December 15, 1965

Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner

Dean, School of Science

Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

Dear Jerry:

I appreciate your taking the trouble to educate me about the ABM problem.
Your views are very persuasive, particular}y about the risks of built-in
escalation from a tactical to a foolhardy attempt at strategic defense.
Comments like the enclosed editorial are convincing support for your caution.

The key is plainly the fallout shelters. I am worried that they might indeed
be adopted in the effort to bolster the ABM system. In the context of the
nuclear stalemate they are a critical aggressive weapon, since their absence
represents a self-inspecting concession to mutual deterrence. For the ABM to
have a sub-strategic utility we would have to ask

(1) Technically, can a system without fallout shelters be put together that
adds any useful security against tactical or accidental attacks;

(2) Politically, can such a system be stabilized at this level as a matter
of domestic policy, and would the U.S. and U.S.S.R. be able to persuade
one another of these intentions.

BS yagqean

I agree with you about these difficulties.

But the mere technical possibility of ABM will mean irresistible pressure for
its adoption in the absence of a political settlement. A three-year moratorium
on deployment may be all one could hope for; without the budgetary pressure of
Viet Nem, would Johnson be able to put it off at all?

Can you communicate such subtleties to the Russians? Or are they not the real
target of your committee's arguments.

If you could let me have a copy of your committee's report, it would be as
much a@ courtesy and may save you some bother in answering rhetorical questions.

Sincerely yours,

Joshua Lederberg
Professor of Genetics