1,3 ‘PECRUITD nT: Let's start at the very beginning of your participation in the Anil debate. l. ifo.r did you bkecore active in the cebate? 2. Who recruited you (to write the article, testify, etc.)?. 3. What was your motivation for involvement in the AB? controversy? , 4, tow effective did you think you would be, i.e., what were your expectations of success? 5. Dic you recruit any other scientists to enter the fray? I was writing regularly on "Science and Man" for the Washington Post. I was somewhat disappointed in Humphrey's ambiguous associations with Johnson's Vietnam policy; I was looking for issues that might help dsicover, and fix, distinctions between his and LBJ's approaches to military policy. I thought the ABM debate, as of 1968, was. a crucial test; and one furthermore that would ‘make a difference' as between Humphrey and Nixon. I did not want to see another missile-gap myth like the 60 campaigh's, end up in a new distortion of our own force calculations. See my 6-22-68 article and thereafter. 2. No one. 4-5, Foresaw an outside chance that. force stratgeies might be effectively debated during the campaign. I asked Jerry Wiesner (as a scientists! committee for HHH) to advocate this to Humphrey, which he did, with indifferent success. ~2- TOTAL ACTIVITY ENGAGED IN REGARDING ABM 1. What were all the things you did. to oppose or support deployment of ABM? 2. How much time and energy co you estimate you expended? 3. Have you spent similar amounts on cther issues? 4. If so, which, when? 1 Some financial contributions; Council for Livable WHXKH World. A few personal letters to senatord. Odd talks on campus. Incidental references in other articles. Not a great deal. A man-week perhaps. 3-4 Much more, e.g. on biological warfare 1966=71. But my, style is not energetic political activism. JI am analytically involved in a wide variety of issues. 3 1. How would you estimate the di¥ision of the scientific community onABM? 90% opposed; 10% for deployment , 75 25 50. 50 25 75 10 90 2. Would you differentiste among academic, industrial and government scientists? Hetween those knowledgesble about ABM and not? &. To what do you ettribute the differences between pro and anti ABM scientists? - . 4. Overall, do you think the extentx and intensity of the scientists! participation in the ABM debate has been beneficial or detrimental to the scientific community? Oo. Has there been any retribution whether to a scientist individua:ly or to the community es s result of tne ABN debate? lL 90% opposed. 2. acad>govt>industrial opposed. More knwledgeable about ABM more Likely to favor it (as a technological tour de force). Those who underatand 3 the economics and politics of action-reaction, or who look more closely into the specific missions for which different designs are planned (like Panofsky) have opposed it. Willingness to accept and plan for a world of mutual hostagery. is the central -issue. Many people find this psychologically intolerable. How ‘can we trust the rationality of anx enemg? Level of confidance in American institutéons is another factor; some anti-ABMers are merely foolhardy Cabout values they have limited faith in) and would take stréng risks in unilateral dismrmament, or do anything to defang the DOD. Some pro-ABMers accept the cogency of technical argument against the present plans, but believe that technology can ultimately solve any problem. 4 Overall about neutral. Pro: some heightened sensitivity and sense of efficacy about role in political decision;,Con: a lot of commitment by peaple who had not thought very deeply about it and took a great deal by rote, on faith. : 5 Retribution? a strong word. Perhaps might be applied to Long/Hammord cases; but it is not unreasonable that the President have the confidence of his principal advisers. Remarkable little recrimination against individuals as far as I am aware. Doubtless helped to polarize a majoritybin Congress against scientists' meddling, and in turn against science (esp. NSF funding: I would not put great weight on this. EFFECTS OF PARTICIPATION: POLITICAL 1. Has your participaticn altered your political views in any way? -. .2. Would you say your experience in the ASM debate has made you more or less likely to participate in future ‘scientific or technological issues with political impli- cations? , -3. What are they likely to be? 1-2 shoe's on the other foot. Dabbling in ABM was bybproduct of mynother commitments to public communication on scientific matters, . 