bw71 ‘ Fei Jam 22 15:53:25 1259 QO & 2 ib
bw71
Lecture notes February 17, 1971

Biological and chemical warfare offer the image of the most
frightening uses of modern technology. The combination of horror and
of technical mystery impels the strongest motives to eliminating them;
but it may also interfere with thinking through the practical measures
that may give us some hope of safeguarding outselves from becoming
victims of these weapons. Our efforts at arms control are also wisely
directed at the more general problem of war-prevention, of finding
non-violent means of solving problems of inter-state conflict. Nor
does history give much support to the easy and innocent approach of
unilateral disarmament, like the de facto policy of the U.S., Britain
and France in the 30’s as a way of preventing war.

The very extent to which biological and chemical weapons are lumped
together is an index of a refusal to analyze the specific problems
that they represent. In fact, they have little in common except that
they involve unfamiliar technologies to which, happily, we have not
become inured over the centuries as we have when we consider the
"conventional" weapons of mass destruction.

This lecture is the third of a series offered within the arms control
course. To complete a logical sequence, it will concentrate on BW.

But before I turn to that, a more general analysis of our motives and
techniques of effective arms control for both C and BW is appropriate.

The historical setting sees us at a point when the Geneva protocol of
1925 has been resubmitted by the President for ratification by the
Senate, this having been repudiated at many earlier occasions. The
protocol has been cited as if it were a moral commandment against the
use of chemical and biological weapons, in distinction, one would
suppose, to the license to kill by other means available to sovereign
states. In fact, the Geneva Protocol has the legal form of a
multilateral contract, a form reinforced by the reservations attached
by France, and implicitly or explicitly by every other signatory to
it. According to its terms, the parties promise not to make first use
of a forbidden weapon. By implication, the treaty is also a threat of
retaliation with C or BW in response to a violation of that promise.
The protocol thus tends to encourage, and by no means to forbid the
production, development, stockpiling, or proliferation of these
weapons. Indeed an effective C or BW capability for retaliation is
the only indicated measure for enforcing its terms.

Nevertheless, the Geneva protocol has also acquired a certain stature
as a moral prohibition, and as weak as it is, it can be opposed only
at the peril of seeming to be in favor of the further use of these
weapons. It also serves as a rallying point for domestic oposition to
military investment in ¢€ or BW capabilities whose tactical utilization
would be impaired by the structures of the protocol.

The emotional pressures of public opinion aside, the value of CBW arms
control can be summarized by the overview that world peace would be
better served if no nation had these weapons than if all did. The
introduction of new technologies into warfare inspires new fears and
anxieties, and a diversion of resources badly needed for other human
purposes. It may also change the balance of power, or inspire new
ambitions therefore, in ways that are also likely to decrease the
Stability of the world system. Even if new weaponry did not
inevitably spread to all contenders, our own technological advances
may be dangerous. Too often, our self-perceived military capability
has not been matched by the political wisdom to use it in our own
best interests. There can be little doubt that much of the public
Outcry for CBW control is intended to narrow the military policy
Fow71 Fri Jan 22 15:55:25 1999 2

options of our own government, in despair at accomplishing this
through more straightforward political decisions. This is best
illustrated by the controversy over the definiticn of CW ~- should the
language of the Geneva protocol be read to forbid such chemical as
tear gas and herbicides? Such issues do raise significant questions
about America’s role in peripheral conflicts, questions that should be
pursued with vigor though I doubt that the Simplications of either the
hawks or the radical left can be trusted. I am concerned whether we
will be able to pursue other important arms control challenges, like
those of lethal gasses or of BW so long as we are embroiled in these
conflicts.

Both C and BW can be, and have been idealized ina way that might
make us hesitate about the insistence on banning them so peremptorily.
Non-lethal weapons, like tear gas, undoubtedly make it easier for the
police to maintain public order. But there is a tendency to use any
weapon to the limit of its legitimacy: we would not Say that the
rubber hose softened the confrontation of police and suspects.
Similarly, we could imagine that enforceable and enforced doctrine
that human life was to be valued much more highly than we have seen it
in recent years. Otherwise, sophisticated weapons are simply
multiplied with the old ones -- and, as in Vietnam, tear gas is used
to drive troops into the range of firepower -- a very different use
than the first justification of dealing with mixed collections of
insurgents and civilians.

The continued use of such weapons , in the absence of a global
understanding of the limits of a "chemical weapon" President

Nixon’s decision to resubmit the Geneva protocol was accompanied by

a unilateral renunciation of any use, first, second, or otherwise, of
BW. This also implied that U.S. stockpiles of BW agents would be
destroyed, and that facilities for their development and production
would also be terminated. After the question of toxins was raised, he
later announced that these would be regarded in the same light as BW.
The president reserved, however, the U.S. biological research efforts
in the field of immunization and BW defense, which would,in any case,
be difficult to distinguish from peaceful research on defenses against
disease of natural origin. With respect to CW, the President committed
the US gainst the first use of any lethal or incapacitating chemical
weapon, indicating his interpretation of the Geneva protocol in
anticipation of ratification and formal adherence to it. FInally, he
indicated his support for new efforts at international control, in
particular a British proposal for the universal condemnation of
biological weapons, and continued study and negotiation on further
measures on CW.

The remaining ambiguities about tear gas and herbicides raise a number
of dilemmas. To accept these agents as illegal within the meaning of
the Protocol would be an exercise in self-condemnation on the part of
the administration. Furthermore, other nations may or may not take a
similar view in future. The danger of conflicting perceptions on such
an issue is all too clear. On the other hand, many people and many
countries hold that these agents are forbidden; their continued use,
especially if sustained after ratification of the protocol will arouse
unremitting charges of bad faith. This expectation also impairs

the progress of the protocol through the Senate.

The best course, in my view, would be for the President to impose

a voluntary moratorium on American military use of tear gas and
herbicides on the grounds that their legal status is questioned, and
that we are winding up our involvement in Southeast Asia in any event.
He could also ask for the negotiation of a specific, well-drafted
agreement that spelled out the international understanding on these
agents and would supersede the ambiguous language of the Geneva
protocol in this sphere. This procedure would minimize the risk that
a1 Fri dan 22 15:55:25 1999

"che whole framework of C & BW arms contre] might be shaken by an
incident of "domestic" use of tear gas that might be alleged to be a
military use, for example in response to 4 war of national liberation
like a convict outbreak.

Weapons that have pervasive civilian uses also complicate the problem
of negotiating controls on weapons capability, and the technological
competition to which this relates -- keeping in mind the paradoxical
effects of the NO FIRST USE doctrine of the Geneva protocol.

It would be understandable were the laymen to react, do away with all
of it; unfortunately, most of the steps we are free to take merely
worsen the situation. Other powers are quite ready to exploit any
technological vacuum we may, in exasperation, leave. On the other
hand, when we become too interested in military innovations, we also
attract competing interest as a reaction to our own.