stop so again they dropped tkex leaflets and said
k that we are going to attack this area with gas. Get out. Some of the
villagers did and some didn't, I'm not sure they had a choice, They then
did hit that village with CS, with the tear gas, followed up immediately
with troops. they captured a number of Viet Cong and of course took over
the village and there wasn't anybody kiléed. There were no shots fired
at all. This is another example of the use of a humanitarian agent
properly applied. They have always dropped pkamp pamphlets before they

attack any of these areas with anticrop agents. They tell the people

where they can go and get food too.

Question: Dy. AgkenG. Morr .
J rave a quan ‘thet iy AM ERA te owe And oy) ai Nelanls .

VWhaude ote vot UN Abo € Ar A. vy Xe UAE al

ACTS Red wh oe etn . fant. ue. oy LA a woe oe ce eee

_ an. ~ Aw aw weak, adnortk & be wWerkeine, ce uf We SN th toes oe

— - fo . Th. + aS ong. vod ger ned bh ee y c i{s ¢ kh
pe xk a My Se aaa “f thay eS 2a hcl tp Wek Qe Ren eee x :
Wr mn ee Ju Gear ace Pua a . St ee _¢ oe Mao le vlc ON
te th. areeke sty of, Nu od vs ctl a pwrbect cua 6A as See MT

Dr. Roe ne vo Ait pteensy pee duct y by Pal, woh ney 4 |
} A Aefit : othuak ER Cre Te ane CAL bin we -* “hy ACA BY
You have got me in an area where I am a little bit shakey Cause I

haven't looked at these things for a long time. It seems to me your

applications there were when the measures that the doctors for example

were taking were against individuals,#patients. This is what they considered

as crimes. I don't think this other comes under khexg any restrictions that
47

were considered there. I'm not quite wure of my grounds.

Da vlanl- 7 _ (oie
Question: Boyer . "jews efoth. lo ae hese Gare thir, Qoace. NE
“the wae arakiy
C.X biological weapons are more humanitarian that convential
SB thicke cw.

weapons. then the case can be made that they are even less humanitarian
than convential weapons. I think that some of your exapmles are very

good as used in the voncentration camps to quell réoting that is fine.

ont the
I don't think the fro woteactitiey che Relig tpesece ey military

hive Vike,
Security—as it is to developing mor e weapons. They are interested in

pov sxantpl y very effective weapons. Neverthelese the research is
~ conducted under such conditions where you are maximizing the safety for

(7 rane
the henkioal Ct, et whereas like we probably ce tha ct reat. used of

“ye ee pe aiken 7 ott
biological weapons ‘ carried as supplementary to

convential weapons . taboo thew oe nkiterns > Leluce heck

     

:
ck oa-at & \ye AUT Re yd. Lis ole Tet vfee he “——
Yo 2 f “"? ‘
wer Lx val Lome eotie€
. 2 o 2 = :
providing proper medical care for the large civilian population -\. WOE da ney

“? 2

I i . vo _ Me.

Dr. Rothschild:

I don't think necessarily the toxic weapons are supplementary to
the conventianal I think they are complemdntary more than that. They
are used in their own area where they can do the most good. But as 2 say
I think you have more control. You don't to kill. You see you drop
an HE bomb or a shéll, within the certain area you are going to kill
everybody that is there and you are going to knock down what is there.
In another area you are going to maime the people that are there unless
they happen to be protected and in other area people aren't going to be
hurh probably. But you have no control once you have launched that thing.
Your control is completely gone, You take a biological weapon which

