1.000:
1.601
1.602:
1.004;
1.C06:
1.008
4.010
1.012
1.614
1.016
1.618
1.620
1.022
1.G24
A.C26
1.0286
1.030
1.032
1.034
1.036
1.638
1.c40
1.042
1.044
1.C4E
1.G48
1.650
1.652
1.654
1.656
1.058
1.060
1.062
1.C64
1.G66
1.068
1.070
1.072
1074
1.676
1.078
1.080
1.082
1.084
1.C8&6
1.088
1.090
1.092
1.094
1.096
1.098
1.100
1.102
1.104

cwll:

PROBLESS CF ARMS CCNTRCL AND CISARFMAMENT (138A)
Lecture &IX (Lederkerg): “Emergent issues in args certrol:
Chemical and kiological weapons: I"

The more basic facts about chemical warfare and its control would be
easy to summarize in one hour. Having twe weans tying together a very large
number of locse ends that have not yet been successfully tied together in
policy or in policy formulation; and I am not sure I']]1 do a very much
better job in sy exposition of them to you,

For sore more or less logical divisicn of the subject I'm going to
divide the problea of the control of chemical weaponry (CW) intc (a) the
core questions: of the lethal agents that might begin to ccmpete with
nuclear weaponry in a very serious escalation of the level cf fatalities in
armed conflict between nations, and (bf) cther aspects of Ch like tear gas
and herbicides. These questions are politically and in puklic fsychology
very much interwoven, and I must say, often hightly confused. For example,
senator Young on the floor of the Senate made a speech a few months ago in
which he referred to the accumulation of stocks of nerve gas ty the
Department of Defense, intended for use in riot control in this ccuntry.
What an ugly, preposterous allegation that would te! He was pessikly
thinking of tear gas and possibly thought there was not such difference
between the two. we need a level of precision in discussing chemicals which
is hard tc manage with a scientifically unsophisticated audience, such as
the Congress of the United States. It may be scmewhat easier in this
particular group. The closer you are to high school, protably the better
lettered you will be with respect to some cf these technical ccncepts.

The use of poisons in human hostility has an unmeasured antiquity.
The Bible doubtless refers to poisoning cf wells and other pestilences.
Thucydides reccrds the use of the fumes that can ke generated ty burning
pitch plus sulphur dating tack to at least the Sth century £.C. Many
so-called primitive cultures have discovered very sophisticated chemical
weapons in the form of herk poisons. Sore cf them have keccme quite
important in sedicine. (Curare, for example, is a South American arrow
poison which has been used toth for hunting game and for armed conflict. It
is as potent a chemical weapon as one would care to have. However, it must
be introduced into the circulation by Ltreaking the skin which is the main
reason it does not appear in the armamentarium of the United States Army at
the present time. Its equivalent in modern technclogy is nerve gas.)

However, with the development of the national military state engaged
in total warfare, since the Napoleonic era, the rules of war became
crystallized arcund the customs of the 19th century. There was very little
use of chemical weaponry, except incidentally for smokes and so on, during
that time. Not until the large-scale use of chlorine cn the Western Front
by the Germans in 1915 did chemical warfare again appear cn a large scale.
the Germans started with chlorine gas which was disseminated from cylinders
~~ gas tanks --~ that were krought to the front. They waited several weeks
from the time of their original deployment until the weather and the wind
were appropriate for their use and then they let lose at 5 p.m. cn April
22, 1915. At that time they liberated 180 tons of chlorine frcem 6,600
cylinders. Curing that period of time there was Flenty cf prior
intelligence. The French were well aware that something was afcct Eut they
made no use of the information and the initial attack was in fact quite
2.000;
2.002
2.c04
2.006
2.008
2.010
2.0142
2.074
2.016
2.018
2.620
2.022
20024
2.026
122028
2.030
2.632
2.034
2.36
2.38
2.040
2.042
2.044
2.C46
2-048
2-650
22652
22054
2.056
2.058
2-C60
2.062
2.064
2.666
2.068
2.070
2-072
2.674
2.076
2.678
2.080
2.082
2.084
2.086
2.088
2.090
2-092
2.094
2.096
2.098
2.100
2.102
2-104
2.106

