BW debate. California Bureau/American Society for Microbiology. San Francisco State College, November 11, 1967 General Rothschild:..... Dr. Lederberg. Well I will confess that the first part of my colleagues presentation did appear like a chamber of horrors and I'm sure none of us can have escaped that reaction. Like him I would also point out that a graphic description of the results of bullets plowing into your brain that had been sprayed from the machine gun would have an equal impact. I want to say from the outset that I don't disagree with him in the least with respect to attempts to compare the humanity and morality of one method of destroying compared to another. If the justified and politically founded objective of warfare is to destroy the enemy, the more expeditious techniques are at the disposal of the force we stand behind if we do stand behind it, presumably the better. Nevertheless both chemical and biological warfare do arouse a moral revulsion in most people, and while I believe I share this to a lesser extent than most and have said so, I think we should understand why life -- science professionals will be especially sensitive about inhumane applications of their own studies. Most of us did not go into science with the expectation of supporting munitions activities and of course are not consulted about that point, but I think this is a very important base and I think one we ought to face realistically as to why so many biologists are raising such a furor. They feel that they had not elected to go into a line of work that would contribute to the destruction of other people, whether it is less or more humane than other techniques. That's why most of us are not working on munitions. We should not be too deeply swayed by these irrational considerations, and they are irrational, but on the other hand it would be a great mistake to dismiss their importance to other people because a great part of the political significance of our involvement in chemical and biological warfare is what other people think about it and to the extent that our involvement in these programs arouse a few irrational anxieties on the parts of our friends as well as neutrals as well as potential enemies I think that we have to consider that as part of the package, as part of the price that is paid by our being involved in these developments. These reactions may be irrational but they're there. One might approach that by attempts at public educaiton but as Gen. Rothschild has indicated in the long run it would be the most humane to use chemical weapons. This might be demonstrated sometime as in for a little effective demonstration of this point in the field. I mainly don't want to talk about chemical warfare since I feel particularly that lumping it together with biological warfare is a strategic error of my very significance. In fact my interest in this subject was aroused when Dr. Meselson asked me to sign a petition that was being circulated starting about a year ago, a good part of which was discussed in Science for January 20, 1967, and I'll just quote one point. "The employment of any one CB weapon weakens the barriers to the use of others. No lasting distinction seems possible between incapacitation and lethal weapons or between chemical and biological warfare. If the restraints on the use of one kind of CB weapon are broken down the use of others will be encouraged." I think there is just as much truth in that as our willingness to distinguish, or unwillingness to distinguish, these mechanisms of warfare will permit. That is, if we insist on our own propaganda on the question and lumping them together then a policy which validates the use of chemical warfare will weaken the restraints on the use of biological warfare. For reasons I will go into I would like to encourage you to adopt exactly the opposite point of view, to regard biological warfare as a very special kind of hazard to the species and just on those grounds alone ought to be carefully distinguished from use of chemical agents. Among other points on the issue of political strategy I point out that the President of the United States is already committed to the use of chemical agents in warfare, because in fact we are using them in the form of tear gas and so on, and it would be very much more difficult to achieve a policy reversal with respect to a set of actions which the country through the President, has already committed than it would be to exercise some restraints with respect to the proliferation of other kinds of weapons. Here again our reasons to try to create whatever distinctions are possible between these classes of weapons. Actually the main complaint that I would make about our present posture in this area is not so much what we are doing in our research and development programs in chemical or in biological warfare in the present world climate, the present political climate, I can see the sense to the argument that it is very difficult to do otherwise. My complaint is what we're not doing. My complaint is that