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JOSHUA LEDERBERG May 7, 1991
UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR

Captain Larry Seaquist

Room 4E829

The Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140

Dear Larry:

Thank you very much for your January memo. I
found it very helpful; and in fact I hope it will be
possible for you to brief our task force if we can
just get it off the ground in July. Colonel Cutting
will be in touch with you about that. Understanding,
of course, that it was written in January and events
have unfolded since then, I have just a very few comments
to make.

I need to be a little bit circumspect for obvious
reasons on account of security.

On section 6, page 4, I think that Detrick could
fill in more detail on your assessments of BW impact
and diagnosis than appears in the report. Anthrax,
albeit with a little delay, should not be that hard
to diagnose if physicians are alert to it. It does
have a fairly short incubation period so that time
is of the essence.

Section 7: it would be a good idea to have some
explicit comparison of the 2x2 vs. 3x3 vaccination
regimes. Is anybody looking at level of antibody
responses in U.S. vs. British troops?

Yes, in our own private conversation we agreed
that we have to carefully reexamine the assumptions
about the half life of anthrax in the field.
Letter to Captain Larry Seaquist
May 7, 1991
~2-

Re: page 7. There is some inter-agency coordination
going on; especially with respect to civilian domestic
vulnerability. Are you in contact with Rick Yannuzzi
who works with Bromley and Scowcroft? He Might be
co-opted to the inter-agency group for the DASD. Rick
used to be at CIA. Perhaps also Larry Mefford, FBI,
another sector of the intelligence community.

Page 9. Please be careful about the labels; it
should always be ABW -- not BW; we have absolutely ab-
jured any offensive programs. I would concur (although
I need to learn more about it) that Detrick is probably
not as well coupled to military operations and policy
as it should be.

Going back again over your section list:

#2 the BDRP TF will revisit the threat agents.
Bacteria are the easiest to produce and so they cer-
tainly belong on the first generation list; but it
gets to be pretty open ended after that.

Section 6. Some time ago I did hear some pretty
comprehensive briefings on the horrendous problems of
medical response; I do think the Army has some more to
add to that.

Section 8. The Brits are pretty savvy and we ought
to work closely with them. :

Section 10. Proliferation is a very tough nut.

Section 11. I be glad to help out on any training
effort you mention there.

Longer term, Section 13, there is ongoing modifica-
tion of the treaty. The big problem is enforcement;
just what we do when we have a pretty sure idea that
somebody is violating it.

Section 14. I am not quite sure what you meant
about old vs. new genetic engineering.
Letter to Captain Larry Seaquist
May 7, 1991
-3-

I'll be glad to go over all this with you sometime
when we can be in a secure room together again. I
kept the copy you gave me, at the Pentagon in care of
Colonel Cutting.

  
  
 

sincerely,

hua Lederberg