Lederberg lecture XIX Chemical Warfare -2-

devastating. However, its effectiveness went beyond what the German Army
strategic planners had expected. They did not know how to exploit this fora
of attack; and they did not really capitalize on it in any very useful way.
They did try again once or twice in much the same fashion, ktut in spite of
a large number of casualties and in Spite of a very consideratle
psychological impact and disarray of the troops against which it was used,
it was not properly followed up from the point cf view of an important
Bilitary advantage.

However, starting from that time, World War I was the scene of a very
considerable escalation of chemical warfare on koth Sides, an astcnishingly
sharp and rapid buildup of a technology race involving koth offense and
defense. The identification of the agents used by the eneay, the
development of gas masks and the development of a doctrine for their
effective use for defensive purposes, the search for agents that would
penetrate the then known gas masks -- all of this was gcing onon both
Sides. By the end of the war, gas munitions came to occupy 5% cf the total
artillery that was expended during World War I.

The difficulties of using cylinders of gas that then blew downwind
toward the enemy has obvious disadvantages; scon thereafter the French
played a major role in finding ways of including chemical agents into
artillery shells and this very rapidly became the main vehicle for
exchanging these materials. Altogether, (according to the account which is
summarized in the volume of the Stockholm Institute for Peace Research
which is cn reserve) 113,000 tons of chemical agents were used in World War
T. They resulted in 1.3 million casualties. These were approximately 5% of
the total casualties in World War I. However, there were only $1,C00 deaths
attributed to gas warfare as compared to a total of akout 5 millicn of the
total] military casualties in World War I. Gas warfare was then very
effective in disatling trcoops in proportion to the level cf effort that was
expected in delivering chemical munitions. It also resulted in a
substantially lower fatality rate than did the other weapons during the
war. However, the use of these weapons was still escalating in 1918 and it
is impossible to predict what the further outcome would have keen.

The original gases that were used were chlorine and phosgene. The
French introduced tear gas on a small scale and this tecame very prevalent
on both sides in artillery shells. Tear gas is a tempecrarily disabling
agent which provokes mostly a psychological incapacity. The main function
disrupted ky tear gas is visicn due to the preduction cf tears and the
irritation of the cornea. There are secondary effects cn lung functions,
and in very large amounts any of these agents can be fatal. fut under the
usual conditions of military exposure they are not intended to te and they
only very rarely were. Chlorine is a lung irritant in its functions. It is
a much more serious agent from the point of view of fotential fatalities.
It can cause lung edema and pneumonia and long lasting disability with lung
itritation and did in a number of cases. It was not cften lethal in
proportion to the number of disabilities that it caused, tut often enough.

There was a very limited use of ancient poisons like hydrogen cyanide
(or prussic acid) or cyanogen chloride. These are very poisonous agents in
the context of the chemical laboratory but in the open field they are
difficult to handle. Mostly they are rather light and volatile and they
drift away very promptly from the area of applicaticn and they were not
used extensively. Then adamsite and mustard gas were introduced later into
3.C00;
3.002
3.C04
3. G06
3.08
3.610
3.012
3.014
3.016
4.G18
3.420
3.022
3.G24
3.026
3.428
3.630
3.032
3.034
3.036
3.638
3.640
3.042
3.4044
3.046
3.C48
3.050
3.652
3.654
3.056
3.658
3.060
3.€62
3.064
3.C66
3.C648
3.070
3.072
3.074
3.076
3.078
3.080
3.082
3.084
3.086
3.C88
3.090
3.0692
3.094
3.096
3.098
3.100
3.102
3. 104
3.106

Lederberg lecture XIX Chemical Warfare -3-

the war. Adamsite was another harrasing agent prokably rcre serious than
tear gas and mustard is a very serious weapon by every count. It is
described as a vesicant, that is to say it causes tlistering on the skin.
when inhaled it can cause internal blistering in the lungs and we now know
-~ it was not known at that time -- its action on cells is very similar to
that of YX-radiation. It does cause profound cell damage through the
Lreakage of chromosomes at a very fundamental level in cell physiclogy. It
is an extremely unpleasant agent with very long lasting effects. t#ustard
gas wounds often took years to heal properly. They protably account for a
significart part of the total casualties in World War I; and the use of
mustard was kecoming more and more prevalent by 1918.

