PrOt, JUSTE Loe! Ovrg

rt . Department of Genetics
MY APR «1971 School of Medicine
Be ” Stanford University
v REMARKS ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A CW BAN Stanford, Caitfornia 9205
e CStPRI Pagar V)
Uv Chapter 3, Part 2 "National Security and CB Weapons" touches on the
p most sensitive considerations that will bear on national policies on BW

disarmament. Many good arguments are stated, but I feel that a great

zeal to justify the abolition of CW has glossed over some troublesome
problems, In particular, the argument is founded on the assumption that

the nuclear balance will remain somewhere near its present point of stability
and that this will be a security blanket to cover every important contigency.
But, of course, if this were the case there would be no motive for any party—

to invest in CW in the first place? Vt Drer

The shortcomings of mutual strategic deterrenta have been discussed at
great length elsewhere and need no general elaboration here. The chief concern
is that the threat is so terrible that it cannot be credibly invoked except
for threats which reach the essential core interests of the major nuclear
powers. A great deal of mischief continues to go on in the world directed at
disrupting the various coalitions that relate in more or less marginal ways
to those core interests,

The scenario that is of gravest concern is the potential use of CW by
a nuclear power, or one of its surrogates, against a non-nuclear advogary
who is,or is believed to be or may be made to be marginal to our own core
interests. In these circumstances the ‘ése" SE nuclear weapons might be too
risky a breach of the nuclear fire-break - and a surprise chemical attack would
then have some advantages, For example, the recent history of Middle Rastern
affairs offer, little complacency about the possible threat of a surprise
attack against Israel. In the present context some other contingencies are less
likely, but various errosions of world order could bring Greece, Turkey, Finland
or even Sweden within the orbit of similar threats. In these circumstances
the strategic use of CW could facilitate the rapid consolidation of a fait accompli
that would preempt an effective counter- reaction short of an ultimate nuclear
confontration, How muchteast can we place in the precise and correct fore-
calculation of the outcome! As unlikely or unpredictable as such events may
appear to be at present, no military establishment can afford to overlook such
contingencies in its force planning. And then technical expectations inevitably
interact with political motives,

There is little doubt about the desirability, on behalf of world order,
of the abolition of chemical weaponry. However,-chemical disarmament should not
be confused, as sometimes occurs during this chapter, with a token, vague, or
unverifiable Varye agreement. Vague prohibitions would be the most mischievious
by inciting mutual recriminations ,internationally, and internal divisions in
democratic societies. .

I do not argue that a CW counter-capability is a prefered response or
deterrent, The nuclear powers, including the USSR, would scarcely fail to
regard a strategic CW counter-attack on their home territory as equivalent to
a nuclear response. (On the other hand, retaliatory tactical use of CW against
incursive forces may be the most credible defensive potential short of pressing
the nuclear button and the anticipation thereof may continue to be some: deterrent
to CW aggression. These arguments are at least debatable. )

The central issue is not whether the US could tolerate an evasible ban
on CW. In view of the alternative hazards of a technology race an unverified
ban might not be extraordinarily more hazardous than the present hardly controlled
situation,

The point is that a verifiable CW ban would represent the only important
A tangible improvement of the present situation, Support for vague and or un-
verifiable agreements helps to make this goal unachievable.