Joshua Lederberg

Views

“Germ warfare” has been universally
condemned as a vile perversion of
scientific insight. This emotional reac-
tion is buttressed by a rational con-
sideration of the strategic and political
instabilities that would follow from
threatened uses of biological weapons
and of the possibilities of worldwide
spread of infectious disease. In the
interest of world order and to reduce
the possibilities of igniting world con-
flict, the development, stockpiling, and
general accommodation of biological
weaponry must be controlled by inter-
national agreement.

The past twenty-five years, in the
course of which the world community
has reached a certain degree of fa-
nuliarity with the problems of nuclear
power and has undertaken some of the
steps needed to contain it as a servant
for rather than against human aims,
have seen a sustained and remarkable
development of molecular biology.
For example, Professor Gobind Khor-
ana recently reported the synthetic
assembly of a small gene through
chemical operations on DNA com-
ponents. It will be a step of another
order of magnitude to extend this
technical capability to the synthesis
of small viruses, but this surely will be
accomplished within the next decade.
This procedure will allow an unlim-

Dr, Lederberg is Professor of Genetics at Stanford
University School of Medicine. His research
career has centered on the genetics and evolution of
microorganisms and was recognized by the award
of a Nobel Prize in physiology and medicine in
1958, He was a member of the panel of consul-
tants on health aspects of chemical and biological
weapons of the WHO, whose report to the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations, in 1969,
helped to focus international interest on new
control agreements. These remarks are abstracted
from a presentation ta the Conference of the Com-
muttee on Disarmament, Geneva, August 5, 1970.
Address: School of Medicine, Stanford University,
Stanford, CA 9.1305.

Biological Warfare: A Global Threat

Will biomedical knowledge be dedicated to peaceful uses by
international agreement or do we face a new weapons spiral?

ited range of experimental variations
of the genetic structure of different
viruses, a process which has many
important potential applications for
human health. It also offers us the
prospect of engineering the design of
viruses to exquisite detail. Accom-
plishments like Khorana’s have been
possible in a small laboratory on an
annual research budget which is
miniscule compared to weapons hard-
ware.

For many years BW has been given
only incidental attention as a subject
of diplomatic discussion, for it seemed
to have little bearing on the adjust-
ments of power that were the main
work of specialists in foreign affairs.
However, BW does have something
to do with efforts to reduce the barbar-
ity of warfare. BW stands apart from
all other devices in the actual threat
that it poses to the health and life
expectancy of every human_ being
whether or not he is politically in-
volved in belligerent actions. In a
word, the intentional release of an
infectious particle, be it a virus or
bacterium, from the confines of the
laboratory or of medical practice must
be condemned as an_ irresponsible
threat against the whole human com-
munity.

The Black Death

The Black Death, the great bubonic
plague that ravaged Europe in the
mid-fourteenth century, is in fact a
well-documented historic example of

Just this process. The plague first

entered Europe in 1346 via the sailors,
rats, and fleas on the ships that re-
turned to Genoa after having been
expelled from Theodosia in the Cri-
mea, where the attacking Tartars had
catapulted some of their corpses into
the Genoese fortifications. This plague,

American Scientist v. 59

which reduced the population of
Europe by at least one-third, would of
course almost surely have made its
way West sooner or later, the nature of
the disease being quite beyond the
comprehension of the medical science
of that era.

The Black Death in Europe was only
one of many visitations of the plague
suffered by Europe during the last
2,000 years. We do not know why this
one should have been so much more
disastrous than many others. The
progress of a disease in any given
individual is subject to many factors,
of which only a few are well under-
stood. A large epidemic, involving
millions of people spread over time
and space, is an immensely more
complicated phenomenon, about
which it is very difficult to make accu-
rate scientific predictions. This com-
bination of a grave potential hazard
with a high degree of unpredictability
is a peculiar attribute of biological
weaponry at its present stage of de-
velopment, and it has a great deal to
do with the rational doctrine that so
far has placed a relatively low value on
its military utility.

The present situation thus might pro-
vide the most favorable opportunity
for international action to regulate
the further development and prolifera-
tion of BW. I am convinced that we
know enough about it to have legiti-
mate concern about its future pros-
pects. Until now no nation appears to
have staked its security to any signifi-
cant degree on BW armaments. I
would therefore hope this provides a
basis for accord. If we wait until
BW has been developed into a reliable
armament for use under a range of
military doctrines, it could then be too
late to disengage important powers
from their commitment to it.

