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JOSHUA LEDERBERG August 10, 1989

PRESIDENT

Senator Herb Kohl

United States Senate
Committee on the Judiciary
Washington, D.C. 20510-6275

Dear Senator Kohl:

Thank you for inviting me to comment on Senate
Bill 993. I am sorry that I was out of the country
until just a few days ago but I will take this oppor-
tunity to make a few observations now.

I believe it would be very desirable to enact
legislation that would implement the BW convention.
I support that very strongly. There are neverthe-
less complications and difficulties in translating
treaty obligations, which apply among sovereign
states, to governing the acts of individuals. There
are also severe definitional problems that I know
will get your very careful attention. The term
"weapons of mass destruction" appears in the pre-
amble to the BW Convention but not in its text:
as it has not been well defined I do not think it
belongs in the legislation.

I have a radical suggestion to cover what we
are looking for with respect to sanctions on indi-
vidual behavior: Make it a federal crime for an
individual to release or threaten to release an
infectious biological agent with the intention of
assault: of doing harm to any individual or indi-
viduals, to assist others to do the same, or to
conspire to perpetrate such acts. Besides its
relationship to the BWC, such crimes are a matter
of federal interest because they go beyond other
forms of personal assault and homicide by endanger-
ing the community at large. While this may seem to
be at a different vector than your bél-~ S$.99793 I
believe that it would actually encompass all é6f the
Senator Herb Kohl
August 10, 1989
~2-

realistic cases that could be envisaged, including
individual homicide, terrorism, and military acts
in violation of the BWC. Terrorist acts coulda
after all be directed at individuals or small
numbers of individuals, not necessarily acts of
"mass destruction". There are many other loose
ends in the Convention but I urge you not to try
to address them in legislation: they are already
troublesome in international discussion, like the
definition of "toxins". These are better coordinated
with chemical weapons and their control.

As to the seizure and destruction of dangerous
material, that ought to be embraced under existing
law as (a) material evidence (b) environmental
safety and (c) interstate transport and export of
dangerous material.

Yours sincerely,

shua Lederberg