AUG & 1969

We have experienced many examples of minor release of toxic
materials into the atmosphere, despite the most careful precautions,
in nuc}fear test experiments. The SkulI Valley incident was a clear
warning about similar aceidenta in field tests of chemical warfare
agents. It showed how the security blanket prevents sxe critical
feretheught about unexpected hazards to the publie; it else illus-
trated how far a security~bound activity must go in covering up its
mistakes after they kage happen, again aeegee the full use of
informed professional judgment in protecting the public.

when we consider biological warfere agents, we must remember that

. : sas: agents .
no release is a minor one» The charactestitic of these wee is

uhknowingly

that they propagate, so that a single particle kmmtwad inhsled by a
sibgle person, hundreds of miles from the point of release could start
a devastating epidemic, whose original source might never be provable.
Fee R oe cos agents can also infect wild animals, with a long chain of
infection in them and in their parasites, before man is involved. Ag
dormant spores, these agents can persist for years, perhaps even cen-
turies, before being unwittingly revived and infecting man. Every open

field test of a human pathogen is a global experiment; those who would

conduct such experiments must answer to mankind/ for the consequences.

Joshua Lederberg