To: Andy Marshall
DIRECTOR, Net Assessment
re High Precision Strike Weapons
[stamped, Dr. Joshua Lederberg
Suite 115
1230 York Avenue
New York, NY 10021-6399]
[stamped, OCT 25 1993]
Bill Perry has already written the book: his paper in foreign affairs.
Some opn'l implications:
Do we need (so few!) huge carriers? Smart (and standoff) weapons can do their job with much smaller payloads, fewer sorties. We don't have enough carriers to go around. Shouldn't we hav[letters cut off in original] (more) smaller units? Perhaps less elaborately defended.
Reciprocally, our high value targets are put at risk. Moving personnel in ships may be too dangerous. Even with smarter weapons, they're a minor part of the logistic load.
There is also a revolution in a) affordability and b) the level [?] and character of the manifest threats. (and hence the price in treasu[letters cut off in original] and blood that our electorate will be willing to support).
If there's to be an organization to help think this through, I'd suggest an analogue to the CNO's executive, primarily some smart O-6's and a civilian advisory panel; perhaps some outside contracting, but attached to the Chairman of the JCS. The DSB is still too close to existing industry [ . . . ]s and too far from active uniforms to be the
10/25/93 MJ
[written in left margin, DoD xt Marshall]
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best suited. DSB could take on some special sub-stud[letters cut off in original].
The proliferation of access and use of WMD's will certainly complicate the environment. BW will be the poorer countrie[letters cut off in original] revenge for HPSW's. Some analysis about what has deterred or deferred their use in the past is certainly worthwhile. More broadly: what is the role of deterrence in the future; how build the international consensus to make deterrence still more effective. I am not overburdened with optimism or good ideas in this realm.
I don't need to add anything to "information war". But not enough is said about deception and counter-deception. That includes provoking attacks on "innocent" facilities. Many examples in Iraq.
I've been party to many studies of "technological surpris[letters cut off in original] That always hangs over our heads; but all concerned th[letters cut off in original] novel operational use of existing technology was a more likely source of surprise than new physics. The latter can happen but there probably would be substantial lags before military application.
Yours,
Joshua.