Memo to JL

July 25, 1968

to respond to the Czech crisis and the Sakaroff's
manifesto. The New York Times and James Restons' columns have clearjyy been
devoted to conveying a message that the state department would be unwilling
to frame in official terms for the fear, clearly expressed, of provoking and
justifying even more intense Soveit intervention (Slovakia). The editorials
that appeared on the 19th and the 2lst and again in today's New York Times
stress the hazards of an aggressive Soviet policy. It is unfortunately
difficult to sammukez communicate an incentive on the other side, that a more
liberal Eastern Europe would make it possible to negotiate more relaxed terms
for arms control agreements. This might be the main thrust of a positive
response to Sakaroff's manifesto.

An Olliphant cartoon that appeared in the Post for July 20, is probably
the most poignant reminder of our délemma. It shows the Russian stradegists
cautioning that if they let Czechoslovakia go, the domino theory would apply.
Reston makes an essentially comparable point in his article for July 2h,

The one thing that does need further comment is his article of July 19
on pulling troops back from Europe. He refers to the American contribution
to NATO as an effective shield for Western Eupope that has éncouraged liberal
forces in Eastern Europe. This is certainly a debatable proposition. On the
other hand, the utility of American forces in Germany does deserve very
cautious consideration has an alternative to the probably development of an
independent German force if we were not there. In practice this means that

we still do have an army of occupation and probably will need to continue to

have one until some effective international peace keeping force can be organized
to take its place. Imagine the unpredictable consequences deriving from

the pressure from right wing elements and forces for unification of Germany
if the West German government did have an independent military capability
comparable to the French. It probably should be pointed out to the USSR
that the American presence in Europe is a defense against due responsible
autonomous action and should be reassuring rather than otherwise. If the
Warsaw pact were so constructed that it required a similar community of
action, we could have a comparable sense of security on our side. This would
be a very difficult subject to negotiate explicitely but it is certainly

what both sides would like to see brought ab out for the other.