we're not aggressively pursuing the means for international control of those kinds of weapons which represent most significant threat to the species. I think no microbiologist need use his imagination for very long to see why I regard biological warfare in that category. If in the present arena and atmosphere of complete lack of restraint, it is necessary for this nation to pursue BW development, that fact in itself makes it necessary for others and we have all the groundwork for a continuous process of escalation. There's just no way that can be stopped in the present atmosphere and every increase in our expenditure, in our defensive actions with respect to biological warfare in this country, and the conditions of secrecy which operate where it is not possible to disclose exactly what we're doing where the general magnitude of our effort is obvious can have no other consequence but to provoke similar defensive escalation on the part of other nations. I think we can take it for granted this is exactly what has happened. I don't know the figures for the research budget in biological warfare of the Soviet Union or of Communist China. The essential point that I'd like to bring to your criticism is that the calculated growth of the capacity for biological warfare is inherently a suicidal activity on the part of human beings. It's exactly in opposition to what so much of our scientific and technical and human effort has been for the control of pestilence, to try to bring about ways in which it can be systematically disseminated. I'm going to say something about secrecy and I'm going to take a rather paradoxical position. There's a sense in which if were possible for the defense department to explore the research and development of biological agents and in fact maintain utter and complete security with respect to its development I would not feel terribly uncomfortable. I would not feel that the possession simply in the hands of this country of this kind of power is the worst thing that I can imagine happening in the world. What I am concerned is that no security system is perfect; its not intended to be perfect, if for no other reason than to achieve budgetary support in Congress there will be constant dissemination of information about what biological warfare programs are up to and any escalation on their own developmental and research efforts is going to provide some of the necessary material for other countries to do exactly the same. So the effort that we put into any large scale development of techniques for the development of more potent biological agents for their dissemination whether it's in one year or ten or twenty, is gradually going to become part of the art of the whole world. This is exactly in nuclear energy and it's bound to be the same if there is a large scale expansion of what we're doing in biological warfare. It is not our possession of dangerous information of dangerous technical insights but it is the dissemination throughout the world that represents a very obvious threat. The larger industrial powers do not have to rely on biological warfare to achieve their major strategic objectives. They are very well possessed of a wide variety of other kinds of weapons and even for defensive purposes while it is important that we have some notion of what kind of biological attack might be posed against us, it is not at all obvious why the strategic deterrent against biological warfare has to be another biological weapon, and we have plenty of strategic deterrent weapons. My concern is that biological warfare is a technique of extermination which is available to nations with much smaller industrial potential than our own, which would be politically much less responsible, which would be a much more situation of temptation to take desperate measures in order to achieve very parochial political aims. I do not think we can expect the same level of responsibility for the future of the rest of the planet on the part of the Egyptian Department of Defense than we do from our own. These are the essential concerns, behind them there are also that the security system prevents the details of development and dissemination of microbial weapons from being accessible to the professional and medical scientific criticism of the rest of the community. I can easily visualize a very eager and very enthusiastic investigator in the chemical corps deciding on a rather limited initiative and subject to a rather limited degree of scrutiny and control because of the security system of performing experiments which would be hazardous to the entire country, and in fact to the world. The degree of review, control and criticism in a secure system cannot possibly compare to that which operates in a system of open science. I am really very much concerned that someone will take in his head to decide that some new strain of anthrax ought to be tried out in the field without having the kind of control that the public consequences of such dissemination are going to be. I think this is one of the inevitable