1971 March-April 195

(2)
The main barriers that may today
keep bubonic plague from being a
great threat in advanced countries are
(1) understanding and use of quaran-
tine, (2) the suppression of rats and
fleas by general urban hygiene, and
(3) the use of modern therapy, es-
pecially antibiotics, to control the
disease. Each one of these barriers
could be breached by further technical
developments if a substantial effort
were to be applied during the next
decade to making the plague bacillus
into a weapon.

Other infectious agents might be
even more adaptable. Some of man’s
deadliest enemies are viruses which,
like yellow fever, are transmitted by
mosquitos or other arthropods. These
have the advantage, from a military
standpoint, that they may not start a
potentially retroactive epidemic in
areas where the vector insect does not
normally abound. [1 is already evident
that such insect-borne viruses could be
applied in the first instance by direct
aerial dissemination, with little or no
further spread from the first wave of
infected targets.

Recent reports of airborne or pneu-
monic rabies, a terrible disease, which
is normally spread by the bite of an
infected dog or other animal, illus-
trate this possibility. There is the
danger that, if a large nucleus of
people is attacked by insect-borne
viruses, further evolution of the virus
may give rise to a new form of the
disease that does spread from person
to person, contrary to the calculations
of the attacker. The Black Death itself
underwent a similar evolution from
the original bubonic plague which
was spread by fleas to outbreaks of the
pneumonic varicty which is far more
contagious.

We have learned in recent years that
viruses undergo constant evolution in
their own natural history, not only by
mutations within a given strain, but
also by the natural cross-hybridization
of viruses that superficially appear to
be only remotely related to one an-
other. Furthermore, many of us carry
viruses in our body cells of which we
are unaware for years and which may
be harmless—though they may even-
tually cause the formation of a tumor,
or of brain degeneration, or of other
diseases. At least in the laboratory,
we can show that such latent viruses
can still cross-breed with other viruses
to give rise to new forms.

196 American Scientist, Volume 59

Escalation of BW research

My gravest concern is that similar
scientific breakthroughs of a rather
predictable kind will be made and
their potential military significance
exploited, so as to result in a trans-
forination of current doctrine about
“unreliable” biological weapons. We
are all familiar with the process of
mutual escalation in which the de-
fensive efforts of one side inevitably
contribute to further technical de-
velopments on the other, and vice
versa. The mere existence of such a
contest produces a mutual stimulation
of effort; moreover, there is no practi-
cal system of counterintelligence that
will protect secret work for an indefi-
nite period of time from becoming
known to others. And the potential
undoubtedly exists for the design and
development of infective agents against
which no credible defense is possible,
through the genetic and chemical
manipulation of these agents. It is thus
clear to me that if we do not do some-
thing about this possibility, work will
go forward and my fears will become
realities.

For many years I have advocated
that the control of biological warfare
be given a special place in interna-
tional and national initiatives, for
reasons I have mentioned. I am deeply
gratified that President Nixon’s an-
nouncement (November 1969) which
disavowed offensive biological war-
fare development has made it possible
for me to address these issues in terms
fully consistent with the policy of the
government of my own country.

Man’s natural enemies

Even after agreement to eliminate bio-
logical weapons, we will still remain
very vulnerable to a form of biological
warfare which is beyond the reach of
any covenant that we can make. This
is the warfare practiced upon us by
nature, the unremitting barrage of
infection by old and new agents that
still constitute a very large part of
the perils to normal and healthy life.

We have all had vexing, perhaps even
tragic, personal experiences with virus
infections. The global epidemic of
influenza that was first identified in
Hong Kong about three years ago was
not a particularly severe form of the
virus, and its eventual mortality was
probably only in the tens of thousands.
It is wrong, however, to believe that

there is any assurance that the next
epidemic of this kind will be as mild:
and we have still developed only the
most feeble and precarious protection
against this threat whose impact is
shared by all the nations but against
which very little common defense has
been erected.

From time to time small outbreaks of
mysterious new diseases like “Lassa
fever” and the ‘Marburg virus’ have
been in the news. These were both
extremely dangerous threats: and
while much credit must be given to the
diligence of the medical people who
dealt with the outbreaks, a large ele-
ment of pure luck was involved in
localizing these incidents. We must
expect that there are many additional
viruses already indigenous to primate
and human populations in primitive
areas, to which the inhabitants of ad-
vanced countries are extremely vulner-

able.

Yellow fever is a historically im-
portant disease which now belongs in
the same category. It is maintained on
earth mainly through an animal reser-
voir of infection, in the monkeys in
tropical jungles. Urban populations
are now protected from yellow fever by
campaigns to abolish the fever-carry-
ing species of mosquitos in South
America and by the availability of
excellent vaccines in advanced coun-
tries. Mosquito species very well ca-
pable of transmitting yellow fever are,
however, abundant in South Asia
and the accidental introduction of
yellow fever, for example, into India
would be a human tragedy of cata-
strophic dimensions. Specialists in
epidemiology are quite puzzled that
this accident has not already hap-
pened; we have no satisfactory ex-
planation for this good fortune.

