Brandt's Relations | With Soviet Union By Arthur J. Goldberg - RECENTLY there has been’ a spate of Press stories reporting misgivings by a num- ber of eminent Americans about Chancellor. - Brandt’s Soviet policy. Among those who ap- , parently disagree with West Germany’s ef-: forts to achieve a better understanding with the Soviet Union are General Clay, Ambas- The writer, now a New York at-'- torney, is the former U.N, Ambas- sador and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. / So : WU sador McCloy, Secretary Acheson and Secre->—~ tary Ball. All of these former high ranking government officials are men of distinction who have served their country well and all have had experience in times past with our German. policy. While I respect them personally, I never- theless am impelled to express complete dis- agreement with their approach to this grave problem. , ‘Their theme, as reported, is a common one: Brandt will be “entrapped by the Rus- Sians” to engage in diplomatic adventures | with the Soviet Union that could loosen, West: Germany’s firm Western ties. Chancel-; lor Brandt’s new policy of trying. to arrive. atr understandings with Moscow should be: slowed down. If pursued, it may result in al potential West German swing away from the: Atlantic Alliance toward Moscow. Brandt is | not. receiving enough concessions from Mos: | cow and the speed with which he is proceed- ing may be detrimental to the status of West ' Berlin and is prejudicing the four-power talks now under way. : I do not believe these criticisms of Chan- cellor Brandt’s policy are valid and I fear | that this cacophony of prestigious American ! voices may have the- grave consequence of undermining Chancellor . Branadt’s govern- ment, which is a tenuous coalition at best. It also may have the serious consequence of convincing the cold warriors in the Kremlin that our country is not genuinely interested in adletente with the Soviet Union on vital , matters of mutual interest and concern, par- ticularly the SALT talks now under way. In light of the Soviet’s overriding concern with the German problem, this could easily follow, particularly because of ambiguity as to whether these expressions by important privaté Americans have tacit administration support. , oe ‘I believe, therefore, that it is necessary to Boint.-qut some obvious and elementary truths; . nr eeeienntiiegs oe oe WILLY Brandt’s opposition to totalitarian- ism of any kind is a matter of record. He stood up against the Nazis and chose exile rather than collaborate with Hitler’s regime. As leader of the Social Democratic Party, he is sophisticated about the Soviet Union and its policies. He is not taken in by commun- ism any more than he was taken in by naz- ism. I can see no good reason for lecturing him about the character of the Soviet. re-- gime; he is well aware of how such aregime operates and of the dangers inherent in dealing with the Kremlin leadership. ‘ Brandt’s dedication to West Berlin as a bastion ‘of’ freedom also scarcely needs reaf- firmation, He was Mayor of West Berlin and , Was a.stalwart defender of its ties with West Gérmany and its allies. It stretches credulity to believe that he has changed his mind in any fundamental regard concerning. the fu- ture of West Berlin. . “Willy Brandt is seeking a detente with the Soviet Union in the interests of West Ger- many and the cause of peace and security in . Europe and throughout “the world. He be- Heves that the mutual self interest of Mos- cow and Bonn and its allies will be served thereby. I assume that he also believes that such.a detente will have profound effects. beneficial to the West in East Germany. I share this. belief with him, and: apparently Ulbricht does also since he and. his col- leagues in Communist East Germany have viewed the negotiations between Moscow and Bonn with grave apprehension. It is in- deed interesting that this apprehension should be. shared both by the Americans I have mentioned and by the East German Stalinist Communtst leadership. on THE SIMPLE tact of the matter i is that 25 years have elapsed since the end of World War II. Basically what Brandt is trying to do is to adjust West Germany to the realities of the situation. The status quo in’ Germany cannot be changed except by force or agree- ment. I do not know any responsible states- man who would recommend force; Brandt, therefore, is seeking an agreement which will ease the tensions that have arisen throughout the past 25 years with respect to Germany and Berlin. These tensions have affected not only Germany but all of us. I think Chancellor Brandt should be praised and supported for his courage in seeking an understanding with the Russians. And I think, also, that the United States should not be mrore German than the Ger- many of Willy Brandt in the effort he is making in this most important area. Finally, I do. not think the United States can have it both ways. We have pressured West Germany to adhere to the non-prolifer- ation treaty because of our justifiable inter- est in. preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and also.of achieving agreement _ between the two great super-powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, on dis- armament ‘measares. In other words, we have asked West Germany to accommodate itself to the realities of the nuclear situa- tion. Why, therefore, should we object to West Germany's seeking a reasonable de- tente ‘with Moscow, as we are attempting to do. . It would be the gravest of matters if, as a result of even subtle intervention on our | part, Chancellor Brandt’s regime were to topple. I can.conceive of no action by ovr country more detrimental to the hope of a reasonable ‘accommodation in Europe and the cause of a detente between the Soviet Union and the West if this were to occur.