hazards of a system of very tight or attempted tight security in military services. In fact you might make the same argument about the whole complexion of the program. That the military objectives are going to be paramount; that the human objectives of the development of weapons of this kind will never achieve the kind of review that they deserve in relation to the potential gravity of such developments for us as a species. Without at this moment wishing to impair the existing defensive and developmental activities of the Defense Department in Biological Warfare, I would submit that a problem of much higher priority is how to develop the kind of controls that will keep such activities both in this nation and in other nations under some kind of rational limitations. The one direction that I can see to this is a demand for the removal of secrecy by whatever expedients we can devise in such work. I think there are good grounds for continuing various kinds of efforts that are related to biological warfare because there are also very much the same things that related to public health. But I can see very little reason even from a military standpoint why these must be blanketed in the kind of secrecy that now enclose them. Biological warfare is not a major strategic weapon in the United States. I don't believe anyone would sustain the proposition that the national security of this country really depends crucially on the secrecy of our activities in biological warfare. They might be politically embarassing, but I don't know enough about what would be released by such information to have a clear insight into this point but it is obvious that the most tender aspect of biological warfare is just the fact that it is being done and the kind of anxieties that are aroused in the minds of people. I've seen very little to suggest really cogent reasons for maintaining any important degree of secrecy with respect to these operations. In fact, the kind of proposal I might be prepared to make is that we enlarge our program in this area but we make it public. And we have it large enough that it can cover all the bases that we might otherwise think we might have missed. In this way biological warfare research will in fact be nothing else than public health research. We are faced by constant attack by microbial invaders of all kinds. We need to know about them by the natural dissemination how to protect ourselves against them much the same thing as involved in their artificial dissemination. The basis of my proposal of the abolition of secrecy it is that it is a step towards the control of weapons that the race cannot afford to have developed in secret without some kind of rational control for what its ultimate objectives are. Unlike other weapons we can afford to take some risks with respect to what the other side may be doing in biological warfare. We have other deterrents that could discourage unexpected attacks. We're not in the same position in trying to open up BW as we would be in nuclear warfare. This could be the first area in which we could attempt to negotiate for the international control of weapons precisely because they are weapons whose deployment has not been established and whose critical nature for our national security is already open to doubt. When biological warfare is developed as a utilitarian military tool to the extent that technologically less advanced countries can make full advantage of it we will have lost that advantage and may have indeed suffered a very important military disadvantage by being subject to attack on a much broader level from a much wider variety of countries than is now the case. One particular approach that I think we might consider some beginning might be made, would be a demand that no microbiological research could be classified. That this be part of the internal law of every country which is a participant in this kind of arrangement. One might argue that the Soviet Union although a party to such a law could still afford to maintain clandestine research in microbiology. This would be exactly the texture of the concern about how you inspect a treaty of this kind. This is a hazard. I'm not sure there would be enough merit in the Soviet Union continuing to do such research with the risk of discovery that it was violating one of its own treaties embodied in its own internal law to warrant its doing so. I think to the extent that we can maintain communication with our scientific colleagues through the abolition of classification controls in other countries we've also reached an avenue of communication that goes far beyond the immediacy of the situation. I'll be glad to develop this thesis a little further, perhaps in some further discussion. But the particular proposal I have in mind is that even for a relatively closed society such as the Soviet Union it would be very difficult for it to maintain a public posture that makes it a matter of public policy of its own published law that work of this kind is not to be classified and for this to remain