3 impact of sciehtifiic advances (esp. biology): domestication of science. -5- PREVIOUS POLITICAL ACTIVITY: _ i. Did you engage in-any partisan political activity Prior to tne ABM dehate? If so,what, campaigning for Candidate? Financial contributions? Writing letters on behalf of someone? 2. Were you previously active in such scientific organizations concerned with public issues such as the Fed. of Amer. Scientists? 1. some pf all, in dependent of ABM issue 2 somewhat -6~- 1. Is i a selene tem = lone ar ine B&D from procurement and depolyment?. 0 scic s e with things they d ? 3. Is there anything j t eres 1g in US policy or attitudes ther. i | ose ythi a nat makes likely the — you think ABN Le ergo? Bee is there a technological taperative? a. cally feasible? oi ween, Cipcpe.s rte fe : Sta 5. If you did think it would do chat tls ea ceed co doy would cog 2 rede favor its deployment, why? mpesese £8 Gey would you 1. I'm not sure I undesstand. I think technology can’ be developed and th prudently be contained. But lead time problems complicate this for bal ce forces in international competition. I.E. If the USSR had developed crn are constrained to do much the same, even shortbof defloyment == anaes 2. Yes. But other scientists (and politicians) can enlarge their wisdmn 3. You mean Ellul's jaw? I think he has cart before the engine. No. (see pl88 attach.) : ch. : bovciewd c. me not for its present missions. Undoubtedly it could eventually e develope or site-defense. Useles -~limi : ; capability. s for damage-limitation a/c Soviet reaction 5. Upset the strategic balance. (see 220 attached). 1. To. what do you attribute the change in votes and apparent interest 'in the ABM between '69 & '7C? 2. Have you any knowledge or thoughts about how and why ‘the anti-Chinese rationale was dropped by the Sen. Armed Services Committee this year? 1. -Strengthening of anti-war movement generally (should be irrelevant!). 2 Confuses the "SALT bargaining chop argument ''. Hard to defend ekk residual ABM (national comm and center) that way (or any other! ). ’ VIEWS OF OPPOHENTS + 1. How well informed do you think your scientific opponents were? 2. Which one of your opponents do you really feel knew what he was talking about? Wohlstetter, e.g. 3. Do you think access to classified inforwation was important in the debate? 1-2 Issue did not really center on technical evaluation (though I share doubts about problems like realibility of the computervprogramming sans operational tests.) I did not gemekxx enter into any direct debate with scientific opponents. I have read a fair bét of the Congressional testimony, however. 3 Yes, for the technical evaluations. I had to grant every debatable point for lack of such access. Therefore I relied, indérectly, to a very large extent on the statements of Panofsky and Drell, and to a lesser extent, Wiesner, York and others for the appropriate coloration of response on that score, ‘All these granted, xkexxe there memained the political evaluation (in terms of deterrence theory), and the face-walue of professed arguments like the bargaining chip. NOW LET'S TALK ABOUT- ALL THE, PEOPLE YOu CONTACTED REGARDING THE ABM: COMMUNITY LEADERS, COMMUNITY GROUPS 1. Did you make any effort to engage the cormunity in Giscussing this issue? 2. If yes, how did you co about it? In muted fashion, Stanford students. * Letters to ediotr; few talks. CONTACTS WITH CONGRESSHEN AND. SENATORS ode With which senators and congressmen did you have any. contact concerning the Ali? 2. Who initiated it? 3. How many times did you see or write to each one? 4. Which AA's or LA's did you see or contact? - 5. ho initiated these contacts? 6. Which £legislators or their assistants do you think you influenced? 1,Harris, Mondale, Tunney. 2 1 wrote. . 3.1 of 2. 4-6 0 or ? However, my Post column is read widely in Washington, and is my principal means of reaching Congress. . -li- CONTACTS (ITH THE DEFENSE TECHNICAL COMMUNITY WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE DRANCH (ARPA, DOD, ACDA, IRB, ETC.) 1. Whom did you communicate with? 2. Who initiated the contacts? 