STANFORD UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER
STANFORD, CALIFORNIA 94305 « (415) 321-1200

 

 

STANFORD UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE
Department of Genetics

poshua Lederberg

Mey 9, 1971

Dr. Henry Kissinger
White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger-

The Genocide Convention has evidently been reported out of the
Foreign elations Committee for ratification by the Senate. As far
as. I can tell, it hes the blessing, or at legst tacit approval, of
the Administration.

2, I reslize how difficult it is to evoid being mouse-trapped by a
convention against sin; but I urge you to ponder the practical diffi-
culties that may follow from ratification. I will do no more than
mention the general impact a non-enforceable "law" must have on the
general respect for law. Nor do I have in mind the verious kinds of
wer-crimes allegations that are already based on the Nuremberg and
Yamashite precedents. It can be argued that the Convention would not
materially alter the existing situation.

‘SO\y

I am concerned about the bearing of the Convention on the legal
basis for the policy of strategic deterrence. It seems indubiteble
that deterrence is based upon e plan to commit systematic genocide on
e large scale -- albeit only upon the gravest provocation, end of course
with the most deep-seated hipes that the plan would never be implemented.

>
Nevertheless, the Convention mskes no allowance for such an exception.
Needless to say, the invocation of the treaty after an act of strategic
retaliation would be a negligible concern. My anxiety is directed rather
to; .

a) The certainty of prolonged legal and judicial herassment of
security policies on the argument that deterrence is a formally illessl
plen end conspiracy. The courts might well hold that the ratification:.
is superseded by any loter law (e.g. Congressional suthorizations and 39-
propriations); but this would also put the U.S. in the posture of having
de-facto abrogated the treaty.

b) The concomitant political pressure to justify strategic wesvonr;
primarily in counter-force rather than deterrent (viz. counter-city) terms.
You will need no illuminstion from me about the implicstions of 5 maior
shift in this direction for stratecic stability and for the erms race. If
there is a technical solution to the ambieuity of preemptive versus counter-
force capability, it would be as foolish to keep it secret as to hide
a domesday machine.

Whether the netion should reopen e major debate on the moral and legal

LT. J. P. KENNEDY, JR. LABORATORIES FOR MOLECULAR MEDICINE, DEDICATED TO RESEARCH IN MENTAL RETARDATION
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY HEREDITY NEUROBIOLOGY DEVELOPMENTAL MEDICINE
premises of strategic deterrence might be questioned. However, the
worst auspices for such a debate would be ao defense of the military
budget and strategic plen after the Convention had been retified.

The issue cannot be reised without some concern for inviting
critical attack; but I believe it would be much more prudent to encourage
a formal reservation now,orcperhaps an explicit reference in the imple-
menting legislation, to exclude a "justifiable retalistion" from the
jurisdiction of the treaty. This will be difficult to achieve, and io

guide along constructive lines, without the leadership of the Administra-
tion. :

ours sincerely,

  

Joshue Lederberg
Professor of Genetics