secret. It is very easy to keep things secret when there's a law that says they must be secret when there's a law that says they must not, there are very severe administrative difficulties to say the least that would involve maintaining really a very close enclosure of entire populations in order to maintain that kind of security. This sort of approach has never been tried as far as I know except in a sense in the United States because we have such an aggressive newspaper industry that it achieves many of the same purposes as an explicit law for the publication of as wide a variety of subjects as possible. That keeps us an open society. I haven't expressed these notions as clear as I might like, but I've done the best that I can with my voice and the limitations of time. Gen. Rothschild: ..... . Dr. Lederberg: I think it is exactly your last point that I'd like to respond to since I don't think we are in very great disagreement on most of the other issues and I'm not sure in disagreement on this one except for the kind of response we ought to take. My kind of concern is that a skilled researcher in biological warfare will develop a strain of dengue virus that he tests out on ten volunteers and says "Oh, this is perfect. It will give a 36 hour incapacitation, they all recover beautifully." We'll produce a very large stockpile on it. On the basis of what will necessarily be extremely inadequate evidence for the safety of its application may then sometime be used in a very large scale. As long as such work is developed within the framework of military security I don't see how it can come out any other way. It will be rather as if Fort Detrick had had the responsibility for the development of the Sabin vaccine, and the question of the safety of the vaccine was itself a subject of military security. It was an agent disseminated on a very large scale for a humanitarian purpose. But we wouldn't dream of doing that because we know that in order to get a workable result we have to subject our efforts in an area that is subject to as much confusion and uncertainty as virology to the widest possible range of scientific criticism. And that criticism hasn't died down yet. I don't know any really important reason why candidate agents for military purposes can't be publicized along with the other 99% of the research that you are talking about and let the question of their safety and their humanity and all the rest of this be subject to a general scientific scrutiny before we commit ourselves as a nation to the use of these kinds of agents. One of the main reasons I say that is in the long run, the operation of military security is going to keep the scientists of this country from knowing about it and being able to apply their judgment. And it isn't going to be kept a secret from the Soviet Union and Communist China. Their military intelligence is going to get at it as they have gotten every other really important major development that has come along. Meantime we will not be able to apply our criteria of scientific judgment on a sufficiently broad basis. Gen. Rothschild: .... . Dr. Lederberg. You might have gotten the greatest cost effectiveness out of doing exactly that, you know, and a few plants with respect to the kinds of agents you pretend to stockpile can in terms of to the economic cost of the enemy make it justify the whole program. I'd be more content to know whether there is an extra external and that almost has to mean civilians, review committee, for example, the Public Health Service, that has the authority to inquire about the safety aspects of the dissemination of agents and their development and it could really assure itself with regard to the point that you make. When you say there is a most careful review by an advisory group, an advisory group is usually told what the people who want the advice want it to be told. That isn't exactly the kind of level of criticism that I'm thinking of. Gen. Rothschild:.... . Dr. Lederberg. It isn't a question of the quality of the people, it is a question of what they are told. Gen. Rothschild:... . Dr. Lederberg: I have the greatest admiration for Dr. Baldwin and I've known him for a very long time and I know that in the context of a professor at the University of Wisconsin he is a very competent advisor indeed because he can consult with a great many other people on questions where his own expertise will be limited. You are dealing with a very broad range of questions and inevitably there will be. I think that to talk about the competence of an advisor in the context of his own information when he is precluded from making further inquiry in getting further advice himself is really cake quite differently. As a matter of fact I'd like to press you on this point. Are these civilian advisors in fact informed with respect to every detail of the program in the areas we are talking about? Do they really have the whole picture available to them? Gen. Rothschild: ... . Dr. Clark:.... . Dr. Lederberg and Gen. Rothschild: Yes, of