3. Whom do you feel you influenced? 4. Who do you feel influenced your thinking? Jr oe ¢ ANOS : aed ph Pn sci ~12- CONTACTS WITH THE DEFENSE TECHNICAL COMMUNITY OUTSIDE THE . MASS GOVT: INDUSTRIAL & NON-PROFITS l. Whom did you communicate with? 2. Who initiated the contacts? 3. Whom do you feel you influenced? 4. Who do you feel influenced your thinking? -13- MEDIA: 1. .TV? Radic? 2. When, how, who arranged? - 3. How effective? ——- rach 4, Feedback from listenef¥s or readers? er -~14- CONTACTS WITS SOCIAL SCIENTISTS 1. Did you communicate with or make use of any social Scientists during your participation? 2. Normative: What is your view of the © - ole played - by the social scientists in the debate? -15-— TECHNICAL AND PROFESSIONAL MEETINGS 1. If engaged in public debate, how recruited? 2, What think of politicization of professional organiza- tions? | KK Roar “J . J ye Thar een fod & vey ph noes -16- ‘Now LET'S MOVE TO MORE GENERAL AREAS AND TALK ABOUT THE ROLE OF “SCIENTISTS AS ADVISORS: ' 1, In general, do you think scientists are used to legitimate decisions based on political considerations, or ¢o you think they really : influenced governmental thinking on the ABH? 2. Could you give me any examples to beer out what you just said? 3. What is your explanation of the Sept '67 decision to deploy? Do you think any scientists were consultes on that decision? If so, who? 4, What is your explanation of the March 169 Safeguard decision? Do you think any scientists were consulted on that decision? If so, who? mo . . inne ack Tiny! “4 4A a & . bo ct ph eee Cu - Ce or pts ait oe 4 , f 4 Cerca UAB hag, COA. I. OD, oS AMAL jue fags Arey oT ; TAL a ,. : ot t, AE re Anh 3G ; 0, bel ky pot | enews AD BI, i, AOALAIAD I 4 aA 1 Cnepaidindt Artes | i Pea A/ 4) ~ , dae . om 34. Ve Cb lees CAD Ge ~ 01 a fi on Kw oe eed fre Qt A ~ ce he, ~~ of U Lge My a n rer Aes Pee, ula Jodi obsess. ca na SOK Lod nuns tan yet Ae te Degen hurd + t - agente A — col Arnie mehr nttal. q dou h Aa elle ae - - . / fo - . - +" of ne, dk fh UWE (noeh Y. [eperes ANAND: ney pow porsche. ca 7 7G a) ate cent! Are yf Apes Ce ‘enhnny de psoas: (rf Opal 7 } Cetrt it vor Sud oe Ve. ‘J -. SK fe 7 if ( an ° . a a 7 ——— , of - UP , Milos Werid's SP ee aet a et . oa 4d . ' . hh oy A, - ; N : ; } * “ TD tn rte ttn. 1k GZ. tga kay? to AD . Cake PEs OF s90* / {;, } ‘ A ° ; “] | . ie a i \ALawn be Coe Aart oe SO Cranford > AS) ny Chew Grrek he 7-17- CONGRESS : 1. What is your view of a congressman's or senator's ability to understand the technical issues involved? 2. Do you think congressmen and’ senators are able to secure adequate outside expertise? 3.. If not, how would you ameliorate this? . , . \ . ~ i | f i . ao . , i , CRAB OL CAR Celt Sepntirfre : ~~ - —— /) — oo 4 7 , f if ay, . A a Ge ahs. Lb QLA. Aeey MA dpc CL A & 4p al y ay | he | ae Crooks rn fs te. an Cc yo 0 ¢ af Lent ee ileoy Oy, FING of Boos tan Ap ANY ear & Ae ‘putes j yoo 8 COU . \ m~ SQ c Me SS ; t.. > ~ (™ i ‘ we g Sy y . Nd 4 ~19- 1. Can a scientist give impartial advice on a question like ABM? 2. Should he, or should he assume an advocacy position and enlist - others to his cause? Row will he be rore effective? 3. With how many decisions of a govt should a man disagree before he decides he must resign from his advisory position in order to maintain his integrity? 4. Can you give an example of where you think it would have been effective in the ABM case if a scientist had resigned? ie aan } | me i SA te f | Aneta Ch Crt) eed « Phe Pyare Ly a Pet Lrg > Crt. <3 AAieds —Yhat.weapons--should-~be--devetoped sO 3--hat-—weapens—should- “NSt be de vehoped? 4, View of SALT talks? 5. How do you view the military establishment in thi country? 