However, with all that, chemical warfare was not of any particular
strategic significance during the war. [I do not think it influenced the
outcome ky one whit in any way. There was not the level of commitment ot it
aS a weapon that could have been expected tc have that outcoge. [It
undoubtedly had a very important psychological effect, particularly on
civilian populations, and this may have keen its major perceived utility.
That is tc say that the threat of chemical warfare attack would require the
adversary to invest a good deal in his cwn ccunter measures, issuing gas
masks to the population. Any air alarm had to also involve the disruption
that is connected with maintaining defenses against gas attacks and so
forth. And those say have been among the major costs. However, as you know,
aerial btomtardment did not reach any very sophisticated level during world
War I. Civilian populations were only incidentally involved and then mostly
as a byproduct of infantry and artillary moverent. The concept of strategic
bombardment of cities had not yet been refined.

Much of the further history of efforts at chemical warfare control is
connected with the fact that the Allies won the war. The use of poisen gas
by the Germans became an important part ef the ccncept cf German
Schrecklichkeit (horror and atrocity) in the conduct of war. The treaty of
Versailles, unilaterally imposed on the Central Powers, made a specific,
rather moralistic statement that, poison gas having keen condemned ty the
civilized world, the Central Powers were bound never again to undertake the
production cf or use of these agents. Il will come back to that again
because the language of the Versailles Treaty was eventually incorporated
without much fucther thought into the language of the Geneva Protccol a
little later on.

In the volume of hearings for the House Committee on Foreigr Affairs,
there is an excellent summary ky Professor Eunn of the University of
wisconsin on the history of the Geneva Frotocol and cther arses control
efforts. He quotes many of the relevant texts. The Versailles Treaty
included the provision that "the use of asphyxiating poeiscncus or other
gases and of analogous liquids and materials or devices teing prohibited,
their manutacture and importation are strictly ferbidden in Germany." This
text was not in any real sense negotiated. It was language that was put
together with a very large nuster of other provisions intended to hamper
any possibility of German rearmament after World War I. There was no cone
capable of protesting, analyzing, trying to understand the implications,
trying to dissect the draftmanship of the language when these phrases were
put together. Had there been, one might have expected to see sore
"legislative history" connected to the language. Consider “the use of
asphyxiatiny, poisonous or other gases and of analoyous liquids, materials
4.C003;
&.C02
4.C04
4. 006
4.C08
4.610
4,012
4,014
4.016

C18

- 020
4.u22
4,024
4.026
4.028
4.630
4.032
4.u34
4.036
4.638
4.c4ug
4,42
GLU4Y4
4.046
4.c4us
4.650
4.052
4.054
4.056
4.058
4.C60
4.G62
4.064
4.G66
4,068
4.c7O
4.072
4.074
4.076
4.078
4.080
4.082
4.084
u.C8E
4.088
4.090
4.092
4.094
4.096
4.098
4. 100
4.102
4.4104
4.106

Lederberg lecture XIX Chemical Warfare ~4~-

or devices." No one really knows what those words mean. They are a kind of
general, moral peohibition against doing anything naughty; but a defeated
power has ne possibility of complaint. The matter was net carefully
analyzed at that time.

in 1922 as part of the program of attempts at universal disarmament
under the yeneral aegis of the League of Nations the conference in
Washington proposed a treaty on submarines and on feoxicus gases. The
submarines part was an attempt to limit the then -turgeoning arms race among
the allied powers and Japan with respect to naval vessels. It alse included
language that was evidently drawn vertatim from the Versailles Peace
Treaty, “the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all
analogous liquids, materials or devices having reen justly condemned ky the
general opinion of the civilized world..." that the parties of the treaty
bind themselves to that prohibition. The fact that the Allied powers in
World War I had no compunctions about the retaliatory use of these agents
and had invested aS much in chemical warfare as the central powers is not
directly alluded to.