course. Gen. Rothschild:... . Dr. Lederberg: Well I believe might make a start on the policy that I've indicated. I think it is going to take a while to get a treaty that says we keep no secrets. But I think a formal statement and a commitment with respect to what activities are fully published and what activities are kept secret might itself be a good idea. I don't know what the guidelines are to the classification officers in this respect, and I imagine there would be a few documents about which there might be some marginal discomfort about whether to open it or not. That is just the point though, you see. I think if there were a policy that the area of biological warfare is so touchy that this must receive special consideration. Maybe the burden of proof ought to be on the other side. Dr. Clark. .... . Gen. Rothschild: ... . Dr. Lederberg: That statement is often made but it doesn't really answer the point. It is the papers that don't get published that we're concerned about and which represent what is being classified and they're presumably the most sensitive aspect of the program. Again a statement with respect to the proportion of work is published is also meaningless too. From this point of view. It is very hard to form judgments of policy based on what has been published when you know that the most sensitive areas aren't. Gen. Rothschild: .... . Dr. Lederberg: I feel myself that that's better than no ventilation at all. With respect to the issues immediately on the table, my only question is whether it is worth the fuss to have the Society as an official body involved in this. You can get at those same top people just as well, and since their judgments are kept top secret it is impossible for the rest of the Society to know whether it has any particular role in endorsing or not endorsing what they have to say. That capsules my own general reaction to whether there should be an official advisory committee of the ASM. I think the Services should be applauded for their efforts to get that kind of civilian advisory support. I guess I only feel it ought to be greatly enlarged, in fact ought to include everybody and as close to everybody as you can manage to have. Gen. Rothshild: ... . Dr. Lederberg: I think the much more important restraint is to publish the list of your civilian advisors and let the country judge whether they are a reputable group or not, you'll hear enough about it if they are not. You don't need the Society to do this and there is no mechanism of selection within the Society that assures that they meet the qualifications that you have in mind. Those people will get on the advisory committee who are interested in biological warfare for other reasons and who are regarded as safe and clearable. This is about the only criterion they satisfy. If the Service feels that it has achieved a great service from the Society in validating the most appropriate experts by the fact of their membership on this advisory committee, I think they are under a great delusion. They just don't think they know how a society operates when that is the case. Gen. Rothshild: ... . Dr. Lederberg: Of course. But the Society doesn't propose anybody in a case of this sort. An officer of the Society does and using the Society to identify who some prominent microbiologists are. Rather than involve the membership of the Society in an issue about which they can't know very much why not just go after these people. You can get the list of officers of the ASM and if that's the criterion of excellence in microbiology and sometimes it is, and sometimes it isn't, but that information is public too. Nobody is keeping it a secret from the Army. Dr. Moulder: ... . Dr. Lederberg: I thought that was an extrapolation from the example I gave on dengue. They are mostly in that line, namely that agents will be widely disseminated for offensive purposes on the basis of what will necessarily be a very inadequate level of testing on security grounds and that even 10 or 100 or even 1000 people subjected to dengue virus under one set of conditions may be a very inappropriate basis to predict what will happen when much more massive populations are exposed under different conditions. One thing I should have stressed more clearly because it is in the back of my mind in all of this is that we don't know when the species is going to be subjected to another risk of decimation analogous to the black plague, analogous to the influenza pandemics and so on. There is not anyone who has the prophetic foresight to know when by the natural processes of the evolution of pathogenic microbes agents of this sort are going to come along. One reason that I had some sympathy for the certain activities in the field of biological warfare is that if public health can't justify the funds maybe the military security can to go after the methods of detection and even the methods of large scale defense against the threat which in this case will have been from natural rather than artificial sources. That is also a reason I would like to see that mode