I would not mention facts like these,
which might stimulate psychotic imag-
inations, if they were not already well
known. My purpose is not to suggest
the vulnerability of the Asian conti-
nent to biological military attack but
rather to point out immense gaps in
the pattern of international coopera-
tive defenses that should be mounted
but that seem to have a low priority in
the present-day world. This is in no
way a derogation of the splendid ef-
forts of the World Health Organiza-
tion but an indication of the hmita-
tions of its budget and a suggestion
that much more needs to be done and
could be done with resources that
might be given over to biological work
in the future.

Countries that are undergoing a transi-
tion in the development of their agri-
culture are vulnerable to analogous
threats in biological warfare directed
against crops as distinguished from
human targets. The introduction of
new crop varieties, which has had all
the human benefits attached to the
“green revolution,” also means that
the food supplies of vast territories are
now committed to specialized strains
of wheat, rice, and other basic crops.
These are now newly vulnerable to
destruction by plant pests of either
natural or artificial origin. (The re-
cent outbreak of corn blight in the U.S.
was a costly confirmation of this out-
look.)

Biological “‘peacefare”’

The promulgation of an international
agreement to control biological war-
fare in a negative sense should, there-
fore, be accompanied by steps ur-
gently needed to build positive efforts
at international cooperation, a kind of
defensive biological research against
natural enemies of the human species.
One of the best assurances any country
might have that the microbiological
research of its neighbors was directed
toward human purposes would be
constantly expanding participation in
international health programs. Any
country that publicly and avowedly
subscribed to the total renunciation of
secret BW research might conceivably
continue clandestine efforts without
revealing their conéent. There would,
however, be great difficulty in main-
taining such an effort, at any sub-
stantial level or quality of operation,
while still keeping its very existence
secret. It would soon be known by its
own citizens who are specialists in
health-oriented research and who are
deeply involved in furthering health
research activities within the frame-
work of the international community.
Therefore, besides the obvious direct
health benefits of expanded interna-
tional cooperation, we would also be
rewarded by a higher level of mutual
assurance that every party was indeed
living up to the spirit of its obligations
under a BW convention.

As the delegates to the Disarmament
Conference are well aware, the United
States’ historic failure to ratify the
Geneva protocol of 1925 was a major

obstacle to international control of
BW. At this writing, the issue is be-
fore the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. The Geneva protocol will
undoubtedly be approved, though not
before an embittered debate about the
definition of chemical weapons (be-
sides nerve gas, should this also mean
tear gas? herbicides?), which present
a whole range of problems distinct
from those of BW. This question aside,
the Geneva protocol is only a partial
answer to international control, for it
effectively constrains only the first use
of a forbidden weapon. In fact, the
U.S.S.R. has stressed that the threat
of retaliation against a first use has
been the main deterrent against
lethal CW, e.g. the use of nerve gas by
Hitler in World War II. However,
this actually encourages investment
in military technology for the testing,
development, and stockpiling of more
and more fearsome biological weapons
in order to maintain such a deterrent.

The U.S. and the U.K. have proposed
a specific ban on afl aspects of BW in
order to close this gap left by the
Geneva protocol. The Soviet bloc
counterproposes a comprehensive ban
(but with no provision for interna-
tional inspection or verification) on
chemical as well as biological weap-

ons. This approach is regarded by the
Western bloc as an evasion of basic
needs for security and likely to make
more problems than it solves, for lack
of a clear definition of a chemical
weapon. This problem would be ag-
eravated if non-lethal agents Jike
tear gas or herbicides are designated
as chemical weapons, since the domes-
tic uses of such chemicals make non-
sense of a prohibition against de-
velopment and stockpiling.

Ecological warfare must be minimized
to the extent that any controls on the
conduct of war can minimize its
ferocity; likewise we should seek all
possible measures to dampen needless
brutality, especially against civilians.
To lump herbicides and tcar gas with
BW for these reasons imperils solu-
tions to all of these problems.

Some of the speculations I have men-
tioned are ones that all of us must fer-
vently hope will never materialize.
But it would seem both foolish and
arrogant to assume that our good will
alone, without concrete arrangements,
will serve to forestall the further de-
velopment, proliferation, and possible
eventual recourse to what surely is one
of the most ghastly methods of warfare
imaginable.

 

“It looks great, but why don’t we put it on a punchcard so I can under-
stand it.”

1971 March-April 197