The 1922 treaty was proposed by the United States and the treaty was
in fact ratified by the United States including this language. It was
repudiated ky France who at that time was urwilliny to liwit itself in the
naval arms race. when they refused to sign, it ktecame a nullity ard neither
the French nor the United States would then ke further beund by a contract
that had failed of consummation,

There were further peace conferences during that era. The effort at
submarine limitation having been abandoned, the chemical warfare control
was extracted from it in further conferences and a treaty that is known
historically as the Geneva FEretocol was drafted and formulated in 1925.
This picked up the language with respect tc chemical agents that I have
just quoted, "tne use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and cf all
analogous liquid materials or devices." It also added a new provision on
tiolegical weapons. With the advance of the science cf sicrokiclogy,
kiological weapons ought to te nipped in the bud. The farties thus
disavowed 3B and CW and specifically “agree to te tcund as tetween
themselves according to this declaraticn." tThe qualifying phrase is of
utmost importance.

The protocol was promoted by the Department of State and ty the
United States delegation. It was approved ky all cther ccuntries with
insignificant exceptions then involved in the negotiaticns. It was then
presented to the United States Senate for ratification. It was generally
believed that it would te a pro forma matter since the Senate in 1922 had
already ratified a treaty that included identical language, and evidently
not very much care was taken to clear it with the necessary pecple. Eut
this time it ran into very great obstacles. The sources cf cpprosition to
the treaty had become crystallized. The United States was teginning to
enter intc a much more isolaticnist path. The repudiation cf the League of
Nations had already taken place. The further ipplicaticns of this were
keginning to be rigidified in United States policy and in the attitudes of
the Senate. It ended up that rather than being a pro fcrma matter that
would be automatically ratified that the Senate refused to ratify the
Geneva Protocol. besides the new isolationism, specific cfposition to the
ban on chemical warfare had been mobilized ky the chemical industry, the
chemical warfare service; the other hawks, even the Asgerican Chemical
5.000;
5.002
5.004
5.006
5.008
5.€10
5.012
5.014
5.016
5.018
5.020
5.9022
5.624
5.026
5.028
5.030
5.632
5.034
5.036
5.638
5.040
5.G42
5.6044
5.646
5.048
5.050
5.652
5.054
5.C56
5.058
5.060
5.062
5.C64
5.66
5.C68
5.070
5.072
5.074
5.676
5.078
5.C80
5.082
5.084
5.086
5.C84
5.690
5.092
5.094
5.096
5.098
5.100
5.102
5.104
5.106

Lederberg lecture XIX Chemical Warfare ~5-

Society, forred a very active lobbying group against the acceptance cf the
Frotocol. The principal arguments were that it was only a piece of paper
that would be scrapped anyhow in the event cf war, that America was
retreating to its own fortress and that it dia net want tc have anything to
do with the rest of the world and it woulda not rely on international
treaties, it would rely on its own strength and force and not get into any
entangling arrangements of any kind. So the Protccol was repudiated ky the
U.S. However, enough other countries had Signed it that it entered into
force as among those countries who signed.