more public so that it could be made more apt for this purpose. It seems to me that the surest way in which to bring about the development of a deciminating pandemic is the selection of agents that have a marginal degree of incapacitation but are highly infective and highly durable in the atmosphere in order to meet the other requirements of military security. Then there will be an enormous difference between trying it out in an experimental basis on the few tens or a few thousands of individuals and leaving it out in nature subject to recombination and mutation on a very very large scale on an offensive basis. That is THE hazard that I am concerned about. Dr. Moulder: ... . Dr. Lederberg: You've got starting a huge focus is what you're saying. Dr. Moulder: ... . Dr. Rothschild: ... . Dr. Lederberg: Which we will have done over the next ten years and over the next 20 years given over. Dr. Rothschild: ... . Dr. Lederberg: Well, let me pursue just that point because _______. (blank) Dr. Rothschild: ... . Dr. Lederberg: Of course there is. There is a danger that this will happen tomorrow with another influenza and our existing public health measures won't be able to do anything about it. Dr. Rothschild: ... . Dr. Moulder: ... . Dr. Rothschild: ... . Dr. Moulder: ... . Dr. Lederberg: Well it plainly isn't enough, it isn't all that is possible to do from a technical standpoint. If we could develop that technical expertise to control infectious disease, I might regard it as even worth paying the cost of a biological warfare program at the same time. It is that lack of balance that we don't have that kind of world public health at a time when we are still playing with fire in these other directions. This is why I argue not for stopping this kind of research and development but for publicizing it. Because I think it will be the very impact of the more general realization of exactly what is going on, exactly what techniques are available that will provoke more effort in these lines. Dr. Douderoff: ... . Dr. Lederberg: I would like to make a remark about it Mike because I do not have priveleged information in this area. It is my belief based on what I've seen and has been published that no very sophisticated efforts are now entrained in their direction but some efforts are. Obviously efforts to produce more pathogenic agents are in the works and you occasionally hear reports on the genetics of virulence out of these laboratories and so on. I am personally (this is just a personal conviction) not deeply alarmed about the level of effort now going on in this direction. I am concerned what will happen if there is a 100 fold escalation of effort in biological warfare. And this I'm afraid is inevitably in the cards if we keep going as we have been. Each of the nations that might be involved in it is provoking the other, and it is that level of activity when as I say a 100 fold increase in the effort to produce more aggressive agents that might produce anyone of a large variety of calculated effects is when I think we really are in the soup. It is the anticipation of this vast expansion of this kind of suicidal effort that I would like us to stop right now. Because I don't think we will be able to stop it once we are committed that deeply to it. Leon Levintoin (sp?): ... . Dr. Rothschild: ... . Levintow (sp?): Dr. Rothschild: Question: Dr. Rothschild: Dr. Lederberg: I think there is a lot to be gained by not doing this unilaterally. But I think we lose a great deal by not taking the initiative towards negotiations in this area. This country is simply not doing that. I would be much more sympathetic to the line you took if we had made proposals in the UN or otherwise suggested a conference for the control of biological weapons and for mutual disclosure, tried to work out exactly what level of such disclosure is possible and so on. We have taken absolutely no position on this point. Dr. Rothschild: ... . Dr. Lederberg: I would like to know what they are, what American participation has been in this. Dr. Rothschild: ... . Dr. Lederberg: I'm not informed about any initiatives that this country has taken in this area. On the contrary a number have been brought up I agree entirely for propaganda purposes. For example by Hungary in the UN and they have been left tabled. And there has been no response on the part of the US at all to them. Dr. Rothschild: ... . Dr. Lederberg: I don't think any of our proposals have been pushed to the point that they have any degree of public visibility either to the American public or the Soviets and I think this is a difficult thing. Dr. Rothschild: ... . Dr. P. Wyatt: ... . Dr. Clark: .... . Dr. Lederberg: I would like to make a partial response to the remark you made because I think that there is a very important distinction. We are necessarily extremely sensitive down to the last iota on questions of security, disclosoure, and inspection when it comes to nuclear weapons. There is just no doubt whatsoever that to the extent that military security is security at