BASIC PHILOSOPHY

This document describes in moderate detail a flight program for
exploring the less remote parts of the solar system during the period
1959 to 196h. Exeiting discoveries and the verification of important.
scientific speculations are possible. Indeed, some of them such as extra-
terrestrial life and the origin of the solar system are being anticipated
and they tend to orient the space exploration program.

These criteria, their interrelationghip, their conflicts, and
their order of importance form the basic pmilosopny of the report. Thess
oriteria arer

2) Phe techr. cal Seasroriies st pos tiie space worarer

2} ASSesaten’ of tie publi c’s reaction te trese Pli gots:

3) The scientific and tecnaicai memt.of these fllents.

Each eritertor ‘cer.aps “area of consideration" 1s a mere
appropriate name) contaiis meyial aiemente of uncertainty. It {s easier

tw evaluate the scientific merits of a specific space exploration than
it is to predict the extent of peblic reaction te its succesea or failure.
Yet public reaction is less difficult *o prejudge than the probability of
success of rocket vehicles. It is a matter of record that by the time an
original vehicle became reliable, a newer, more venturesome model was
pusning a greater frontier. There is nothing to indicate the pattern will
be different with rockets. But the major uncertainties arise in attempting
to analyse hypothetical sequences of events.

While the ultimate value of space exploratien depends upon the
iatrinsic merit of the scientific experisents it performs, their success in
tarn depends upen recketry knov-how and the public's willingness and ability
to finance ite implementation. ‘The willingness of a free and honestly
informed community to finance space science depends upon its collective
curiosity and ite pride, accompanied by a sense of urgency to satisfy then
bothe

Most scientific experiments succeed after many attempts have failed.
This is the accepted pattern in science. Space science does not enjey the
sane latitude because it is so expensive and because the public ‘takes

failures so personally. It is partially the public's self identificatien
with the space science program that makes tnem willing to finance it.
Therefore, the restrictions placed upon space science become all the

more fearsqme when a rival nation is not only successful, but appears te
have succeeded on ite first attempt. Long-range flight scheduling becomes
at the same time both essential and precarious. At any time it may be
necessary to drop the score and play by ear.

Congressional hearings which culminated in the Space Act of 1958
make it clear that the preservation of the national reputation and the
efficient pursuit ef space knowledge are two of the Acts primary goals.
International competition has sade the American public feel more keenly
aboot its reputation than about any other ef the Space Aot goals. This
social situation poses the question, "Is it possible for the space
laboratories te conduct an efficient research and development program with
the nation peering over their shoulders and periodically demanding spectacular
action?*

Pert of the space flight schedule is conceived with the preceding
question in mind. It is intended, that a logical, stable scientific prog rea

will be purmeed rapidly, but em a non<crash basis. Sone spectacular

au
 

 

“firetmess" flights are necessary in order that personnel working on the
basic actentifis pregran are not forever etverves inte the crash progress.
These problems are more pueweuly discussed in Chapters IV and V.

Any realistic program planning requires that the scheduling is
flexible. The synodic periods of Mars and Venus are not very helpful in
this comectien. Severthalees it 1s taken for granted that as experimental
date are acquired from early space flights, the plans for subsequent voyages
will have to be modified. 4 certain degree ef optinien is required.

For. example, if a too pessimistic attitude is assumed towards
the possibility of conteni nating celestial objects, spas exploration will
be indefinitely pestponed. ‘By the time this document was prepared, CETEX,

an international Committee on Contamination by Extreterrestrial Expleratien,

had mot wubaitted its “code af conduct" te COSPAR Inaswach as the enly

methed of enforcing a “code of conduct” is to rely upen the United Nations
a3 a sounding beard of public opinion, the code camot afferd to be toe
restrictive. Flight scheduling denands being optimistic, and assuming

that contamination problems will be worked out as the progren evolves.

ah
However, it is necassarr tc leave open tre possibility that planetary
impacts will have to be postponed antil after ali the near misses acd
satellite flights are completed, and the microbiologists have had an
opportunity to evaluate the observations.

The optimistic schedule does not include any nuclear explosions.
It does include plans for sterilization research. Chapter discusses:
the subject in more detail.

Estimates of the information transmission rates that will be
available in the next few yeare also reflect an optimistic outleok.
This is partially compensated by conservatism in estimating the weights
required for upper stage guidance and control and in the weights made
available for aclentific instruments. Even conservative estimates on the
Weights available for scientific instruments allow for the planning ef
some sophisticated experimentation.

In formalating the besic program for deep space expleration,
certain ground rules naturally evolved. One such subcriterion is that
the experimental apparatus required for observation be perfected as

repidly es are the Teckets needed to transport them. It is a corollary

- "5
to thie rule that the scientific instruments be more reliable than the
rockets. These rules are consistent with the Space Act objective of
“efficient and rapid pareuit of knowledge.*

The above ruled apply to the basic scientific program only.
Occasionally, high reliable vehicles will be employed to test equipment
for subsequent explorations. Nor do the rules necessarily apply te
desperation flights where a vehicle of questionable reliability is employed
and virtually any success is regarded as a moral victory.

Perhaps the primary technical project of the NASA is to put a
man into space. This was criginally regarded as a criterion in attempting
to formilate a basic exploration pregren. However, it was never in
theeretical conflict with the other criteria, primarily because virtually
every space exploration exportneat contributes somethigg to the man in space
program.

Tae National Academy of Sciences regards the man in space pregren
as an end in itself. ‘Until a scientist can be landed ca another planet

and returned te the earth, it is very improbable that his presence in space
will previde more definitive scientific information than the same

weight ef instruments returned to the earth. When the art of rocketry
allows man te travel from other planets and Wack, the man in space progres
will create new relationships between the three criteria mentioned at

the beglaning ef the chapter.

Richard Davies
Physics Section
2-20-59