Comments on "Study of the Post-Attack Environment"

A somewhat more detailed draft of this has been mislaid; so I will recapitu-
late very hatsily.
The model situation suggested was an ambient radiation level w€x2@xxudz% leading
to 20 rads/year. Might this not be much more serious than contemporary thinking posits?

1 A positive answer would then make any residual secpnd-strike capabolity a more credible
deterrent.

However, this could then simply be fed back into weapons design, and the net consequence
would be simply to encourage "dirty" bombs, in effect a step closer to the doomsdzy
machine approach to deterrence. That is to say, the study would rapidly move from

an arms-control to a military-design context.

Conversely, it would also motivate civil defense planning, and then the further actions
and reactions that can be predicted therefrom.

In summary, the study might illuminate the environment to be expected after a given
style of attack, but this would in turn be influenced by the technical reactions to
the findings. Is this a proper target for our own efforts?

There may be a positive value in studying retroaction effects-- the exteht to which a
"Vietor' would be poisoned by global spread of radioactive byproducts. But we do assume
that any first-strike would concentrate on acute, short-term damage to military faci-
lities and so on, with relatively little fallout.

What are the realistic possibilities of anticipating the political and social conse-
quences? Do you posit no further military aggression, either by the first attacker,

or by netighboring states? Or supportive cooperation? (These factors might loom larger
than any others in deciding the outcome of a nation-limited attack.) Again, since the
"cooperative support" would be one purpose of a military occufation, such a study again
merges into one of strategic design.

(I will retrieve some references mentioned in JD Singer's book @ p.78 <"Deterrence, Arms
Control and Disarmament>").

Biological hazards.

Even at the level of 20 rads/yr (administered chronically) the "health cost" of radiation
is likely to be about $100 per man rad, or less. Overkill at higher doses, and a

lower marginal value of another life (triage) would in fact reduce this considerebly

in a post-attack environment, assuming many casualties from physical destruction.

The chronic impairmant of productivity (in the framework of the present-day econozy)
would be about 10% of the health-value.

Direct effects on crops ete at this level would be negligible, except for the transport
of health-hazardous radioisotopes to man. One can say that there is a chance that

the man-effective radiation dose post-attack has been underestimated for neglect of
ecosystem factors, but I doubt if this is a decisively large factor.

Woodwell has edited a monograph on Ecologic Effects of Nuclear War (Brookhaven). 1

will be glad to get this out, and to review the radiobiology for the group if you are
interested. ;

Prof. Joshua Lederbarg

Department et Genotics _ .

School of Medicine Ce, -
Stanford University

Sanford, Catifernia 94305

MAY 14 1971