all that our life does depend on that. The argument that I would like to make is that we can afford to take a higher level of risk with respect to the same issues of inspection and certainty of compliance on the other side in biological weaponry than we can in atomic weaponry. Precisely for the reasons that our survival as a nation does not depend on this. These are not valid weapons sufficiently proved out that they're going to be widely used anyhow in advance of some largely scale premonition that they have in fact been tested. They are not in the same stage of development that anybody can push a button and go ahead and do anything with them. I'm trying to say that just because we are at a stage long before the large scale development and deployment of these agents we can afford to explore levels of confidence with one another in the world about biological agents that we couldn't tolerate with respect to nuclear ones. And that is why I think they are very good candidates for efforts at reaching some degree of mutual agreement at a level of confidence that wouldn't be sufficient to apply to nuclear weaponry. Dr. Rothschild: ... . Dr. Lederberg: Well, I'd be glad to carry it one step further but I guess I was jumping one step ahead to the region of arms control. And assertions that we have in fact eliminated our stockpile of nuclear weapons is not something that we are about to do without very intensive inspection of machinery. I submit we can afford to enter a treaty with respect to the disposition of stockpiles of biological weapons at a level of confidence that falls far short of what we need in the nuclear area, and that is essentially what I was driving at. Joe Neilands: Gen. Rothschild: Joe Neilands: Dr. Rothschild: Dr. Lederberg: Well let's not make that part of any defense of American policy. Dr. Rothschild: Mark Achtman: Dr. Rothschild: Mark Achtman: Dr. Rothschild: Mark: Dr. Rothschild: Dr. Lederberg: No, I don't know anything about it, and I don't think that anybody else does either and I feel we are living in a fools paradise with respect to our security against world virus disease. Question: Dr. Lederberg: That was in Tihuana (sp?) No that wasn't entirely facetious if I can anticipate your remarks. That is clumsiness in dealing with very potent agents and it shouldn't be condoned. That clumsiness can occur in the service, it can occur in the police department and it oughtn't to be condoned. There ought to be skilled use of any of these agents. It has nothing to do with the philosophical issues about whether they're to be used at all. Dr. Rothschild: Dr. Allan G. Marr: Dr. Rothschild: Boyer: Dr. Rothschild: Dr. Lederberg: I think your remarks are strong arguments for more research on chemical warfare weapons to make sure they are developing to the point of efficacy where they can be relied upon. Separately from the combined use of any others. I think as you pointed out pragmatically many commanders do not have this degree of confidence in new weapons and how important it will be in such cases where there will be civilian hostages and so on is a question of the humane quality of a weapon going to be through a commander under the condition of stress in a military situation. He is going to use every combination of this resources that he has at his disposal and the net result may be no different than will be whether he had chemical weapons or not. If they could be developed to the point of absolute reliability we may reach the ideal state that you are talking about. You can win a war without hurting anybody but I think we call a halt before we get there. Dr. Rothschild: Dr. Moulder: Dr. Romig: Panel Discussion: Dr. Marr: Dr. Romig: Dr. Marr: Dr. Romig: Dr. Allen G. Marr: Dr. Romig: Gen. Rothschild: Dr. A.J. Clark: Dr. Rothschild: Dr. A.J. Clark: Dr. Rothschild: Dr. A.J. Clark: Dr. Moulder: Dr. Romig: Dr. Allen G. Marr: Dr. Moulder: Dr. Allen G. Marr: Dr. Moulder: Dr. Romig: Dr. Moulder: Dr. Romig: Dr. Moulder: Questioner: Dr. Moulder: Dr. Clark: Dr. Moulder: Dr. Clark: Dr. Moulder: Dr. Clark: Dr. Moulder: Dr. Clark: Dr. Moulder: Questioner: Dr. Moulder: Question: Dr. Moulder: Question: Dr. Marr: Dr. Clark: Dr.Marr: Dr. Moulder: Dr. Clark: Questioner: Dr. Wyatt: Dr. Romig: Questioner: Dr. Moulder: Dr. Rothschild: Dr. Clark: Dr. Rothschild: Dr. Clark: Dr. George Hegeman (sp?) Dr. Clark: Dr. Wyatt: Dr. Clark: Question: Dr. Clark: QUestion: Dr. Clark: Question: Dr.Marr: Dr. Phaff: Dr. Clark: Dr. Phaff: Dr. Clark: Dr. Moulder: Dr. Dimmick: Dr. Marr: Dr. Dimmick: Dr. Clark: Dr. Hegeman: Dr. Clark: Dr. Hegeman: Dr. Moulder: Dr. Hegeman: Dr. Moulder: Dr. Marr: Dr. Dimmick: Dr. Marr: Dr. Dimmick: Dr. Marr: Dr. Dimmick: Dr. Marr: Dr. Dimmick: Dr. Clark: Dr. Wyatt: Question: Dr. Marr: Question: Dr. Marr: Dr. Hegeman: Dr. Clark: Dr. Neilands: Dr. Dimmick: Dr. Neilands: Dr. Dimmick: Dr. Neilands: Dr. Dimmick: Dr. Neilands: Dr. Clark: Question: Dr. Clark: Question: Dr. Clark: Dr. Hegeman: Dr. Clark: Dr. Moulder: Dr. Clark: Dr. Romig: Dr. Clark: Dr. Moulder: Question: Dr. Clark: