Joshua Lederberg

In February 1975, 150 experts from around the world met at the
International Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules to discuss
openly the wisdom of pursuing genetic engineering research. Leder-
berg attended that meeting and has been an active participant in the
continuing debate on this controversial subject. In a recent paper (17)

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he expressed his view of the matter. He begins by explaining that we
now have the technical capability to fragment animal or human DNA
into perhaps a million segments and transfer a single segment to a
bacterial host for study or for production of large quantities of a
specific DNA segment. This technique of gene implantation can also
be used to transfer the genetic information from the cell of one species
to that of another. Although applications for the “DNA splicing”
procedure have not yet been fully developed, such research “promises
some of the most pervasive benefits for the public health since the
discovery and promulgation of antibiotics.” For example, the tech-
nique could be used for large-scale production of human proteins,
such as the antibody globulins that are currently in scarce supply for
medical use. The biosynthetic proteins would make it possible to
provide many people passive immunization against such infectious
diseases as influenza, hepatitis, herpes and rabies.

Lederberg emphasizes another important reason for continuing
DNA splicing research: to learn as much as possible about how to
defend against “viral pandemic.” A new, virulent strain of influenza,
for example, could be terribly destructive if scientists did not have
enough tools to quickly develop a vaccine, or some other medical
defense.

The potential benefits are great; there are also risks. Many scientists
are concerned that DNA splicing may inadvertently generate a new
pathogen inimicable to man. Since the procedure is relatively simple,
there is concern that people with “less-than-mature” professional and
ethical judgment may try to use it. Lederberg emphasizes the impor-
tance of making every effort to assess both the risks and the benefits
of DNA splicing research to find the optimal balance in its control.

A committee of the National Academy of Sciences has recom-
mended that where hazard in the research is reasonably predictable,
laboratory containment procedures akin to those appropriate for
known pathogens should be used. Lederberg agrees with this. He
disagrees, however, with proposals that would place extreme security
requirements on research involving implausible hazards, such as the
introduction of existing genes for antibiotic resistance into other non-
pathogenic species. Instead, he believes that the best strategy would
be to use safe ‘“‘vectors,” such as bacteria with little chance of survival
outside the laboratory.

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