In international law the Protocol has a Status of a contract. The
actual language ot the Protocol states that the parties are kound as among
themselves, that is to say, if T have joined the treaty, and if you also
joined it, then we are co-partners in a mutual multilateral agreerent that
we will not use chemical or microbiological methods of warfare against one
another. In the treaty is the implicit reservation that it does nct k-ar the
use of chemical weaponry against other countries that may have refused to
enter the Pretocol. That is in the language of the treaty. Fut in crder to
place even further stress on that, France, {among the first of the
countries to ratify the Protocol) added a Specific reservaticn that said
the same thing all over again, very explicitly. As far as France was
concerned the treaty would apply only to those countries who alsc were
bound by the conditions of the Protocol; and furthermore, France would not
consider that it was commited in respect to any country that troke the
treaty or with respect to any country any cf whcese allies ktroke the treaty.
This was an explicit reservaticn. This reservation was copied ky many other
countries who ratified the treaty... By well estaklished Frinciple of
internaticnal law the countries who Signed the treaty after these
teservations had keen stated, and did net object, were kound ty the
reservaticns. Juridically as well as politically, the Geneva Prctocol is
then a promise among parties of the treaty not to use these weapons first.
And it explicitly recites the Privilege of using these weapons if somecne
else uses them first against you. In fact the Scviet Unicn has taken the
official fosition that the Geneva Frotocol is the foundation-stcne of
deterrence in the area of chemical weaponry kecause it reiterates the
tights and the threat of retaliation in the event that it is violated. the
Frotocol is a way of announcing to the world that if anycne uses a chemical
weapon, there will be legitimized retaliation with chemical weaponry
against such use.

The Protocol says nothing about research, developrent, preduction,
stockpiles, proliferation, distribution, sales, acquisiticn, or any other
aspect of chemical weaponry. It is a contractual limitation on first use.
In the context that I have just indicated it is indeed a certain
encouragement to saintaining the capability of retaliation and therefore to
the development and the Stockpiling of chemical weapons in order to he
available as a deterrence. No one has stated that position wore clearly and
more unambiguously and perhaps more justifiably than the Scviet Union.

Eetweer World Wars I and Il were a few proking incidents in which
chemical weapons were protakly applied, although the documentation for this
is incomplete. (This is recited in much detail in the SIERI velure.) The
most credikle incidents were -- first that the Italian Fascists used
chemical weapons, probably mustard, in Ethiopia: some 16,000 out cf the
50,000 Ethiopian casualties during the Akyssinian war derived fron chemical
6.000;
6.002
6.004
6.006
6.008
6.010
6.012
6.0174
6.016
6.0618
6.20
6.022
6.024
6.026
6.628
6.630
6.632
6.034
6.036
6.6034
6.040
6.042
6.C4u4
6.046
6.U48
6.050
6.052
6.054
6.056
6.058
6.660
6.062
6.064
6.066
6.068
6.670
6.072
6.C74
6.076
6.078
6.€80
6.082
6.084
6.086
6.0894
6.090
6.692
6.094
6.096
6.098
6. 100
6.102
6. 104
6.106

Lederberg lecture XIX Chemical Warfare -6-

weapons. The Italian position held that this was perfectly correct despite
the prohititions of the Geneva Protocol; because it was in retaliation to
inhuman methods of warfare, including decapitation that had been practiced
by the Atyssinians in that conflict. Furthermore it was nct really a war
and therefore the protocol was not designed to te applied to it anyhow! The
Significance of CW here is obviously not that it enhanced the capakility of
Imperial [Italy to acquire Akyssinia. It was a military field test of
particular kind of chemical technology to give military planners in the
Italian Army the opportunity to evaluate the significance of Ck. Just as
the Spanish Civil War was used to test new air power technology.

We also have read many reports of the use of chenical weapons by
Japan in the invasion and occupation of China from akout 1932 to 1945,

