THE RAN D CORPORATION

February 22, 1988

Dr. Joshua Lederberg
President

The Rockefeller University
1230 York Avenue

New York, NY 10021

Dear Dr. Lederberg:

I found your letter of February 12 concerning my RAND Report, "The
Strategic Nuclear Debate" both interesting and quite useful.

In replying, first let me comment on your initial botherment about
slotting of individuals into schools of thought. This has been a
problem both with the Reports in this series and with my earlier book,
"The Arms Debate". My defense is that I have specified that the range
of views is a spectrum and the cutting into schools is necessarily
arbitrary. Except perhaps for those like Albert who have actually
generated the ideas I have used to define the schools, I would expect
individuals to draw from more than one. You state that p.85 comes close
to your view; since p.85 is a statement of my own views, perhaps we can
join one another in being eclectic.

Coincidentally, your letter came just as I was completing the draft of
the enclosed chapter, which discusses "Discriminate Deterrence". To
place the chapter in context, it is the penultimate summary of my new
book, "Still the Arms Debate", succeeding the NATO portion which in turn
follows the strategic nuclear piece you have commented on. (The final
chapter discusses policy as such, rather than the debate.) I would
recommend taking seriously the first sentence, and skipping to p.14
which starts the discussion of DD, particularly since I have not yet put
some important charts into the draft. To provide some jargon
definitions you will need, however, the "Active Middle" is the name I
give to the school that crosses all segments of the arms debate (the
Third World, strategic nuclear, and NATO), favoring an active American
policy of maneuver and optimization (e.g., continued use of Contra
pressure in Nicaragua as well as controlled deterrence.) The "Reactive
Middle" is dubious about our ability to optimize and fears the attempt
(let Arias solve Nicaragua, existential deterrence.) The
"Disengagers/Disarmers" want to get away from worldwide nuclear and
other commitments.

You will note, incidentally, that toward the end of the first paragraph
on p.15, I did in fact treat your own views as being eclectic. If you
think my statement is inaccurate, it can, of course, be changed. My
selfish reason for sending you the chapter is to get other comments
while I can still take account of them.

23+ 393-04)

   
 

1?OO Mair Street, PO B

santa Monica, CA 9C
THE RAN D CORPORATION

Dr. Joshua Lederberg -2- February 22, 1988

In any case, I will let the several pages stand on their own; I can
summarize them by saying that in my view, DD does take a clear (and
well-reasoned) stand on some controversial issues in the debate. My
views, in partial disagreement, will be in my final chapter.

On the specific points in your letter, however:

o Albert has ALWAYS stressed non-nuclear options; for the last
twenty years, he has specifically stressed high-tech
conventional alternatives. Since the quote from him on p.21
which you liked, makes clear that he surely considers anything
nuclear as a last resort, there is nothing inconsistent about
this. Nonetheless, his last resort, in contrast to Bundy and
McNamara's, does end up with controlled nuclear options, and
my reading is that this is also the stand of DD, as in the
portions I quote in the enclosed chapter.

o The fact that "DD is relatively silent on arms control" is
in itself indicative of a viewpoint. A parallel Bundy/
McNamara/Halperin document would have centered on arms
control. I was going to say something like this in my
description of DD, but decided not to because arms control IS
mentioned and it's tough to cite that sort of negative. If
you would give me permission, however, I should like to use
the above-quoted sentence from your letter in this chapter.

o I do agree with your final paragraph on "MAD versus defense
spending." Not inconsistent with this, I think the next
decade of debate is going to focus on the question of how
radically the Soviet Union is really changing, and how this
should affect our policies. I also agree with DD, however —-
and I think this is one of its major values -- that in the
next century the questions themselves may be quite different.

Thank you for your letter. In addition to any further comments you
have, I'd like very much to visit you and talk further one of the next
times I come East, or perhaps when you come West. RAND would be
delighted to pull together a discussion group should you be interested
in presenting a few informal remarks.

Si
c

bert A. Levine
Director
National Security Strategies Program
Project Air Force