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From : Joshua Lederberg

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Susect: Soviet Interpretations of Recombinant DNA ("U.S. Military 'R&D' through Soviet
Eyes" by Michael Milstein and Lev Semejko, Bull. Atomic Scientists 33:32-38, 1977).

I had not understood the fuss about "recombinant DNA" at the ccD, and
had taken for granted the substance of editor's note, (p.36) - until I had the
gpportunity to read this article.

But in fact, there is a loophole in the 1972 BW convention! Article I
refers to "Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins...."

A synthetic DNA might validly be claimed to be neither a "biological
agent" nor a toxin. Yet one could imagine the development of a synthetic DNA -
modelled upon but not identical to a virus - which could be used for hostile
purposes.

A similar Loophole applies to new synthetic polypeptide sequences that
might mimic natural toxins.

The problem arose, in part, from the introduction of the "toxins"
question after the main problems in drafting the treaty had been overtaken -
and no. orewas willing to risk reopening the text for "technicalities".

‘“"Recombinant DNA" has little to do with this story. But synthetic DNA -
a la Khorana ~ is right on the mark. And it is not covered by disclaimers at
the last session of CCD.

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If there is any possibility of any CW treaty, that may be the best place
to plug these loopholes. If not, a formal assertion that the U.S. regards
any use for hostile purposes of nucleic acids (whether biological, semi-
synthetic, or synthetic) to be forbodden within the spirit of the BW convention,
and asking other powers to do the same, would be a positive step (1) in answer
to the Milstein-Semejko perspective, and (2) to quiet a certain amount of

domestic paranoia. OT. ag

tat Ans Gaylene gecyernl
Wee {or mn,

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