1. ‘Atlantic Alliance! economic and political unification 3 systematic programs of world development. - B 4, See 220. Maybe start of longlasting better dialogue with ‘USSR over mutual problems. (@$¢4¢ 5. It has enormous job to do; under systematic direction like McNamara's, it can do it rather well. Side effects, of inappropriate degree of political and economic infltence that are difficult to seprate from the scale of its task,_ need to be watched more carefully. Will take a shrewd and courageous Bresident and OSD. Laird may be doing moderately well, but the task of ‘keeping DOD honest! is’ an enormous one. The recent Enthoven-Smith book paints a convincing picture. Military people whould have broader career options, e.g. to branch into foreign service, arms control, AID work etc., so they are notbpersonally locked into a rigid narrow stance of how to solve the country's problems. Conversely a good combat solder does not necessarily mature into the shrewdest strategist. DOD cannot be held responsible if the President accepts only its advice, knowing the inherent bias .in the source. But DOD must be more actively barred from influence in Other areans ---_suppest—ef—acadamitc rescareh; regional employment patterns; foreign policy. Yarmolinkky's book covers this very well. DOD should not be the prime funder in areas like engineering research. It needs significant contact with the academic community, but the latter must have other recourse to keep its independence. be OY 1. How do you regard Russia? 2. How would you assess the probability that we and the Soviet Union ' will engage in a massive engagement within the next 5-10 years? — 3. How much contact have you had with Russian scientists? “7vé yor 2 4. How do you regard China? . 5. How would you assess the probability that we and the Chinese _ will engage in a massive engagement within the next 5-10 years? 6. Have you participated in any Pugwash Conferences? > cewv fe Cussr4 1. Captured by a dictatorship, in a historical tragedy. 2. p= 0.1 «a gravely high number. If we do not repair our domestic divisions, we may (mis?)lead the hardliners in the USSR to try for very risky adventures..in the belief that we are incapable of responding. (E.G. a Cubanization of Latin America). 3. Discussions at meetings in US and Europe. Vists to my lab. I have nver visited USSR 4. “Waking Giant". Confused in national ideology. (Communism may be a passing phase in its national developments,;)/ i.e. nationalism runs’ deepr than politica,é . 5. Would require a major stupidity. p = .05. 6. No. (Hard luck in following through several invitations that I had intended to accept.) ~26— 1. Do you feel one's: institutional position; whether one is in academia, industry or government cclorg one's political perceptions? 2. If yes, how? 3. If not, why not? 1. Personal success invidiously systains faith un the status quo. "Outspoken liherals" would be intemperate radicals if they lacked personal anchors. THE LAST PEt QUESTIONS ARE A BIT “ORE PERSONAL... ; 1. Who was you thesis advisor? 5 Were You politically active . . Did you Clscuss politics or interface with your professor? d . Ar . . , € you still in close touch with your professor? ce upon your politica} Where? When? wnile a Student? the science-politics l. EL Tatum Yale Univ 1946-7, 2 No 3 Casually 4 Moderately IN — © excepy he was a model of a temperate man -22- ROLE MODEL (B) 1. “hich of your own students are active politically? 2. Do you discuss politics or science politics with them? 3. Do you keep in close touch with your former students? . ‘4, Do you feel you influenced any of their political views or attitudes? mirror image of p. 27 2.. In keeping with times, much more than I did. 29 Havé you ever worked on weapons development? What defense related work have you been connected with? Is any of your research defense sponsored? Is any of your research government sponsored? Has the pattern changed over the last 5 years? What percentage of your time is spent advising the government? Au RP wWNHH ° 1. No 2, None very directly. 3 Yes: ARPA funds a computer-intelligence project that we would have trouble finding alternative support for, though NIH and NSF are beginning to come through. No trace of pplitical interference from DOD; the project has no short-term military utility. (May be an input to strategic command and control systems at some point). 4. All with rare exceptions (mostly NIH) 5. Some bits and pieces from USAF cut off. NASA support severly cut back. Plateauing Cand inflationary erogion) of NIH/NSF. 6 10. ~30~ a Prof. Joshua Lederbe NAME: oe . nda of Geneticg DATE OF INTERVIEW: MAY 1 1 197 1 hool of Medicing . Stasrt PLACE: . ‘ord University Stantord, California 94205 _LENGTE: US OF et OR(ANOWYMITY? WHAT OTHER PEOPLE SO YOU SUGGEST I INTERVIEW? MAY I USE YOUR NAME WHEN I CONTACT HIM?