In 1937 a group of chemists in the Nazi regime in Germany discovered
nerve gas, tabun, as a byproduct of searches for a chemical festicide.
(There is a very close connection ketween the biology and the technology of
an important class of insecticides, the organic phosphates, and the nerve
gas.) In these experiments, molecules knewn to interfere with the
transmission of the nerve impulses are tested for their relative toxicity
on insects and on mammals. Insecticide research is, of course, locking for
agents that have a very high degree of safety as far aS mangals, livestock
and man are concerned. These agents have improved very consideratly since
their early introduction; yet there are still fatalities in the
agricultural use of the agents designated as insecticides. By accident,
tabun was stumbled upon and was found to be at least as toxic to sammals as
to insects. This was very highly classified informaticn. Further
investigation in Germany then uncovered a series of other related and even
more effective agents like sarin and one or two cthers. That started a new
generation of CW agents. These were from a military point cf view very much
more effective than the others: except that they were lethal, which is not
a military advantage. But they acted very quickly, they are insidious, they
could work if applied to the skin as well as if they were breathed. If they
did not kill they would incapacitate, but not very long. If you are going
to die you'll know it within a few minutes; and if you have not received a
dose that kills you fairly promptly then you probably will recover from it
tecause the effects on the nerves are reversible. The way in which nerve
gas kills -- is paralysis of the respiratory centers and the stcppage of
respiraticn. Nerve gas was not known to the outside world during the entire
period of World War [I. The Germans, of course, kept it a secret.

As early aS 1942 the Nazis began large-scale production cof rerve gas.
They ended the war with stockpiles of at least 12,000 tons of nerve gas.
There is incosplete documentation of German policy during Werld War II
about the use of these agents. There is little doubt that a major element
in their initial decision not to use it in the early pericd of the war was
fear of retaliation. German intelligence was just as faulty as the Allies.
They heard CULors of a consideratle breakthrcugh in sope
insecticide-related research that was teing kept highly classified; and
they jumped to the conclusion that the Allies had also discovered nerve
gas. That material was not nerve gas, it was [D1, and this was a military
secret because a major devastation in military activity for centuries
immemorial has teen typhus fever spread by lice areng soldiers in
encamtpments. (On the other hand, we had equally faulty intelligence that
exaggerated the Japanese CW capability. There was information about their
1.000;
}.U02
7.004
}.006
1.008
}.010
1.012
7.014
1.016
tp OTe
7.020
1.022
1.024
1.026
7.028
7.030
1,032
2.034
7.036
7.038
7.040
7.042
7.048
7,046
7.048
7.050
7.052
7.054
7.056
7.058
7.060
7.062
7.064
7.066
7.068

Lederberg lecture XIX Chemical Warfare -7-

having used chemical weapons in China. Farticularly had there keen an
American invasion of Japan, there was considerakle fear that the Japanese
were preparing for the use of chemical weaponry. Actually they were not
competent, beth from the point of view of any new agents and from the point
of view of the development of the chemical industry.) In the later part of
the war it appears that German military doctrine was starting to lean
toward the use of chemical weapons. However, by that tise their chemical
industry was so disrupted and there were such acute shortages for synthetic
rubber and fuel; their economy was beginning to fall apart. They had also
lost the air war and they therefore no lcnger had the majer instrument for
the delivery of these weapons and therefore any Significant opportunity
they may have had to take advantage of their unmistakable technological
lead had reer lost.

Luring the war all of the Allied countries made statements to the
effect that the Allies would not be the first to use chemical wearpenry Lut
if the Germans used CW against the USSR or any of the Allies, then their
retaliation would be unleashed. The bluff worked! The fact that this
strateyy saved the Russians from being clotbered with nerve gas during
World War II, which could have been a decisive factcr in the German
invasion of the Soviet Union, undoubtedly plays a large part in their
present position with respect to arms control measures.

U.S. presidents have repeatedly ccmmitted the U.S. to the general
principles cf the Geneva protocol, without having had the wish or the power
to see it formally ratified ty the U.S. Senate. Since 1961, the war in
Vietnam has raised new issues in this field. The anti-war reacticn has
focussed a degree of attenticn on curbing Ch that was never achievatle
before despite the grave threats of escalation in lethal CW technclogy. On
the other hand, tear gas and herbicides were introduced in a way that
complicates the interpretation of waht CW should mean. It will ke difficult
to achieve further progress in the contre] of C or BK until this complex
array of issues is disentangled, with inevitatle delays in dealing with the
issues of most crucial import.

END CF LECTURE I