you are specifically referring to which you are interested in here, you do

have a level of control. You know the damage you are going to do. For
48
expmple, if you are using an incapacitating agent, you know that the
people are going to die ax are gohng to within some range, some predeterminable
ragge. In the case of an incapacitating agent it will be a low range.
Furthermore certainly with agents that we are talking about for our country
tek. Lab
you will not have long term residual effects which you do have wath the
conventional weapons. To me anyone who has, Seen anyone hurt through
Ayn. weapons can be under no allusions of the suffering they undergo
and we are used to encountering diseaseall the time. We don't like it.
Some of them you recover from without treatment, others you need treatment
for and you suffer when you are going through them. but if you can
recover from this and not have residual effects and you can control it,
to me this is a lot more humane that the use of your normal HE weapons
which are bi auins weapons. Napalm, flaming gasCle ns, for exapmle,
or fine particles of metal and so on.
Dr. Lederberg:
I think your reamrks are strong arguments for more research on
chemical warfare weapons to make sure they are developmdn to the point of
separatély divey  ?
efficacy where they can relied upon, Saxandix from the combined use of mess ‘
others. I think as you pointed out pragmatically many commanders do not
have this degree of confidence in new weapons and how important it will
be in such cases where there will be civilian hostages and so on is @
question of the humane Ghatity"B8ing to be through a commander under the
condition of stress in a military situation. It is going to use every
combination of his resources that he has xm at his disposal and the net

may be
regult no different than will be whether he had chemical weapons or not.

A
If they couts be developed to the point of absolute reliability we may

reach the ideal state that you are talking about. You can win a war
wt Cal a badd be feu cece
without hurtin} anybody but I think it will impossible-to pet there.

t
49
Dr. Rothschild:

You mention chemical weapons specifically. If the xkwkxx chemical
weapons were used in war it wouldn't be more than a very short time before
you officers and your men would be well qualified in the field,in the
first place they are not well trained in defense now and the first gas |
attack against us would be disastrous, I assume any enemy would use
it on a very large scale and our men would not protect themselves
because you can't force them to protect themselves against something
that the country says is not a humane weapon and we shouldn't use at
and noone else should use it either. But gox ahead and learn how to
protect yourselves anyway, they don't learn. I think that your officers
would learn how to use it offensively very quickly too. I think that

4
you are denegat ing your Americans very weriously when you say that they

yan dora,
would not want to use these rkex war, humane weapons. I think they would. —
. f ah

You have examples in Vietnam. The Marine Corps Colonel who wouldn't call
for fire on the village when flying over the village because there
were civilians there and he got killed.by fixxe fire from that village.
after fyth Lng

This has been repeated £xam time xm time where we have lost lives of

A

é
our people unnecessarily because we are not going to shoot at these
villages where there are women and childred\ This comes up repeatedly.

So you give them a weapon whereby they don't have to kill the people

there and they would be very happy to use it there I think.
Let me 2 wat ke 6. Apheaoias te Re (rene ok week
Dr. Moulder: urn thi, AN Cob fornia Baanchr.

I have two purposes in coming, the first is the purpose for which
I was asked, that is to answer questions about the advisory committee.

And the second is to ask the questions of my own that I have about the
Committee, the ASM and its attitudes toward biological warfare, Some

of these questions I'd like to give you some tentative answers I have.
Others I have no answer at all. And in the discussion I truly would like
to get your answers and your thinking onthese questions to use them in my
own further thinking on the problem. I'd like to start out with a fairly
light hearted account of my recent experiences at Chicago.

WE have a student newspaper called the Chicago Maroon. It is very
much like all the codlege newspapers. In the second edition of the Maroon
this year I was identified by our local SDS branch as "chief advisor
to Fort Detrick." This has a lesson to us, to be more serious. And that

rrctordetiy Socikty
is t6_ persons , the Committee appears to be an important and influential

You may be sure that I contacted the Paper and attempted to assure
one. platen’ aod was
them that I was not the chief advisor to Fort Detrick if indeed there was
such a person, And I found in talking inxkatx with the Maroon reporter
who is a very intelligent and perceptive young man that it is very km hard
to explain the purposes and the objectives of the Committee to someone
outside the Society. I think that is a lesson we should take,that the
purposes and the objectives of the Committee are not easily defined as
it is presently constituted. '
dete

I think the present function of the Committee is easy. , hat it is
doing now is, and I think that Dr. Romig will agree with me, it is a panel
of once-a~year hopefully expert consultants who are Achsilted on basic
scientific programs at Fort Detrick and professional problems related to

Coa. We can Covct pa,
microbiologists at Fort Detrick. To my knowledge, they have not been

consulted on genezal policy and the Committee has not been consulted.on,